Master's Thesis Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. Airline Industry
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Master’s Thesis MSc in Finance and Investments Mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. airline industry An event study of stock data observations from the last three decades May 15, 2017 Author: Lars Christian Hjorth-Johansen Supervisor: Björn Preuß Consisting of 165,841 characters including spaces - equivalent to 79 pages. ABSTRACT After the Deregulation Act of 1978 changed the U.S. airline industry from being government controlled to a liberalized market, a merger wave struck the industry where consolidation among a great proportion of airlines created the legacy carriers of today. Three decades later, the industry have seen a new wave, only this time with a completely different underlying motivation. From previously consolidating in order to grow geographically and improve operational performance, the new millennium have seen U.S. airlines merge in order to survive as bankruptcies and financial distress have challenged the existence of the majority of U.S. airlines. Where there exists evidence of collusive pricing as a result of the mergers in the post- deregulation time period, there are not any recent research including mergers of the 21st century. With a foundation based on previous studies, this thesis aims to answer two hypotheses. The first hypothesis asks whether there are positive abnormal returns for bidder and target airlines involved in an airline merger at the time of announcement. The second hypothesis looks at the existence of collusion among rivals through the market power hypothesis, which suggests that rivals benefit from competitors’ mergers as collaboration limits output and increase prices. The hypotheses are tested through an event study where all available stock data from U.S. airlines between 1985 and 2016 is included, thus only including data from a liberalized industry. Through measuring the normal performance of the stocks, abnormal returns are calculated and analyzed. The data have been divided into smaller samples to better explain the economic performance of the merging airlines and their rivals through the three-decade horizon, and in addition looked at collectively to yield an overall conclusion. From the available data, there are evidence of both bidder and target airlines achieving positive abnormal returns upon an M&A announcement, in line with previous research. While the data initially indicates the existence of market power through collusive pricing, the inclusion of new data makes this study decline the market power hypothesis for the dataset as a whole, indicating that rivals experience slight disadvantages from their competitors’ mergers rather than benefits. II Table of Contents ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ II 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1 1.1 MOTIVATION 2 1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 3 1.3 STRUCTURE 4 1.4 ACADEMIC RELEVANCE 6 2 THEORY .............................................................................................................. 8 2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 8 2.1.1 DEFINITIONS OF M&As ..................................................................................................... 9 2.1.2 M&A EFFECT ON STOCK PERFORMANCE .................................................................... 9 2.1.3 M&As IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY ............................................................................... 11 2.1.4 EFFICIENCY AND THE MARKET POWER HYPOTHESIS ........................................... 13 2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 15 2.2.1 THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS ...................................................................... 16 3 M&AS IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY .......................................................... 18 3.1 OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY 18 3.1.1 THE EVENTS THAT CHANGED THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY ....................................... 19 3.1.2 MODERN AIRLINE CONSOLIDATION .......................................................................... 20 3.2 MOTIVATION FOR AIRLINE M&As 21 3.2.1 OPERATIONAL MOTIVATION ........................................................................................ 22 3.2.2 STRATEGIC MOTIVATION ............................................................................................. 23 3.2.3 RESTRICTING ENFORCEMENT ...................................................................................... 24 3.3 THE CASE OF THE AMERICAN – US AIRWAYS MERGER 25 3.3.1 MAJOR ISSUES PRE-MERGER ........................................................................................ 25 3.3.2 POST-MERGER EFFECTS ................................................................................................. 26 3.4 HYPOTHESES AND AREAS OF FOCUS 27 III 4 STATISTICAL FRAMEWORK ..................................................................... 28 4.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 28 4.2 THE EVENT STUDY FRAMEWORK 29 4.2.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL .................................................................................. 29 4.2.2 DAILY DATA ..................................................................................................................... 30 4.2.3 EVENT WINDOW .............................................................................................................. 31 4.2.4 MEASURING NORMAL PERFORMANCE...................................................................... 32 4.2.4.1 CONSTANT MEAN RETURN MODEL ................................................................... 32 4.2.4.2 MARKET MODEL ..................................................................................................... 33 4.2.4.3 ECONOMIC MODELS .............................................................................................. 33 4.2.5 SELECTION OF MODEL ................................................................................................... 33 4.2.6 ESTIMATION WINDOW ................................................................................................... 34 4.2.7 MEASURING ABNORMAL RETURNS ........................................................................... 35 4.2.8 THE JOINT TEST ............................................................................................................... 37 4.2.9 WILCOXON NON-PARAMETRIC SIGN TEST ............................................................... 39 5 DATA AND PROCESSING ............................................................................. 41 5.1 DATA COLLECTION 41 5.2 TYPES OF AIRLINES 42 5.3 DELIMITATIONS 43 5.4 CROSS-CORRELATION AND SKEWNESS 45 6 RESULTS ........................................................................................................... 46 6.1 DESCRIPTIVE DATA 46 6.2 MERGING AIRLINES 49 6.2.1 BIDDER AIRLINES ............................................................................................................ 50 6.2.2 TARGET AIRLINES ........................................................................................................... 51 6.2.3 ALL MERGING AIRLINES ............................................................................................... 54 6.3 RIVAL AIRLINES 56 6.3.1 COHERENCE WITH KNAPP STUDY .............................................................................. 57 6.3.2 COHERENCE WITH SINGAL STUDY ............................................................................ 58 6.3.3 ACCESS TO NEW DATA .................................................................................................. 60 IV 6.3.4 COMBINING ALL RIVALS ............................................................................................... 62 6.3.5 CONSOLIDATED RESULTS ............................................................................................. 65 6.3.5.1 MERGING AIRLINES ............................................................................................... 65 6.3.5.2 RIVAL AIRLINES ...................................................................................................... 66 7 DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................... 69 7.1 CONCLUSION 69 7.2 WEAKNESSES 70 7.3 FUTURE EXPECTATIONS 71 7.4 FUTURE RESEARCH 72 8 BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................. 74 APPENDICES ......................................................................................................... VII V List of figures Figure 1: Structure of the thesis ................................................................................................ 6 Figure 2: : Timeline of an event study .................................................................................... 30 Figure 3: The timeline of this event study .............................................................................. 35 Figure 4: Total number of yearly merger announcement in the United States ....................... 47 Figure 5: Available data of airlines involved in mergers in the United States ........................ 48 Figure 6: Number of mergers used in rival analysis and average number of rivals ................ 49 Figure 7: Abnormal returns of target airlines split into takeovers and consolidations ............ 54 Figure 8: Abnormal returns of target airlines .......................................................................... 56 Figure 9: Abnormal returns of rival’s data from Knapp (1990) and Singal (1996) ................ 60 Figure 10: Abnormal returns of rival airlines