68 Special Report SPECIAL REPORT

April 2011 — Issue 39

Dr Sam Bateman retired from the Royal Australian Navy as a Commodore and Important disclaimer is now a Professorial Research Fellow at This publication is designed to provide the Australian National Centre for Ocean accurate and authoritative information Resources and Security at the University of in relation to the subject matter covered. Wollongong, and a Senior Fellow and Adviser It is provided with the understanding that to the Maritime Security Programme at the the publisher is not engaged in rendering S Rajaratnam School of International Studies any form of professional or other advice A reliable partner or services. No person should rely on at the Nanyang Technological University in the contents of this publication without Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations Singapore. He has written extensively on first obtaining advice from a qualified defence and maritime issues in Australia, professional person. the Asia–Pacific and Indian Ocean. He has Executive Director’s introduction co-authored the reports Our western front: About Special Reports Australia and the Indian Ocean (2010) and Generally written by ASPI experts, Timor‑Leste is a fledging nation wrestling with the challenge of forging a viable state. It’s entering a Sea change: Advancing Australia’s ocean Special Reports are intended to deepen interests (2009) for ASPI and the RSIS Policy understanding on critical questions very complex period in the lead‑up to the 2012 elections. The country’s leaders inherited a difficult facing key strategic decision-makers Paper Good order at sea in Southeast Asia. situation, reconstructing a devastated country and healing deep-seated community divisions. The and, where appropriate, provide policy economic and social challenges facing Timor‑Leste are daunting, although the exploitation of oil He is a nominated member of the expert recommendations. In some instances, and eminent person’s group established material of a more technical nature may and gas revenues offers a potential lifeline. by the ASEAN Regional Forum to advise on appear in this series, where it adds to the This report sets out a number of the challenges for the country, such as possible domestic unrest, regional security issues, and a member of the understanding of the issue at hand. Special international editorial board for the Journal of Reports reflect the personal views of the transnational crime, food security, land reform, law and justice issues, security sector reform and author(s), and do not in any way express the Indian Ocean Region. maritime development. The situation is made more complex by the large number of donor states or reflect the views of the Australian and the need for Timor‑Leste to coordinate their assistance. Dr Anthony Bergin is Director of Research Government or represent the formal position of ASPI on any particular issue. Programs at ASPI. His training is in law, While the challenges facing Timor‑Leste are significant, the country has defied the odds before and political science and international relations. ASPI prevailed. With targeted and sustained international support, it has every chance of doing so again. Tel +61 2 6270 5100 His doctoral dissertation was on Australian Fax + 61 2 6273 9566 Australia wishes to have an equal relationship with Timor‑Leste, working together to advance our law of the sea policy. For twenty-five years Email [email protected] common interests. This year is the tenth anniversary of Australia’s Defence Cooperation Program he taught on the political and legal aspects Web www.aspi.org.au with the country, one of our largest cooperation programs. The DCP will underpin Australia’s long of marine affairs first at the Royal Australian © The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Naval College and then University of New Limited 2011 term defence relationship with Timor-Leste. South Wales at the Australian Defence This publication is subject to copyright. Australia has around 400 ADF members deployed as part of the International Stabilisation Force Force Academy. For several years he taught Except as permitted under the Copyright Act (ISF) that has a clear drawdown process. Timor-Leste’s Government has expressed a wish for the ISF a graduate course in international law as 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any to eventually leave as a matter of national sovereignty. an Adjunct Reader in Law at the Australian means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, National University. He has held visiting photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or A central message of this report is that Australia stands ready to assist Timor‑Leste as a reliable academic appointments at the Department transmitted without prior written permission. partner, not just to ensure the state’s own survival but also to strengthen regional security. of Maritime Studies, University of Wales Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. and the Center for Marine Policy, University I’m grateful to all the contributors to this volume, and in particular to our Timorese contributor of Delaware. He has served on the editorial Dionísio Babo-Soares, former co‑chairman of the Commission of Truth and Friendship between boards of two leading international ocean Timor‑Leste and Indonesia. I also acknowledge the work of ASPI’s Director of Research Programs, law and policy journals and for many years Anthony Bergin, in preparing this special report for publication. edited the journal Maritime Studies. Dr Bergin has been a consultant on maritime issues to a I’m confident that this report will make an important contribution to public debate on Australia’s wide range of public and private sector clients role in assisting Timor‑Leste to meet its long‑term security and development challenges. and has published extensively on the political, Peter Abigail security and legal aspects of marine policy. Executive Director 2 Special Report A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 67

Contributors adviser to the Vice Prime Minister for Social Affairs to Timor-Leste. Professor Damien Kingsbury holds a Personal Chair in the School of International and Dr Vandra Harris is a Senior Lecturer in Political Studies at Deakin University. He has the graduate program in International published widely on politics and security Development at RMIT University’s School of issues in Southeast Asia, amongst which Global Studies. Prior to entering academia are two edited books and an authored book Vandra worked in community development in on Timor-Leste, East Timor: The Price of Australia and with an INGO. As an academic, Liberty. A third edited book on Timor-Leste she has lectured in a range of topics with post-independence politics is now in press. an international focus, and has worked Damien first visited what was then referred as a research fellow on two Australian to as Timor Lorosae in 1995 to undertake Research Council projects at Flinders PhD research for his thesis on the role of the University Law School, and at the Nordic news media in Australia–Indonesia bilateral Institute for Asian Studies in Copenhagen, relations. Damien returned to Timor-Leste Denmark. Vandra’s publications are primarily to lead more than forty Australian ballot focused on partnerships and cultural observers in 1999, basing himself at Maliana change in international development, and and spending most of the ballot day in Balibo. on Australia’s international policing in the He also coordinated Australian observers Asia–Pacific region. Her main research focus for the 2007 presidential and parliamentary is the intersection of these two research elections. Damien is a board member of the interests, in the nexus between security Balibo House Trust and is a regular media and development. Her most recent book commentator on Timor-Leste political and is Conflict, security and nation-building in security issues for both the Australian and Timor-Leste: Cross-sectoral perspectives, international media. edited with Andrew Goldsmith (Routledge, forthcoming 2011). Dr Dionísio Babo-Soares holds a PhD in Anthropology from the ANU, Masters Professor James J Fox is currently a Professor Degree from Massey University Palmeston (Emeritus) at Australian National University. North, NZ and Degree in Constitutional Law He served as the Director of the Research from Udayana University in Bali, Indonesia. School of Pacific and Asian Studies from Dr Babo-Soares is currently a professor at the August 1998 until the end of February 2006. Faculty of Law and Social Sciences with the He has carried out research on Timor since Universidade da Paz and at the Facullty of 1965. He was an international observer with Social and Political Sciences the University of the Carter Center for the Popular Consultation Timor-Leste (UNTL). Together with Professor (1999), the Constituent Assembly elections Jim Fox, he is co-author of, Out of the Ashes: (2001), and the Presidential Elections (2002 East Timor: Destruction and Reconstruction and 2004); he was a member of UN/World (Adelaide, 2000) and Constitutional Writing Bank Joint Assessment Mission (1999) and the and Elections in East Timor (ANU, 2003). He is King’s College Independent Study Group on also the author of several chapters in books Security (2002) and served as a consultant to published in Indonesia, Australia, Portugal and ACIAR/AusAID on the design mission for Seeds Timor-Leste. Between 2005 and 2008 he was of Life 2 (2004). With Dionisio Babo‑Soares, the co-chairman of the Commission of Truth he has published Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Friendship between Timor-Leste and and Reconstruction of East Timor and Indonesia. He was a member of the Council with Helder da Costa, Colin Piggin and of Defense and Security between 2003 and Cesar J da Cruz: Agriculture: New Directions for 2005 and is currently the Vice-President of the a New Nation, East Timor (Timor-Leste). Superior Council of the Judiciary. He is a legal A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 3

Contents

Executivesummary 4

1 The ADF and Timor-Leste: looking towards 2020 11 Damien Kingsbury

2 The future of Timor-Leste’s foreign policy 21 Dionísio Babo-Soares

3 Socioeconomic challenges: the gap between expectations 30 and achievements and Vandra Harris

4 Timor-Leste: potential for a prosperous agricultural future 38 James J Fox

5 The maritime interests of Timor-Leste 44 Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin

Appendix: Defence Cooperation Program 65

Acronyms and abbreviations 66

Contributors67 4 Special Report

Executive summary growing young population continue to place pressure on a limited employment market. 1 The ADF and Timor‑Leste: looking Mismanagement of the state oil fund could towards 2020 lead to the misallocation of resources, including heightened opportunities for corruption, an Australia has maintained a long, often artificial boom economy causing inflationary indifferent, and occasionally troubled pressure, a lack of sustainable investment, and relationship with the territory that is now political discord. There are also concerns that the independent Democratic Republic of the lack of a common national language and Timor‑Leste. Yet, despite some antagonism the ‘dollarisation’ of the Timor-Leste economy towards Australia, effectively all Timorese will inhibit the country from developing non-oil political leaders currently support a positive types of industry and employment. relationship with Australia, not least in helping to ensure the state’s long-term security. To that In terms of security, the Falintil–Timor-Leste end, Australia needs to decide upon the future Defence Force (Falintil–Forças de Defesa of its defence commitment to Timor-Leste, de Timor‑Leste, or F‑FDTL) will continue to which has been critical on two separate require mentoring and training over the period occasions, and a blueprint of action for the to 2020, not least to ensure that it remains period out to 2020. focused on external defence activities and not political and policing activities. The national The period between 2010 and 2020 will see police force (Policia Nacional de Timor‑Leste, a transition in the political leadership of or PNTL) is also in need of development Timor‑Leste, from the generation that cut its and retraining. For Australia, the increasing teeth in the initial struggle for independence assertiveness and almost certain expansion circa 1975 to a generation that was educated of China’s ‘soft power’ approach towards during the period of Indonesian occupation. Timor-Leste will challenge Canberra’s political Transitioning from a charismatic leadership influence. For a variety of reasons, Australia model to a more rational–legal model has a special interest in the degree and type of of state coherence and administration interest shown in Timor-Leste by large, growing should bring a variety of advantages to the and not necessarily benign powers. country. The consolidation of democracy in Timor-Leste should complement this Australia’s best chance of preserving a development through elections scheduled meaningful political presence in Timor-Leste for 2012 and 2017. Moreover, if managed is through the creation, maintenance and distributed appropriately, the country’s and enhancement of stability and resource-dependent economic growth will self‑determination. To that end, maintaining lead to improvements in living standards and a constructive commitment to Timor-Leste’s internal stability, as will the standardisation security and, by extension, Australia’s own of rule-of-law mechanisms and proposed security, will remain a necessary element in political decentralisation. the role of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). A relatively small continuing ADF presence However, a number of the destabilising factors as part of the Defence Cooperation Program that led to the near collapse of the Timorese should have a cautionary capacity, helping state in 2006 still pose problems. Widespread to prevent further crises and, failing that, poverty, high levels of illiteracy and a rapidly orchestrating a rapid and efficient response. A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 5

Recommendations lie. In this regard, Australia’s continuing close alliance with and support from the 1. Rather than drawdown entirely after the US is valuable. 2012 elections, the ADF should maintain, 8. The relationship between Australia’s subject to Timor-Leste agreement, a security sector and AusAID should be proportionately appropriate military strengthened to ensure a more complete group, to assist with F-FDTL training. and nuanced approach to fulfilling the 2. ADF personnel deployed to potentially civil needs of people in receipt of assistance. conflict zones should receive training in aspects of pro-active civil policing, given 2 The future of Timor‑Leste’s the confluence of their training and civil foreign policy roles in civil environments. To date, there hasn’t been any public blueprint 3. In addition to being highly trained in that outlines the framework of foreign policy transferring appropriate skills to the for Timor‑Leste. The foreign policy approach F-FDTL, ADF personnel should continue to adopted by Timor‑Leste has been guided by develop their linguistic, cultural nation-building priorities: to respond to an and/or anthropological skills and a emergency and humanitarian situation, to stronger grounding in the history and phase out the United Nations Transitional politics of Timor-Leste. Administration, to plant the seeds of a successful state based on the rule of law and to 4. When not on duty in their training role, resist outside pressures that may compromise ADF personnel should not be identifiable the country’s newly won independence. by uniform and in particular should not carry weapons in public, which elicits Nurturing Timor‑Leste’s independence, negative responses among many Timorese politically and economically, is central to its when the threat-environment is low. foreign policy objectives. This dictates the country’s search for cooperation and mutual 5. Apart from technical skills, a more widely benefit with other countries. It’s in the interest distributed intelligence function could of Timor‑Leste to establish and maintain the impart skills to F-FDTL counterparts while best possible relations with all governments, at the same time providing on-the-ground regardless of size, ideology and geography. information to allow the recognition of potential threats before and as they arise. Timor‑Leste has developed a modest foreign policy approach and intends to maintain that 6. Greater training and articulation is needed approach to benefit its people and state. Its between Australian Federal Police (AFP) core national interest is to ensure success in Operational Response Group officers building a liberal democratic state founded and the ADF in civilian environments upon the rule of law. to enhance the capacities of both organisations to respond efficiently to It shouldn’t be assumed that Timor‑Leste’s critical situations. acceptance of Chinese aid necessarily has significant implications for the future direction 7. Australia shouldn’t directly compete with of its foreign policy. It certainly doesn’t mean China for Timor-Leste’s affections. Instead, that Timor‑Leste is leaving its traditional allies. the Timorese may need to be reminded, The country continues to see Australia as a in more beguiling ways, of where Timor- strategic partner. Leste’s true and most reliable friendships 6 Special Report

Timor‑Leste needs the know‑how of the 11. Bilateral relations between Timor‑Leste ADF to enhance the development of the and Australia should be pursued F‑FDTL. Working with the US in the security vigorously with a long‑term strategic and defence realms in our region is also very perspective. The accession of Timor‑Leste important. Timor‑Leste maintains special to ASEAN should benefit Australia in relations with Indonesia and Australia, with terms of regional security and stability. which it shares land and sea boundaries in the case of Indonesia, and a sea boundary in 12. Timor‑Leste will always work towards the case of Australia. Relations with Australia making good relations with Indonesia a continue to be good, despite tension over the high priority, given the shared strategic exploitation of oil and gas in the Timor Sea. interests between the two countries.

While border-crossing incidents occur from time to time, both Timor‑Leste and Indonesia 3 Socioeconomic challenges: have been able to forge strong bilateral the gap between expectations relations. Relations with Indonesia have and achievements been very good despite the traumatic past. As one of the poorest countries in the world, Indonesia is by far the largest trading partner Timor‑Leste faces an uphill battle if it’s to of Timor‑Leste, and trade is increasing. meet the high—but not unreasonable— Now that Indonesia has taken over the expectations of its people. Now entering its chairmanship of the Association of Southeast second decade of independence, the country Asian Nations (ASEAN), Timor‑Leste looks set to has shown extremely slow improvement accede to full ASEAN membership this year. across a range of development measures. Accommodating the needs of a rapidly growing Timor‑Leste has benefited and continues to population will only add to that challenge. This benefit from foreign aid. The challenge for the situation stands in stark contrast to the hopes country and its development partners is how of Timorese citizens, and must be carefully to keep aid flows sustainable, maintaining managed to ensure security, stability and existing jobs and creating new ones to meet development in the future. emerging needs. Emergent socioeconomic inequalities—both Recommendations real and perceived—must be carefully managed as the nation develops. Growing 9. Australia is the source of know‑how gaps in wealth and opportunity characterise and technological advancement that even the best-performing developing Timor‑Leste needs for its long‑term nations, constituting a major challenge for national development and sustainability, policymakers in Dili. In addressing the country’s not least defence and security. significant infrastructure and service needs, Timor‑Leste will continue to emphasise the Timorese Government must be sensitive this in its foreign policy approach, to the potential for increasing such gaps, particularly through defence and security or perceptions of favouritism or neglect. cooperation with Canberra. The growing population in the capital and 10. Timor‑Leste needs a better understanding the difficulty of accessing regional areas of the foreign policy priorities of will exacerbate this situation, and will also Australia, particularly in the areas of contribute to declining conditions in Dili. trade, defence and security. A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 7

The capacity of Timorese citizens to participate these factors will support progress in the areas in their country’s development must be outlined above. enhanced through more relevant skills development programs to complement other Recommendations strategies designed to attract further foreign investment. Development programs must have 13. Develop an apprenticeship-style a stronger commitment to building the skills program that employs local labour on of citizens through their active engagement. internationally funded programs, placing This may require additional support to equal emphasis on skills development and contractors to ensure that they have the skills infrastructure outcomes. This must include and understanding necessary to foster such a commitment to developing contractor engagement, as well as understanding that skills in training and capacity building in projects will take longer to allow for genuine developing countries. training opportunities. 14. Continue to utilise Australia’s development Police and legal structures need to be scholarship program to skill Timorese supported and consolidated. The nation’s citizens as engineers and project police force (the PNTL) has been trained under managers, including by providing strong the confusing and internally contradictory support for Timorese students in Australia. guidance of the United Nations Police (UNPOL) 15. Continue to develop the skills of the deployment. The PNTL also faces a significant AFP’s International Deployment challenge in securing the support of both Group officers to transform individual citizens and the military (the F‑FDTL). As it officers trained to police Australian completes the transition to autonomy from communities into participatory educators, UNPOL, the PNTL needs creative and flexible both in Timor‑Leste and in other support that demonstrates respect for its deployment zones. capacity and its aspirations. 16. Consolidate relationships between the AFP This must be backed up by a legal system that and an increasingly independent PNTL, can be understood by Timor‑Leste’s citizens and building on a foundation of strong and can effectively reach those outside the capital. respectful relationships between the police This will require continued development of leaders of each country, and with a focus a system that incorporates both the rule of on listening to Timor‑Leste’s evolving goals law and traditional legal systems, and the and needs and developing appropriate development of resources, including laws, ways to meet them. prisons and accountability mechanisms. The emerging culture of impunity must be 17. Foster and accelerate the evolution of redressed through strengthened accountability, the Timorese legal system in a manner anticorruption and justice mechanisms. that embraces positive aspects of both traditional and formal legal systems, Addressing these issues will be crucial for to ensure that the legal system is more Timor‑Leste in order to achieve greater political accessible to ordinary citizens and that and economic independence. To increase impunity does not become accepted the likelihood of that occurring, Australia as unavoidable. must negotiate the competing Timorese desires for ongoing support as well as greater 18. Continue to focus on support for strong autonomy and control. Careful attention to accountability and anticorruption mechanisms and bodies, demonstrating 8 Special Report

that every citizen will be held accountable would involve the development of new skills for his or her actions by impartial bodies and the use of new technologies. At the heart with the ability to enact legal responses. of this transformation would be the use of a comprehensive set of spatial databases at 4 Timor‑Leste: potential for a the national level combined with reliable crop prosperous agricultural future assessment (‘ground-truthing’) at the district level, and coordination and communication Despite the ravages and disruptions of foreign between levels. Training in local crop occupation, warfare and forced migration, assessment and the creation of various Timor‑Leste’s population has doubled since assessment sites throughout the country to 1980 and is expected to double again in less monitor local mixed field production would than thirty years. If the country is to achieve be essential to these efforts. Monitoring local sustainable economic development and rainfall is also critically important for cropping minimise its dependence on food imports, the advice to farmers and for the establishment of local agricultural industry will need to cater for an early warning system for food security. a progressively larger and more urban society. The Timorese Government has rightfully Australia is particularly well positioned to assist identified food security as a key priority in its Timor‑Leste in its strategic development goals Strategic Development Plan (2011–2030). for agriculture. It has considerable expertise in dryland farming and conducts world-leading The agronomic complexities of agriculture research into semitropical agriculture and in Timor‑Leste—the disruptions that have livestock management. In the past decade, occurred to agricultural production capacities Australia has provided ‘improved inputs’ since 1999, import policies for food security, to agriculture that are essential for future problems of land tenure, issues of resettlement productivity, and it has the capacity to build and the need to introduce new technologies— on its experience in Timor and neighbouring all require the formulation of a comprehensive areas of Southeast Asia to cooperate with strategy for the development of agriculture. Timor‑Leste in enhancing its agricultural sector. For more than a decade now, there’s been no systematic and, as a consequence, no Recommendations reliable gathering of data on Timor‑Leste’s agricultural production. This has wide-ranging 19. Australia, through AusAID, should assist implications for national planning. For Timor‑Leste in developing an Agricultural example, the required level of rice imports Data and Planning Unit based on the use can’t be determined with any accuracy if of GIS technology. levels of local production remain uncertain 20. As part of its efforts to create an or unknown. If Timor‑Leste is to meet its food Agricultural Data and Planning Unit, security needs, it’s therefore essential that the Australia should assist Timor‑Leste Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) in the restoration and development has the capacity to measure, with reasonable of a functioning network of local confidence, national agricultural production. meteorological stations.

The opportunity exists to begin afresh with 21. Australia, through the combined efforts a new system of data collection—one that of the Australian Centre for International would be more efficient, more accurate and Agricultural Research (ACIAR) and more relevant to Timor‑Leste’s needs. This AusAID, should assist Timor‑Leste in a A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 9

comprehensive program of forage crop by conflicting advice. That advice is usually development, pasture improvement and offered at the level of individual agencies; a weed eradication. whole‑of-government approach to managing national maritime interests and interagency 5 The maritime interests of coordination is not apparent. Timor‑Leste Australia has extensive security and resource Maritime issues offer fertile ground for interests in the Timor Sea. It should do much fostering good relations between Australia and more to assist Timor‑Leste with maritime Timor‑Leste. Common interests in the maritime security and in developing its capacity to domain include security, resource development manage its maritime interests. There’s an and marine environmental protection. These obvious desire in Dili that these should be are all areas of Australian expertise. There priority areas for national development. would be considerable mutual benefit in Building capacity for managing maritime Australia assisting Timor‑Leste to develop its interests should consider institutional capacity to manage these ocean interests. arrangements, legal frameworks and resources.

