t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s

FINDING THE RIGHT MIX

Disaster Diplomacy, National Security, and International Cooperation January 2009 e Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for a International Cooperation

FINDING THE RIGHT MIX

Disaster Diplomacy, National Security, and International Cooperation

Charles M. Perry with Marina Travayiakis Bobby Andersen Yaron Eisenberg

January 2009 A Publication by e Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Contents

Illustrations v Acknowledgments vii Introduction 1 References 4 The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process 5 State as the Lead Federal Agency 6 Requesting Department of Defense and Military Assistance 10 The Executive Secretariat Process and Recent Adjustments 11 Capacity Building over the Longer Term 15 Initiatives to Improve and Institutionalize the Interagency Process 17 The Issue of Funding 21 Conclusion 26 References 26 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief & Humanitarian Assistance 29 Accessing U.S. Military Capabilities and Skills 30 Will Capability Gaps Be a Problem? 32 DoD and Service Efforts to Ensure That HA/DR Capabilities Are Available 35 Is an Inventory of Key Capabilities Really Needed? 38 Review of High-Value/High-Leverage Assets 39 Airlift and Sealift Support 39 Supply Chain Management and Distribution Logistics 43 Engineering and Construction Support 47 Communications and Information Management 50 Medical Assistance and Health Diplomacy 53 Summary 58 Private Sector Contributions and Capabilities 59 Conclusion 66 References 67 Operational Challenges, Civil-Military Coordination, & 72 COCOM Platforms for HA/DR Collaboration Developing a Concept of Operations for Military Support 73 Ongoing Challenges to Civil-Military Coordination 81 COCOM Platforms and Programs to Promote Collaboration 87 U.S. Pacific Command 87 U.S. Southern Command 91 U.S. Africa Command 96 Conclusion 98 References 99

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t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s iii t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s Key Partnerships and Platforms for International Cooperation 102 UN Structures and Procedures 102 NATO Structures and Procedures 108 European Union Structures and Procedures 112 ASEAN Initiatives 115 Key Non-European Allied and Partner Country Capabilities 119 119 122 The Republic of ROK( ) 124 126 Canada 130 A Final Note on India and 132 Conclusion 134 References 134 Summary Conclusions & Recommendations 141 Reference 147 Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms 148 About the Author & Contributors 152

Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for iv International Cooperation t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s Illustrations State as the Lead Federal Agency 7 The Executive Secretariat Process 11 The DoD Coordination/Approval Process 13 Letter of Commitment Process 15 Major DoD Funding Lines for HA/DR Operations 24 GFM / JFP Allocation Process with JFCOM as Primary JFP 31 U.S. Contributions to Operation Unified Assistance 41 U.S. Contributions to Operation Lifeline 42 Global Snapshot of Seabee Deployment 48 Expansion of FFE/FEST Units for Stability Operations 49 USNS Comfort – Continuing Promise 2007 55 USNS Mercy – 2008 56 U.S. Private Sector Contributions to the Tsunami Response 59 GRT’s Data Management System 63 U.S. Corporate Donations to Earthquake Relief in China 65 HA/DR Operational Phases 73 Disaster Relief Life Cycle 75 Comparison between Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), 77 Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), and Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center 78 Coordination at the Joint Level 79 Pacific Partnership – USS Peleliu (2007), USNS Mercy (2008) 91 Continuing Promise 2008 (April-November) 93 5 exercises in 5 countries: a snapshot of New Horizons in 2007 94 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 103 UN Response to Earthquake – The Cluster Approach 107 Requests for Assistance to Nato-Eadrcc 109 NATO Contributions To Pakistan Relief 110 Requests for Assistance to EU Civil Protection Mechanism 114 ASEAN Standby Arrangements for Disaster Relief and Emergency Response 116 ASEAN Institutional Arrangements 117 Decision Process for Australia’s AUSASSIST Plan 119 Major ROK Disaster Relief and Reconstruction Assistance 125 Types of ROK Assistance for Disaster Relief and Reconstruction 126 Structure of Japan Platform 128 Chain of Command for Disaster Relief within Canadian Forces 131

Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for v International Cooperation Finding the Right Mix vi t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s Acknowledgments

Obviously, any study effort of this magnitude has and U.S. Africa Command, as well as on national di- benefitted from the support of numerous individu- saster relief programs in Singapore, the Republic of als and organizations both from the public and pri- Korea, Japan, and Canada. The efforts of all three vate sector. First and foremost, I want to thank the of these individuals were crucial to the completion Smith Richardson Foundation of Westport, Connect- of this project. icut, and especially Marin Strmecki, the Foundation’s At various points in the study, other IFPA colleagues Senior Vice President and Director of Programs, and – especially Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jacquelyn Davis, and Allan Song, a Senior Program Officer for Interna- James Schoff – provided important additional tional Security and Foreign Policy at the Founda- insights, assistance, and guidance, all of which made tion. Without their initial encouragement and the the final report better than it otherwise would have Foundation’s generous financial support, this study been. Many thanks are also due to Nicholas Perry would never have been possible. for his excellent research support on a range of As for the research team at the Institute for For- project tasks and issues, Anika Binnendijk for her eign Policy Analysis (IFPA), special thanks are due in-depth research on the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, to Marina Travayiakis, who worked closely with me Adelaide Ketchum for her outstanding contributions throughout all phases of the study. Marina also con- in editing this report, and Christian Hoffman for his ducted extensive research on U.S., UN, NATO, and superior graphic design and layout work. EU disaster relief planning and civil-military coor- With respect to the field research and interviews dination, and prepared draft papers on these issues conducted as a key part of this study effort, a host of for integration into the final report. She helped as other individuals need to be thanked as well for pro- well to draft the section of the report that examines viding critical insights on key issues discussed in this Department of Defense (DoD) and military service report and/or for contributing in important ways to concepts of operations (CONOPS) for humanitarian workshop dialogues and brainstorming sessions or- assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). In addition ganized in support of the study. From U.S. official and to Marina’s assistance, Bobby Andersen provided in- nongovernmental expert circles, this would include, dispensable drafts on private sector contributions in alphabetical order, Thomas Baltazar, Maureen to HA/DR operations, various aspects of civil-mili- Bannon, Lieutenant General Robert “Rusty” Black- tary relations, and trends with respect to disaster man, Colonel Gene Bonventre, Andrew Bruzewicz, relief planning now under way at the Association James Castle, Marc Cheek, W.I. “Ike” Clark, Kath- of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and in Aus- leen Connolly, General Bantz Craddock, Tom Dolan, tralia. Finally, Yaron Eisenberg prepared extreme- Robert Eldridge, Emily Goldman, Lieutenant Gen- ly helpful draft reports on HA/DR-related activities eral John Goodman, Lieutenant General W. C. “Chip” at U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, Gregson, Bailey Hand, Clifford Hart, Ambassador

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John Herbst, Malcolm Johnson, Colonel Charlie King, Koichi, Maurits Jochem, Kanehara Nobukatsu, Ka- Captain Robert Kiser, Donald Kisicki, Stacie Konan, nazawa Hironori, Kim Changsu, Kim Jungsup, Lee Leonard Kotkiewicz, Rear Admiral Michael LeFever, Chung Min, Lee Yongsoo, Asta Mackeviciute, Moon Kate Legates, Nancy Lindberg, Peter Long, Bernd Chung-in, Zabeta Moutafis, Major General (Ret.) Pan “Bear” McConnell, Joseph McMenamin, Eric McVa- Zhenqiang, Park Chang Kwoun, Marc Preston, Seki don, Colonel David Mitchell, Captain Rick Morrison, Kaoruko, Suzuki Atsuo, Takamatsu Koji, Tokuchi Captain Donald Morton, Barry Pavel, Linda Poteat, Hideshi, Umemoto Kazuyoshi, Commander Darryl Ambassador Clark Randt, Jr., Susan Reinert, Admiral Watters, Lieutenant General Yamaguchi Noboru, Ya- Gary Roughead, Robert Salesses, Jon Smart, Edward mamoto Rika, Yoshuzaki Tomonori, and Zhuang Ji- Smith, Lieutenant General Glenn Spears, Captain anzhong. I am grateful to all of these individuals for Allan Stratman, Rob Thayer, Rabih Torbay, John Tri- the perspectives and knowledge that they offered gilio, Douglas Wallace, Scott Weidie, and Colonel over the course of this project. Christopher Wrenn. From potential partner coun- Charles M. Perry tries and major regional or international organiza- Cambridge, MA tions, I wish to thank, again in alphabetical order, January 2009 Ahn Kwang Chan, Choi Kang, Major General (Ret.) Gong Xianfu, Hoshino Toshiya, Major General Isobe

Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for viii International Cooperation c1hapter Introduction

Over the past decade, the conduct of humanitari- pabilities to weather future disasters with less need an assistance and disaster relief (or HA/DR) opera- for external support. tions has become an increasingly prominent aspect As for the U.S military’s larger role in disaster relief of American diplomacy, and one in which U.S. mil- overseas, a number of additional factors come into itary forces are playing an ever more central role. play. To begin with, America’s regional combatant The reasons for this development are both varied commands (or COCOMs), such as U.S. Pacific Com- and intertwined. First and perhaps foremost is the mand, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Southern simple fact that many foreign disasters, particularly Command (to name just three), collectively main- those that occur in less developed parts of the world, tain an unrivaled global network of forward-based, quickly outstrip local capacities to cope, and can ready-to-respond assets in the transportation, lo- only be managed and contained by means of prompt gistics, engineering, communications, and medical outside help. Secondly, the frequency, scale, and so- support arenas that have proven to be well-nigh in- cio-economic impact of such disasters have all ris- dispensable – and are often the first to arrive on the en quite steeply since the 1990s, and these trends scene – when civilian alternatives are unavailable, show no signs of abating (Wiharta et al. 2008). In- already committed elsewhere, and/or overwhelmed. deed, whether the result of climate change, rap- When necessary (and approved by the secretary of id urbanization, environmental degradation, poor defense), the COCOMs can also reach back to an ex- governance, civil unrest, or some combination of tensive array of bases, warehouses, and technical these and associated factors, natural disasters of support centers in the continental (CO- one kind or another are likely to occur more often NUS) for additional troops, supplies, and specialized in the years ahead, to leave increased levels of death skills, pulling them forward in an expe- 1 According to the World Bank, disaster- and destruction in their wake, and to impose costs ditious manner to where they are most related costs for the decade 1990-1999 were more than fifteen times higher than those for on the global economy in the hundreds of billions needed. Hence, when a sudden foreign the 1950-1959 period, rising from about $38 1 (if not trillions) of dollars. The United States, to- disaster occurs, American armed forc- billion in the 1950s to about $652 billion in gether with other nations and various regional and es are often looked to as a source for the 1990s (World Bank Independent Evalua- international organizations with an ability (and re- early relief, precisely because they are tion Group2006). The International Federa- tion of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies sponsibility) to respond, therefore, can expect to be already likely to be deployed relative- (IFRC) further reports that natural disas- called upon more regularly and on a more urgent ly close to the area affected, are capa- ters between 2001 and 2007 have cost some basis to provide emergency assistance when disas- ble of organizing a first response with $658 billion (IFRC 2008). Finally, both the World Bank and the Interna- ter strikes overseas. And to maximize the benefits little delay, and are able to draw fairly tional Strategy for Natural Disaster Reduc- of such assistance, it will need to be followed up, in quickly (when authorized to do so) on tion (UNISDR) project that costs imposed by many cases, by longer-term foreign aid investments a much larger pool of talent and mate- global natural disasters will exceed $300 bil- lion per year by 2050, barring aggressive to underwrite recovery and reconstruction in the af- rial for a more tailored and sustained disaster reduction measures (United Na- fected nation or nations, and to build up local ca- response. tions Development Program; World Bank).

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However, beyond U.S. military forces’ short-no- 2008, similar increases in local support for the Unit- tice availability, inherent capacity to respond, and ed States and its military have also been evident in comparatively large inventories of useful disaster- Southeast Asia, Oceania, Central and South America, relevant capabilities, changes in doctrine and strat- and the region after visits paid by the U.S. egy have made it even more likely that the military Navy’s hospital ships, the USNS Mercy and the USNS will contribute significantly to future foreignHA/DR . Comfort, as well as by a number of amphibious as- Of highest importance in this context is the greater sault ships (including the USS Peleliu, the USS Boxer, emphasis that the Department of Defense (DoD) now and the USS Kearsarge) that were fitted out specifi- places on stability operations and what it calls de- cally for medical care and public outreach missions, fense support to civil authorities (DSCA) in meeting including the construction of schools and clinics. the security challenges of the twenty-first century.2 So, too, as demonstrated in August 2008 when U.S. This particular development is discussed in some de- delivered much needed supplies of bottled 2 DoD’s formal definition describes “stabili- tail in chapters 2 and 3, as the level water, nonperishable food, blankets, and other relief ty operations” as an overarching term encompass- of support for stability operations items to the Georgian port of Batumi, the military’s ing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordina- and DSCA missions overall will be capacity to respond promptly with humanitarian aid tion with other instruments of national power to a critical factor in determining the can also send an important signal of political resolve maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environ- degree to which the U.S. military in a relatively non-confrontational manner (Bengali ment and to provide essential government servic- is (or will be) properly postured, 2008). Again, a good deal more will be said in subse- es, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance, of which disaster re- equipped, and trained to conduct quent chapters about these and similar initiatives, lief is an integral part (Joint Staff 2006). DSCA re- effective HA/DR operations in the but the principal point to be made here is that HA/ fers very specifically to the provision of DoD and/ future. Suffice it to say here that DR operations – including goodwill missions car- or military support to non-DoD civilian authori- ties, principally during a civil emergency or home- stability operations require skills ried out well before any disasters ever strike – can land defense-type contingency (Joint Staff 2001). and capabilities for civil support pay significant dividends in the battle for hearts and missions – including efforts to im- minds in strategically important countries. prove or rebuild local infrastructure and to encour- Positive poll ratings, of course, tend to fall over age self-sufficiency – that are central as well to the time, especially when they are based on time-limited success of HA/DR activities that are more narrow- and only occasional engagements (however helpful ly aimed at disaster relief and disaster prevention. at the moment) between one country and another. So, as American armed forces become more com- When military teams providing HA/DR assistance fortable with and engaged in stability operations in depart from the country being helped (sometimes the broad sense, they will also become better pre- with little likelihood of returning), the improve- pared for – and are more likely to be asked to sup- ments they were able to establish on the ground – port – HA/DR missions overseas. and the good feelings toward America so generated Additional motivation for the U.S. military to – can begin to wither, at times quite quickly. This is move in this direction can be found in the very real especially true when the local capacity to maintain strategic benefits that have resulted from recent those same improvements is limited. Therefore, as HA/DR efforts, and in the prospect that similar re- a way to sustain the material benefits U.S. military sults can be achieved by future missions along the forces can and do provide to countries in need (and same lines. For example, shortly after the 2004 tsu- to bolster the good feelings such aid can produce), nami and 2005 earthquake relief operations in which DoD officials have begun to advocate taking a longer- American military units played such decisive and term approach to HA/DR that would focus on more 3 TSCPs refer to the theater-level plans de- high-profile roles, public approval rat- regular (and repeated) contact with aid recipients veloped by the regional COCOMs and their in- ings for the United States jumped signif- overseas, as well as on projects that would promote dividual service components (the army, navy, air force, and marine corps forces assigned icantly in Indonesia and Pakistan, two lasting cooperative relationships and build local ca- to the COCOM) to build cooperative relation- largely Islamic countries that are key to pacity. A number of regional COCOMs and their ser- ships with foreign defense establishments that the war on terror but had harbored de- vice components are now making major progress in promote specific U.S. security interests, de- cidedly mixed (and at times quite nega- this direction by building into their theater security velop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational opera- tive) attitudes toward America after the cooperation plans (TSCPs) many additional opportu- tions, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime U.S. invasion of Iraq. Between 2006 and nities for HA/DR-related collaboration.3 As a result, and contingency access to a host nation. See “security cooperation” in Joint Staff (2008). Finding the Right Mix

2 The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s the HA/DR content of COCOM security cooperation time surveillance aircraft on island in March activities overall is rising, and it is becoming insti- 2001 (interview 2007a, 2007b). tutionalized through annual exercises and training Each of the trends and examples noted above un- programs at the bilateral and multilateral levels. On derscores the great potential that exists to leverage more than one occasion, moreover, these activities HA/DR operations in support of U.S. strategic inter- have taken place at just the right time and place ests (and those of its allies and friends), while at the when a disaster occurs so that they have been able same time addressing very real global needs for hu- to transition right into a live relief operation. manitarian assistance. There are, however, a num- As a core part of COCOM TSCPs, then, HA/DR ac- ber of organizational and operational challenges to tivities are emerging as important tools for strength- HA/DR planning and implementation that must be ening a regional capacity to respond collaboratively better understood and more fully dealt with if di- to sudden disasters and for building regional part- saster diplomacy and the U.S. military’s support for nerships (and encouraging cooperative engage- it are to meet these particular goals. To begin with, ment) more broadly. This could include, it is worth while critical military assets can not be easily held noting, the construction of warehouses, supply de- in reserve for HA/DR operations, much more can pots, airstrips, and port facilities to which U.S. mil- and should be done before any future deployment to itary forces might be granted access during future ensure that U.S. and allied/coalition partner forces contingencies that are not directly connected to an are really ready to contribute usefully to such opera- HA/DR operation. In this way, TSCP-related HA/DR tions. Secondly, in the disaster relief realm in partic- projects help to build forward access and pre-posi- ular, an appropriate division of labor must be defined tioned support that can be utilized for a wide range and maintained between military and non-military of U.S. military operations. Moreover, given their fair- responders, and greater efforts must be made to fa- ly non-controversial character, HA/DR-oriented pro- miliarize the military and civilian disaster response grams are increasingly being viewed by countries communities with one another’s quite divergent op- other than United States, as well as by regional se- erational cultures. Thirdly, potential political con- curity organizations, as politically attractive venues straints on HA/DR plans and operations – such as for pursuing – and, in some cases, restoring – mil- the ongoing debate between NATO and the Europe- itary cooperation between and among potential an Union (EU) over which organization should take partners for whom such cooperation remains lim- the lead in disaster relief and civil support missions ited or has faltered. Since the early days of the post- in and around Europe – must be fully factored into Cold War era, for example, NATO has relied on HA/ U.S. and allied preparations. Fourth and finally, both DR exercises as a way to bring candidates for mem- a whole-of-government approach and a public-pri- bership closer to NATO operational standards and vate approach to collaboration need to be embraced to establish a tradition of collaboration with many more widely within the HA/DR community. Such a other countries beyond NATO’s boundaries who nev- shift in perspective is essential, precisely because ertheless have an impact on -Atlantic security. foreign relief efforts have become highly complex So, too, in the Asia-Pacific theater, Japan and the and sophisticated exercises in international coordi- Republic of Korea (ROK), who still find it difficult nation and cooperation, requiring enormous mana- to collaborate in the military arena, have nonethe- gerial skills across diverse disciplines to link together less been able to do so more consistently on HA/DR and effectively coordinate a daunting array of mili- matters, and there are signs that this cooperation tary units, humanitarian agencies, international or- may soon be extended to include China and other ganizations, non-governmental organizations, and regional powers (Chosun Ilbo 2008). According to private sector contributors. Chinese strategic experts, bilateral and multilater- What is urgently needed at this point, then, is a al collaboration on HA/DR activities may also be the hard-headed, strategic assessment of U.S and key al- perfect way to get Sino-American military coopera- lied plans, capabilities, and operations in the HA/DR tion back on track, which has floundered since the arena, and it is to this task that the rest of this study May 1999 bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade devotes itself. Chapter 2 explores in depth current and the forced landing of an American EP-3 mari- American procedures for requesting and approving

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The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process 3 t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s

military support for HD/DR efforts overseas, clarify- HA/DR operation, paying especially close attention ing how that process now works and how it might to recent lessons learned in that regard by region- work better. Chapter 3 delves deeply into the ques- al COCOMs that now are emerging as real innova- tion of capability needs (and potential gaps) inso- tors in the HA/DR sector. Chapter 5 surveys various far as HA/DR missions are concerned, identifying bilateral and multilateral partnerships and institu- those military assets and skills that would appear tional arrangements that the United States might to be particularly important to the successful com- exploit more thoroughly in providing military sup- pletion of these missions, as well as a number of port to future HA/DR operations. Finally, chapter 6 operational areas where the private sector might offers a few summary conclusions on how America provide a cost-effective alternative or reinforcing might achieve and maintain a better mix, as stated contribution. Chapter 4 explores more comprehen- in the title of this study, between and among disas- sively the overriding challenge of civil-military coor- ter diplomacy, national security, and internation- dination in the organization and management of an al cooperation.

References Shashank Bengali. 2008. U.S. delivers relief aid to Georgia. McClatchy News Service. August 25. Chosun Ilbo. 2008. Korea, China, Japan FMs meet. June 16. http://english.chosun.com/cgi-bin/printNews?id=200806160025. IFRCS. 2008. World disasters report. http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/pubs/disasters/wdr2008/WDR2008-full.pdf. ———. 2007. World disasters report. http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/pubs/disasters/wdr2007/WDR2007-English.pdf. interview 2007a. Major General (Ret.) Pan Zhenqiang, director, Internation- al Security Program, China Reform Forum, Beijing, China. April 26. ———. 2007b. Major General (Ret.) Gong Xianfu, vice chairman, China Insti- tute for International Strategic Studies, Beijing, China. April 30. Joint Staff. 2001. Joint publication 1-02. Department of Defense dictionary of military and associated terms (as amended through 26 August 2008). http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. Daniel Pipes. 2002. What is Jihad? New York Post. December 31. http://www.danielpipes.org/article/990. United Nations Development Program (UNDP). http://www.undp.org/cpr/disred/english/wedo/wedo.htm. Sharon Wiharta, Hassan Ahmad, Jean-Yves Haine, Josefina Lofgren, and Tim Randal. 2008. The effective- ness of foreign military assets in a natural disaster response. Stockholm International Peace Research In- stitute (SIPRI). http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=358#. World Bank Independent Evaluation Group. 2006. Hazards of nature, risks to development. http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/naturaldisasters/docs/natural_disasters_evaluation.pdf. ——— Briefing on global disaster trends. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSF/Resourc- es/395669-1126194965141/1635383-1207662247174/Burton_Toolkit.pdf, 3.

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4 The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process chapter 2 The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process How It Works and How It Could Work Better

Since the 2004 tsunami and 2005 Pak- number of small- and medium-sized disasters of re- istan earthquake relief efforts, much has been writ- cent years, none of which approach the scale of the ten about what went right and what went wrong, tsunami or earthquake noted above, but nonethe- and how a future U.S. response to a foreign disaster less require the prompt provision of targeted mili- could be made more effective. A critical first step tary and non-military aid. One of the consequences, to improving the overall process, however, is to un- however, is that there could be precious little money derstand how an initial decision to respond is made left in the DoD kitty for any large-scale disaster that and implemented. What are the criteria for respond- might occur, prompting in turn an earlier than ex- ing? What are the procedures for authorizing a re- pected need for supplemental funding the approv- sponse? When is it appropriate to request military al of which can not be guaranteed. help? How can the responsible parties make sure As noted in the introduction, moreover, current that military assistance is provided when and where thinking with respect to disaster relief planning it is needed and in the proper scale? Perhaps most has become increasingly intertwined with and in- importantly, are the policies and procedures now fluenced by broader discussions on stability opera- in place, some of which were designed and autho- tions, with its emphasis on coordinated military and rized thirty to forty years ago, still relevant to cur- civilian support to nations in need across a wide rent and emerging requirements for disaster relief spectrum of relief, recovery, and reconstruction ac- and humanitarian assistance? tivities. As a result, those charged with responsibility Answers to these questions have never been as for preparing and managing disaster relief opera- obvious and pro forma as one might think, in part tions – and for absorbing lessons learned to improve because the formal U.S. process for approving for- the effectiveness of future operations – are increas- eign disaster relief efforts and, most specifically, mil- ingly taking a longer-term perspective that places as itary support has often been bypassed in favor of much emphasis on preventive measures that may be an informal, back-channel process that is not al- initiated before and after a disaster has occurred to ways exacting, well informed, or consistent. More- reduce the damage and the costs of future incidents over, new procedures and organizational structures as it does on the provision of emergency relief in the introduced largely as a result of the 2004 tsunami midst of a disaster. This shift in perspective has in and 2005 earthquake experiences have caused many turn underscored the critical importance of cou- to question the relevance of past practice via either pling relatively short-term disaster relief efforts with process for deciding when and how to respond. So, humanitarian assistance programs aimed at build- too, policies and funding mechanisms put in place ing local capacities over time to cope with sudden to cope with an occasional large-scale disaster have disasters. Hence, traditional notions of what a prop- proven to be inadequate for responding to the rising erly framed foreign disaster relief policy really ought

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to include and emphasize, and the manner in which In addition to staff from the regional bureau, the it should ideally be executed, have begun to change State Department’s IASC generally includes repre- quite significantly over the past few years. sentatives from the bureaus of political-military af- The goal of this chapter is to clarify how the U.S. fairs, consular affairs, diplomatic security, and public decision process is likely to unfold from this point affairs, as well as personnel fromUSAID , the Nation- on, given reforms now or soon to be in place. This al Security Council (NSC), and the Departments of chapter also highlights a number of improvements Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and De- that still could be made to ensure that America’s fense, each of which establishes a parallel depart- participation in foreign disaster relief efforts – and mental joint task force (or JTF) that is linked to the any decision to deploy U.S. military assets in sup- White House and all other relevant agencies through port of such efforts – at least begins on the right the Operations Center. Given the numbers involved, foot and then paves the way to disaster prevention managing and directing the interactions among all and damage limitation via targeted humanitarian the relevant offices and agencies can be a very time- assistance. Obviously, when both objectives can be consuming and labor-intensive process, especial- achieved more consistently, the overall relief opera- ly during major disasters. In response to the 2004 tion, from first response to recovery and reconstruc- tsunami tragedy, for example, the Operations Cen- tion, is likely to be more successful and the military ter operated twenty-four hours a day for seventeen component in particular more cost effective. days, with over 280 people rotating through in shifts (Schoff 2005, 63). Moreover, theNSC chaired a daily video conference with the various JTF heads that fo- State as the Lead Federal Agency cused on operational issues, led by the NSC’s director For foreign disaster relief operations, the Depart- for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/ ment of State serves as the U.S. lead federal agency DR) in the International Economic Affairs section.3 (LFA), relying on the regional bureau responsible for In the field,USAID works closely with the U.S. em- the area where the disaster has struck and on the bassy and the local USAID mission in the affected U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) country (assuming that USAID has a mission there) to coordinate the overall response. Once the gov- to assess the humanitarian situation and determine ernment of a disaster-stricken nation has requested priority needs. Within USAID, the Office of Foreign assistance, the local U.S. embassy reaches out imme- Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the primary party re- diately to the Operations Center within the Execu- sponsible for coordinating the U.S. government re- 1 Under U.S. law, to set a formal disaster re- tive Secretariat of the State Department sponse to both natural and man-made disasters over- lief operation in motion, the cable must meet via a disaster declaration cable.1 For seas, including those arising from civil conflict, acts three criteria: 1) the disaster must be beyond the ability of the host nation to handle on its large-scale events, the U.S. ambassa- of terrorism, or industrial accidents. Insofar as disas- own; 2) the host nation must formally request dor will probably also contact the rele- ter relief operations more specifically are concerned, U.S. assistance; and 3) such assistance must be vant U.S. military regional combatant then, OFDA actually serves as the operational-level in the strategic interests of the United States. command (COCOM) directly, such as U.S. LFA within the broader State Department communi- 2 The State Department’s lead-agen- cy role for non-military incidents was con- Pacific Command PACOM( ) in Honolu- ty. Within twenty-four hours of a disaster declaration, firmed in presidential directive/NSC-27, lu, though this depends largely on the OFDA provides up to $50,000 to the U.S. ambassador January 19, 1978. http://www.jimmycarter li- personal ties between the ambassador in the affected country for the purchase of local re- brary.org/documents/pddirectives/pd27.pdf. in question and the COCOM command- lief supplies (OFDA 2006, 10), though this amount can 3 This approach to the management of a “complex contingency operation” is simi- er. For its part, the Operations Center, be quickly increased to $100,000 without much dif- lar to that outlined in the May 1997 presiden- which maintains a twenty-four hour ficulty. If the scope of a disaster merits it, OFDA de- tial decision directive (PDD) 56, in which the watch on emerging or rapid-onset cri- ploys a regional advisor and a disaster assistance re- deputy secretaries of relevant departments ses overseas, will quickly set up an in- sponse team (DART) to the affected area to conduct established appropriate interagency work- ing groups (normally an executive committee teragency standing committee (or IASC) rapid assessments of the disaster situation, analyze at the assistant secretary level) to supervise led by the appropriate regional bureau the existing capacity of the host nation and other re- the day-to-day management of the operation. to monitor the situation and facilitate lief agencies, and, if required, coordinate operations http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm. interagency coordination.2 on the ground with the affected country, other pri-

Finding the Right Mix

6 The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s vate donors and international organizations, and, mostly UN agencies and nongovernmental organi- when present, U.S. and foreign militaries. zations (NGOs) active in disaster-prone areas, such OFDA teams include specialists from a variety as UNICEF, CARE, and the International Federation of disciplines, including experts in disaster relief of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. In total, planning, damage assessment, search and rescue, OFDA funds to local and international NGOs and UN water and sanitation, nutrition, shelter, logistics, agencies providing relief to tsunami-affected coun- contracting, communications, and medicine. As tries reached over $84 million (OFDA 2005, 17). OFDA no two disasters are alike, DARTs generally are tai- support to relief agencies operating in Pakistan and lored and scaled to the crisis at hand, drawing in India after the 2005 earthquake totaled more than non-State Department experts as required. During $69 million (OFDA 2006, 7). the 2004 tsunami response, for example, OFDA dis- So, too, OFDA works closely with other parts of patched over fifty-fiveDART members and one hun- USAID, such as the Office of Food for Peace (FFP), dred field-basedUSAID staff to India, Indonesia, the the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), the Office Maldives, , and . Through fifteen of Conflict Management and Mitigation CMM( ), the airlifts of emergency relief commodities, OFDA de- Office of Military Affairs (OMA), and the appropriate livered hygiene kits to meet the emergency needs of State as the Lead Federal Agency more than 80,000 people, water containers for over 143,000 people, and emergency medical kits from Host Nation COCOM the World Health Organization (WHO) with suffi- Request for Support cient supplies for 10,000 people for three months from US Embassy (OFDA 2005, 16). The response to tropical cyclone DoD Executive Secretariat Sidr that hit Bangladesh in November 2007, on the Local U.S. Embassy State requests DoD support other hand, was far more limited in scale and time- Issues Disaster Declaration Cable frame, but nonetheless vital, including the dispatch Regional Bureau of a five-personDART team the day after the storm USAID/OFDA Operations Center Executive Secretariat White House and the provision of USAID emergency funding for State Department much-needed fresh water supplies and for airlifting plastic sheeting, hygiene and sanitation kits, and Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) medical supplies to key distribution points. In early Members include representatives from USAID, NSC, the DART March 2008, a similarly small but essential response bureaus of political-military affairs, consular affairs, diplomatic affairs, public affairs, and the departments of to heavy flooding in Ecuador involved a single C-130 health and human services, agriculture, and defense cargo plane (from the Kentucky Air National Guard) delivering some 162 flood cleanup kits, 9,000 alco- Joint Task Forces hol pads, 2,250 bio-hazard waste bags, and 9,000 disposable vinyl gloves. All requests for assistance from OFDA staff and USAID regional bureau, to ensure that the immedi- DARTs in the field are relayed to an on-call response ate needs of the affected population are met. OFDA management team (RMT) in charge of emergency collaboration with these organizations extends to operations based back in Washington. Logistics of- establishing the groundwork for longer-term recov- ficers from theRMT coordinate the delivery of initial ery and reconstruction assistance, including devel- relief supplies, such as plastic sheeting, hygiene kits, opment projects and cash-for-work activities, such health supplies, water containers and purification as waste management, debris removal, and shelter units, and blankets, from one of OFDA’s commodity construction. Moreover, USAID has standing con- stockpiles located in Dubai, Italy, and Miami. The tracts in place with private contractors whereby it RMT also serves as the logistics liaison to other cri- can charter commercial aircraft (both fixed- and ro- sis centers and task forces involved in a U.S. govern- tary-wing) to provide lift support, ship relief supplies, ment response, including the State Department’s and conduct search and rescue operations. That said, IASC. Project officers in Washington also review when the evolving requirements of a particular relief and fund flash appeals from partners in the field, effort cannot be met by civilian assets contracted

Finding the Right Mix

The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process 7 t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s

or chartered by USAID, or by the UN, local and inter- in response to flash floods in the Horn of Africa in national NGOs, and various donor countries, OFDA 2006, State issued a request for DoD assistance. When (and the State Department more generally) is au- personnel from DoD spoke with the relevant region- thorized to work with the Department of Defense al bureau at State, they found that staff at the bu- (DoD) to identify and direct the use of military as- reau were unaware of OFDA’s role or that USAID was sets (if deployed) for HA/DR missions overseas. In in fact the LFA, and needed to provide the justifi- most cases, this involves the provision of addition- cation for DoD assistance. Still worse, DoD actually al air- and sealift support, but it may also include had to give bureau officials the contact information a broader array of special military assets and ex- for the proper USAID/OFDA representatives (inter- pertise in the communications, engineering, water view 2007a). Examples such as this illustrate the co- production and purification, and medical support nundrum facing DoD: How does the military (meant arenas, among other contributions. primarily as a resource of last resort) respond to re- Traditionally, if it is determined that military as- quests for assistance when State Department offi- sets are indeed necessary to respond to a disaster, cials may not yet have properly coordinated with OFDA will submit a formal request for military as- USAID/OFDA to fully assess the availability of civil- sistance to the State Department’s Executive Secre- ian options, including cheaper, commercial alter- tariat, which will in turn forward the request to the natives? In an effort to avoid such situations in the Executive Secretariat of DoD. Following an intensive future, USAID, DoD, and State’s Bureau of Political- intra-DoD review process, the secretary of defense or Military Affairs (State/PM) are drafting new HA/DR deputy secretary may order the deployment of mil- guidelines to clarify how State should respond to itary assets to the disaster zone in support of OFDA and handle overseas disasters, and to improve the efforts, signing what is called a “third party waiver” State-DoD assistance request process. to allow U.S. military goods and services to be used OFDA, of course, is generally quite willing to re- in a non-military operation to assist a “third party.” quest the mobilization of military assets for over- On the basis of such a waiver, over fifteen thousand seas relief missions, and to give DoD relatively wide U.S. soldiers and sailors were deployed as part of the latitude to work directly with its counterpart in the 2004 tsunami response to work alongside OFDA in the affected nation. This is especially true when that na- affected regions. More specifically, the U.S. military tion lies within a region of strategic interest, as was provided twenty-six ships, eighty-two planes, and the case during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the fifty-one helicopters to help deliver more than 24.5 2005 Pakistan earthquake, the 2006 Philippine mud- million tons of relief supplies and enable USAID and slide, and the 2007 Bangladesh cyclone. That said, other disaster relief agencies to move much-need- increased calls for DoD involvement in HA/DR mis- ed aid to inaccessible areas affected by the tsunami sions have pushed the military to operate less as (OFDA 2005, 17). But DoD assistance may be as lim- an instrument of last resort in support of civilian ited (if nonetheless crucial) as the dispatch of a sin- relief agencies and more as a regular contributor, gle C-130 to deliver supplies to a disaster zone, or the intimately involved in a broad range of humanitar- diversion of a nearby ship to assist in the evacuation ian work. Increasingly, U.S. forces are on the ground, of people at risk or injured. In theory, the criterion working alongside host nation officials and military for both levels of response is that no commercial al- personnel to eliminate sources of instability and im- ternative exists or is readily available. prove livelihoods through various development and However, despite the formal process for request- capacity-building projects. In the Horn of Africa, for ing military assistance, local U.S. ambassadors and example, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) estab- country officers in the relevant regional bureau at lished the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Afri- the State Department have often requested DoD as- ca (CJTF-HOA) in 2002 to promote regional stability sistance directly, leaving USAID and OFDA out of the and protect coalition interests through disaster re- loop. Moreover, some officials at State are neither lief, humanitarian support, medical and dental as- familiar with disaster management issues and pro- sistance, and construction and water development cedures nor even aware of USAID’s and OFDA’s role projects. CJTF-HOA also provides military-to-mili- as the LFA for foreign HA/DR activities. For instance, tary training in counterterrorism and in border and

