AMERICAN EAGLE up Close and Personal by Joel Chusid

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AMERICAN EAGLE up Close and Personal by Joel Chusid AMERICAN EAGLE Up Close and Personal by Joel Chusid Then VP of American Eagle Joel Chusid accepts Joel Chusid, one of the founders of American Eagle and a Contributing Editor to Airliners, delivery of the first EMBRAER ERJ-140 from recalls some of the more personal memoirs of the regional airline, now approaching its Embraer Chairman Maurico Botelho in São Jose 23rd birthday. He also talks with some of the American Airlines executives who had an dos Campos, Brazil in July 2001. (Embraer) impact on Eagle’s path to its position today as the world’s largest regional airline. The Beginnings the big airline, the lower the cost of the it was a shot was fired across American’s For the airline industry in the early system to them. It was a “choosing bow at Chicago and DFW hubs, and it 1980s, the name of the game was sides” arrangement much the like the became a cause for action. “connections”. With reservation systems alliances of today. Airlines like Air American’s President, Robert Crandall, owned by individual airlines, a display Wisconsin, Wings West, Metroflight, felt then, and still does, that codeshares preference, or bias, as it was known, was Chaparral, Command and several others were “inappropriate and misleading,” given to same-carrier connections. I was were on the American team. and he openly argued against them. As a selling a version of American’s Sabre result, American was late in getting into system called “multi-host” to commuter Switching Sides the game. Crandall finally realized that carriers who were given incentives to Air Wisconsin, which had been a American had no choice but to develop connect passengers to American Sabre user, was lured over to United’s its own network in order to remain Airlines’ long-haul flights; similar sys- Apollo, leaving a vacuum in Chicago. competitive. Today he admits that the tems were offered by United’s Apollo, Simmons Airlines was recruited to industry has “evolved,” and none of us at Eastern’s System One and TWA’s replace them. But a new troubling trend, the beginning had any inkling that Worldspan. The advantage to the com- to at least some people, was developing – Eagle would ever be flying semi- muters was a new reservation system, codesharing. This was something that transcontinental jet routes. The thought greater visibility, last-seat availability, had been going on for years under the of a “commuter” flying LAX to Northwest and even flight information in travel Allegheny Commuter umbrella, but it Arkansas or DFW to Aguascalientes was agents’ systems, which were relatively becoming an increasingly popular way to unthinkable back then. new at the time. The smaller carriers increase screen presence in reservations were housed in their own “partitions” systems, and American opposed the Code Name: Eagle and their cost was based on the notion fiercely. When United and Delta Crandall tasked our department, which percentage of connections generated - upped the ante by putting their codes on was within Marketing and headed by Mike the more passengers who connected to their commuter carriers’ flight numbers, Gunn, to develop our own commuter 20 • AIRLINERS • MAY/JUNE 2007 codesharing program. Gunn agreed that “first two” of American’s Eagle network. bers how the AMR Board wrestled with American needed a national feed network, Metroflight operated the first flight of the the decision to incorporate oversight on but was unconvinced that they needed to franchise program on November 1, and I maintenance and pilot training, and was be owned. So Rick Nelson, Steve Sedlak flew one of the first flights to Lafayette, divided on what level of involvement and I began developing our ideas for a Louisiana on that rather stormy day. there should be. On one hand, an arm’s franchise arrangement under the code Metro operated a fleet of Convair 580s length relationship was an option; an name “Eagle”, since projects like this and had a couple of Twin Otters, but we intensive oversight program was the were always worked on under secrecy did not want the Otters to remain in the other. Plaskett also recalls that there was with the so-called “non disclosure agree- fleet. The Convairs were slow, but spa- doubt and uncertainty at the time. “If we ment.” United had called their program cious. Ed Criner, who was Director of don’t control them, how are we to protect United Express, and Delta created Delta Flight Operations at Metroflight at the our brand?” But he also believes that the Connection. American Express was transition and is currently President of association with American and the other obviously not an option, and we didn’t Executive Airlines, remembers them major carriers helped the smaller airlines like American Connection. (Ironically, well. “They