Israel and the Middle East News Update
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Jousour Bridges and Return
Jousour, issued by the LPDC represents an array of opinions and perspectives on issues pertaining Palestinian refugees affairs in Lebanon. It aims to expand the realm of rational dialogue between the Lebanese and Palestinians beyond stereotypes and dogmas while contributing to the development of common relationships in a positive and constructive manner. This supplement is distributed for free with An-Nahar, Al-Liwa’a, and The Daily Star. Special Supplement Issue 1, October 2018 The “Deal of the Century” and the UNRWA Crisis: Challenges and Choices Photo by: Haitham Mousawi Lebanon, an asylum 70 Years, from Compassion The “Other” Through Both To Refugees and Displaced To Controversy Pal. and Leb. Eyes Amine Gemayel Tarek Mitri, Abbas Zaki, Husein Abu Elnaml Pernille Dahler Kardel Ziad Sayegh Asaad Shaftari Hasan Mneymneh On “Bridges” Chairman of the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee e issue this newspaper supplement to introduce the Lebanese and attempting to break free of the chains of the past, including the Lebanese attitudes WPalestinian public opinion to the importance of examining the problematic toward the Palestinians and the Palestinian attitudes toward the Lebanese, under and complex difficulties the joint relations suffer from. These relations have a direct and honest approach. The writers – Lebanese and Palestinian – that extended over the span of this 70-year-old asylum, marked by much serenity and participated with us on this project rely on those fixed principles, considered overshadowed by misunderstanding and controversy that peaked in the years of the Civil War and bloody internal strife. The Lebanese and Palestinian people points of convergence for the Lebanese and Palestinians alike. -
Command and Control | the Washington Institute
MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds Command and Control by David Makovsky, Olivia Holt-Ivry May 23, 2012 ABOUT THE AUTHORS David Makovsky David Makovsky is the Ziegler distinguished fellow at The Washington Institute and director of the Koret Project on Arab-Israel Relations. Olivia Holt-Ivry Articles & Testimony his week, the world's major powers resumed negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Should they fail, T the specter of a possible Israeli strike looms large, seeming to grow more likely as Tehran's nuclear program advances. In recent weeks, however, the conventional wisdom has shifted to favor the view that Israel is not on the cusp of a strike against Iran. This has been driven in part by public comments from former Israeli security officials -- notably former Mossad head Meir Dagan and former Shin Bet head Yuval Diskin -- questioning the wisdom of such an attack. An Israeli strike is not feasible, the thinking goes, so long as its security community remains divided -- and the thinly veiled threats of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are therefore mere bluster. Don't be so sure. Dagan and Diskin's views aren't likely to tell us much about the likelihood of a strike on Iran one way or the other. For starters, they're former officials -- given the sensitivity of this issue, and the recent media misinterpretation of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Benny Gantz's remarks earlier this month, no other current members of the security establishment are likely to go public with their views. -
Operation Cast Lead--Zion Fascism at Its Best
South Asian Studies A Research Journal of South Asian Studies Vol. 29, No.2, July - December 2014, pp. 685-694 Operation Cast Lead--Zion Fascism at Its Best Umbreen Javaid University of Punjab, Lahore. Maliha Shamim University of Punjab, Lahore. Abstract Jews consider themselves to be the original inhabitants of Palestine. It has always been the official policy of Israel to occupy and populate the Palestinian territories. The victories in successive Arab-Israeli wars emboldened Israel to pursue its policy more vigorously. The Palestinians of occupied territories specially those living in West Bank and Gaza have to face the onslaught of Israeli atrocities. After breaking the truce entered into with Hamas, Israel attacked Gaza in December 2008, justifying the attacks as its right of self-defense. The Gazan operation named Operation Lead was not condemned by EU, US or European countries. To prepare the Israeli army for the Gaza offensive the troops were even religiously and politically brainwashed to successfully combat the Palestinians. The elections held after the Gaza offensive and extremist candidates returned to the Israeli parliament. Such extremist stance taken by Israeli public will go a long way in making the already biased Israeli society a more racist and fascist Israeli polity. In the absence of any criticism or condemnation of Israeli actions it pursues the murder and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians with impunity. Accumulation of latest weaponry and warring techniques have transformed Israel into a regional Sparta and religious extremism and fascism have come to assume an important place in today’s Israel. This article has been prepared with the help of newspapers and answers certain questions as why is Palestine most coveted by Jews. -