Finding the Right Mix

8 The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s maritime security. In 2008, U.S. Africa Command Pakistan. With OMA help, USAID also updated its (AFRICOM) became fully operational, absorbed the Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and CJTF-HOA and expanded its efforts, and began to Response in 2005, which included reference mate- promote similar civil affairs-type projects elsewhere rial for OFDA staff working with U.S., coalition, and on the continent. For their part, U.S. Southern Com- multinational military forces, including NATO. And mand (SOUTHCOM) and PACOM already run similar while OMA tends to focus on policy issues related to programs in their respective areas of responsibility U.S. civil-military coordination (CMCoord), yet an- (or AORs), such as Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-Bra- other group within OFDA concentrates on the oper- vo) in and Joint Special Operations ational aspects. This group, the Operational Liaison Task Force- (JSOTF-P). Unit (OLU), conducts training on joint humanitarian Yet, despite the military’s accomplished record operations in cooperation with the U.S. military re- and expanding portfolio in the HA/DR arena, it still gional commands, and it dispatches CMCoord offi- lacks the necessary skills to conduct a number of cers to onsite locations to assist with coordination in essential non-military activities, such as camp man- actual relief efforts. Some seniorUSAID staff are as- agement for displaced persons, medical assistance signed as well to regional COCOMs, especially those for women and children, and child protection. In – such as PACOM and SOUTHCOM – that oversee de- contrast, USAID, along with the broader humani- fense operations in disaster-prone AORs. tarian community, has been working in the field for Of course, initiatives to enhance CMCoord for di- some time now, and is generally better able than the saster relief operations (about which more is said in military to determine the longer-term needs of an af- chapter 4) will be inadequate if similar efforts are fected community, particularly with regard to gender not made to improve how State’s regional bureaus and pediatric issues, nutrition assistance, and infra- and its Executive Secretariat coordinate disaster re- structure development. Therefore, military engage- lief efforts with USAID/OFDA. In this sense, intra- ment in HA/DR missions still needs to be carefully State coordination is just as important an objective coordinated with host nation (HN) personnel, USAID, as interagency coordination. One step toward that UN staff, local and international NGOs, and private goal was taken in January 2006, when the secretary sector partners to identify priority local needs and to of state created the Office of the Director of Foreign ensure that the various stakeholders in a disaster re- Assistance (DFA) as a way to align more effectively lief effort focus on areas where they have a compar- the foreign assistance activities promoted and car- ative advantage: security, logistics, and transport for ried out by various main State Department offices militaries, and recovery, reconstruction, and reha- and those of USAID (which is better seen as an inde- bilitation for aid workers. With more fully integrat- pendent agency that nonetheless reports to State). ed planning and response strategies, the military The DFA has authority over most State and USAID and civilian components of HA/DR activities should foreign assistance programs and provides guidance be able to remain distinct but nonetheless closely to other agencies that manage foreign aid activi- aligned, thereby enabling a seamless transition from ties.4 TheDFA also serves concurrently as the USAID 4 Some foreign aid pro- relief to recovery and a harmless military exit. administrator. grams, such as the Millenni- um Challenge Account, the In an effort to formalize a closer working rela- In May 2007, USAID and State jointly released their Office of the Global AIDS Co- tionship with DoD as well as with foreign militar- Strategic Plan for FY 2007-12, which defines the pri- ordinator, and the Office for ies, USAID established the earlier mentioned OMA in mary aims of U.S. foreign development assistance as Reconstruction and Stabi- 2005 to serve as the focal point for USAID interaction 1) achieving peace and security, 2) supporting just lization, will remain out- side the scope of the DFA. with military planners during disaster response ac- and democratic governance, 3) investing in people, tivities and stability operations. To date, OMA has fa- 4) promoting economic growth and prosperity, 5) cilitated the establishment of a joint USAID and DoD providing humanitarian assistance, 6) promoting emergency supply warehouse in , provided international understanding, and 7) strengthening pre-deployment briefings to U.S. military units en U.S. consular and management capabilities (U.S. De- route to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, and partment of State/USAID 2007, 10). With regard to served as a liaison between the humanitarian com- providing humanitarian assistance, the new frame- munity and DoD during disaster response efforts in work proposes to provide life-saving disaster relief

Finding the Right Mix

The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process 9 t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s

assistance in emergencies, prevent and mitigate di- ed programs a central DoD policy objective, though sasters by developing local and global mechanisms much remains to be done to educate defense officials to anticipate and respond to natural or man-made and military commanders on the strategic value of disasters, and help build the capacity of foreign gov- such missions, how best to implement them in con- ernments to manage problems associated with dis- cert with non-DoD civilian authorities, and what the placed persons and refugees. To accomplish this, the implications may be for force structure and military Strategic Plan identifies the Departments of Home- procurement. The creation of a new deputy assistant land Security, Health and Human Services, and De- secretary of defense for stability operations capabil- fense as key government partners with which State ities (ODASD/STB) in early 2007 should help in this and USAID plan to coordinate to help implement fu- regard, but the work of this office is only in the early ture foreign assistance activities. stages and its influence is unclear. As a sub-branch At this point, it is unclear whether these and oth- of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for er recent efforts to restructure the cumbersome and Policy (OUSD(P)), ODASD/STB can urge the individu- fragmented U.S. foreign assistance program will im- al military services to plan and acquire capabilities prove once and for all how State coordinates future for stability operations, including disaster relief, but HA/DR efforts withUSAID . Some argue that since the it can not require them to do so. DFA also serves as USAID administrator, USAID will Meanwhile, as requests for U.S. military and likely participate in the policy and budget decision- broader DoD assistance in support of foreign disas- making process to a greater extent than it does at ter relief have steadily risen in recent years, so has present (Veillette 2007, 2). On the other hand, some the need to ensure that those requests are ground- critics fear that the role of USAID is being steadily ed in sound strategic assessments, communicated marginalized in favor of the Department of State, to DoD in a useable format, and based on a dem- with some of its responsibilities being usurped by onstrated need for unique military capabilities not main State bureaus and offices. Either way, State (or no longer) available from civilian or commercial and USAID need to improve internal HA/DR pro- sources. All too often, State Department officials will cedures so that both are operating with the same simply request a specific type and scale of military understanding and assumptions when it is time support (for example, sea-based transport helicop- to turn to the military for additional disaster re- ters for evacuating disaster victims) without think- lief assistance. ing through the logistical support required to make that capability available, or the possible availabili- ty of more cost-effective alternatives. Rising inter- Requesting Department of Defense est in “getting the request process right” (which DoD and Military Assistance officials believe would resolve at least 70 percent of the difficulties that bedevil the current process) For their part, DoD, service staff, and COCOM plan- coincided as well with a wholesale reorganization ners are exploring various ways to enhance military of OUSD(P) in January 2007 to better address the readiness for and involvement in HA/DR activities, department’s growing emphasis on managing in- as military support to disaster relief operations has ternational military coalitions, equipping partner become an increasingly prominent part of Ameri- nations to fight terrorists, and improving U.S. and ca’s diplomatic repertoire. In late 2005, for example, coalition responses to sudden disasters and human- after the Pakistan earthquake, the Pentagon intro- itarian crises. 5 As noted in chapter 1, stability operations in- duced DoD directive 3000.05, “Mil- As part of this shakeup, a number of new assis- clude a wide variety of military missions and ac- itary Support for Stability, Securi- tivities to restore and/or maintain a safe and tant and deputy assistant secretary of defense posi- ty, Transition, and Reconstruction secure environment in a foreign country that tions were established, including, in addition to the (SSTR) Operations,” essentially elevat- is trying to cope with, or recently experienced, ODASD/STB slot described above, an assistant sec- significant internal conflict or a major disas- ing stability operations to a core mili- retary of defense for global security affairs OASD( / ter, natural or man-made. Apart from interact- tary mission comparable to tradition- ing with host nation officials, such operations GSA), and, under this post, a deputy assistant sec- al combat missions.5 Simply put, the generally would involve extensive collabo- retary for partnership strategy (ODASD/PRT) and a ration between U.S. military forces and civil directive makes the provision of mil- deputy assistant secretary for coalition and multi- authorities attached to U.S., non-U.S., interna- itary aid in support of HA/DR-relat- tional, and non-governmental offices and agen- cies operating in the country in question. Finding the Right Mix

10 The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s national operations (ODASD/CMO). Together, these cific military units/commands to respond), via the three new offices share responsibility for organiz- intra-DoD and the broader interagency policy re- ing the DoD response to natural or man-made di- view process. However, this arrangement is fairly sasters. These organizational changes have in turn recent and has yet to be tested against a serious, prompted a top-to-bottom re-examination of the large-scale catastrophe. formal State-DoD disaster assistance request pro- Once an overseas crisis erupts, DoD may, if asked, cess as it is supposed to work, as well as a review of decide to deploy military assets in support of civilian the informal, back-channel process as it has tended relief agencies and foreign governments if 1) the re- to unfold. The idea behind these reviews has been sponse capacity of the host nation and international to introduce reforms to improve the process (com- community is overwhelmed, 2) all other commer- monly known to insiders as the Executive Secretar- cial options have been exhausted, and 3) there ex- iat process) and to make sure that military/DoD as- ists no comparable civilian alternative to the use of sistance is requested – and efforts made to make military and civil defense assets. These three basic it available – only when it is truly necessary. The standards essentially replicate what are known as OUSD(P) reorganization for handling disaster relief the Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and associated humanitarian assistance missions and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief devel- is described below, along with what the responsi- oped by the UN (UNOCHA 2007). The decision to re- ble officials are suggesting with regard to addition- quest the use of military assets is formally made by al reforms and adjustments. the Department of State, validated by USAID/OFDA, and approved by DoD. As mentioned earlier, once The Executive Secretariat Process the host nation has requested assistance from the and Recent Adjustments local U.S. ambassador, who in turn has issued a di- Within OASD/GSA, the office of coalition and multi- saster declaration cable back to State via the appro- national operations (CMO) has responsibility for han- priate regional bureau and the Executive Secretariat dling DoD activities during the early weeks or initial (where the operations center resides), OFDA deploys emergency phase of a disaster relief operation. How- to the disaster site to assess the situation and deter- ever, the Office of Partnership StrategyPRT ( ), also mine the type of emergency relief needed. If OFDA within OASD/GSA, directs longer-term assistance decides DoD involvement is called for, it will inform and recovery projects, focused on host-nation ca- State’s Executive Secretariat, which will forward the pacity building and rehabilitation, including educa- request for military assistance to the Executive Sec- tion programs, medical and public health support, retariat at DoD. and HA/DR-related security cooperation (to create Interestingly, while DoD representatives – gener- and/or strengthen local first responder teams). The ally drawn from the local embassy’s Joint U.S. Mil- ODASD/STB office is responsible for draftingD oD pol- itary Assistance Group (JUSMAG) or from a nearby icy for stability operations and for studying mea- U.S. forward base or smaller military facility – may sures to improve the interagency process, military participate in the OFDA assessment as DART team training, and education exercises for post-conflict members, DoD does not have the legal authority to SSTR operations, and, to a certain extent, humani- conduct an alternative assessment as to whether tarian and disaster relief missions. As e Executive Secretariat Process its title suggests, ODASD/STB also ap- pears poised to play a role in promot- Host Nation STEP 1: USAID/OFDA ing the utility and eventual acquisition Request for Support Validates Request State Department from U.S. Embassy 1 Drafts Request of SSTR-related capabilities, many of 2 which would be appropriate for HA/DR, STEP 2: Request Transmitted to DoD though little appears to be happening OUSDP/CMO Staffs Request with 3 on this front at the moment. All three Appropriate Offices STEP 3: Request Approved e Joint Staff offices work closely together and with and DoD Response Sent 4 other DoD bureaus and agencies, as well STEP 4: Order Issued as with the Joint Staff (for tasking spe- Regional Command

Finding the Right Mix

The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process 11 t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s

military aid is truly required and should be request- the Office of the Secretary of DefenseOSD ( ) for final ed. Given OFDA’s role as the LFA for foreign disaster review and approval by the secretary and/or deputy relief, the DART teams are supposed to have the fi- secretary of defense. Once approval (which would nal word on such matters. In practice, however, for- include the third-party waiver discussed earlier) is ward-deployed military units are often the first to given, the Joint Staff orders the appropriate regional arrive on scene as part of a DoD humanitarian assis- combatant command, such as PACOM or SOUTHCOM, tance survey team (or HAST), and such teams may and, if necessary, a functional combatant command, very well conduct the first in-depth assessment of such as U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) conditions on the ground, including making ini- or Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), to respond to the tial recommendations with regard to the type and crisis and provide both humanitarian assistance and level of military support required. This is especial- any needed on-site organizational support.7 Mean- ly true when disasters occur in countries quite dis- while, throughout this entire process, the CMO ex- tant from the United States. When cyclone Sidr hit perts will have been coordinating planning efforts Bangladesh in November 2007, for example, a twen- informally with their counterparts in the main State ty-three-person HAST unit from the 3rd Marine Ex- Department, USAID/OFDA, the local U.S. embassy peditionary Force (MEF) based on Okinawa arrived in the disaster-stricken country, and other relevant well before any DART team members from Wash- agencies and departments, to determine the neces- ington, and immediately began to develop a plan, in sary extent of the operation and the optimal mili- coordination with Bangladeshi government and U.S. tary deployment, given the evolving situation within embassy officials in Dhaka, for how best to provide the disaster zone. essential U.S. military assistance (Dubee 2007; U.S. Since the 2007 OUSD(P) reorganization, this back- Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, Force Public Affairs channel coordination process has also forestalled a Office 2007). That said, the official request for such frivolous or inappropriate request for military assis- aid must still be agreed to by USAID/OFDA experts tance on more than one occasion. For example, when and forwarded to DoD based on a DART recommen- State and DoD were discussing how best to respond dation, albeit one that may have been definitively to the March 2007 floods in Bolivia, GSA/CMO offi- shaped by a prior HAST assessment. cials got wind of, and were then able to head off, an Only DoD, however, can actually commit military impending request from State that DoD airlift three assets in support of an OFDA-approved assessment, bailey bridges (pre-engineered, ready-to-assemble having first reached a conclusion that appropri- steel bridges often used by the military) to hard-hit ate assets are indeed available and that there are areas, a response that would have been out of propor- no overriding military mission requirements else- tion to the damage on the ground, overly expensive, 6 Specific guidance for DoD and mil- where for the use of said assets.6 With- and of dubious utility to the local population even if itary involvement in foreign disaster re- in DoD, the humanitarian operations delivered. During the same crisis, SOUTHCOM, at the lief is set forth in DoD directive 5100.46, “Responsibilities for Foreign Disaster Re- staff based in the CMO office takes the request of the U.S. embassy in La Paz, was preparing lief Operations,” http://www.js.mil/whs/ lead in moving a request for military to airlift relief supplies (such as blankets and plastic directives/corres/pdf/510046p.pdf. support through the in-house bureau- sheets) found at a Miami-based USAID warehouse to 7 Support from functional COCOMs may cratic process. Through an intra-DoD re- the disaster area, but, again, timely GSA/CMO inter- be requested if, for example, additional air- view process that it manages, this staff vention helped USAID to identify a less expensive al- lift or sealift from TRANSCOM is needed, or if regional COCOM forces need to be reinforced collaborates with other DoD offices, in- ternative – shipment by Federal Express. Reaching with forces based in the continental Unit- cluding the appropriate regional desk, these decisions took a good deal of back and forth, ed States (CONUS) under JFCOM control. the Joint Staff, the Office of the Comp- largely via email, between State and DoD, but the pro- troller, Legal Affairs, and the Defense Security Co- cess demonstrates that DoD can and does exert con- operation Agency (DSCA), to organize and propose a siderable influence behind the scenes to shape and, military response or to deny the request. Even in the if necessary, redirect State Department requests for event of a large-scale disaster likely to require a sub- military assistance, even if it can not always prevent stantial DoD/military response, this review can be ill-considered requests in the first place. accomplished within two to three hours, after which Several factors, however, may prompt either a draft plan is sent back up the chain of command in the U.S. ambassador or the regional COCOM com-

Finding the Right Mix

12 The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s mander to side-step both the formal and infor- e DoD Coordination/Approval Process mal request processes described above and to Secretary of State Coordination Secretary of State set in motion a military response to a local di- Request for DoD Comptroller saster without a prior request for DoD assistance DoD Support Secretary of Defense from State’s Executive Secretariat or, in some Secretary of Defense cases, without waiting for DoD approval of such a OSD Regional Desks OSD Leadership request. First, a COCOM commander already has a limited degree of authority to act alone (gen- Office of the Under DSCA Coalition & Multinational erally in the first forty-eight hours) to provide Secretary of Defense Operations for Policy / Coalition emergency assistance when a rapid response is & Multinational Joint Staff seen as vital to saving life, limb, and property. In Operations (CMO) Joint Staff/Regional Command such cases, the COCOM commander may deploy DoD General military and civil defense assets under his or her Counsel control to the disaster site without prior DoD ap- proval, though such assistance normally must be ularly strong in AORs (such as the Asia-Pacific the- capped at $100,000 in value. Moreover, once the ater) where the distances and travel time can be immediate crisis has been stabilized, further ac- quite long between potential military responders tion requires formal DoD guidance via the CMO and the disaster site in question. and the wider intra-DoD/interagency process. For For instance, in response to an undersea earth- instance, within hours of the Indian Ocean tsu- quake and tsunami in the on April nami tragedy, the U.S. Navy deployed P-3 Orion re- 2, 2007, the U.S. ambassador to , connaissance aircraft to assist with initial search the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, Leslie V. Rowe, and rescue efforts and to assess the extent of the requested urgent military assistance from PACOM damage. All subsequent military action, howev- Commander Admiral Timothy J. Keating, including er, was directed through the appropriate chan- helicopter support that had proven so popular and nels and chains of command. effective in both the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and Second, even before a regional COCOM acts, a U.S. the 2005 Pakistan earthquake relief efforts. Though ambassador in the COCOM AOR may reach out di- relatively minor compared to the death and destruc- rectly to the COCOM commander and ask for assis- tion caused by these two larger disasters, the dam- tance (though, as suggested earlier, the likelihood age wrought by the Solomon Islands earthquake and of such a request would depend largely on any per- tsunami was viewed by local officials as the most -ex sonal relationship already established between the tensive to be suffered by the islands since the bat- ambassador and the COCOM commander). At a min- tle-related damage of World War II, much of which, imum, such a move would preempt the formal plan- in the eyes of the indigenous population, had been ning and interagency decision-making processes of imposed by American military operations. Draw- the Departments of State and Defense, including ing perhaps on the example set in Pakistan (where OFDA, processes that, as noted above, are already U.S. helicopters came to be seen as “angels of mer- susceptible to being short-circuited or incorrectly cy” by Pakistanis who had previously expressed hos- followed. Unfortunately, in some cases where this tility towards America), Ambassador Rowe hoped has occurred, the eagerness of the U.S. ambassador, that the rapid deployment of helicopter-carrying the COCOM commander, or both, to show clout, en- U.S. naval platforms to the Solomons would trigger gage in humanitarian activities, and promote the U.S. an equally welcome degree of goodwill toward the image abroad has generated decisions whose impli- United States among the islanders while also pro- cations were not fully considered, especially with viding timely relief assistance of a more practical regard to the utility and necessity of the military and necessary sort. support provided or the level and source of fund- In response to Ambassador Rowe’s request, PA- ing needed to underwrite it. The inclination to act COM immediately pre-deployed the USNS Stockham, in a somewhat more precipitous manner than may which carried a contingent of the ship-borne heli- be warranted, moreover, would seem to be partic- copters so desired by Rowe (in this case, SH 60F Sea

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The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process 13 t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s

Hawks), so that the helicopters would be nearby and mally well versed in HA/DR issues and procedures, ready to provide some medical-related lift assistance tend to drive the process for requesting DoD assis- as soon as formal DoD approval came through.8 How- tance and to bypass USAID. Moreover, since a request ever, in this particular case, the decision to request for military assistance via the Executive Secretari- and send U.S. military equipment was at process must be sent from one Cabinet-level of- 8 Since it could take up to six days to get a premature. USAID/OFDA did not believe, fice to another (in this case, from the secretary of ship with the necessary assets from to and OASD/GSA later agreed, that the state to the secretary of defense), USAID’s authori- the Solomon Islands, and as long as seven to ten days to complete the Executive Secretari- scale or scope of the disaster, as bad as ty and interaction with DoD are often subordinated at approval process, it might be two weeks or it was for the islands, really warranted to that of the U.S. ambassador, the regional bureaus, more before help arrived if PACOM had wait- DoD involvement, especially since Aus- and, more specifically, State’s Executive Secretari- ed for formal approval before deploying. tralia and New Zealand were closer and at (which is also staffed largely by regional bureau/ already assisting militarily (interview country team veterans). As a result, the COCOMs 2007a). In the end, the Sea Hawks aboard the Stock- sometimes provide services (or are pressed to do ham did provide some medical-related transport so) even when OFDA assessments have concluded, and lift assistance, and, somewhat ironically, they or would if consulted, that such assistance, though were used to “rescue some rescuers” when Red Cross useful, may be unnecessary. relief workers traveling on a Taiwanese freighter got This is not to suggest, however, that ambassa- caught up on some off-shore reefs. For the most part, dors, COCOM commanders, and others on the front however, local officials and NGO teams ashore had lines of a sudden disaster are wrong to try to expe- no idea how to use the Sea Hawks as part of the dite the process, nor that following the Executive initial relief effort, and there were almost certain- Secretariat process to the letter will produce the ly cheaper and perfectly adequate ways to provide best and most effective response when time is of what help the Stockham and its crew eventually did the essence. Indeed, unless there is high-level po- provide. After some deliberation, USAID determined litical pressure moving the process along, as there that no more than $200,000 worth of non-military almost always is for large-scale disasters such as U.S. assistance was really required, and PACOM had the Pakistan earthquake, the Executive Secretariat to absorb most of the costs of deploying the Stock- process can be cumbersome and time-consuming, ham. Hence, even though the Stockham proved use- even when it unfolds as it should via the appropri- ful once it was on the scene, it was not essential, and ate experts at OFDA and DoD. For the more com- the entire episode illustrates how calling on U.S. mil- mon small- to medium-scale disasters, however, itary assets prematurely and/or unnecessarily can such pressure is often absent, and requests for very waste scarce resources and burden an already over- specific, time-urgent military assistance can get un- taxed military. necessarily bogged down in red tape, even if prop- 9 Though admittedly somewhat arbi- As a general rule, GSA/CMO offi- er procedures are being followed.9 To some extent, trary, disaster response planners in DoD de- cials argue, the U.S. military should this was the case during the Solomon Islands crisis, fine small- to medium-scale disasters as events that cost around $2 million or less, and in be viewed as a resource of last re- and it seemed likely to become an ongoing problem which no more than two thousand to three sort, not a resource of first resort. It during a rash of similarly small-scale, but nonethe- thousand (and normally considerably few- should be called on to assist when less quite devastating, disasters that occurred within er) people die and no more than a few thou- the civilian response capacity has fairly narrow geographic zones during the summer sand are displaced. In contrast, a large-scale disaster might involve tens of thousands of been overwhelmed and the mili- and fall of 2007, including an August earthquake in deaths and hundreds of thousands (if not mil- tary can provide a unique service , flooding in in September as a re- lions) of displaced persons, while imposing for which no other comparable ci- sult of , widespread wind and water costs of tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. vilian alternative exists. However, damage in the Dominican Republic in November even though USAID is the LFA for overseas disas- due to tropical storm Noel, and later in November ter assistance, it is often viewed as an LFA in name the impact of cyclone Sidr on Bangladesh. Clearly, only, and its expertise and responsibilities ignored. relying on an Executive Secretariat review process As likely happened in the Solomon Islands case, the that could take anywhere from seven to fourteen local U.S. ambassador and the country officers in the days to complete was not ideal for handling back- relevant regional bureau at State, who are not nor- to-back disasters of this magnitude. Something had

Finding the Right Mix

14 The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s to be done to accelerate the provision of essential the likely depletion of DoD’s quite small annual fund- military assistance in these lesser, but still serious, ing line for disaster response), the more deliberative cases, when essential aid could not be found from lo- Executive Secretariat process will be followed. This cal or international civilian sources, and the prompt Letter of Commitment Process and targeted provision of American military assis- Host Nation tance could make a world of difference. Request for Support Letter of Commitment Regional Command from US Embassy faxed from Fortunately, lessons learned from this series of Prepares and back-to-back crises have prompted a real break- USAID/OFDA pre-positions forces through in how requests for military assistance will 3-way Dialogue OUSDP/CMO be handled in the future for small- and medium-scale USAID/OFDA Expedites intra-DoD disasters. When such an event occurs, the appropri- Review and Approval ate officers from the main State Department,USAID / Main State Bureaus OFDA, OSD, and the local regional COCOM will have a Joint Staff four-way dialogue (mostly via email) to determine OUSDP/CMO Directs COCOMs on Specific Deployments if military assistance really seems to be required. If the answer is yes, then USAID/OFDA will fax a one- Regional Command Functional Commands page “letter of commitment” stating that this is in- Back Channel Dialogue Alerted if Necessary deed the case to the regional COCOM, a copy of which is sent simultaneously to the CMO office in OSD. CMO authorities then will expedite the intra-DoD coordi- makes perfect sense given that the military compo- nation they would normally begin when military as- nent of any response is likely to be quite diverse and sistance is requested, facilitate a DoD decision on a sizeable, and will almost certainly play – as it did in proper course of action, forward that decision to the responses to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the secretary or deputy secretary of defense for for- the 2005 Pakistani earthquake – a prominent man- mal approval (and the third-party waiver), and then agement role in the early relief phases of such oper- transmit that approval to the COCOM, which will al- ations, which must be carefully coordinated across ready be organizing the required response on the ba- interagency lines and aligned with broader interna- sis of the faxed letter of commitment. The goal is to tional efforts. Making sure to cross as many of the t’s complete this whole process, from initial request to and dot as many of the i’s as possible in the initial deployment, in less than twelve hours, and recent requests for support and deployment decisions will experiences suggest that it can often be done even make the response that follows that much smoother faster. Operating with only a skeletal crew the day and more effective. On the other hand, when one or before Thanksgiving in 2007, for example, it tookD oD more smaller disasters occur, the task is not so much no more than ten hours to get the requested mili- one of marshalling a huge multi-agency, cross-insti- tary aid headed to Bangladesh after cyclone Sidr hit, tutional response over a wide geographical area, but and it took only fifteen minutes to get the assistance one of getting very specific assets and supplies, such needed on its way to the Dominican Republic dur- as search and rescue helicopters or fresh drinking ing tropical storm Noel (interview 2007b). For com- water, very quickly on the scene. For this more lim- parison’s sake, under the traditional Executive Sec- ited but still very essential type of operation, the let- retariat format, it can take two to three days just to ter-of-commitment process will be preferred, as it complete the State-USAID-DoD coordination process, allows a timely and targeted response. and up to seven to ten days to get any approved mil- itary assistance to the actual disaster zone. Capacity Building over the Longer Term Since late 2007, then, decisions on DoD’s provision In addition to such efforts to reform and stream- of foreign disaster relief have in theory been guided line the State-DoD request for assistance process by a new two-tier process. In the event of a large-scale (discussed more fully under “Initiatives to Improve disaster such as a massive tsunami or earthquake and Institutionalize the Interagency Process,” be- (perhaps involving tens of thousands killed, hun- low), OASD/GSA planners are taking steps to improve dreds of thousands or even millions displaced, and the overall impact of military-led humanitarian

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assistance activities by shifting DoD’s focus from the countries visited (some of which were home to short-term recovery projects and high-profile, time- large Islamic populations), the cost of the deploy- limited initiatives to longer-term capacity-building ment plus all the services provided amounted to be- activities to enhance local and regional skills and re- tween $26 million and $30 million, and many argue sources. Each year, DoD receives about $60 million that most of the benefits of these visits – including for overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid the needed medical support and the boost in Amer- (OHDACA) projects, some $40 million of which is tar- ican popularity – simply sailed away or atrophied geted for longer-term capacity-building efforts that once the Mercy left port. Moreover, among some so- include medical and logistical assistance, the con- cieties, it has been further argued, such operations struction of schools, clinics, and roads, and training can create dangerous dependencies among the pop- in disaster planning and preparedness.10 Even with ulations served that might produce over time the op- the best of intentions, however, the desired outcome posite effect of what is desired – local resentment can prove difficult to achieve and sus- over a level of American assistance that could never 10 Of the $60 million, roughly $40 million is 11 earmarked for humanitarian assistance pro- tain. For example, as the U.S. military be adequately repaid or developed indigenously. grams, $5 million for the humanitarian mine relief effort in Pakistan after the earth- More recent medical and “health diplomacy” action program, and $17 million for foreign quake came to a close, the decision was missions undertaken in 2007 by the USS Peleliu, an disaster relief and emergency response. For made to donate to the Pakistani 67th amphibious assault ship equipped for the first time more information, see U.S. Department of De- fense, Defense Security Cooperation Agen- Medical Battalion a Mobile Army Sur- to conduct a medical mission, in Southeast Asia and cy (2007). Funding issues are discussed in gical Hospital (MASH) that had been set Oceania and by the USNS Comfort hospital ship in more depth in the last section of this chapter. up in Muzaffarabad. TheMASH unit had the Caribbean and South America made a consid- 11 Some experts argue that this could be es- pecially troublesome when dealing with the treated over twenty thousand patients, erable effort to redress some of these shortcomings. island communities of Oceania and the West- conducted some sixteen thousand im- The missions integrated a number of off-ship civic ern Pacific where “gift culture” traditions, munizations, and filled close to thir- assistance and educational programs into the op- most notably the felt need to “repay” a gift or ty-eight thousand prescriptions, and erational plan and began to establish partnerships, service provided by a visitor, are deeply in- grained. In this context, when providing aid the idea was that it could now play an when possible well before the ship deploys, between and humanitarian assistance, one should equally crucial role in addressing fu- on-board civil support teams and NGOs based ashore. be careful, these experts argue, not to make ture local needs during the recovery In 2008, the same approach was followed with a the recipients feel incapable of reciprocat- ing in some meaningful way, because of the period. Unfortunately, the MASH unit good deal of success in organizing the Mercy’s fol- scale and/or nature of the support provided. was soon abandoned as the Pakistani low-on deployment to Southeast Asia and Oceania, military was not sufficiently trained or and the maiden medical missions undertaken by the equipped to sustain it, and all the operational man- amphibious assault ships USS Boxer and USS Kear- uals that might have helped had somehow been lost sarge in the Caribbean Sea and along both the Atlan- soon after the donation. The U.S. Army, moreover, tic and Pacific coasts of Central and South America. had already mothballed the remaining MASH units Such efforts (discussed in more detail in chapters 3 in its own possession and shifted to a more mod- and 4) may well lay the groundwork for more sus- ern field hospital system, so access to spare parts tainable projects that help build local capacity with- would have become a problem in the relative near in the countries visited, all of which could, in turn, future even if the Pakistanis could have sustained help to reduce the damage suffered and the outside operations. assistance needed in the event of future disasters. Humanitarian assistance specialists in OASD/ The cost of each operation, however, has hovered GSA’s Partnership Strategy Office argue that simi- in the $20 million range, and the projected costs for lar inefficiencies and failures to take a longer-term similar operations in the future are not expected to perspective tended to limit the overall utility of the decline. Funding at that level is clearly beyond the highly publicized medical missions undertaken in scope of DoD’s annual OHDACA budget, so the U.S. 2006 by the USNS Mercy, one the U.S. Navy’s two ac- Navy, whose leadership views these deployments tive hospital ships. While the thirty-day deployment as crucial tools for engaging key foreign countries of the Mercy in Southeast Asia in the aftermath of and improving America’s image among their citizens, the Indian Ocean tsunami led to immediate jumps is now hoping to build into the Navy’s 2010 budget in local approval ratings for the United States among (and the future-years defense budget, of which it will

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16 The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s

be a part), a line item for up to four such missions prove to be critical in turning back efforts by local a year, for a total of $80 million. In the meantime, insurgents or terrorist groups to exploit the dire cir- the Navy appears willing to continue to underwrite cumstances that often prevail after a disaster to ad- such costs as part of its annual operations and main- vance their own agendas. tenance (O&M) expenditures, but it remains to be seen if it will continue to do so if special line-item Initiatives to Improve and funding is not approved for 2010 or maintained in Institutionalize the Interagency subsequent years (interview 2008).12 Process With these considerations in mind, OSD planners As mentioned above, given the shortcomings of in the GSA/PRT office are turning increasingly to the State-DoD military assistance request process the experiences of the NGO humanitarian assistance as practiced in recent years (especially in Execu- community for guidance on the design of cost-effec- 12 The current chief of na- tive Secretariat format), disaster relief specialists tive projects that may have a longer-lasting impact val operations, Admiral in OSD’s CMO office have focused since the office Gary Roughead, USN, speaks on local capacities to manage and recover from di- was created in January 2007 on introducing a high- strongly in favor of such fund- saster events. The conclusion these planners seem er degree of professionalism and standardization to ing for carefully planned med- to be reaching is that a smaller amount of mon- ical ship deployments and the overall process. To a large extent, this has in- ey more wisely spent may have a larger overall im- other naval humanitarian ac- volved greater efforts on DoD’s part to educate re- tivities that are programmed pact – including on local attitudes toward America gional bureau and Executive Secretariat personnel well in advance. From his per- – than high-profile, one-off, photo-op events that spective, such efforts – which at the State Department on the rules and proper don’t directly help the local population help itself he calls “proactive humani- procedures for assessing a foreign disaster and or- tarian assistance” – offer bet- and that may or may not be repeated. Future initia- ganizing a properly scaled and composed response ter opportunities to bring to tives should also focus, these planners say, on leav- bear the full range of the Na- that includes the military. This is a vital first step -to ing something more permanent behind and on what vy’s HA/DR capabilities (e.g., ward improving State-DoD and broader interagency medical aid, engineering, lift, happens after the mission ends. In this context, par- coordination, and it needs to be pursued on a reg- training) in support of useful ticular note was made of a month-long health edu- ular, institutionalized basis, given that there is no projects that will have a last- cation program run by the Red Cross in ing impact (interview 2008). established, functional equivalent at State to OSD’s that pulled fifty healthcare officials from fifteen dis- CMO operation. Indeed, since the OHDACA funding tricts together for a two-week intensive course, took began in earnest in 1996, personnel now assigned to the top 20 percent for more in-depth training with- CMO have developed considerable expertise in disas- in their home districts, and finally drew them all to- ter relief and humanitarian operations, but the non- gether again for a broader health policy course, all USAID personnel they must interact with at State for a total cost of just $110,000. have relatively little background in HA/DR issues To be sure, hospital ship visits can be of great and procedures, including for many a limited un- service, especially during the early days of a disas- derstanding of the State/USAID role as LFA. To help ter and during the immediate recovery phase, and bridge this information gap, CMO has developed a in view of the successful cruises of the Peleliu and detailed briefing, “Foreign Disaster Response,” that Comfort in 2007, as well as Mercy, Boxer, and Kear- it has been presenting primarily to regional bureau sarge in 2008, a more multi-mission approach with personnel. The briefing is essentially a primer on greater activity ashore promises to be the wave of the overall U.S. foreign disaster response decision- the future regarding the Navy’s annual humanitari- making process, but with an emphasis on DoD’s role, an assistance activities in key regional theaters. That authority, and organizational structure in the area said, for U.S. military and broader DoD engagement of HA/DR operations. efforts with vulnerable countries in the periods be- In part as an outgrowth of these briefing activi- fore and after a disaster strikes, smaller-scale, ca- ties, DoD and State (with CMO and USAID/OFDA, re- pacity-building programs may yield better “disaster spectively, in the lead) have set up a joint working diplomacy” returns over time. As the more success- group aimed at reforming and professionalizing ful provincial reconstruction team (PRT) programs the much-discussed Executive Secretariat process, in Afghanistan and Iraq are proving, such efforts to which remains the preferred approach for larger- address local needs in a sustainable way could also scale disasters. A key DoD objective in the working

