ANNALS OF WAR THE SILENT STRIKE
How Israel bombed a Syrian nuclear installation and kept it secret. BY DAVID MAKOVSKY
n the first days of March, 2007, agents had dispatched bombers to Iraq to destroy from the Mossad, the Israeli intelli- the Osirak nuclear reactor. That strike Igence agency, made a daring raid on the marked the rise of the Begin doctrine, Vienna home of Ibrahim Othman, the named for Israeli Prime Minister Mena- head of the Syrian Atomic Energy Com- chem Begin, which held that no Israeli mission. Othman was in town attending adversary in the Middle East should be al- a meeting of the International Atomic lowed to acquire a nuclear weapon. Israel Energy Agency’s board of governors, itself has reportedly possessed nuclear and had stepped out. In less than an weapons since roughly 1967, although it hour, the Mossad operatives swept in, has never either admitted or denied it; the extracted top-secret information from London-based International Institute for Othman’s computer, and left without a Strategic Studies estimates that today Is- trace. rael has as many as two hundred nuclear In recent months, Israel and the warheads. Off the record, Israeli officials United States had become worried by reject any claim of moral equivalence be- Syria’s nuclear ambitions. In the nine- tween their reputed possession of nuclear teen-nineties, Syrian President Hafez al- weapons and Syria’s. One reason, officials Assad sought to buy nuclear research re- say, is Syria’s relationship with Hezbollah actors from Argentina and Russia, but and Hamas, both of which are consid- the deals fell through under U.S. pres- ered terrorist organizations by the U.S. sure. Toward the end of 2006, Israel State Department. began to pick up intelligence of possible On March 8th, days after the raid, renewed nuclear activity. There were Meir Dagan, the director of the Mossad, also suspicions about a large, “enigmatic” and two senior officials met with Israeli building under construction in the desert Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and pre- of northeastern Syria, General Michael sented the findings from the raid. During Hayden, the director of the C.I.A. at the a courtroom appearance last year, at time, told me. which Olmert was facing corruption The information the Mossad opera- charges (he was largely acquitted), he tives recovered was damning: roughly never directly mentioned Dagan or the three dozen color photographs taken Syrian site, but he referred obliquely to “a from inside the Syrian building, indicat- piece of information” that had been put ing that it was a top-secret plutonium on his desk “such as rarely happens in the nuclear reactor. The reactor, called Al country.” He added, “I knew from that Kibar, was nine hundred yards from the moment, nothing would be the same Euphrates River and halfway between again. The weight of this thing, at the ex- the borders with Turkey and Iraq. The istential level, was of an unprecedented photographs showed workers from scale.” Olmert pledged to destroy the re- North Korea at the site, which was far actor as soon as possible; if it went “hot,” from Syria’s biggest cities. The sole pur- radiation from its destruction could con- pose of this kind of plutonium reactor, in taminate the Euphrates. the Mossad’s analysis, was to produce an Five years later, the Al Kibar affair is atomic bomb. Inside, the reactor had still not discussed on the record in Israel. many of the same engineering elements When referred to by journalists or mil- as the North Korean reactor in Yong- itary analysts, reports are usually cred- byon—a model that no one but the ited to foreign sources. Word has grad- North Koreans had built in the past ually leaked out that Israel destroyed the thirty-five years. Al Kibar reactor. Some of the details of Two and a half decades earlier, Israel the operation have been published. In
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TNY—2012_09_17—PAGE 34—133SC. April, 2008, after several months of se- crecy, U.S. intelligence officials finally briefed Congress on their evaluation of the reactor. The most senior members of the Bush Administration, including Bush himself, mentioned in their mem- oirs how the U.S. responded to the evi- dence on the reactor. In recent months, I have spoken with about two dozen Israeli and American officials who were knowl- edgeable about the fate of Al Kibar, to learn exactly what happened and why de- tails of the affair have remained so closely guarded. As Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government consider how to confront Iran’s nascent nuclear program, Israel’s response to Al Kibar has emerged as both an exemplary and a cau- tionary tale.