RSIS COMMENTARIES RSIS Commentaries Are Intended to Provide Timely And, Where Appropriate, Policy Relevant Background and Analysis of Contemporary Developments
RSIS COMMENTARIES RSIS Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position of the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from RSIS. Due recognition must be given to the author or authors and RSIS. Please email: [email protected] or call (+65) 6790 6982 to speak to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, Yang Razali Kassim. __________________________________________________________________________________________________ No. 156/2011 dated 27 October 2011 Israel and Hamas: A new equation for Mid-East peace? By James M. Dorsey Synopsis Israeli and Palestinian hardliners rather than moderates are serving each other's purpose in the Middle East conflict. That is the underlying dynamic of the political calculations of both Israel and Hamas in the recent lop- sided swap of an Israeli soldier for over a thousand Palestinian prisoners. Commentary THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN peace process remains frozen with little, if any, prospect of it gaining momentum. President Mahmoud Abbas' effort to achieve United Nations recognition of Palestinian statehood in a bid to break the logjam is mired in diplomatic red tape and likely to be foiled by a United States veto if it comes up for a vote in the Security Council. True to form, hardliners on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian divide are finding common ground where moderates are grasping for straws. In doing so, they are reaffirming a long-standing fact of life of the Israeli- Palestinian equation: hardliners can serve each other’s needs to mutual benefit without making the kind of wrenching concessions that thwart the ambitions of peacemakers and moderates on both sides. -
Signatories. Appeal from Palestine. 20.6
19/06/2020 Signatories for “Appeal from Palestine to the Peoples and States of the World” Name Current/ Previous Occupation 1. Abbas Zaki Member of the Central Committee of Fatah—Ramallah 2. Abd El-Qader Husseini Chairman of Faisal Husseini Foundation— Jerusalem 3. Abdallah Abu Alhnoud Member of the Fatah Advisory Council— Gaza 4. Abdallah Abu Hamad President of Taraji Wadi Al-Nes Sports Club—Bethlehem 5. Abdallah Hijazi President of the Civil Retired Assembly, Former Ambassador—Ramallah 6. Abdallah Yousif Alsha’rawi President of the Palestinian Motors Sport & Motorcycle & Bicycles Federation— Ramallah 7. Abdel Halim Attiya President of Al-Thahirya Youth Club— Hebron 8. Abdel Jalil Zreiqat President of Tafouh Youth Sports Club— Hebron 9. Abdel Karim Abu Khashan University Lecturer, Birzeit University— Ramallah 10. Abdel Majid Hijeh Secretary-General of the Olympic Committee—Ramallah 11. Abdel Majid Sweilem University Lecturer and Journalist— Ramallah 12. Abdel Qader Hasan Abdallah Secretary General of the Palestine Workers Kabouli Union—Lebanon, Alkharoub Region 13. Abdel Rahim Mahamid Secretary of the Al-Taybeh Sports Club— Ramallah 14. Abdel Raof Asqoul Storyteller—Tyre 15. Abdel Salam Abu Nada Expert in Media Development—Brussels 16. Abdel-Rahman Tamimi Director General of the Palestinian Hydrology Group—Ramallah 17. Abdo Edrisi President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry—Hebron 18. Abdul Rahman Bseiso Retired Ambassador—Cyprus 19. Abdul Rahman Hamad Former Minister—Gaza 20. Abu Ali Masoud Vice-Chairman of the Fatah Advisory Council—Ramallah 21. Adalah Abu Sitta Chairwoman of the Board of Directors of the Right to Live Society—Gaza 22. Adel Al-Asta Writer—Gaza 23. -
מחלקת שפות זרות/FA & Defence/3953
c. Method As proposed by the Chairman, the task was given to the Sub-Committee for Intelligence and the Secret Services, comprising six members of the Knesset. The members of the committee are: MK Yuval Steinitz – chair, MK Ehud Yatom, MK David Levy, MK Haim Ramon, MK Eli Yishai and MK Ilan Leibovitch. MK Danny Yatom, who was replaced in the course of the committee’s work as part of the rotation of members of the Labor faction in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, also contributed to the work of the committee at the beginning. Mr. Shabtai Shavit – a former head of the Mossad - served as a consultant to the committee. The committee takes this opportunity to thank him for his significant contribution. The senior professional assistant of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Colonel (res.) Shmuel Letko, served as the secretary of the committee. The work of the committee was closely accompanied by the incoming Director-General of the Committee, R. Admiral (res.) Avriel Bar-Joseph, and by the outgoing Director-General of the Committee, Mr. Baruch Friedner, who was also given the task of writing the report. The Committee began its work in July 2003 and completed it recently. The Committee held some 30 plenum sessions and scores of smaller work meetings, in the course of which the following, inter alia, appeared before it: The Prime Minister, Mr. Ariel Sharon The Minister of Defense, Mr. Shaul Mofaz The Deputy Minister of Defense, Mr. Zeev Boim The Chief-of-Staff, Lieutenant General Moshe (Boogy) Ya'alon The Head of Military Intelligence, Major-General Aharon (Farkash) Zeevi 13 The Head of the Mossad, Major-General (res.) Mr. -