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group is to promote reforms to current practice of action. Rather than make a specific request for a that would require State to confirm that DoD as- particular military capability (which State officials, sistance is in fact “necessary and essential” (and including those at OFDA, tend to do), the template not simply “desirable” or “useful to have”) and to would lay out a more detailed description of the sit- vest in USAID, and OFDA specifically, the authori- uation on the ground, such as the scale and type of ty to make that determination. At present, USAID physical damage, the level and nature of casualties, and OFDA, despite their putative LFA expertise, are the status of any displaced persons or refugees, the 13 Similarly, DoD never really wants to re- only required “to check a box” (along condition of transport infrastructure, and the over- fuse a from State for mili- with other main State Department of- all security conditions. The request would leave it tary support, in part as such support is seen as an increasingly important mission in what fices) simply confirming that military to OSD, the Joint Staff, and ultimately the region- is now called phase 0 (pre-conflict) military assistance would be “useful,” a confir- al and functional COCOMs to determine what mili- operations aimed at shaping the security en- mation that USAID and OFDA are gener- tary assets to provide, where they should be drawn vironment in key regional theaters (and en- ally quite willing to give once a request from, when they should depart or be supplied, and gaging potential allies and coalition partners) so as to prevent future crises and/or to pre- gets this far, as it would normally mean under what rules of engagement. Working together pare for an effective response. Hence, the im- fewer demands on the USAID budget to with main State and USAID/OFDA specialists, CMO portance of ensuring that there’s a real need, underwrite support that DoD and the officials are also putting together a one-day train- lest scarce DoD resources, including fund- 13 ing, for disaster relief be misapplied. military would otherwise provide. To ing course and a longer course module on the for- help boost USAID/OFDA authority, the eign disaster relief decision process that will soon be CMO office in OSD also supports the adoption of a integrated into the core curriculum of the Foreign national security presidential directive (NSPD) that Service Institute (FSI). Ideally, once the diplomats would give USAID Cabinet-level authority, given that so trained are assigned to various regional bureaus the State-to-DoD request for military assistance un- and/or posted overseas, the ideas presented in these der the Executive Secretariat process must proceed educational materials will be sustained by efforts as a Cabinet-level exchange. Clearly, this will not now underway at the State Department’s Bureau happen in the near term, but if it ever does, OFDA as- for Political-Military Affairs to publish a first-ever sessments of the need (or lack thereof) for military/ guidebook on HA/DR policies and procedures. DoD assistance, which more often than not are quite Over at the Pentagon, recent efforts to update similar to those made by disaster relief experts in OSD policy guidance with regard to foreign disaster OASD/GSA/CMO, would presumably hold sway over relief should also make for a smoother, better-coor- those of State’s Executive Secretariat and regional dinated interagency process. For example, the CMO bureaus, who tend to support the requests of the office is in the midst of substantially updating DoD local ambassador, however inexpert he or she may directive 5100.46, “Responsibilities for Foreign Disas- be. For smaller-scale relief operations, of course, the ter Relief Operations,” a key DoD document last up- newly instituted letter-of-commitment process al- dated in December 1975. The current effort will bring ready assures USAID and OFDA a more central role DoD’s stated policy more fully into accord with the in authorizing and coordinating a military/COCOM strategic realities of the post-9/11 world, and ensure response. that the sections of the directive that detail which Meanwhile, DoD’s focus, both in the working DoD offices and agencies have lead responsibility for group and more generally, will be on educating the organizing and implementing any U.S. military sup- non-expert community at State on the criteria for port to a foreign disaster relief effort reflect the orga- determining whether or not military assistance is nizational changes instituted at OUSD(P) in January essential and on the correct procedural steps to re- 2007. Further, the updated directive will require CO- quest and secure such support, be it via a letter of COMs to file carefully structured after-action reports commitment or the more formal Executive Secre- following any disaster relief operation they are in- tariat process. Toward that end, another key objec- volved in, so that the primary lessons learned with tive of the CMO office has been to develop a template regard to operational challenges, capability needs, for the Department of State to use when requesting requirements for interagency/multinational coor- DoD assistance, so that such requests will provide in- dination, and the like are captured on paper and formation that DoD can use in deciding on a course filed in a central location, even if they are still not

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18 The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s fully embraced by those responsible for disaster re- for how to more effectively leverage existing DoD/ lief planning and preparedness. Moreover, while DoD military assets in concert with those that may be directive 5100.46 has been undergoing revisions, the provided by non-DoD/civil contributors to foreign Partnership Strategy Office at OASD/GSA has been disaster relief (U.S. GAO 2007, 24-33). crafting a new DoD directive on humanitarian assis- As is discussed in greater detail in subsequent tance, outlining procedures and assigning responsi- chapters of this study, clarifying capability needs bilities for DoD relief efforts and disaster prevention and interagency coordination requirements will be programs that may be set in motion after the ini- no easy task. Moreover, as imperfect as the State De- tial crisis response. Such a document (a final draft partment’s understanding of DoD procedures and of which should be ready by 2009) has never ex- capabilities for HA/DR missions may be, many of isted before, and the need for one now is but one the roadblocks that now inhibit smoother State- more illustration of DoD’s growing role in post-di- DoD and broader interagency coordination can be saster recovery and capacity-building efforts, all of traced to shortcomings in DoD policies and organi- which must be closely coordinated with those of the zational structures. Among the COCOMs, for exam- Department of State, other federal agencies and in- ple, efforts to facilitate interagency participation in ternational organizations that become involved in contingency planning for HA/DR missions and oth- foreign disasters, and the nongovernmental human- er stability operations – principally through each itarian-aid community. COCOM’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JI- At a broader policy level, the PRT office is also ACG) – have met with limited success so far, not the leading a DoD effort to integrate the secretary of least because of the relatively small number of quali- defense’s Security Cooperation Guidance (which in- fied personnel from non-DoD agencies and organiza- cludes military training, exercise, and assistance tions who are trained and available to participate in projects by the COCOMs to help build foreign part- JIACG planning sessions. For example, CENTCOM’s JI- ner skills and capabilities) with his Contingency ACG, which is by far the largest in terms of proposed Planning Guidance (which focuses on military ser- staffing, had a total projected membership of fifty- vice requirements to cope with primary warfighting six in 2007, consisting of forty-nine DoD employees scenarios). The end result, currently referred to as (forty-one military, eight civilian), two FBI agents, the Guidance for the Employment of Forces (or the and only one representative each from State, DEA, GEF), should accord a higher degree of importance Homeland Security, Treasury, and USAID (U.S. GAO in military planning circles to non-warfighting, en- 2007, 28). Similarly limited representation from be- gagement-type missions such as disaster relief and yond DoD was projected for the EUCOM and PACOM humanitarian assistance, just as the earlier-men- JIACGs, and in all cases competing commitments tioned DoD directive 3000.05 elevated stability op- elsewhere and travel funding constraints rendered erations as a whole to the level of a core military the presence of even these few non-DoD person- mission on par (for planning purposes at least) with nel an uncertain proposition. As one COCOM wag combat operations. Whether or not the GEF – a fi- summed it up, “It’s awfully hard to promote inter- nal draft of which was approved in May 2008 – will agency coordination when the people attending in- be adhered to and fully embraced by the military teragency meetings are almost all DoD personnel” services and COCOMs remains to be seen, but, if it (interview 2007c). is, the incentives to develop better procedures and Other DoD-related constraints include the fact improved capabilities to support foreign disaster re- that DoD policy generally discourages the sharing lief operations, including mechanisms to enhance of DoD contingency plans with non-DoD agencies interagency coordination among all primary partic- or offices unless the secretary of defense explicitly ipants in such operations, would certainly receive authorizes it. Moreover, COCOM commanders nor- a boost. Ideally, this would help as well to reinforce mally must pass the interagency elements of any recent calls by Congress that DoD and the COCOMs contingency plan (including those for HA/DR opera- make greater efforts to identify potential capability tions) through the Joint Staff to the National Security gaps in the stability operations realm (which, again, Council (NSC) for interagency staffing and plan -de includes HA/DR missions), together with proposals velopment (U.S. GAO 2007, 32). In addition to the co-

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ordination challenges that such a cumbersome and the Pentagon, the CMO office has prepared as well hierarchical process presents, the planning cultures an in-depth review section on HA/DR planning and of DoD and non-DoD officials are often quite diver- operations for DoD’s standard action officer train- gent, leading to false expectations in DoD with re- ing course, held several times each year, that will gard to the approach that other federal agencies are provide new staff with a comprehensive overview likely to take in tackling a common problem and to of the key players and their roles, at both the na- underestimations with regard to the level of resourc- tional and international levels. A similar CMO brief es they would or could assign to its resolution. DoD with a more focused DoD pitch will be integrated maintains a very robust approach to planning, sup- into USAID’s Joint Humanitarian Operations Course ported by dedicated career personnel with access to (JHOC) that OFDA presents on a regular basis to CO- substantial resources compared to what is available COM staffs. According to DoD officials, these JHOC to other executive departments, and trained to an- presentations, which began in February 2007, have ticipate and prepare for all manner of plausible sce- helped to bring COCOM personnel up to speed on narios in any given situation (U.S. GAO 2007, 31). The the HA/DR responsibilities and capabilities of non- State Department, by contrast, tends to focus more DoD agencies, while making sure that they also un- narrowly on current operations and the immediate derstand proper procedures and decision-making task at hand, an approach that, among other things, channels for requesting and approving DoD and CO- has left it with a relatively small pool of planners to COM assistance for foreign disaster relief beyond the support COCOM planning activities. As partial rem- initial emergency response that any COCOM com- edy, State Department officials have proposed that mander may authorize.15 the COCOMs “virtually include” State planners, us- So, too, recent adjustments at the Department ing electronic communication tools, and they have of State signal a more determined effort to foster suggested as well that DoD revise its policies to al- State-DoD and broader interagency coordination in low COCOM commanders to reach back directly to the stability operations arena, including HA/DR ac- State and other government offices (bypassing the tivities. In February 2007, the relatively new Office Joint Staff and theNSC ) for input as HA/DR and oth- of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabiliza- er stability operations are being organized (U.S. GAO tion and (S/C/R&S) was removed from the main State 2007, 32).14 EUCOM is apparently testing the “virtu- Department’s organizational structure and placed 14 CNO Admiral Roughead has taken a step al linkage” idea with State, but broader under the foreign-aid coordinator (who also heads in that direction by initiating a series of dis- adaptations to DoD policy to allow for USAID), a shift that brought the S/C/R&S enterprise cussions and briefings with the State Depart- ment’s various regional bureaus to bring key more direct COCOM reach-back to non- squarely within a policy planning community that personnel up to speed on the Navy’s plan for DoD assets have yet to be taken. is deeply committed to (if not always adept at) the future HA/DR missions (especially via Mer- That said, there are signs of move- civil dimensions of stability operations. With sup- cy-, Comfort-, and Peleliu-type ship visits) and ment toward longer-term solutions on port from the foreign-aid coordinator, this consoli- to encourage wider participation by interest- ed foreign service officers (interview 2008). the specific issue of interagency coor- dation should eventually help the S/C/R&S office to 15 USAID personnel may not formally pres- dination for foreign disaster relief, in- attract much-needed funding increases and more ent or explain DoD briefing material includ- cluding the new interagency working personnel, both of which could help ease a num- ed in the overall JHOC course material, but they can (and do) provide it to COCOM JHOC at- group known for now as the Foreign Di- ber of the State-DoD coordination difficulties noted tendees as a key “leave behind.” This would in- saster Relief Standing Committee. This above, such as limited staff forJIACG meetings. For clude clear organizational charts and decision group was created in mid-2007 as a way example, plans to have on hand by 2008 an active trees, detailing primary POCs and telephone for the true experts and practitioners response corps of about 30 R&S technical experts, numbers/email addresses for key OSD officials who manage DoD/COCOM contributions to di- from the U.S. government’s four main and perhaps as many as 250 sometime in the future, saster relief operations (interview 2007a). disaster relief officesOASD ( /GSA/CMO, who could be deployed to crisis spots overseas with- USAID/OFDA, and both the Political-Mil- in forty-eight hours, together with proposals to cre- itary Affairs (PM) Bureau and the Refugees, Popula- ate a much larger civilian reserve corps (possibly in tion, and Migration (RPM) Bureau at the main State the thousands) that could mobilize for deployment Department) to gather on a regular basis to com- in four to six weeks, may eventually pave the way pare notes, float proposals, coordinate policies, and to closer and more effective civilian and military identify key areas for further improvement. Within collaboration across a range of stability and recon-

Finding the Right Mix

20 The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s struction missions (Hegland 2007; IFPA 2007; Lopez 2008).16 By definition, this would include operations The Issue of Funding aimed at building up local capacity in countries that Even if impediments to interagency coordination have been destabilized or have become vulnerable are reduced significantly, the ever-present chal- to instability as a result of natural or man-made di- lenge of securing and sustaining adequate fund- sasters. The prospects for such collaboration seem ing for military support to HA/DR operations will particularly bright if still somewhat distant when likely remain. On the surface, money issues would note is made of the fact that S/C/R&S officials, in not appear to be overly problematic. USAID, ele- contrast to their State Department “cousins,” appear ments of the main State Department, 16 Initial efforts to boost civilian R&S ca- to have adopted a robust approach to operation- and DoD all control a variety of fund- pabilities along these lines were out- lined by Ambassador John E. Herbst, the al planning similar to DoD’s (Joint Force Quarter- ing lines that are either earmarked for State Department’s coordinator for recon- ly 2006, 82-83). or could be used to underwrite foreign struction and stabilization, at a June 13, In the end, then, while there are clearly specific disaster relief and humanitarian assis- 2007, Institute for Foreign Policy Analy- improvements to be made in current HA/DR plan- tance. In recent years, total U.S. govern- sis (IFPA) workshop in Washington, D.C.. 17 In this context, unity of effort could ning and implementation procedures, solving inter- ment spending in support of such oper- be defined as the existence a common un- agency challenges at the broader stability operations ations has averaged about $2.3 billion derstanding among the various partici- level may be the real key to solving these same chal- per year, and that figure could easily in- pants in a disaster relief operation of the lenges at the more specific level of individualHA/DR crease by $1 billion or so if a sudden cri- overall purpose and concept of operations, based on closely coordinated plans and pol- operations. Both sets of activities, HA/DR missions sis of major proportions were to occur icies and a solid foundation of mutual trust and stability operations overall, confront a common (Straw 2006).19 However, only a relative- and confidence (U.S. GAO 2007, 24-25). underlying reality, namely that the tasks they must ly small percentage of that money – un- 18 The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 re- manage can not be accomplished by the military til FY 2008 no more than $60 million to worked the command structure of the Unit- ed States military, placing new emphasis on alone, but rather require a multifaceted interagen- $63 million per year – is set aside via OH- joint, cross-service planning and operations cy, and often multinational, team. That team, more- DACA funding to help finance DoD and (as opposed to service-specific activities that over, must be tailored to fit the changing needs of COCOM activities in the HA/DR realm, were often uncoordinated). Given the new em- the overall operation (for example, moving from and a smaller percentage still (recent- phasis now placed on civil-military coordi- nation across various departments in support initial crisis response to stabilization, recovery, and ly about $17 million per year) for specif- of stability operations and similar activities, reconstruction), drawing from a mix of civil and mil- ic foreign disaster relief and emergency some now call for the passage of legislation itary, national and international, and governmen- response initiatives (U.S. Department that would encourage and facilitate interagen- cy collaboration in the same way that Gold- tal and nongovernmental assets, including private of Defense/Defense Security Coopera- water-Nichols paved the way to joint force sector sources. This is discussed further in chap- tion Agency 2007). Much of the OHDA- collaboration across the military services. ter 4 (especially in the sections dealing with HA/DR CA funding, moreover, is programmed 19 In May 2005, the U.S. Congress approved operational concepts and civil-military coordina- for specific activities planned well in emergency supplemental appropriations for FY 2005 in the amount of $907.34 million, $656 tion, or CMCoord, as it is now called), but the main advance, allowing limited flexibility million of which went to the various tsunami point here is that policy reforms and organization- to respond to unanticipated events or relief and recovery projects with most of the al shifts now in place or proposed for the State/DoD to direct funding toward new, possibly remaining funds (over $250 million) going to disaster relief decision-making process will never be more promising, opportunities for HA/ DoD, both for OHDACA and O&M expenditures. as effective as planned or expected unless or until DR collaboration with foreign partners the diverse interagency and institutional contribu- as they arise. tors that increasingly are drawn into foreign disas- That said, despite their limitations, OHDACA ap- ter relief operations, particularly large-scale ones propriations provide the lifeblood for a family of DoD such as the 2005 Pakistan earthquake response, real- HA/DR programs authorized under Title 10 of the ly learn to collaborate and achieve a unity of effort.17 U.S. Code (which deals with the structure and opera- And this, most American disaster relief specialists tions of America’s armed forces), and it is through a never tire of saying, could require nothing less than strengthening of this OHDACA vehicle that increased the equivalent of a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the funding for these baseline programs could most eas- interagency and its likely partners outside the U.S. ily be secured. A brief overview of OHDACA-funded government.18 programs and a proposed expansion, therefore, is

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The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process 21 t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s

perhaps a necessary prelude to any further money- disaster assistance from the United States (includ- related discussion. ing from DoD and the COCOMs) may be reduced. For To begin with, OHDACA funding has focused for FY 2008 alone, the four major foreign area COCOMs a number of years on three core programs: humani- (CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM) had tarian assistance (HA), foreign disaster relief/emer- identified some 880 HA projects the total cost of gency response (FDR/ER), and humanitarian mine which was estimated at over $83 million, twice the action (HMA). Funds for all three programs are man- amount normally approved by Congress. So even be- aged for DoD by DSCA in consultation with State and fore any potential reassignments of money might be USAID. As stated on the DSCA website, the actual considered, programmatic trade-offs must be made programs are planned and executed by the COCOMs that are likely to complicate disaster relief planning for two primary purposes: 1) to shape the interna- over the long haul. tional security environment in a manner that dis- As for FDR/ER initiatives, the operational focus suades would-be aggressors and reassures allies and is on providing timely and effective disaster relief to friends via low-level cooperation (when other pro- nations in a COCOM’s AOR, thereby reducing the pos- grams are not available to do so), and 2) to respond sibility of increased instability after a disaster occurs rapidly and effectively when called upon to assist (including efforts by local terrorists or insurgents to victims of natural or man-made disasters (U.S. De- exploit post-disaster chaos and fear to their advan- partment of Defense 2008). Generally, some $40 mil- tage). Not surprisingly, typical activities funded un- lion of the total budget is reserved for HA, with the der this category of assistance include air or sealift bulk of the rest (as referenced above) now going to to transport emergency supplies to the disaster area, FDR/ER after being split fifty-fifty with HMA for a forward logistical support to facilitate distribution period of time. In an emergency, such as a sudden of supplies, search and rescue missions, and medical earthquake or tsunami, funds can certainly be re- evacuation. Similar to the HA category, FDR/ER ex- assigned by the COCOMs from one program to an- penditures could also include programs to boost the other, but that normally means that money is made disaster response capabilities of local governments available for one worthy initiative at the expense of and relief-minded NGOs, thereby decreasing future another. To the extent that HA funding is shifted to requirements for outside help. In theory, the avail- the FDR/ER category, it could also mean that longer- ability of funding from the FDR/ER account means term capacity-building and goodwill-development that the COCOM commander need not draw on his efforts will be sacrificed to immediate short-term own O&M funds and thus decrease overall command needs, without any assurance that those funds and readiness to provide such emergency assistance. In the programs they support will ever be reimbursed reality, however, the level of funds normally avail- or restored. able, which must be shared among all COCOM AORs, A quick rundown on specific activities in each is quite limited (again, only about $17 million in re- program, especially in the HA and FDA/ER catego- cent years), sufficient only for small-scale contin- ries, is sufficient to illustrate how intertwined and gencies or to provide seed money for much larger reinforcing they often are, and how disruptive taking operations, in which case funding for non-emergen- from one to pay for another can be. HA projects, for cy capacity-building projects would be severely lim- example, are aimed at averting humanitarian crises, ited, if not consumed altogether, by the crisis at hand. promoting regional stability, and facilitating recov- The end result, of course, is that as requests forD oD ery from conflict by donating excess non-lethalD oD disaster relief have increased, COCOM efforts to tap property and providing on-the-ground civil support whatever FDR/ER monies are made available each by U.S. military personnel. Typical projects include year have also risen, often to an aggregate level well building schools, clinics, and roads, as well as pro- beyond what has been appropriated. This, in turn, viding medical, technical, engineering, and logisti- has led to some very difficult – and, from individu- cal assistance. Increasingly, however, such aid has al COCOM perspectives, rather arbitrary – decisions also included targeted investment in disaster pre- about which military responses do and do not qual- paredness and mitigation programs in vulnerable ify for OHDACA funding, and to the short-changing countries, so that future demands for emergency of a number of longer-term investments in local ca-

Finding the Right Mix

22 The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s pabilities that could eventually ease the overall CO- tember 30, 2010). The bill stipulated, however, that COM burden by building in-country response and the $40 million was to be used “solely for foreign recovery capacities. disaster relief and response activities,” so the op- The third majorOHDACA program is the human- tion of shifting any unused portion to support un- itarian mine action initiative, aimed at educating funded HA projects may be foreclosed (U.S. House of civilian populations in participating countries to Representatives 2007). Moreover, while the boost in identify and report mines and other unexplod- funding targeted specifically for foreign disaster re- ed ordnance and at training a local demining cad- lief is certainly welcome and should alleviate some re. HMA remains a fairly small effort in monetary of the cost constraints that have emerged in recent terms at about $5 million per year, and one that years as DoD responses have become more frequent, is very specifically tied to a particular set of activi- funding shortfalls still could arise – and possibly be ties. Hence, it can not be readily tapped for supple- quite acute – in FY 2010, for example, if there are one mental funds to finance additional HA or FDR/ER or two fairly large-scale events to respond to in FY requirements as they emerge. In an effort to alleviate 2008 and FY 2009, or even a greater than expected annual funding shortfalls in either category, there- number of medium-scale events, in addition to the fore, DoD budgeteers requested in 2007 the creation dozen or more small-scale disasters to which the of an entirely new OHDACA funding category for FY military almost certainly will be asked to respond 2008-09 entitled the Building Partnership Capacity to each year. So, too, as baseline funding for OHDA- Initiative, to be funded at an initial level of $40 mil- CA has hovered in the $60 million range per year, HA lion. In the first instance, these new monies, it was initiatives, which have generally cost at least $40 proposed, could be used to buy necessary disaster million per year (with FDR/ER and HMA taking the relief supplies (such as water, tents, blankets, plas- rest), could be underfunded by as much as $20 mil- tic sheeting.) and to cover the costs of transport- lion over the FY 2008-09 timeframe, unless addition- ing emergency relief personnel and supplies to the al monies are appropriated for FY 2009. The key may scene of any disaster. However, since DoD proposed rest in the degree to which selected HA projects can that these funds should also be considered “two- be interpreted as falling within the definition of “for- year money,” if the funding for FY 2008 was not used eign disaster relief and response activities,” but this for foreign disaster efforts, it could then be used, so possibility remains highly uncertain, given that the the argument went, to help finance unfunded HA three-year $40 million funding line is entirely new projects, for which, as noted above, there is nev- and that there is no precedent as yet with regard to er enough money. It is perhaps no coincidence, in how it may actually be spent. this context, that the additional $40 million would One option, therefore, to which the COCOMs and be just enough (when combined with the $40 mil- their service components increasingly may turn to lion regularly appropriated) to underwrite all 880 help fund HA and FDR/ER activities (but especial- HA projects identified by the foreign area COCOMs ly the HA component) is to draw upon their own in 2007 (U.S. Department of Defense 2007). O&M budgets, as the U.S. Navy already does to un- As it happened, the 2008 defense appropriations derwrite the costs of its hospital ship deployments bill signed by the president on November 13, 2007, in- and newly-instituted “grey hull” medical missions. cluded the $40 million increase in OHDACA funds, but In that event, however, concerns with regard to the the timing associated with their expenditure and the potential negative impact on other priority opera- potential restrictions placed on monies earmarked tions would most likely increase. Both in the military for disaster relief activities may afford less flexibil- and in Congress, for example, there are those who ity than was initially hoped. While the total OHDA- will argue that the benefits of divertingO&M funds CA budget was increased to $103.3 million (from a to cover HA/DR-related missions are not worth the final budget of about $63 million forFY 2007), $63.3 costs in terms of reduced command readiness, es- million was authorized as “two-year money” (avail- pecially as such missions can be quite expensive. In- able through September 30, 2009) and $40 million deed, while they may be unique in scope and scale, (presumably the new “partnership” funds) was au- future Mercy, Comfort, and grey-hull medical mis- thorized as “three-year money” (good through Sep- sions are projected to cost at least $20 million each,

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Major DoD Funding Lines for HA/DR Operations far as project focus is concerned. Most Managed for DoD by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) in coopera- HCA events have a medical and/or en- tion with Department of State and USAID. gineering focus – commonly referred to Overseas Human- The primary Title 10 funding vehicle for COCOM HA/DR activities, including foreign itarian, Disas- disaster relief and emergency response (FDR/ER), humanitarian assistance (HA), and as a medical civic action program (MED- ter, and Civic Aid humanitarian mine action (HCA) CAP) or an engineering civic action pro- (OHDACA) FY 08 funding set at $103.3 million, $63.3 million of which is two-year money (spend- able through 30 Sept 09) and $40 million of which is three-year money (spendable gram (ENCAP) – such as minor surgery through 30 Sept 10). The $40 million is to be used solely to support FDR. and dental care, vaccination of children Humanitarian Civic Covers DoD relief and development activities that are implemented as part of a U.S. and animals, well digging, and the con- Assistance (or Civic military exercise or training event overseas (e.g., MEDRETEs, MEDCAPs, ENCAPs, etc.) Action) Under Sec- Also managed by DSCA, but charged against O&M budgets of military services struction of roads, schools, and clin- tion 401 of Title 10 Annual funding rose from $7 million in FY 2000 to $11 million in FY 2008. ics, but measures to enhance disaster Section 1206 Fund- Allows DoD and the COCOMs, with State Department approval, to “train and equip” preparedness (such as training first re- ing Under the Na- foreign militaries to perform counterterrorism and stability operations, which could tional Defense include HA/DR operations sponders and building or repairing ware- Authorization Act FY 09 budget sets asides up to $350 million for this purpose and extends 1206 au- houses) may also qualify for HCA funding. thority for three years (through 30 Sept 11) of 2006 That said, annual funding levels forHCA Commander’s Allows U.S. military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to spend up to $500 mil- Emergency Re- lion in O&M funds per year on special humanitarian assistance/civic aid projects remain rather limited (totalling about sponse Program Efforts to increase spending level to $1 billion and to use the money in other coun- $11 million for all COCOMs in FY 2007), tries have failed so far (CERP) and, since it must be used in the con- Provides COCOM commanders with funds for civic assistance and humanitarian re- lief/reconstruction, particularly in foreign countries where U.S. military forces are text of planned military training, exer- Combatant Com- engaged in contingency operations cises, or operations, it could not easily manders Initiative Annual funding normally $25 million, but FY 09 request was for $100 million. Less Fund (CCIF) than $1 million used for HCA-type projects between FY 05 and FY 07, but spending is be drawn upon to help support emer- expected to increase in FY 09 gency measures in response to a sudden Developing Countries Combined Exercise Program (DCCEP) covers expenses incurred disaster or to help fund HA activities by by a developing country in a bilateral or multilateral exercise Personnel Expenses (PE) Program covers travel and other personal expenses of for- service units when they are out of rota- eign personnel attending a training seminar or conference tion from their primary mission deploy- Smaller O&M Exercise Related Construction (ERC) Program permits U.S. forces to conduct low- ments (for example, the Peleliu medical Funding Lines cost infrastructure improvements in host country to support joint military exercises Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) Program allows U.S. Special Operations mission in 2007 and the Boxer mission in Forces to conduct HA as an adjunct to training exercises with foreign military forces 2008). Moreover, precisely because they in support of stability and/or COIN operations are considered to be standard O&M ex- Presidential Draw- Authorizes the U.S. president to redirect up to $100 million from programmed DoD down Authority funding to a sudden disaster response that requires immediate military support penses, HCA costs are not reimbursable Under Foreign As- Primary funding mechanism for 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and 2005 Pakistan (as are many humanitarian-related ex- sistance Act earthquake responses (Title 22) Reimbursed by Congress via special supplemental appropriations penses incurred by the military during a disaster relief operation). In a number equivalent to about one-third of previous OHDA- of ambiguous circumstances (for exam- CA annual budgets for just one HA event.20 For this ple, a COCOM or service component decision to offer 20 In view of these costs, the fact that the reason, perhaps the least controversial emergency aid when a disaster unexpectedly strikes U.S. Navy leadership is now aiming to con- move by the COCOMs and their com- during a military exercise in or near the disaster area), duct at least four such medical missions each year confirms the impossibility of cov- ponents would be to utilize more cre- this has led to unhelpful wrangles between forward- ering such an expansion in service-tied HA atively and purposefully annual funds based commanders and Pentagon-based lawyers as via the classic OHDACA route. Further details authorized for humanitarian civic as- to what was and was not legally permissible, ren- on this initiative can be found in chapter 3. sistance (HCA), which, like HA, FDR/ER dering timely assistance to disaster victims all the and HMA, is managed by DSCA, but charged to ser- more complicated and reducing any incentive to of- vice O&M accounts (rather than to OHDACA monies) fer such aid in the future. because HCA must be directly tied – or legally inter- That said, since 9/11,HCA activities, together with preted as being tied – to an overseas training or ex- HA, HMA, and FDR/ER efforts, have increasingly been ercise opportunity for U.S. military forces (U.S. Code viewed as key military tools in the global war on 2006). In other words, HCA projects can not be un- terror, helping to ease local conditions (including dertaken solely for humanitarian purposes. disaster-related damage) in overseas communities Within the confines of this particular restric- that may be vulnerable to radicalization and politi- tion, however, there is a fair amount of leeway inso- cal instability. Accordingly, DoD and the regional CO-

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24 The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s

COMs have begun to explore alternative sources of sonnel Expenses (PE) program allows DoD to pay O&M monies to help fund HA/DR initiatives, includ- the travel, subsistence, and personal expenses of de- ing both emergency assistance and capacity-build- fense personnel from developing countries in con- ing efforts. One possibility that remains controver- nection with their attendance at a bi- sial is to leverage more fully funding provided under lateral or regional conference, seminar, 21 In early 2007, DoD proposed a new initia- section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense Authoriza- or similar meeting. Perhaps even more tive, commonly known as the Building Glob- al Partnerships Act, under which it could tion Act (NDAA), which currently authorizes DoD and useful, the Exercise Related Construc- provide up to $750 million per year to “train the COCOMs (with State Department concurrence) tion (ERC) program permits U.S. forces and equip”-type missions anywhere in the to spend up to $350 million per year to train and to carry out low-cost infrastructure im- world, and do so free of the funding restric- equip foreign militaries to undertake counterterror- provements in host countries to support tions (such as adherence to certain human rights regulations) that often accompany mon- ism and stability operations, the latter of which (as military exercises overseas, including ies provided under the Foreign Assistance Act discussed earlier) could be interpreted as including a site adaptation, training facilities, se- (FAA). Congress refused to approve this re- variety of HA/DR-oriented missions (Pincus 2007a).21 curity fencing, and the storing of sup- quest, and legislation that supports the cur- rent 1206 program was simply extended in Another option might be to utilize funds made avail- plies that could also be used in disaster 2008 through September 30, 2011 and capped able under the Commander’s Emergency Response relief-oriented operations. In addition, for FY 2009 at $350 million. Not surprising- Program (CERP), which now authorizes U.S. military the Joint Combined Exchange Train- ly, in his April 2008 testimony to the House Armed Service Committee, Secretary of De- commanders operating in Iraq and Afghanistan to ing (JCET) program allows U.S. Special fense has called on Congress to spend up to $500 million a year of O&M monies, pro- Operations Forces to conduct limited make this program permanent and to increase vided via supplemental funding, on local humanitar- civil support-type efforts as an adjunct 1206 funding to the $750 million level request- ian assistance and construction projects such as re- to training exercises with foreign mili- ed in 2007 (Pincus 2007b; Valero 2008, 1). 22 Congress did approve an additional $500 building schools and roads, setting up clinics, digging tary forces in support of stability and/ million in CERP funds to be used anywhere in wells, and the like. More to the point, the Pentagon or COIN operations. Together, all four the world as part of the FY 2007 Iraq supple- hoped to increase CERP funding in FY 2008 to $1 bil- programs offer useful opportunities to mental appropriations bill, but the bill was lion and to receive authorization to spend that mon- boost foreign partner country HA/DR vetoed by President Bush and sent back to Con- gress (Pincus 2007b). Appropriations legis- ey in countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan, but capabilities via exercises and training lation proposed in the Senate in March 2008 neither this proposal nor a more limited version – ei- with U.S. forces and to enhance disaster for fiscal year 2009 includes provisions to ther of which might well have eliminated overnight preparedness by means of warehouse make the CERP program permanent and glob- al in coverage, but no particular funding line a host of funding problems related to HA/DR pro- construction and the pre-positioning of was proposed (U.S. Senate 2008). The fate of grams – was able to secure congressional approv- essential supplies.23 At current levels of the CERP program, like that of the 1206 pro- al (Pincus 2007b).22 One alternative may be to draw funding, however, they can provide no gram, will be determined largely by the broad- er debate over the degree to which DoD should upon some of the money made available to COCOM more than a partial and largely acciden- assume foreign aid and humanitarian assis- commanders as part of the Combatant Commanders tal solution to what are expected to be tance responsibilities that were once primari- Initiative Fund (CCIF), money that Congress agreed increasing demands in the years ahead ly the responsibility of the State Department. in 2006 could be directed in part to HCA projects, es- for HA/DR-related funding. 23 Such improvements, it needs to be pecially in foreign countries where U.S. forces are en- In the event of a truly major disaster, stressed, can be extremely cost-effective. Ac- cording to one informed observer, every dol- gaged in a contingency operation of one kind or an- of course, the president has the power, lar invested in preparedness could achieve other. Through FY 2008, however, CCIF support for under sub-section 506(a) (1) of the For- an eight-dollar reduction in disaster re- such projects was quite limited (Congressional Re- eign Assistance Act, to draw down (i.e., lief costs. See remarks by U.S. Ambassador search Service 2008, 39-40). redirect) up to $100 million in any fis- to Croatia Ralph Frank at the Southeast Eu- rope Disaster Preparedness Conference in Du- Beyond HCA, section 1206, CERP, and CCIF consid- cal year from previously programmed brovnik on March 21, 2006 (Ferrare 2006). erations, there are a few additional, but rather small, DoD funding for unspecified emergen- pockets of O&M funds that COCOMs may tap to pro- cies that require immediate military assistance. This vide a degree of financial relief on the HA/DR front. is what happened in response to the 2004 Indian The Developing Countries Combined Exercise Pro- Ocean tsunami and the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, gram (DCCEP), for example, allows DoD, after con- and most of the funds so expended have been re- sultation with State, to use O&M funds to pay the imbursed to DoD (or soon will be) by Congress via incremental expenses that are incurred by a devel- special supplemental appropriations. Presidential oping country while participating in a bilateral or draw-downs, however, are exceptional measures, of- multilateral exercise with U.S. forces, while the Per- fering no possibility of relief from the everyday limits

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that now exist and will only grow on HA/DR-relat- a larger than desirable element of “robbing Peter to ed funding for smaller-scale contingencies. What pay Paul,” with the hope that the new guidelines now is really needed is a sustained increase in OHDA- being codified by the GSA/CMO office in OUSD(P) CA funding along the lines originally proposed for will hold to a minimum any approval of DoD and/ FY 2008-09 (an annual baseline of some $60 mil- or COCOM expenditures that are not truly required lion, plus another $40 million in two-year funds that or appropriate. could be flexibly billed), though even a more mod- est increase could have a significant beneficial effect on HA and FDR/ER activities, most if not all of which Conclusion would also provide, in the words of one former se- Looking ahead, then, the U.S. foreign disaster re- nior PACOM commander, “vital axle grease” to help sponse process – and, most particularly, that portion advance DoD and COCOM theater security cooper- dealing with the provision of DoD/military support – ation (TSC) objectives (Gregson 2004). A doubling should run far more smoothly and predictably once of traditional OHDACA funding lines to some $120 the reforms proposed and/or already adopted with million per year, which remains a relatively mod- regard to the State-DoD Executive Secretariat dy- est amount of money in the context of the defense namic really take hold, and the new procedures for budget as a whole, would likely eliminate any mon- authorizing military aid for small- and medium- ey shortages for some time to come, providing am- scale disasters become standard operating practice. ple flexibility to cover both sudden emergencies and The higher priority both State andD oD now place on out-of-cycle opportunities to work with allies and stability operations and humanitarian assistance as partner countries in the HA/DR realm. key components of the war on terror and the “diplo- If accompanied by relatively small-scale increas- macy of deeds” also suggests that current problems es (for example, less than $10 million per command) with respect to interagency coordination – prob- in COCOM O&M funds that could be used for TSC lems that bedevil disaster relief missions as much projects (to include HA/DR initiatives), the positive as any other SSTR-type operation – will eventually impact of OHDACA increases would simply be mag- get the attention they deserve. After that, the key nified and rendered longer-lasting. Dedicated steps challenge for HA/DR planners and practitioners at in this direction, however, may be difficult to set in DoD and the COCOMs will be to make sure that these motion before a consensus is reached at the high- policy and operational adjustments are matched by er policy level between Congress and the adminis- the necessary increases in funding. Only then will tration on the rising role of DoD and the military it be safe to assume that the capabilities and skills services in foreign aid activities, including with re- needed to implement a major U.S. disaster relief ef- gard to the scale and global applicability of section fort overseas will be available when and where they 1206 and CERP appropriations. Until then, even with are required and in sufficient quantity. the $40 million in three-year money earmarked for disaster-related operations in the FY 2008 defense appropriations bill, DoD approval for FDR/ER oper- ations and related HA initiatives will always include

References Congressional Research Service. 2008. The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress. August 25. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34639.pdf Bryce S. Dubee. 2007. Okinawa Marines to assess deadly cyclone damage. Stars and Stripes, November 21. http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=57895&archive=true. Joe Ferrare. 2006. Southeastern European experts work together in disaster preparedness. American Forces Press Service. March 22. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=15096.