Maritime issues, including maritime security, Recommendations are new concerns for Timor‑Leste. Although living on an island, the Timorese lack a 22. With assistance from AusAID, an maritime culture: they’re an agricultural experienced maritime administration people, rather than seafarers. There’s been officer might be offered to Timor‑Leste almost no investment in maritime industry. as a technical adviser to the Until recently, with the advent of oil and gas Dili harbourmaster. developments in the Timor Sea, the Timorese haven’t looked upon the sea as having any 23. Australia should take the lead in initiating great economic potential. regular meetings between the littoral countries on maritime security in the The complex legislation and institutional Timor Sea. Procedures for information arrangements required to manage national sharing to provide maritime situational maritime interests tend to be overwhelming awareness at the regional level should be for the bureaucracy in Dili: little progress has on the agenda. been made in establishing arrangements for managing maritime affairs. Maritime 24. Maritime security issues should be knowledge and awareness are basic specifically addressed in the bilateral requirements for managing national maritime Defence Cooperation Agreement. interests. They involve an understanding that 25. Australia should propose an inaugural problems at sea are interrelated, of how the meeting of the Maritime Commission. international maritime industry functions, of the roles of maritime security forces, of the 26. Australia should renew its offer of relevant international legal frameworks, and contracted air surveillance of Timor‑Leste’s of the benefits to be gained by participation southern EEZ. in international maritime regimes. These 27. All officers entering Timor‑Leste’s F‑FTDL attributes are lacking in Timor‑Leste at present. Naval Component should complete Progress in developing institutional the RAN Junior Officers’ Warfare arrangements for managing national Application Course. maritime interests has also been hindered 10 Special Report

28. Sea‑riding opportunities should be 34. Future Australian capacity-building provided for F‑FDTL Naval Component activities need to foster the development officers in Darwin-based patrol boats. of sustainable management. Australia should focus on monitoring, control and 29. An offer of a sponsored training mission surveillance training of key Timor‑Leste for the commander of the Naval fisheries staff, who can then train their Component of the F‑FDTL and some own officers. of his senior officers to Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea should 35. Australia should continue to assist be made. The mission should visit Darwin, Timor‑Leste in the development of Canberra and Sydney and include visits to effective fisheries legislation. the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, 36. Support for the Arafura and Timor Sea the Australian Fisheries Management Experts Forum and Arafura and Timor Authority, and Australian Search Seas Ecosystem Action program should and Rescue. continue, to ensure that they are effective 30. Australia should give priority to helping to regional mechanisms for the cooperative build the capabilities of the PNTL Maritime ecosystem-based management of the Unit. Possible initiatives are: Timor and Arafura seas. • the posting of an experienced water police officer as part of the Timor‑Leste Police Development Program • short‑term attachments of PNTL officers to state water police services in Australia • assistance in establishing a diving team, including training and equipment.

31. A senior RAN hydrographic specialist should visit Dili to assess the hydrographic requirements of Timor‑Leste and where Australia might provide assistance.

32. Provided Timor‑Leste is agreeable, Australia might fund the Regional Maritime Programme of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community to assist Timor‑Leste in implementing International Maritime Organization measures.

33. The Australian Maritime College or an Australian TAFE might assist with the establishment of a seafarers’ training college that would train young Timorese for employment in the local maritime and international shipping industries. A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 11

1 The ADF and Timor‑Leste: what he believed would be unviable states. looking towards 2020 Furthermore, in talks with Indonesia’s President Soeharto in Yogyakarta on Damien Kingsbury 5–8 September 1974, Whitlam indicated a preference for Portuguese Timor’s integration Australia has had a long, often indifferent, into Indonesia, and again on 4 April 1975 and occasionally troubled relationship with in Townsville.1 the territory that’s now the independent Indonesia’s then government was strongly Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. The militaristic and aggressively anticommunist. character of that relationship has affected In the context of communist victories in Laos, (and will continue to affect) the ability Cambodia and Vietnam, the development of Australia to respond to developing of a Marxist element within the Timorese circumstances in Timor-Leste. In particular, Social Democratic Association (later Fretilin) Australia’s defence commitment to led concerned strategists in Jakarta to warn Timor‑Leste has been critical on two that Portuguese Timor could turn communist occasions, raising the question of how it and potentially destabilise the region. Hence, should position itself—with the agreement they argued in favour of Portuguese Timor’s of the Timor-Leste Government—over the incorporation into Indonesia, pointing to period to 2020. India’s effectively painless incorporation of Background the Portuguese enclave of Goa in 1961. Australia’s support for the policy of Australia’s military intervention (1941–45) in incorporation of Portuguese Timor into what was then Portuguese Timor was little Indonesia, along with that of the US, has been remembered in Australia in the early post-war widely viewed, both within Timor-Leste and years. Despite Australia’s brief flirtation without, as having given a ‘green light’ to with the idea of assuming responsibility for Indonesia’s invasion of the territory, informally Portuguese Timor, primarily on strategic from September 1975 and formally from grounds, Portugal maintained its stewardship 7 December 1975. In per capita terms, the of the colony and Australia more or less invasion was among the most brutal of the forgot about it until 1975. However, after the 20th century. Up to a third of the population Indonesian invasion of 1975, former Sparrow was killed or died of related causes, which Force commandos, who’d been stationed has left deep psychological scars among the on the island during World War II, combined population, many of whom continue to reflect with anti-occupation activists to remind individual and social psychological symptoms their Australian countrymen of the Timorese of that trauma. Australia’s international support the soldiers received during their support for Indonesia’s occupation of battle with Japanese imperial forces. Timor‑Leste, including de facto and then Following the overthrow of Portugal’s de jure recognition, and its signing of the creaking dictatorship in 1974, Portuguese Timor Gap Treaty in 1989 were seen by many Timor began to prepare for political Timorese as betrayals at best and culpability devolution. After backing down over Dutch in the plight of its people at worst. These New Guinea in 1963 (and the establishment issues continue to resonate among Timorese of the ‘Barwick Doctrine’), Australia’s then alongside other specific concerns about prime minister, Gough Whitlam, decided Australian policy towards Timor-Leste. that Australia shouldn’t support small and 12 Special Report

Ahead of the 1999 United Nations (UN) If Australia’s 1975 policy towards Timor-Leste supervised ballot in Timor-Leste on whether was borne of perceptions of strategic to accept ‘autonomy’ or independence, necessity with Indonesia, its relationship Australia actively opposed the establishment with Timor-Leste today is still seen partially of an armed UN presence in the territory, through that lens. This thinking played a major which by any reasonable assessment was role in Australia’s precipitous withdrawal of a necessary precondition for anything troops based along the Indonesian border resembling a free and fair vote. Australian in 2003. The withdrawal complied with a Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander request from Jakarta, even though it was Downer also confirmed that Australia’s consistent with a wider if equally precipitous preferred outcome of the vote was for international (including UN) drawdown of continuing integration with Indonesia.2 direct support. Those events also followed a More positively, Australian UN workers, growing push from within Timor-Leste for the the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and ‘Timorisation’ of the fledgling state following Australian observers of the ballot were well formal independence in 2002. However, it was received by pro‑independence Timorese (the clear then (and hindsight has confirmed) that relatively few anti-independence Timorese the new state wasn’t ready to take its affairs and Indonesian authorities barely tolerated fully into its own hands. As a consequence, them, knowing that a free vote would almost the post-2003 period was marked by certainly not support their cause). increasing social and political instability.

Given the opportunity, the people of Strong relations with Indonesia remain critical Timor-Leste overwhelmingly (78.5%) chose to Australia’s regional security, its diplomatic independence from Indonesia. In response, relations and, to a lesser extent, its economic Indonesia’s army and its proxy militias went integration into the region. Long-term on a rampage, killing at least 1,400 people security and stability in Timor‑Leste are and destroying around three-quarters of central to allaying any lingering concerns in Timor-Leste’s built infrastructure. Under Jakarta about having an unstable neighbour pressure from the US Clinton administration, on its borders. Australia is seen by Indonesia outraged Australian public opinion forced the as having a direct role in ensuring that Australian Government to overturn its policy stability, preferably through cordial diplomatic of non‑intervention and in September 1999 relations and aid rather than a military Australia led a military peace enforcement presence. Furthermore, as one of the world’s mission, INTERFET (International Force in most developed countries, Australia has East Timor) into Dili. Years of bitterness acknowledged its responsibility to assist towards Australia dissolved as it helped developing countries, particularly those near deliver independence to Timor-Leste. to Australia. Timor-Leste remains at the top Notably, Australia’s willingness to help of both the ‘development’ and ‘proximity’ stabilise Timor‑Leste had a number of priority lists and, apart from Solomon motivations: to ensure that it remained a Islands, receives the largest pro rata amount secure strategic neighbour; to ensure that of Australian aid. As with Solomon Islands, Australia’s often difficult relationship with a significant proportion of that assistance Indonesia was not further damaged; and (38% over the 1998–2010 period) supports a humanitarian (including Australian domestic police and military presence. political) reasons. Much of the goodwill earned by Australia in 1999 was squandered as a result of the A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 13

2002–03 Timor Sea negotiations between nationalist elements. The provocations of Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer some Timorese ‘militants’ against ISF troops and Timor-Leste Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. and the troops’ sometimes intemperate Claims that Timor had been placed in an responses, including pulling down Fretilin unequal bargaining position and what Alkatiri flags, gave further substance to perceptions called Australia’s ‘hostile’ declaration in 2002 of Australia’s partisan orientation. that it would not accept the International It’s interesting to note that the Portuguese Tribunal for the Law of the Sea considering legacy was briefly ‘rehabilitated’ in the eyes maritime boundary disputes involving of many Timorese. This reflected Portugal’s Australia led to long-term anti-Australian generally benign post-colonial intentions, resentment within Timor-Leste, especially the mythologising that is often central to among more nationalist-oriented groups constructing historical narratives, and the and individuals. Referring to the negotiations projected or actual partisan alliances of in a 2004 interview with the Portuguese external actors. To a considerable degree, journal Publico, current Prime Minister, then Portugal remains favoured by nationalist President, Xanana Gusmao, accused Australia elements within Timor-Leste, in particular of ‘stealing’ and ‘bad faith.’3 One outcome within Fretilin. This has fed into a supposed of that process, and the intervention of the Australia/Portugal, neo-imperialist/ Australian Defence Force (ADF) in the 2006 benign dichotomy6. crisis, was that Australia was increasingly seen within Timor-Leste in partisan and Despite some antagonism towards Australia, self-interested terms.4 particularly at lower and middle political levels but occasionally at senior levels when deemed The Timorese have a long history of forming politically convenient,7 effectively all Timorese alliances with, or opposing, external actors political leaders support a positive relationship (starting with Chinese and Buginese traders, with Australia, not least in helping to ensure then the Portuguese, Dutch and so on). As the state’s long-term security. Australia, in all other states (and societies all over the for its part, needs to be seen as a benign, world), there is also considerable domestic sympathetic and constructive partner, political value to be gained from identifying despite what are sometimes confronting oneself in opposition to an outside threat, provocations with its neighbour. In this area, a practice that retains currency following it’s common for Timorese to engage in strong the Indonesian interregnum. In particular, outbursts; the problem is that reciprocating in perceptions of Australia’s push for a change a similar manner escalates the confrontation of government in 2006–7 hardened the view, in ways that can lead to a breakdown of especially within Fretilin, that Canberra’s relations or, more locally, violence. Positively, intentions in Timor-Leste remain primarily Australia’s diplomatic posture in Timor-Leste based on self-interest. has improved considerably in the two or three Furthermore, Australia’s contribution to the years to the end of 2010, and the sense of an 2006 International Stabilisation Force (ISF) Australian–Portuguese dichotomy has almost was seen by some as initially ineffective and disappeared (in part because the dichotomy later as a potential or actual interference in was over-manufactured in the first place, but domestic political affairs.5 That view wasn’t also because of Australia’s diplomatic efforts universal, but was widespread enough to and Portugal’s declining economic fortunes). maintain traction with some more vocal 14 Special Report

Negative factors for future stability are the lack of a consistent/printed national language (Tetum being the most viable but Among the destabilising factors that led to also underdeveloped) and the ‘dollarisation’ the near collapse of the Timorese state in of the Timor-Leste economy, which are likely 2006 were (often unrealistic) expectations to inhibit the country from developing non-oil about the fruits of independence— types of industry and employment. expectations that exceeded the capacity of the government. Underpinning this Positive factors affecting stability was continuing widespread poverty and a real decline in living standards in the The period between 2010 and 2020 will years immediately after 1999, with high see a transition in the political leadership levels of illiteracy and a rapidly growing of Timor‑Leste, from the generation that young population placing further pressure cut its teeth on the initial bid and the on a limited employment market. Those subsequent struggle for independence to underlying tensions then fed into a situation a generation that was educated during that was exploited in political rivalries that the period of Indonesian occupation. The had arisen during the brief civil war of 1975 younger group includes a significant cohort and again, within the resistance movement, who were educated in Indonesian and, for in 1988–89. Elite competition for control most who undertook higher studies, who of limited resources within a framework studied in Indonesia. This group was largely of patron–client relations and set against connected with or part of the student and widespread social trauma and dislocation underground resistance movement, centred combined unstable elements into an on Renetil, which has tended to fracture explosive mix. around a number of personalities. Its core in 2010 remained connected to the Democratic Exacerbating this situation was Fretilin’s Party which (if it’s able to capitalise on underlying belief that it was at the forefront the transition process) could become a of the resistance and that, for some of its significantly stronger political player over the members, it was the only legitimate party of next ten years. government. More broadly, the Timorese state also suffered from problems of corruption, Others of the post-1975 political generation a tendency to slip into non-accountable were variously educated in Portugal and or arbitrary political decision-making, and Australia, with the Australian cohort probably a retreat to ‘traditional’ models of social constituting an important majority. This organisation.8 The retreat was informed will have implications for ‘Australia-literacy’ by inadequate police reform, including and an ability to negotiate around a series continuing brutality and corruption, a poorly of mutual considerations, including issues trained, out-of-touch judiciary that most of mutual strategic and security concern. often employed a language (Portuguese) The post-1999 political generation is unfamiliar to defendants and plaintiffs, and largely educated in Indonesian, leading to the fact that the Falintil–Timor-Leste Defence a continuation of Timor-Leste’s voluntary Force (F-FDTL) hadn’t yet stepped away from ‘Indonesianisation,’ including the widespread its role as active ‘guardian of the nation’ with use of the Indonesian language for a perceived right to interfere politically. commercial and other purposes.

Four years out from the 2006 crisis and many The critical question for political transition of these factors still have a negative impact will be the capacity of new political leaders upon Timorese society. Of particular concern to continue to develop policies that help A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 15

foster national identity. This will in part mean the better distribution of resources be dependent on the management of the and financial liquidity, especially outside Dili. transition from charismatic leadership Decentralisation should also produce a more models, which are prone to diminution and locally representative and accountable form fracturing, to a more rational-legal model of government than the centralised, party-list of state coherence and administration. This model that currently exists. The process of transitional process will be assisted in no democratic consolidation is also likely to small measure by Timor-Leste’s continuing, continue, not least as a result of support relatively successful, consolidation of from the international community. This democracy, through elections scheduled for should be enhanced by the consolidation of 2012 (possibly to be held earlier) and 2017; the party alliance process, even though that its useful if narrowly sourced economic didn’t look likely in the second half of 2010. growth (Timor-Leste relies on oil and gas A gradual shift to a younger generation of for 95% of its income, making it the most more experienced and astute politicians will hydrocarbon dependent state in the world) also enhance the prospect of rational policy and the distribution of that growth; the development, such as the fine tuning of state standardisation and implementation of economic investment, social policy (including rule of law mechanisms; and the currently language policy), foreign policy and so on. proposed (and three times delayed) process of Timor-Leste will continue to rely almost decentralisation (now tentatively scheduled exclusively on receipts from hydrocarbon for 2014). Decentralisation will assist and investments and subsequent government enhance local democratic participation, spending to underpin most economic potentially improving representation activity. The major concern here is whether and accountability, while economic government access to the oil fund will decentralisation has the potential to inject lead to capital corruption, as well as elite considerable liquidity into districts that competition for access to finite financial continue to rely on subsistence and barter resources. The purpose of this would be as much as cash transactions. The new self-enrichment in tandem with increased generation of leadership will by and large leverage over patron–client relations, be better educated and theoretically more probably overlapping with political party competent managers than its predecessors. leadership. There’s also continuing official It will also have the advantage of not opposition to current liquefied natural gas deriving from a military or military-inspired processing arrangements. At the time of background, lessening the tendency writing, the Timor-Leste Government was towards arbitrary decision-making and insisting that gas from the Greater Sunrise authoritarianism. There may, however, field be processed in Timor-Leste (as a means continue to be a more nuanced but still of kick-starting the country’s hoped for assertive nationalist tendency towards industrialisation). The current gas partner, ‘Timorisation’ (the assertion of a nationalist Woodside Petroleum, was concurrently agenda) as observed over 2009-10 and, to discussing development concessions for some extent, an inability to rationally address the government. difference without descending into conflict. Based on the current and the variable In the period out to 2020, the process projected government income, the F-FDTL will of decentralisation initiated in 2008 has continue to be supported at approximately the potential to increase the absorptive current levels of pro rata expenditure capacity of the state, which in turn will 16 Special Report

(about 18%). With continued external training If not carefully developed, the role of the support such as that provided under the F-FDTL may cause more problems than it existing Defence Cooperation Program and solves (e.g. its role in the affairs of 2006, no major disruptions, it could be reasonably limited defence capacity/high cost ratio), expected that the F-FDTL could reach with a relatively high degree of reluctance internationally recognisable standards of (and some incapacity) for it to be turned competence towards 2020. This will have into more of a public works or engineering implications for international training projects organisation. The F-FDTL will continue to and possible inclusions in international require mentoring and training, for example peacekeeping operations. as under the Defence Cooperation Program, over the period to 2020, not least to ensure The decentralisation process has been delayed that it remains focused on external defence and significantly scaled back from its original (and, preferably, infrastructure development) proposal for significant reallocation of funds activities and away from political and policing over a wide area of government activity. This activities. A generational change here may has reflected a degree of disorganisation also help to maintain cultural change within over the development and implementation the F-FDTL. of the policy, debate about the policy in the parliament and reluctance on the part of Distinct from defence, the national police some ministers to effectively decrease their (Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste, or PNTL) authority relative to district government. This will continue to require mentoring and may limit some of the potential benefits that training, not least to break the acculturation could accrue from such a policy, should it of Indonesian policing methods, including eventually be implemented. the excessive use of force, corruption, lack of accountability and lack of adequate The state oil fund will reach or come close distribution across the territory. A move to reaching its maximum level of capital towards ‘community policing’ (a reversion to accrual by 2020. Depending on government traditional justice and informal policing) as policy, over the intervening period there will recommended by some analysts in response continue to be an argument made for the to current policing inadequacies is likely to government accessing capital rather than only create many more immediate and longer term interest from the fund, with the intention of problems than it resolves. Along with policing, investing in human resource development continued training in and greater access to and infrastructure. More negative, however, the judicial process (including via a more will be the possible misallocation of resources, accessible language) are critical for respecting, including heightened opportunities for maintaining and enhancing the rule of law. corruption, the likely reduction in benefits against costs, an artificial boom economy Finally, Timor-Leste’s population continues causing inflationary pressure, a lack of to grow at an unsustainable (if somewhat sustainable investment, and political discord. declining) rate. As James Fox discusses in In all of this, government spending will this report, this will create pressure on locally remain the main economic driver; economic sourced food security, employment and the development outside the government sector ability of the state to deliver current, much will be limited. less improved, levels of service (for example, in education and health). A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 17