he small suite of offices where Prime Minister Olmert and a half dozen ofT his aides worked, in a nondescript government office building in Jerusalem, sits behind glass doors and was so closely watched that it was nicknamed the Aquar- ium. For that reason, in the days after the discovery of the Syrian installation, Olmert began hosting important meet- ings at his official residence, on Balfour Street, a couple of miles away. Olmert, a former cabinet minister and onetime mayor of Jerusalem, had come to power in early 2006 on a platform of peace, and the war that summer with The Mossad extracted evidence of the nuclear site from the computer of a Syrian official. Hezbollah, in Lebanon, had been disas- trous for his popularity. In December, in leaders were summoned one by one, to Turgemen—nicknamed TnT by U.S. an attempt to restore his focus on peace- insure confidentiality and to prevent leaks. officials—to Washington, to report the making, Olmert had begun holding reg- A second group—including Amir Peretz, news to other senior U.S. officials. Dagan ular meetings with Mahmoud Abbas, the the Defense Minister; Gabi Ashkenazi, briefed his U.S. counterpart, Hayden, the President of the Palestinian Authority, to the Israel Defense Force’s chief of staff; C.I.A. director. Dagan, Turbowicz, and address the establishment of a Palestin- Amos Yadlin, the I.D.F. head of military Turgemen met with Vice-President Dick ian state. On February 15, 2007, a few intelligence; Yuval Diskin, the head of Cheney and the national-security adviser, weeks before the Mossad raid in Vienna, the Shin Bet, Israel’s security service; and Steve Hadley. Dagan presented them Olmert met with Turkish Prime Minis- Dagan, of the Mossad—met most Fri- with the photographs of the site and other ter Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in Ankara, days from late March of 2007 through information. According to one former se- and asked him to explore whether Syrian early September. Each member signed a nior U.S. official, Cheney, who had been President Bashar al-Assad—the son of secrecy agreement. urging the intelligence community to in- Hafez—would be willing to open secret The time came to inform the Ameri- vestigate a link between North Korea and peace talks with Israel. After meeting cans. On April 18th, during a routine visit Syria, was vindicated by the news. with Assad on April 3rd, Erdogan re- to Israel, Robert Gates, George W. Bush’s President Bush instructed his intelli- ported back to Olmert that Assad was Secretary of Defense, met with his Israeli gence chiefs to verify the Israeli claims; willing. By that time, Israel had discov- counterpart, Peretz. Because Peretz does the disastrous intelligence failure on ered evidence of the Syrian reactor, and a not speak English fluently, an index card weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was grim resolve had set in. was prepared for him, which he could fresh in everyone’s mind. Bush’s words, The briefings on Balfour Street began refer to as he divulged the news about the according to the former U.S. senior with Israel’s former Prime Ministers, in- reactor. Olmert also dispatched Dagan, official, were “Gotta be secret, and gotta cluding Shimon Peres, Ehud Barak, and along with two of Olmert’s top personal be sure.” A C.I.A. crisis task force was Netanyahu, Olmert’s political rival. The aides, Yoram Turbowicz and Shalom established, and, according to the same
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TNY—2012_09_17—PAGE 35—133SC.—LIVE ART R22558—EXTREMELY CRITICAL PHOTOGRAPH TO BE WATCHED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE PRESS RUN official, the C.I.A. compared “handheld” committee’s members were forbidden end of its tenure. “We were just turning photographs of the site with “overheads” from taking any relevant documents out the corner in Iraq, and there was an un- taken by American satellites. The pho- of the White House Situation Room. easy sense about Afghanistan,” Eliot tographs were then given to the National From the start, several members of the Cohen told me. “Many in the Adminis- Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which Drafting Committee were skeptical that tration were deeply reluctant to start what analyzes imagery and map-based intelli- diplomacy could neutralize Syria’s nuclear they thought would be a third Middle gence for policymakers and the national- program. The fear was that Assad would Eastern war. They thought the American security community. The N.G.A. deter- stall in order to buy time for the reactor to people would have no patience for it, mined that the two sets of photographs go hot, at which point military action quite apart from their own aversion to were valid, as did nuclear experts at would become too risky. Over several such a prospect.” the Department of Energy and an out- Tuesday afternoons, an