Lebanon's Palestinian Refugee Camps
NURTURING INSTABILITY: LEBANON’S PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS Middle East Report N°84 – 19 February 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION: THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON ..................... 1 A. MULTIPLICITY OF ACTORS AND CAMPS ........................................................................................1 1. Main political actors.................................................................................................................1 2. Palestinian refugees and camps ................................................................................................1 II. THE EVOLUTION OF LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS......................... 4 A. OPEN WARFARE (1969-1990).......................................................................................................4 B. THE POST-WAR YEARS (1990-2004).............................................................................................6 C. 2004-2005: TURNING POINT OR DEAD END? ................................................................................7 1. UNSCR 1559...........................................................................................................................7 2. The Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee........................................................................9 3. Nahr al-Bared: a difficult test case..........................................................................................11 D. THE REFUGEES’ PRECARIOUS -
Israel's Struggle Against Hamas
Università degli Studi “Roma Tre” Scuola Dottorale in Scienze Politiche XXV Ciclo Israel’s Struggle Against Hamas Supervisore Dottorando Prof. Leopoldo Nuti Niccolò Petrelli Coordinatore della Sezione Prof. Leopoldo Nuti Introduction The PhD research, ‘Israel’s Struggle against Hamas: Strategic Culture, Adaptation and War’, studies the impact of cultural factors on the Israeli counter-insurgency vis-à-vis Hamas in the period comprised between 1987 and 2005, analyzing to what extent the peculiar traits of the Israeli approach to security and military affairs account for the shaping of a distinct ‘way of war’ and for the successes and failures of the Jewish state in countering the Islamic Resistance Movement’s insurgency. The concept of ‘counter-insurgency’ is logically contingent on that of ‘insurgency’, to which it applies. Being insurgency a protracted struggle to control a contested political space conducted by one or more popularly based non-state challengers1, ‘counter-insurgency’ could be defined as all those measures through which elements of national power are applied for the purpose of suppressing an insurgency. From this definition it appears clear how the concept constitutes an analytical paradigm through which scholars and practitioners approach asymmetric warfare (or war against ‘irregulars’, ‘partisans’ or ‘guerrillas’), that is struggles between non-state and state actors.2 Although old as human civilization, asymmetric warfare rose to prominence after 1945, coming to represent the norm, rather than the exception, of war.3 The end of the Cold War and the last two decades seemed to confirm the ascendancy of this specific kind of warfare over ‘conventional’ or ‘symmetric warfare’ and the setting of a pattern that will probably continue for some time.4 Counter-insurgency represents therefore a topic worth to study not only by virtue of its prominence in the history of warfare, but also in light of the nature of the conflicts confronting the international community, either currently and possibly also in the near future. -
Former Aman Chief Offers Realism on Threats to Israel - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of The
Former Aman Chief Offers Realism on Threats to Israel - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the... Page 1 of 3 Former Aman Chief Offers Realism on Threats to Israel By: Ben Caspit for Al-Monitor Israel Pulse. Posted on February 8. READ IN HEBREW Major General (res.) Amos Yadlin had served as head of the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman) until two years ago. In Israel, the head of Aman is viewed as the country’s “national evaluator,” the man who heads the Subcommittee for Intelligence and Secret Services, a forum in which the Shin Bet and Mossad chiefs also participate, together with the prime minister’s military secretary. At the end of the day, Israel’s national intelligence assessment is in the hands of Aman, the organization that dominates the lion's share of Israel’s first-rate and extremely experienced intelligence community. The role of Aman chief is Israel’s most sensitive, most responsible and most explosive position in the country. About This Article Yadlin is a cautious and reserved man, an outstanding air force pilot who participated in the bombing of the Iraqi reactor. He was born to a political family (his father, Aharon Yadlin, was education minister). He nurtures gentlemanly manners and European breeding in the heart of the rough-and-tumble Middle East. He is Summary : partner to some of the incisive criticism brought against Israel’s captains by his colleagues, former Mossad Former IDF intelligence chief Amos head Meir Dagan and former Shin Bet head Yuval Diskin, but he is careful to express his criticism with the Yadlin has discounted Prime Minister utmost discretion and not air it in the public domain. -
