Ex-Security Chiefs Publicly Oppose Attack on Iran
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Page 1 of 1 Bloomberg Printer-Friendly Page 16/03/2009
Bloomberg Printer-Friendly Page Page 1 of 1 Israel Says Hamas Must Free Shalit or Risk Worse Deal (Update2) Share | Email | Print | A A A By Jonathan Ferziger March 15 (Bloomberg) -- Israeli envoys told Hamas that time is running out to reach an agreement that would free hundreds of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for captive Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. “We want to bring Gilad home and we’re making an enormous, unprecedented effort to do it,” Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said in broadcast remarks at the beginning of his weekly Cabinet meeting in Jerusalem. Yuval Diskin, head of Israel’s Shin-Bet security service, and government negotiator Ofer Dekel conveyed the message through Egyptian mediators today that the Palestinian Islamic movement will no longer be dealing with Olmert if it doesn’t accept a deal now, Olmert spokesman Mark Regev said. Benjamin Netanyahu, who is trying to assemble a new government to succeed Olmert as prime minister, will probably demand a tougher deal, analysts said. Olmert is ready to release about 450 Palestinians in exchange for Shalit, Israel’s Haaretz newspaper reported, without saying where it got the information. “Hamas may go for it because they know that it will be much more difficult to free their prisoners under Netanyahu,” Ephraim Kam, an intelligence specialist at Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies, said in a telephone interview. “The people he’s probably going to have in his Cabinet are going to be much more reluctant to release Hamas prisoners than Olmert is.” Hamas Demands A Hamas spokesman in the Gaza Strip said there’s been no word from Egypt that Israel accepted the group’s conditions, which include the release of 450 Hamas prisoners as well as any women, children and leaders of Palestinian factions in Israeli jails. -
Command and Control | the Washington Institute
MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds Command and Control by David Makovsky, Olivia Holt-Ivry May 23, 2012 ABOUT THE AUTHORS David Makovsky David Makovsky is the Ziegler distinguished fellow at The Washington Institute and director of the Koret Project on Arab-Israel Relations. Olivia Holt-Ivry Articles & Testimony his week, the world's major powers resumed negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Should they fail, T the specter of a possible Israeli strike looms large, seeming to grow more likely as Tehran's nuclear program advances. In recent weeks, however, the conventional wisdom has shifted to favor the view that Israel is not on the cusp of a strike against Iran. This has been driven in part by public comments from former Israeli security officials -- notably former Mossad head Meir Dagan and former Shin Bet head Yuval Diskin -- questioning the wisdom of such an attack. An Israeli strike is not feasible, the thinking goes, so long as its security community remains divided -- and the thinly veiled threats of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are therefore mere bluster. Don't be so sure. Dagan and Diskin's views aren't likely to tell us much about the likelihood of a strike on Iran one way or the other. For starters, they're former officials -- given the sensitivity of this issue, and the recent media misinterpretation of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Benny Gantz's remarks earlier this month, no other current members of the security establishment are likely to go public with their views. -
Peace Between Israel and the Palestinians Appears to Be As Elusive As Ever. Following the Most Recent Collapse of American-Broke
38 REVIVING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS: HISTORICAL LES- SONS FOR THE MARCH 2015 ISRAELI ELECTIONS Elijah Jatovsky Lessons derived from the successes that led to the signing of the 1993 Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization highlight modern criteria by which a debilitated Israeli-Palestinian peace process can be revitalized. Writ- ten in the run-up to the March 2015 Israeli elections, this article examines a scenario for the emergence of a security-credentialed leadership of the Israeli Center-Left. Such leadership did not in fact emerge in this election cycle. However, should this occur in the future, this paper proposes a Plan A, whereby Israel submits a generous two-state deal to the Palestinians based roughly on that of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s offer in 2008. Should Palestinians find this offer unacceptable whether due to reservations on borders, Jerusalem or refugees, this paper proposes a Plan B by which Israel would conduct a staged, unilateral withdrawal from large areas of the West Bank to preserve the viability of a two-state solution. INTRODUCTION Peace between Israel and the Palestinians appears to be as elusive as ever. Following the most recent collapse of American-brokered negotiations in April 2014, Palestinians announced they would revert to pursuing statehood through the United Nations (UN), a move Israel vehemently opposes. A UN Security Council (UNSC) vote on some form of a proposal calling for an end to “Israeli occupation in the West Bank” by 2016 is expected later this month.1 In July 2014, a two-month war between Hamas-controlled Gaza and Israel broke out, claiming the lives of over 2,100 Gazans (this number encompassing both combatants and civilians), 66 Israeli soldiers and seven Israeli civilians—the low number of Israeli civilians credited to Israel’s sophisti- cated anti-missile Iron Dome system. -