even more senior On June 17th at the White House res- side nuclear-proliferation authority. Fi- national-security group gathered in Had- idence, just before a scheduled visit from nally, an ad-hoc C.I.A. “red team” con- ley’s office in the West Wing of the Olmert, Bush met with advisers in the cluded, according to the former senior White House. At the time, few from the Yellow Oval Room, which encouraged in- U.S. official, “If it’s not a nuclear reactor, group advocated American military ac- timacy and informality, and which al- then it’s a fake nuclear reactor.” tion. “Every Administration gets one lowed Bush to “be in a listening rather While U.S. intelligence officials scram- preëmptive war against a Muslim coun- than deciding mode,” according to an- bled to confirm the Israeli report, Had- try,” Gates told Edelman, half in jest, other former senior official. Recounting ley, the national-security adviser, directed “and this Administration has already that period for a 2011 Washington Post an interagency deputies committee— done one.” article, Hayden said that he “told the Pres- known, with deliberate blandness, as the Moreover, Israel’s 2006 war with ident that Al Kibar was part of a nuclear Drafting Committee—to develop policy Hezbollah had weakened Rice’s faith in weapons program” and that “we could options. The committee’s members in- Israel’s military judgment. “Condi conceive of no alternative uses for the fa- cluded Elliott Abrams, a deputy na- thought that the Israeli military was un- cility.” But, because they “could not iden- tional-security adviser; James Jeffrey, a reliable and that they were no longer the tify the other essentials of a weapons pro- top Middle East specialist at the State ten-foot giants that we had grown up gram,” such as a reprocessing plant or Department, who was later the deputy na- with,” a former senior Administration active work on a warhead, Hayden wrote, tional-security adviser; Eric Edelman, a official told me. Rice feared that a strike “we cautiously characterized this finding senior aide to Gates who had previously would lead to a wider conflict, including as ‘low confidence.’ ” served as the Ambassador to Turkey; and war with both Syria and Hezbollah. She The Administration conceded that Eliot Cohen, who was counsellor to the was also invested in two diplomatic ini- the reactor could go hot in the coming State Department under Condoleezza tiatives: six-party talks with North Korea months, but, once the term “low confi- Rice. No personal aides were included in about its nuclear program and a Middle dence” had been invoked, Bush no longer the group’s secure government e-mails. East peace conference that would be held felt he had the political cover to justify a The policy options were not circulated on later that year, in Annapolis. Meanwhile, preëmptive strike. In his memoir, Bush any government computers, and the the Administration was staring down the says that he told Olmert, “I cannot justify an attack on a sovereign nation unless my intelligence agencies stand up and say it’s a weapons program.” David Albright, a nuclear-proliferation expert at the Insti- tute for Science and International Secu- rity, told me that a reprocessing plant has yet to be found; then again, he noted, Syria has not granted anyone permission to look for one. Olmert met with American officials in Washington on June 19th. He told re- porters that he was there to discuss Iran and the Palestinian peace process, but, in his meetings with Bush and Cheney, he urged that the U.S. lead the attack on the Syrian reactor. Olmert argued that a U.S. strike would “kill two birds with one stone,” allowing Bush to remind the international community of Assad’s villainy and send a message dissuading Iran from pursuing its own nuclear pro- gram. Olmert told Bush that if the “I should have bought toys with better posture.” U.S. did not destroy the reactor, Israel
TNY—2012_09_17—PAGE 36—133SC.—LIVE ART—A16862 would, even if it lacked support from the would block Israeli action. “Olmert said chief of staff, and one of the most deco- Americans. Bush promised an answer he did not ask Bush for a green light, but rated soldiers in Israeli history. The “two shortly. Bush did not give Olmert a red light,” an Ehuds,” Olmert and Barak, had a cor- On July 12th, Bush convened a sec- Israeli general told me. “Olmert saw it dial relationship, despite belonging to ond meeting, and declared that he would as green.” different parties. When Olmert was the send an envoy to Syria with an ultimatum mayor of Jerusalem, in the nineties, he for Assad to begin dismantling the reac- he Israelis began preparations for a defended Barak, then the Prime Minis- tor. The five permanent members of the unilateral attack. The I.D.F. and the ter, from the usual refrain from the right Council, or P5—the United States, Rus- TIsraeli Air Force