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26 The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s Lt. General W.C. “Chip” Gregson, USMC (Ret.), then Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific. 2004. Email exchange with Dr. Charles M. Perry, IFPA, October 4. Corine Hegland. 2007. Pentagon, State struggle to define nation-building roles. National Journal, April 30. http://www.govexec.com/story_page_pf.cfm?articleid=36760&printerfriendly vers=1. IFPA. 2007. Rethinking the war on terror: Developing a strategy to coun- ter radical Islamist ideologies. June 13, Washington, D.C. interview. 2007a. With foreign affairs specialist, OASD/GSA/CMO-Humanitarian Affairs. July 12. ———. 2007b. With foreign affairs specialist, OASD/GSA/CMO-Humanitarian Affairs. November 30. ———. 2008. With HA/DR senior planners, Office of Chief of Naval Operations. January 30. Joint Force Quarterly. 2006. An interview with Carlos Pascual, vice president and direc- tor of foreign policy studies of the Brookings Institution. No. 42 (3rd quarter): 80-85. Joint Staff. 2006. Joint publication 3-0. Joint Operations. Washington, D.C. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf. Todd C. Lopez. 2008. Army, State Department partner in stability operations. Army News Service. March 3. http://www.army.mil/-news/2008/03/07/7029. Office of the Secretary of DefenseOSD ( ). 2008. Operation and maintenance overview fiscal year (FY) 2009 budget estimates. February. http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/fy2009_overview.pdf. Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster AssistanceOFDA ( ). 2005. Annual report for fiscal year 2005. http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_as- sistance/publications/annual_reports/pdf/AR2005.pdf. ———. 2006. Annual report for fiscal year 2006. http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_as- sistance/publications/annual_reports/pdf/AR2006.pdf. Walter Pincus. 2007a. Taking Defense’s hand out of State’s pocket. Washington Post, July 9. ———. 2007b. Pentagon hopes to expand aid program. Washington Post, May 13. James Schoff. 2005.Tools for trilateralism: Improving U.S.-Japan-Korea coopera- tion to manage complex contingencies. Herndon, : Potomac Books. Liz Straw. 2006. The international community’s funding of the tsunami emergency: U.S. government funding. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition. Washington, D.C. DARA. June. http://www.daraint.org. UNOCHA. 2007. Guidelines on the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief –“Oslo Guidelines.” Revision 1.1. November. http://ochaonline.un.org/AboutOCHA/Organigramme/EmergencyServices- BranchESB/CivilMilitaryCoordinationSection/PolicyGuidanceandPublica- tions/tabid/1403/Default.aspx/Oslo_Guidlines_Nov06_Rev1.1[1].pdf. U.S. Code. 2006. Title 10 (Armed Forces), section 401. Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in con- junction with military operations. http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/uscmain.html and http://www.ciponline.org/facts/hca.htm. U.S. Department of Defense. 2007. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid (OHDACA), Defense fiscal year FY( ) 2008/FY 2009 budget estimates. February. http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/budget_justi- fication/pdfs/operation/O_M_VOL_1_PARTS/30_OHDACA.pdf. ———. 2008. DSCA Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine ActionHDM ( ). http://www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/HA/HA.htm.

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The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process 27 t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development. 2007. Strategic plan fiscal years 2007-2012. Washington, D.C. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86291.pdf. U.S. Government Accountability OfficeGAO ( ). 2007. Military operations: Actions needed to im- prove DoD’s stability operations approach and enhance interagency planning. Report to rank- ing member, House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives. GAO-07-549. May. U.S. House of Representatives. 2007. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008. HR 3222. 110th Cong. 1st sess. November 13. http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-3222. U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, Force Public Affairs Office. 2007. COMMARFORPAC leads relief ef- forts. U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. Release 07-001. November 22. U.S. Senate. 2008. A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for military activities of the De- partment of Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 2009, and for other purposes. S.2787. 110th Cong. 2nd sess. March 31. http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s110-2787. Connie Veillette. 2007. Restructuring U.S. foreign aid: The role of the director of foreign assistance in trans- formational development. A CRS Report to Congress. Congressional Research Service. January 23. http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/rl33491.pdf. Rafael Enrique Valero. 2008. House committee presses State and Defense officials on lack of coordination on nation building. Government Executive.Com. April 17. http://www.govexec.com/story_page_pf.cfm?articleid=39801&printerfriendlyvers=1.

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28 The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process chapter 3 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief & Humanitarian Assistance What’s Available and What Might Be Needed

In theory, identifying and assembling military skills some extent, this will be true as well with respect and capabilities that are best suited for an approved to the programmed humanitarian missions under- (or soon to be approved) foreign disaster relief op- taken by the regional COCOMs that are not crisis- eration should not be overly complicated. As soon driven (such as the multi-port medical ship visits as the secretary or deputy secretary of defense has touched on in chapter 2), since the aid priorities signed off on the mission, the full weight of the mil- of one country may obviously differ sharply from itary chain of command comes into play, and or- those in another region and even from those of its ders to deploy with all deliberate speed are rapidly neighbors. That said, based on lessons learned from drafted and transmitted. In many cases, as noted recent disaster responses and humanitarian assis- in chapter 2, DoD and the regional COCOM likely to tance programs, it is entirely possible to develop a 1 Of course, in a bilateral or lead the mission will already have taken significant good understanding of the general types of military multinational disaster relief operation, additional skills, preparatory steps well before a formal decision to capabilities and skills that have proven to be most capabilities, and supplies can respond has been taken, in order to speed deploy- useful to HA/DR operations, together with an appre- and will be provided by allied ment to the disaster location and/or to forward stag- ciation of the various configurations and formats in or partner nations, regional ing areas from which assistance will be distributed. which such assets appear to be most effective in a organizations (such as NATO and the EU), and international Yet, even if these first steps to organize military sup- range of regional settings. A quick review of DoD and organizations (including the port for disaster relief go like clockwork, this would service staff efforts to accommodate the capability UN and its constituent agen- not necessarily guarantee that the right mix of per- needs of stability operations as they plan for the fu- cies). The degree to which these various groups become sonnel, platforms, equipment, and supplies would ture should provide some insight as well into wheth- involved, and the nature and be readily available at the levels really needed. To a er or not HA/DR-relevant capabilities are likely to be scale of their contributions, greater or lesser degree, there will almost always be fielded and deployed as needed, given that HA/DR will vary from disaster to di- saster, with some not con- capability gaps of one kind or another that must be operations are a subset of stability operations. Both tributing at all or in only a filled or worked around over the course of an opera- assessments – that is, the lessons-learned analysis limited way. How the groups tion, not the least because relief requirements quite and the DoD/service planning review – should also are organized to respond to often change as the situation evolves. What is need- shed light on the degree to which additional capa- foreign disaster, and what ca- pabilities they can bring to ed during the first phase of a disaster response by bilities ought to be sought from other quarters, in- bear, are discussed in detail the military could be quite different from what is cluding from the private sector (which is emerging in chapter 5, “Key Partner- needed in the middle or closing phases. The key is to as a more prominent contributor to foreign disaster ships and Platforms for In- 1 ternational Collaboration.” have as clear a sense as possible in advance of what relief and humanitarian assistance efforts). The present discussion focus- those changing requirements might entail and how The goals of this chapter are threefold. First, it es on U.S. military capabili- they might ideally be met. seeks to clarify – and to render more transparent to ties and, to a lesser extent, on corporate capabilities found Of course, since no two foreign disasters will ever those who are not students of military affairs – the principally in the Ameri- be exactly alike, there is a limit to what the military current U.S. force planning and force management can business community. can know and prepare for before a crisis erupts. To process as it relates to the organization of HA/DR

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operations. The key question to be explored in this responders. Classic examples would be the use of PA- context is whether or not current practice is likely COM’s 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) based to provide HA/DR-relevant assets when, where, and in Okinawa to establish the initial JTF in Utapao, in the formats and quantities in which they may be Thailand (which quickly transformed into a multi- needed, or, alternatively, if some form of standing national combined support force, or CSF), after the inventory that keeps more careful track of such as- 2004 tsunami struck, and reliance on CENTCOM’s sets ought to be developed as well to facilitate their Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) 1, then operating ready availability. The second objective of the chap- in waters close to the Arabian Gulf, to organize the ter is to discuss in some detail those skills and capa- disaster assistance center (DAC) in Pakistan in the bilities that have been or are likely to be especially wake of the 2005 earthquake. valuable to HA/DR operations, referencing when ap- When regional COCOMs that maintain substan- propriate various policy and/or operational adjust- tial forward-based forces (PACOM, EUCOM, and, for ments that could be taken to enhance their utility. the moment, CENTCOM) do not have sufficient or Third, and finally, the chapter will examine the grow- appropriate capabilities on hand to respond, they ing contributions that the private sector (especially may reach back – as COCOMs with limited assigned the American business community) is making to di- forces (such as SOUTHCOM) do on a regular basis saster responses overseas, highlighting areas of ex- – to various functional COCOMs and their compo- pertise where companies can most usefully reinforce nent commands based in the continental United – and at times perhaps stand in place of – military States for additional support via a special request forces engaged in HA/DR missions. Together, these for forces (RFF) or a request for forces and/or ca- three lines of investigation should yield a reasonably pabilities (RFF/C). For foreign disaster relief, the complete picture of what capabilities and skills are primary functional COCOMs involved would be 2 As DoD’s joint force pro- needed most and likely to be found in the military, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM),2 which includes vider (JFP), JFCOM assigns to and what alternative sources there may be outside the Army’s Forces Command (FORSCOM), the Na- the COCOMs nearly all con- ventional forces based in the of the military, should military assets prove to be vy’s Fleet Forces Command (FLTFORCOM), the Air continental United States. inadequate or unavailable. Force’s Air Combat Command (ACC), and the Ma- It controls over 80 percent rine Corps’ Forces Command (MARFORCOM), as well of America’s CONUS-based as TRANSCOM, which includes the Navy’s Military combat-ready convention- al forces, and it also has the Accessing U.S. Military Capabilities Sealift Command (MSC) for sealift assets and the responsibility for manag- and Skills Air Force’s Air Mobility Command (AMC) for airlift ing the assignment of in- assets. Working in conjunction with the Joint Staff, dividual augmentees to As described in chapter 2, once DoD policy officials JFCOM, TRANSCOM, and their various component deployed units (USJFCOM). propose a military response to a foreign disaster 3 Before the GFM pro- commands locate and reassign the needed CONUS- and it is approved by the secretary or deputy secre- cess was introduced in 2004, based forces to the regional COCOM, along with asso- each regional COCOM owned tary of defense, the task of locating, preparing, and ciated equipment. Since 2004, all RFF/Cs have been his assigned forces and de- deploying specific military platforms, supplies, and coordinated through what’s called the global force ployed them according to a personnel falls primarily on the Joint Staff and, more COCOM-specific plan, with lit- management process (GFM), which allows JFCOM, specifically, on the regionalCOCOM in whose AOR the tle (if any) attention to how its service components, and the other functional CO- that may impact force lev- disaster has occurred. Normally, the COCOM com- COMs to supply the regional COCOMs with the force els and requirements for oth- mander will direct service units based near or op- er COCOMs. In contrast, the levels and mixes they require, based on an integrat- erating closest to the scene of the disaster to move GFM approach allows JFCOM, ed assessment of the availability of U.S. convention- in its JFP role, to examine as expeditiously as possible to the area in question al forces worldwide and their readiness over time.3 RFF/Cs and possible solu- to provide whatever assistance is needed. In re- tions via a global supply per- Depending on the location, scale, and nature of sponse to major disasters (such as the 2004 Indian spective and in accordance the disaster, as well as on the readiness of available with a long-term cross-CO- Ocean tsunami and the 2005 Pakistan earthquake), units, CONUS-based reinforcements could include COM plan. See USJFCOM 2007a. the commander will also order a forward-deployed active, reserve, National Guard, and even U.S. Coast service component to stand up a JTF and an asso- Guard platforms, personnel, and supplies. Such as- ciated headquarters element within the disaster sets, moreover, could be deployed independently for zone to manage the overall military operation and a specific, time-limited task or as part of a broad- to facilitate its coordination with civilian disaster

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30 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s er, longer-term JTF. For its part, JF- GFM / JFP Allocation Process with JFCOM as Primary JFP COM may also provide a JTF-scale SECDEF operation with certain key joint feedback enabling capabilities that it re- Forward recommendation tains under its command, such as via the orders "book" a standing joint force headquar- process to SecDef for ters-core element (SJFHQ-CE) or a CJCS / JCS approval joint public affairs support element Request Clarify / define requirements Staff with agencies and OSD (JPASE).4 In setting up the DAC af- from COCOM Crosswalk RFF/C against existing Coordinate w/ affected services/COCOMs priorities and GFMB guidance to articulate / attempt adjudication of ter the Pakistan earthquake, for ex- non-concurrences (through GFMB) CJCS Forward RFF/C ample, an SJFHQ-CE proved to be for sourcing extremely helpful in transform- ing a service-based headquarters CJCS sends appropriate JFCOM provides recommended team drawn from CENTCOM’s ESG implementer to SOCOM, sourcing solution to CJCS / JCS STRATCOM, TRANSCOM - Info copies all COCOMs and Services 1 into an effectiveHA/DR -oriented or other federal agency - From all conventional forces JTF headquarters able to provide (if their forces are (COCOM “assigned” and command and control for joint and required) Service “unassigned” forces) Sourcing recommendation includes multinational operations. JPASE - Risk to sourcing other requirements units, on the other hand, provide - Force rotation sustainability assessment - Other issues identified by trained and equipped teams with CJCS sends remaining COCOM / service providing the force(s) substantial joint public affairs ex- RFF/C requirements to pertise at the operational level, a JFCOM. Forwarded RFF/C includes DRAFT DEPORD skill of immense value in advanc- Primary JFP (JFCOM) ing the strategic communications JFCOM components Via service components - Develops global joint sourcing solutions (including RC) and public diplomacy objectives FC CFFC - Coordinates recommended solution ACC MFL of disaster relief and humanitar- with other COCOMs and services ian operations. Indeed, such ca- RCC components Monitors force availability and recommends sustainment actions to CJCS / JCS pabilities are in high demand as USA USN efforts to “get the story out” regard- USAF USMC ing the benefits ofHA/DR missions performed by the American mili- 4 For some time, JFCOM has maintained two deployable SJFHQ-CEs (Alpha and Bra- tary have become increasingly central to U.S. glob- vo) composed of command and control experts who could assist two- or three-star head- al engagement strategies. quarters to transition quickly into joint or multinational headquarters (USJFCOM). As DoD-approved relief efforts may also tap into the of October 1, 2008, the SJFHQ structure was reorganized into a new Joint Enabling Ca- department’s global network of warehouses for ad- pabilities Command (JECC) format, composed of several smaller, more agile, function- ally-focused capability teams that can be tailored more precisely to the specific needs ditional supplies not readily available or available in of a JTF. Seven deployable teams or modules are planned, including in the areas of op- sufficient quantity among regionalCOCOM units or erations, plans, information management, and logistics (USJFCOM 2008a). CONUS-based reinforcements. At present, there are 5 Formally such items are referred to as excess defense articles (EDA), and their release to three major DoD warehouses worldwide, including foreign governments or militaries is managed by DSCA once approved by the secretaries of state and defense. EDA are primarily provided to allied or partner nations receiving U.S. se- a CONUS-based facility in Atlanta, Georgia (which curity assistance, but useful non-lethal equipment may also be released as part of a DoD-sup- SOUTHCOM can draw on most easily), together with ported HA/DR mission. Under what is known as the Denton program, DoD also may agree to a facility in Okinawa (primarily for PACOM-managed transport privately donated humanitarian cargo to foreign countries using military trans- operations) and another in Italy (largely for EUCOM-, portation assets on a space-available basis. In that event, there is no cost to the donat- ing agency or organization, but the State Department, USAID, and DSCA must all certify that AFRICOM-, or CENTCOM-managed activities). Apart transporting the cargo is in the national interest of the United States, that the material be- from current supplies, these warehouses also store ing transported is in useable condition, and that there are legitimate requirements for the excess items that are not up to current military stan- transported material and adequate arrangements for distribution in country. There is also a minimum load requirement of two thousand pounds, and the donor must have a desig- dards (such as Cold War era field hospitals and tents) nated recipient for the cargo at the final destination. Transportation depends, moreover, but which may nevertheless prove to be quite useful on the existence of a military flight between specific points of origin and destination, and in support of non-combat, HA/DR contingencies.5 there can be no guarantee of a specific delivery date (U.S. House of Representatives 2007).

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The Atlanta facility, moreover, holds in storage some so in a quicker and more cost-effective manner, if four hundred thousand humanitarian daily rations the Joint Staff, for example, had such data readily at (HDRs), which are culturally sensitive (for example, its fingertips? Might not the development of such they contain no pork) and diet-attuned (for exam- an inventory and roster, it is added, help as well ple, low-fat and low-calorie) military meals ready to to identify potential shortfalls in essential military eat (or MREs) developed specifically for people liv- assets so that steps could be taken beforehand to 6 For the need to con- ing under duress and/or displaced as a result of a avoid any capability gaps in times of crisis? 6 From duct capability gap anal- natural or man-made disaster. Indeed, HDRs have a big picture perspective, wouldn’t such an assess- yses along these lines, see GAO 2007 (17-19). been so well received that the UN’s World Food Pro- ment process on the HA/DR front, it is further pro- gram (WFP) is reviewing them as an alternative to posed, be an ideal stepping stone for putting in place the WFP’s biscuit meals, which are often discarded a more comprehensive system, as called for by many by disaster victims. in Congress following the release of DoD Directive 3000.5 (“Military Support for Stability, Security, Tran- Will Capability Gaps Be a Problem? sition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations”), for As DoD, the COCOMs, and their various service-spe- predicting and redressing potential capability gaps 7 For a useful discussion cific component commands are called upon more with respect to stability operations as a whole? 7 In of why current DoD and CO- frequently for HA/DR-related assistance, they are other words, a key incentive for setting in place a COM planning may not be ad- equate to identify potential clearly developing a broader base of knowledge with capability tracking system for HA/DR missions lies capability gaps in the sta- respect to the types of military capabilities, skills, in the fact, according its proponents, that it could bility operations mission and supplies that are likely to be needed in respond- also facilitate broad military support for SSTR-type area (to include HA/DR mis- ing to a variety of disasters in a range of topographic missions writ large. sion), see GAO 2007 (40-43). and climatic conditions. So, too, they are becoming So far, however, DoD, COCOM, and service staff increasingly skilled at assembling in a timely fash- reactions to such proposals have been less than en- ion disaster relief teams built around a mix of avail- thusiastic. In the first place, since every disaster re- able units and equipment. That said, past experience sponse is a situation-specific event, maintaining a alone is no guarantee that the capabilities likely to pre-ordained inventory or list of essential capabili- be of greatest utility to HA/DR operations will be ties, they argue, makes little sense, especially if the available in the future when, and in the format, need- idea is to maintain such assets in some type of pre- 8 In this context, the point ed. Hence, with foreign disaster relief and associated assigned, standby status.8 Even within specific disas- is often made that the costs humanitarian assistance emerging as a higher prior- ter categories, they go on to add, efforts to identify of storing and maintain- ing equipment packages spe- ity mission for American military forces, a growing and track a predetermined set of military capabili- cifically designed for HA/ number of U.S. defense analysts (especially among ties likely to be needed – and, on this basis, to fore- DR operations could be quite those working on Capitol Hill) have begun to sug- cast and remedy any capability gaps – would not prohibitive over time. More- gest that DoD would be well advised to institution- be particularly helpful, as what is required for an over, the shelf life of certain types of emergency sup- alize what it now knows with regard to emerging earthquake, say, in Pakistan might be quite differ- plies (such as MREs or medi- capability needs, and to develop and maintain an ent from what would be needed for an earthquake cines) may be rather limited. up-to-date inventory of key platforms and supplies in Indonesia, given differences in climate, terrain, deemed to be essential to HA/DR operations. Ideal- transport networks, population density, and the like. ly, such an inventory would include details on the There are, it is acknowledged, generic military ca- readiness of these assets to deploy, as well as a ros- pabilities – especially in lift, engineering, logistics, ter of key personnel who possess skills and practi- medical, and communications – that would prob- cal experience critical to such operations. ably be called upon to one degree or another, when In answer to those who might question the wis- civilian alternatives are not available, for virtually dom of such an inventory and roster, advocates have any disaster relief operation. In that event, howev- tended to respond with questions of their own aimed er, such assets, it is argued, would be drawn largely at highlighting the operational benefits of such an from deployed forces (including those already as- approach. Wouldn’t it be easier to pinpoint the lo- signed to the regional COCOMs and unassigned forc- cation and availability of potential disaster response es managed by CONUS-based service components), forces and capabilities, they have argued, and to do

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32 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s and, to the extent necessary, reconfigured in a force in needed capabilities should a real disaster sud- mix tailored to the situation at hand. denly flare up. Secondly, and as a corollary to this first point, This approach has proved to be quite productive the military designs, fields, maintains, and deploys in the SOUTHCOM and PACOM AORs, where storm- forces and supporting equipment for its primary and weather-triggered disasters occur each year on warfighting missions, not for secondary missions a fairly regular schedule (interview 2007a, 2008a). such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and SOUTHCOM planners, for example, can generally as- similar civil support activities. When so directed sume that hurricanes and tropical storms of some by command authority, military capabilities will be severity will occur in Central America and the Carib- deployed in support of these lesser contingencies, bean between August and November, and advance but they will not be procured with those contingen- preparations to cope with such events clearly helped cies uppermost in mind or requested beforehand by to speed the command’s responses to the damage the regional COCOMs specifically for such contingen- caused in Nicaragua by hurricane Felix in Septem- cies. Indeed, the underlying assumption for most ber 2007 and in the Dominican Republic by trop- DoD and service planners seems to be that anything ical storm Noel in November 2007. In the specific one would need for HA/DR operations can readily case of the Noel relief effort, the medical element be found in the high-quality general-purpose forc- (MEDEL) of JTF-Bravo – one of SOUTHCOM’s only for- es maintained by the COCOMs and their component ward-deployed elements and one that is dedicated commands for major combat operations (MCOs) in to HA/DR missions – was able to prepare five days of accordance with established DoD guidance.9 Accord- medicine for deployment to the Domin- 9 Primary guidance in this context comes ing to this perspective, all the regional COCOMs real- ican Republic in less than twelve hours from DoD’s Contingency Planning Guidance, a 10 classified assessment of keyMCO scenarios that ly need to do in the event of a disaster in their AOR is (May 2007). Turning to the PACOM AOR, DoD urges the COCOMs to use as a baseline for to re-package units and equipment that they already when cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in making their own more detailed concept plans deploy for combat purposes (together with any re- May 2008, PACFLT amphibious assault (CONPLANs) for potential combat operations. inforcements from CONUS-based commands), and ships with substantial disaster relief ca- 10 According to the MEDEL commander, its then reassign these forces in accordance with con- pabilities, as well as C-130 and C-17 car- speedy response is attributable to two factors: 1) the fact that the MEDEL conducts at least cept plans (CONPLANs) previously developed by the go planes from a PACAF rapid response one medical readiness and training exercise COCOM staff for precisely such an event. group, were already in and around Thai- (MEDRETE) a month, and 2) JTF-Bravo’s inher- To some extent, of course, regional COCOMs can land as part of an annual disaster re- ent rapid deployment capability, based in this increase the likelihood that forces and capabilities sponse exercise, and poised to provide particular case on the prompt availability of a C-5 Galaxy from the New York Air National that would be especially useful in responding to nat- almost immediate assistance of direct Guard to transport the MEDEL team, the med- ural disasters will already be in theater at or close and significant value (Winn 2008, 8).11 ical supplies, and two of the JTF’s UH-60 Black to the levels needed, by planning to conduct disas- Such coincidences, however, are by their Hawk helicopters. Stationed at Soto Cano Air Base in , the full JTF, which includes ter relief-related exercises during particular times of nature quite unpredictable, and, while six hundred troops and twenty aircraft, trains the year when seasonal events, such as floods, hur- tremendously helpful when they do oc- continuously throughout the year for a va- ricanes, tropical storms, mudslides, and the like, are cur and are acted upon, they are hardly riety of likely HA/DR missions (May 2007) most likely to occur. To support such activities, the a sufficient basis on which to prepare 11 The ships and planes were forward-de- COCOMs may also request in their annual RRF mes- for the fielding and deployment ofHA/ ployed as part of the annual multinational Cobra Gold exercise that focuses on various sages to the Joint Staff additional capabilities that DR-relevant military assets. Moreover, disaster relief contingencies. The C-130 that they know would be useful for the types of HA/DR advance planning along these lines by delivered the first relief aid to Myanmar on missions that are more likely to be called for (and the COCOMs would be difficult (if not May12 was assigned to PACAF’s 36th Contin- need to be practiced) within their specific AOR. In impossible) to carry out for disasters – gency Response Group based in , which was created specifically to respond rapidly to this way, programmed humanitarian assistance (HA) such as earthquakes and volcanic erup- disasters in the Pacific region (Winn 2008). and humanitarian civic assistance (HCA) activities tions – that are not directly connected and related initiatives that have a foreign disaster to changing weather and climatic conditions and relief (FDR) component provide COCOM command- are less easy to predict. ers with useful opportunities to anticipate and plan Still, those who adhere to the “warfighting first” for the somewhat unique demands of a disaster re- approach would argue nonetheless that standard lief operation, thereby minimizing any potential gap conventional force deployments and planning

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procedures, keyed principally to the demands of high-level DoD directives and strategic planning doc- high intensity conflict, should constitute sufficient uments that the COCOMs generally refer to for assess- preparation for lower intensity (and non-combat) ing their capability needs do not really provide, it is operations, including foreign disaster relief and argued, the level of detail that is required to identify humanitarian assistance. More specifically, as- potential capability gaps at the regional (and opera- sessments made on a regular basis by the region- tional) level, especially for non-MCO contingencies. al COCOMs to determine the level and mix of forces Time after time, recent disaster relief operations they may need to respond to DoD-sanctioned MCOs have revealed a higher demand for certain military should be more than adequate to uncover, so their assets – heavy transport helicopters that can per- argument goes, any possible capability gaps of rel- form sling-load operations at high-altitudes, for ex- evance to less demanding contingencies below the ample – than the relevant COCOM predicted would MCO level. Therefore, any effort to earmark individ- ever be needed based on current mechanisms for 12 In theory, the regional/geographic CO- ual systems, units, or even categories of projecting future requirements. The need for other COMs regularly complete scenario-driven as- forces as priority capabilities for HA/DR disaster-appropriate equipment – such as smaller sessments of forces and capabilities needed for a range of contingencies identified by DoD missions is unnecessary, and it could, if and lighter four-wheel drive vehicles that are more as principal planning guidelines. During this pursued, unduly complicate and inter- easily deployable and earth-moving equipment that process, the COCOMs are supposed to compare fere with a COCOM commander’s abili- can operate better in remote areas with poor trans- the requirements for important emerging mis- ty to manage his forces for maximum port infrastructure – may not be anticipated at all. sion areas – stability operations as a whole now being one – to current COCOM inventories support of higher strategic priorities. Moreover, since a sizeable percentage of the skills and recommend remedies to eliminate any ca- In the opinion of some senior DoD offi- and capabilities most useful for “secondary” mis- pability gaps so revealed. Presumably, these cials and military commanders, even just sions (including HA/DR operations) reside in reserve recommendations would be included in the in- tegrated priority lists that all COCOMs submit maintaining an agreed-upon list of exist- and National Guard units, they may be far less avail- to the Joint Staff each year for approval. The ing military capabilities and platforms able than they might otherwise be, given the de- Joint Staff, moreover, reviews and approves the deemed to be optimal (and, hence, likely mands now placed on reserves and the Guard by overall capability assessments of the COCOMs, 13 which are then supposed to drive the system to be requested) for disaster relief oper- operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. development and force procurement programs ations might give an inaccurate impres- Secondly, focused as it still is on warfighting pri- of the military services. So, too, the joint quar- sion – especially to State Department orities for MCOs, DoD guidance to the COCOMs and terly readiness reviews (JQRRs), which bring and other non-DoD interagency officials their service component commands for planning together the COCOMs, senior DoD person- nel, the military services, and various DoD who may be seeking military assistance military contingency operations continues to pay agencies to assess capability needs and risks for a specific relief effort – that these -as inadequate attention, many HA/DR planners would associated with missions that support strate- sets are in fact readily available. For those argue, to the requirements for interagency coordi- gic-level planning guidance, should provide yet another regularized procedure for highlight- who hold such views, actually putting in nation that are so central to HA/DR missions, as dis- ing potential capability gaps. Unfortunately, place a system to track the current loca- cussed in chapter 2. As a result, the likelihood is high none of these planning efforts can be counted tions and readiness levels of such assets, that key capabilities for facilitating such coordina- on to do so for mission areas other than those already programmed in the guidance as high and to make that information generally tion (for example, compatible communications sys- priority. Contrary to the opinion expressed available at the interagency level, would tems) will be overlooked or maintained at lower than by many DoD and COCOM planners, therefore, be even worse. ideal levels. Beyond the hardware issue, moreover, one can not simply assume that COCOM gener- Critics of this point of view argue past deployments have revealed that disaster relief al purpose forces and force levels determined in this manner will in fact account adequate- that business-as-usual planning by DoD teams organized around (and led by) forward-de- ly for the capability needs of lesser contingen- and the COCOMs really provides little as- ployed general purpose forces may actually be quite cies and/or less traditional (and perhaps lower surance that the skills and capabilities ignorant of the fact that there are important non- priority) missions. See GAO 2007, 17-19, for a more detailed discussion of this point in ref- needed for HA/DR operations – most es- military groups with whom they may need to coor- erence to stability operations requirements. pecially, large-scale relief efforts compa- dinate in a HA/DR operation, or that there are fairly 13 According to a New York Times edito- rable to those launched in response to well established procedures for facilitating such co- rial published on May 18, 2008, the Guard, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the ordination. Similar blind spots have also been not- whose primary responsibilities are to pro- tect the homeland and respond to disas- 2005 Pakistan earthquake – will be avail- ed with regard to the existence of potentially helpful ters (albeit principally within CONUS), able in a timely fashion at the levels, and pockets of HA/DR expertise that reside in DoD agen- has only about sixty-one percent of its in the locations and formats, most like- cies or may even be attached to COCOM headquar- equipment readily available because the ly to be needed.12 In the first place, the ters, which means, in turn, that any reach-back to rest is already deployed overseas.