Ex-Security Chiefs Publicly Oppose Attack on Iran
Ex-Security Chiefs Publicly Oppose Attack on Iran Avnery at a demonstration. Click here for JJ Goldberg’s view of the recent Jerusalem Post conference in New York, which had a very right-wing tenor, but also some instances of sharp dissent and acrimony. The following is part of Uri Avnery’s “A Putsch Against War” piece, May 5. Our reference to this column is out of respect for him as an intelligent observer, but should not be read as an endorsement for all his views: …. IT STARTED with the most unlikely candidate to lead such a rebellion: the ex-Mossad chief, Meir Dagan. For eight years, longer than most of his predecessors, Dagan led the Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence service, comparable to the British MI6. (“Mossad” means “institute”. The official name is “The Institute for intelligence and Special Operations”.) Nobody ever accused Dagan of pacifism. During his term, the Mossad carried out many assassinations, several against Iranian scientists, as well as cyber attacks. A protégé of Ariel Sharon, he was considered a champion of the most aggressive policies. And here, after leaving office, he speaks out in the harshest terms against the government’s plans for an attack on Iran’s nuclear installations. Not mincing words, he said: “This is the stupidest idea I have heard in my life.” This week he was overshadowed by the recently relieved chief of the Shin Bet. (Shin Bet and Shabak are different ways of pronouncing the initials of the official Hebrew name “General Security Service.”) It is equivalent to the British MI5, but deals mostly with the Palestinians in Israel and the occupied territories. -
Will Israel Blast the Iranian Bomb
WILL ISRAEL BLASTBLAST THE By Michael Karpin IRANIAN BOMB ? he idea of nuclear weapons in the hands of a dangerous Israel also has two spy satellites, and according to non-Israeli enemy like Iran is unacceptable to nearly all Israelis. sources, Israel uses the Kurdish territory in northern Iraq There is no chance that Israel will reconcile itself to to put agents into Iran to gather data. It can be assumed that living with nuclear threats from the ayatollahs. If Iran the two countries have accumulated some useful material continues on the path to atomic weaponry, is Israel on the defenses at known nuclear sites in Iran, especially the capable of acting to eliminate that danger? operational centrifuge installation at Natanz, and the reactor TIsraelis hope for a diplomatic solution leading to cancellation at Arak due to be completed in 2009 (and able to extract of the Iranian nuclear program. But what if negotiations fail? plutonium from spent uranium shortly thereafter). Israel would prefer American military intervention, yet the It is doubtful that attacks on Natanz and Arak would eradicate prevalent opinion among Israeli experts is that the U.S. would be Iran’s nuclear plans. Learning from the bombing of Iraq’s very hesitant to use force against Iran. Meanwhile, political and Osirak reactor by the Israeli air force in 1981, Iran has no doubt military leaders in Israel have repeatedly declared that if and when dispersed other subterranean uranium enrichment plants across Iran reaches the point of no return, Israel will not hesitate to take the country. If one were hit, another could be activated. -
201204.Friedman.Iran-Israel-Calculus
Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes A Catalyst for Ideas Distributed via Email and Posted at www.fpri.org April 2012 IRAN IN ISRAEL’S STRATEGIC CALCULUS By Brandon Friedman Brandon Friedman is a Research Fellow at the Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University. This article is based on his February 27, 2012 talk at FPRI on “Muscle-Flexing, Quiet Diplomacy, and Iran's Nuclear Program,” The audiocast of this event can be accessed here: http://www.fpri.org/multimedia/2012/20120227.friedman.iran.html “Will Israel Attack Iran?” was the provocative headline of respected Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman’s January story published in The New York Times Magazine. Bergman claimed that “yes,” Israel would attack Iran in 2012.1 A few days later, Israeli scholar Barry Rubin published a long article of his own which argued that “no,” Israel would not strike Iran.2 So, which is it? Yes or no? The less satisfactory answer, the less media-worthy answer, but perhaps the more accurate and honest answer is that “it depends.” And therefore, the better question to ask, it seems to me, is under what set of circumstances is the current Israeli leadership more or less likely to feel it must take independent military action? Before I address that question, however, I would like to briefly explain the three assumptions that underlie my interpretation of this issue. First, I believe Iran’s ultimate goal is a nuclear weapons capability. Second, I believe Israel's security cabinet has not yet made any decision about a military strike on Iran but that the current government views a nuclear-armed Iran as an unacceptable outcome.