considered three possi- that a Labor leader would cede half of sia, China, Britain, and France—would ble strategies: a wide strike by the Israeli Jerusalem to the Palestinians. (In fact, oversee the dismantling. Air Force, nicknamed Fat Shkedi, after Barak did offer significant parts of Jeru- Bush called Olmert at eight o’clock Israel’s Air Force chief, General Eliezer salem during the Camp David summit the next morning. If the Americans were Shkedi; a narrower strike, nicknamed in 2000.) to hit the reactor, he said, the Adminis- Skinny Shkedi; and a ground attack by But the friendship did not endure. tration would have to explain to Con- special forces. Barak told his fellow cabinet ministers gress that the intelligence had come from A key consideration was the desire to that he feared a repeat of the 2006 war, Israel. Was this what Olmert wanted? minimize the potential of a response from and thought it would be better to delay Bush offered to send Rice to the region, Damascus. Since discovering the reactor, the attack on Al Kibar. This would give but Olmert replied that he was not inter- many Israeli officials had concluded that Israel’s military command in the north ested in a visit from Rice, and said he the lower the signature of the attack the sufficient time to prepare for possible feared that a diplomatic route would less likely Syria would be to retaliate. By Syrian retaliation. For Olmert, the 2006 simply enable Syria to stall until the re- failing to report the presence of a nuclear Lebanon war had established deter- actor went hot. In his memoir, Bush reactor, Assad would be violating his ob- rence; Hezbollah had not openly fired a wrote that “the prime minister was dis- ligations to the International Atomic En- shot at Israel since then. Olmert sus- appointed” at the U.S. preference for di- ergy Agency. To avoid drawing further pected that Barak had another reason plomacy, adding that Olmert told him, attention to this violation—not to men- for putting off an attack on Al Kibar. “This is something that hits at the very tion the humiliation of having its nuclear The final report of the Winograd Com- serious nerves of this country.” The ambitions exposed and thwarted by Is- mission, a government-appointed in- American nuclear-prevention policy to- rael—Assad might prefer to bury the quiry into the decisions involved in the ward North Korea and Pakistan was matter. Psychologists consulted by the 2006 war with Hezbollah, was antici- characterized as “too early, too early— I.D.F., who had profiled Assad for years, pated around the end of the year and oops—too late,” Ariel Levite, a nonresi- argued that Syrian retaliation might be was expected to criticize Olmert for his dent senior associate in the nonprolifer- avoided if Israel did not corner the Presi- handling of the war and weaken him ation program at the Carnegie Endow- dent by publicly claiming credit for a politically. Olmert worried that Barak ment, told me. The Israelis also believed strike, thus preserving for Assad what Is- would seize upon the report’s findings, that a diplomatic focus would undermine raeli security officials called a “zone of de- trigger Olmert’s ouster as Prime Minis- the surprise of a military operation. Once nial.” Assad’s decision not to take any di- ter, and lead the operation against the Assad realized that he had been caught, rect hostile action against Israel during its Syrian reactor himself. as Abrams put it to me, what would stop 2006 war with Hezbollah, in Lebanon, In Israel, all major military actions him from putting a kindergarten near demonstrated that he saw the advantage that could lead to war must be approved the site, or from deploying anti-aircraft of avoiding military confrontation with by the security cabinet. Olmert invited weaponry? Israel. Also, from what the Israelis could several members of the security cabinet Although the U.S. and Israel agreed discern, the Al Kibar reactor was in a re- separately to his home and briefed them on the fundamental facts and risks, they mote location; a strike would be unlikely on Al Kibar. Each signed a written vow had reached opposing policy conclu- to cause civilian fatalities or even draw of secrecy, agreeing to face investigation sions. Until the phone call from Bush, public attention. if he or she leaked information. Over the Olmert hoped that the United States Given these factors, the I.D.F., the next five weeks, a half-dozen extraordi- would lead the attack. Now he was wor- Mossad, and the Foreign Ministry, led by nary security-cabinet meetings unfolded. ried that any U.S. official who was not on Tzipi Livni, all favored a low-signature Barak argued that a careful attack in the board with the Israeli strike would try to attack on the reactor. Back in June, an Is- early phases after the reactor went hot sabotage it by leaking information, and raeli special-operations