Trend Analysis the Israeli Unit 8200 an OSINT-Based Study CSS
CSS CYBER DEFENSE PROJECT Trend Analysis The Israeli Unit 8200 An OSINT-based study Zürich, December 2019 Risk and Resilience Team Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich Trend analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study Author: Sean Cordey © 2019 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich Contact: Center for Security Studies Haldeneggsteig 4 ETH Zurich CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland Tel.: +41-44-632 40 25 [email protected] www.css.ethz.ch Analysis prepared by: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich ETH-CSS project management: Tim Prior, Head of the Risk and Resilience Research Group, Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Deputy Head for Research and Teaching; Andreas Wenger, Director of the CSS Disclaimer: The opinions presented in this study exclusively reflect the authors’ views. Please cite as: Cordey, S. (2019). Trend Analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study. Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich. 1 Trend analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study . Table of Contents 1 Introduction 4 2 Historical Background 5 2.1 Pre-independence intelligence units 5 2.2 Post-independence unit: former capabilities, missions, mandate and techniques 5 2.3 The Yom Kippur War and its consequences 6 3 Operational Background 8 3.1 Unit mandate, activities and capabilities 8 3.2 Attributed and alleged operations 8 3.3 International efforts and cooperation 9 4 Organizational and Cultural Background 10 4.1 Organizational structure 10 Structure and sub-units 10 Infrastructure 11 4.2 Selection and training process 12 Attractiveness and motivation 12 Screening process 12 Selection process 13 Training process 13 Service, reserve and alumni 14 4.3 Internal culture 14 5 Discussion and Analysis 16 5.1 Strengths 16 5.2 Weaknesses 17 6 Conclusion and Recommendations 18 7 Glossary 20 8 Abbreviations 20 9 Bibliography 21 2 Trend analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study selection tests comprise a psychometric test, rigorous Executive Summary interviews, and an education/skills test. -
The Truth of the Capture of Adolf Eichmann (Pdf)
6/28/2020 The Truth of the Capture of Adolf Eichmann » Mosaic THE TRUTH OF THE CAPTURE OF ADOLF EICHMANN https://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/history-ideas/2020/06/the-truth-of-the-capture-of-adolf-eichmann/ Sixty years ago, the infamous Nazi official was abducted in Argentina and brought to Israel. What really happened, what did Hollywood make up, and why? June 1, 2020 | Martin Kramer About the author: Martin Kramer teaches Middle Eastern history and served as founding president at Shalem College in Jerusalem, and is the Koret distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Listen to this essay: Adolf Eichmann’s Argentinian ID, under the alias Ricardo Klement, found on him the night of his abduction. Yad Vashem. THE MOSAIC MONTHLY ESSAY • EPISODE 2 June: The Truth of the Capture of Adolf Eichmann 1x 00:00|60:58 Sixty years ago last month, on the evening of May 23, 1960, the Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion made a brief but dramatic announcement to a hastily-summoned session of the Knesset in Jerusalem: A short time ago, Israeli security services found one of the greatest of the Nazi war criminals, Adolf Eichmann, who was responsible, together with the Nazi leaders, for what they called “the final solution” of the Jewish question, that is, the extermination of six million of the Jews of Europe. Eichmann is already under arrest in Israel and will shortly be placed on trial in Israel under the terms of the law for the trial of Nazis and their collaborators. In the cabinet meeting immediately preceding this announcement, Ben-Gurion’s ministers had expressed their astonishment and curiosity. -
Adi Strauss Edan Kleiman Owner of the Strauss Group ZDVO Chairman APRIL 28 TUESDAY - from Sorrow to Joy
ALOC T H HE EI M B Tamir Pardo Reuven Rivlin Former Director of the Mossad President of Israel ISRAEL 20/20 INSIDE EDITION Security & Leadership Conference Moshe Ya’alon Dan Halutz Former Minister of Defense Former IDF Chief of Staff 26-30 April 2020 Ritz-Carlton, Herzliya, Israel FEATURED SPEAKERS Join us for an inside look at the state of security in Israel and the region as the country’s most respected policy-makers and elite Yuval Diskin Gilad Shalit military personnel offer their Former Head of the Shabak Survivor of 5 years of Hamas captivity unique insights. Information and Registration: [email protected] [email protected] Adi Strauss Edan Kleiman Owner of the Strauss Group ZDVO Chairman APRIL 28 TUESDAY - From Sorrow to Joy * Morning Lt. Gen. (Res.) DAN HALUTZ, former IDF Chief of HIGHLIGHTS Staff and former IAF Commander Briefing withLt. Gen. (res.) MOSHE (BOGIE) * TENTATIVE, subject to change