Proposed Australian responses positions itself in relation to the rest of the world. Australia shouldn’t seek to compete As a result of these considerations, Australia’s directly with China, but rather to explore best chance of maintaining a stable political opportunities for assistance that China is presence in Timor-Leste is through the unable or unwilling to provide or, more likely, creation, maintenance and enhancement has not yet identified. This doesn’t imply of stability and self-determination. An that Australia shouldn’t compete with China Australian military presence, such as under for Timor-Leste’s affections, particularly if a continuing Defence Cooperation Program, Timor-Leste seeks to start a bidding war, has the capacity to establish and maintain which is possible, if undesirable. But it may stability, but at a relatively high financial cost mean gently reminding Timor-Leste of to Australia and in ways that may challenge where its true and most reliable friendships Timorese perceptions of self-determination. lie. In this, Australia’s continuing close How Australia and the ADF interact with alliance with and support from the US are the Timorese both officially and unofficially valuable, with Washington able to make its is critical to determining the extent of the presence felt in distinctly noticeable ways (for benefits that the Australian presence can example, through visits by US warships and provide. Such a presence also has the double hospital ships). benefit for the ADF of exposing Australian troops to an international context outside of There’s also the perception and, to some a potentially more dangerous and politically degree, the reality of lingering historical problematic context (such as Afghanistan). grievances about Australia. Particular ‘sore points’ are negotiations over the Timor The increasing assertiveness and probable Sea Treaty of 2003 and, more recently, the expansion of China’s ‘soft power’ approach position of Woodside and the Australian towards Timor-Leste (and the region more Government over the onshore/offshore generally) has been marked by an equal processing of Timor Sea natural gas and a assertion within Timor-Leste that it has proposal to process Australian asylum seekers choices in strategic partnerships (see the in Timor-Leste as a variation on Australia’s chapter on foreign policy in this document). ‘Pacific Solution’. Beyond that, there’s a In one sense this is correct, in that Timor-Leste growing sense of assertive nationalism that is a sovereign state and may seek friends applies to (or against) all non-Timorese but where it wishes. However, the proximity specifically Australia, as a dominant regional of the country to Australia, its shared state, at both official and non-official levels. maritime boundary and its shared natural This has been reflected from the community resource arrangements create for Australia a and non-government organisation level all the heightened sense of awareness of the degree way through to the Prime Minister in some of and type of interest shown in Timor‑Leste his 2010 public pronouncements, even if the by large, growing and not necessarily government is still officially on friendly terms benign powers. with Australia. To that end, maintaining a constructive Many Timorese, including among commitment to Timor-Leste’s security and, Timor‑Leste’s political and military elites, by extension, Australia’s own security, will want an Australian military force to remain remain a necessary element in the ADF’s in the country. However, many don’t want thinking about how it positions itself in that military presence to be in public view. relation to Timor-Leste and how Timor-Leste This ambiguity reflects necessity bumping 18 Special Report

up against resentment. The F-FDTL wants towards being highly trained in the areas of the ADF to remain for training purposes, specific skills and skills transfer under the in particular to raise troops to a UN Defence Cooperation Program. They should peacekeeping standard which would probably also continue to possess and develop requisite take until 2020 based on current skills levels. language skills and cultural familiarity and However, it doesn’t want the ADF to be adaptability. Although relations between seen as usurping the defence/security role ADF personnel and the Timorese community of the F-FDTL. Australia, on the other hand, were initially very good and in most cases has indicated that it will draw down its ADF remain positive, difficulties will inevitably deployment following the 2012 elections. The arise because of the nature of the ADF’s question remains as to whether the shape, role, the duration of its presence, and size and function of the training contingent fluctuating local perceptions about its role. will remain or whether there is scope for One of the major problems of interaction a differently structured, more specialised between ADF personnel and Timorese locals force that includes training and possibly has been the barrier of different primary other capacities. languages. More highly developed linguistic, cultural and/or anthropological skills and a Rather than an entire drawdown, an ideal stronger grounding in the history and politics outcome would be for the ADF to maintain of Timor-Leste that are currently being a proportionately appropriate military developed will continue to be very useful group to assist with F-FDTL training under for better appreciation and communication the Defence Cooperation Program and that across contexts. This knowledge should be could, if requested, also quickly evolve into a further developed, along with technical skills, cohesive, active unit should there be a request to help ADF staff adapt to the environment at another time of possible crisis. Canberra that they’re working in. Apart from will not wish to be the security guarantor technical skills, a more widely distributed of first resort. While crises on the scale of intelligence function could impart skills to 2006 are unlikely, smaller scale conflict is F-FDTL counterparts while at the same time possible, especially before and after elections. providing on-the-ground information to Australia should not maintain a permanent enable the recognition of potential threats garrison-style deployment. That might cast before and as they arise, rather than after Australia as an occupying country. But a they arise, which was the situation in 2006. small continuing ADF presence will have a cautionary (and potentially reactive) capacity, Finally, although it’s beyond their current helping to prevent further crises and, failing remit, consideration should be given to that, orchestrating a rapid and efficient expanding the mandate of ADF personnel response. However, in order to address claims deployed to potential civil conflict zones by about ‘neo-imperialism,’ when not on duty in also offering training in aspects of pro-active their training role, ADF personnel should not civil policing. This capacity was noticeably be identifiable by uniform and in particular missing after the immediate emergency had should not carry weapons in public, which passed in 1999 and was particularly noticeable elicits negative responses among many in 2006, when there was a confluence of Timorese when the threat environment is low. these roles within a civil environment. In the period since 2006, the ADF deployed on patrol As well as skills to assist the F-FDTL, while in Timor-Leste have had what amounted to the ADF already has specialised units within a quasi-policing function, such as in crowd Timor-Leste, this unit should continue to work A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 19

control and responding to serious criminal Based on discussions with senior officials, it incidents (such as killings and arson) as they appears that the link between the Australian are in the process of happening or just after security sector and DFAT is relatively close they have happened. There was extensive as, based on similar discussions, is the link criticism of the ADF for being unable to between DFAT and AusAID (an executive adequately or appropriately respond to such agency within the Foreign Affairs portfolio). environments, particularly in 2006–07. To However, the relationship between Australia’s suggest that ADF personnel will never again security sector and AusAID could be have to respond to similar types of incidents is strengthened to ensure a more complete and, to both take a very short-term view of history within that, nuanced approach to fulfilling and to be very certain about the future. needs of people in receipt of assistance.9 In this, greater training and articulation Furthermore, as was demonstrated in 2006–7 between AFP Operational Response Group and which has the potential to again exist, officers and the ADF for such environments further collaboration between the AFP and would further enhance the capacities of the ADF could allow both parties to address both organisations to respond efficiently to certain structural weaknesses: until the critical civil situations. Based on discussions advent of the AFP’s Tactical Response Team, with senior AFP officers, at present there is the AFP’s International Deployment Group a mixed response within the AFP hierarchy (which oversees the force’s international to maintain what in Timor‑Leste are referred operations) did not have a ‘hard presence’ to as ‘formed units’ such as the Operational while the ADF does not have a policing and Response Group, primarily due to cost and law enforcement capacity, even though in domestic organisational relevance, and to some circumstances it is required to make ask the hard questions about its contribution ‘police judgments’ and operationalise ‘police to international programs and collaboration responses’ (e.g. powers of arrest). The with the ADF. At the same time, there is also employment of ‘formed’ units, in particular recognition within the AFP, especially at senior the AFP’s Tactical Response Team in initial levels, that the demand for ‘formed’ units situations and its Stability Response Team in and international operations is driven by ongoing poor security environments, would government policy rather than institutional probably be the point at which this graduated policing preferences. There is also recognition articulation takes place. One concern that has that greater articulation with the ADF been raised in discussion with observers of could provide a more useful on-ground international police forces concerning such response capacity. an articulation is that it involves the potential A joint ADF–AFP operational capacity for ‘formed’ AFP units to be deployed within should reflect an understanding that Australia for domestic purposes,10 which analysis, preventive action and responses runs counter to the wider culture of the AFP to security contexts require government (this concern is heightened whenever there agencies to continue to operate and further is discussion of articulation between the AFP develop cooperatively on the basis of a and the ADF). However, both institutions have ‘whole‑of‑government’ approach. Such a history of respecting civilian government an approach also implies continuing and and the rule of law and that’s unlikely (if not improved high levels of coordination between yet guaranteed as such) to change. Australia’s security sector, the Department of In the longer term, as Australia’s relationship Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and AusAID. with Timor-Leste matures and Timor-Leste 20 Special Report

continues to stabilise, Australia will require a ADF personnel deployed to potentially civil smaller, less intrusive but better coordinated conflict zones should receive training in aid, policing and military assistance program. aspects of pro-active civil policing, given the In 2010, Australia was seeking to draw down confluence of their training and civil roles in its ADF presence in Timor-Leste almost civil environments. entirely following the elections scheduled In addition to being highly trained in for 2012. While the chances of having to transferring appropriate skills to the F-FDTL, maintain a substantial long-term presence ADF personnel should continue to develop their have subsided, a complete withdrawal linguistic, cultural and/or anthropological skills may leave the ADF exposed to the risks of and a stronger grounding in the history and having to return at a later date. Timor-Leste politics of Timor-Leste. is currently relatively stable and looks set to continue more or less as it is. However, there When not on duty in their training role, ADF remain a number of potential spoilers in personnel should not be identifiable by uniform Timor-Leste, including potentially fractious and in particular should not carry weapons in electoral processes and their outcomes public, which elicits negative responses among (including the distinct possibility of a minority many Timorese when the threat-environment government or fragile alliance), continuing is low. friction between elements of the F-FDTL and Apart from technical skills, a more widely the PNTL and a lack of complete professional distributed intelligence function could impart development within both organisations skills to F-FDTL counterparts while at the same and continuing destabilisation by unofficial time providing on-the-ground information groups (including criminal and informal to allow the recognition of potential threats Indonesian Army activities) from across the before and as they arise. western border. A small but highly effective dose of ADF prevention now would be Greater training and articulation is needed more preferable, for regional stability, the between Australian Federal Police (AFP) well‑being of the people of Timor-Leste, Operational Response Group officers and the Australia’s security and the training ADF in civilian environments to enhance the opportunities it would offer both ADF and capacities of both organisations to respond F-FDTL personnel, compared to a potentially efficiently to critical situations. larger, reactive dose in the future. That was Australia shouldn’t directly compete with the lesson of 2003, learned at considerable China for Timor-Leste’s affections. Instead, the cost in 2006. Having learned that particular Timorese may need to be reminded, in more lesson of history, one trusts that such beguiling ways, of where Timor-Leste’s true mistakes won’t be repeated. and most reliable friendships lie. In this regard, Recommendations Australia’s continuing close alliance with and support from the US is valuable. Rather than drawdown entirely after the 2012 elections, the ADF should maintain, subject The relationship between Australia’s security to Timor-Leste agreement, a proportionately sector and AusAID should be strengthened appropriate military group, to assist with to ensure a more complete and nuanced F-FDTL training. approach to fulfilling the needs of people in receipt of assistance. A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 21

Endnotes 2 The future of Timor‑Leste’s 1 Dunn, J. 1996. Timor: A People Betrayed. foreign policy Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Dionísio Babo-Soares Corporation. p. 61

2 Speech given at Resende Inn, Dili, August This paper presents an overview of 1999, at which the author was present. Timor‑Leste’s foreign policy since independence and likely future directions. 3 Agence France Presse, ‘East Timor condemns Australia for theft’ To date, there hasn’t been any public 28 April 2004. blueprint that outlines the framework of the nation’s foreign policy. However, it’s 4 This observation is based on extensive argued here that the foreign policy approach discussions with senior Fretilin members adopted by Timor‑Leste has been guided by in the period between late 2006 and nation-building priorities: to respond to an 2010. Fretilin spokesperson Raul Mousaco emergency and humanitarian situation, to (who writes under a number of names and actively propagates similar views) has phase out the United Nations Transitional been especially vocal as a critic of Australia Administration, to plant the seeds of a and its intentions. successful state based on the rule of law and to resist outside pressures that may 5 Notably, some actions by ADF personnel, compromise the country’s newly acquired and such as the taking down of Fretilin flags, much-cherished sovereignty. were seen within Fretilin as illustrating Australia’s political interference. The core national interest of Timor‑Leste 6 Based on various official and unofficial is to ensure success in building a liberal statements by Fretilin spokespeople and democratic state founded upon the rule of party members, particularly following the law, following the prerogatives enshrined 2007 election. in its Constitution. Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão recently noted that from 7 Attacks by Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao 20 May 2002, the day Timor‑Leste gained its against Australia in 2010 appeared to full right of independence and sovereignty, all reflect his positioning ahead of future national elections. Timorese have acquired a new status, equal to all without exception: that of citizens. 8 For example, the current debate about the suitability of non-formal methods of He noted that the real challenge is how to policing and legal adjudication. end the emotions, the labelling of ‘mau-hus and bi-hus’ (spies and informers of the 9 Comparing UN peacekeeping missions in enemy), ‘autonomistas and independentistas’ Cambodia and Timor-Leste, Sue Downie’s (pro-autonomy and pro-independence 2005 PhD thesis argued coherently that, despite the initial difficulties faced in people), and heroes and traitors, veterans and insecure environments, there was a strong non‑veterans. case in favour of development programs Overcoming this labelling and the emotions being implemented hand in hand with attached to the tags will be the litmus peace keeping operations. test for the success of Timor‑Leste’s liberal 10 AFP Operational Response Group democratic state. does have this capacity written into its mandate. 22 Special Report

Geopolitical context economic order capable of ensuring peace and justice in the relations among peoples. In between two giant neighbours—Indonesia (Para. 2, Section 8) and Australia—Timor‑Leste, from one perspective, can be said to be safe and Early foreign policy orientation protected. But Timor‑Leste could be easily used to serve the interests of Timor‑Leste hasn’t yet outlined its foreign those two states, which generally share policy agenda, although work’s now starting common interests, but also differ in some on drafting a foreign policy blueprint strategic goals. document. The nation’s foreign policy has been carried out on the basis of common Both countries have concerns that Timor‑Leste sense, common knowledge and values as could be used as a bridge for transnational dictated by acceptable international norms. criminal activity that may affect them. While border-crossing incidents occur from time to Having Dr José Ramos-Horta as the leading time, both Timor‑Leste and Indonesia have thinker on foreign policy since independence been able to forge strong bilateral relations. has generated a high profile for the country in diplomatic circles. But his move in 2006 In the area of transnational crime, there have to become the second president of the been instances in which foreigners were republic may not have helped to maintain accused of money laundering. Last year, that momentum: the country’s arguably according to Police Commissioner1 Longuinhos now struggling to overcome a diplomatic Monteiro, out of nine cases, eight involved deficit, which is affecting its profile and individuals of Nigerian nationality. However, international prestige. drug trafficking and transnational crime don’t yet constitute a major concern for A public foreign policy vision statement Timor‑Leste’s law enforcement community. will generate fresh interest in the international community and encourage Nurturing Timor‑Leste’s independence, much-needed investment to underpin politically and economically, is central to sustainable development. its foreign policy objectives. This dictates the country’s search for cooperation and However, whatever emerges from such a mutual benefit with other countries. It’s in document it’s unlikely that Timor‑Leste will the interest of Timor‑Leste to establish and move away from a progressive approach maintain the best possible relations with all that dictates establishing relations with all governments, regardless of size, ideology friendly countries. and geography. It can’t survive on its own. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that This is highlighted in the Constitution of Timor‑Leste’s relations with other countries Timor‑Leste: ought to aim for a ‘harmonious and The Democratic Republic of East Timor prosperous Timor‑Leste, with peace, security shall establish relations of friendship and and stability in the region and the world’ and cooperation with all other peoples, aiming that its mission is to ‘safeguard the interests at the peaceful settlement of conflicts, of Timor‑Leste and its people through active the general, simultaneous and controlled diplomacy and international cooperation’.2 disarmament, the establishment of In the first years since independence, the a system of collective security and traditional allies of Timor‑Leste, such as establishment of a new international Portugal, Australia, US and New Zealand, A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 23

provided most of the basic resources since 2000.3 This aid contributes to a range of to establish the future Foreign Ministry developmental activities that affect security of Timor‑Leste. The ministry started by and stability and strengthen the overall establishing diplomatic training, sending new process of nation building. recruits for training abroad and defining an China has assisted Timor‑Leste by providing agenda for foreign affairs. funding for the construction of the Between October 1999 and May 2002, as presidential palace, the foreign ministry Timor‑Leste was under the UN Transitional building, new defence headquarters and Administration, foreign policy was directed to military residential quarters, as well as some ensure a phasing out of that administration training programs. and sow the right seeds for a successful The European Union has provided close transition towards an independent state. to e47 million in emergency assistance Timor‑Leste ratified almost all major and between 2008 and 2013 is providing international legal instruments, including the another e63 million in aid. Japan contributed UN Charter and the Universal Declaration US$181 million between 2002 to 2009. New of Human Rights, before the restoration of Zealand and Malaysia have also contributed to independence in May 2002. security aid. Timor‑Leste became a member of the UN on 27 September 2002. Joining ASEAN and Future foreign policy demands other regional forums, restoring relations Timor‑Leste subscribes to open, active with Indonesia, and membership of the engagement and the principle of equal Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa footing in pursuing its international relations. (the Community of Portuguese Language But it maintains special relations with Countries) are key foreign policy objectives. Indonesia, with which it shares land and sea boundaries, and Australia, which shares a sea Foreign aid boundary. This cooperation is geared towards Fighting poverty is a national strategic goal. bringing mutual benefits to both sides. So far, Much of the foreign aid to Timor‑Leste has cooperation between Timor‑Leste and each of contributed towards job creation, albeit not its two neighbours has been quite productive. always long-term or permanent jobs. The Timor‑Leste is one of the poorest nations in challenge for Timor‑Leste and its development the world. It must intensify both multilateral partners is how to keep aid flows sustainable, and bilateral relations with all countries, with maintaining existing jobs and creating new particular emphasis on those with the ability ones to meet emerging needs. and interest to provide assistance in the Timor‑Leste has benefited and continues development of its human capital, security to benefit from foreign aid. Between 1999 and economy. and June 2010, Australia provided around Relations with Indonesia have developed $930 million in official development well. Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão recently assistance to the country. In 2010–11, the paid working visits to Jakarta and conducted Australian Government will provide an comparative studies in East Java.4 estimated $103 million. Relations with Australia continue to be good, The US has provided approximately despite tension over the exploitation of oil US$280 million in development assistance and gas in the Timor Sea. The untapped 24 Special Report

gas wealth has been subjected to intense direction by distancing itself from its negotiations to reach an outcome that will traditional allies: Australia, the US, New be of mutual benefit. However, civil protests Zealand and to some extent Portugal. against what’s perceived to be unfair Coincidently, Singaporean Foreign Minister Australian treatment of Timor‑Leste have George Yeo paid a three-day visit to occurred in Dili from time to time. Timor‑Leste around that time. Yeo apparently While the government of Timor‑Leste advised the government of Timor‑Leste not to is considering a proposal by Australian be anxious to apply for membership of ASEAN Prime Minster Julia Gillard to establish a and to prepare itself for accession before refugee processing centre in Timor‑Leste, joining the regional forum.7 Yeo’s sensible the Parliament of Timor‑Leste has passed message appeared to be that Timor‑Leste a resolution calling on the government should approach both extra-regional to reject the proposal. The government and regional powers to provide security seems to have no option but to follow the assistance before joining ASEAN. In response parliament’s resolution. to external concerns about the purchase of the Chinese patrol boats, Timorese Foreign The saga of the Chinese boats Minister Zacarias da Costa played down the significance of the purchase.8 He suggested it To upgrade its naval force capacity, the was purely trade. He didn’t think that Beijing Timor‑Leste Government decided last August was looking for a strategic military anchor to purchase two Jaco class patrol boats in Timor‑Leste, let alone a strategic military from China. Some Australian media reports partnership with Dili. claimed this decision was a slap in the face for Australian diplomacy. According to The Regional states concerned over Timor‑Leste’s Australian’s Peter Alford, the purchase fanned Chinese boat purchase were perhaps renewed concern in the Australian strategic less worried about a possible change in community about China’s role in the region. Timor‑Leste’s foreign policy direction than what the sale might have said about China’s Alford noted that Prime Minister long-term strategic goals in the region. Xanana Gusmao had praised Chinese no-strings‑attached assistance in providing There are several possible interpretations of $9 million to build Timor‑Leste’s defence Timor‑Leste’s purchase. It may demonstrate headquarters. This was viewed as possibly Timor‑Leste’s determination to pursue its the beginning of China’s involvement in the own foreign and military policy direction—it future training of Timor‑Leste’s military.5 no longer wishes to be protected solely by traditional allies. It may also show that The Australian also expressed concern that Timor‑Leste is looking for a mutually and ‘while it has been known for several years that economically beneficial partner to advance East Timor would buy the Jaco class patrol its national interests. China is helping to train boats from China, it was not anticipated that Timorese naval officers. they would be operated, for the foreseeable future, by the Chinese navy.’6 There’s some truth in all these explanations, but it shouldn’t be assumed that the purchase Some Dili analysts suggested that the patrol necessarily has significant implications boat deal demonstrated Timor‑Leste’s for the future direction of Timor‑Leste’s determination to define its own security foreign policy. A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 25

It certainly doesn’t mean that Timor‑Leste As a fledging and poor country, Timor‑Leste is leaving its traditional allies. The country has developed a modest foreign policy continues to see Australia as a strategic approach and intends to maintain partner. Major General Taur Matan Ruak’s that approach to benefit its people visit to Australia late in 2010 was very and state. Its approach also reflects successful. There’s now increased training constitutional provisions: of Timorese F‑FDTL officers in Australia and The Democratic Republic of East Timor stronger cooperation between the two shall maintain especial ties of friendship defence forces. It was pleasing to note that and co-operation with its neighboring in February 2011 President Jose Ramos‑Horta countries and the countries in the region. awarded Australia’s Chief of the Defence (Para. 4, Section 8) Force, Air Chief Marshal Houston, the Medal of the Order of Timor‑Leste, intended One may summarise Timor‑Leste’s priorities to recognise individuals who’ve made a as follows. significant contribution to Timor‑Leste and the Timorese people. Establishing and maintaining good relations with all nations. Timor‑Leste needs the know-how of the ADF to enhance the development of the The Constitution of Timor‑Leste enshrines a F‑FDTL, particularly given the common strong commitment to the ideal of peace and strategic interests imposed by geography. friendly cooperation among nations, founded Being dependent upon the goodwill of other on international justice and morality, but also countries is certainly not a wise strategy in to serve Timor‑Leste’s own national interests: the current security environment, in which all states face threats that can come from On matters of international relations, the powerful and determined non-state actors. Democratic Republic of East Timor shall govern itself by the principles of national Timor‑Leste thus welcomed the statement independence, the rights of Peoples to self of US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates determination, the permanent sovereignty that the US Government must improve its over their wealth and natural resources, ability to help its partners defend themselves the protection of human rights, the 9 or, if necessary, fight alongside US troops. mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial Working with the US in the security integrity and equality among States and and defence realms in our region is very the non‑interference in domestic affairs of important. US military regional commanders other states. (Article 1, Section 8) often visit Timor‑Leste, and joint military exercises have been carried out there. As a small country, Timor‑Leste remains committed to collective approaches to Foreign policy priorities international relations and security, reflecting the primacy of the Charter of the United As a young nation with an active and Nations. Key principles underlying that pragmatic diplomacy, Timor‑Leste has commitment include respect for human developed diplomatic relations with more rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy than a dozen countries. It’s established and the rule of law. These objectives are to diplomatic representation in about be pursued in cooperation with regional and twenty‑four countries, including Russia, Israel bilateral partners and through membership of and Palestine, as well as Cuba and China. 26 Special Report

international organisations, in particular the Regional cooperation UN and ASEAN. Timor‑Leste has sought to actively engage Relations with Indonesia have been very in regional forums to foster cooperation and good despite the traumatic past. Indonesia enhance stability among regional partners, is by far the largest trading partner of including by becoming a founding member Timor‑Leste, and trade is increasing. There of the Southwest Pacific Dialogue, together are also now up to 8,000 Timorese students with Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Papua studying in Indonesia. They’re charged only New Guinea and the Philippines. Timor‑Leste domestic student fees, and that benefits has been granted a special observer status both countries. with the Pacific Islands Forum and is a special The East Timor – Indonesia Boundary observer within ASEAN, with the expectation Committee will have to survey and delimit of becoming a full member. Now that a land boundary. There are also outstanding Indonesia has taken over the chairmanship of issues pertaining to human rights violations ASEAN, Timor‑Leste looks set to accede to full in 1999. Timor‑Leste’s application for ASEAN membership this year. full membership of ASEAN is supported by Indonesia. Enhancing multilateralism