unit had been dis- would not contaminate the Euphrates. he expressed his fears to Bush. The Pres- patched to within a mile of the site to take Olmert gave a long and persuasive rejoin- ident promised Olmert that the Ameri- and transmit additional photos, bring der. “It may have been the most dramatic can side would remain “buttoned up.” back soil samples, and provide Israel with set of sessions that I can ever recall in the Bush probably did not relish further other information it needed for a strike. security cabinet,” one of the cabinet min- military action and feared a repeat of the By June, Peretz had lost the Labor isters in attendance told me. intelligence debacle in Iraq, but he seems Party leadership and the position of De- On September 1st, Turbowicz told to have understood Olmert’s position. At fense Minister passed to Ehud Barak, the White House that preparations were no point did Bush suggest that the U.S. the former Prime Minister, former Army almost complete. Israel informed one
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TNY—2012_09_17—PAGE 37—133SC. other country’s intelligence service be- areas without causing any human or ma- lic statements about the strike. Olmert fore the strike—Britain’s MI6—but did terial damage.” The Israelis say that not flew to Moscow to brief Russia, which has not share the exact timing of the attack a single Syrian air-defense missile was close ties with Assad. Dick Cheney was with either country. launched. At least ten, and perhaps as eager to expose the flagrant role of North On September 5th, the security cab- many as three dozen, workers were killed Korea in the Syrian project and argued for inet deliberated for the last time, and in the strike. disclosure. But Condoleezza Rice, keen to voted to strike. (The only minister to As the planes returned to their bases, preserve the six-party diplomatic talks abstain from voting was Avi Dichter.) Olmert went to his secondary office, at with North Korea, urged that the request The cabinet also voted to grant Olmert, the Kirya defense complex, in Tel Aviv, for silence be honored. She prevailed. Barak, and Livni sole power to approve and asked to be connected to Bush, who On October 23rd, Olmert met Erdo- the military approach and the timing of was in Australia. “I just want to report to gan in London to brief him on the attack the strike. Barak and Olmert had made and on Israel’s motives. During the meet- several handwritten amendments to the ing, Olmert asked Erdogan to gauge Syr- text of the resolution that ordered the ian interest in re-starting peace negotia- strike, explicitly indicating the potential tions. Assad agreed to indirect peace talks, for war. After the cabinet session, Ol- which began in Ankara in February, 2008; mert, Barak, and Livni reconvened in they ended that December, when Syria the briefing room adjacent to Olmert’s and Turkey withdrew in protest over Isra- office. The chief of staff came into the el’s war against Gaza. Israelis say the two room and recommended attacking that sides never discussed the Al Kibar strike. night, using the Skinny Shkedi ap- As the months went by, and the odds proach. After the chief of staff left, Ol- you that something that existed doesn’t of Syrian retaliation diminished, Bush mert, Barak, and Livni voted unani- exist anymore,” Olmert told him. “It was asked Olmert for permission to tell certain mously to proceed. done with complete success.” senators and representatives what had happened. Details had begun to leak out, ust before midnight on September 5, yria has consistently denied that it had and members of the congressional intelli- 2007, four F-15s and four F-16s took a reactor, and the responses from its gence committees were upset that they offJ from Israeli Air Force bases, including administrationS officials have been contra- had not been briefed. Moreover, there was Ramat David, southeast of Haifa. After dictory. Three weeks after the strike, a fierce debate within the Administration flying north along the Mediterranean President Assad told the BBC that Israeli over the decision not to go public about Coast, the planes turned east and followed warplanes had attacked an unused mili- North Korea’s role in the construction of the Syrian-Turkish border, to avoid detec- tary building and said that Damascus re- the Syrian reactor. Olmert relented; in Is- tion by radar. Using standard electronic served “the right to retaliate,” though not rael, however, official restrictions remain. scrambling tools, the Israelis blinded Syr- necessarily in a “bomb for bomb” manner. After rebuffing repeated requests by ia’s air-defense system. In Tel Aviv, in a Meanwhile, Bashar Ja’afari, the Syrian the I.A.E.A. to visit the site, Syria ulti- room of the underground I.A.F. com- Ambassador to the United Nations, con- mately permitted a small group of inspec- mand-and-control