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An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 194 1 / by Charles E

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An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 194 1 / by Charles E AN UNKNOWN FUTURE AND A DOUBTFUL PRESENT WRITING THE VICTORY PLAN OF 1941 Charles E. Kirkpatrick AN UNKNOWN FUTURE AND A DOUBTFUL PRESENT WRITING THE VICTORY PLAN OF 1941 Alben C. Wedemeyer, principal author of the Victory Plan as a major in 1941 , shown in 1943 as a general officer. (U.S. Military Academy) AN UNKNOWN FUTURE AND A DOUBTFUL PRESENT WRITING THE VICTORY PLAN OF 1941 by Charles E . Kirkpatrick N llJTl\Rt I~ CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C. , 1992 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kirkpatrick, Charles Edward. An unknown future and a doubtful present: writing the victory plan of 194 1 / by Charles E. Kirkpatrick. p. em. Includes bibliographical references. I. World War, 1939-1945--United States. 2. Strategy. I. Title. D769.I.K57 1990 940.54'0973-<1c20 90-34984 CIP First Printed 1990-CMH Pub 93-10 Fo r sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 Foreword A striking feature of World War II was America's ability to raise and equip a modern army seemingly overnight. Emerging from its negligible base in 1941 and competing with the needs of the other services and Allies, the Army stood in just forty-eight months at 8 million men with equipment second to none. Such a prodigious feat owes much to sound military planning, as The Victory Plan of J 94 J carefully demonstrates. But this study also underscores the fact that even in 1941 warfare had become so vast in scope, so expensive, and so technologically complex that nations could never again afford to maintain in time of peace the armies needed in time of war. As Albert Wedemeyer, the remarkable Army officer who wrote the 1941 plan, makes clear, mobilization transcends purely military matters and must be understood to embrace the total capacity of nations. The conclusion seems inescapable: the United States Army must keep mobilization planning at the center of all its military planning. The experience of the nation's total mobilization for World War II offers good counsel, not so much in its details of numbers and types of units raised or materiel required as in its description of the thought process Wedemeyer and his colleagues used in reach­ ing these decisions. I recommend the following analysis of Wedemeyer's vital work to military planners and to all those study­ ing mobilization and logistics. It will provide a clear picture of how Ollr recent predecessors approached the complex challenge of pre­ paring for modern wal; a challenge that remains with LIS today. 21 December 1989 HAROLD W. NELSON Colonel, USA Chief of Military History v The Author Major Charles E. Kirkpatrick is an Air Defense Artillery officer who commanded units in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the United States and later served as an assistant professor in the Department of History. United States Military Academy. He subse­ quently taught military history and tactics at the United States Army Air Defense Artillery School. Major Kirkpatrick received the B.A. cum laude and with honors in history from Wake Forest College in 1969. and the M.A. in European history the following year. He was a Ford Fellow at Emory University, from which he earned the Ph.D. in 1987. Major Kirkpatrick is the author of Archie in the A.E.F.: The C"eation oj the AntiaircmJt Service oj the United States Army, 1917- 1918 (1984). VI Preface As the research for this study progressed, it quickly became evident that the documentary record alone could never resolve all of the questions about how and why the Victory Plan was written. Nor could it reveal how certain decisions were reached, or upon what influences. In answeri ng such questions, I was fortunate to have the help of the author of the Victory Plan. General Albert C. Wedemeyer spent long hours patiently discussing his duties of the summer of 194 1, and equall y long hours reading and commenting upon my draft manuscript. Through these discussions and through following the general's reading program, I not only gained insights into the development of the Victory Plan, but also an education in strategic thought. I am indebted to General Wedemeyer for the latter as much as for the former. The members of the Center of Military History panel on this manuscript have materially improved the work, and I particularl y thank Mr. Morris MacGregor, Col. Michael D. Krause, Col. Thomas Wilkerson, Dr. Jeffrey]. Clarke, Dr. Jack Nunn, and Mr. John Elsberg. I also acknowledge with particular gratitude the critical reviews of this paper by Professor Maurice Madorf, Professor Carl Boyd, Professor Charles Endress, and Dr. Keith E. Eiler, General Wedemeyer's biographer. I am indebted to Dr. Edward]. Drea, Dr. Bruce