In line with the vision and mission of the Timor‑Leste has joined the African, Caribbean strategic plan of the Ministério dos Negócios and Pacific Group of States. To become a full Estrangeiros (Ministry of Foreign Affairs member of the group, Timor‑Leste acceded to and Cooperation) of Timor‑Leste, the the Cotonou Agreement, which emphasises country is looking into developing wider the economic and social development of cooperation with different states in the member countries in order to raise the quality region and the world, including by reinforcing of life of their citizens, based on equality of 10 its internal security agenda. Apart from partners and ownership of development its traditional allies, Timor‑Leste has also strategies as well as the participation of established twenty‑four missions and civil society, the private sector and local embassies worldwide. governments. This reflects the constitutional requirement of participatory democracy Non-ideologically based foreign policy and provides a platform to interact with the European Union to further the national In February 2003, Timor‑Leste acceded to development priorities of Timor‑Leste. the Non‑Aligned Movement and pledged to subscribe fully to the Kuala Lumpur Ties with Portuguese-speaking countries Declaration on Continuing the Revitalization of the Non‑Aligned Movement. The intention With other former Portuguese colonies in is to promote the democratisation of the Africa (Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, system of international governance in order Guinea-Bissau and São-Tome and Príncipe) to increase the participation of developing and in Latin America (Brazil), Timor‑Leste countries in international decision-making. shares a diversity of emotional and This will enhance national, regional and cultural links, including history, language international security. and religion (mostly Catholic and other Christian denominations). A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 27

Portuguese has been chosen as the official has encouraged both sides to pursue dialogue language in all those Comunidade dos Países aimed at a peaceful solution. On the question de Língua Portuguesa countries. Due to this of Taiwan, while Timor‑Leste supports the emotional and cultural attachment, they’ve One China policy, it calls for the two countries been supportive of the Timorese fight for to resolve their differences amicably. self-determination and independence. The Timor‑Leste has ratified a number of Timorese Constitution has a guiding proviso: international conventions, particularly in the The Democratic Republic of East Timor area of human rights, and actively supported shall maintain privileged ties with the the international initiative to stop the countries whose official language is proliferation of nuclear weapons. Portuguese. (Para. 3, Section 8) Selected bilateral issues include the following: Promoting donor–recipient dialogue • Timor‑Leste supports the independence of the Republic of Saharawi in West Aid effectiveness features as a priority Sahara, Africa, and has taken part in a for Timor‑Leste because of the long-term number of exchanges with the Saharawi commitment of the UN and development interim government to support its cause. partners to successful nation building. • Timor‑Leste has supported the Timor‑Leste co-sponsored and is actively independence of Palestine, and asked pursuing a forum for dialogue among fragile Palestine and Israel to refrain from states. The ‘g7+’, as it is known, was seen as violence and resolve the issue in a an innovation in the international system, peaceful manner. through which countries experiencing conflict • Timor‑Leste has campaigned for the and fragility and their development partners lifting of international economic could jointly shape and guide international sanctions on Cuba and Myanmar. In the assistance to support peace building and case of Cuba, Timor‑Leste’s parliament state building. has also appealed to the US to release five Cuban ‘terrorist’ prisoners who’ve In April 2010, Timor‑Leste hosted the been detained without trial in the US for International Dialogue on Peace Building and several years. Timor‑Leste has supported State Building. This event coincided with the the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. meeting of g7+, which includes Afghanistan, Myanmar has, however, supported the the Central African Republic, the Democratic inclusion of Timor‑Leste in ASEAN. Republic of Congo, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Chad, Southern Sudan, • Timor‑Leste has supported Nepal and Solomon Islands. Key among non‑proliferation on the Korean the countries’ priorities are the Millennium Peninsula, in Iran and in other parts of Development Goals. the world. It supports the application of Indonesia to be a permanent member of Policy positions on selected the Security Council. international issues • Timor‑Leste has not rushed into recognising the independence of Kosovo. Timor‑Leste adopts an even-handed approach on issues pertaining to regional security. On • Soon after its independence, Timor‑Leste the issue of the Korean Peninsula, Timor‑Leste approached the US to lift its ban on the sale of arms to Indonesia, which was 28 Special Report

halted during that country’s occupation policies by stronger players. In the military of Timor‑Leste. The US later lifted area, Timor‑Leste is committed to bilateral the ban. cooperation with friendly countries that • Given its good relations with Indonesia, provide disinterested support. Timor‑Leste has taken a moderate The motto of the Congresso Nacional da approach on the issue of Papua. It Reconstrução de Timor‑Leste is that ‘having continues to urge both sides to resolve liberated our country now we must liberate the conflict amicably and encourages our people’. This is a fundamental principle Indonesia to listen to the wishes of the with direct impact on foreign policy: liberating Papuans, including the need to improve the people includes freedom from hunger their living conditions and respect human and disease, empowerment, and the ability rights. Relevant to this, the Constitution to stand as a nation with the same prestige of Timor‑Leste adheres to the principle and honour that successful democracies take that ‘The Democratic Republic of East for granted. Timor [sic] shall extend its solidarity to the struggle of the peoples for national Recommendations liberation’ and ‘shall grant political asylum, in accordance with the law, to Recommendation: Australia is the source of foreigners persecuted as a result of their know-how and technological advancement struggle for national and social liberation, that Timor‑Leste needs for its long-term defence of human rights, democracy national development and sustainability, not and peace’.11 This reflects the 24‑year war least in the areas of defence and security. Dili of liberation endured by the people of will continue to emphasise this in its foreign Timor‑Leste. policy approach, particularly through defence and security cooperation with Canberra. Timor‑Leste’s foreign policy doesn’t tilt towards any country or group. It’s not based The security threats and risks faced by on ideological orientation, reflecting the Timor‑Leste aren’t as acute as those independent approach taken by Timor‑Leste confronting Australia, particularly in terms on key international issues. of non-state actors involved in transnational crime and terrorism.

National interest and foreign policy Recommendation: Timor‑Leste needs a better Timor‑Leste’s foreign policy will continue to understanding of the foreign policy priorities emphasise open and proactive engagement of Australia, particularly in trade, defence and in international relations and be based on security. non-interference in other countries’ affairs. Australia’s presence in Timor‑Leste since Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão has stated 1999 underlines its commitment as an several times that Timor‑Leste welcomes active partner on the road towards the foreign assistance, but not with strings consolidation of independence. A democratic attached. This should be seen as part of the and economically strong Timor‑Leste is in overall strategy: Timor‑Leste doesn’t wish Australia’s national interest, as well as the to compromise its national security and interests of Indonesia and ASEAN. It also sovereignty, even when undue pressures strengthens the capacity of regional forums are exerted upon its national development to mitigate risks and to respond to existing and emerging threats. A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 29

Recommendation: Bilateral relations Endnotes between Timor‑Leste and Australia should 1 Comandante-Geral da PNTL, as the be pursued vigorously with a long-term Commissioner position is known in strategic perspective. Timor-Leste. While Australia has significantly reduced its 2 See Strategic Development Plan military presence in Timor‑Leste in recent 2009–2015, with projections for 2020, years (there are around 400 ADF members Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Timor-Leste deployed as part of the International in collaboration with United Nations Stabilisation Force), there’s now a question Development Programme. as to whether and how long the troops should remain. 3 US Dili Embassy, unpublished information, 2011. Outside a direct Australian troop presence, Timor‑Leste can derive great strategic 4 Xanana Gusmão Kunjungi Surabaya, benefits from cooperation with Australia on Kompas, 10-12-2010, Jakarta. border control. 5 Peter Alford, ‘Dili acts to ease concerns Recommendation: The accession of Timor‑Leste of drift towards China’, The Australian, to ASEAN should also benefit Australia in terms 30 August 2010. of regional security and stability. 6 Peter Alford, ‘Dili acts to ease concerns of Indonesia and Timor‑Leste have many drift towards China’. strategic shared interests. 7 See http://news.yahoo.com/s/ Recommendation: Timor‑Leste will always afp/20100820...20100820160931. work towards making those interests a 8 See http://news.yahoo.com/s/ foundation for stability and friendship. afp/20100820...20100820160931.

Conclusion 9 R Gates, ‘Helping others defend themselves’, Foreign Affairs, May/ Timor‑Leste has proved itself to be an June 2010, www.foreignaffairs.com/ excellent learner; just as our people learned articles/66224/robert-m-gates/helping- to fight an independence war, we’re now others-defend-thems... learning to govern our nation-state by assuming the sole responsibility to govern. 10 See Strategic Development Plan 2009–2015, And we’re doing so at a time when the world’s with projections for 2020. going through drastic changes. 11 Section 10, Constitution of the Democratic American philosopher Eric Hoffer once said Republic of East Timor, Constituent that ‘in a time of drastic change it is the Assembly, 2002, p. 16. learners who inherit the future. The learned usually find themselves beautifully equipped to live in a world that no longer exists.’

Those who try to teach us lessons, because they consider themselves learned, may never realise that Timor‑Leste has already inherited the future. 30 Special Report

3 Socioeconomic challenges: That cause was given credibility and a sense of the gap between expectations attainability by the high level of engagement and achievements by the UN and members of the international community. As the years since independence Vandra Harris have progressed, however, few Timorese have seen the substantial improvements Despite significant achievements in the past they expected in their living standards. The decade, Timor‑Leste faces an uphill battle in evident wealth of international (and, more the coming decade as it seeks to meet the recently, local) actors in the country has only high—but not unreasonable—expectations highlighted this gap between expectations of its people. While few can fully imagine and reality. the Timorese people’s experiences of the past forty years, their hopes for a good life as Development citizens of a democratic, independent nation Statistics demonstrate very patchy progress will resonate with many Australians. since independence in a range of the Two facts provide the critical foundation for indicators used to measure wellbeing. In fact, this discussion of socioeconomic realities there’s been measurable regression in some and policing in Timor‑Leste as it enters areas such as life expectancy at birth. More its second decade of independence: its positively, child and infant mortality rates population growth (although slowing) is have improved significantly, while school among the highest in the world, and its enrolment rates and GDP per capita have human development is among the lowest. improved marginally. Access to electricity, The interaction of these dubious distinctions clean water and sanitation has shown variable means that it will be extremely difficult to change, with improvements in some areas ensure that living conditions don’t deteriorate matched by deterioration in others. further for the majority of the population in Living conditions on the whole show a country that already shows extremely slow marginal improvement, while at the same improvement in development measures.1 In time a range of other frustrations play on the face of this, it becomes doubly important the minds of many Timorese. The lack of that foreign interventions be well coordinated employment opportunities is a principal and consistently focused on Timor‑Leste’s concern, particularly in Dili, where there’s leadership and the country’s ownership of its growth in both the total population and the own development. number of people graduating from education Timor‑Leste entered the 21st century with and training courses with the expectation optimism that struggle and resistance would of being able to use their new skills in paid finally see their reward in emerging prosperity work. Unfortunately, job creation numbers and stability. The struggle for independence don’t meet graduate numbers —indeed, at was an arduous and dangerous commitment present, for every fifty new entrants into the to securing the political, economic and social labour market (trained or otherwise), a single freedoms to which each person is entitled, job is created, and with an annual workforce as enshrined in the Universal Declaration growth of 20,000 per year many people of Human Rights, and to improving living remain disappointed.2 This number is likely conditions for individuals and communities in to grow as the UN withdraws, taking with Timor‑Leste. it a range of employment opportunities— although as widely anticipated, the UN A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 31

recently renewed its mandate for a further on factors such as poverty, security and twelve months at current levels, giving at basic services. least one more year before this issue begins These disparities are somewhat to bite. understandable when one considers While concerns like these are measurable, the geographic and resource realities of there are also reports of a less tangible Timor‑Leste, the proportion of people bewilderment or anger among citizens who living in the capital (over 20% of the are beginning to wonder what they fought for. national population), and the location of With this comes perceptions of emerging (or most decision-makers in Dili. That doesn’t recurrent) social divisions, which without care mitigate the resulting inequity; nor does could be inflamed to trigger further violence it diminish migration to Dili, where the or civil disturbance. Among these factors are number of households is expected to almost urban–rural inequities, access to services and triple between 2005 and 2020. Geographic to land, economic inequities, and perceived limitations (sea and steep mountains) prevent discrimination based on ‘ethnicity’, language unfettered urban sprawl, but increasing and religion. Such perceived divisions have density is likely to lead to a decline in health, been used to mobilise conflict in Timor‑Leste security and employment opportunities for in 2006, as well as innumerable conflicts in residents of the capital. other countries. While those factors may Whether it’s the result of deliberate provide easy points for social mobilisation, discrimination or of slow and patchy Timor‑Leste’s social and political leaders could rollout, another factor with the potential create long-term conflicts if they succumb to to contribute to discontent is unequal the temptation to play on differences for their or inadequate access to services and own ends. That option will be increasingly infrastructure. Timor‑Leste’s population is seductive as they attempt to appeal to projected to double in the next thirty years, younger generations, who are at the coalface which would be difficult for any country of the country’s attempts to transform itself to absorb effectively, let alone a country into a global player both economically and whose infrastructure falls well short of politically, and for whom the current leaders’ meeting the needs of the existing population. roles in the resistance have little meaning. Roads, medical facilities and schools are Some of the perceptions of exclusion and critical to Timor‑Leste’s economic and social marginalisation are demonstrable and others development, both for attracting investment are more questionable. An urban–rural divide and for fostering domestic productivity is clear, not only in the physical difficulty and wellbeing. of travelling within Timor‑Leste, but also in significant discernible differences when Health and education statistics on resources are disaggregated— The government has performed well in regard and in the case of resources such as sanitation to the health sector, allocating a significantly and drinking water, the gap is being closed higher level of government expenditure by deteriorating conditions in urban areas to that area than is the average for even rather than improving circumstances in rural middle‑income countries. If this level of areas. Further distinctions are discernible investment continues to be used efficiently, when rural statistics are disaggregated by there’s a good chance that the country will region, showing significant discrepancies be able to keep pace with the demand for between eastern, central and western regions 32 Special Report

hospitals and health services—although the issue has been the subject of ongoing debate maintenance of existing facilities will be as in both parliament and civil society, as well critical as the construction of new ones. as a revision of the Petroleum Fund Law in November 2010. Education will be a larger challenge. One‑sixth of Timor‑Leste’s population Unfortunately, Timor‑Leste faces significant will be primary school aged by 2020, an needs at a time when it’s been unable to increase of almost 60% on 2005 figures. fully expend development assistance monies In addition, with approximately half the from its funders, and has a large un- or adult population illiterate (including the under‑utilised labour force. This demonstrates 15–24 year age bracket), there are many a clear failure of training and resources, in the outside the traditional primary school age sense that investors and contractors are still range seeking basic education. Even with able to claim, for example, that the country planned large class sizes, Timor‑Leste will doesn’t have a corps of skilled engineers need twenty‑five new schools per year over and labourers who could now be deployed the coming decade, along with maintenance to implement sustainable infrastructure and repairs to existing schools, many of which projects, either in conjunction with are in desperate need of attention. It must international donors and businesses or funded also meet the need for growing numbers of through the national budget. This highlights teachers fluent in Portuguese, the language the necessity for appropriate and relevant of instruction. skills development, which should have been more prominent in the past decade. A landmark demographic study3 has indicated that under the most conducive circumstances Security (including domestic commitment and international assistance) Timor‑Leste’s The crisis of 2006 and assassination attempts government could conceivably meet the on the President and Prime Minister in 2008 challenges of providing sufficient facilities and were well reported in the Australian media, staff for health and education in the coming conveying a sense of ongoing instability in decade. It’s harder to imagine that it could do the nation. Although Timor‑Leste would be so for roads, water, electricity and sanitation. atypical of newly independent states were In those areas provision already falls well it entirely stable and peaceful in its first short, leaving the government considerable decades, a key and compounding effect of challenges to catch up with current demand, instability is to further disrupt the economy let alone future growth. Health and education and discourage international investment are critical for building a strong population (which already suffers from a range that’s equipped to meet the government’s of disincentives). lofty goals for Timor‑Leste’s future; consistent Competing measures exist for the security power and water and an effective transport of Timor‑Leste’s citizens. It’s generally network are critical to attracting investment acknowledged that the increasing number that will provide jobs and capital, which of people on the streets of Dili after dark are also needed to support growth and indicates a reduced fear of violence. In development. The government is aware of contrast, for example, there’s no indication the need to meet infrastructure demands, that domestic violence is declining, or that as seen in its desire to use petroleum fund there’s confidence in legal (traditional or resources above ‘sustainable levels’ to make formal) responses to it. Despite this, there immediate investments in those areas. This A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 33

are significant concerns about diverse groups effectiveness, as discussed in several referred to as ‘gangs’, ‘martial arts groups’ reports by the International Crisis Group in and ‘ninjas’. Some areas of Timor‑Leste recent years. are experiencing outbreaks of violence A core problem has been that UN Police have paralleling those of 2007, and 2010 saw a very little unity beyond the blue UN patches major security operation targeting ninjas they wear, inhibiting its ability to implement in the border districts.4 These concerns are effective policing and build the capacity of real, and responses must be grounded in a Timor‑Leste’s police force (the Policia Nacional deep understanding of context, terminology Timor‑Leste, or PNTL). UN Police are drawn and politics, so that tension is relieved rather from more than forty member states with than inflamed. approaches that vary from community-based Impunity is also becoming a feature of the policing to gendarmeries, and are without political and security landscapes. There’s clear directives as to a coherent approach. clear evidence of absence of both capacity Similarly, Timorese police are expected to and will to respond to injustice and hold understand and comply with human rights leaders and members of the security forces to principles when those principles aren’t account. This can be seen in examples such always consistent with the models they’ve as the long delays in the government formally experienced under Indonesian rule, or indeed considering the report from the Commission the UN Police. As a result, mentoring and for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East capacity development can be in conflict, and Timor, little evidence of accountability for the job of the PNTL is made more difficult and the 2006 crisis, and the Maternus Bere case potentially dangerous by the fact that they are of 2009.5 operating in a society with a long-established distrust of police. While national and international militaries are central in responding to major security Further complicating this situation, the crises, effective police and legal systems can nation’s military (the Falintil–Forças de Defesa help prevent small issues becoming larger de Timor‑Leste, or F‑FDTL) has on several crises that require a military response. There’s occasions indicated its lack of faith in the been significant change and transition in ability of the PNTL to perform its function, Timor‑Leste’s police and legal systems, but and has made overt threats to step in if there’s still a long way to travel along the road policing failures continue. Indeed, there are to their effective and independent operation. numerous and well-documented instances of the military taking on policing functions UN Police have been present in Timor‑Leste without government directive. At the same since 1999, providing both practical policing time, many commentators voice concern functions and ‘capacity development’ of about the institutional alignment of police the local police force. This has been further and military in Timor‑Leste, preferring supported by the Australian-led Timor‑Leste instead to see the clear distinction between Police Development Program. Handover police and military functions that has long of police districts and institutions to local underpinned conceptions of constitutional leadership began in mid-2009, and there’s government. At this point, the mechanisms been a consistent rollout since that time. for closer alignment appear to be working Despite assessments that must be satisfied reasonably well to contain conflict at senior before each handover, there are concerns that levels6, and will certainly receive close ongoing capacity remains low, limiting operational 34 Special Report