YA’ALON, former IDF Chief of Staff and former Minister of Defense APRIL 26 SUNDAY - Opening Day Afternoon Meet with DR. STEVE JACKSON, Senior Neurosurgeon, Neurosurgery Department, Rabin Medical Center: Treating Severe Brain Damage in Morning Opening Remarks by ZDVO Chairperson Adv. EDAN IDF Wounded Veterans. Severely wounded veteran KLEIMAN, ZDVF Executive Director Dr. MOSHE AHARON KAROV, treated by Dr. Jackson on SHEMMA, Col. (Res.), and ADRIAN TEPER, Conference evacuation to the hospital, will be in attendance Organizer and ZDVF Director for Latin America. Meet with TAMIR PARDO, former director of the Evening Attend Israel’s official Yom Ha’atzmaut Mossad: The Challenges of the Mossad and (Independence Day) Celebration and Torch- Changes in the Intelligence Arena (with special Lighting Ceremony at Mount Herzl, Jerusalem surprise guest to be announced) Afternoon AVRAHAM SINAI: The Rabbi From Hezbollah, the remarkable story of the Israeli spy in Hezbollah APRIL 29 WEDNESDAY - Yom Ha'atzmaut Maj. -
Operation Cast Lead--Zion Fascism at Its Best
South Asian Studies A Research Journal of South Asian Studies Vol. 29, No.2, July - December 2014, pp. 685-694 Operation Cast Lead--Zion Fascism at Its Best Umbreen Javaid University of Punjab, Lahore. Maliha Shamim University of Punjab, Lahore. Abstract Jews consider themselves to be the original inhabitants of Palestine. It has always been the official policy of Israel to occupy and populate the Palestinian territories. The victories in successive Arab-Israeli wars emboldened Israel to pursue its policy more vigorously. The Palestinians of occupied territories specially those living in West Bank and Gaza have to face the onslaught of Israeli atrocities. After breaking the truce entered into with Hamas, Israel attacked Gaza in December 2008, justifying the attacks as its right of self-defense. The Gazan operation named Operation Lead was not condemned by EU, US or European countries. To prepare the Israeli army for the Gaza offensive the troops were even religiously and politically brainwashed to successfully combat the Palestinians. The elections held after the Gaza offensive and extremist candidates returned to the Israeli parliament. Such extremist stance taken by Israeli public will go a long way in making the already biased Israeli society a more racist and fascist Israeli polity. In the absence of any criticism or condemnation of Israeli actions it pursues the murder and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians with impunity. Accumulation of latest weaponry and warring techniques have transformed Israel into a regional Sparta and religious extremism and fascism have come to assume an important place in today’s Israel. This article has been prepared with the help of newspapers and answers certain questions as why is Palestine most coveted by Jews. -
RSIS COMMENTARIES RSIS Commentaries Are Intended to Provide Timely And, Where Appropriate, Policy Relevant Background and Analysis of Contemporary Developments
RSIS COMMENTARIES RSIS Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position of the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from RSIS. Due recognition must be given to the author or authors and RSIS. Please email: [email protected] or call (+65) 6790 6982 to speak to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, Yang Razali Kassim. __________________________________________________________________________________________________ No. 156/2011 dated 27 October 2011 Israel and Hamas: A new equation for Mid-East peace? By James M. Dorsey Synopsis Israeli and Palestinian hardliners rather than moderates are serving each other's purpose in the Middle East conflict. That is the underlying dynamic of the political calculations of both Israel and Hamas in the recent lop- sided swap of an Israeli soldier for over a thousand Palestinian prisoners. Commentary THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN peace process remains frozen with little, if any, prospect of it gaining momentum. President Mahmoud Abbas' effort to achieve United Nations recognition of Palestinian statehood in a bid to break the logjam is mired in diplomatic red tape and likely to be foiled by a United States veto if it comes up for a vote in the Security Council. True to form, hardliners on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian divide are finding common ground where moderates are grasping for straws. In doing so, they are reaffirming a long-standing fact of life of the Israeli- Palestinian equation: hardliners can serve each other’s needs to mutual benefit without making the kind of wrenching concessions that thwart the ambitions of peacemakers and moderates on both sides. -
Israel Debates No. 1 26