R. Pirnie, Dr. Michael Deis, Mr. Terrence]. Gough, Col. Paul Miles, Col. W. Scott Dillard, Col. Henry Gole, Lt. Col. Robert Frank, and Lt. Col. Gregory Fontenot for their frank and helpful com­ ments. My colleagues in the Military Studies Branch have read and commented upon successive drafts of the manuscript, and I wish particularly to thank Majs. Steve E. Dietrich, Thomas Grodecki, and Jon House and Dr. Edgar Raines (o r their advice and forbearance. I am especiall y grateful to Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, Jr., chief of the Military Studies Branch, who has shared his expertise in the field and guided my research, helping me to develop my ideas and the structure of the monograph. Dr. Cochran has been a deft and gentle editor, as well as a thoughtful critic. I n several visits to the city of Washington, 01: Keith Eiler dis­ cussed with me General Wedemeyer's work in the summer of 1941 VII and provided additional documentation from the general's col­ lected papers at the Hoover Institution. Dr. Alfred M. Beck kindly allowed me to use an interview he had conducted with General Wedemeyer in the course of his own research. I am indebted to the staffs of the Military Reference Branch of the National Archives of the United States, and particularly Mr. Leroy Jackson; the Washing­ ton National Records Center at Suitland, Maryland; and the ar­ chives of the United States Army Military History Institute at Car­ lisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, especially Dr. Richard Sommers and Mr. David Keogh, for their professional help. The archivists' exten­ sive knowledge of their collections enabled them to point out valu­ able areas of research I had not theretofore considered. Linda Cajka prepared the photographic layout, and Sfc. Marshall T. Williams prepared the cover. Finally, lowe special thanks to Mr. Duncan Miller, who edited the manuscript and whose suggestions materially improved both style and content. While this study could not have been written without the assis­ tance of all of these scholars and friends, I am responsible for the interpretation that I have placed upon the facts, and for any errors that may exist, either in point of fact or in the analysis of those facts. Washington, D.C. CHARLES E. KIRKPATRICK 21 December 1989 Major, USA VIU Contents Chapter Page INTRODUCTION I I. THE PLANNER ........ .. ... ... .... ........... 5 The Development of a Strategic Thinker ........ .. 6 Student of Applied Strategy: The Reading Program of a Professional Officer ............. 14 2. THE REQU IREMENT ....... ..... .... .. .. ... ... 35 The Military in 1941 .. .. .. ... .. ... ....... •....... 44 Marshall Orders a New Plan . .. .. .. .............•.. 50 3. STRATEGIC ESTIMATES . ... ... ... .. ... .... .... 55 The First Steps: Outlining the Problem .. ..... .... .. 59 Question One: T he National Objective . ....... .... 6 1 Question Two: The Military Strategy . ...... ..... 63 Question Three: The Mi litary Forces .............. 77 4. DETA ILED PLANNING . ... ....... .... ......... .. 81 At Issue: How Many Divisions? .......... ... ... ... 81 Structure of the Division: Planning Considerations .. .. .. .. ... ... .. .......•...... 84 Organizing the Force: Inlluence of the War Plan ............................. .. .... 91 Mission One: Hemispheric Defense . ........ .... 92 Mission Two: Defend the Outlying Possessions . .. 93 Mission T hree: Overseas Task Forces ... ... .... .... 95 Recapitulation .. .. .. .. .. .. ............ .. ....... 100 5. ASSESSMENTS .. ... ... .. .. .... ............... 103 Limitations of the Plan-Total Divisions 103 Limitations of the Plan-Type Divisions 107 IX Page Limitations of the Plan-Replacement Problem ....... III Successes of the Plan-Total Army Strength . .. I 14 Successes of the Plan-Operational Fit ... ... .... ... 115 Successes of the Plan-Political and Military Reality .. .... .. ... ............... ......... 116 Successes of the Plan-The Planning Process. 118 Successes of the Plan-Competence in Planning ...... 120 What Was the Victory Plan? . ................ ... ... 121 APPENDIX: The Army Portion of the Victory Plan ..... 125 BIBLIOGRAPHy .................................. 139 INDEX ........................... .. ......... .. ... 153 lllustrations General Albert C. Wedemeyer . .... .. .......... ... frontispiece Grant Hall, Command and General Staff School .... .... .. 15 Early Construction at Fort Benning ....... .... .. .... .. .. 15 Brig. Gen. Paul Malone ................................. 16 Maj. Gen. Stanley D. Embick ... .. ... ... .. .... .. .. ...... 16 German Attache Friedrich von Boetticher . ... .. ..... ..... 17 Captain Wedemeyer at the Kriegsakadernie . .... ........... 17 Mothballed Destroyers ... ........ .... ................ 67 Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson . .................................. 67 Under
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