attention from those concerned with security Policy directions sector reform. These factors have important implications At a time when Timor‑Leste is asserting its for Australia’s engagement with Timor‑Leste right to make its own mistakes rather than in the coming decade, with the twin goals be subjected to those of others, further of improving the human development of engagement with the PNTL will be fraught, Timorese citizens and benefiting Australians to say the least. It will nonetheless be critical through investment in a secure and to continue to support and develop the flourishing near neighbour. In particular, PNTL’s skills and education as an important these recommendations are focused on contribution to the nation’s stability economic development and security as and prosperity. strategies for meeting the desires and needs of Timor‑Leste’s people. They’re consistent Such improvements must be supported by with the broad priorities outlined in the the continued development of legal and 2010–11 budget for Australia’s international judicial systems, as the work of the police will aid program and AusAID’s 2009–2014 country be undermined if suspects are investigated strategy. For economic development, key and arrested but can’t be afforded a fair factors include infrastructure (such as the and timely legal response or, if necessary, be consistent supply of electricity), human accommodated in appropriate institutions. resources (local people with appropriate Given Timor‑Leste’s history and the isolation skills), governance supportive of investment, of many of its rural areas, support must be and stability. given to integrate and strengthen traditional law as part of the nation’s broader legal Training programs have been poorly targeted framework. This may serve a vital purpose in in the past, but large-scale training of strengthening trust in legal systems, because Timorese citizens to participate in delivering local leaders are accessible, have a capacity to infrastructure programs is critical. While this respond, and do so in ways that are visible to deficit can’t be corrected immediately, an and recognised by the community. apprenticeship-style program that employs local labour on internationally funded Of course, work is needed to ensure that programs is needed, placing equal emphasis traditional law and its processes are on both skills development and infrastructure consistent with formal legal structures and outcomes. Implemented effectively, this actors, and properly acknowledged by them. would delay the completion of projects in the Integrating the two systems to foster a short term, so it must be emphasised that hybrid, relevant and acceptable legal system it will build a skilled domestic workforce in with effective structures to support it will the medium to long term. A critical aspect be a difficult but important task for both is implementation—it isn’t enough to Timorese and international actors. simply expect that contractors are skilled in Improvements in legal and police training and capacity building in developing effectiveness are critical components of countries. Australia must consider ways it the broad social change that’s necessary to can resource organisations to implement this achieve significant reductions in violence most effectively and sustainably. Of course, against women and children and increased such a process is politically and practically physical security for all citizens. complex, but it’s an important opportunity for the development of novel approaches, and A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 35

to continue to work closely with Timor‑Leste’s the move towards models that prioritise skills government to balance the diverse demands transfer in developing countries. for infrastructure, jobs and training. Further attention to domestic security A core challenge in this area will be in in Timor‑Leste is also important. For the addressing wage distortion that’s resulted police and legal systems, there’s broad from the massive international presence scope for continued, sensitive input from in Timor‑Leste in the past decade and the Australia. In this sense, what’s needed is a so-called ‘dollarisation’ of the economy. tandem process of continued support to These factors mean that wages are much the PNTL and continual improvement of higher than those in similar countries, making Australia’s international policing capacity. Timor‑Leste significantly less competitive Complementing this, continued investment internationally. While this will act as a in and support for legal and judicial disincentive for Australian contractors development is critical. implementing training schemes, improving Australia has been a world leader skills will go some way to balancing the in international policing through its discrepancy between wage expectations and establishment of the International skill levels. Deployment Group of the Australian Federal At the same time, continuing to utilise Police (AFP), a ready deployment of police Australia’s development scholarship program available for international operations. to skill Timorese citizens as engineers and The group has demonstrated a desire and project managers will complement labour capacity for continual improvement but, as force development. It will consolidate the with any organisation (particularly those investments made in education delivery expanding in novel ways), there remains since independence, which have allowed room for further development. One key area more Timorese to reach levels of education is the transformation of individual officers compatible with Australian university entry trained to police Australian communities into requirements. For those Timorese who pursue participatory educators, because those are their tertiary studies in Australia, it mustn’t be quite different tasks. forgotten that material support will be critical This is particularly important in the current to their academic success. context, with a disillusioned and fiercely In combination, these programs can independent PNTL under pressure from the contribute to the Timor‑Leste Government’s military, distrustful communities, and the goal of hastening infrastructure development, continuing presence of a UN Police force as well as responding to the social and that comprises people of varying skills, security-related challenges of a large and commitment and approaches to policing. The frustrated labour force with no foreseeable AFP must find a way to support increasingly prospect of employment. It can also independent PNTL leadership in such a way contribute to Timor‑Leste’s ability to build as to be a relevant and influential voice. an environment that has the requisite The AFP’s approach must be grounded physical and human resources for attracting in respectful relationships between the foreign investors. At a time when Australia’s police leaders of each country, with a focus expenditure on technical assistance is under on listening to Timor‑Leste’s goals and review, this shift would be consistent with demonstrating willingness to explore ways to support it in meeting those goals. Only in this 36 Special Report

way can the AFP contribute to the ongoing transform individual officers trained to police training and operation of Timor‑Leste’s police Australian communities into participatory force consistent with policing styles valued educators, both in Timor‑Leste and in other in Australia. deployment zones.

Continued Australian support for and Consolidate relationships between the AFP and collaboration on the legal system are of an increasingly independent PNTL, building vital importance. The aim must be to foster on a foundation of strong and respectful the continued evolution of a Timorese relationships between the police leaders of legal system that embraces positive each country, and with a focus on listening to aspects of both traditional and formal legal Timor‑Leste’s evolving goals and needs and systems—and this needs to be accelerated developing appropriate ways to meet them. so that impunity doesn’t become accepted Foster and accelerate the evolution of the as unavoidable. This can be tied in with the Timorese legal system in a manner that anti-corruption focus that features in the embraces positive aspects of both traditional current aid budget. and formal legal systems, to ensure that the Continued focus on support for strong legal system is more accessible to ordinary anticorruption tools and institutions would citizens and that impunity does not become complement the strengthening of legal accepted as unavoidable. structures and resources, so that Timor‑Leste’s Continue to focus on support for strong citizens may begin to believe that every accountability and anticorruption mechanisms individual will be held accountable for his or and bodies, demonstrating that every citizen her actions, by impartial bodies that have the will be held accountable for his or her actions power to enact legal processes. Language by impartial bodies with the ability to enact is also a critical factor in access to the legal legal responses. system: most ordinary citizens are unable to speak Portuguese (the usual operating Conclusion language of the courts). Timor‑Leste is positioning itself to have a Recommendations strong voice on the global stage, as seen for example in its leadership of the newly formed Develop an apprenticeship-style program that ‘g7+’ group of fragile states, and in its securing employs local labour on internationally funded of an elected position on the Executive Board programs, placing equal emphasis on skills of UN Women. Growing assertiveness is development and infrastructure outcomes. also reflected in public statements by the This must include a commitment to developing nation’s leaders on key domestic and foreign contractor skills in training and capacity policy matters, and with citizens and leaders building in developing countries. expressing frustration at the slow pace of Continue to utilise Australia’s development development since independence, long‑term scholarship program to skill Timorese citizens as planning such as for skills development may engineers and project managers, including by be hard to sell. With socioeconomic and providing strong support for Timorese students security challenges likely to increase, it’s in Australia. doubtful that resources and patience will match the growing need. Continue to develop the skills of the AFP’s International Deployment Group officers to A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 37

In this light, future relationships between structure of Timor-Leste by 2020 and its Timor‑Leste and Australia will hinge on sectoral implications, report to DSTO, Australia demonstrating both high‑level December 2009, Flinders University, engagement (reflected in particular in the Adelaide, p. 38. status of Australians sent there in official 3 Saikia and Hosgelen 2009. capacities) and respect for Timor‑Leste’s autonomy and capacity. This stage of 4 See Muggah and LeBrun (eds) October transition requires trust and flexibility 2010, Timor-Leste Armed Violence from all parties, careful monitoring of Assessment Final Report, Small Arms socioeconomic and security challenges, Survey, Geneva; especially Scambary, and close harmonisation of international ‘Groups and gang violence’, pp. 22–36. interventions. The task is complex, and 5 Maternus Bere was indicted for crimes relies in part on the ability to draw relevant against humanity and captured in lessons from experiences elsewhere and 2010 after entering Timor-Leste; he adapt them to Timor‑Leste’s context. Skilful was released to Indonesian authorities integration of these factors will support without the judicial order required by progress in the areas outlined above and help the constitution. While this sparked to achieve the more positive expectations for public outrage, the responses were Timor‑Leste’s future. peaceful and included a parliamentary no-confidence motion. Endnotes 6 See International Crisis Group 2010, 1 Of the forty lowest ranked nations, ‘Timor‑Leste: time for the UN to step Lesotho and Timor-Leste are the only back’, Asia Briefing 116, 15 December, Dili/ countries showing decline or extremely Brussels, p. 10. marginal improvement on the United Nations Development Programme’s composite Human Development Index. Both countries have measures for less than half of the trend period represented; however other countries with similarly short measurement periods (e.g. Djibouti) show more significant improvement. See United Nations Development Programme 2009, Human Development Report 2009, New York.

2 See Government of Timor-Leste 2009, Working together to build the foundations for peace and security and improve livelihoods of Timorese Citizens: 2008 national priorities, Timor-Leste and Development Partners’ Meeting, Dili, 28–29 March 2009, p. 3; Saikia and Hosgelen 2009, Population growth and 38 Special Report

4 Timor‑Leste: potential for a also shows that Timor‑Leste’s population is prosperous agricultural future heavily concentrated in the western half of the country. Despite the fact that the four James J Fox districts of Manatuto, Baucau, Viqueque and Lautem to the east comprise nearly half the Timor‑Leste’s most recent census (October land area of Timor‑Leste (47%), those districts 2010) puts the country’s population at just have only about a quarter of the country’s 1 over one million: 1,066,582. The census reveals total population (27%).2 that Timor’s population has been growing Recent population figures also reveal the at an annual rate of 2.41% since 2004, the increasing concentration of growth in the highest rate of any Southeast Asian or Pacific capital city, Dili, and its surrounding areas. island state. Thus, despite the ravages and Whereas the country’s population has been disruptions of foreign occupation, warfare and growing at an average rate of 2.4% per year, forced migration, the country’s population has Dili’s has been growing twice as fast at 4.8%. doubled since 1980 and is expected to double As a consequence, just under 22% of the again in less than thirty years. population now resides in the capital (with Population growth and its consequences will some spill-over to the neighbouring areas of be a major factor in Timor‑Leste’s future. If the Aileu, Liquica and Manatuto). country is to achieve sustainable economic To better understand the consequences development and minimise dependence on of population growth and distribution for food imports, the local agricultural industry Timor’s agricultural potential, the government will need to cater for a progressively more could look at a variety of factors, including the highly populated and more urban society. capacity of different districts to absorb and The government has rightfully identified provide for a growing number of inhabitants; food security—regular physical and the quality of local distribution networks and economic access to a basic food supply—as mechanisms for appropriate food allocations; a key priority in its indicative Strategic and the impact of urbanisation and internal Development Plan (2011–2030). As part of migration on the agricultural industry. In its efforts to address the country’s many the absence of improved data collection food security challenges, Timor‑Leste will and analysis methods, significant policy need to understand how population growth, reforms and technological change, such as distribution and composition will affect the population-related trends have the potential supply and demand for agricultural products, to affect food security adversely in the particularly staple foods. coming decades. Drawing upon information from the 2010 census and highlighting priority areas for Agricultural diversity future research and planning would be a The differential distribution of Timor‑Leste’s good starting point. The census shows that rural population has parallels in agriculture. most of Timor’s population (70%) still resides The country can be divided into six broadly in rural areas, with marked differences in defined agro-climatic zones based on altitude population density between districts. For and rainfall. These climate zones are largely example, the population density of the largely the result of a mountainous spine that spans rural district of Ermera (149 people per square the country from east to west. In broad kilometre) is six times that of Manatuto terms, 21% of Timor‑Leste territory is below (24.3 people per square kilometre). The census A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 39

100 metres in elevation, 44% is between example, mung beans are a key crop in two 500 and 1,000 metres, and the rest is higher districts but barely grown in other districts. than 1,000 metres. Each of Timor‑Leste’s There are many reasons for these agronomic agro‑climatic zones has a corresponding, differences: rainfall, elevation and component distinctive cropping pattern.3 soils, but also cultural and historical traditions.

Timor is in an area that’s strongly affected Underpinning all aspects of agricultural by the El Niño – Southern Oscillation (ENSO) production is the general state of the cycle. This means that Timor alternates, in environment. Assessing that state requires a seemingly erratic phases, between periods more nuanced understanding of changes to of drought and heavy rains. Although for the the environment over time, such assessments past decade Timor has experienced more have been given less attention than more La Niña events than El Niño events, over immediate environmental issues. However, the past century periods of El Niño drought it’s critically important to note that data from have been dominant. Indications are that Landsat Mapper reveals a significant level this pattern will continue and the severity of of deforestation and foliage reduction in El Niño phases will probably increase. Timor‑Leste, as well as a marked decline in all major vegetation types for the last decade of Timor’s mountains also influence rainfall the 20th century.4 There’s no indication that patterns, with more precipitation in the this degradation has ceased or decreased. In mountains than on the coast. In effect, fact, there’s considerable evidence to conclude topography and prevailing weather patterns that it has, if anything, continued and possibly produce a second period of seasonal rain increased. This poses formidable problems for for Timor’s south coast. Whereas most of all future development. the north coast has its monsoon rain from December through February, the south coast Agricultural development enjoys additional rains in April, May and June. As a result, the north coast is far drier During the Indonesian occupation, than the south. These patterns are critical considerable resources were directed to to agriculture and to the patterning of local improving local agriculture and significant livelihood activities. improvements in production were achieved, particularly in rice. A combination of Thus, for example, almost 80% of all subsidies and a guaranteed floor price for paddy production is concentrated in five rice contributed to these developments. A of Timor‑Leste’s thirteen districts; 90% of large department of agriculture, with an coffee production is concentrated in four unnecessarily inflated extension service, was central districts, which are not the districts created at the time. that produce the bulk of Timor‑Leste’s rice. The country’s considerable savannah area In step with the UN preference for lean public contributes to local agricultural productivity services, staffing within the then Division of but livestock are unevenly distributed: cattle Agricultural Affairs was reduced considerably are heavily concentrated in three districts, following 1999. Relatively little attention was and many cattle and buffalo are to be found given to the development of local agriculture in the main areas of rice production. Similarly, during these initial UN years. Some of the although maize is generally planted across basic recommendations of the 1999 UN – the whole of Timor‑Leste, secondary crops World Bank Joint Assessment Mission, which have very distinct distribution patterns. For aimed to restore the nation’s agricultural 40 Special Report

capacities, were never implemented and as a deployment of seasonal financing, consequence overall agricultural productivity modern technologies and the benefits of has diminished. Although funding for cutting‑edge research.5 agriculture has increased since independence, Australia is particularly well positioned to the increase has occurred from a low base assist Timor‑Leste in its strategic development with a limited agriculture staff responsible for goals for agriculture. It has considerable the formidable task of developing agriculture expertise in dryland farming and conducts in an exceptionally challenging environment. world-leading research into semitropical With languishing agricultural productivity, agriculture and livestock management. In the Timor‑Leste has been drawn into a cycle of past decade, Australia has provided ‘improved reliance on ever-increasing food imports, inputs’ to agriculture that are essential for particularly of rice, to meet its food needs; future productivity. It also has the capacity $38 million was spent on rice imports in 2009 to build on its experience in Timor and and $42 million has been allocated in the neighbouring areas of Southeast Asia to 2010 budget for continuing rice imports. The cooperate with Timor‑Leste in enhancing its imports, with accompanying subsidies, make agricultural sector. it difficult for local producers to compete and lessen the possibilities of local marketing of The Seeds of Life Project basic food crops in expanding urban areas. The Seeds of Life (SoL) project is Australia’s Although the government has declared most important contribution to the its intention to end reliance on imported development of agriculture in Timor‑Leste. rice, without a robust, substantially more It’s been developed in stages over the developed agricultural capacity such goals are past decade to improve food security at impossible to achieve. a fundamental level. In its initial phase, the Australian Centre for International Plans for the future of agriculture Agricultural Research (ACIAR) took the in Timor‑Leste initiative to coordinate efforts by various Timor‑Leste’s Strategic Development Plan centres within the Consultative Group of (2011–2030) proposes an aspirational, highly International Agricultural Research—a global ambitious development program for the network of international food research nation. The plan calls for the investment institutes—to provide new forms of highly of substantial oil revenues to boost living productive, potentially appropriate seed standards, per capita income and productivity. technology for the major food crops grown in Among its stated goals for the coming decade Timor‑Leste.6 to 2020 is a strong focus on ‘creating the basic Each of the cooperating centres provided conditions for development [of] agricultural specific seed material from its gene bank: productivity and food self-sufficiency’. Agriculture is designated as one of three key • The International Rice Research Institute sectors for the two decades of the plan: in the Philippines contributed a variety of upland and lowland rice varieties. Timor‑Leste is now ripe for a Timor Green • The International Maize and Wheat Revolution, in which the government Centre in Mexico contributed works with smallholder farmers to maize varieties. increase the use of improved inputs through targeted subsidies and the • The International Centre for Tropical Agriculture in Columbia contributed A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 41

cassava, a wide variety of beans phases but will support the government’s (red beans, soybeans, mung beans) ambitions for the rapid development of and cowpeas. Timor‑Leste’s agriculture. • The International Potato Centre in Peru contributed sweet potato varieties. Options for further cooperation • The International Crops Research Australia has the capacity to extend its efforts Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics in India in agriculture by providing the expertise contributed peanut varieties. to help equip MAF for the future tasks envisaged for it in Timor‑Leste’s Strategic All of the introduced materials were then Development Plan. rigorously tested for yield and suitability in different growing environments in For more than a decade now, there’s been cooperation with Timor’s Ministry of no systematic and, as a consequence, no Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF). Controlled reliable gathering of data on Timor‑Leste’s testing began in 2000 and continued until agricultural production. This has wide-ranging 2005. In 2005, ACIAR and AusAID began a implications for national planning. For second, five-year phase (SoL II) of participatory example, the required level of rice imports testing of the most promising of these food can’t be determined with any accuracy if crop varieties in farmers’ fields. In 2008, levels of local production remain uncertain or selected seed varieties were produced for unknown. If Timor‑Leste is to meet its food distribution to farmers. security needs, it’s essential that MAF has the capacity to measure national agricultural A notable feature of the project was its production with reasonable confidence. emphasis on a large number of farm demonstration trials in hundreds of farmers’ During its occupation, Indonesia produced fields (in five of Timor‑Leste’s thirteen a record of agricultural statistics on the districts). Farmers were thus given the production of major food crops in all districts. opportunity to compare their own ‘local’ From field to final report, this was a complex varieties with ‘new’ varieties of corn, sweet process: records were kept in notebooks potato, cassava, peanuts and rice, and and laboriously copied, collated, typed and decide for themselves how they wished to retyped. Some of the data may have been proceed in the future. This relatively open, crude estimation and extrapolation from non-interventionist strategy has provided one year to the next, but a valuable profile a relatively slow but nonetheless effective of Timorese agriculture was lost after the diffusion of seed material among networks of Indonesian departure. related farmers. There’s an opportunity to begin afresh with A further extension of the project (SoL III) a new system of data collection—one that’s was prepared in 2010 to carry the project more efficient, more accurate and more into another phase. This time the project relevant to Timor‑Leste’s needs. This would aims to create a national seed program for involve the development of new skills and the Timor‑Leste and to combine seed production use of new technologies. Undoubtedly, data and distribution efforts with other support formats would resemble previous formats, activities, including improved agronomic but they could be optimally modified. At the practices, reduced storage losses and heart of this transformation would be the use improved rural finance. This next phase of SoL of a comprehensive set of spatial databases will be far more interventionist than previous at the national level, combined with reliable 42 Special Report

crop assessment (‘ground-truthing’) at Pasture and forage crop development are the district level with coordination and an important component of agriculture communication between levels. Training in Timor‑Leste. The development of a in local crop assessment—by no means program aimed at improving pastures and an easy task for swidden agriculture—and enhancing appropriate forage species will the creation of various assessment sites provide a substantial return to the country’s throughout the country to monitor local farmers. Pasture improvement and forage mixed field production would be essential to development will produce positive dividends these efforts.7 for livestock production. Production, especially of Bali cattle, sheep and goats, can be Recommendations significantly increased in the eastern region of Los Palos, the western regions of Maliana and The systems used for agricultural assessment Covalima, and Oecussi. could also be used for the assessment of forest cover and overall vegetative integrity. Australia is a world leader in pasture A functioning system would do more than improvement technologies and in the simply gather information on production; it establishment of livestock raising through would be capable of developing agricultural forage improvement. AusAID projects in the planning and logistics. It would be equally 1980s made an effort to improve pastures critical to conservation planning. in West Timor through the use of stylo grass varieties and Leucaena species for Recommendation: Australia, through AusAID, livestock fattening. should assist Timor‑Leste in developing an Agricultural Data and Planning Unit based on Improving pasture management will also the use of GIS technology.8 require the implementation of a weed control program, encompassing the eradication of Timor‑Leste is part of an area prone to severe weeds that are a major detriment to livestock El Niño droughts. Monitoring local rainfall raising and agriculture. Much of Timor‑Leste, is critically important for cropping advice to but particularly Los Palos and Baucau, are farmers and for the establishment of an early already heavily infested with Siam weed warning system for food security. During the (Chromolaena spp). A set of recommendations Portuguese period, Timor‑Leste had a network for the biological control of Chromolaena of sixty‑seven rain stations throughout the and its replacement with Leucaena have island. The system was taken over in 1975; been clearly articulated for Timor‑Leste, some stations were upgraded, others became although such efforts may be difficult to inoperative. In 1999, the equipment in many implement and may only be achievable over of the lowland stations was destroyed, while an extended period.9 more remote stations became inoperative. The system was partially restored after Recommendation: Australia, through the 2000 but never became fully operative as combined efforts of ACIAR and AusAID, a network, or integrated with a capacity should assist Timor‑Leste in a comprehensive for planning. program of forage crop development, pasture improvement and weed eradication. Recommendation: As part of its efforts to create an Agricultural Data and Planning Unit, Australia should assist Timor‑Leste in the restoration and development of a functioning network of local meteorological stations. A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 43

Conclusion 6 The goals and early stages of the Seeds of Life project are discussed at length in The agronomic complexities of agriculture ‘Agriculture: new directions for a new in Timor‑Leste—the disruptions that nation, East Timor (Timor-Leste)’, ACIAR have occurred to agricultural production Proceedings, no. 113, Canberra, 2003. This capacities and to the rural population in volume contains a range of papers that general since 1999, import policies for examine some of the key challenges of food security, problems of land tenure, agriculture, livestock raising and forestry issues of resettlement (which derive from in Timor-Leste. the Indonesian period as well as recent returns to traditional lands) and the need to 7 Squash/pumpkin is one of the most introduce new technologies—all require the valuable food sources of the local formulation of a comprehensive strategy for population, but its production was the development of agriculture. Australia is never monitored during the Indonesian in a position to offer assistance in developing occupation. It remains, to today, the least and pursuing this strategy and ultimately appreciated major source of subsistence creating a prosperous agricultural future for for the Timorese population. the people of Timor‑Leste. 8 The identification and initial designation of Timor-Leste’s agro-climatic zones, Endnotes which is now used by MAF, was based 1 Sensus Populasaun no Uma Kain 2010: on a project sponsored by AusAID in Resultado Preliminariu, Outobru 2010, its Agricultural and Regional Planning Direcção Nacional de Estatística. Assistance Program East Timor. AusAID has already supported the development 2 This is even more striking, given the of a system similar to the one proposed relatively large urban community in the here for Papua New Guinea based on town of Baucau. the PNG Resource Information System 3 James J Fox, ‘Diversity and differential and the Mapping Agricultural Systems of development in East Timor: potential PNG Project. problems and future possibilities’, in Hal 9 See Rachel C McFadden, ‘Chromolaena Hill and João Mariano Saldanha (eds), East in Southeast Asia and the Pacific’, in Timor: development challenges for the ‘Agriculture: new directions for a new world’s newest nation, Asia Pacific Press, nation, East Timor (Timor-Leste)’, ACIAR Canberra, pp.155–173. Proceedings, no. 113, Canberra, 2003, 4 George A Bouma and Halina T Kobryn pp. 130–134. In that volume is also an 2004, ‘Change in vegetation cover in East important paper by Colin Piggin on ‘The Timor, 1889–1999’, in Nature Resources role of Leucaena in swidden cropping and Forum 28:1–12. livestock production’ (pp. 115–129).