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tap these specialized capabilities could be delayed that they require), while still assuring the availabil- significantly, if it happens at all. During the 2005 ity of force levels and force mixes needed for priori- Pakistan relief effort, for example, the DAC was un- ty warfighting missions. One of the most significant aware that an international health specialist (IHS) developments in this regard was the earlier-men- specifically trained for such operations was resident tioned release of DoD Directive 3000.5 in late 2005 on the CENTCOM surgeon’s staff, and there were, as (discussed in more detail in chapter 2), which ele- a result, many unnecessary shortfalls (and short cir- vated the full spectrum of stability operations, HA/ cuits) in the military medical support provided.14 DR activities included, to a priority on 14 IHS personnel are only found in the U.S. Thirdly, and in a similar vein, the warfighting -fo par with traditional combat operations. Air Force, but they play (or should play) an ex- traordinarily important role in broader CO- cus of traditional COCOM and service component To be sure, this call for a much great- COM planning for international medical planning would almost certainly give short shrift to er emphasis on stability operations re- missions. In addition to their medical exper- the civil support and local capacity-building orienta- quirements in determining U.S. military tise, they are trained in all facets of HA/DR tion of HA/DR missions and stability operations as a posture has not been welcomed by all, operations, as well as in civil-military and in- teragency coordination procedures. They whole. Drawing again on a healthcare example (giv- and it will take time to see any real im- also receive extensive training in foreign lan- en the importance of such capabilities to effective di- pact on overall force structure, especially guages and cultures, and generally have some saster relief), the medical support requirements es- with respect to major military platforms embassy experience. As a result, IHS offi- cers bring a more integrated, long-term per- tablished by the regional COCOMs and their service (which take years to field from design to spective which is particularly valuable to components are likely to give priority, for quite un- deployment). Nonetheless, stability op- the recovery and reconstruction phases of derstandable reasons, to the combat surgery needs erations considerations are at least being a disaster response (Bonventre 2006a, 4). of otherwise healthy young American adults (par- discussed more frequently and in greater ticularly men), but pay little attention to the gener- depth now among DoD and military service planners, al public health requirements of a multigenerational a trend that can not help but put HA/DR capability civilian population living in areas that are medical- needs more squarely in the spotlight. As mentioned ly underserved and/or are coping with the after ef- earlier in this study, the creation in early 2007 of a fects of a natural or man-made disaster. This is an new office inOSD for stability operations capabilities oversight that has become increasingly obvious and should over time help to make this happen. problematic – and that has required adjustments Of potentially far greater importance, moreover, in COCOM/service component planning – as medi- is the work underway in the Office of the Assistant cal diplomacy, including hospital ship deployments Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, or and COCOM MEDCAPs, have become more important OASD/GSA (also mentioned in chapter 2) , to integrate tools for U.S. military engagement overseas. None- the primary documents that have driven force plan- theless, despite a greater awareness of the likely ben- ning and management for some time now – most efits that would accrue, little effort has been made notably, DoD’s Contingency Planning Guidance (fo- so far to develop – as proposed by a senior lessons- cused on warfighting requirements) and its Securi- learned team shortly after the operation in Pakistan ty Cooperation Guidance (focused on peacetime en- – a military medical equipment and supply package gagement activities) – into a new, single document designed specifically for civilian healthcare in disas- entitled the Guidance for the Employment of Forces, ter relief situations (Bonventre 2006a, 3). or the GEF (interview 2007b).15 Presumably, this con- solidation will place security cooperation initiatives – DoD and Service Efforts to Ensure That which would include peacetime engage- 15 In addition to the guidance docu- HA/DR Capabilities Are Available ment activities with allies and partner ments specified above, this new docu- ment will also incorporate DoD’s Nuclear All that said, whatever one believes regarding the nations aimed at building, training, and Weapons Employment Policy and various capacity of standing general purpose forces to sup- exercising HA/DR capabilities – on a Global Force Management (GFM) and Glob- ply most (if not all) of the military capabilities that more equal footing with COCOM and al Defense Posture (GDP) guidelines (in- may be needed for foreign disaster relief, recent de- service component efforts to prepare terview 2007b and Hoffman 2007). velopments in defense planning at the OSD and ser- for warfighting contingencies. The new guidance – vice staff levels may open the door to more accurate approved in final draft form in May 2008 (Sherman and comprehensive planning in support of HA/DR op- 2008, 1) – is expected as well to move the defense erations (and the military capabilities and skill sets planning process away from a primary emphasis on

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designing and refining decisive military responses make truly unique and desirable contributions, giv- to specific combat scenarios of greatest concern to en their inherent mobility and expeditionary charac- a more concerted focus on preventive measures to ter, their ability to operate independently off shore, reduce the likelihood of conflict in the first place and and their ability to maintain a comparatively small to minimize the damage (and speed the recovery) footprint on shore (when operating ashore is re- from conflicts that can not, in the end, be prevented quired). So, too, the capacity of maritime forces to (Sherman 2008, 1). Over time, such a shift in focus, put to sea and leave the area of operations quickly in tandem with broader support for DoD Directive could prove to be extremely valuable in facilitating 3000.5, should help to confirm the growing impor- the transition from the emergency response phase of tance of HA/DR missions, the rising demand for the a disaster relief operation dominated by the military special skills and capabilities they require, and the to a civilian-led recovery and reconstruction phase. clear need for better planning mechanisms to en- Beyond these considerations, planning and exercis- sure their availability, wherever they may be locat- ing for HA/DR missions are activities that the chief of ed. More specifically, it should confirm the value of naval operations (CNO) views as an excellent focus HA/DR training and capacity-building efforts at the for building allied and partner nation capabilities bilateral and multilateral levels as tools for restruc- under his Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) pro- turing – or, in military parlance, “shaping” – region- gram (interview 2008b).16 There are not many coun- al security environments so that they are both less tries, he has observed, that can partner effectively 16 Originally promoted as conflict-prone and better able to weather whatever with the U.S. Navy on high-end, “tip of the spear” the “thousand ship navy” con- future instabilities do occur at a lower cost in terms combat missions, but quite a few are able and ea- cept by Admiral Michael Mul- len, USN, when he was the of casualties, property damage, and socio-econom- ger to do so in the HA/DR arena. As an added bene- CNO, the GMP program en- ic dislocation. fit, working cooperatively onHA/DR programs and visions the development and As in the case of DoD Directive 3000.5, populariz- exercises not only teaches allied/partner navies how effective utilization of a self- ing and institutionalizing the integrated approach to work with U.S. maritime forces, but to work with regulated web of relation- ships with partner nations, proposed in this new guidance will take time. Even each other as well, creating in the process a base- relying on global cooperation before the GEF was approved, however, a number of line for cooperation later on in other mission areas. to meet the maritime secu- rather promising (if still somewhat uncoordinated) In this way, HA/DR collaboration, the CNO has gone rity demands of the twenty- first century. The current CNO, steps in this direction were already being taken by on to argue, can be used as a forcing function to ad- Admiral Gary Roughead, has the leaderships and planning staffs of the individu- vance GMP objectives more broadly. taken up the GMP idea with al military services as they continued to revise doc- In part for this reason, the Navy staff has been enthusiasm, and has promot- ed the notion of “pro-active, trine, adjust operational priorities, and transform tasked with developing a global plan for maritime- expeditionary HA” – which in- force structure to adapt more effectively to the post- based HA/HCA activities (including disaster pre- volves the carefully planned Cold War and post-9/11 security environments. Per- paredness efforts) that would be integrated into deployment of ships specifi- haps the most mature and far-reaching initiatives the security cooperation programs of the Navy’s cally equipped for dedicated humanitarian and civil sup- in this regard have been those of the sea services – various component commands – such as U.S. Pa- port missions (as in the fall most particularly, the U.S. Navy, but including as cific Fleet USPACFLT( ) and U.S. Naval Forces Europe 2007 USNS Comfort deploy- well the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard – in the (USNAVEUR) – assigned to the regional COCOMs. To ment to the Caribbean/Cen- tral American region) – as run-up to and following the release of A Cooperative ensure continuity and funding in the out-years of a way to build cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower in October 2007. DoD’s Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), Navy ties and partner capabili- Commonly referred to as the “new maritime strategy,” planners are hoping as well to integrate this global ties (interview 2008b, 2008c). this document, signed by all three maritime service HA/HCA plan into the program requirements of the chiefs, specifically identifies the capacity to conduct Navy’s Program Objective Memorandum (or POM), HA/DR operations as one of six core capabilities of the service’s annual planning document that seeks U.S. maritime power that need to be strengthened to align Navy program priorities with the planning to ensure that a proper blend of peacetime engage- guidance and fiscal constraints outlined in the De- ment and MCO assets will be readily available (Sea fense Planning Guidance (DPG) provided to the mil- Services 2007, 11). itary departments by the secretary of defense. Navy Moreover, the HA/DR mission area, the report planners believe that embedding the HA/HCA plan points out, is one to which the maritime services can within the POM would allow for a greater degree

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of thoughtful, advance planning, and that this, in Compared to the Navy (and the sea services as turn, would lead to HA/HCA activities that have a a whole), the Army and Air Force have been a bit more powerful and lasting effect on host nation slower to acknowledge the rising importance of HA/ populations. More time for planning, for example, DR missions and to assign a higher priority to them would allow for better coordination with NGOs and in their formal doctrine and operational guidance. would improve the chances that the naval platform The Army, of course, has been understandably pre- involved would carry a bigger and more robust suite occupied with the immediate demands of the Iraq of capabilities specifically selected for the tasks to war, and the Air Force has been focused on the Joint be performed (interview 2008c).17 A more delibera- Strike Fighter (JSF) and tanker aircraft procurements tive process would also make it more likely that the (among other priorities). In recent months, however, achievements of the overall mission would be prop- there are signs that both services are be- 17 That said, it remains more difficult to do erly publicized and recorded via carefully designed ginning to turn their attention to stabil- advance planning for grey-hull ships, such as the USS Peleliu and USS Kearsarge, that bring public affairs and public diplomacy campaigns, both ity and civil support operations, includ- more robust capabilities to the mission, be- of which are key to the promotion of positive foreign ing HA/DR-related activities. The Army, cause they can only perform medical and HA/ attitudes toward the United States. for example, released a new field oper- HCA deployments when they are out of rota- Together with the CNO’s decision discussed in ations manual in February 2008 that tion from their primary combat missions, a readiness status that is often hard to predict chapter 2 to program and fund up to four medical builds on the precedent of DoD Direc- with precision. White-hull hospital ships, on ship deployments per year, the Navy’s efforts noted tive 3000.5 and puts stability operations the other hand, can be programmed more pre- above to institutionalize HA/DR planning and oper- on par with conventional combat op- cisely. Moving forward, therefore, the Navy intends to maintain a balance of grey- and ations as a way to assist friends and allies overseas erations (Headquarters, Department of white-hull deployments, so as to ensure more – and to help shape the geopolitical environment Army 2008)19. Drawing on the Army’s ex- predictability in this particular mission sec- within which U.S. maritime forces must operate – periences in Afghanistan and Iraq, as tor. Such predictability, it is argued, is impor- tant to the success of security cooperation promise to keep HA/DR requirements relatively high well as on lessons learned from the Ar- and GMP engagement through proactive Na- on the priority lists of the Navy, Marine Corps, and my’s relief efforts after hurricanes Rita vy-sponsored HA/HCA initiatives, given that Coast Guard leadership. How and to what degree and Katrina, this new manual – formal- they are aimed at achieving long-term effects this may influence global force management con- ly known as FM 3-0 – emphasizes the via sustained partnerships (interview 2008c). 18 SOUTHCOM was the host COCOM for the siderations and future procurement preferences re- need for improved training, skills, and GFS pilot project. See USSOUTHCOM 2007 for mains to be seen. Based on recent deployments, it capabilities to help restore essential civ- details on the Swift’s six-month deployment seems likely that an increased emphasis on HA/DR il services, dispense vital humanitarian in Caribbean and Central American waters. missions in the future will at least reinforce pre-ex- assistance, and support critical infra- A description of the Swift’s HA activities con- ducted under Operation Handclasp is report- isting demands for amphibious ships and shallow- structure development (that is,, nation- ed in Clark 2007. Project Handclasp is a Navy draft vessels (for close-in operations), sea-based building), while conducting at the same HA project that accepts and transports edu- transport helicopters, supply ships and sealift ca- time more effective counterinsurgency cational, humanitarian, and goodwill materi- al overseas on Navy ships on a space-available pabilities, Seabee assets, and expeditionary medi- (COIN) operations. On the specific issue basis. This particular delivery involved the cal teams, to name but a few platforms and skill of whether or not existing or currently shipment of medical equipment to . sets that have proven especially useful in the HA/ planned general purpose forces are like- 19 Chapter 3 in the field operations man- DR context. With regard to new construction, more- ly to have sufficient capabilities to han- ual “Full Spectrum Operations” is especial- ly enlightening on Army requirements for over, there has been some discussion of developing dle such tasks, one senior commander operating simultaneously in four realms – a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) variant or an LCS mis- directly involved in writing the manual namely, offensive, defensive, stability, and sion module that would be optimized for HA/DR and noted that while “there will be people civil support operations, which taken to- other stability operations (Ewing 2008, 22), and the who naturally will say, ‘If I can do high- gether constitute full spectrum operations. Navy’s advanced high-speed catamaran – the High end offense and defense, I can do any lesser kind of Speed Vessel (HSV)-2 Swift – served in 2007 as the operations…what we [the Army] have found through test platform for the Global Fleet Station (GFS) con- seven years [of operating in Afghanistan and Iraq] cept, which is aimed at engaging allied and partner is that is not the case” (Caldwell 2008). nations in various training activities (to boost GMP For its part, the Air Force leadership has been goals), while simultaneously providing targeted hu- less forward leaning than the Army leadership on manitarian assistance ashore.18 the issue of COIN and irregular warfare (IW) require- ments, cautioning in its most recent white paper on

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future strategic requirements that the United States Is an Inventory of Key Capabilities Really Needed? should not assume that future conflicts will be low- In summary, then, while traditional conventional intensity, IW-type operations similar to those cur- force planning procedures (including the GFM pro- rently being conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan (U.S. cess) may be sufficient to identify, access, and sup- Air Force 2007). In recent speeches and press inter- ply most of the resources that the regional COCOMs views devoted to explaining this white paper, former might need for HA/DR missions, it is not at all clear Air Force chief of staff General T. Michael Moseley that they will yield everything that may be needed, stressed as well the need to recapitalize and exploit or that the forces provided will be properly trained emerging technologies to maintain high-end com- and the capabilities configured for the mission at bat capabilities able to match and (if need be) defeat hand. Hence, the potential for critical capability those of “ascendant powers” (such as China and a ris- gaps still does exist, and that potential may become ing ) that are posturing to contest U.S. supe- a reality on a broader and more regular basis as HA/ 20 In this context, the partnership pro- riority in the air, space, and cyberspace DR missions emerge as a key component of Ameri- grams established between individual Ameri- domains (Spiegel 2008). At the same ca’s engagement policies in strategically important can states and specific foreign countries have already facilitated emergency airlifts, for ex- time, however, Moseley acknowledged regions. Based on current military operations and ample, by Air National Guard cargo planes to the need to maintain flexible airpower on recent lessons-learned assessments, an increased partner countries in need. In one recent ex- options “across a full spectrum [of mili- emphasis on full-spectrum capabilities – including ample, a C-130 from the Kentucky Air Na- tary operations] from humanitarian as- HA/DR and other civil support assets – seems to be tional Guard delivered emergency supplies to Ecuador in March 2008 to help in the clean- sistance all the way out to nuclear de- in the offing, even though it remains to be seen how up operation following severe flooding in the terrence” (Spiegel 2008). To underscore that will affect the precise balance between forces western and central portions of that coun- the Air Force’s role as “the Nation’s pre- optimized for warfighting and those for stability op- try, which is partnered with Kentucky. mier global, multi-dimensional maneu- erations missions. So, while the scope and scale of 21 Throughout the relief effort, the jun- ta in Myanmar refused to allow American ver force,” the white paper points as well changes to come remain unclear, some adjustments warships anchored off that country’s coast- to the service’s increasingly important will need to be made to force planning, force man- line to provide disaster relief via their heli- global reach capacity – or its “ability to agement, and force sourcing procedures as present- copter and platforms, as U.S. move, supply, or position assets, with ly defined. Such adjustments will be needed both to maritime forces had done so successfully in re- sponse to earlier crises elsewhere. As a result, unrivaled velocity and precision, any- reduce (if not eliminate altogether) the likelihood U.S. Air Force C-130s flying from Utapao air where on the planet” – as demonstrat- of future capability gaps in the HA/DR realm, and to base in Thailand to Yangon airport in Myan- ed in America’s recent military respons- make certain that the forces and capabilities that do mar emerged as the only officially sanctioned way to get critically needed supplies of water, es to a variety of foreign disasters. exist are trained and organized (or can be on short food, medicine, blankets, and shelter materi- So, even among Air Force circles notice) in ways that will maximize their utility in als into the country (Kazmin and Lynch 2008). who seem more concerned than their HA/DR operations. Navy and Army counterparts about a potential (and, That said, adjustments along these lines need not in their view, unwise) erosion in MCO warfighting ca- be very extensive, complex, or costly to have a posi- pabilities due to an overemphasis on stability oper- tive effect in the relative near term. In its role as joint ations requirements, it is understood that Air Force force provider (JFP) to the regional COCOMs, JFCOM transport and logistical assets that are central to the is already taking useful steps – via, for example, its rapid delivery of emergency relief and humanitarian ongoing series of multinational crisis response ex- assistance overseas have become vital tools of mili- periments and its annual Noble Resolve exercise in tary influence in the security environment now tak- support of NORTHCOM (both of which have a disaster ing shape, and that they are likely to be called upon response focus) – to highlight and ensure the avail- with increasing frequency in the years ahead.20 In- ability of special HA/DR requirements that might deed, as brought so forcefully home during the ini- otherwise be overlooked by a more business-as-usu- tial American and broader international response to al approach to the assessment of capability needs the damage wrought by cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (see USJFCOM 2007b, 2008b, 2008c). So, too, as dis- in May 2008, there will be times when airlift support cussed above, DoD policy initiatives and recent revi- by Air Force cargo planes provides the only means sions to the strategic plans and operational guidance approved by the assisted nation for delivering crit- documents of the individual military services are ically needed aid via a military platform.21 raising the profile ofHA/DR missions and associated

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38 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s civil support activities, and spotlighting, in the pro- crease for a more structured (if still non-binding) cess, how existing and future military platforms and approach to identifying and preparing in advance technologies can better support such operations, all military assets seen to be crucial to successful HA/ in the name of transforming America’s armed forc- DR operations, whatever the precise scenario. Un- es to manage more effectively the security challeng- til that time, however, simply developing a better es of the twenty-first century. sense of the broad categories of military skills and What is needed most at this point, therefore, is capabilities that have already proven to be extreme- not so much a detailed inventory of military skills ly valuable in such operations, and that are likely to and capabilities useful to HA/DR operations that prove valuable in the future, would be a useful, re- could be tracked over time, but simply a fuller ap- inforcing step to take, and it is to this task that we preciation of how the military as a whole has con- will now turn. tributed to such operations in decisive ways in the recent past, and what might be done, by means of force posture improvements and a more dedicated Review of High-Value/High-Leverage approach to HA/DR planning, to build on this track Assets record in the future. One idea recently floated by a While a substantial portion of the U.S military’s over- NORTHCOM official was to attach a detailed checklist all conventional force posture might very well be able of the types of military units and assets that would be to contribute in useful ways to HA/DR operations required to effectively executeHA/DR concept plans without major adjustment, not all military skills, (CONPLANs) or operational plans (OPLANs) devel- capabilities, and platforms are equal in this regard. oped by COCOM planning staffs USNORTHCOM( 2008). Based on past performance, there are certain spe- If one wished to take this approach one step further, cific sets of assets – concentrated in the military lift, such lists could be generated in what is called TPFDL logistics, engineering, communications, and medical (or time-phased force deployment list) format, which support sectors – that would be especially valuable at would include details on the transportation require- some level for virtually any disaster response, what- ments for moving certain units or types of units (and ever the scale of the disaster and wherever it may the supplies and equipment they may need) to a des- have occurred. Not surprisingly, most of 22 A formal TPFDL identifies the types of ignated port of debarkation.22 Attaching a list like these same assets would be equally use- and/or actual units required to support a mil- this to an HA/DR CONPLAN or OPLAN should not itary OPLAN, indicating precise locations and ful for the HCA and similar engagement in any way suggest that the units and items listed ports of debarkation. Time-phased force de- programs that have become increasing- would actually be assigned to (or programmed for) ployment data (TPFDD) adds the details re- ly central to the theater security cooper- garding equipments needs and transportation the mission described. It would, however, get the CO- ation efforts of all the regionalCOCOM s. to port requirements. See TPFDL and TPFDD COMs to begin to think more concretely and in real- definitions onThe Free Dictionary by Far- Understanding more fully what these istic operational terms about what might be need- lex, at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/ high-value/high-leverage skills, capabil- time-phased+force+and+deployment+list ed well beforehand. ities, and platforms have done for past and http://www.thefreedictionary.com/ Of course, the goal of such an exercise would not time-phased+force+and+deployment+data. HA/DR operations, and what they may and should not be to develop a “one size fits all” ap- confidently be expected to do for future operations, proach to preparing the military for HA/DR missions. is the essential first step, therefore, in making sure As noted earlier, each mission must be carefully tai- that they will indeed be available and ready to per- lored to accommodate the unique conditions of the form as required when the next disaster hits or the situation at hand, and these conditions will proba- next HCA-type deployments are planned. What fol- bly vary quite widely from region to region even for lows is a sector by sector evaluation based on the re- similar types of disasters. In turn, the specific ca- sults of recent activities in the field and on current pabilities that are needed and the forces that can DoD, service, and COCOM planning priorities. best provide them may vary significantly as well from one HA/DR contingency to another. But once Airlift and Sealift Support the shift toward a greater focus on stability opera- Air and sealift support remains perhaps the most tions matures and becomes a more integral part of useful and unique military contribution to foreign standard military planning, demands will likely in- disaster relief operations, particularly in cases where

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the local transport infrastructure (including air- Baghram began to deliver critical supplies to Chakla- ports, seaports, roads, and railway lines) has been la Air Base in Pakistan. From here, the supplies were swept away or severely damaged, leaving local re- loaded onto helicopters for further distribution to sponse mechanisms powerless to assist devastated areas that were unreachable by any other means, and isolated communities. In such circumstances, and, when the altitude was too high for helicop- fixed-wing cargo aircraft, transport helicopters, and ters to fly effectively, relief supplies were airdropped a variety of maritime supply vessels and naval plat- close to those in need. Moreover, as the scope and forms have proven, time and again, to be the most re- magnitude of the disaster became known, addition- sponsive and cost-effective means for transporting al C-17 and C-130 aircraft from other U.S. air bases in relief-related supplies, equipment, and personnel America, Europe, the Pacific, and the quickly to disaster-stricken areas. For example, Air landed in Islamabad carrying military meals ready Mobility Command’s C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft, to eat (MREs), blankets, winterized tents, and oth- which are the largest airlifters in the U.S. Air Force er critical supplies to assist relief efforts. inventory, are often the first to arrive on scene, when Naturally, fixed-wing military cargo aircraft also the priority task is to move large quantities of mate- were in high demand following the Indian Ocean rial in the shortest period of time over long distanc- tsunami in December 2004. The largest tsunami hit es. Capable of carrying more than 270,000 pounds the west coast of Sumatra in Aceh province, affect- of cargo over 6,320 nautical miles (which can be ex- ing a five-hundred-kilometer stretch of coastline and tended by in-flight refueling), C-5s can move a good- sweeping nearly five kilometers inland (Wiharta et ly number of helicopters and/or over-sized ground al. 2008, 87). Major roadways, coastal roads, and vehicles, as well as a substantial volume of sup- bridges were washed away, and the country’s few air- plies and key support personnel, to disaster zones strips and harbors were damaged or destroyed. The on quite short notice (U.S. Air Force 2008). When tsunami also severely compromised local military available landing strips are limited or damaged, the assets, leaving the Indonesian government with only smaller C-130 Hercules and C-17 Globemaster III air- two helicopters on the entire island of Sumatra (El- craft, both of which have relatively large payload leman 2006, 56). Hence, foreign military assistance, capacities, are capable of short takeoffs and land- especially air assets, were essential to helping the ings on unprepared runways, and support in-flight local government to gain access to affected and re- refueling, stand out as particularly attractive alter- mote areas and to deliver the first wave of relief sup- natives. Largely for these reasons, the C-130, which plies. Toward those objectives, C-5, C-17, and C-130 is also the more numerous of the three aircraft, has aircraft from U.S. bases in Japan and America deliv- become the real workhorse of disaster relief oper- ered much needed helicopters, humanitarian aid, ations insofar as initial airlift is concerned, and no support personnel, communications equipment, organization has a greater supply (much of it for- and emergency responders into or around the di- ward deployed) than the U.S. military. saster zone. Overall, the airlift operation involved Indeed, a major reason why American forces were twenty-four C-5s, thirty-five C-17s, twenty-one C-130s, able to serve as “the backbone of the relief operation two KC-135 refueling aircraft, and one C-21 (Kreish- in support of the Pakistan military” (USAID 2006a) er 2005), most (though not all) drawn from bases lo- during the 2005 earthquake response lay in the fact cated in PACOM’s AOR. that there already was a sizeable airlift presence at That said, in addition to six C-5s and five C-17s Baghram Air Base in neighboring Afghanistan de- sent from Air Mobility Command (AMC) inventories ployed in support of operation Enduring Freedom. based in CONUS, TRANSCOM provided a seven-man With almost 30 percent of the affected areas in Pak- tanker airlift control element (TALCE) for the on- istan completely sealed off by mudslides and other site management of airfield operations, including earthquake-induced damage, there was great con- the provision of command, control, and communi- cern, of course, that numerous villages and towns cations (C3) networks, aerial port services, main- in the more remote mountainous sectors would re- tenance, weather reporting, and intelligence. Over main isolated for some time to come. Almost imme- two thousand airmen from one hundred Air Force diately, however, C-17 and C-130 cargo aircraft from units and fourteen bases flew more than fourteen

Finding the Right Mix

40 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s hundred sorties and scores of long-haul missions, tsunami, the USS Abraham Lincoln was involved in moving more than eighteen million pounds of re- a naval rotary-wing reorganization program (Bra- lief supplies and equipment (averaging 261 tons per vo to Sea or B2C), which was designed to improve day) and nearly eight thousand passengers to lo- the integration of helicopters into carrier flight op- cal distribution centers from which they could then erations. Instead of S-3 Viking tanker aircraft as an- be sent to disaster areas in greatest need (Kreisher tisubmarine warfare platforms, the carrier had on 2005). A senior USAID official later noted that the board a light helicopter antisubmarine squadron, Air Force’s emergency response was indispensable HSL-47, with eight H-60 Seahawks in its air wing, to USAID and others in the international relief area, which amounted to more HSL aircraft than any oth- concluding that “the one thing that distinguishes er carrier strike group had (Elleman 2006, 56). The the United States from the rest of the world [for di- Abraham Lincoln had seventeen (instead of seven) saster relief purposes] is its military, especially the helicopters from three squadrons – Helicopter An- Air Force and its airlift capability” (U.S. Air Force ti- Squadron 2, Helicopter Anti-Subma- 2005a). rine (Light) Squadron 47, and Helicopter Combat But the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami Support Squadron 11 – on board that could provide also provided a striking confirmation of the strategic direct sea-to-land access and allow responders to value of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps sea-basing reach inland areas. Ongoing efforts to integrate heli- concept, according to which offshore maritime plat- copter assets into carrier air wings based on the B2C forms are utilized as a logistical and communica- experiment will undoubtedly expand naval capacity tions hub that is much less dependent on land-based to respond to future HA/DR missions (as well as to facilities (which are often damaged in a disaster sce- combat contingencies) in a similar manner. nario). Since the tsunami had washed out hundreds PACOM also deployed a seven-ship expeditionary of miles of coastline, bridges, and major roads, in- strike group (ESG) led by the helicopter and dock land areas were inaccessible to first responders via landing ship USS Bonhomme Richard, which brought ground-based transport options, forcing many to another twenty-five helicopters to the scene, includ- operate from the sea. When the tsunami struck, for- ing CH-53 Sea Stallion heavy-lift helicopters, CH-46 ward-deployed naval assets were nearby in the Pa- Sea Knight medium-lift helicopters, and UH-1 Huey cific theater, and able to arrive with critical mass Ships to commence sea-based relief operations immedi- USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Maritime Prepositioning Ships ately. In fact, a six-ship carrier strike group (CSG) Group 9 USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) MV 1st Lt. Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011) led by the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (which was USS Shiloh (CG 72) SS Maj. Stephen W. Pless (T-AK 3007) the first to arrive, on January 1, 2005) was visiting USS Benfold (DDG 65) MV Cpl. Louis J. Hauge Jr. (T-AK 3000) when it was ordered to respond to the USS Shoup (DDG 86) MV Pfc. James Anderson Jr. (T-AK 3002) MV 1st Lt. Alex Bonnyman (T-AK 3003) tsunami crisis. Interestingly enough, just before the USS Louisville (SSN 724) USNS Rainier (T-AOE 7) USNS 1st Lt. Henry L. Martin (T-AK 3015) Hospital Ship U.S. Contributions to USS Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) Operation Unified Assistance Strike Group 5 Combat Stores Ships USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) USNS San Jose (T-AFS 7) Rotary-wing Aircraft Fixed-wing Aircraft USS Duluth (LPD 6) USNS Concord (T-AFS 5) CH-53D Sea Stallion Medium/Heavy-Lift Car- USS Rushmore (LSD 47) USNS Niagara Falls (T-AFS 3) CH-46 Sea Knight go and Passenger Aircraft USS Milius (DDG 69) High-Speed Vessels CH-47 Chinook C-17 Globemaster III USS Bunker Hill (CG 52) USS Swift (HSV 2) SH-60B Sea Hawk C-5 Galaxy USS Thach (FFG 43) MV WestPac Express (HSV 4676) HH-60 Pave Hawk C-130 Hercules USCGC Munro (WHEC 724) Large, Medium-Speed Roll- MH-60S Knight Hawk KC-130 on/Roll-off Ships MH-53E Sea Dragon MC-130 Other U.S. Navy Ships USNS Watson (T-AKR 310) UH-1 Huey C-2 Greyhound Elements of Forward Deployed Fleet Replenishment Oilers C-21A Amphibious Ready Group USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199) Air Refueling Tanker USS Essex (LHD-2) USNS John Ericsson (T-AO 194) KC-135 Stratotanker USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49) Oceanographic Survey Ships Reconnaissance Aircraft Dock Landing Ship USNS Mary Sears (T-AGS 65) P-3C Orion USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) USNS John McDonnell (T-AGS 51)

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light utility helicopters. In addition, the forward- medical evacuations, and delivering nearly fifteen deployed amphibious ready group (ARG) led by USS thousand tons of cargo to distressed villages, which Essex left the Persian Gulf on January 10 to assist was more than any other country or organization ongoing humanitarian relief efforts. En route to In- handled, including the UN (LeFever 2006). donesia, Essex picked up four -based MH- CENTCOM and PACOM efforts to get a sufficient 53E Sea Dragon heavy-lift helicopters – the Western number of helicopters where they were most needed, world’s largest helicopters, capable of carrying up to moreover, were both prompt and persistent. Within fifty-five troops or a sixteen-ton payload fifty nauti- eight hours of the Pakistan earthquake, Combined cal miles or a ten-ton payload five hundred nautical Forces Command–Afghanistan deployed eight heli- miles – to augment the lift capacity of the avail- copters (five CH-47Chinooks and three UH-60 Black able U.S. helicopter fleet (U.S. Navy 2005a). In ad- Hawks) to the affected area (Wiharta et al. 2008, 109). dition to its own helicopter combat squadron, the The following day, Rear Admiral Michael A. LeFever, ARG also utilized six CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters USN, commanding officer of ESG 1, arrived in Paki- from Okinawa and two more MH-60S Knight Hawks stan to establish a disaster assistance center to co- from USNS Niagara Falls, one of Military Sealift Com- ordinate U.S. military support with the U.S. Embassy mand’s (MSC) four combat stores ships operating in and USAID/DART members. By mid-November 2005, the area (U.S. Navy 2005b). Helicopters from the Bon- U.S. military operations reached their peak with no homme Richard and Essex groups focused primarily fewer than twenty-five helicopters operating simul- on the efficient dispersal of relief supplies to key dis- taneously, and some twelve hundred military per- tribution points ashore, leaving those on the Abra- sonnel providing transportation, cargo processing, ham Lincoln to locate survivors, conduct search and and engineering support (LeFever 2006). Because rescue missions and medical evacuations, and dis- of the sustained demand for helicopters as the relief tribute immediate aid to remote areas. At the height operation unfolded, some even had to be dismantled of the tsunami relief effort, U.S. forces had about fif- and shipped from bases outside of the region. One ty-eight helicopters all told dedicated to the opera- army aviation unit from Hawaii’s Wheeler Army Air- tion (Elleman 2006, 10-11). field, for example, was faced with the onerous task of Based in part on their success in the tsunami re- tearing down components of four Chinook airframes lief effort, military helicopters also played a critical in five days for transport to Afghanistan via three role in the U.S response to the 2005 Pakistan earth- C-5s, only to reassemble the pieces once they arrived quake during Operation Lifeline. Although fixed- at Bagram (U.S. Department of Defense 2005). U.S. Contributions to wing aircraft shuttled relief supplies en With a harsh winter close at hand and a large Operation Lifeline masse, “the high altitude and mountain- number of injured victims, many within the relief Fixed-wing Aircraft ous terrain, lack of suitable landing sites, community were concerned that a second wave of Medium/Heavy-Lift Car- and initial shortage of forward operating deaths would soon eclipse the initial toll. In order to go and Passenger Aircraft refueling locations” meant that the majori- expedite relief efforts and ensure that those affected C-17 Globemaster III ty of the airlift role within the actual disas- in remote areas received immediate and adequate C-5 Galaxy C-130 Hercules ter zone fell on the helicopters (Center of aid, the U.S. military outfitted its fleet of CH-47Chi - C-9B Skytrain Excellence in Disaster Management and nook helicopters with a special type of loading capa- Rotary-wing Aircraft (25 Helos) Humanitarian Assistance 2006). As in the bility called sling-loads, which are essentially nets CH-47 Chinook tsunami response, helicopters played a cru- attached underneath the helicopters. Sling-loads al- Black Hawk UH-60 cial role in reaching difficult-to-access ar- lowed each helicopter to carry two nets holding a MH-53 Sea Stallion MH-53E Sea Dragon eas, delivering relief supplies, and airlifting total of 4.5 tons of cargo (USAID 2006b). Introduced SH/-60MH-60 Sea Hawk injured locals to medical centers. Military for the first time in Pakistan, this new airlift concept MH-60S Knight Hawk officials have cited the Pakistan relief oper- dramatically increased the effectiveness, capacity, USS Tarawa Expeditionary Strike ation as the largest helicopter airlift in his- and speed of the rotary-wing relief operation. The Group (ESG) 1 USS Tarawa (LHA 1) tory. Overall, U.S. military helicopters flew local population even dubbed the U.S. fleet of high USS Cleveland (LPD 7) more than fifty-two hundred sorties, car- altitude heavy lift CH-47 Chinooks “angels of mer- USS Pearl Harbor (LSD 52) rying more than twenty thousand passen- c y.” Traditionally, loading and unloading the inside USS Chosin (CG 65) USS Ingraham (FFG 61) gers, conducting over thirty-seven hundred of a helicopter takes about twenty to thirty min-

Finding the Right Mix

42 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s utes, and requires, of course, a landing site. How- existed to help filter the hundreds of daily reports ever, by using sling-loads in Pakistan, helicopters and situation updates. As relief supplies flooded air- picked up cargo from forward operating bases, flew ports and warehouses in the affected regions, first up to ten thousand feet into affected areas, hovered responders struggled to sort through, catalogue, and and dropped much-needed medical and relief sup- distribute the piles of supplies that had accumulat- plies, and then quickly flew out. The development ed (Thomas and Kopczak 2005). So, too, the lack of of this technique was a breakthrough in airlift capa- transport and warehouse capacity in the early days bility and will undoubtedly prove its worth in future of the operation forced first responders to unload HA/DR operations in mountainous terrain (such as relief items at those points that were easiest to ac- in Sichuan province in China, where the May 2008 cess, sometimes leaving excess goods piled up on earthquake struck). the road (Thomas 2005). Ad hoc supply and trans- That said, while the CH-47 Chinooks saved the port networks sometimes worked to move things day in Pakistan, helicopters do not always perform along, as was the case when a German Red Cross well in high-altitude mountainous terrains because worker simply walked up to an American helicopter their rotor lift and engine performance decreases pilot and convinced him to help deliver ten tons of substantially in the thinning air. Hence, an after-ac- hospital equipment to a German field hospital (El- tion U.S. military assessment highlighted the need to leman 2006, 73). Sadly, even when they get the job “ensure [that] future joint heavy lift requirements in- done, such informal channels do little to introduce clude high altitude capability” (LeFever 2006), a prior- a cost-effective approach to managing the flow and ity that might well have gone unaddressed had it not storage of relief goods and services. been for the airlift experience in Pakistan. In part as a Critical to the creation of effective supply chains transitional move, the U.S. Navy awarded Sikorsky Air- are accurate and ongoing assessments of the extent craft Corporation a $3 billion contract in April 2006 of damage to existing infrastructure, the number of to design and build 156 Sikorsky CH-53K helicopters people affected, the secondary threats to the popula- for the Marine Corps. This new heavy-lift platform tion, and the capacity of the international communi- will be able to carry an external load up to twenty- ty to respond. Assessments greatly influence the type seven thousand pounds out to a distance of 110 nau- and quantities of relief items mobilized from nearby tical miles in hot climates and high altitudes with- warehouses or procured overseas, and become blue- out refueling in flight, making it “the perfect aircraft prints for planning disaster response activities. Be- for humanitarian operations in Pakistan and combat cause of incomplete or partial assessments, howev- operations in Afghanistan” (Sirak 2006). er, available supplies are not always well matched to victim needs. Too often, relief agencies and organi- Supply Chain Management and zations simply “push” relief supplies ahead instead Distribution Logistics of responding to valid requests based on proper as- The optimal use of transportation assets, whether sessments of victim needs, assessments that could be ground-, air-, or sea-based, however, requires an ef- leveraged to “pull” those supplies that are really re- ficient logistics and supply chain management pro- quired into the disaster zone. This push-pull problem cess to ensure that relief supplies arrive where they arises in part from the fact that assessment teams of- are really needed, in the right quantity and in the ten do not include a logistician; in fact, over 40 per- proper format. But setting such a process prompt- cent of the assessment teams sent out by the larg- ly in place remains quite a challenge, given that a est aid agencies during the tsunami response did not clear understanding of what is needed where is of- include logistics staff (Thomas 2005). This oversight ten absent in the early days of a relief operation. In has it roots in the limited number of professional the wake of the 2004 tsunami tragedy, incomplete logisticians trained to manage humanitarian logis- assessment reports and conflicting information re- tics operations, and in the high turnover of experi- garding the total number of individuals and coun- enced field logistics personnel. In addition, of those tries affected and their outstanding requirements few logisticians who do work with relief agencies, wasted resources and time, particularly since no few (only 26 percent surveyed during the tsunami systematic data collection and management system response) have access to appropriate communica-

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tions equipment and to tracking and tracing software, operations the USS Bonhomme Richard joined the relying mostly on manual processes to prepare for effort, flying more than 175,000 pounds of fresh -wa the receipt of procured or donated goods, or at min- ter, food, and medical supplies on and off the ship imum, to locate warehouses, assess physical infra- (Navy Supply Corps 2005). Logistics professionals structure in the disaster area, and establish transpor- and medical and dental personnel aboard Bonhom- tation pipelines. This paucity of expertise prompted me Richard, along with embarked logisticians from a spokesman from Doctors Without Borders to com- Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) 5 and the 15th Ma- ment that “…what is needed are supply mangers with- rine Expeditionary Force, formed a logistics opera- out borders: people to sort goods, identify priorities, tions command center to assess shore requirements track deliveries and direct the traffic of a relief effort and to coordinate the ship’s response with other lo- in full gear” (Thomas and Kopczak 2005). gistics professionals throughout the region. As a result, military forces increasingly are being In support of frontline efforts, MSC also sent six asked to coordinate most, if not all, logistics support of its twelve maritime pre-positioning ships from 23 The six maritime pre-po- once they join a relief effort. During the tsunami re- Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron 3.23 Collec- sitioning ships were the MV sponse, relief aid came from multiple sources, includ- tively, these ships were stocked with enough equip- 1st Lt. Jack Lummus (T-AK- 3011), SS Maj. Stephen W. Pless ing the Indonesian government, USAID, the UN and ment and supplies to support fifteen thousand (T-AK 3007), MV Cpl. Louis J. its affiliated agencies, dozens of countries,NGO s, and, marines for thirty days (U.S. Navy 2004b). In addi- Hauge Jr. (T-AK 3000), MV Pfc. of course, the vessels of TRANSCOM’s Military Sealift tion to combat equipment, the ships carried food, James Anderson Jr. (T-AK 3002), Command (MSC) and the Air Force’s C-130s, C-5s, and fuel, medical supplies, construction and road build- MV 1st Lt. Alex Bonnyman (T- AK 3002) and USNS 1st Lt. Har- C-17s staged out of Utapao and Singapore (Elleman ing equipment, electrical power generating equip- ry L. Martin (T-AK 3015). 2006, 43). No matter where relief aid came from, how- ment, airfield matting, and a Navy field hospital. The ever, sea-based U.S. Navy ships coordinated the logis- squadron also had forty-three osmosis water purifi- tical flow of most relief supplies. In addition, P-3C cation units, each of which was capable of produc- Orion surveillance aircraft and humanitarian assis- ing up to six hundred gallons of potable water per tance assessment teams (HASTs) from PACOM were hour from seawater, and five of the ships had evap- deployed to survey the disaster areas and identify re- orators capable of making an additional twenty-five quirements for military-specific support in the logis- thousand gallons of water per day. Given the priority tics arena (U.S. Navy 2004a). Indonesia’s Minister of need for clean water for cooking and drinking after Defense, Juwono Sudarsono, later characterized the flood-based disasters, these military water produc- U.S. military as having been the “backbone of the lo- tion assets proved to be absolutely critical (as they gistical operations providing assistance to all affect- were during the 2006 Philippine mudslides and in 24 For example, only days ed after the disaster” (Elleman 2006, 43). Bangladesh after cyclone Sidr in 2007.)24 In addition, after cyclone Sidr hit Ban- Upon hearing of the tsunami tragedy, Rear Ad- MSC deployed two replenishment oilers, USNS Tippe- gladesh in November 2007, U.S. Marine helicopters from miral Douglas Crowder, commander of USS Abra- canoe and USNS John Ericsson, to provide food and the USS Kearsarge amphib- ham Lincoln, immediately set up a joint planning fuel to ships and sea-based aircraft, as well as sever- ious assault ship were fer- group (JPG) while en route to Indonesia to plan for al resupply support vessels, including USNS San Jose, rying much needed supplies the multiple contingencies involved in the human- USNS Rainier, USNS Watson, the WestPac Express, and of fresh water produced by the Kearsarge to emergen- itarian relief mission. The JPG created crisis action the HSV-2 Swift. These ships also supported partner cy distribution centers ashore teams (CATs) to organize the day-to-day activities nations assisting with relief efforts. For example, the (U.S. Marine Corps 2007). of the relief mission. TheCAT s located relief supplies, combat stores ship USNS San Jose replenished at sea coordinated relief efforts with other regional liaison the French frigate Georges Leygues and the Austra- officers, identified personnel with prior disaster-re- lian amphibious ship HMAS Kanimbla. lief experience to join shore parties, and provided Of course, effective supply chain networks de- daily first aid and cultural awareness training cours- pend on a range of back-office support services as es to all shore party volunteers. Helicopter pilots well as on experienced logistics professionals in the and crews also received refresher courses on cargo field. In this context, the U.S. military draws on the handling, and maintenance crews modified helicop- Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for support and ters to carry emergency supplies. As noted in the lift supplies, whether for combat readiness, emergen- discussion, a few days after Abraham Lincoln began cy preparedness, or day-to-day operations, includ-