center known as “the tinued to insist that nothing was bombed tors, including Olli Heinonen, to visit for pit,” Olmert, Barak, Livni, and senior in Syria and that Israeli planes “were en- one day in June, 2008. The inspectors security officials followed the planes by countered by our air defense fire” and found particles of man-made uranium in radar. The room would serve as a bunker were forced to drop their ammunition the samples, which Syria claimed were for Olmert in the event that the strike and fuel tanks. the residue of the bombing. In 2009, the sparked a war; the Israelis had also pre- “Nobody in Syria believed that Israel inspectors reported that graphite had also pared a military contingency plan. did this,” Andrew Tabler, a Syria expert been found at the site; Syria again issued General Shkedi tracked the pilots by who is a fellow at the Washington Insti- a denial. In its most recent report, the audio in an adjacent room. Sometime be- tute and was in Damascus at the time, told I.A.E.A. concluded that the site was tween 12:40 and 12:53 A.M., the pilots me. “People believed the regime.” Syrians “very likely” a nuclear reactor. uttered the computer-generated code were incredulous on two accounts, Tabler When I met with Heinonen this past word of the day, “Arizona,” indicating said: that Assad had secretly built a reactor spring, he told me that the site had been that seventeen tons of explosives had and that Israel had demolished it. Even as cleaned up before the inspectors’ visit. been dropped on their target. “There was confirmation of some sort of strike came His statement echoed a cable, released by a sense of elation,” one participant re- out in the world press, Syria did not strike WikiLeaks in 2010 to an Israeli daily, called. “The reactor was destroyed and back. This reinforced Israel’s initial psy- that Condoleezza Rice sent to State we did not lose a pilot.” chological reading: as long as Assad could Department representatives around the The next day, the Syrian Arab News deny the existence of the reactor, he would world on April 25, 2008, after the con- Agency announced that Israeli planes had not feel pressured to retaliate. gressional briefing. “Syria’s concealment entered Syrian airspace but had been re- The Israelis helped secure that zone of and lies about what happened for months pelled: “Air-defense units confronted denial. They briefed their regional allies, now after the Israeli air strike is compel- them and forced them to leave after they including Egypt and Jordan, and urged ling proof that it has something to hide,” dropped some ammunition in deserted their leaders to refrain from making pub- Rice wrote. “In fact, after the attack on
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TNY—2012_09_17—PAGE 38—133SC.—LIVE ART R22559A—#2 PAGE—FIXED A LOOSE LINE IN RH COLUMN the site, Syria went to great lengths to today is whether the lessons of that suc- it is strongly fortified; an attack on it clean up the site and destroy evidence of cess can be applied to Iran, which has would run a higher risk of failure. A strike what was really there.” Syria’s cleanup insisted, against all evidence, that its might set back the Iranian program, but effort was also monitored and confirmed nuclear ambitions are limited to civilian for how long, and at what cost? Some Is- by I.D.F. satellites. purposes, and whether Israel and the raeli officials have expressed concern that Heinonen said that one of the in- U.S. view the threat the same way. a strike would only provide Iran with spectors’ escorts at the site was General Barak is a leading proponent of a justification to pursue its nuclear program. Mohammed Suleiman, who served as possible unilateral strike on Iran. In his The issue in Israel is whether the a primary regime contact on various public statements and in private con- Americans have sufficient resolve to issues related to Iran. An Israeli gen- versations, he has referred to the “sword thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Obama eral called him the head of the Syrian on Israel’s neck”—the prospect of a has declared, “I don’t bluff,” and has said “shadow army,” meaning he dealt with regional neighbor and an outspoken that all options are on the table, including issues unrelated to Syria’s conventional enemy of the state acquiring the ability the use of force. So far, efforts by the five Army, such as transferring Iranian to destroy it. He cites a May 20th state- permanent members of the U.N. Security weapons to Hezbollah. Israeli officials ment by Hassan Firouzabadi, the chief Council and Germany have focussed on say that Suleiman, a fellow-Alawite and of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, diplomacy and U.S.