Israel Debates No. 1 26. February 2009 The Israeli domestic discussion on the Gaza war The Cast Lead military operation that the Israeli military waged against Hamas, which rules the Gaza Strip, from December 27, 2008 through January 17, 2009, was and is still being intensely discussed in public in Israel, as well as among Israeli politicians and security experts. From the outset, Israeli public opinion – with the exception of the country’s Arab citizens – was overwhelmingly in favor of the operation. When the hostilities ended after 22 days, some 50% of Israelis even called for the fighting to continue, not believing that the threat from the Gaza Strip has been definitively dealt with. Another characteristic of public opinion is that practically there were no expressions of empathy with the large number of casualties among the Gaza Strip’s population, among the population generally as well as in the media. Below we present the opposing views of two renowned Israeli security experts, illustrating the range of the Israeli domestic debate on the handling and results of the military operation. Although the two authors reach radically different conclusions, they both advance valid arguments for their positions. Dr. Reuven Pedatzur, a lecturer at Netanya College, represents a highly critical position on Operation Cast Lead. He concludes that the “use of military force against Hamas was unavoidable,” but that this does not justify the “excessive use” thereof. He also identifies the unclear objective and the lack of an exit strategy, and in light of the “satisfaction and self- praise” on the part of the military and the politicians, he warns against drawing inappropriate conclusions from this operation, which was “not war – it is not even a real battle.” In contrast, Prof. -
No Exit? Gaza & Israel Between Wars
No Exit? Gaza & Israel Between Wars Middle East Report N°162 | 26 August 2015 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Gaza after the War ............................................................................................................ 2 A. National Consensus in Name Only ............................................................................ 2 B. Failure to Reconstruct ............................................................................................... 4 C. Coming Apart at the Seams ....................................................................................... 5 D. Fraying Security Threatens a Fragile Ceasefire ......................................................... 8 E. Abandoned by Egypt .................................................................................................. 10 F. Israel’s Slight Relaxation of the Blockade ................................................................. 12 III. The Logic of War and Deterrence ................................................................................... -
THE CHALLENGE of GAZA: Policy Options and Broader Implications
BROOKINGS 1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20036-2103 www.brookings.edu ANALYSIS PAPER Number 23, July 2011 THE CHALLENGE OF GAZA: Policy Options and Broader Implications Daniel Byman Gad Goldstein ANALYSIS PAPER Number 23, July 2011 THE CHALLENGE OF GAZA: Policy Options and Broader Implications Daniel Byman Gad Goldstein The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment and the analysis and recommendations are not determined by any donation. Copyright © 2011 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 www.brookings.edu Table of Contents Executive Summary . iv Acknowledgements . ix The Authors . x Introduction . 1 The Nature of the Challenge in Gaza . 3 Factors Beyond Gaza to Consider . 18 Policy Options . 24 THE CHALLENGE OF GAZA: Policy Options and Broader Implications The Saban Center at BRooKings iii Executive Summary lthough both the United States and Israel Hamas draws on many resources to stay in power . devote tremendous attention to the Middle Most notably, Hamas has long exploited its infra- East peace process, the Gaza Strip and its structure of mosques, social services, and communi- HamasA government have continued to vex Ameri- ty organizations to raise money and attract recruits . -
מחלקת שפות זרות/FA & Defence/3953
c. Method As proposed by the Chairman, the task was given to the Sub-Committee for Intelligence and the Secret Services, comprising six members of the Knesset. The members of the committee are: MK Yuval Steinitz – chair, MK Ehud Yatom, MK David Levy, MK Haim Ramon, MK Eli Yishai and MK Ilan Leibovitch. MK Danny Yatom, who was replaced in the course of the committee’s work as part of the rotation of members of the Labor faction in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, also contributed to the work of the committee at the beginning. Mr. Shabtai Shavit – a former head of the Mossad - served as a consultant to the committee. The committee takes this opportunity to thank him for his significant contribution. The senior professional assistant of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Colonel (res.) Shmuel Letko, served as the secretary of the committee. The work of the committee was closely accompanied by the incoming Director-General of the Committee, R. Admiral (res.) Avriel Bar-Joseph, and by the outgoing Director-General of the Committee, Mr. Baruch Friedner, who was also given the task of writing the report. The Committee began its work in July 2003 and completed it recently. The Committee held some 30 plenum sessions and scores of smaller work meetings, in the course of which the following, inter alia, appeared before it: The Prime Minister, Mr. Ariel Sharon The Minister of Defense, Mr. Shaul Mofaz The Deputy Minister of Defense, Mr. Zeev Boim The Chief-of-Staff, Lieutenant General Moshe (Boogy) Ya'alon The Head of Military Intelligence, Major-General Aharon (Farkash) Zeevi 13 The Head of the Mossad, Major-General (res.) Mr.