Finding the Right Mix

44 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s ing HA/DR missions. TheDLA , in turn, runs several inventory control, and delivery of all tsunami-relat- defense supply and distribution centers, such as the ed aid provided through the various military supply Defense Energy Support Center (DESC), which fa- channels. The NRCC even locally purchased more cilitates the deployment of fuels and other energy than $t0,000 in relief supplies (U.S. Navy 2005c). sources, and the Defense Supply Center Cargo handlers from the Naval Expeditionary Lo- (DSC-P), which coordinates the procurement and gistics Support Force (NAVELSF) loaded NRCC in- delivery of medical supplies and construction ma- ventory onto MSC supply ships for further delivery terial. The commanders of both organizations act to frontline ships. Once supplies reached ships oper- as key supply chain managers for forward-deployed ating closer to shore, namely those in the Abraham forces, responsible for identifying customer require- Lincoln, Bonhomme Richard and Essex strike groups, ments and for managing inventory control, storage, helicopters on board those ships then shuttled relief distribution, and delivery systems. The main point supplies from ship to shore. Linked together, CONUS- here, however, is that when a foreign disaster strikes based facilities, Hawaii-based facilities, supply units and a military response is approved, the full scope tied to main operating bases and to less developed of the DLA’s network, from CONUS-based centers of operating sites overseas, and forward-deployed mar- excellence to supply facilities overseas, can be mo- itime forces dispersed across the Pacific and Indian bilized to a degree and at a speed that few (if any) Oceans, brought to bear a formidable relief capaci- commercial supply networks could replicate. ty with long reach that was both highly mobile and In response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, for ex- minimally dependent on shore-based assets (many ample, DLA coordinated closely with the Navy Supply of which were unusable in any event.) Systems Command (NAVSUP), which handled the Na- The Air Force’s airlift effort operated a supply chain vy’s logistics during the relief mission. On their end, similar in many ways to that of the U.S. Navy. Just as NAVSUP personnel worked closely with the Naval Op- relief supplies were moved from the FISCs and NRCC erational Logistics Support Center (NOLSC) in Virgin- onto MSC supply ships for further delivery to the front- ia and with three fleet and industrial supply centers line ships, forward-based and AMC-assigned aircraft (FISC) in the Pacific area to deliver transport materi- flew cargo to a central distribution center point at al, critical supplies, and personnel support to the af- Utapao in Thailand. From there, in-theater airlift op- fected countries. FISC Yokosuka, the Navy’s forward erated mainly in a hub-and-spoke system. Once relief supply center, sent officers with expertise in fueling materials arrived at Utapao, they were loaded onto operations, requisition processing, contracting, and C-130 and C-17 aircraft and flown to other smaller air- transportation to the Naval Regional Contracting fields throughout the disaster area. From these hubs, Center (NRCC) in Singapore, which headquartered relief supplies were offloaded onto waiting trucks the Navy’s logistics operations in the Pacific. FISC for transport on “spoke” routes to outlying helicop- Yokosuka also moved high priority ship and air wing ter landing zones for further delivery. This method materials from Yokota Air Base to Singapore for fur- allows for greater efficiency in the use of various air- ther transport to ships stationed in the Indian Ocean craft and increases the overall pace and breadth of (Navy Supply Corps 2005). When Bonhomme Richard cargo delivery. Moreover, since most coastal roads arrived on short notice at Guam on its way to Indo- were washed out in the hardest hits areas of Suma- nesia, FISC Pearl Harbor handled all of its logistics tra, “helicopters were the only way to move supplies requests. Finally, logistics support and contracting efficiently from the logistical ports of entry at Ban- representatives from FISC completely re- da Aceh and Meulaboh to the more than 60 villages outfitted USNS Mercy with humanitarian relief sup- and camps of displaced persons along the coast” (El- plies, medical equipment, operating theaters, and leman 2006, 61). Indeed, helicopters “provided [the] four 75,000-gallon per day evaporators with a 1.2 mil- last link in the chain as the only way to get the sup- lion-gallon holding capacity in just five days – a re- plies to those in need” (Elleman 2006, 55). markable feat considering USNS Mercy had not been In Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake, relief goods deployed in thirteen years (Elleman 2006, 79). quickly flooded Pakistan’s single airstrip, creating Meanwhile, as the key logistics staging point, the a coordination and logistical nightmare, with non- NRCC was responsible for the procurement, storage, essential cargo and inappropriate aid (such as ex-

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Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief 45 t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s

pired food, Viagra, and women’s swim suits) block- sistance from NOLSC in Virginia. Within days of the ing critical relief supplies and services and further earthquake, logisticians from NOLSC arrived in Is- congesting the already taxed transport systems. To lamabad to assist in operational logistics and trans- help manage the international aid pouring into Pak- portation. NOLSC personnel immediately established istan’s single airstrip, U.S. forces sent in air transpor- the Disaster Assistance Center Logistics Operations tation specialists, air traffic controllers, cargo movers, Center (DAC-LOC) to provide twenty-four/seven sup- and aircraft maintenance crew to handle all U.S. aid port to Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan (DAC- and much of the international aid arriving at Chak- PAK) and to serve as a liaison to DAC-PAk and the lala Air Base (U.S. Air Force 2005b). A twenty-three- NAVCENT Logistics Response Center. Additionally, member contingency support group from MacGuire DAC-LOC coordinated the delivery of critical human- Air Force Base also arrived to provide planning and itarian relief supplies from ESG 1 and other naval logistics support, including help in the development logistics aircraft to Islamabad. Once bulldozers of an air operations center (AOC) for aviation tasking cleared the roads, trucks hauled relief supplies to coordination. U.S. officers also prepared daily brief- Muzaffarabad and depots deeper inside Azad Jam- ing slides of all air and sea movement in support of mu and Kashmir (AJK) and the North West Frontier the overall relief effort. A U.S. Congress report later Province. Of course, as discussed already, helicop- observed, “Perhaps the largest contribution the U.S. ters handled the final distribution and delivery of re- military made to the relief effort was the logistical lief supplies into the earthquake zone. As mentioned management of the air space and relief operations earlier as well, helicopter crews sped up the delivery staged from Chaklala Air Base” (U.S. Senate 2005). process using sling-loads to ensure that at least thir- U.S. military and commercial ships also ferried hu- ty days’ worth of food and other relief supplies were manitarian assistance into Karachi, Pakistan’s larg- on hand at central distribution centers. Using the est city and port. The first U.S. Navy ship to partici- sling-load method, the U.S. military delivered the li- pate in the relief effort wasUSS Pearl Harbor, a dock on’s share of the aid, delivering over twenty-six mil- landing ship from ESG 1. USS Pearl Harbor was on a lion pounds of supplies and transporting more than regularly scheduled deployment to the North Arabi- eighteen thousand people in over forty-six hundred an Gulf as part of maritime security operations when missions (U.S. Department of Defense 2006). it received orders to change course. After a brief stop To ensure that the right products went to the right in Bahrain to collect heavy engineering equipment, place at the right time, NOLSC also provided situa- such as dump trucks, front-end loaders, backhoes, tional awareness updates to the NAVSUP LOC, the cargo trucks, a road grader, and a forklift, the dock CENTCOM Deployment and Distributions Operations landing ship arrived in Karachi on October 18, 2005. Center (CDDOC) in Kuwait, and other commanders After offloading its cargo, Pearl Harbor headed to- and staff assisting with logistics operations. NOLSC wards Fujairah in the (UAE) transportation and distribution offices worked close- to pick up 130 tons of emergency relief supplies and ly as well with NAVCENT and TRANSCOM on cargo volunteers from UAE’s Red Crescent Society bound tracking and tracing by sending cargo routing in- for Pakistan (U.S. Navy 2005d). TheESG 1 amphibious formation file CRIF( ) status reports to all ships and assault ship USS Tarawa and amphibious transport units (Dodson and McKemmy 2006). Whether in re- dock USS Cleveland delivered engineering equipment sponse to the Indian Ocean tsunami or the Pakistan and emergency supplies into Karachi as well. earthquake, then, the U.S. military established high- Since the earthquake had severely damaged Pak- ly effective supply chains to manage operational lo- istan’s infrastructure and subsequent mudslides ob- gistics, linking logistics centers in the United States structed many key roadways, first responders faced to centers and personnel operating in the wider re- significant logistical challenges. “Relief support had gion and directly in the disaster zone. In response to to start with the total reconstruction of the trans- both disasters, U.S. military supply managers and lo- portation infrastructure in areas hardest hit by the gisticians from logistics operations centers around earthquake” (Dodson and McKemmy 2006). To do the world maintained robust information exchange so, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), and engagement with deployed forces. a component command of CENTCOM, requested as-

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46 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s

The major humanitarian relief organizations, of when maritime combat forces are also stretched to course, could and should take steps to improve their the maximum because of the hostilities in Iraq and own logistical capabilities, thereby easing the burden Afghanistan, offers perhaps the clearest evidence of that military forces – particularly American forces – the growing importance of military engineering and now carry in the management of large-scale disaster general construction assets that can be used to sup- responses. Good first steps would include boosting port both high-intensity warfighting contingencies their in-house logistics staffs and acquiring some of and lower-intensity stability operations. the technology solutions to inventory control now The specific capabilities of theNMCB s, as well as in use by commercial groups and the military. Sim- those of a number of specialized units maintained ply coordinating more closely with each other to re- by the Seabees (such as the underwater construc- duce duplication and maximize the use of limited re- tion teams or UCTs), run the full gamut of general sources such as time, money, goods, transportation, construction skills.27 Among other capabilities, they and human capital would also be helpful. For the include those related to building construction, hos- foreseeable future, however, the military will con- pital/clinic setup, water-well drilling, utilities con- tinue to field the most skilled and ready-to-respond struction and maintenance (of electrical, plumbing, logistical and supply chain capabilities, even if there heating, and air conditioning systems, for example), are situations – as in Myanmar after cyclone Nargis and the construction and repair of bridges, airfields, – when politics blocks their full exploitation. piers, and wharfs. Survey teams may also be includ- ed, together with assessment teams able to identi- Engineering and Construction Support fy and quantify engineering and construction capa- The provision of engineering and general construc- bilities that may be needed for a particular task. On tion support constitutes yet another area of exper- relatively short notice, personnel with the right mix tise within the U.S. military that has proven to be of skills can be regrouped into NMCB units that are of enormous value to HA/DR operations overseas. scaled to task and that can link up as necessary with Trained specifically for disaster-relief and civil-sup- pre-positioned supplies. Their ability to 25 Composed of approximately six hundred port activities, engineering units from all the mili- deploy overseas without having to carry Seabees and other personnel, each NMCB can be broken down into task-specific detach- tary services are uniquely prepared and equipped all their equipment and gear with them, ments (or DETs) ranging from two to a hun- to participate in such operations, whether as part together with the fact that they are self- dred or more Seabees. Modular gear and of an emergency response to a foreign disaster or a sustaining once deployed, renders these equipment packages for the three NMCBs (and planned HA/HCA exercise undertaken by a regional units ideally suited for responding to their DETs) that are normally forward-de- ployed are pre-positioned at the battalion bas- COCOM in the context of its theater security cooper- foreign disasters and/or for operating es overseas and on supply ships belonging ation program (TSCP). Units from the Seabees’ naval in areas with limited capacity to support to the Maritime Pre-positioned Force (MPF). mobile construction battalions (or NMCBs), which outside groups. The most agile, ready As a result, the Seabees are an ideal rapid re- sponse engineering and construction force may already be forward-deployed, are expedition- to respond NMCB elements are the Air for the regional COCOMs (interview 2008d). ary-minded, can be tailored in size and composition Detachments (or Air DETs), common- 26 The Navy now has nine activeNMCB s, to the task at hand, and can draw upon pre-posi- ly referred to as the Seabees’ “911” force. five of which are based in Gulfport, Mis- sissippi, and four in Port Hueneme, Cal- tioned supplies and equipment sets based in theater, Composed of up to one hundred individ- ifornia. The current eighteen-month have been especially active in recent years, and de- uals, the Air DETs can be deployed via C- rotation schedule involves six months mands for their services are on the rise.25 Indeed, the 130s or C-17s anywhere on the globe in of forward-deployed duty, followed by NMCBs currently stationed in Okinawa, Kuwait, and approximately forty-eight hours, while twelve months of homeport training. 27 While the NMCB is the basic building block Iraq, along with the smaller DETs that they assign a full NMCB would normally need about for Seabee deployments, there are a few spe- to various foreign duty locations, have maintained seven days to forward deploy. cial units – including two UTCs, two construc- some of the highest operational tempos (or OPTEM- Another valuable Seabee charac- tion battalion maintenance units (CBMUs), POs) of any U.S. Navy units. Moreover, the pressures teristic for HA/DR missions is that all and one naval construction force support unit (NCFSU) – that may deploy when some- that such OPTEMPOs placed on active duty units NMCB DETs are trained and equipped what unique skills are required. TheUTC s ob- were so stressful that the Navy decided to stand up to deploy to all DET duty stations, no viously do a lot of underwater construction an additional active duty NMCB in 2007 in order to matter where they may be initially de- and repair, the CBMUs are active in fleet hos- pital operations, and the NCFSU specializes establish a less taxing and more productive Seabee ployed. In early February 2008, for exam- in truck transport, quarrying, rock crush- rotation schedule.26 This decision, taken at a time ple, NMCB 74, stationed in Kuwait, was ing, and electrical transmission lines.

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supporting DET operations in Djibouti (for roof re- As for disaster relief support, Seabee DETS were pairs at the Waddi Primary School, as part of JTF- among the first military units to arrive on scene fol- HOA); in Tema, Ghana (for the construction of a lowing the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, providing all major medical facility, as part of the Africa Partner- manner of disaster relief across the affected region ship Station (APS) program centered around the USS from debris removal, road clearing, runway repair, Fort McHenry deployment in the Gulf of Guinea28); and overall damage assessment to the distribution in the Black Sea region of (for road build- of potable water, medical supplies and tents. Seabee ing, as part of JTF-East29); and in Trinidad and To- DETs from the Okinawa-based NMCB were equally bago (for the development of a community center prompt to respond to the 2005 Pakistan earthquake and clinic, as part of SOUTHCOM’s annual HA/HCA and the 2006 Philippines mudslides with a similarly exercises now known as the New Horizons/Beyond broad range of construction and engineering sup- the Horizons initiatives (interview 2008e)).30 World- port that would not otherwise have been available 28 The Africa Partnership Station APS( ) pro- wide, Seabee DETs will be involved in no in a timely manner. In the Pakistan case, Seabees, gram was an international maritime coopera- fewer than twenty-three such efforts of together with other service engineers, developed tion initiative led by U.S. Naval Forces Europe that aimed to improve maritime safety and se- varying size and duration in FY 2008 in rather unique solutions to the challenge of earth- curity in West and Central Africa through a support of the TSCPs of PACOM, CENT- moving operations in difficult to reach high-altitude series of information exchanges and training COM, EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, and NORTH- village areas, arranging for the accelerated acquisi- opportunities with local maritime services. COM. Seabee teams, moreover, complet- tion of light-weight Bobcat loaders and excavators Structured around a seven-month deployment in the Gulf of Guinea by the USS Fort McHen- ed a number of critical ENCAP missions that could be flown in by sling-loaded helicopters. ry amphibious dock landing ship and the High – including school, hospital, and clinic On the Philippines front, moreover, regular Seabee Speed Vessel (HSV)-2 Swift, APS deployments renovations – as part of the HA activi- participation in the annual HA/DR-oriented Balika- included training teams from all three U.S. maritime services, plus military staff from ties ashore sponsored by the USS Peleliu tan exercises between U.S. and Filipino forces has various European allies and selected civil- and USNS Comfort medical ship deploy- provided important opportunities for post-disaster ian experts from U.S. government agencies ments in FY 2007, and they will conduct follow-on assistance and local training to help re- and NGOs. Activities ashore included dozens of HA missions, many conducted by Seabees, similar missions during comparable op- duce the likely damage from future mudslides and in the countries visited. See U.S. Navy 2007. erations planned by the Navy for FY 2008 similar disasters. 29 JTF-East was established by EUCOM on and beyond. Over the near term, this Although traditionally much less expeditionary- the Black Sea coast of Romania as a base from would include the deployment of the minded than the Seabees, the U.S. Army Corps of which to engage the various Central Asian countries in security cooperation initiatives. USNS Mercy to the Western Pacific and Engineers (USACE) has participated in a growing 30 In the Beyond the Horizons portion of Southeast Asia as part of PACOM’s Pacif- number of HA/DR operations overseas in recent these exercises, SOUTHCOM plans for a much- ic Partnership 2008 initiative, and the years, and it is rapidly adjusting its organizational expanded construction component in FY deployments of the USS Boxer along the structure to become a more prominent and effec- 2008, with no fewer than nineteen construc- tion projects in ten countries (as opposed to Pacific coastline of Central and South tive player in disaster relief and civil support activ- the normal three or four countries). The Sea- America and the USS Kearsarge in the ities outside the continental United States (CONUS). bees will play prominently in most if not Caribbean as part of SOUTHCOM’s Con- Incentives to move in this direction certainly accel- all of these activities (interview 2008e). tinuing Promise 2008 initiative. erated with the start of U.S. combat operations in Global Snapshot of Seabee Deployment Horn of Africa NMCB 74 Det Kuwait 22NCR FWD Romania NMCB 74 Korea San Nicholas Island NMCB 74 Det NMCB 14 Det NMCB 5 Det NMCB 5 Det Japan ROTA Afghanistan San Clemente Island NMCB 5 NMCB 74 Det NMCB 1 Det NMCB 5 Det Andros NMCB 17 Det NMCB 74 Det Guam Bahrain NMCB 5 Det USS Fort McHenry Iraq NMCB 74 Det GTMO African Partnership 30NCR FWD Philippines NMCB 74 Det NMCB 74 Det NMCB 1 II MEF NMCB 5 Det NMCB 17 II MEF NMCB 1 SOF NMCB 17 SOF NMCB 5 Det

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Afghanistan and Iraq, which substantially increased Expansion of FFE/FEST Units for Stability Operations the demand for innovative, forward-deployed army Forward Engineer Support Team - Main (FESTM) engineering support. Additional boosts came with 28 person team the release of the 2007 Army Action Plan for Stabil- Forward Engineer Support Team - Advance (FESTA) ity Operations and the 2008 Army Field Manual on 9 x 7 person teams Operations, both of which elevated stability opera- Contingency Real Estate Support Team (CREST) tions to a priority level equal to warfighting. More 8(5) x 5 person teams to the point, they provided important doctrinal jus- Structure Environmental Support Team (EnvST) 8 x 4 person teams tification for more vigorous efforts by theUSACE to FFE Logistics Support Team (LST)§ support the regional COCOMs with general engineer- 8 x 4 person teams ing skills and capabilities that might be needed for

Current Engineer Infrastructure and a range of stability operations missions, including Intelligence Reachback Center (EI2RC)‡ those related to public works and civil infrastruc- 4 person teams ture development that are so central as well to more Base Development Team (BDT)‡ 10 x 12 person teams specific HA/DR initiatives. A critical first step toward improving USACE Reorganize FFE into recognizeable, modular plugs responsiveness for CONUS contingencies, howev- er, was taken as early as 2001 when the concept of Field Force Engineering (FFE) was introduced. The idea behind FFE was to create a mechanism that Forward Engineer Support Team - Main (FESTM)† 2 teams of 9 military and 28 civilian personnel [TOE] would link forward-deployed forces more effective- Forward Engineer Support Team - MainAdvance (FESTM (FESTA)† )† ly, especially those engaged in smaller-scale con- 28 teams of 92 military and 286 civilian civilian personnel personnel [TOE] tingency operations (with limited organic combat Environmental Support Team -(EnvST) support), with mission-specific USACE assets. To- 8 teams of 4 civilian personnel [TDA] ward that end, the FFE construct called for relative- Contingency Real Estate Support Team (CREST) ly small, multidisciplinary teams of engineers and 8 teams of 4 civilian personnel [TDA] related professionals – known as forward engineer Engineer Infrastructure and support teams (or FESTs) – that could be deployed Intelligence Reachback Center (EI2RC) overseas where needed in a matter of days. Simi- 1 team of 8 military personnel [TDA] Proposed FFE Reorganization lar to the Seabee DETs, the FESTs can be tailored Base Development Team (BDT ) both in size and composition to meet specific and 8 teams of 12 military personnel [TDA] evolving requirements on the ground, and USACE FFE - Field Force Engineering is planning to reorganize existing teams – whose FEST - Forward Engineer Support Team structure is somewhat ad hoc – into more carefully TOE - Table of Organization and Equipment designed modular plugs. The goal is to have on hand TDA - Table of Distribution and Allowances † tele-engineering capable eight smaller FEST-advance (or FEST-A) eight-person § LPRT=4/16 FFE trained / designated teams that can provide a forward JTF with limited ‡ reachback organization with non-deployable teams but specialized assessment, along with contracting and technical support capabilities, and two larger 31 FEST support is provided to the regional COCOMs via their Army Service FEST-main (or FEST-M) teams each with thirty-sev- Component Commands (ASCCs), and the Army is now assigning USACE liaison officers to variousCOCOM staffs to make sure that theCOCOM leaderships un- en members who can provide broader assistance on derstand what the FESTs can bring to a disaster response operation, both via 31 a more sustained basis (USACE 2008a). organic assets and via reach-back capabilities. Both FEST units are led by mil- Both FEST elements employ a sophisticated itary officers but staffed by civilian specialists. FEST-As normally include two voice, video, and satellite communications package, military staff members and six civilians, while FEST-Ms generally include nine military staff members and twenty-eight civilians. A similar expandable struc- dubbed the Tele-engineering Communications-De- ture, it is worth noting, is employed by the U.S. Air Force’s Red Horse engineer ployable (TCE-D) kit, to reach back for additional ex- teams, which include a sixteen-person advance element known as a Red Horse pertise and engineering support from the USACE’s One team and a more robust ninety-four-person Red Horse Two team. The Red Horse teams, then, can also provide useful expeditionary engineering sup- worldwide network of offices, labs, and centers of port to forward-deployed JTFs, but neither one has the range of deployable ca- excellence. During the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, pabilities nor the reach-back capability of the USACE teams (USACE 2008a).

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32 Under the National Response Plan (for for example, FEST-A teams in Indonesia, nizations to improve local and regional capacities to domestic emergencies) developed by the U.S. Thailand, and Sri Lanka relied on tech- manage and respond to large-scale disasters (USACE Department of Homeland Security, USACE 33 has been assigned lead responsibility for nical evaluations from CONUS-based ex- 2008c). Building on this EUCOM/CENTCOM-cen- the emergency support function (ESF) re- perts transferred via TCE-D channels to tered experience (which it now refers to as its Emer- lated to public works and engineering, in- provide relief workers with up-to-date gency Management International, or EMI, program), cluding emergency power and water supply, reports on which transport routes were USACE hopes to organize future CMEP activities in temporary roofing and housing, debris clear- ance and removal, and infrastructure assess- best to use to bring essential supplies to the AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM AORs, both of which ment. As it reorganizes to provide broader isolated communities. Based on their re- are burdened by numerous disasters each year. So, support overseas, USACE seeks to adapt cer- view of near-real-time satellite imagery, too, USACE plans to expand on the numerous water tain procedures developed to speed the pro- vision of domestic disaster support to foreign non-deployed USACE analysts were also management and civil construction projects (such disaster scenarios. In this context, long- able to use TCE-D networks to provide as the building of clinics, schools, and low-cost hous- standing USACE responsibilities for disaster FEST teams with detailed damage assess- ing) that it has undertaken for many years now in a support in the U.S. trust territories pro- vide an especially useful base of experience ments of airfields, harbors, bridges, and host of foreign countries under contract to USAID, relevant to future foreign disaster relief. buildings, thereby helping to steer local the World Bank, the UN, the EU, and other govern- 33 Similar to other cooperative pro- populations and relief teams away from mental agencies. Needless to say, such efforts have grams with former Soviet bloc countries, unsafe sectors and establishing an initial also prepared the USACE well to work effectively with these CMEP activities were paid for by War- saw Initiative funding. The Warsaw Initia- data base on which structures should be a diverse array of civil, military, governmental, and tive program is a U.S. program established repaired or rebuilt first in the recovery/ even NGO partners, in itself an important capabili- in 1994 by the Clinton administration to ad- reconstruction phase (Bohannon 2005). ty to bring to HA/DR operations. vance closer relations and military interop- Policy planners at USACE headquarters So, while not yet deployed forward on as wide erability between NATO and PfP countries. in Washington, D.C., are also drawing a scale as the Seabees, the USACE’s ability to assist on lessons learned from supporting the Federal the regional COCOMs in the event of a sudden for- Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) during eign disaster has grown considerably in recent years, hurricane Katrina and other domestic disasters to as has its ability to support both the COCOMs and a expedite foreign disaster support in the future. Key variety of non-military development organizations initiatives on this front include the negotiation of (be they American, foreign, or international) in lon- advance contracts with prime venders for overseas ger-term capacity-building projects. TheUSACE also support in the areas of facility construction, debris enjoys the twin benefits of being tied directly to the removal, and emergency power supply, as well as the Army and DoD with authority to operate through the pre-scripting of critical engineering and construc- COCOMs, while remaining an organization staffed tion missions (such as prompt temporary housing, largely (nearly 90 percent) by civilians with access emergency power setups, and urban search and res- to non-DoD funding streams and customers. USACE cue support) likely to be performed in a disaster sce- teams, therefore, may have an easier time operating nario (USACE 2008b).32 in foreign environments where uniformed personnel With an eye toward improving foreign partner di- may not be welcome (or safe), yet still be able to do saster prevention and damage limitation capabili- so in full support of U.S. strategic objectives (given ties, USACE officials are seeking as well to strengthen their DoD/Army affiliations). Based in part on new their civil military emergency preparedness (CMEP) policies for rehiring retired personnel in emergen- training programs with former coun- cy situations, non-military USACE staff are likely to tries as part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) emerge as well as an increasingly important talent activities, and to extend these programs to other pool for relieving overstretched military units in key regional theaters. As of early 2008, some fifty-five engineering skill sectors. CMEP events in over twenty-three countries in East and Central Europe, Central Asia, and the Cauca- Communications and Information Management sus had been completed since they began in 1999, Clearly, effective communications among first re- using a combination of technical workshops, ta- sponders, together with accurate information on ble-top exercises, and larger planning conferences evolving conditions in and around the disaster to pull together a broad range of civilian and mili- zone (or what is commonly referred to as “situation- tary experts from national and multinational orga- al awareness”), are essential to successful disaster

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50 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s relief operations. This is especially true when local and the use of chat rooms, which used SIPRNET al- sources (and networks) of information are over- most exclusively. As a result, Utapao essentially was whelmed by the scale and severity of the disaster at cut out of much of the early decision making (El- hand (as was the case during the 2004 Indian Ocean leman 2006, 72). Utapao finally acquired SIPRNET tsunami), rendering them incapable of communi- on January 7, but since SIPRNET computers were cating promptly and accurately on what assistance housed separately from all other servers, they were is needed, where it is needed, and in what priority not monitored around the clock, and thus, were used order. Timely information sharing may be compli- little. It was only after Lt. General Blackman, the CSF- cated further when there is a flood of relief agencies 536 commander, approved the purchase of dozens all responding at roughly the same time, with many of commercial cellular phones to distribute among if not all relying on communications systems – in- military and civilian first responders, as well as the cluding hardware, software, and bandwidths – that construction of an unclassified website that allowed are not interoperable with those of the others. Over- foreign militaries and international aid groups to coming such challenges and developing innovative monitor the overall operation, that day-to-day com- solutions to communications barriers is still one munications were substantially improved. Yet, as more arena of military expertise that could prove this example demonstrates, more often than not it invaluable to future foreign disaster responses. It is is the military that can best resolve communications a capability, moreover, that is unlikely to found in and information-sharing difficulties to the benefit adequate measure from non-military or commer- of the wider disaster relief community, even if the cial quarters. military itself is part of the initial problem. This is not to suggest, of course, that the mili- In the early days of operation Unified Assistance, tary in general and American forces in particular while CSF-536 was still active, PACOM’s Joint Intel- have all the answers when it comes to communi- ligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) presented another cations solutions, or that they are free from respon- example of how the regional COCOMs can assist in sibility for some of the problems of the past (some ways that non-military participants in foreign disas- of which may occur again in the future). Given the ter relief would be hard pressed to duplicate. JICPAC, numbers of civilian, military, governmental, and an intelligence fusion center that provides com- NGO groups involved, multi-agency and multina- mand decision makers with a wide variety of intel- tional HA/DR operations appear to function best in ligence analyses and risk assessments, used its newly an unclassified, open-architecture system of infor- formed Contingencies Operational Intelligence Cell mation sharing, yet military firewalls and classifi- to maintain non-stop, all-source intelligence oper- cation policies have often prohibited such sharing ations and produced the first comprehensive dam- and restricted the timely exchange of information. age assessment and situational awareness reports This can be (and has been) a problem even between that could be shared with all interested parties. JIC- U.S. military units engaged in the same disaster re- PAC data on transnational threats in the region were lief operation. During the Indian Ocean tsunami re- also essential once the OUA relief mission began to lief operation (operation Unified Assistance, orOUA ), expand in Indonesia’s Aceh province, where a long- for instance, the USS Abraham Lincoln, which served standing separatist movement held the potential to as a main communications hub linking the multi- block the transport of aid to communities in need. national CSF-536 headquarters in Utapao with PA- As an integral part of the JICPAC assessment pro- COM headquarters in Honolulu, was operating on cess, P-3 reconnaissance aircraft and helicopters the classified Secret Internet Protocol Router Net- equipped with cameras deployed by PACOM soon work (SIPRNET), while CSF-536 itself was initially after the disaster struck provided some of the most set up to use only the unclassified Non-secure In- detailed photographic imagery of key ports, towns, ternet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), which and lines of communication, all of which helped is relied upon by most non-military government to direct relief supplies to where they were needed organizations. most via the quickest route. This information also U.S. military-to-military exchanges, moreover, proved to be extremely helpful in setting priorities depended quite heavily on Internet Relay Chat (IRC)

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for reconstruction during the recovery phase of the ble (for example, FalconView software was used relief operation (Dorsett 2005, 14-15). by the U.S. military, while USAID/OFDA teams used PACOM experts played a central role as well in or- ArcView), and that communications between Pak- ganizing and synthesizing commercially developed istani and American responders were often hin- information (such as satellite imagery produced by dered by the fact that “Pakistan was heavily reliant Digital Globe), and then integrating that with com- on fax communications while others relied mostly mand assessments and making the finished product on e-mail” (Hand 2006). As a result, preparations readily available to all relief agencies in an unclas- are being taken both by DoD and COCOM planners sified format. In this regard, PACOM’s Asia-Pacific to facilitate the use of cell phones and commercial Area Network (APAN), a non-secure commercial e-mail accounts as the principal means of commu- website created and maintained by the command nication for and between military and civilian re- to help promote multilateral defense cooperation sponders in future operations. In addition, RADM in the Asia-Pacific region, emerged as a critical in- LeFever, the DAC commander during the Pakistan formation portal that was used extensively by for- relief effort, has pressedD oD to develop a deployable eign military partners (including Britain, Canada, wide area network (WAN) that would be compatible and Australia), the tsunami-affected nations, inter- between military units (ideally including both U.S. national organizations, NGOs, and other non-tradi- and key partner forces) and major non-military re- tional security partners. Since operation Unified sponders, and work toward that goal appears to be 34 34 Another option might be broader reli- Assistance, moreover, APAN has been underway. ance on the Collaborative (Combined) En- further developed to serve, among oth- Another promising step toward broader informa- terprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS), a single, multina- er roles, as a repository for the daily/ tion sharing on best practices for managing com- tional data network that can be used to monthly situation reports and after-ac- plex civil-military contingencies was taken by JFCOM facilitate confidential, multi-level informa- tion assessments filed by a variety of in October 2007, when the command launched an tion sharing. At the moment, however, ac- military and civilian relief teams that effort to develop an enhanced version of the Joint cess to CENTRIXS terminals appears to be too limited within the disaster relief com- have participated in a number of disas- Knowledge Online (JKO) network. Basically, this is munity to allow effective exploitation. ter responses in the PACOM AOR over an internet-based portal that uses advanced distrib- the past several years. As such, it serves as a critical uted learning technology to deliver courseware and clearinghouse for disaster response lessons learned. links to other relevant training products and servic- The APAN website (http://www1.apan-info.net/) is es to individuals who are preparing for or currently also now home to a virtual information center (VIC) engaged in joint and/or combined integrated op- that tracks disasters and other regional crises as erations, including HA/DR operations and exercis- they unfold in near real-time, as well as an informa- es. In addition to the U.S. warfighting community, tion site for the Multinational Planning Augmenta- the enhanced JKO network is being made available tion Team (MPAT). As discussed in greater detail in to key intergovernmental and interagency partici- chapter 4, MPAT facilitates the creation and/or ex- pants in such operations, including NATO and other pansion of multinational task force headquarters multinational partners. Previously, only DoD per- to manage disaster relief efforts and other crisis re- sonnel could access JKO’s content through NIPRNET, sponses, and the APAN website entries are a conve- but this improved version can be tapped quite eas- nient way to share MPAT guidance with the global ily by authorized non-DoD users via a user name disaster relief community. and password entry system. A key objective over Lest it seem that the communication challenges time is to support knowledge access, management, described above – and the solutions developed by and distribution by means of a variety of common- the military – are specific to the PACOM operating ly available and easy to manipulate cyber/electron- environment, it should be noted that incompatible ic tools, including instant messaging, email, chat software systems also complicated timely response rooms, news files, and archived reports and analy- efforts following the 2005 Pakistan earthquake. Af- ses. An option, moreover, for real-time reach-back ter-action reports by DoD indicate, for example, that through JKO channels to service staffs, subject mat- software systems used by first responders from dif- ter experts, and additional specialized information ferent U.S. government agencies were incompati- banks is likely to be of particular value to both ci-

