THE TERROR and the PITY: YASIR ARAFAT and the SECOND LOSS of PALESTINE by Barry Rubin*

THE TERROR AND THE PITY: YASIR ARAFAT AND THE SECOND LOSS OF PALESTINE By Barry Rubin* Abstract: As has so often happened before, some observers have underestimated Yasir Arafat's ability to survive political or military disasters partly of his own making. Others have overestimated Yasir Arafat's willingness to make peace or his ability to change his positions. This article presents a long-term view of Arafat's leadership and a short-term analysis on the current state of Palestinian politics. In the year 2000, Yasir Arafat and the been seriously examined, at least publicly. Palestinian leadership initiated a new, self- Instead, traditional themes of Palestinian inflicted nakba, a catastrophe equaled only political thinking and structure have by the 1948 Arab defeat. The decision to continued or reemerged. This article reject a negotiated solution building on the analyzes some of these main themes and Oslo peace process, the Camp David structures. It has been very much proposals, and the Clinton proposal influenced, and its arguments have been constituted nothing less than a second, and largely based, on many private discussions long-term, loss of a chance to achieve a with Palestinian political figures and Palestinian state. Whatever rationales can intellectuals. be made for this choice, the cost already The evaluation of Arafat's attitude incurred-only a small part of the ultimate toward the Oslo process itself is price--vastly exceeds any of these unknowable and is not this article's subject. decision's supposed reasons and certainly Moreover, it is unnecessary to argue that any likely benefits to be achieved. Arafat has never changed but only that he This debacle was brought about by the has always kept major parts of his world same leadership and thinking which had view and strategic concepts consistent. contributed to other, earlier disasters like Whatever permutations occurred in the those in 1967 (the provocation and loss of course of his career, he was ultimately war with Israel), 1970 (the PLO's defeat unable to break with the past. and expulsion from Jordan), 1978 (failure Regarding the peace process, it is to use the opportunity afforded by the possible that he never intended to make an Egypt-Israel Camp David agreements), agreement (viewing the Oslo agreement 1982 (the defeat by Israel in Lebanon), merely as an escape from the dead end he 1983 (the defeat by Syria in Lebanon), faced in the early 1990s); or that he had no 1988 (the inability to make a major policy particular plan; or that he held ambiguous shift toward negotiations), 1990 (the and conflicting ideas which predominated sacrifice of the U.S-PLO dialogue and at different moments or over different Arafat's decision to back Iraq in the specific issues. What seems unlikely, Kuwait crisis), and others. though, was that he could ever really have In the atmosphere of self-justification at expected Israel-a country whose good rejecting the opportunities of 2000 and of intentions he never accepted-would offer self-congratulation at having launched a him a political settlement in which he war of independence, these issues have not received all the territory he wanted plus the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) 72 Barry Rubin acceptance of all refugees to live in Israel running and navigating the ship than without even an end-of-conflict agreement. anyone else on board. Equally, it is not necessary to argue that There are many reasons why Arafat's Arafat has always, or even today, views his replacement is extremely unlikely. First, personal mission as Israel's destruction. there is no specific individual who has Rather, his priority has proven to be anywhere near the charisma, gumption, or keeping the door open for that goal's future political standing to even think of taking achievement. Ironically, if he had been his place. The fact that any remaining willing to compromise, he might have potential successors have been prevented obtained a state on terms which would from campaigning for his job keeps them have allowed the pursuit of that goal at from organizing a support base. They some future stage. What he refused to do accept Arafat's decisions, even those they was to set in motion a psychological, think wrong or disastrous, lest excessively ideological, and structural process that vigorous dissent wreck their chances for might have led to permanent acceptance of succession. a two-state solution or to run the risk of Actually, the three best potential appearing to be a traitor to his original candidates to succeed Arafat are all dead. goals by making a compromise deal. In Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) arguably the short, he would not "risk" making the second most powerful PLO leader during agreement permanent or take responsibility the 1970s and 1980s-was slain, probably for appearing to make a full and final by Iraq, in 1991. Khalil