Nurturing Instability: Lebanon's Palestinian Refugee Camps
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NURTURING INSTABILITY: LEBANON’S PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS Middle East Report N°84 – 19 February 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION: THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON ..................... 1 A. MULTIPLICITY OF ACTORS AND CAMPS ........................................................................................1 1. Main political actors.................................................................................................................1 2. Palestinian refugees and camps ................................................................................................1 II. THE EVOLUTION OF LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS......................... 4 A. OPEN WARFARE (1969-1990).......................................................................................................4 B. THE POST-WAR YEARS (1990-2004).............................................................................................6 C. 2004-2005: TURNING POINT OR DEAD END? ................................................................................7 1. UNSCR 1559...........................................................................................................................7 2. The Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee........................................................................9 3. Nahr al-Bared: a difficult test case..........................................................................................11 D. THE REFUGEES’ PRECARIOUS STATUS ........................................................................................13 1. The fear of tawtin...................................................................................................................13 2. Marginalisation......................................................................................................................16 III. GROWING INSTABILITY IN THE CAMPS............................................................. 18 A. INTER-FACTIONAL CONFLICT......................................................................................................18 B. THE PLO AND FATAH .................................................................................................................20 C. FAILED CAMP MANAGEMENT .....................................................................................................22 1. Popular committees................................................................................................................22 2. UNRWA................................................................................................................................22 IV. JIHADISM ....................................................................................................................... 24 V. CONCLUSION: WAR IN GAZA, THE CAMPS AND LEBANON’S FUTURE..... 29 APPENDICES A. MAP OF PALESTINIAN CAMPS ..........................................................................................................32 B. MAIN PALESTINIAN POLITICAL FACTIONS IN LEBANON ...................................................................33 C. CAIRO AGREEMENT ........................................................................................................................34 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................36 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ......................37 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................39 Middle East Report N°84 19 February 2009 NURTURING INSTABILITY: LEBANON’S PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The vast Palestinian refugee population is routinely Today, the refugee question is intricately related to forgotten and ignored in much of the Middle East. Lebanon’s sectarian divisions. Palestinians are over- Not so in Lebanon. Unlike in other host countries, the whelmingly Sunni Muslims and, as the prospect of refugee question remains at the heart of politics, a re- any significant return of refugees – most of whom current source of passionate debate and occasional have never set foot in their former homeland – to Is- trigger of violence. The Palestinian presence was a rael diminishes, fear has revived of their permanent catalyst of the 1975-1990 civil war, Israel’s 1982 in- settlement or naturalisation (tawtin) in Lebanon, which vasion and Syrian efforts to bring the Palestine Lib- would affect the confessional balance. The Christian eration Organisation (PLO) to heel. Virtually nothing leadership in particular has played on such apprehen- has been done since to genuinely address the problem. sion, deploying it as a tool to mobilise its base. In Marginalised, deprived of basic political and eco- turn, successive governments have enacted measures nomic rights, trapped in the camps, bereft of realistic to foreclose any such possibility, notably by ensuring prospects, heavily armed and standing atop multiple that refugees live in extremely precarious conditions. fault lines – inter-Lebanese, inter-Palestinian and in- Refugee camps are denied basic public services; Pal- ter-Arab – the refugee population constitutes a time estinians face severe employment restrictions; and, bomb. Until the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved, a more recently, have been denied property rights. comprehensive approach is required that clarifies the Palestinians’ status, formally excludes their perma- The effort to hold refugees at bay and prevent their nent settlement in Lebanon, significantly improves social or economic absorption has dangerous implica- their living conditions and, through better Lebanese- tions. Because their presence is deemed to be tempo- Palestinian and inter-Palestinian coordination, en- rary and justified by the unresolved conflict with hances camp management. Israel, Palestinians have been granted a remarkable degree of political autonomy. The notion of armed The history of Lebanon’s Palestinian population has struggle in particular remains sacrosanct and is used been always tumultuous, often tragic. All sides are at as a reason for the existence of multiple paramilitary fault. Although their presence at first was peaceful, it groups. In the wake of the civil war, manifestation of rapidly became militarised; by the late 1960s, the this right to armed resistance increasingly has lost its PLO advocated armed struggle against Israel, and in meaning: Palestinians can bear arms, but only in their 1970 it transferred its leadership from Jordan to camps and on a few training grounds; these in turn Lebanon. Palestinians also involved themselves di- become zones of lawlessness that Lebanese authori- rectly in the domestic strife that marred Lebanon for ties cannot enter; and their weapons are aimed not at close to two decades. Israel’s invasion, aimed at de- Israel, the purported rationale for continued armed stroying the PLO, led to large-scale devastation as status, but inward. The explosive end result is camps well as the ugly massacre at the Sabra and Chatila that harbour a marginalised, impoverished population; camps conducted by a Lebanese militia under the Is- an abundance of weapons; and a leadership that, no raeli military’s passive eye. Syria, seeking to assert its longer in a position to fight Israel, is adrift, without a hegemony over its neighbour and ensure control over sense of purpose. the Palestinian national movement, conducted its own military campaign against Yasser Arafat and his fol- The situation has become more complicated still. Pal- lowers. The Lebanese state distinguished itself by estinian camps are another instrument in the regional shameful treatment of its refugee population. tug of war. For the West and its Lebanese allies who currently hold power, challenging the status quo in the camps is one way of advancing both Lebanon’s Nurturing Instability: Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugee Camps Crisis Group Middle East Report N°84, 19 February 2009 Page ii sovereignty and the cause of disarming all groups, RECOMMENDATIONS Hizbollah included. The internal Palestinian conflict opposing Fatah and Hamas also manifests itself in the To the Lebanese Parliament and Government: camps. For Syria, some of the Palestinian armed groups are cards to be used both in the context of ne- 1. Adopt a law clearly defining and delimiting the gotiations with Israel and as allies on the Lebanese notion of settlement/naturalisation (tawtin) that will domestic scene. Finally, the spread of militant a) restrict tawtin to the acquisition of Lebanese Islamist groups within the camps suggests they are citizenship and/or the right to vote; and becoming recruiting grounds for international jihadist movements. b) provide Palestinian refugees with all funda- mental rights short of tawtin, including the Despite the gravity of the challenge, management of right to work and to own property. the crisis by all relevant players has left much to be desired. Given their fragmented and discredited na- To the Lebanese and Syrian Presidents: tional movement, Palestinian refugees seldom have been as deprived as they are today of a legitimate and 2. Begin negotiations aimed at dismantling Palestin- recognised leadership capable of providing them with ian military bases outside the refugee camps. either concrete assistance or a vision for the future. Until very recently at least, the Lebanese government