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vilian and military users who are already forward- lar schedule to address everyday healthcare needs deployed in support of a relief mission. and to help build up local medical skills – place a Of course, many more communications and data premium on sustaining and enhancing American exchange technologies beyond the JKO network military capabilities in the area of expeditionary could be discussed to illustrate the unique capabil- medical care. ities in this particular sector that U.S. military forc- Since the deployment of the San Diego-based es (and those of many of America’s partner nations) USNS Mercy to Southeast Asia in January 2005 to can contribute to HA/DR-type operations. The main provide medical assistance to the tsunami victims, point, however, is not the military’s technological ca- the U.S. Navy’s two hospital ships – neither of which pacity per se, but its ability to leverage that capacity had been to sea since operation Desert Storm in to ensure command and control and to expedite cri- 1991 before the tsunami struck – have emerged as sis operations – including foreign disaster respons- particularly valuable platforms both for emergency es – in austere (and possibly insecure) environments relief and broader engagement missions. For exam- where situational awareness may be incomplete and ple, during the Mercy’s tsunami-related deployment, unclear at the outset. And of all the diverse elements which led to a six-month stay in the Southeast Asian that make up the disaster relief community, none are region, the ship traveled thirty-six thousand nau- better positioned to provide such support than the tical miles, treated more than one hundred thou- increasingly net-centric and expeditionary-minded sand patients, and performed nearly five hundred armed forces of the United States. surgeries (Smith 2005).36 After first treating some ten thousand patients from Banda Aceh in north- Medical Assistance and Health Diplomacy western Sumatra (the part of Indonesia closest to As noted several times already in this report, provid- the epicenter of the earthquake that triggered the ing emergency medical aid to the victims of a sud- tsunamis), the Mercy went on to conduct a series of den foreign disaster, as well as longer-term public MEDCAP and dental civic action program (DENCAP) health assistance and training through programmed activities on the island of Alor off the southeastern exchanges with regional allies and partner nations, coast of Sumatra and in East Timor, before rushing are missions for which the U.S. military is especial- back northwest to the island of Nias after it was ly well suited and well equipped. Moreover, if the hit by an 8.7 magnitude earthquake in March 2005. raft of small and medium-sized disasters to which Here, medical personnel from the ship performed American forces responded in 2007 and 2008 is any 123 urgent care surgeries and over 19,000 medical indication, the demand for military medical support procedures of one kind or another (Asia-Pacific De- – be it a one-time airlift of urgently needed medical fense Forum 2005, 6), before swinging back south- supplies via a C-130 or the deployment of one of the east yet again a month later to assist 35 TheUSS Kearsarge, for example, can sup- U.S. Navy’s multipurpose amphibious assault ships the people of the Madang area in Papua port up to six hundred patients while still pro- viding routine care to crew members and (which are second only to the USNS Mercy and USNS New Guinea after a series of major vol- embarked troops. Major medical facilities in- Comfort hospital ships in sea-based medical capa- canic eruptions there displaced thou- clude four main operating rooms, two emer- bility35) – will almost certainly continue to rise. At sands from their homes, leaving them gency operating rooms, four dental operating the same time, MEDCAP and other civic aid initia- without proper shelter, food, or water rooms, x-ray facilities, a blood bank, various labs, and an intensive care ward. This setup tives that PACOM and SOUTHCOM have integrated supplies, and in need of a wide range of is fairly standard for all landing ship, heli- into their increasingly sophisticated, multi-stop hu- basic health care support. copter deck (LHD)-class ships, a number of manitarian ship visits (such as Continuing Promise Apart from confirming the utility of which, including the Kearsarge, the Essex and the Wasp, have performed admirably in nu- 2008) – together with the shorter, country-specific hospital ships for foreign disaster relief, merous foreign disaster responses and pro- medical readiness training exercises (MEDRETEs) the Mercy’s 2005 deployment highlight- grammed HA/HCA mission (USS Kearsarge). that all the regional COCOMs use for training and en- ed three other characteristics of a suc- 36 On board the ship were twelve operat- gagement purposes – underscore the ongoing value cessful international medical mission. ing theaters, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) equipment, a one thousand-bed hos- of what one expert has called “health diplomacy” in None of the three, it’s worth acknowl- pital facility, a diagnostic and clinical lab- non-crisis conditions (Bonventre 2007, 18). Both ini- edging, was on full display in the Mercy’s oratory, a pharmacy, an optometry lab, two tiatives – the provision of emergency disaster relief post-tsunami tour, but all have had a oxygen-producing plants, and hundreds of and the conduct of collaborative efforts on a regu- definitive effect on the design and con- active-duty and reserve medical and med- ical support personnel (U.S. Navy 2005e)

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duct of subsequent missions. The first aspect, and health NGOs that can establish effective coopera- the one that perhaps received the most coverage tive ties with counterpart groups and local officials in news reports of the Mercy’s post-tsunami tour, in the countries visited. The objective of such part- relates to the surprisingly positive influence such nerships, of course, would be to ensure that capaci- missions can have on public attitudes toward the ty-building projects on the ground are organized in United States within the countries assisted, includ- such a way that they will have a longer lasting ef- ing among Islamic communities where the image fect after the ship departs. The 2005 Mercy deploy- of America has been significantly tarnished follow- ment took the first steps in this direction by relying ing the U.S. invasion of Iraq. One survey, for example, on Project HOPE, a Virginia-based health education found that favorable views of America in Indonesia and humanitarian assistance organization, to help jumped from a low of 15 percent to a high of 79 per- identify and finance opportunities to repair or re- cent of those polled after the tsunami relief effort, build clinics and hospitals damaged or destroyed with a good portion of that rise directly attributable by the tsunami. to the work of the Mercy (Pew Research Center 2007). It was left, however, to the ship deployments A similar increase in favorability ratings was record- that followed – which have been less crisis-driv- ed during the Mercy’s second, follow-up mission to en and have benefited from longer lead times for Southeast Asia in the spring of 2006, with 87 percent planning – to refine and expand upon this partner- of those surveyed in Bangladesh stating that the ac- ship approach. Each new mission has added to the tivities of the hospital ship had made their opinion of on-board NGO team such established groups as Op- the United States more positive (Ballen 2006). Many eration Smile, CARE International, Aloha Medical other examples could be noted as well in connection Mission of Hawaii, and International Relief Teams, with the deployments of the USNS Comfort in 2006 while reaching out as well to a carefully selected and 2007 and the USS Peleliu in 2007, but the main mix of local and international NGOs – and, when point is that such deployments can have (and have appropriate, governmental and intergovernmen- had) a powerful public relations effect, one that can tal agencies – with which to collaborate on train- help to advance broader U. S. strategic and foreign ing, construction, and related development projects policy interests by laying a more solid foundation of ashore. Increasingly, the trend has been toward as- goodwill among the populations served. sembling a more robust and multifaceted human- Hence, more recent medical ship deployments – itarian assistance program in support of medical including the last Comfort tour of Central America ship tours that can complement (and magnify the and the Caribbean in the fall of 2007 and the Mercy impact of) the medical team’s work via additional tour of Oceania and Southeast Asia in the late spring aid efforts performed both on and off the ship. and summer of 2008 – have included comprehensive To the extent possible, moreover, the central programs for public outreach and media relations thrust of these “medical ship plus” deployments has (USSOUTHCOM 2008a).37 That said, even in the case been on the transfer of skills and technologies that of the best-planned missions, the rise in positive atti- can be sustained by the populations being served, tudes toward the United States achieved in this way so that there is less likelihood of a sudden gap in ca- may not last long. Shifts in public opinion may be pability that the local government or local NGOs will easily reversed when the mission focuses primarily struggle to fill once the ship sails away. 37 TheUSNS Comfort deployment in 2007, on short-term medical care performed This emphasis on sustainable assistance high- for example, prompted over thirty-six thou- largely on board ship, taking only lim- lights the third key lesson with regard to military sand media/public affairs-related products and/or events (including local print, televi- ited (if any) steps to improve public medical missions that emerged from the Mercy’s sion, and radio news stories), the publication health conditions ashore by building first tour and has been reconfirmed by subsequent of over six hundred articles, the welcom- up local medical capabilities. ship deployments: the need to leave behind medi- ing of close to 900 general public visitors on The second key feature of a success- cal capabilities and supporting infrastructure that board the ship, the hosting of over 150 dis- tinguished visitors, the conduct of dozens ful medical mission first revealed by the reinforce and improve, but don’t exceed or over tax, of public concerts by the ship’s band, and Mercy’s 2005 tour, therefore, is the need local standards and growth potential. This is a vital, the distribution of thousands of mementos to develop sustainable onshore medi- if still poorly understood lesson, because providing (for example, soccer balls, pamphlets) with the Comfort logo (USSOUTHCOM 2008a). cal facilities by partnering with public health care and associated assistance that the host

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54 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s nation can’t or won’t maintain may actually leave advanced training, biomedical engineers repaired the country worse off over the long run than it was over four hundred pieces of equipment and trained before such aid was provided.38 almost five hundred local professionals and tech- Moreover, in countries where there is domes- nicians, Seabee units completed close to $400,000 tic unrest, such a turn of events could also expose worth of infrastructure repairs (primarily to hos- the local government to charges that it was un- pitals, clinics, schools, and orphanages), and en- able or unwilling to care for its people, accusations vironmental engineers trained over two thousand that could undermine its legitimacy and render it 38 To some degree, this was the case after the U.S. disaster relief team operating in Pakistan in more vulnerable to local insurgents and/or terror- response to the 2005 earthquake donated the 212th MASH unit to the Pakistan military when the relief mission came to an end. Unfortunately, U.S. personnel who staffed the unit during the relief ist groups (Bonventre 2007, 6). On the other hand, effort provided a U.S. standard of medical care that local personnel could not possibly replicate. agreeing to receive and actively supporting port calls Furthermore, the situation became worse when the Pakistani military sought to move the unit by U.S. medical ships that carry on board a multi- from the Azad Jammu and Kashmir region where it was initially deployed to the Federally Admin- talented medical support and humanitarian assis- istered Tribal Areas (FATA) where the local population was in even greater need of better medical support. As it happened, the AJK governor refused to permit the transfer unless a capability sim- tance team that is focused on capacity building and ilar in quality to the MASH unit (as operated by the American team) was provided as a replace- sustainable aid could significantly improve the sta- ment (which, of course, was not possible), the Pakistani central government lost an opportunity tus of the host nation government. By offering an al- to use health diplomacy to build good will in the FATA region, and the MASH unit itself could not be sustained and went unused in matter of months after it was donated. As a result, the entire ternative source of medical care that promotes the initiative backfired, creating more irritation with and distrust of federal authorities in Islam- idea of greater health care independence for local abad among communities in the outlying provinces and tribal areas (Bonventre 2006a, 2006b). communities, such aid can also reduce popular sup- 39 Both the forces in Afghanistan prior to 2002 and Iraqi insurgents some- port for insurgent or terrorist groups who may seek time after the U.S. invasion sought to control access to local medical care as a way to con- trol the general population. Similarly, in the parts of under their control, Hezbollah to boost their appeal in areas that are medically un- units curry favor by offering free or inexpensive medical care, but the type of care provid- derserved by offering free or low-cost medical care ed has tended to deepen the dependence of the communities so served on Hezbollah rath- that nonetheless has little or no capacity-building er than to build up local capabilities to operate independently. This was also the case potential.39 USNS Comfort’s four-month 2007 tour with medical care offered by al-Qaeda funded groups operating in certain displaced per- son camps in Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake. (Bonventre 2006a; Bonventre 2007, 7). of countries in Central America and the Caribbe- USNS Comfort an offers perhaps the most complete picture of Patients how a hospital ship outfitted along the lines de- Treated Encountered scribed above can simultaneously provide - 1. 1,281 3,372 2. 5,365 23,065 tial urgent care, train local health providers, repair 3. Panama 8,690 29,028 or replace local facilities and equipment, deliver 4. Nicaragua 8,355 28,345 5. 12,554 47,876 NGO assistance otherwise unavailable, generate 9 1 6. Peru 9,360 46,441 positive media coverage and better feelings about 2 7. Ecuador 12,060 51,028 America, and even help to constrain the opera- 10 8. 6,597 27,131 5 3 9. Haiti 11,833 39,533 tions of local insurgents. 4 11 12 10. Trinidad and Indeed, as detailed in the accompanying map Tobago 8,744 30,560 8 and table, at the end of the Comfort’s 121-day cruise 11. Guyana 10,061 44,608 7 12. Suriname 3,738 15,222 during which it visited twelve countries, almost Medical ninety-nine thousand patients were seen (most- 6 99,000 patient visits ly ashore), close to twelve hundred surgeries were Engineering 1,200 Surgeries performed (many by Project HOPE and Operation Seabee Units completed >$400,000 >32,000 immunizations worth of infrastructure repair >24,000 eyeglasses distributed Smile volunteers), well over thirty-two thousand Biomedical engineers repaired hundreds >122,000 pharmaceuticals distributed immunizations against infectious diseases were of pieces of equipment 29,000 medical students received given, more than twenty-four thousand pairs of Environmental engineers trained >2,000 advanced training local technicians eyeglasses were distributed, over 122,000 pharma- Dental Strategic Communications >25,000 patients ceuticals were dispensed, and veterinarian teams >600 articles published in international and > 3,000 teeth extractions treated close to eighteen thousand animals. On local media > 3,000 fillings the capacity-building front, close to twenty-nine 84% of media coverage was positive or 7,000 sealants balanced >20,000 fluoride applications thousand medical students and just under three Colombian government reported increase in hundred local veterinarian personnel received intelligence on FARC where Comfort visited Continuing Promise 2007

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USNS Mercy well as valuable tools for non-crisis humanitarian 3. Timor-Leste engagements performed on a regular rotational ba- 9,800 medical patients sis. That said, with the current emphasis on deploy- 2 270 surgeries ing ships with a more robust and multi-mission tool 1 5 4. Papua New Guinea kit to support expeditionary medical operations, a 25,179 medical patients 3,175 dental patients number of the Navy’s grey-hulled warfighting ships 6,983 eyeglasses provided 3 4 – most specifically, theLHD and LHA amphibious as- $640,300 value of biomedical repair 9 major engineering projects sault ships – are also proving to be worthy alter- 982 animals treated natives to the Mercy and Comfort, as illustrated by the Peleliu deployment in 2007 and the USS Boxer 1. Philippines 5. e Federated States of Micronesia and USS Kearsarge deployments in 2008.40 In addi- Pohnpei and Yap States 10,972 medical patients 2,888 medical patients tion to their substantial on-board medical facilities, 2,364 dental patients 551 dental patients these ships bring to such operations a vastly superi- 2,735 eyeglasses provided $1.1 million value of biomedical repair or transport helicopter capability, as well as tilt-ro- 316 surgeries onboard $222,700 value of biomedical repair 2 major engineering projects Chuuk State tor V-22 Osprey aircraft and air cushioned landing Samar 11,994 medical patients craft (LCACs), all of which facilitate the ship-to-shore 204 surgeries 9,625medical patients transfer of medical personnel, engineers, and other 2,233 dental patients 2,276 dental patients 5 major engineering projects 6,433 eyeglasses provided technical support teams, medical supplies, and var- $284,500 value of biomedical repair 2. 3 major engineering projects ious tools and supplies needed for construction and 8,879 medical patients 793 animals treated repair projects. These same airlift and sealift assets 2,697 dental patients $330,400 value of biomedical repair make it much easier as well to transport patients to 234 surgeries and from the ship and to reach out to patients far- Pacific Partnership 2008 5 major engineering projects ther inland, when treatment options on land are in- adequate. Similarly, the ability of LHDs and LHAs to local technicians and conducted numerous ener- operate in shallow water means that they will often gy and water use assessments (thereby improving be able to tie up at a local pier (and at times to low- overall efficiencies in the medical care sector). On er their rear loading ramp to the pier or to a beach the public affairs and strategic communications area), making for easier access from the shore to the 40 As part of SOUTHCOM’s Continuing Promise 2008 initia- front, more than six hun- ship and its facilities. tive, the USS Boxer deployed along the Pacific coastline of Cen- dred news articles were When deployed in a “medical ship plus” configu- tral and South America from April to June 2008, visiting El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru. For its part, the USS Kear- produced by local and ration, LHDs and LHAs can also accommodate a con- sarge cruised along the Atlantic coastline and in the Carib- international media (84 siderably larger than normal Seabee contingent (as bean from August to November 2008, visiting Colombia, the percent of which were well as other military engineers), which would allow Dominican Republic, Guyana, Nicaragua, Panama, and Trin- positive or balanced in for more numerous and more ambitious engineer- idad and Tobago. Country visits were longer (two weeks each) than those conducted by the USNS Comfort in 2007, al- tone), with significant ing civic action programs and other infrastructure lowing for ambitious humanitarian assistance. Both ships coverage in all the major projects within the countries visited. Moreover, the hosted over 150 military and Public Health Service medical daily newspapers. Last ready availability of Osprey aircraft and medium- professionals, and more than sixty Seabees and other mili- tary engineers, as well as a number of NGOs (such as Proj- but not least, the Colom- lift helicopters (such as the CH-46 Sea Knight and ect HOPE and Project Handclasp). See USSOUTHCOM 2008b. bian government report- the CH-53E Sea Stallion) increases the opportunities ed a marked increase in for undertaking such projects – and for encourag- intelligence reporting on FARC rebels and drug traf- ing more positive views of America as a result – in fickers in areas visited by the Comfort and its var- more rural communities farther away from the coast, ious teams. which are often among the more needy or, in the As these statistics make clear, the U.S. Navy’s two, event of a natural disaster, unreachable via tradi- large, white-hulled hospital ships can serve as highly tional travel and supply routes. As demonstrated visible and memorable symbols of American good- when the Kearsarge provided relief aid to Bangla- will and capacity to help, generating considerable in- desh in November 2007 after cyclone Sidr hit, the terest and publicity wherever they go. As such, they ability of these types of ships to produce fresh drink- remain truly unique assets for disaster diplomacy, as ing water on board – in the case of the Kearsarge,

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up to two hundred thousand gallons a day – will to the waters just off Myanmar, where its helicop- be of immense value as well in responding to future ter fleet could be deployed most effectively in pro- foreign disasters, as will use of the ship’s helicop- viding relief to the hardest-hit areas.42 ters and LCACs to transport the water to wherev- Looking ahead to future disaster contingencies, er it may be needed (USS Kearsarge Public Affairs the Air Force Surgeon General’s Office recently -de 2007). As noted in the discussion of lift assets earli- veloped an innovative, stand-alone hospital pack- er in this chapter, forward-deployed sea-based heli- age that can be airlifted to a disaster site within copters stand out as particularly valuable platforms twenty-four hours of a request. Once the unit has for the distribution of potable water and other relief arrived at its destination, a basic medical capability supplies to coastal areas when the transport infra- can be up and running within twelve to twenty-four structure ashore has been destroyed, and the heli- hours, with full operational capability reached with- copters aboard the U.S. Navy’s LHDs and LHAs are in thirty-six hours. Dubbed the HUMRO-OCP (short among the most ideally suited for such missions. for the Humanitarian Relief Operations Operation- For all of the above, the Navy’s plans to main- al Capability Package), it is designed to function as tain a balance of white- and grey-hulled deploy- a self-sufficient unit that can operate wholly on its ments in support of programmed HA/HCA cruises own anywhere it is deployed. The package includes with substantial medical components makes emi- complete diagnostic and surgical capabilities for a nent sense, especially since the grey hulls can only twenty-five-bed facility with all the required operat- perform such missions when they are out of normal ing support (such as security forces, engineers, and sea duty rotation. As for providing medical support base services) built in. Personnel required to run in response to a sudden disaster, past practice sug- the facility would total some 90 medical staff, with gests that the Navy will remain ready and willing to around 150 airmen in a support capacity. Perhaps redirect either platform – hospital ship or amphibi- most intriguing, the HUMRO-OCP includes a major ous assault ship – that may be close (or soon could training component for local personnel, so that the be) to the vicinity of such a disaster. This is not to entire hospital can be left behind for the host nation suggest, however, that only maritime forces have an to own and operate after some ninety days. PACAF important role to play in providing emergency med- teams tested the whole concept in early 2008 in a ical care and longer-term sustainable aid. As not- series of field exercises spread across the Hawaiian ed earlier, for example, Air Force transport aircraft islands called Pacific Lifeline, and the first units are – especially C-17s and C-130s – have played, and will now being pre-positioned to forward locations in continue to play, a principal role in airlifting critical PACOM’s AOR (Sater 2007). medical personnel and supplies to distant disaster As a mini variant of the Navy’s “medical ship plus” zones and distribution hubs. Indeed, there are cir- deployments, a C-17 Globe- 41 After cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, it is clear that the gen- cumstances when airlifting is the quickest and least master III airlifted approxi- erals of the ruling junta were extremely reluctant to approve re- lief operations by the Essex expeditionary strike group in part threatening response (compared to a warship, that mately fifty Air Force, Army, because they feared such operations would provide a cover 41 is) , even when an LHD specifically configured to and Navy personnel in July for – or simply lead to – an armed attack by U.S. military forc- provide medical assistance in a disaster situation 2007 from Hickam Air Force es to remove them from power. Single flights by cargo planes is close at hand. For example, as mentioned earli- Base in Hawaii to the Pacif- from Utapao to Yangon airport and back, on the other hand, were much less worrisome (Sevastopulo and Kazmir 2008). er in this chapter, PACAF C-130s that were pre-de- ic islands of Vanuatu, Kiri- 42 As an interim measure, some helicopters from the ex- ployed to Utapao air base in Thailand as part of the bati, and Nauru to provide a peditionary strike group led by the Essex had also been pre- annual Cobra Gold exercise were the first U.S. plat- range of medical, dental, en- positioned to Utapao to help boost available lift capability forms allowed into Myanmar after Nargis hit, and gineering, and related civil from there to Yangon and, ideally, from Yangon to the hard- they were able to deliver large cargoes of drinking support and training to the est-hit areas of the Irrawaddy Delta. Assuming the Myan- mar government agreed, the more optimal deployment of water, water purification kits, plastic sheeting, and local residents, as part of a the helicopters for the purposes of aiding the delta popula- other medical supplies to Myanmar in a matter of PACOM theater security co- tions would have been onboard ships stationed off the Myan- hours (once formal approval was received from Yan- operation (TSC) exercise (Air mar coast, and the Essex group eventually did deploy to that area to await approval from Yangon to begin ship-to-shore gon). On the other hand, it would have taken the USS Force Print News 2007). Op- relief operations. When that approval was still not forth- Essex about four days to travel from the Gulf of Thai- erationally, the primary goal coming more than two weeks after the cyclone first struck, land (where it was deployed as part of Cobra Gold) was to demonstrate PACAF’s the commander of the Essex strike group reiterated the idea of basing the helicopters at Utapao (Wright 2008, 5).

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ability to quickly deliver medical and other key di- ical assistance is an excellent way to build positive saster relief assistance to remote areas of the Pacific, and lasting ties that can expand in time into other while at the same time boosting local capabilities to areas of security cooperation. In certain foreign di- manage the consequences of any future disasters. In saster situations, moreover, military medical relief a similar vein, 3rd Air Force units assigned to EUCOM teams may be the only healthcare providers able to began to exercise in November 2007 a new quick- reach and treat those in need in a timely and effec- response humanitarian assistance capability that tive manner. This has been proven time again since could respond to a natural disaster anywhere in EU- the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in numerous over- COM’s AOR, provide initial support (mostly medical), seas disasters, both large and small. In contrast, the and assess the requirements for follow-on emergen- refusal of the Myanmar junta to take full advantage cy relief. The capability is designed in such a way of such support when it was available and need- that it can be tailored to meet the specific needs ed provides perhaps the most poignant illustration of any disaster that may arise. The 2007 test, how- of the severe consequences that can occur when ever, involved the deployment of a one hundred- military medical aid is not accepted. Both exam- person team and about one hundred short tons of ples suggest that DoD ought to do all that it can to cargo on six C-130s, the first of which took off fully strengthen the U.S. military’s health diplomacy ca- loaded within sixteen hours of receiving an order pabilities, and to make them more deployable and to respond, and the last some twenty hours later more responsive to the medical needs of civil soci- (Dawson 2007). eties in regions of the world where major disasters Army medical teams have also played an active are most likely to occur. role in foreign disaster relief and in regular exchang- es as part of a TSC exercise. When the 2005 Indian Summary Ocean tsunami hit, for example, U.S. Army Pacific In each of the support sectors examined above, the (USARPAC) planners based at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, U.S. military brings to the table skills and capabili- organized the deployment of special mortuary af- ties that are truly unique, such as wide-body cargo fairs teams from Army units in the United States to aircraft that can land on and take off from makeshift the disaster zone to help in the identification and or damaged runways, heavy helicopters equipped for evacuation of the deceased. For its part, the 8th U.S. sling-load operations, expeditionary-minded Seabee Army in sent a number of medical units DETs and USACE FESTs, and rapidly deployable field along with CH-47 Chinook helicopters to help trans- hospitals and medical teams. In some cases, more- port them and other relief teams and supplies, to ar- over, their uniqueness lies as much in the fact that eas where they were most needed. As often happens, they are forward-deployed, close to the scene of a moreover, a regularly scheduled medical training foreign disaster, and trained at least in part to of- mission organized by USARPAC evolved into a full- fer emergency aid when requested, as in what they blown disaster relief effort when cyclone Sidr hit are innately able to do or accomplish. Depending on Bangladesh in mid-November 2007. At that time, an the situation at hand, civilian and non-U.S. military eighteen-person team of pediatricians, family prac- alternatives may also be available, but they will not tice doctors, optometrists, dentists, veterinarians, often be as numerous, as flexible, or as prompt to and medical technicians was already in Bangladesh respond. Nor can they easily match the reach-back for an eight-day MEDRETE training mission. Once options available to most forward-deployed Ameri- it became clear what was needed, however, the en- can forces. Based on the foregoing analysis, however, tire team was sent to the flood-ravaged area of Pat- there is still much that can be done to enhance the uakhali in southern Bangladesh, where it treated utility and impact of U.S. military assets deployed in over two thousand patients and took care of more support of HA/DR operations, even with respect to than five hundred head of livestock over a three- so-called high-value/high-leverage assets. Making week period (Kakesako 2007). a more concerted effort to identify and set in place In conclusion, since getting good healthcare is those enhancements, be it via a technology fix, bet- a universal concern and since healthcare activities ter training, or a slightly more HA/DR-friendly con- are largely non-threatening, providing military med- cept of operations, therefore, should be the order of

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58 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s the day for HA/DR planners, if they are going to get ny provided extensive water purification equipment the most out of what is available. This will be true and established water management training in the especially as long as HA/DR missions continue to be affected areas, and ExxonMobil donated significant viewed primarily as a secondary priority for the mili- amounts of diesel fuel for relief vehicles and heavy tary platforms and technologies that have proven to equipment used in excavation and evacuation activ- be most useful, and for which demand in support of ities. Just as the U.S. military has done, many com- HA/DR efforts is nevertheless likely to rise. panies are also looking for ways to contribute more effectively to relief operations (and to have a longer- lasting impact) by partnering with NGOs and oth- Private Sector Contributions and er organizations that have proven track records in Capabilities the HA/DR realm ( 2006, Iwata 43 Apart from their deeper understanding 2005).43 In that respect, the close collab- of the local culture, norms, and political dy- Some of the demands for U.S. military support to namics of the countries in which they work, oration between UPS and CARE, Pfizer foreign disaster operations may be met in the fu- humanitarian aid agencies generally enjoy a and UNICEF, Citigroup and the World ture by the private sector, which is emerging as an degree of trust and respect overseas that gives Food Program, and Dow Chemical and them a legitimacy that companies can rely on increasingly important contributor to, and partici- Habitat for Humanity in the days and to fully leverage their own contributions. Col- pant in, such operations. During the unprecedent- laborating with aid organizations can also weeks after the tsunami hit helped both ed business community response to the 2004 Indian keep overhead costs at reasonable levels, pro- to speed the delivery of critical corpo- vide better security for donations of cash and Ocean tsunami, for example, U.S. corporations alone rate aid to priority areas and to ensure supplies, and increase the value of donations as contributed $566 million in cash or products and a tax incentive, while enhancing a company’s that it contributed as much as possible services, and over 140 companies gave more than own brand equity. (Jordan 2006; Iwata 2005) to capacity-building efforts that would $1 million each (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2005). facilitate eventual recovery. Moreover, if U.S. companies together were a country, Such partnerships appear to be especially fruit- they would have ranked as the fifth largest donor na- ful in cases where a private company and a relief tion in the tsunami response, following the govern- group enjoy a longstanding history of collaboration, ments of the United States, Australia, , and such as UPS and CARE (both of which are based in Japan (Jordan 2006, 5). Similarly, U.S. private sector Atlanta, Georgia), or where each maintains a large aid and contributions to the 2005 earthquake in Pak- presence in the areas hit by disaster, such as Exxon- istan surpassed $104 million (Jordan 2006, 36). Look- Mobil and Save the Children in Banda Aceh. Clear- ing to the future, corporations – especially, though ly, the close ties and history of cooperation between certainly not exclusively, those based in America – CARE and UPS were instrumental in ensuring that seem to be positioning themselves to serve as alter- priority shipments of over one million pounds of re- native sources for a number of the skills, capabilities, lief supplies got where and supplies that are needed most, but often remain U.S. Private Sector Contributions they were most need- in limited supply, for HA/DR operations. The trick to the Tsunami Response ed as quickly as possi- will be in learning how best to mobilize these pri- ble in the wake of the products and vate sector contributions in support of such opera- tsunami (Jordan 2006, services – 25% employee/customer tions, given that this is still relatively new territory giving –27% 19). Commercial-NGO for the business world. collaboration can also Apart from making financial donations (gen- achieve significant re- erally channeled through UN agencies and NGOs), sults when there is a businesses can in theory bring to disaster relief and close match between civil support initiatives a wide range of expertise in the company’s prod- key operational sectors, such as logistics and sup- uct or service and the ply chain management, communications, informa- particular needs of a tion management, medical supply, construction, and relief agency, as in Co- engineering support. In the aftermath of the 2004 ca-Cola’s response to corporate or affiliated tsunami, for example, teams of UPS logistics experts the Red Cross’s call for foundation giving – 48% were able to unravel severe bottlenecks in the sup- emergency supplies of $566 million total ply and delivery of relief aid, Dow Chemical Compa-

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potable water for victims of the Indian Ocean tsu- Logistics Center, the creative use of commercial im- nami. Working with local subsidiaries in Southeast agery provided PACOM with timely and reliable in- Asia, Coca-Cola converted a number of its soft-drink formation for evaluating changing priorities and production lines to bottle large amounts of drinking alternative courses of action throughout the relief water, and then, based on input from the Red Cross operation (Dorsett 2005). and other humanitarian agencies, used its own dis- Advanced private sector technologies now being tribution network to deliver the water to stricken developed or studied as a means to help train more areas in direst need (Hawkins 2006). flexible and adaptive military forces are also prov- Similarly, Pfizer’s rapid support to UNICEF in- ing useful for the disaster response mission. Compa- volved the provision of requested medical supplies nies in the simulation, virtual reality, and high-tech and water purification expertise to tsunami-impact- training arenas, for example, have strengthened the ed areas, which in turn contributed to a significant U.S. military’s ability to leverage so-called info-cen- boost in employee morale and retention (Jordan tric operations. Immersive simulation techniques al- 2006). Based in part on the success of these types low service members to experience multiple cultures, of partnerships, Abbott Laboratories recently made terrains, and operational environments similar to arrangements with the American Red Cross for the conditions they may encounter in the future, pre- timely supply of a variety of products – from anti- paring those so trained to better manage the flood of biotics to baby food – in the event of a future emer- information that will bombard them in contingency gency. This arrangement offers increased visibility operations overseas, including disaster relief efforts for Abbott’s brand name through the distribution of (Laurent 2007). Language and cultural training mod- the company’s products, while ensuring as well that ules are being offered as well, given the central im- the products so provided meet the necessary speci- portance of such training – confirmed by virtually fications of the Red Cross’s delivery system (Thom- all after-action reports from military units involved as and Fritz 2006). in HA/DR operations – to the success of almost any But private sector companies have also part- international response effort. Perhaps most inter- nered quite effectively with the U.S. military. esting of all, private companies are also devising General Electric (GE), one of the world’s leading ways to provide computerized training to forces that companies, with product lines spanning engines, are routinely stationed abroad or deployed at sea generators, light bulbs, appliances, finance, health- (Laurent 2007). Recently, commercial satellite oper- care, and media, mobilized its resources in only four ator Intelsat, Ltd., and Cisco Systems, Inc., formed a days following the 2004 tsunami and began ship- partnership with DoD to deliver high-speed internet ping heavy equipment for the relief effort to Indo- connections to forward-deployed military units, and nesia via the long-range lift assets of the U.S. Navy in 2007 IBM entered into a cooperative partnership and U.S. Air Force (Jordan 2006). And when tradi- with JFCOM to provide better collaboration between tional military information sources (including hu- and among various service components operating man intelligence, airborne imagery, and satellite in the same theater (Orillion 2007). IBM’s data shar- coverage) proved insufficient to provide a full pic- ing programs and technologies will allow military ture of conditions on the ground, additional non- personnel to receive the right operational informa- military imagery from the private sector became tion in the right context when it is needed, and to a critical tool for assessing the extent of the tsu- adapt as necessary as the surrounding conditions nami’s destruction and for tracking evolving con- change (Orillion 2007). ditions (Dorsett 2005). Commercial entities, most As noted in chapter 2, the Pentagon has also con- notably Digital Globe, provided the U.S. military, as tracted with commercial air service companies in well as NGOs, international relief agencies, and lo- the past, including UPS, DHL, and FedEx, to ensure cal government officials, with comprehensive and the timely delivery of supplies to military units over- accurate high-resolution satellite imagery of the seas when military lift was unavailable or deemed most heavily devastated areas. Together with the too costly. Based on this experience, DoD intends unclassified, open-source internet channels main- to expand such partnerships for HA/DR operations tained on the home pages of USAID and the UN Joint in particular, in part in order to free up military as-

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60 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s sets that may be needed elsewhere and to lessen the nies are also offering aid workers their expertise in State Department’s reliance on the military when these two sectors to help ensure the efficient and commercial alternatives are available. In addition cost-effective flow and storage of goods and mate- to those specializing in air and ground transporta- rials, and to help “identify priorities, track deliv- tion, private corporations with expertise in other eries, and direct the traffic of a relief effort in full support sectors can also offer emergency response gear” (Economist Global Agenda 2005; Fritz Institute capabilities similar to those provided by the military, 200544). The World Economic Forum is one organi- including, as previously noted, in the satellite com- zation that has been working, through its Logistics munication and information management realms. and Transportation Corporate Citizenship Initia- Indeed, the opportunities for broader private sec- tive (L&TCCI), to mobilize the core competencies tor-DoD collaboration on HA/DR training, exercising, of member companies, including DHL, Exel, FedEx, and real-world operations appear to be far greater TNT, and UPS, to accumulate and then distribute than current practice might suggest. Insofar as the donated resources effectively. At its January 2008 military is concerned, therefore, the business world annual meeting at Davos, the Forum announced a remains a comparatively untapped resource when new, more formal initiative by three member com- it comes to the support it could provide for disas- panies, TNT, UPS, and Agility, to partner with the ter relief missions. UN’s Global Logistics Cluster45 to provide humani- In addition to assisting the military, however, U.S. tarian agencies with cutting edge logistics support corporations have also taken steps to build better in the event of a large-scale disaster. 44 The Fritz Institute is a non-profit or- cooperative ties with U.S. State Department agen- When such a disaster strikes, the Lo- ganization which addresses complex op- erational challenges in humanitarian cies and officials charged with LFA responsibilities gistics Cluster, which is led by the WFP, disaster relief by leveraging corporate sec- for foreign disaster relief, working primarily through would pass a request for urgent assis- tor resources and best practices. USAID’s Global Development Alliance (GDA). Follow- tance to a committee of representatives 45 In September 2005, the UN’s Inter-Agen- ing the Indian Ocean tsunami, American business- from the three companies, who would cy Standing Committee (IASC), which oversees disaster relief planning, officially endorsed es formed a number of private-public partnerships then decide on the size and composi- the cluster concept as a useful way to organize through the good offices of theGDA to leverage more tion of a joint logistics emergency team and mobilize humanitarian agencies with- than $11 million in corporate sector funds for recon- (or LET) that would be sent to the di- in particular sectors or areas of activity (with struction efforts in the tsunami-affected countries. saster zone to set in place and manage each cluster having a clearly designated and accountable lead), thereby avoiding the free- Companies as diverse as Chevron, ConocoPhillips, an appropriately scaled logistics opera- lancing and duplication of effort that occurred Microsoft, Coca-Cola, Prudential, and 3M, among tion for the first three to six weeks of the far too often during the Indian Ocean tsuna- others, helped to design, organize, and fund numer- disaster response. Depending on local mi response. The Pakistan earthquake pre- sented the first opportunity to implement the ous reconstruction efforts USAID( 2005). In 2005, for needs, the LET would include logistics concept at the field level and to test its viabil- example, Chevron Corporation and USAID/Indone- specialists (such as airport coordina- ity as a framework for coordinating the emer- sia signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) tors and warehouse managers), specif- gency response. Ten clusters were established within the first twenty-four hours of the Paki- to jointly contribute $10 million to support the eco- ic logistics assets (warehouses, trucks, stan relief effort in the areas of food and nutri- nomic recovery of Banda Aceh, including the provi- forklifts, etc.), and transportation ser- tion, water and sanitation, health, emergency sion of technical education and vocational training vices (World Economic Forum 2008). shelter, early recovery and reconstruction, lo- in key reconstruction skills, such as welding, car- The first real-world test of the LET gistics, IT telecommunications, camp man- agement and protection, and education. pentry, and even computer programming (Jordan teams in a foreign disaster scenario 2006). In the disaster prevention field, moreover, came in May 2008 during the emergency response USAID helped to coordinate private sector initia- to cyclone Nargis, which became the deadliest natu- tives to identify and deploy earthquake and tsuna- ral disaster in the recorded history of Myanmar. De- mi detection technologies to the Southeast Asian spite the complex operating environment and the region more broadly, and to ensure that local gov- devastated infrastructure on the ground, the LET ernments had the capacity to operate and maintain companies were able to leverage their strong local such equipment over the longer run (USAID 2005). resources, networks, and supply chains, especially Given the central importance of high-perform- those based in nearby Thailand, to provide logistics ing logistics and supply chain operations to effective support, inventory management, and warehousing, disaster relief, a growing number of private compa- and to coordinate large shipments of supplies and