5 Government of Timor-Leste, On road to peace and prosperity: Timor-Leste’s Strategic Development Plan, 2011–2030, 7 April 2010, Office of the Prime Minister, summary, p. 17. 44 Special Report

5 The maritime interests of Maritime knowledge and awareness are basic Timor‑Leste requirements for managing national maritime interests. They involve an understanding that Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin problems at sea are interrelated, of how the international maritime industry functions, of Maritime issues offer fertile ground for the roles of maritime security forces, of the fostering good relations between Australia relevant international legal frameworks, and and Timor‑Leste. Common interests in the of the benefits to be gained by participation maritime domain include security, resource in international maritime regimes. These development and marine environmental attributes are lacking in Timor‑Leste protection, which are all areas of Australian at present. The International Maritime expertise. There would be considerable Organization (IMO) Convention is the only mutual benefit in Australia assisting maritime convention that’s been ratified by Timor‑Leste to develop its capacity to manage the Timor‑Leste Government. these ocean interests. Progress in developing institutional Maritime issues in Timor‑Leste arrangements for managing national maritime interests has also been hindered Maritime issues, including maritime security, by conflicting advice from different are new concerns for Timor‑Leste. Although sources—Portugal, Australia, the US, living on an island, the Timorese lack a various UN agencies and other overseas maritime culture: they’re an agricultural advisers and consultants from various people, rather than seafarers. There’s been backgrounds. Furthermore, advice is usually almost no investment in maritime industry. offered at the level of individual agencies: a Until recently, with the advent of oil and gas whole‑of-government approach to managing developments in the Timor Sea, the Timorese national maritime interests and interagency haven’t looked upon the sea as having any coordination isn’t apparent. great economic potential. Natural environment Delays and conflicting advice The land area of Timor‑Leste is approximately The complex legislation and institutional 15,000 square kilometres of mainly rugged arrangements required to manage national terrain. It comprises the eastern part of the maritime interests tend to be overwhelming island of Timor; the Oecussi enclave to the for the bureaucracy in Dili: little progress has west, separated from the main part of the been made in establishing arrangements country by about 60 kilometres of Indonesian for managing maritime affairs. The delays territory; and two islands, Atauro Island are frequently attributed to the need to first offshore from Dili and Jaco Island at the establish a National Maritime Authority eastern extremity of Timor. (NMA), apparently to be responsible for the The country is under the influence of two entirety of maritime affairs. This planned sets of monsoonal conditions: the northwest institution has come to be seen as the or wet monsoon between about November solution to all maritime problems, but little and April each year that brings storms and progress has been made towards actually flooding, and the southeast or dry monsoon establishing it. between about May and October that brings strong winds to the south of the island. The A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 45

occasional periods of rough sea conditions boundaries with Indonesia to the east, west in the south are a major consideration in and north around the main territory and the assessing the maritime requirements of Oecussi enclave, and to the south with both Timor‑Leste. Much of the country’s maritime Australia and Indonesia. activity, including maritime surveillance and enforcement, will be on that side of the island. With Indonesia

Timor‑Leste is exposed to natural disasters. At this stage, no maritime boundaries The country is in an area of high seismic have been agreed between Indonesia and activity with risks of earthquakes and Timor‑Leste. Delimiting those boundaries tsunamis. Earthquakes can cause significant is likely to be difficult, but negotiations damage, including landslides, destroyed or have been delayed pending the countries’ damaged housing, and roads and bridges agreement on disputed land boundaries. rendered impassable. Seasonal monsoonal rains and strong winds or cyclones in Before Timorese independence in 1999, the Timor Sea can also destroy housing Indonesia had a full set of archipelagic and infrastructure. baselines covering all of Timor. Then, in 2009, Indonesia promulgated a revised set Maritime boundaries of archipelagic baselines that took account, The domestic law relating to the maritime among other things, of the independence 2 boundaries of Timor‑Leste is contained in of Timor‑Leste. The revised system in the Law No. 7/2002.1 Under that law, Timor‑Leste vicinity of Timor (see Figure 1) joined the has declared a 12 nautical mile (nm) territorial southernmost points of the Indonesian sea, a 24 nm contiguous zone, and a 200 nm islands stretching from east of Timor to exclusive economic zone (EEZ). midway along the south coast of Alor Island, from where the baselines continued to a point The situation with maritime boundaries on Timor, which is the northern terminus of is complex. Timor‑Leste requires maritime

Figure 1: Indonesia’s revised baselines around Timor

Prepared by I Made Andi Arsana of the Department of Geodetic Engineering, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia 46 Special Report

the main land border between Indonesian Drawing maritime boundaries between West Timor and Timor‑Leste. Timor‑Leste and the Indonesian islands to the north and east will also be difficult, The baseline segment between Alor Island particularly around the Timor‑Leste island and Timor is problematic: it places the of Atauro. The Indonesian baseline system Oecussi enclave of Timor‑Leste within affords Atauro almost no territorial sea to Indonesia’s baseline system. This is contrary its north. The gap between the Indonesian to UNCLOS Article 47 (5), which provides that islands and Timor‑Leste varies from about archipelagic baselines ‘shall not be applied 15 to 40 miles. If a line of equidistance is used, by an archipelagic State in such a manner as one issue will be whether the Indonesian to cut off from the high seas or the exclusive baselines or Indonesian land territory is used economic zone the territorial sea of another for determining equidistance. state.’ Timor‑Leste may push for some form of channel or corridor linking a maritime area off Oecussi to the main area of Timor‑Leste.

Figure 2: Joint Petroleum Development Area

Source: Reproduced courtesy of Geosciences Australia, June 2004 MP 2004/613.3 A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 47

With Australia discontinuity in the boundaries that became known as the ‘Timor Gap’ adjacent to the The distance between the northwest coast (then) Portuguese colony of Timor. of Australia and the island of Timor is less The 2002 Timor Sea Treaty between than 400 nm. This means that Australia Australia and Timor‑Leste established the requires EEZ and continental shelf boundaries Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) in the Timor Sea with both Indonesia in the Timor Gap area (see Figure 2). This is and Timor‑Leste. Similarly, Indonesia and an interim agreement without prejudice to Timor‑Leste require boundaries with each future negotiations on maritime boundaries. other, as well as trilateral agreement with Australia conceded significant rights to Australia at the ‘turning points’ where the Timor‑Leste in the treaty, possibly reflecting various bilateral boundaries between the some weakening over the past thirty years three countries intersect. or so of arguments for maritime boundaries Australia claims a continental shelf in based on natural prolongation. However, the Timor Sea on the basis of the major there remain perceptions that Australia gave geomorphological feature known as the away too much with the treaty.4 Timor Trough. This is about 3,000 metres deep and lies only about 30–60 nm off the Maritime administration south coast of Timor.3 Australia’s seabed boundary agreements with Indonesia in the Timor‑Leste appears to be adopting a Timor and Arafura seas were negotiated Portuguese model (see Box 1) for the on the basis of natural prolongation of the management of maritime affairs through continental shelf. However, those boundaries the planned NMA. This will give considerable were agreed upon before the Indonesian authority to the Ministry of Defence in the occupation of Timor‑Leste and there was a field of oceans management and policy.

Box 1: The Portuguese model

Portugal has adopted an integrated and to protect Portugal’s sovereignty and comprehensive ocean policy (the National fulfil international commitments, and Marine Strategy) for the governance of all coastguard missions to provide maritime maritime affairs. security and safety in Portuguese territorial waters and areas of influence. The Inter-Ministerial Marine Affairs Commission has been set up under the It also manages marine scientific and National Ministry of Defence to coordinate, hydrographic programs, and includes support and evaluate the implementation the National Maritime Coordinating of the National Marine Strategy. Centre (Centro Nacional Coordenador Marítimo) and the navy’s Maritime The commander of the Portuguese Operations Centre (COMAR—Centro de Navy is the head of the National Operações Marítimas). Maritime Authority. Sources: ‘Portugal, a maritime nation’, http:// www.marinha.pt/PT/noticiaseagenda/doutrina/ The Portuguese Navy has a dual role: Documents/Portugal_a_maritime_nation.pdf; conducting naval combat missions National Ocean Policy of Portugal. 48 Special Report

The Timorese Secretary of State for Defence clear that the planned NMA will have a much has described the NMA as follows: wider role than the Australian organisation.

The National Maritime Authority will In Australian terms, the NMA will combine form the focal point for maritime security the roles of the Border Protection Command, policy coordination and the subsequent the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, operational application of this policy. This and Australian Search and Rescue, as well as Authority shall be made up of military the maritime functions of other Australian and civilian representatives of all relevant Government departments and agencies, domestic agencies with a stake in this such as the Department of Infrastructure process. The collocation of these personnel and Transport and the Department of will enable real time coordination and the Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population ability for interagency responses to be and Communities. The feasibility of such a developed to respond to evolving security monolithic structure is questionable, even for threats. This Authority will also become a relatively small country. the hub of Government coordination on While the relationship between the NMA and a range of operational issues within the the Timor‑Leste defence force (the F‑FDTL) maritime domain.5 and police (the PNTL) isn’t yet clear, it seems The maritime roles and functions that will be likely that the Ministry of Defence and the performed by the NMA are set out in Box 2. defence force will have prominent roles, with It’s possible that the authority may also the F‑FDTL Naval Component commander have some role in maritime infrastructure becoming the head of the NMA. But so far development and aspects of marine industry. there’s been no significant discussion of the While Australia’s Border Protection Command NMA. A working group is to be established by has been mentioned as a possible model, it’s the Council of Ministers, but hasn’t yet met.

Box 2: Maritime roles and functions

1. Maritime security policies and 5. Marine navigational aids and services operations to protect the nation 6. Ship and personnel safety services, against a range of threats, both marine surveys, port state control, traditional and non-traditional marine accident investigations, 2. Maritime surveillance and boating safety, marine qualifications enforcement of national laws in the and crewing standards maritime zones 7. Marine scientific research and 3. Maritime safety services, including hydrographic surveys search and rescue operations, distress 8. Humanitarian assistance and disaster systems and safety communications relief, by coordinating the maritime 4. Marine environmental protection, response to humanitarian disasters including prevention and mitigation of 9. Political–military activities in support marine pollution and management of of foreign and defence policy. sensitive sea areas and marine parks A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 49

The NMA has some appeal but fundamental Maritime infrastructure issues remain, including the clear delineation of the roles of the defence force and police, The maritime transport sector, along with the overlap between the security and the road and aviation sectors, has the maritime sectors, and civilian oversight of potential to deliver major social and economic the NMA. development benefits.7 However, maritime infrastructure is currently almost totally Maritime economy lacking in Timor‑Leste. There are no slipping or ship repair facilities anywhere in the country. Economic priorities As a consequence, naval patrol boats have had to travel to Surabaya to slip. While offshore oil and gas revenues underpin the country’s economic future, not much The National Infrastructure Development Plan attention’s been given to the maritime includes port development. Japan is assisting sector in national economic development. with refurbishing the port of Dili through the The overall development priority has been to Japan Port Aid Project, but Dili isn’t suitable address economic stagnation and mobilise for further expansion due to its restricted economic activity.6 navigational approaches and its location in the town area. Land isn’t available for Oil and gas revenues are growing rapidly. port expansion. Current production revenue is from the Bayu–Undan gas field, which is expected to As a consequence, a new port is planned yield US$9.4 billion over the next fifteen years for Tibar to the west of Dili. This will be a or so. The Greater Sunrise field will be the multipurpose port, including an oil terminal, next major development, with revenues of a cruise liner berth, a container terminal, and US$24 billion over the life of the field (about a ship repair and maintenance facility. There thirty years). Australia and Timor‑Leste have are also plans to build a new port at Suai on agreed to share revenues from Greater Sunrise the southern side of the island to service the on a 50/50 basis, but there’s no agreement yet offshore oil and gas industry and to provide on how to develop the field, including where an operating base for naval vessels. However, the gas will be processed. the southern coastline is open and port development will be expensive. Addressing the problem of youth unemployment is a major economic and social Maritime sector development priority. Youth unemployment is extremely high, particularly in Dili and Baucau. The maritime economic sector in Timor‑Leste The 15–29 age group represents about 40% comprises offshore oil and gas, shipping, of the population, but has few marketable fisheries and marine tourism. There’s no ship skills and an unemployment rate of about repair or boatbuilding industry, although 43%. Socioeconomic factors, including high the potential for such industries exists. levels of youth unemployment, fuelled the Development and viability studies of the 2006 crisis. However, job creation and private maritime sector have been proposed to sector investment in the non-oil sector both examine the potential opportunities in the remain low. maritime domain. Particular reference has been made to a study of the scenarios for sustainable receipts arising from a tax on shipping in the straits of Ombai and Wetar. 50 Special Report

However, such a move would be contrary to the important IMO conventions for ship most interpretations of the international law safety, security and marine environmental of the sea. protection. There are no arrangements for licensing, certification of seafarers and Oil and gas vessels; responsibility for those activities rests with the harbourmaster, who carries most of The petroleum sector has been solely the responsibilities for administering ports responsible for the strong growth in the gross and shipping. The port of Dili doesn’t comply domestic product (GDP) of Timor‑Leste since with the International Ship and Port Facility 2004–05. Real petroleum GDP has grown Security (ISPS) Code. by 991%, compared with a growth in real non-petroleum GDP of only 1%. However, Fisheries those figures aren’t reflected in employment data; the proportion of Timorese employed in The fisheries sector is also seriously the petroleum sector is minute (0.07%). underdeveloped, although Australia has already been providing some assistance, Some support for the offshore oil and gas including in training fisheries managers. sector is conducted through Timor‑Leste; There’s no organised commercial fishing personnel and supplies move through Dili industry in Timor‑Leste, and indigenous Airport. This will increase dramatically when fishermen sell their catch at local markets. the infrastructure developments on the south About 5,300 East Timorese are understood to coast are completed. work as fishermen.

Shipping No foreign fishing vessels are licensed to fish in Timorese waters. Illegal, unreported Shipping and cargo traffic into and out of and unregulated (IUU) fishing is believed to Timor‑Leste has grown at a steady pace be rife, causing an estimated loss of income over recent years (see Table 1). The port of of about $36 million per year. There are no Dili handles about 80% of incoming cargo, fisheries licensing arrangements, immature and cargo traffic is predicted to continue vessel monitoring data systems, limited staff rising rapidly. capacity and minimal ability to do anything Arrangements for the administration of about IUU fishing. Timor‑Leste intends, shipping and other maritime activities however, to develop a licensing system and are seriously underdeveloped at present. plans to sell five commercial fishing licences Timor‑Leste hasn’t yet ratified any of to vessels from Japan and South Korea. Some

Table 1: Vessel and cargo movement, port of Dili, 2005 to 2009 Year No. of vessels Container Containter General cargo General cargo Imports (TEUs) Exports (TEUs) Imports (ton/m3) Exports (ton/m3) 2005 242 7,640 7,514 57,885.27 5,307.82 2006 234 8,232 6,909 110,221.11 49.89 2007 278 11,208 10,990 126,171.55 1,658.67 2008 349 12,069 10,798 133,984.00 289.30 2009 343 16,492 15,947 155,487.70 0.00 Totals 1,446 55,641 52,158 583,749.63 7,305.68 TEU = twenty-foot equivalent unit (intermodal shipping container) A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 51

success against IUU fishing was achieved Marine environmental protection in October 2010 when a joint operation by the national police (Policia Nacional de Timor‑Leste lies within the ‘Coral Triangle’ and Timor‑Leste, or PNTL) Marine Patrol Unit and participates in the Coral Triangle Initiative, the Falintil–Timor‑Leste Defence Force (Forças which includes Indonesia, the Philippines, de Defesa de Timor‑Leste, or F‑FDTL) Naval Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands Component apprehended an Indonesian and Malaysia. This organisation addresses vessel fishing illegally in Timor‑Leste’s waters; sustainable development, food security the fishermen received sentences of between and marine biodiversity concerns in the three months (30 men) and twelve months Coral Triangle Initiative area. Australia is a (two men). The authorities acted after ‘development partner’ in the initiative. they’d received information from the local Timor‑Leste is endowed with rich natural community living on the southeast coast of resources. It’s important that the country the country. improve its management of coastal and The Regional Plan of Action (RPOA) for marine resources to ensure food security fisheries in Southeast Asia has identified and livelihood management. In recent years, priority areas for capacity building in Timor‑Leste has made some progress in the region: marine and coastal resource management, • implementing systems and requirements including the completion of a coastal and to verify that fish catches aren’t derived marine habitat survey; mapping and species from IUU activities identification; a river catchment and marine productivity assessment; the establishment of • flag state control over fishing vessels marine protected areas; and the development operating beyond the territorial sea and of ecotourism. EEZs of RPOA participating countries • regulation of transhipment activities Timor‑Leste is an active participant in the Partnerships in the Environmental • modernisation of fisheries legislation Management for the Seas of East Asia across RPOA participating countries, (PEMSEA) organisation. It supports consistent with RPOA objectives.8 the continuous implementation of the Sustainable Development Strategy for the Marine tourism Seas of East Asia, and has pledged to provide Marine tourism is a potentially major area of financial support to PEMSEA activities economic development that could provide amounting to US$100,000 on an annual basis. much-needed employment and additional Oil spill response is the current responsibility national income for Timor‑Leste. Ecotourism of marine police, the fire department and and diving-based tourist activities are already the Ministry of Infrastructure. However, making a significant contribution to national the appropriate response equipment isn’t and local economies. Further development of available; in the event of a severe oil spill, marine tourism will require better maritime it would have to be flown in from Australia infrastructure and marine safety services than or Singapore. As the fire on board the currently exist. West Atlas oil rig in the Timor Sea and the associated oil leak in 2009 demonstrated, Timor‑Leste is vulnerable to environmental 52 Special Report

damage from accidents on board oil and gas there’s a modicum of control in and around rigs in the Timor Sea. This is particularly so Dili, the rest of Timor‑Leste is wide open to in the southeasterly season, when Timor is illegal movements of goods into or out of the downwind from a possible accident. The West country. Dili and Baucau are the only official Atlas accident caused extensive damage to ports of entry into Timor‑Leste, but small marine habitats in Indonesia. craft from Indonesia regularly enter and leave Timorese waters without any form of control. Maritime security At present, the authorities in Dili know little about what happens in national waters. Maritime threats Authorities in Dili also suspect the fraudulent The maritime threat environment faced by use of containers entering the country from Timor‑Leste is relatively benign, although Australia, Singapore and Thailand. This there’s been no comprehensive analysis of might include secreting contraband (such as possible threats. Increasing attention is being cigarettes) in legitimate cargo; substituting paid to maritime border protection, which contraband for a legal cargo; or packing is now a priority for both the defence force legitimate cargo (for example, bottled water) and the police. Little attention is given to at the front of a container and contraband the broader regional strategic environment; (such as beer) at the back. some appreciation is given to the risk of Piracy and IUU fishing instability in neighbouring areas of Indonesia affecting Timor‑Leste. Piracy isn’t a problem at present for Timor‑Leste. There have been no incidents People smuggling of piracy or armed robbery against ships People smuggling is a potential problem in Timorese waters or, in recent years, in for Timor‑Leste, as people attempt to use adjacent areas of eastern Indonesia. As noted the island as a stepping stone to Australia above, IUU fishing is a major problem for or asylum seekers make Timor‑Leste itself Timor‑Leste, particularly in southern areas. a destination. The latter situation might Strategic plan come about if religious problems arise in neighbouring areas of West Papua and the The strategic vision for the defence and Malukus and Christians flee to Timor‑Leste. security of Timor‑Leste is provided by the Movement of people in and out of Indonesia Force 2020 plan, developed with the support is particularly difficult to police. of the Australian Government and made public in 2007.9 The plan was later criticised Other trafficking by the UN and the governments of Australia Due to the lack of adequate border protection and the US as unaffordable and in excess of in Timor‑Leste, there’s a significant problem Timor‑Leste’s needs. However, it remains on with dutiable goods entering the country the table as the basis for security and defence without payment of duty. Petrol, cigarettes, planning in Dili. diesel and alcohol are cheaper in Indonesia Force 2020 surveys the strategic environment, than in Timor‑Leste, and there are incentives identifies future challenges and provides to smuggle those goods into the country. guidance on strategic response. It Conversely, rice is subsidised in Timor‑Leste acknowledges the critical strategic location and may be smuggled out to Indonesia. While A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 53