Al-Wazir (Abu peace treaty. Jihad)-Arafat's personal favorite, was These factors, and not the precise killed by Israel in 1988. Faisal al-Husseini, wording of the agreement or a dispute over the Palestinian Authority (PA) cabinet a tiny portion of the territory at stake, were member in charge of Jerusalem affairs, the real cause of the peace process's died of natural causes in 2001. Husseini's failure. For this historic period, at least, it aristocratic family connections, is likely to prove a "permanent" failure. charismatic personality, and the respect most PLO officials and activists held for 1. Why Yasir Arafat is President for him made him the last man who could Life have challenged Arafat. But Husseini Reports of my demise, said the decided not to seek Palestinian leadership, American writer Mark Twain, are greatly largely because he knew how difficult and exaggerated. So has it been with thankless a task an anti-Arafat campaign Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat, in terms of would be. both his physical and political longevity. Second, Arafat does remain reasonably In fact, there is absolutely no reason to popular even in the worst of times. Even believe or expect that Arafat will ever be those who hate or ridicule him know that displaced as unchallenged leader of the he is, for better or worse, the father of their Palestinians during his lifetime. And his revolution. They save their jokes and angry lifetime is likely to continue for at least a criticism for private conversation while few years more. publicly toeing the official line. At the Arafat's situation is like that of a same time, Palestinians know that Arafat bumbling ship's captain who has enjoys a level of international standing that repeatedly gotten lost and driven his boat no other Palestinian comes close to onto the rocks.(1) The passengers grumble duplicating and any other leader would among themselves and wonder whether he take years to equal. knows what he is doing. But they have no Third, Arafat controls the security desire to mutiny. He is the only captain forces and institutions that enable him to they have, and he knows more about punish anyone who challenges him. He combines three dominant roles as 73 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) The Terror and the Pity: Yasir Arafat and the Second Loss of Palestine simultaneously the PA's head, the PLO's expanding the new intifada, Arafat acted to chairman, and Fatah's chief. In addition, prove himself equivalent to the most Arafat uses sophisticated methods to militant, outflanking the radicals by having maintain psychological and political his own men basically duplicate their control over his lieutenants. To show that strategy and tactics, though not their he is fully in command of everyone's fate, ideology. Arafat periodically builds people up and Given these and other factors, Arafat is tears them down as he chooses. No one is unassailable. As is common with secure, but, by the same token, everyone contemporary Arab leaders, Arafat's assets can hope for eventual readmission to the are position and power. His actual inner circle. Personally uninterested in performance is relatively unimportant, and wealth, Arafat knows about anyone else's a failure to bring material benefits has corrupt or illicit activities and is prepared never threatened his leadership. In accord to use this information against them should with the system's nature and his the need arise. personality, Arafat has no intention of Fourth, Arafat is willing to do whatever picking a successor or even installing a is necessary to ensure his continued permanent second-in-command. popularity. Arguably, he did so in sacrificing the chance of obtaining a 2. Succession as Wishful Thinking Palestinian state through a compromise Obviously, Yasir Arafat will one day agreement with Israel. When it comes to leave the scene and, given the realities of his domestic coalition, Arafat is definitely life span to which mortals are subject, that a 90 percent man, not a 51 percent man. It day cannot be all that distant. Thus, seems common behavior for a politician to succession is certainly a valid subject for put preserving his domestic constituency analysis. At the same time, though, the over satisfying external forces (like the issue came to play a political role of its United States), much less historic enemies own in the contemporary debate. (like Israel). Yet this apparently obvious On one hand, the idea that Arafat might conclusion is somewhat misleading. soon die or be replaced-presumably by Leaders often put a priority on reaching someone more moderate--seemed to offer a material goals that require sacrifices and way out of the total deadlock brought persuading their public to support hitherto about by his destruction of the peace unacceptable policies that the national process and a return to relying on violence interest requires or for its own benefit.

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