were manufactured in the upgrade their standards and quality. It American’s current non-owned feeder 1950s, had no autopilots, and were was interesting to note that when things program today is called American equipped with just the basic navigation went well, the brand American Eagle was Connection.) There were rumors of AA instruments.” What a difference from the used, but whenever there was anything developing a commuter feed system for fleet today. negative to report, the operating carrier’s months, but it was kept under wraps, Chaparral joined a month later with name was used. This became harder and while negotiations went on behind the its Gulfstream 1Cs, CASA 212s and Beech harder to do as the program matured and scenes. The American Eagle logo con- 99s, and by year’s end, 60 daily flights Eagle became a known brand. sisted of the Helvetica “American” and were serving eight cities from DFW. The As history shows, AA opted for the “Eagle” in script, with the double wings in carriers adopted AA ticket stock, flight more intense oversight, and I drafted the two colors, instead of AA’s one. What one numbers, and a new AA-inspired livery. first station procedures, evaluations and may not realize is the size of the script was AA had been taking Metro’s reservations flight service procedures. After all, this reduced twice over time, with the feeling calls under a special program, so that was was a marketing program, not an opera- at the time that one day it would disappear an easy transition. AA’s scheduling whiz, tional one. AA helped with the transition and Eagle would just become a part of the Jim Murphy, diplomatically coordinated at Eagle stations for the first few days. big airline. schedules with the carriers to maximize Pre-reserved seats, advance boarding feed, but each filed their own, which passes, a frequent flyer program, even The Big Announcement occasionally created conflicts. adjusting the in-flight beverage offering - The ‘80s marked American’s massive it was a lot for the commuter employees “Growth Plan” which added dozens of Oversight or Arm’s Length to learn, but they were all put through new markets and by design, new hubs. The Sabre multi-host partitions I had training at AA’s Learning Center. Even DFW was by far the largest and most sold melted away into AA’s. The flight attendants went through something logical place to start the foundation of an “Eagles” had to submit to inspections of called “sparkle training.” Eagle operation. In the summer of 1984, their maintenance and flight operations. Metro added new markets the Senior Vice President of Marketing Safety was always of paramount concern, following year, and I remember the Thomas Plaskett, who later went on to as the traveling public did not have com- embarrassing inaugural flight to Monroe, become President of Pan Am, made the plete faith in small carriers that were not Louisiana on a comfortable Convair 580. official announcement that Metroflight household names and were competing We had only eight passengers who were and Chaparral Airlines would be the with the automobile. Crandall remem- thrilled with the attention, the cham- Metroflight, with its fleet of Convair 580s and de Havilland DHC-6 Twin The Swearingen Metro was the early 19-seat aircraft of choice among Otters, was the first franchise carrier to sign on as an American Eagle carrier. Eagle operators. N1012Z (msn AT-502), operated by franchise carrier N73165 (msn 368) is shown on short final landing at Ft. Smith, Arkansas. Air Virginia, lifts off of Runway 33 at Washington National Airport on a (Bob Garrard) sunny June day in 1985. (Bob Garrard) 21 An oddball of the Eagle fleet was N245CA (msn 83), a Gulfstream 1C Another fairly rare aircraft to be included in the American Eagle fleet was operated by Chaparral. Photographed at Abilene TX, this 37-seat “stretch” the Embraer Brasilia. N124AM (msn 120.016) was acquired by Air of the basic Gulfstream 1 was an early attempt to modify a basic corporate Midwest to supplement its fleet of Metros. It is seen at rest in aircraft for airline use. It would not be the last. (Jay Selman) American’s short-lived hub at Nashville. (Jay Selman) pagne and the opportunity to chat up tive carriers, selected initially from our 340As. Some passengers were sorry to company executives. There was egg on our multi-host partners, but some did not see the Convairs go, despite the newness face, however, when we landed and it was have hub and spoke operations. Wings of the Saabs; after all, the 580s were larg- discovered that no bags had been loaded West fed both San Francisco and Los er and more spacious. Command, the due to a last minute aircraft switch! Angeles with their Beech C99s and the North American launch customer of the tube-like Swearingen Metroliners; ATR-42, joined the franchise.
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