of Timor‑Leste, adjacent to major sea lines of However, the division of responsibilities communication (SLOCs) and near to poor, and between these bodies is unclear. With its potentially unstable, provinces of Indonesia. small size and unresolved boundaries, the The plan recognises the importance of Oecussi enclave poses particular problems developing a trilateral security dialogue for border management.11 A comprehensive between Canberra, Jakarta and Dili. legal framework for law enforcement at sea is currently lacking. Force 2020 draws a distinction between military defence and a more enlarged Maritime security forces concept that includes non-military defence. Following more of a Portuguese approach to Maritime security is provided by the F‑FDTL defence and security than an Australian or US Naval Component and the Maritime Unit of model, the plan supports the more enlarged the PNTL. concept as the basis for defence planning in Timor‑Leste that includes a range of social, Defence force political and economic activities. The F‑FDTL has four components: Army, Navy, Recognising the island nature of the country, Training and Support. An air component is Force 2020 stresses the need for a naval planned. The total strength of the F‑FDTL is component in the F‑FDTL. Specific roles about 1,400, of whom about 240 are in the mentioned are ‘to carry out EEZ surveillance, Naval Component. In September 2010, about patrol the SLOCs, escort and assure the safe 150 new naval recruits were being trained by passage of oil tankers and guarantee the a Portuguese naval training team. Some of 10 security of oil platforms’. The plan criticises them will be marines. post-independence studies sponsored by the UN that concluded that Timor‑Leste didn’t The Naval Component will be maintained as need a naval component and should rely part of the F‑FDTL, although, following the instead on a small customs and excise service Portuguese model, it will have a dual function for border and fisheries protection. Under the and operate effectively as a coastguard. Force 2020 plan, the F‑FDTL Naval Component However, the idea of redesignating the may eventually be expanded to a light patrol Naval Component as the Coast Guard is force equipped with corvette-sized ships and not supported. landing craft. Police force Maritime border protection and maritime policing The strength of the PNTL is 3,500, of whom about 50 are in the Maritime Unit. The Border protection and maritime policing Maritime Unit was transferred from UN in the maritime zones are major priorities control to the PNTL in 2009. It remains a for the security forces of Timor‑Leste. The young force still largely dependent on the Commander of the Defence Force recognises UN Police (UNPOL). this and is giving priority to the development Most of the Maritime Unit is currently of the F‑FDTL Naval Component. Three based in Dili, with a section at Atabae near security bodies are involved in providing the Indonesian border on the north coast. maritime border protection: police, military However, there are plans to expand the and intelligence. Coordination is through unit to nine bases with 150 personnel, and the Border Operations Coordination Council. 54 Special Report

to tighten controls over vessels entering to perform surveillance in border areas. No Timor‑Leste waters. formal division of responsibilities appears to exist between the Naval Component and Existing personnel in the Maritime Unit are the Maritime Unit. The Organic Law speaks believed to have good small craft experience of security of the coastal area, although in and coxswain skills. Extensive training has practice this is believed to be within the 12 nm been provided overseas, including search and territorial sea. rescue training in Japan. The US is funding boat ramps as part of a US$1.5 million Existing capabilities assistance program, and the United Nations Development Programme is funding The current vessels of the F‑FDTL are shown safety equipment. in Box 3. All are based at the one naval base at Port Hera, about thirty minutes by road to the Legal framework east of Dili.

The Organic Law of the PNTL established The Albatros class patrol boats are old vessels in 200912 recognises that the crisis of 2006 originally donated by Portugal in 2002. showed deficiencies in the initial model of However, they were refitted in Surabaya in the PNTL established after independence. 2008 and that may extend their lives by a few The new law provides the police with a larger more years. They have limited capabilities and operational capacity and an efficient chain of seem to be mainly used for training, although command within a clearly defined hierarchy. It they could undertake patrols in northern doesn’t envisage a military role for the PNTL. waters. They’re unsuitable for any operations on the south side of the island. The charter for the Maritime Unit of the PNTL is contained in Article 32 of the Organic Law The Type 62 Shanghai class boats are new for the PNTL. It includes missions to prevent vessels bought from China in 2010, and crimes at sea and illegal immigration, to five Chinese advisers remain in country to safeguard human life at sea, to preserve assist with training and maintenance. The and protect the marine environment and craft are really coastal gunboats and are

Box 3: F‑FDTL Naval Component patrol boats

• 2 x Albatros class: Atauro and Oecussi • 2 x Type 62 Shanghai class: Jaco and Betano - Length 22 metres - Length 43 metres - 60 tons - 193 tons - Built in Portugal, mid-1970s - Built in China, 2009–2010 - One 12.7 mm machine gun - 2 x 30 mm single-barrel Bofors - Maximum speed about 11 knots and 2 x 14.5 mm twin-barrel - Range probably less than machine guns 300 nm - Maximum speed 28 knots

- Range 750 nm A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 55

over-armed for routine offshore maritime There are two foreign advisers with the surveillance and law enforcement operations. maritime section of the PNTL (one Australian, They have numerous other deficiencies for one Spanish), although the Australian (an that role: short range, low freeboard, and UNPOL placement) is near the end of his lack of efficient arrangements for launching posting in Dili. With UN support, a diving small craft. They’re also over-armed for a team has been established. US Coast Guard constabulary role, and maintenance of their training teams also regularly visit to conduct weapons might become a problem. With a training for both the Naval Component and transit distance of about 250 nm to possible the police. operating areas off the south coast, they’re not capable of sustaining a patrol for any Coordination length of time in those waters. Problems are evident in interagency In addition to the naval patrol boats, the coordination, including between the Naval maritime police have rigid inflatable boats Component of the F‑FDTL and the PNTL. and a 9‑metre half cabin cruiser. New rigid The two forces both have roles in maritime inflatables are being purchased. Customs also security, but lack clear mandates as to who has some small craft. is responsible for what. The navy has the South Korea has offered to supply one small assets but naval personnel lack policing patrol boat and one 38‑metre vessel. The powers under current legislation. Conversely, latter is probably a Chamsuri class vessel, large the marine police have the powers but lack numbers of which were built in the 1970s. capabilities. No arrangements currently exist As newer, more capable patrol craft enter for the embarkation of PNTL officers in naval South Korean naval service, the Chamsuri class patrol boats to conduct law enforcement boats are slowly being retired. Four have been at sea. transferred previously to Bangladesh, three to Kazakhstan and eight to the Philippines. Key Australian interests

Base facilities Security and resource interests

The naval base at Port Hera has limited Australia has extensive security and repair and maintenance facilities. Australia is resource interests in the Timor Sea. The assisting with the refurbishment of some of area is extremely rich in undersea oil and the buildings at Port Hera. gas resources, and major developments are underway. Further discoveries are possible. Foreign advisers The Timor Sea also has valuable fish stocks vulnerable to IUU fishing. The Naval Component has a heavy The Timor Sea is a vital part of the maritime dependence on foreign maritime advisers. approaches to Australia. It is a well-used There are five permanent advisers from the route for the illegal entry of people, drugs Portuguese Navy plus a ‘fly in’ naval training and other contraband from Southeast Asia team of ten to conduct basic training. As into Australia. mentioned above, five Chinese advisers are in country to assist with the Shanghai class The importance and challenges of the area vessels. There’s one Royal Australian Navy have grown as a result of the emergence (RAN) adviser and an RAN Chief Petty Officer. of Timor‑Leste as an independent state, 56 Special Report

Australia’s broader strategic engagement protection and marine scientific research in with Indonesia, and the opening up of new the Timor Sea. However, Timor‑Leste hasn’t reserves of oil and gas in the Timor Sea and yet ratified UNCLOS. adjacent waters. A stable Timor‑Leste is a Some arrangements for cooperation in the key security interest for Australia, along with Timor and Arafura seas are in place through the maintenance of good relations with both the Arafura and Timor Sea Experts Forum, the Indonesia and Timor‑Leste. members of which are Australia, Indonesia Australia has a vital interest in the and Timor‑Leste. The forum seeks to fulfil maintenance of good order in the Timor the obligations of the three countries under Sea. It’s important that weak domestic law UNCLOS Part IX. Particular concerns are the enforcement capabilities in Timor‑Leste prevention of IUU fishing, and information don’t create a situation in which the country and data sharing. The forum has developed becomes a transit point for people-smuggling the Arafura and Timor Seas Ecosystem and illegal trafficking into Australia of drugs Action program to work on ecosystem-based or other contraband, as well as a support base management of the two seas, which have for IUU fishing in Australian waters. Australia a rich abundance of fisheries resources and has arrangements to prevent IUU fishing in extensive marine biodiversity. the Timor Sea with Indonesia but not yet However, uncertainty remains, particularly with Timor‑Leste. The southern waters of about maritime boundaries and resource Timor‑Leste are understood to provide a safe management regimes in the area. Neither haven for ‘mother ships’ supporting illegal Australia nor Indonesia has ratified their fishing activity in Australia’s EEZ. Sri Lankan comprehensive 1997 maritime boundary refugees have tried to enter Australia illegally agreement in the Timor and Arafura seas.13 from Timor‑Leste, and there have also been The subsequent treaties between Australia attempts at smuggling drug precursors from and Timor‑Leste don’t establish maritime Timor‑Leste to Australia. boundaries, and there are indications that, Australia has an interest in the security as indicated in Figure 3, Timor‑Leste may of shipping passing near Timor‑Leste. The seek eventually to push out the north–south Ombai and Wetar straits are used extensively lateral limits of the Timor Gap established by shipping bound to and from northwest by Indonesia and Australia.14 That would be Australian ports and Torres Strait. strongly opposed by both Indonesia and Australia. These problems with maritime Good governance in the Timor Sea boundaries hinder the development of governance arrangements in the Timor Sea. The Timor Sea links Australia with Indonesia and Timor‑Leste. Arrangements for good The 1997 treaty created a complex maritime governance of the Timor Sea are important boundary system of overlapping jurisdictions to all three littoral countries. The geography on either side of the Timor Gap, with an of the area dictates the need for a high level Indonesian EEZ coincident with an Australian 15 of maritime cooperation in all aspects of continental shelf. Ultimately, the success maritime governance. The three countries and stability of the regime for resource have an obligation under Part IX of the development in the Timor Sea will depend on 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the good political relations between the littoral Sea (UNCLOS) to cooperate on resource countries—both bilaterally and trilaterally. management, marine environmental It’s a key strategic interest for Australia to A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 57

Figure 3: Prospective Timor-Leste maritime boundary claims

Source: East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN), ETAN Statement on Timor‑Leste/Australian Maritime Arrangement, http://www.etan.org/news/2006/01timsea.htm. Map created and copyrighted to La’o Hamutuk (The Timor-Leste Institute for Development Monitoring and Analysis). do what it can to ensure that those relations for the ADF is to contribute to stability are maintained. and security in the South Pacific and East Timor. Timor‑Leste in Australia’s defence policy This involves conducting military Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper operations, in coalition with others as connects Timor‑Leste with the South Pacific: required, including in relation to protecting our nationals, providing disaster relief and For both humanitarian and strategic humanitarian assistance, and on occasion reasons, Australia has an enduring by way of stabilisation interventions …17 interest in helping to build stability in this region. Australian interests are inevitably Australia will continue to have particular engaged if countries in the region become responsibilities to assist our neighbours in vulnerable to the adverse influence of dealing with humanitarian and disaster strategic competition.16 relief needs, and to support their security and stability.18 After ensuring the defence of Australia from direct attack, the second priority task Australia’s conflation of Timor‑Leste with the South Pacific can sit badly in Dili. The 58 Special Report

East Timorese regard themselves as part of the Timor Sea. This cooperative endeavour is Southeast Asia, with different problems and covered by a complex framework of treaties prospects from those of the Pacific island (see Box 4). countries. This attitude was very evident in Timor‑Leste’s rejection of Australia’s offer Recommendations of participation in the Pacific Patrol Boat Despite the common maritime interests of Program—the name itself was a ‘turn-off’ for Australia and Timor‑Leste, maritime issues some in Timor-Leste. Suspicion of Australia’s have often had a negative impact on the intentions was also a factor in Timor‑Leste’s two nations’ bilateral relations rather than a rejection of Australia’s offer of contracted positive one. There’s ongoing disagreement aerial assistance, although the desire to first about the exploitation of the oil and gas establish an NMA was cited as the reason. resources of the Timor Sea, and Australia’s Treaty framework attempts to persuade Timor‑Leste to join the Pacific Patrol Boat Program were perceived as 19 Australia and Timor‑Leste have agreed to ‘clumsy, almost post-colonial’. cooperate in the development of resources A view still exists in Timor‑Leste that the in the JPDA and the Greater Sunrise field in allocation of oil and gas revenues from

Box 4: Treaty framework

• The 2002 Timor Sea Treaty is an neither Australia nor Timor‑Leste interim agreement without prejudice shall assert its claims to sovereign to maritime boundary claims. It rights and jurisdiction and maritime specifies the shared arrangements boundaries for the period of the for the JPDA, giving Timor‑Leste 90% treaty (fifty years). The CMATS Treaty of petroleum production revenues also prescribes the arrangements for from within the JPDA. It creates a joint distributing revenue derived from commission to establish policies and exploitation of the JPDA; allows regulations for the JPDA. Bayu–Undan Timor‑Leste to exercise water column is currently the only operating field in (fisheries) jurisdiction within the the JPDA. JPDA; and provides for a Maritime Commission to constitute a focal point • The Petroleum (Timor Sea Treaty) for bilateral consultations on maritime Act 2003 gives effect to the Timor matters of interest to the parties. Sea Treaty between Australia and Timor‑Leste. The treaty provides • The 2003 International Unitisation a framework for the exploration, Agreement for Greater Sunrise development and exploitation of the provides the secure legal and petroleum resources in the JPDA. regulatory environment required for the development of the Greater • The 2006 Treaty between Australia Sunrise gas reservoirs. Of those, 20.1% and East Timor on Certain Maritime fall within the JPDA and 79.9% are in Arrangements in the Timor Sea areas where Australia has continental (the CMATS Treaty) is another shelf jurisdiction. interim agreement. It states that A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 59

the Timor Sea is unfair. This now extends Institutional arrangements to the notion that the processing plant for the Greater Sunrise field should be located Institutional arrangements for managing on Timorese soil rather than in Australia or maritime interests at the national level constructed as a floating plant.20 comprise government departments and agencies with clearly defined responsibilities. The previous lack of appreciation in Duplication of responsibilities and effort must Timor‑Leste of the significance of the be avoided, and procedures should be in place maritime domain to the country’s future to ensure interagency coordination. prosperity and security is echoed in the relative lack of priority given to maritime At a regional level, arrangements are required needs in Australian assistance to Timor‑Leste. for cooperation between the agencies With the exceptions of fisheries and related of neighbouring countries with similar marine scientific research, Australia’s responsibilities. This is particularly the case maritime assistance to Timor‑Leste has with maritime surveillance, the success of been relatively small. AusAID’s Australia– which largely depends on information-sharing Timor‑Leste Country Strategy 2009–2014 between adjacent countries. makes no specific mention of any maritime Such institutional arrangements between requirements, while frequently referring to Australia, Indonesia and Timor‑Leste are rural programs.21 The Maritime Commission currently lacking at both the national and provided for under the CMATS Treaty to be regional levels. Timor‑Leste is putting a lot a focal point for bilateral consultations on of faith in the NMA, which is based on the maritime matters of common interest has Portuguese model of maritime management never met. arrangements. However, there’s some lack Australia did not appoint a naval adviser to of understanding of maritime requirements, Dili until early 2010. Perhaps because of that, the necessary legal and organisational defence cooperation assistance to the F‑FDTL frameworks, and the roles and functions Naval Component has been relatively small. of the NMA and how it will relate to There’s little direct contact between the existing organisations. F‑FDTL and NORCOM in Darwin, although However, those are matters for Timor‑Leste liaison between NORCOM and Indonesian to resolve, although Australia should stand Defence headquarters in eastern Indonesia is ready to offer advice and assistance when becoming routine, particularly on coordinated requested. This would be an ideal opportunity naval operations.22 to provide support and influence in a very Australia should do much more to assist important area of national development, but Timor‑Leste with maritime security and it’s difficult to be forthcoming with assistance in developing its capacity to manage its without a clear picture of what Dili has in maritime interests. There’s an obvious desire mind. As the NMA is based on a Portuguese in Dili that those areas should be priority areas model, Canberra should be cautious about for national development. interposing its own ideas.

Capacity building for managing maritime The ports and shipping sector is one area interests should consider institutional where Australia might offer management arrangements, legal frameworks assistance. The Dili harbourmaster has and resources. extensive responsibilities and would benefit from support. Australian Maritime Safety 60 Special Report

Authority officers have already contributed to to Timor‑Leste. However, during bilateral DCP an IMO report on the maritime administration talks in 2009, Timor‑Leste rejected the offer needs of Timor‑Leste, but many months after of aerial surveillance, citing the need to first that report was completed there’s been no establish the NMA. indication of a response or action from Dili. A bilateral defence cooperation agreement Recommendation: With assistance is to be negotiated before the end of from AusAID, an experienced maritime International Stablisation Force deployment. administration officer might be offered to The maritime sector should be specifically Timor‑Leste as a technical adviser to the addressed in that agreement, including Dili harbourmaster. arrangements for maritime information collection and exchange. Maritime security Recommendation: Maritime security issues At the regional level, regular maritime security should be specifically addressed in the bilateral meetings between Australia, Indonesia and Defence Cooperation Agreement. Timor‑Leste would be beneficial to enhance Maritime Commission good order in the Timor Sea. Particular measures that might be considered are The Maritime Commission, which is part of information exchange, coordinated patrols the CMATS Treaty, has never met, perhaps and the attachment of liaison officers to each because of fears that the commission could other’s ships. However, some sensitivities become bogged down in unresolved issues might be encountered with trilateral associated with oil and gas projects in the cooperation, including residual concerns in JPDA. However, notwithstanding those Dili about Indonesia and Timorese sensitivity dangers, there would be benefits in the about Timor‑Leste’s lack of capabilities Maritime Commission meeting to discuss and skills. the whole range of maritime issues that are Recommendation: Australia should take the shared concerns of both countries, such as lead in initiating regular meetings between the customs, illegal people movement and IUU littoral countries on maritime security in the fishing. Meetings of the commission might Timor Sea. Procedures for information sharing also help to ‘jump start’ the NMA in Dili. to provide maritime situational awareness at Recommendation: Australia should the regional level should be on the agenda. propose an inaugural meeting of the Bilateral defence cooperation Maritime Commission.