-led sanctions on longtime friend of the Assad family, that his country is committed to the Iran’s export of oil and other economic was believed to be one of the very few “full annihilation of Israel.” Olmert told sectors. Israel may not be so patient. “Is- senior regime officials who knew of the me, “Israel cannot tolerate an enemy rael often believes it stands alone,” one reactor’s existence. with militarized nuclear power. We did official who deals with national-security On August 1, 2008, Suleiman was not tolerate it in the past, whether it was issues told me. “If there are differences killed by snipers while hosting a dinner in Iraq or Syria, and we cannot tolerate with the U.S. over Iran, Israel will as- at his weekend home overlooking the sea it in Iran.” sume, as it has in the past, that whoever’s at the Syrian port city of Tartus. The op- A nuclear Iran also poses a consider- national security is most directly impacted eration is believed to have been carried able threat to American interests. “The will have to act even if the other does out jointly by the Mossad and the Sha- entire world has an interest in prevent- not agree.” yetet 13, or Flotilla 13, an élite commando ing Iran from acquiring a nuclear Olmert was more cautious. “Each case unit of the Israeli Navy that specializes in weapon,” President Obama said in a must be examined separately,” he said. sea-to-land incursions and counterterror- speech on March 4, 2012. “An Iranian “The Iraqi case was different from the ism. Nobody else was injured. Israel has nuclear weapon could fall into the Syrian case, and the Syrian case is differ- never acknowledged the assassination. hands of a terrorist organization. It is ent from the Iranian case.” Olmert placed Olmert’s poll numbers did not recover almost certain that others in the region himself in the camp of former high-rank- after the fallout of the 2006 war, and the would feel compelled to get their own ing officials, including Ashkenazi, Dagan, rest of his term as Prime Minister was nuclear weapon, triggering an arms race and Diskin, who are openly opposed to marred by corruption charges, even as he in one of the world’s most volatile re- unilateral Israeli action against Iran; he continued Palestinian peace talks with gions. It would embolden a regime that has publicly urged Netanyahu not to pur- Abbas. In July, 2008, he announced that has brutalized its own people, and it sue that approach. “Worse comes to worst, he would resign his position, and he left would embolden Iran’s proxies, who and all options have been tried, then, nat- office after elections the following Febru- have carried out terrorist attacks from urally, it may force Israel to act to defend ary. This July, Olmert was cleared of the Levant to southwest Asia.” It would its existence,” he told me. “But it must be charges of receiving illicit cash payments also undermine American credibility. clear that we tried with the international and of double-billing Israeli organiza- Nuclear nonproliferation is a signature community, and particularly with the tions for travel expenses, but convicted on issue for Obama and has been for the United States, to act together before we breach of trust. He faces another trial on U.S. since the Second World War. The resort to the last option of an Israeli mili- corruption charges related to a Jerusalem last three Administrations, both Dem- tary operation.” real-estate deal, but some recent polls ocratic and Republican, have pledged As in 2007, Israel is likely to assess show that if Olmert were to head a new that Iran will not be allowed to develop the situation in Iran with an eye to its centrist coalition it would run strongly a nuclear program. own security. Speaking to Israel’s Na- against Netanyahu’s party. If he is acquit- Yet the situation in Iran differs funda- tional Security College in July, 2012, ted of the final charge, many analysts mentally from the Syrian case. The Syrian Barak declared, “I am well aware of in Israel expect him to attempt a politi- affair was known to only a small num- the depth and complexities involved in cal comeback, though he has denied ber of officials in Damascus, Israel, and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear it in public. Washington, whereas the prospect of weapons. However, I am certain beyond striking Iran’s nuclear program has been any doubt that dealing with that chal- or Israel, the raid on Al Kibar was vigorously discussed in public. Experts lenge” of a nuclear-armed Iran “from the an unparalleled success. The Begin have pointed to the risk of civilian casual- hour of its emergence—if it emerges— doctrineF was reaffirmed, and neither ties and prolonged retaliation. What’s will be far more complicated, far more Syria nor Hezbollah has encroached more, a key Iranian site lies deep under- dangerous, and far more costly in human on Israel since. The pressing question ground outside the holy city of Qom, and lives and resources.”
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