Resources Naval single-service training hasn’t been a prominent element of Australia-based Resources for managing maritime interests at training under the Defence Cooperation the national level comprise people with the Program (DCP). However, it’s now a DCP necessary knowledge and expertise, as well priority to gradually increase maritime as the material resources (ships, aircraft and security assistance, and this paper strongly systems) for maritime surveillance, patrol and supports that priority. A $4 million maritime response in waters under national jurisdiction. security assistance package covering The scarcity of human resources with contracted aerial surveillance, training and the appropriate skills and experience is a major provision of two naval advisers was offered A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 61

problem. There’s much potential for Australia It would also be useful if Naval Component to assist with training both the F‑FDTL Naval officers were given the opportunity to Component and the PNTL Maritime Unit. sea-ride for short periods in RAN patrol boats based in Darwin. This would help build The F‑FDTL has recently received new patrol personal relationships, and could be arranged boats, although they have some deficiencies, on an ad hoc basis by direct liaison between and the PNTL is in the market for new Dili and NORCOM. craft. Desirably, capabilities shouldn’t be replicated between agencies, and it may Recommendation: All officers entering be useful for a study to be conducted on Timor‑Leste’s F‑FDTL Naval Component should Timor‑Leste’s requirements for patrol vessels. complete the RAN Junior Officers’ Warfare An Australian shipbuilder might be interested Application Course. in this opportunity, but there’s no Austrade Recommendation: Sea-riding opportunities representative in Dili who might help should be provided for F‑FDTL Naval facilitate that involvement. Component officers in Darwin-based On the materiel side, the lack of air patrol boats. surveillance of maritime zones is a major The Naval Component commander has problem. The PNTL is seeking a helicopter expressed an interest in up to 30 positions policing capability, and some military pilots in Australia, including in officer training are in training for the prospective F‑FDTL and technical courses. However, the lack of Air Component. English among the other ranks of the F‑FDTL Recommendation: Australia should renew is a major problem—most speak Bahasa its offer of contracted air surveillance of with a smattering of Portuguese, following Timor‑Leste’s southern EEZ. their basic training by Portuguese naval instructors. The decision to adopt Portuguese Naval training as the official language has created problems throughout the country, including in the A current major problem is that senior officers maritime sector. Lack of general education of the Naval Component have little naval adds to the training problem. Half the experience. There’s no doctrine, concept of population of Timor‑Leste is illiterate. operations or standard operating procedures for the Naval Component. Those factors will There’s also a problem with the defence greatly inhibit the ability of the F‑FDTL to force retaining personnel after they acquire conduct joint or coordinated operations with worthwhile technical skills. This affects the the RAN and the Indonesian Navy. This might Naval Component in particular, and will be overcome in the longer term by having become more acute as positions open up for all officers entering the Naval Component Timorese in the burgeoning oil and gas sector. complete the RAN Junior Officers’ Warfare However, it’s important that the Timorese Application Course and experience some work out their own training needs. To help sea‑time in ships of the RAN. Two junior them, it would be useful for the commander officers have completed a basic seamanship of the F‑FDTL Naval Component and some course at the Australian Maritime College of his senior officers to visit Australia and (AMC) through the DCP, but that course New Zealand for tours of naval training provides only basic navigational and seafarer establishments and the agencies with skills and has no naval operational application. responsibilities akin to those of the projected 62 Special Report

NMA. New Zealand’s National Maritime be possible to nominate an Australian for Coordination Centre has been mentioned that position. as a possible model. Papua New Guinea’s It’s important that the PNTL Maritime Unit National Surveillance Coordination Centre and gains an underwater diving capability, other PNG arrangements are also possible particularly as the marine tourism industry models, in view of the similarity between grows. Australia could help with training and PNG and Timor‑Leste in their requirements equipment to establish a diving team. and situations. Recommendation: Australia should give Recommendation: An offer of a sponsored priority to helping to build the capabilities of training mission for the commander of the the PNTL Maritime Unit. Possible initiatives are: F‑FDTL Naval Component and some of his senior officers to Australia, New Zealand and • the posting of an experienced water police Papua New Guinea should be made. The officer as part of the Timor‑Leste Police mission should visit Darwin, Canberra and Development Program Sydney and include visits to the Australian • short-term attachments of PNTL officers to Maritime Safety Authority, the Australian state water police services in Australia Fisheries Management Authority, and Australian Search and Rescue. • assistance in establishing a diving team, including training and equipment. Water police Hydrographic assistance Many of Timor‑Leste’s current difficulties with border protection, smuggling and illegal Timor‑Leste requested hydrographic people movement can be traced to the lack of assistance from Australia in 2009. capability in the Maritime Unit of the PNTL. Paper‑based and electronic charts were later In theory, the unit has the requisite powers provided, although none of the Timorese and skills, but in practice there are many patrol boats possesses the ability to use problems, including a lack of coordination electronic charts. Timor‑Leste has a need with the F‑FDTL Naval Component and a lack for updated hydrographic surveys of coastal of capabilities. The Maritime Unit was only areas, including the approaches to the new recently transferred from the UNPOL, which port at Tibar, and inshore surveys of southern may have given little priority to the work of coastal areas to help inform decisions about the unit. new maritime infrastructure to be located on the south coast. The development of a water police capability in Timor‑Leste is an important area where Recommendation: A senior RAN hydrographic Australia might provide assistance. An specialist should visit Dili to assess the experienced Australian water police officer hydrographic requirements of Timor‑Leste and might be posted as part of the Timor‑Leste where Australia might provide assistance. Police Development Program (a bilateral program with the Australian Federal Police). Legal framework PNTL marine police officers might be sent to Australia for short-term attachment to a state Timor‑Leste lacks national legislation and water police unit. regulations for much of the maritime sector, as well as for maritime law enforcement. The It’s understood that the UN has advertised legal authority of F‑FDTL officers to enforce a maritime coordinator position, and it may A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 63

national laws at sea appears uncertain, and young Timorese for employment in the local they lack the necessary expertise. Roles maritime and international shipping industries. and responsibilities of the F‑FDTL Naval Component and the PNTL Maritime Unit Fisheries must be clarified to remove any suggestion of overlap or competition between the There’s a clear common interest in developing two organisations. effective arrangements to counter IUU fishing in the Timor Sea and to assist Timor‑Leste in The Australian Fisheries Management developing sustainable management of its Authority has offered assistance in developing fisheries resource. Timor‑Leste is currently fisheries legislation, and Australia could unable to assess it’s fishing sustainably similarly be involved in developing legislation because there’s been no rigorous assessment for ports and shipping, maritime security of the state of the fisheries resource. The and law enforcement. The Regional Maritime Australian Department of Sustainability, Programme of the Secretariat of the Pacific Environment, Water, Population and Community has been assisting Pacific Communities is working on a concept island countries with the implementation proposal to help Timor‑Leste identify such of IMO measures for the safety and risks under the Coral Triangle Initiative. security of shipping and the prevention of The Australian Fisheries Management marine pollution. Authority is engaged in an ongoing fisheries Recommendation: Provided Timor‑Leste is capacity‑building program aimed at agreeable, Australia might fund the Regional improving fisheries management skills. Maritime Programme of the Secretariat of the Recommendation: Future Australian Pacific Community to assist Timor‑Leste in capacity-building activities need to foster implementing IMO measures. the development of sustainable fisheries management. Australia should focus on Maritime economy monitoring, control and surveillance training of key Timor‑Leste fisheries staff, who can in turn Employment train their own officers.

The maritime sector offers great potential Recommendation: Australia should continue for providing employment and helping to assist Timor‑Leste in the development of to overcome the current crisis of youth effective fisheries legislation. unemployment in Timor‑Leste. Opportunities are available in fisheries, aquaculture, Marine scientific research shipping, marine tourism and offshore support. The AMC or an Australian TAFE might Marine scientific research is essential for assist with the establishment of a seafarers’ the effective management of the Timor Sea training college that would equip young and its resources. Here, there’s a success Timorese for employment in the international story of maritime cooperation between shipping industry. This would be in line with Australia, Indonesia and Timor‑Leste. The AusAID’s interest in vocational training. Arafura and Timor Seas Ecosystem Action program, established under the Arafura Recommendation: The AMC or an Australian and Timor Sea Experts Forum, has secured TAFE might assist with the establishment of funding from the Global Environment Facility a seafarers’ training college that would train for comprehensive research to support 64 Special Report

cooperative ecosystem-based management Endnotes and use of the area’s living coastal and marine 1 National Parliament of the Democratic resources, including fisheries and biodiversity. Republic of Timor‑Leste, Maritime boundaries of the territory of the Democratic Recommendation: Support for the Arafura and Republic of Timor‑Leste, Law No. 7/2002 of Timor Sea Experts Forum and the Arafura and 20 September 2002. Timor Seas Ecosystem Action program should 2 Clive Schofield and I Made Andi Arsana, continue, to ensure that they are effective ‘Commentary—Closing the loop: Indonesia’s revised archipelagic baselines system’, regional mechanisms for the cooperative Australian Journal of Maritime and Oceans ecosystem-based management of the Timor Affairs, vol. 1, no. 2, 2009, pp. 57–62. and Arafura seas. 3 Bill Campbell, ‘Maritime boundary arrangements in the Timor Sea’, in Donald Conclusion R Rothwell and Martin Tsamenyi (eds), The Maritime dimensions of independent East While the maritime sector generally has Timor, Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy no. 8, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of been neglected, Timor‑Leste has had no Wollongong, 2000, p. 56. shortage of offers of development assistance 4 Vivian Louis Forbes, ‘The hate/love triangle and advice from overseas in recent years. in the Timor Sea: Australia, Indonesia and However, there’s some scepticism in Dili about East Timor—Part Two’, strategic analysis the motives and utility of such assistance. paper, Future Directions International, Perth, 14 May 2010, p. 2. Therefore, the Australian Government needs to be conscious that further studies and 5 Secretary of State for Defence, ‘Developing a relevant maritime security policy’, speech to reviews by foreign agencies may be less International Conference on Maritime Security: well received than offers of training and Timor‑Leste a maritime state, Dili, 12 June 2010. material assistance. 6 Economic and social development brief prepared by the World Bank Group and the The sustainability of assistance to Timor‑Leste Asian Development Bank, in consultation with is an important issue. It’s no good providing development partners, August 2007. start‑up assistance for an aid project in the 7 ibid., p. 63. maritime sector, and then not providing 8 Regional Plan of Action (RPOA) to Promote ongoing assistance to ensure its sustainability. Responsible Fishing Practices including Australia has a good record in this regard, combating IUU Fishing in the South-East Asia based on its experience in the Pacific with the Region, Summary report—capacity building and MCS curriculum workshop, Manado, Pacific Patrol Boat Program. Australia also has Indonesia, 12–14 August 2009. the advantages of geographical proximity and 9 Government of Timor‑Leste, Forca 2020 (Force clear common interests with Timor‑Leste. 2020) Military Plan, available from http:// www.etan.org/news/2007/06forcas.htm. Finally, building rapport at a personal level between Timor‑Leste personnel and their 10 Forca 2020, p. 89. opposite numbers in Australia is important. 11 ‘Timor‑Leste: Oecusse and the Indonesian Australia should encourage projects that order’, Policy Briefing—Asia Briefing,no. 104, include this dimension of direct liaison, for International Crisis Group, Dili/Brussels, 20 May 2010. example between NORCOM and the F‑FDTL, or the NMA and the Australian Maritime 12 Organic Law of the Policia Nacional de Timor‑Leste (PNTL) Decree-Law No. 9/2009 Safety Authority. dated 18 February 2009. A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 65

13 Treaty between the Government of Australia Appendix and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone Boundary and Certain Seabed Boundaries, Defence Cooperation Program 1997, 36 ILM 1053. The Australian Defence Cooperation Program 14 East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN), ETAN Statement on Timor‑Leste/ with Timor-Leste was established in 2001. It’s Australian Maritime Arrangement, focused on building F-FDTL capacity through available from http://www.etan.org/ training and skills transfer in engineering, news/2006/01timsea.htm maritime security, logistics, infantry skills, 15 Sam Bateman and Donald R Rothwell, ‘East strategic policy, governance, finance, medical Timor’s maritime dimensions: an introduction’, in Donald R Rothwell and Martin Tsamenyi skills and English language. (eds), The maritime dimensions of independent East Timor, Wollongong Papers on Maritime The approved DCP budget for the 2010-2011 Policy no. 8, Centre for Maritime Policy, financial year is around AUD$10.721m. DCP University of Wollongong, 2000, p. 6. priorities for this year include: 16 Australian Government 2009, Defending Australia in the Asia–Pacific century: Force 2030, • Expanding the English Language Program Defence White Paper, Department of Defence, to double the student capacity, from Canberra, para. 4.34, p. 36. approximately 100 to 200. 17 Australian Government 2009, Defending Australia in the Asia–Pacific century: Force 2030, • Gradually increasing maritime security para. 7.10, p. 54. assistance, with the posting of two 18 Australian Government (2009), Defending Australian naval advisors to Timor-Leste, Australia in the Asia–Pacific century: Force 2030, the provision of Australia‑based training, para. 7.11, p. 54. support to establish the National 19 Jose Belo, ‘Proud Timorese are fed up with Maritime Authority, and infrastructure Canberra’s bullying’, Sydney Morning Herald, development assistance. 15 June 2010, available from http://www.smh. com.au/opinion/politics/proud-timorese-are- • Providing engineering assistance to fed-up-with-canberras-bullying-20100614-ya3f. html. promote a nation-building role for the F‑FDTL, including the ability to contribute 20 ‘Timor‑Leste and Australia: a widening gap— Hello, my name is Jose, I’m from Timor‑Leste to humanitarian assistance and disaster and I’m here to complain’, The Economist, relief tasks. 17 June 2010, available from http://www. economist.com/node/16381395. • Increasing the number of F-FDTL 21 Australian Government (2009a), Australia members attending DCP-sponsored – Timor‑Leste Country Strategy 2009–2014, training courses. AusAID, Canberra. Australia has 25 Australian DCP personnel, 22 ‘Australia–Indonesia coordinated patrol’, Navy press release, 27 April 2010, available both civilian and ADF, in Timor-Leste. They are from http://www.navy.gov.au/Australian-_ based in Dili, Port Hera, Metinaro and Baucau. Indonesia_coordinated_patrol. Recent Activities

Delivery of a joint Australia-Malaysia peacekeeping training workshop to F-FDTL personnel in June 2010. 66 Special Report

Working accommodation for the F-FDTL Acronyms and abbreviations Engineering and Logistics Unit at ACIAR Australian Centre for International F-FDTL Training Headquarters in Metinaro Agricultural Research (east of Dili) completed in May 2010, in ADF Australian Defence Force addition to the construction of new English language classrooms at the Metinaro training AFP Australian Federal Police school in September 2010. ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations At the Defence Cooperation Talks in July CMATS Treaty between Australia and East 2010 both countries agreed an expanded Treaty Timor on Certain Maritime English Language Program, maritime security Arrangements in the Timor Sea assistance, engineering training for the DCP Defence Cooperation Program F-FDTL and professional development for the Secretariat of Defence (SED). DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia) A second maritime adviser position was EEZ exclusive economic zone established in January 2011 to support the F-FDTL Falintil–Forças de Defesa de F-FDTL Naval Component in maritime training Timor‑Leste (Falintil–Timor-Leste and seamanship skills. Defence Force) The English Language Program is being GDP gross domestic product expanded to include more SED and IMF International Monetary Fund F-FDTL staff. The aim is to increase the IUU illegal, unreported and unregulated number of F-FDTL personnel trained annually (fishing) to approximately 200 to enable participation JPDA Joint Petroleum Development Area in more Australian training courses as well as MAF Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries those of other English-speaking countries. (Timor-Leste) Australia offered a total of 50 places on nm nautical mile training courses to Timor-Leste in 2010. These NMA National Maritime Authority included Army and Navy courses, and courses (Timor‑Leste) in IT, defence command and English language. OECD Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development PEMSEA Partnerships in the Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia PNG Papua New Guinea PNTL Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (National Police of Timor-Leste) R&D research and development SLOCs sea lines of communication SoL Seeds of Life project UN United Nations UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea UNPOL United Nations Police 2 Special Report A reliable partner: Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations 67

Contributors adviser to the Vice Prime Minister for Social Affairs to Timor-Leste. Professor Damien Kingsbury holds a Personal Chair in the School of International and Dr Vandra Harris is a Senior Lecturer in Political Studies at Deakin University. He has the graduate program in International published widely on politics and security Development at RMIT University’s School of issues in Southeast Asia, amongst which Global Studies. Prior to entering academia are two edited books and an authored book Vandra worked in community development in on Timor-Leste, East Timor: The Price of Australia and with an INGO. As an academic, Liberty. A third edited book on Timor-Leste she has lectured in a range of topics with post-independence politics is now in press. an international focus, and has worked Damien first visited what was then referred as a research fellow on two Australian to as Timor Lorosae in 1995 to undertake Research Council projects at Flinders PhD research for his thesis on the role of the University Law School, and at the Nordic news media in Australia–Indonesia bilateral Institute for Asian Studies in Copenhagen, relations. Damien returned to Timor-Leste Denmark. Vandra’s publications are primarily to lead more than forty Australian ballot focused on partnerships and cultural observers in 1999, basing himself at Maliana change in international development, and and spending most of the ballot day in Balibo. on Australia’s international policing in the He also coordinated Australian observers Asia–Pacific region. Her main research focus for the 2007 presidential and parliamentary is the intersection of these two research elections. Damien is a board member of the interests, in the nexus between security Balibo House Trust and is a regular media and development. Her most recent book commentator on Timor-Leste political and is Conflict, security and nation-building in security issues for both the Australian and Timor-Leste: Cross-sectoral perspectives, international media. edited with Andrew Goldsmith (Routledge, forthcoming 2011). Dr Dionísio Babo-Soares holds a PhD in Anthropology from the ANU, Masters Professor James J Fox is currently a Professor Degree from Massey University Palmeston (Emeritus) at Australian National University. North, NZ and Degree in Constitutional Law He served as the Director of the Research from Udayana University in Bali, Indonesia. School of Pacific and Asian Studies from Dr Babo-Soares is currently a professor at the August 1998 until the end of February 2006. Faculty of Law and Social Sciences with the He has carried out research on Timor since Universidade da Paz and at the Facullty of 1965. He was an international observer with Social and Political Sciences the University of the Carter Center for the Popular Consultation Timor-Leste (UNTL). Together with Professor (1999), the Constituent Assembly elections Jim Fox, he is co-author of, Out of the Ashes: (2001), and the Presidential Elections (2002 East Timor: Destruction and Reconstruction and 2004); he was a member of UN/World (Adelaide, 2000) and Constitutional Writing Bank Joint Assessment Mission (1999) and the and Elections in East Timor (ANU, 2003). He is King’s College Independent Study Group on also the author of several chapters in books Security (2002) and served as a consultant to published in Indonesia, Australia, Portugal and ACIAR/AusAID on the design mission for Seeds Timor-Leste. Between 2005 and 2008 he was of Life 2 (2004). With Dionisio Babo‑Soares, the co-chairman of the Commission of Truth he has published Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Friendship between Timor-Leste and and Reconstruction of East Timor and Indonesia. He was a member of the Council with Helder da Costa, Colin Piggin and of Defense and Security between 2003 and Cesar J da Cruz: Agriculture: New Directions for 2005 and is currently the Vice-President of the a New Nation, East Timor (Timor-Leste). Superior Council of the Judiciary. He is a legal 68 Special Report SPECIAL REPORT

April 2011 — Issue 39

Dr Sam Bateman retired from the Royal Australian Navy as a Commodore and Important disclaimer is now a Professorial Research Fellow at This publication is designed to provide the Australian National Centre for Ocean accurate and authoritative information Resources and Security at the University of in relation to the subject matter covered. Wollongong, and a Senior Fellow and Adviser It is provided with the understanding that to the Maritime Security Programme at the the publisher is not engaged in rendering S Rajaratnam School of International Studies any form of professional or other advice A reliable partner or services. No person should rely on at the Nanyang Technological University in the contents of this publication without Strengthening Australia – Timor-Leste relations Singapore. He has written extensively on first obtaining advice from a qualified defence and maritime issues in Australia, professional person. the Asia–Pacific and Indian Ocean. He has Executive Director’s introduction co-authored the reports Our western front: About Special Reports Australia and the Indian Ocean (2010) and Generally written by ASPI experts, Timor‑Leste is a fledging nation wrestling with the challenge of forging a viable state. It’s entering a Sea change: Advancing Australia’s ocean Special Reports are intended to deepen interests (2009) for ASPI and the RSIS Policy understanding on critical questions very complex period in the lead‑up to the 2012 elections. The country’s leaders inherited a difficult facing key strategic decision-makers Paper Good order at sea in Southeast Asia. situation, reconstructing a devastated country and healing deep-seated community divisions. The and, where appropriate, provide policy economic and social challenges facing Timor‑Leste are daunting, although the exploitation of oil He is a nominated member of the expert recommendations. In some instances, and eminent person’s group established material of a more technical nature may and gas revenues offers a potential lifeline. by the ASEAN Regional Forum to advise on appear in this series, where it adds to the This report sets out a number of the challenges for the country, such as possible domestic unrest, regional security issues, and a member of the understanding of the issue at hand. Special international editorial board for the Journal of Reports reflect the personal views of the transnational crime, food security, land reform, law and justice issues, security sector reform and author(s), and do not in any way express the Indian Ocean Region. maritime development. The situation is made more complex by the large number of donor states or reflect the views of the Australian and the need for Timor‑Leste to coordinate their assistance. Dr Anthony Bergin is Director of Research Government or represent the formal position of ASPI on any particular issue. Programs at ASPI. His training is in law, While the challenges facing Timor‑Leste are significant, the country has defied the odds before and political science and international relations. ASPI prevailed. With targeted and sustained international support, it has every chance of doing so again. Tel +61 2 6270 5100 His doctoral dissertation was on Australian Fax + 61 2 6273 9566 Australia wishes to have an equal relationship with Timor‑Leste, working together to advance our law of the sea policy. For twenty-five years Email [email protected] common interests. This year is the tenth anniversary of Australia’s Defence Cooperation Program he taught on the political and legal aspects Web www.aspi.org.au with the country, one of our largest cooperation programs. The DCP will underpin Australia’s long of marine affairs first at the Royal Australian © The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Naval College and then University of New Limited 2011 term defence relationship with Timor-Leste. South Wales at the Australian Defence This publication is subject to copyright. Australia has around 400 ADF members deployed as part of the International Stabilisation Force Force Academy. For several years he taught Except as permitted under the Copyright Act (ISF) that has a clear drawdown process. Timor-Leste’s Government has expressed a wish for the ISF a graduate course in international law as 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any to eventually leave as a matter of national sovereignty. an Adjunct Reader in Law at the Australian means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, National University. He has held visiting photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or A central message of this report is that Australia stands ready to assist Timor‑Leste as a reliable academic appointments at the Department transmitted without prior written permission. partner, not just to ensure the state’s own survival but also to strengthen regional security. of Maritime Studies, University of Wales Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. and the Center for Marine Policy, University I’m grateful to all the contributors to this volume, and in particular to our Timorese contributor of Delaware. He has served on the editorial Dionísio Babo-Soares, former co‑chairman of the Commission of Truth and Friendship between boards of two leading international ocean Timor‑Leste and Indonesia. I also acknowledge the work of ASPI’s Director of Research Programs, law and policy journals and for many years Anthony Bergin, in preparing this special report for publication. edited the journal Maritime Studies. Dr Bergin has been a consultant on maritime issues to a I’m confident that this report will make an important contribution to public debate on Australia’s wide range of public and private sector clients role in assisting Timor‑Leste to meet its long‑term security and development challenges. and has published extensively on the political, Peter Abigail security and legal aspects of marine policy. Executive Director