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equipment to the Myanmar border. In addition, TNT, the German logistics group and owner of DHL, part- Agility, and UPS jointly organized and managed a nered with OCHA and the UN Development Program twenty-thousand square meter warehouse for WFP (UNDP) to help streamline the UN’s overall relief dis- food and non-food relief items located in Bangkok, tribution process. Among other things, the agree- thereby greatly increasing the speed and efficiency ment calls for DHL staff to train not justUN workers of aid distribution to the stricken region. On average, but also other groups, such as customs officials, who the LETs received and discharged over two hundred play a key part in the delivery of humanitarian relief metric tons of cargo each day over the course of the supplies (Murray 2005a). In addition to its collab- Myanmar relief effort (Agility 2008). oration with OCHA, DHL has also signed a five-year Well before the LET plan was unveiled, howev- agreement with the International Federation of Red er, TNT, a Dutch-owned international mail deliv- Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to conduct ery and logistics company, had already been an ac- research on and develop new supply-chain man- tive partner of the WFP, working in particular with agement tools for the IFRC. For its part, FedEx has WFP’s airlift operation, the United Nations Human- collaborated with the American Red Cross on sup- itarian Air Service (UNHAS).46 Apart from providing ply chain management for over ten years now to logistical and airlift support to UNHAS, TNT has also such a degree that the Red Cross’s control room in 46 Operating from several locations around stored WFP commodities at its own Washington, D.C., is an exact replica of FedEx’s con- the world, UNHAS provides UN agencies and oth- expense, and, when necessary, pro- trol room at its headquarters in Memphis (Murray er humanitarian organizations with access to chartered aircraft for passenger or cargo flights vided a team of supply chain manage- 2005a). Following the 2004 tsunami, moreover, Fe- on short notice. UNHAS can contract for a one- ment and fleet management experts dEx used its logistics and transportation expertise time operation or for an extended service. At to assist the WFP during relief emer- to provide the Red Cross with complimentary ship- any one time, it is likely to have over one hun- gencies. In response to both the Indi- ping and storage of its emergency pharmaceuticals, dred aircraft under contract capable of strate- gic or theater airlift operations. Commonly used an Ocean tsunami and the Pakistan first aid supplies, protective suits, and water puri- aircraft include Lockheed C-130 Hercules, An- earthquake, moreover, TNT airlifted fication systems that were destined for Southeast tonov AN-24s, Beechcraft BE1900s, and Fokker food and non-food emergency items Asia (Warhurst et al. 2005). F-50s. As an example of annual efforts, in 2005 UNHAS arranged transport for close to 370,000 from WFP’s regional warehouses to Presumably, these and similar private sector individuals and more than 153,000 tons of car- relief distribution hubs, and also pro- initiatives will provide at least a partial solution go. See http://www.unjlc.org/airoperations/ vided airport ground support servic- to the problem, as stated by one senior Deutsche fleet/ and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UNHAS es and tented warehouse space. In a Post World Net executive, that it is not so much the similar vein, when UPS announced a $2 million do- “goods that are lacking or the airplanes to bring in nation in support of relief and recovery efforts for vic- the goods [in many disaster response situations], tims of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, half of the con- but the knowledge of how to distribute them in the tribution consisted of in-kind services, such as the right way” (Wulf-Mathies 2005) For instance, as re- transport of medical and health-related items to and lief goods streamed into airports and warehouses within the affected region (UPS 2005). The three-com- throughout the tsunami-affected regions in 2004 pany LET plan announced at Davos in 2008, therefore, and 2005, aid agencies struggled to sort through seems like a logical follow-on activity and a near-per- and distribute supplies, causing local airport con- fect match between corporate capabilities and UN gestion and severely constraining the movement needs. Delivering relief supplies and food as quickly of relief supplies to inland communities (Fritz In- and efficiently as possible to people in need is per- stitute 2005). Logistical challenges also abounded haps the toughest challenge in a disaster situation, downstream, in terms of limited warehouse stor- but it is one for which private sector logistics orga- age for excess inventory and bottlenecked trans- nizations are extremely well prepared. portation pipelines (Fritz Institute 2005). To help For example, Exel, a DHL sister company with resolve these problems, the Disaster Resource Net- freight management expertise, managed the road work (DRN), another increasingly valuable arm of the transport and container haulage of several tsunami World Economic Forum, organized private sector crisis shipments for the WFP, often moving aid on teams to take control of all relief cargo operations at the ground at a rate of one hundred tons a day (War- the airports in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, thereby sig- hurst et al. 2005). So, too, Deutsche Post World Net, nificantly enhancing the “throughput and dissem-

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62 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s ination” of tsunami humanitarian relief (Warhurst Similarly, Intel Cor- 47 TheDRN was created to train engineering, con- et al. 2005)47 In a subsequent effort, following the poration forged a suc- struction, and logistics specialists from the Forum’s member companies to support humanitarian relief op- Pakistan earthquake, DRN was able as well to get cessful private-public erations. DRN emergency teams are deployed when re- supplies to difficult-to-reach areas despite impass- relationship with the In- quested to do so by a recognized international relief able conditions on the ground, airlifting over $3 mil- ternational Rescue Com- agency (World Economic Forum; Warhurst et al. 2005). lion in high-priority relief goods, including fourteen mittee (IRC) in 2004 with 48 A random sampling of IRC’s procurement sys- tem prior to its partnership with Intel in fact revealed hundred transitional shelters and a large number the aim of improving the that the organization’s response time to a world disas- of light-weight portable wood stoves (Disaster Re- IRC’s overall response ter could be as long as fifty-two days (Thomas 2004). lief Network). time – that is, reducing the time it takes from the Any sizeable international disaster relief oper- announcement of an international emergency op- ation will also require a considerable effort to co- eration to the arrival of IRC staff and supplies to the ordinate the flow of information among all the affected population (Thomas 2004). With Intel’s as- participants involved. For this task, information sistance, IRC procurement and delivery strategies management technology, as noted earlier, looms have already been restructured in such a way as to as an especially important capability, and one pri- save the agency $300,000 or more per year (Thomas vate sector product that shows particular promise 2004).48 Yet another private sector software product in this regard is the Humanitarian Logistics Soft- with the potential to enhance response efficiency is ware (HLS) system developed by the San Francisco- Suma, developed by the Pan American Health Orga- based Fritz Institute in collaboration with the IFRC. nization. This system not only tracks donated relief This first-ever web-based supply chain software -en supplies and allows relief workers to categorize do- ables real-time matching of the needs of populations nations rapidly upon receipt; it also helps them to and areas stricken by disaster with the business ca- manage warehouse stocks more effectively and to pabilities and donated supplies that could be key to set up more efficient distribution procedures (Mur- survival and recovery (Synergos Institute 2005). The ray 2005b). For its part, Global Relief Technologies system also tracks supplies from donation to de- has developed a promising new data management livery, giving both relief organizations and private system dubbed GRT that can operate from a variety sector donors an online overview of the overall re- of portable electronic devices used by relief work- lief pipeline. Beyond that, however, it enables a faster and more tar- GRT’s Data Management System geted order placement process by means of web-based supplier lists, online pre-purchasing details, and catalogs of priority requested items (Murray 2005b). According to IFRC satellite relief responder communications estimates, the HLS technology could PDA-based rapid no interruptions speed up the relief process by 20 per- data management disaster cent to 30 percent. Furthermore, not system location only does the HLS system offer the field benefits of standardization and easy workers customization for the specific needs decisionmaker of aid agencies, but it can also store instantly receive critical data data on exchanges made over time accurately assess situation so that a more accurate assessment can be made later on about how use- ful the system really has been in a particular relief operation, and how it might be improved for use in fu- appropriate resources deployed HQ personnel ture operations (Synergos Institute field workers 2005).

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ers in the field (including cell phones and person- cil to provide airtime on its F2 satellite to help ac- al organizers), which is slated to soon replace the celerate both national and international decision outdated, paper-based emergency data-gathering making with regard to disaster responses, includ- systems currently used by the American Red Cross ing via the transmission of improved early warning (Copeland 2008). In time, GRT-enabled devices will information (UN News Centre 2007). allow forward operators to transmit and share crit- The corporate sector has also played an impor- ical data in real time over satellite networks to se- tant role in restoring telecommunications networks nior decision makers at regional and home-base during the recovery phase of major disaster respons- headquarters. es. After the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, for example, Increasingly since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the DRN, drawing on the expertise of its business moreover, other private groups, such as Aidmatrix, members in the communications field, worked with the Center for International Disaster Information Pakistan’s IT ministry, as well as with wireless and (CIDI), and Global Hand, have begun to develop on- satellite technology firms in the United States, to line registries listing corporate goods and services provide communications equipment and personnel that have been (or will be) donated, and to estab- to help speed up emergency operations (World Eco- lish online clearinghouses to facilitate private sec- nomic Forum 2005). Also of note was the creation of tor link-ups with various relief agencies in search of the World Bank-supported website called RISEPAK assistance. More needs to be done to make these on- (Relief and Information Systems for Earthquakes in line registries and clearinghouses user friendly, to Pakistan), a joint venture of researchers and pol- keep them as current as possible, and to improve icy makers from the United States and Pakistan their utility for responding to foreign (as opposed which set up an internet portal to share informa- to domestic) disasters. That said, these new infor- tion on how to facilitate and sustain communica- mation management tools have brought a consider- tions between and among various disaster relief able degree of order to what has often been a rather groups working in the field in Pakistan who were chaotic and haphazard system for linking corporate having difficulty coordinating because of the incom- donors to NGOs and other relief agencies. As a result, patibility of their communications gear (RISEPAK the prospects for getting donated supplies, equip- 2007). In an even earlier effort to address compatibil- ment, and expertise to where they are most need- ity problems in the telecommunications sector, the ed have been significantly improved. Ericsson Corporation, in partnership with UNOCHA, As alluded to earlier, in the telecommunications UNDP, and the IFRC, launched a major initiative in sector commercial satellite links stand out as still 2000 known as First on the Ground, which sought one more business-supplied asset that has helped to provide interoperable mobile communications to facilitate disaster relief efforts overseas, partic- equipment to first responders in the disaster relief ularly in remote areas or when the ground-based community, though this initiative obviously has a communications infrastructure has been disrupt- long way to go to meet its goal and was not mature ed, overloaded, or destroyed (UN News Centre 2007). when the earthquake struck (UN Department of Pub- In this context, SDN Global, a satellite technology lic Information 2000). More recently, the UN’s WFP company which participated in the response to the and the Vodafone Group Foundation (VGF) formed 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, has been collaborating a collaboration in 2006 to improve emergency infor- with the Disaster Relief and Strategic Telecommuni- mation-sharing and overall communications tech- cations Infrastructure Company (DRASTIC) to pro- nologies for disaster response operations (Disaster vide around-the-clock broadband satellite-delivered Relief Network 2007). voice and data service to humanitarian workers, al- In addition to partnering with NGOs and other lowing them a constant means of contact with the humanitarian organizations (as well as with the mil- world, including in the most isolated and austere itary), many businesses have come to believe that locations (Hoskins 2005). Similarly, satellite provid- they can provide more decisive and longer-lasting er ICO Global Communications recently partnered contributions to disaster relief if they join forces with the UN’s International Telecommunications with other companies in a consortium (Thomas Union (ITU) and the Commonwealth Business Coun- and Fritz 2006). Examples include the U.S. Cham-

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64 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s ber of Commerce’s Business Civic Leadership Cen- ganizations and businesses around the world, in- ter (BCLC), the Business Roundtable’s Partnership creasing still further the prospects that needs on the for Disaster Response, the Committee Encourag- ground would be matched to available private sector ing Corporate Philanthropy (CECP), the Fritz Insti- resources. Overall, total global private assistance to tute’s Corporations for Humanity, and the previously the South Asia disaster surpassed $266 49 TheBCLC runs a business-sector informa- mentioned DRN established by the World Econom- million, underscoring in dramatic fash- tion resource for Chamber members to support 49 disaster preparedness and response partner- ic Forum. Such partnerships within the corporate ion the important impact of private sec- ships with NGOs and government agencies, sector can often exploit the combined internation- tor flows for successful disaster relief and has been at the forefront of efforts to de- al supply chains and communications networks of (UNOCHA 2007). velop best practices with regard to private sec- member companies to achieve results far greater Many more examples of useful pri- tor support to disaster relief operations. An association of chief executive officers from than any individual company could ever secure on vate sector support to recent disas- leading American companies, the Business its own. Following the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, ter relief efforts could, of course, be Roundtable created the Partnership for Di- for example, DRN connected Fast Retailing Co., a described, including the quite sub- saster Response to facilitate member-compa- ny contributions in all phases of disaster relief Japanese provider of fleece jackets, with Crossroads stantial assistance offered to Chinese and recovery, especially in the logistics, com- International and the Interfaith League Against authorities after the May 2008 earth- munications, and data management realms. Poverty, to distribute ten thousand jackets in the quake in Sichuan province by a long list TheCECP , whose membership includes more than 165 CEOs and chairpersons from lead- region. Moreover, with medical supplies of American companies active in Chi- ing U.S. and foreign corporations, has helped previously donated by the international pharmaceu- na and U.S.-China trade (U.S. Chamber member companies to coordinate their finan- tical distributor Henry Schein, Inc., DRN coordinated of Commerce 2008). The examples re- cial contributions to disaster relief efforts and with New York City’s Medics and the Medical Ac- viewed so far, however, are enough to to leverage their global supply chain networks, innovative technologies, and skilled employees tion Network to bring emergency medical servic- confirm that the corporate world has to aid affected communities. The Fritz Insti- es to earthquake survivors. More recently, the DRN been, and will likely remain, an increas- tute, a non-profit dedicated to the promotion has taken steps to formalize its ties to the Emer- ingly able, if still somewhat underuti- of best practices for rapid and effective disas- ter relief and recovery, created Corporations gency Shelter Cluster managed by the UN’s IASC as lized, source of supply for expertise for Humanity to help mobilize corporate re- a way to the maximize future HA/DR support from and capabilities of great value to for- sources and technology for long-term improve- its member companies with expertise in the engi- eign disaster relief. Moreover, private ment in the delivery of humanitarian aid. neering and construction sectors. sector contributors can bring to relief One of the most noteworthy examples of a multi- efforts a business-minded, bottom-line approach company response from the corporate sector, how- to the task at hand – whether it involves transport, ever, was the Bush administration’s initiative to supply chain, information management, or overall appoint five current and former Business Round- communications – that is sorely needed, but is of- table CEOs to lead the South Asia Earthquake Relief ten ignored, by the traditional humanitarian assis- Fund following the 2005 Pakistan earthquake. The U.S. Corporate Donations to Earthquake Fund, actually administered by the CECP, was a na- Relief in China tionwide effort to spur private and corporate contri- butions, to increase awareness about the emergency, others 52.1 and to stimulate greater engagement from the pri- vate sector in the overall relief effort. As a result, the U.S. private sector mobilized close to $113 mil- Amway 4.3 lion for the earthquake victims (CECP). Much of Wal-Mart 3 Anheuser- Busch 1.6 the non-cash contributions consisted of medicine, Avon 5 7.6 emergency care equipment, and supporting servic- Coca-Cola 2.4 Proctor & Gamble FedEx 1.5 es, which were channeled primarily through Pak- IBM 2 4.2 Intel Foundation

Johnson &Johnson istani partners and non-profit international relief Nike 5 Johnson 6.2 Nu Skin Co 1.6 organizations that were well established in coun- try, such as the IRC, Mercy Corps, and Save the Chil- Motorola 2.1 Microsoft 1.6 dren (McConnell 2005). At the same time, the DRN, McDonald's 1.8 in addition to the specific initiatives noted above, activated the support of more than thirty-seven or- $102 million total Figures in millions of $US. Contributions over $1.5m broken out.

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tance community, focused as it understandably is tions from the business community in areas where on providing direct aid to disaster victims without it can match and reinforce (if still not really exceed) worrying unduly about cost-effectiveness. Good (if potential contributions from the American military not best) value for money considerations, howev- looms as well as a priority objective, and one that er, are likely to become more and more important should be pursued as quickly as possible, given cur- to the humanitarian relief community, as competi- rent trends in the number and severity of natural di- tion increases among them for scarce donor fund- sasters worldwide. ing and as major donors and even the general public demand hard evidence of effective performance in the field. So, too, the incentive to conduct relief op- Conclusion erations as economically as possible is also likely to Based on the military programs and operations an- increase in years to come, given that the accumulat- alyzed in this chapter, HA/DR missions are likely to ed costs imposed by global disasters in this decade retain a high profile in the years ahead, both in the alone are already expected to total more than $250 context of emergency relief efforts after a foreign di- billion. Once the full costs of the damage imposed saster and as a way to assist and engage with other on Myanmar and the broader region in May 2008 countries in a more thoughtful and productive man- by cyclone Nargis, as well as by the Sichuan earth- ner over the longer term. Ideally, the initiatives now quake in China, are known, this projection is almost being taken by OSD and service staff planners to in- certain to be much higher come 2010. stitutionalize HA/DR activities and to accord them Returning to an issue addressed earlier in this a higher priority in current strategic guidance will chapter, tapping the private sector’s capabilities in help to ensure that the capabilities that are needed the HA/DR realm – and integrating them more com- to conduct effectiveHA/DR operations will be avail- prehensively into the official governmental planning able where, when, and in the format that they are process – could provide as well some additional in- required. However, as important as it is to have on surance against any potential gap that might emerge hand the hardware, technologies, and expertise to in the provision of military assets for disaster relief successfully execute the types of HA/DR missions operations. Indeed, given competing demands for discussed so far, they are not in and of themselves their use in other military contingencies, many of sufficient to the task. Of equal importance is to have the key enabling capabilities that reside in the U.S. in hand a well-thought-out plan of operation, prefer- military (and were highlighted earlier in this chap- ably one that fully exploits existing mechanisms for ter) can justifiably be considered “low density-high military to military, civilian to military, and broader demand” assets in so far as foreign disaster relief is interagency collaboration. It is, in this sense, rela- concerned. As a result, however carefully the CO- tionships as much as capabilities that will determine COMs plan, these particular assets may very well be the success or failure of future HA/DR operations. requested more frequently and in greater quantities What such a plan should look like, how it should be than they are likely to be available. Therefore, in ad- organized, and what tools may already exist at the dition to boosting private sector support to various regional COCOM level to improve the overall chanc- relief agencies, finding ways to maximize contribu- es for success is the topic of the next chapter.

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Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief 71 chapter

Operational Challenges, 4 Civil-Military Coordination, & COCOM Platforms for HA/DR Collaboration

Obviously, the best-laid plans can end up being quite this chapter, there is no single solution that will ap- useless if they are not executed properly, and so it is ply across the board. Based on recent efforts byHA/ with HA/DR operations. Moreover, given the num- DR practitioners to cull key lessons learned from past ber and diversity of civil and military organizations experience, there are, however, common operational that could be involved (many of which may have challenges that arise in virtually every operation, big limited experience working together and quite dif- or small. Understanding these challenges may not ferent modes of operation), the task of organizing yield a template for effective action that fits every the participants in an international operation into situation, but it could certainly lead to a set of gen- a single, coordinated campaign is likely to be chal- eral guidelines that would apply in most cases. Not lenging in the extreme. The fact that the traditional surprisingly, when it comes to organizing military humanitarian community and the military bring to support for foreign relief efforts, many of the tough- the table different skills and experiences, and often est challenges involve the need for more effective co- quite divergent perspectives on how best to respond ordination between civil and military responders at to crises, simply makes the challenge of collabora- the local, national, regional, and/or international tion that much more difficult. So, too, the absence levels. So, while solving civil-military coordination of a common playbook for orchestrating a joint civ- (or CMCoord) problems won’t resolve every difficul- il-military operation – or even separate playbooks ty likely to arise over the course of an HA/DR effort, for each community that both could nonetheless it could take care of the most intractable. agree on (and refer to) – renders the objective of ef- This chapter begins with a review of key opera- fective mutual support extremely tough to achieve, tional issues that must be addressed – and to some and more of a “learn as you go” enterprise than one extent are being addressed by U.S. military plan- would like. It should come as no surprise, then, when ners – in the development of a basic concept of op- those being assisted in the wake of a serious foreign erations (or CONOPS, in military terminology) for disaster look at the army of responders rushing to providing military support to an HA/DR operation their aid and wonder, “Who’s really in charge here?” overseas. Particular attention is given to the overall and, “How is this all going to work?” More worri- challenge of CMCoord in the various phases of a relief some, given the current state of play, is that a num- operation, from initial response to eventual recovery ber of those same responders are likely to be asking and reconstruction. The chapter then takes a more the very same questions. in-depth look at very specific CMCoord challenges Depending on the location, scale, and type of that are likely to tax almost any HA/DR operation, disaster that occurs or assistance that is required, however well prepared and attentive to the CONOPS answers to these questions may not always be the discussed. Key challenges here include conducting same. As noted in earlier chapters and repeated in an accurate assessment of needs that both civil and

Finding the Right Mix

72 t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s military responders can agree on and act upon, tran- fort in which non-military responders play a more sitioning from a military to a civilian lead in a way prominent role. that sustains and builds upon investments in local In recent years, moreover, the magnitude, severity, capacity already made, and supporting a common and frequency of large-scale and rapid-onset natural public affairs message or set of messages about the disasters have triggered a steady growth in military objectives of the mission at hand. Finally, the chap- contributions to HA/DR missions, especially during ter explores at some length the various civil-military the initial surge phase of a response. As detailed in programs and platforms for collaboration in the HA/ chapter 3, the reasons, insofar as the U.S. military is DR realm that three of the regional COCOMs most ac- concerned, are obvious. In the first place, it possesses tive in that arena – PACOM, SOUTHCOM, and AFRI- exceptional strategic reach, tremendous capacity for COM – have set in place or are developing. All three a rapid and robust response, and unmatched capa- are emerging as innovative laboratories for planning bilities in the areas of logistics, transportation, com- and implementing HA/DR-oriented reforms that are munications, and emergency medical care, making minimizing past operational difficulties while pro- it an ideal first responder to fill immediate gaps in moting civil-military cooperation. assistance. Of course, as the situation on the ground evolves from initial relief to recovery, U.S. military forces, in close coordination with civilian govern- Developing a Concept of Operations mental entities and various NGOs, are likely to as- for Military Support sume additional responsibilities to sustain the op- eration, including the collection and distribution of As described in chapter 2, the U.S. military generally relief supplies, the organization and administration plays a supporting role in HA/DR operations, present of camps for displaced persons, the training of lo- to supplement and reinforce the activities of vari- cal responders and aid workers, and the reconstruc- ous civil authorities and NGO relief agencies. Toward tion of critical local infrastructure. Viewed from this that end, the UN’s Guidelines on the Use of Foreign angle, military forces assigned to HA/DR operations Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief need to be thinking from the outset of an operation in – commonly known as the Oslo Guidelines, and dis- terms of sequential (but interrelated) phases to their cussed more fully in chapter 5 – suggest that for- support activities. This would include an opening sit- eign military forces should only be requested when uational assessment phase, followed by a forward de- there is no comparable civilian alternative, in which ployment phase, an in-country assistance phase, and, case the military option becomes an appropriate eventually, an exit phase, this last phase marking the “last resort” to meet a critical humanitarian need transition of the mission to a recovery effort led prin- (UNOCHA 2007). These guidelines, however, do not cipally by non-mili- constitute policy, and many governments, includ- tary humanitarian HA/DR Operational Phases ing that of the United States, interpret them, par- relief experts. This ticularly the principle of last resort, quite broadly. emergency relief phase recovery/development chart illustrates in “Last resort,” for example, does not necessarily mean broad brush terms last to be called upon no matter what the circum- the phasing of mili- military and civil defense relief stances, nor should it. In situations of urgent need, tary and civilian re- the timeliness with which key foreign assets can be lief roles over the international civilian relief deployed and become operational, and the appro- course of a notional priateness and efficiency with which they may be HA/DR operation. utilized within the overall relief effort, must be con- As emphasized sidered, as well as their specific origin (Wiharta et in chapter 3, how- al. 2008, 31). Indeed, the use of military forces often ever, there will nev- precedes civilian response efforts as a way to jump need for assistance er be a “one size fits start relief operations and render immediate aid to all” model to fol- local/national response alleviate suffering and save lives, while paving the low in times of cri- way as well to a larger and longer-term follow-on ef- sis. Each disaster re- time

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quires a different response tailored to the type and iar to all. Fortunately, as a way to move forward in scale of the disaster and to the local operational en- this direction, the Joint Staff is overseeing a whole- vironment. So, too, capability needs may differ de- sale revision of U.S. military doctrine for foreign HA/ pending on whether American forces are providing DR missions, integrating key lessons learned from direct or indirect assistance, and doing so as a part 2001 (when the doctrine was last reviewed) to 2008.2 of a U.S. national response or a multinational effort. Once this new doctrinal guidance is approved and That said, as American military units have assumed released, the organization and management of the a higher-profile role in foreignHA/DR operations, the military component of American foreign relief ef- absence of a basic template for organizing such ef- forts should become more predictable, while remain- forts has led at times to unnecessary inefficiencies ing flexible enough to accommodate a variety of cri- and to a duplication of effort, especially between mil- sis situations. itary and civilian responders. Putting all the pieces According to the most recent draft of the updated together in launching and directing a major relief ef- doctrine, once the president and secretary of defense fort can be, according to the commander of Ameri- authorize a decision to employ military capabili- ca’s 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami response, a little like ties, the critical first step for the regional COCOM “starting a family vacation for which you were try- leading the effort is to define a “national strategic ing to pack the car and decide where you were go- end-state,” or, in layman’s terms, a set of objectives ing while you were driving down the road” (Miles (diplomatic, informational, military, and econom- 2005). Improving U.S. disaster responses in the fu- ic) that should be met by the conclusion of the op- ture, therefore, will require a more carefully consid- eration. The COCOM commander will then develop ered division of labor between military and non-mil- a mission statement to provide more specific direc- itary – and between U.S. and allied/partner nation tion for achieving the desired end-state objectives. – stakeholders. It will necessitate as well greater pre- Generally, the mission statement is a short para- event coordination and collaboration between the graph that describes the military’s role in assisting military and other disaster response organizations, the host nation and any relief agencies that may be together with an increased emphasis on HA/DR con- operating in the disaster area. Following the Indian siderations overall within military doctrine, plan- Ocean tsunami, for example, the mission statement ning, training, and resource management. specified that PACOM would “provide assistance to Of course, it would also help if military command- the governments of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand ers and DoD officials could agree up front on a basic, and other affected nations to mitigate the effects but adjustable, concept of operations (or CONOPS) of the recent earthquake and tsunami in the Indian 1 For the military, a CONOPS “describes that could be followed, whatever the Ocean. Conduct of operation is in support of USG how the actions of the joint force compo- specific conditions.1 Coordination and [U.S. government] lead agency and in coordination nents and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to ac- unity of effort among civil and military with international organizations, nongovernmen- complish the mission, including potential participants in such operations could be tal organizations, and coalition nations” (USPACOM branches and sequels” (Joint Staff 2006). facilitated as well if these commanders 2005). Of central importance in selecting the mili- 2 The new doctrine is scheduled to be re- and officials reached an agreement on tary units that will actually undertake the mission, leased before 2009 as Joint Publication 3-19, a set of standard operating procedures moreover, is an early determination of whether or Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. It will take the place of Joint Publication 3-07.6, Joint Tac- (or SOPs) that could be applied, with al- not they are likely to face, in military parlance, a tics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Hu- lowances for obvious adjustments and “permissive, uncertain, or hostile operational envi- manitarian Assistance, dated August 15, 2001. fine tuning, to virtually anyHA/DR sce- ronment,”3 and a decision on what this means for 3 A permissive environment is an opera- nario. SOPs would be especially useful force protection requirements. tional environment in which host country to have on hand to encourage common Once the basic nature of the operational setting military and law enforcement agencies have control, as well as the intent and capability to approaches to JTF headquarters orga- is established, the commander and his or her sup- assist in HA/DR operations. In an uncertain nization, to clarify chains of command porting staff plan the various phases of the opera- operational environment, host nation forces, (especially in multinational operations), tion from beginning to end. Clarifying what will (or whether opposed to or receptive to U.S. mili- to help coordinate joint and combined should) happen in each phase helps the command- tary involvement, do not have complete con- trol of the territory and population within the planning and decision making, and to er to visualize and think through the entire opera- intended operational area. A hostile environ- establish a common terminology famil- tion, to determine if additional forces need to be ment is one in which hostile forces maintain control and have the intent and capability to oppose or react to U.S. military involvement. Finding the Right Mix Operational Challenges, Civil-Military 74 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s requested, and to identify supply sources and poten- lief and recovery once a disaster occurs, and transi- tial civilian partners. In essence, the commander of tion to long-term rehabilitation after the emergency any large-scale disaster response must plan more or phase has ended. As in the continuous operations less simultaneously for all phases, with a continu- approach described above, the key task here for a ous process of transition in mind, which one notable COCOM planner would be to anticipate and think practitioner referred to as a “continuous operations” through what could be done before, during, and after mindset. At one and the same time, planning must a disaster to make each phase of a disaster response be done for an initial deployment, an assessment of unfold as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible. the situation, a subsequent execution of the mission In terms of pre-disaster planning and prevention, for (possibly in stages), and a redeployment, including a example, recent relief efforts underscore the value clear exit strategy and the handover of any ongoing of laying the groundwork for responsive operations recovery and reconstruction efforts to the appropri- well ahead of time by pre-positioning supplies and ate civilian/international authorities in a way that equipment for a likely range of disaster events with- “gets the military off the stage while the audience in specific regions, and by maintaining these for- is still clapping” (Blackman 2005). Of course, in ar- ward-deployed stocks in as ready-to-deploy a state eas where natural disasters are prevalent or where as possible.4 Moreover, to achieve the best synergy HA and HCA exercises are a key part of the regional of effort, it would be ideal if the con- 4 DoD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review command’s theater security cooperation (TSC) plans, tent and scale of such pre-positioning (QDR) points specifically to the importance of maintaining forward-deployed forces and ma- rudimentary contingency plans (or CONPLANs) for were coordinated in some way with the terial in and near crisis-prone regions, so that responding to a range of foreign disasters usually type and level of military forces (and they may more quickly transition from tradi- exist already, and they can be (and are) used as a associated supplies) forward-deployed tional deterrence missions to humanitarian general framework to facilitate a rapid response. in a specific region overall, as well as and disaster relief operations when so re- quired (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, 14). Conditions “in the field,” however, will determine with the content and scale of stockpiles how any pre-exiting CONPLAN is actually applied to maintained in rear areas (including the continental and adjusted for the situation at hand. United States, or CONUS). As described in chapter 3, For the military, another useful way to approach such an integrated approach to logistics could draw the phasing of an HA/DR operation is to divide the usefully from the experiences of private-sector sup- full lifecycle of a disaster event into three primary pliers and distributors. phases: pre-disaster planning and prevention, re-

Disaster Relief Life Cycle intensity

U .S . a h nd o i st n na te ti rn o a n t an io d n l a o l ca transition U c i l c . v i phase S il v . i i a li a n a relief n n a r d g e support l f e ie phase o n f surge r c a e i e g i e phase g s n n c i e m s

i l i t

a

r

i

e

s

time pre-disaster planning relief and long-term reconstruction and prevention recovery and rehabilitation

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Disaster responsiveness could be improved as ties understand well before any request is ever made well by negotiating memoranda of understanding what is required capability-wise, and what the prob- (MoUs) with a wider array of nations within key re- able cost would be, when the military is asked to gions that might request aid in the future or serve perform a specific emergency-related mission US( - as a transit point for overseas military deployments NORTHCOM 2008). Tasks covered under current in support of disaster relief missions. MoUs might PSMA agreements include such typical emergency also be a useful way to encourage potential part- support missions as providing helicopter or fixed- ner nations to place some of their own military as- wing airlift, conducting airborne or ground-based air sets on standby status or to maintain a special surge control, supplying various communications packag- capacity that could reinforce a developing or on- es to first responders, removing debris from emer- going disaster effort. So, too, advance agreements gency routes, setting up fuel distribution centers, could be signed with a select number of corporations and organizing and supplying temporary housing. that produce products and capabilities of particular Whatever the specific task, however, the overarch- value to HA/DR-type efforts, with the companies in ing idea is to encourage civil and military planners question agreeing to retain a special surge capacity to think ahead together and avoid duplicating efforts that could be triggered in the event of a major disas- where critical military support is concerned each ter. With regard to critical supplies, speed of delivery time a new crisis erupts. Applied to foreign HA/DR to priority areas could be advanced as well by estab- scenarios, the PSMA concept could at least encour- lishing and/or strengthening partnerships between age COCOM commanders in charge of military ca- NGOs and other relief agencies and the business sec- pabilities and units likely to be called upon to think tor. As noted earlier in chapter 3, this is especially more concretely about equipment lists, overall de- true in cases where a relief group and a private com- ployment packages, and projected costs for similar pany enjoy a longstanding history of collaboration, types of support in an OCONUS context. If experts such as CARE and UPS, or where both maintain a from USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance significant presence in the country or countries hit could be convinced to serve as the FEMA equivalents by disaster, such as ExxonMobil and Save the Chil- in this process, so much the better. dren in Banda Aceh (Jordan 2006, 6-19). In the case Finally, pre-disaster planning and prevention re- of CARE and UPS, both are headquartered in Atlan- quire regular joint and multinational military exer- ta and have enjoyed an especially close working re- cises and training opportunities that are specifically lationship over the years. These ties unquestionably focused on disaster relief. These exercises must in- made for more direct and effective communication clude robust non-military participation, most par- between UPS distributors and CARE personnel on ticularly specialists from OFDA and counterpart the ground in stricken areas, helping to ensure that agencies in other countries, the UN’s OCHA, disas- priority shipments arrived where they were most ter assistance offices from other international and needed as quickly as possible. transnational governmental organizations, and rel- At the more operational level, military read- evant disaster-minded NGOs. Cultivating relation- iness could be advanced via the development of ships with non-military partners through training pre-scripted mission assignments (PSMAs) for spe- exercises and by means of conference and workshop cific capability sets with a high likelihood of being dialogues helps to build partnership capacity, in- tapped to support a foreign relief effort. The PSMA creases familiarity with one another’s capabilities, idea was developed by NORTHCOM and FEMA, large- and promotes effective civil-military cooperation ly as a way to simplify and facilitate the process of during disaster response efforts. Of course, partic- providing military assistance to civil authorities for ipation should also be encouraged from the busi- particular emergency tasks during a U.S. homeland- ness sector, which has much to offer, but remains defense contingency. Each PSMA includes a detailed minimally involved in government-led training and statement of work, a description of the assets and exercise programs. Indeed, as noted earlier, wider personnel required to perform that work, and an es- business involvement could lead to the pre-disaster timate of the costs involved, all of which is agreed negotiation of contractual and other arrangements upon in advance by FEMA and DoD so that both par- with private sector entities for transport, logistics,

Finding the Right Mix Operational Challenges, Civil-Military 76 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s information management, and other disaster re- the extent of casualties and loss of life, the capacity sponse support. of the host nation government to respond, and the As for the relief and recovery phase, a key prob- degree of destruction to local infrastructure, espe- lem in the initial surge phase of any major disaster cially the damage done to logistical facilities and var- relief operation, and one that has bedeviled effec- ious modes of transportation. To prevent duplication tive coordination between military units and civil- of effort,HAST s also establish liaison ties and work ian relief agencies in recent HA/DR operations, is the closely with host nation authorities and with OFDA/ difficulty of obtaining timely and accurate informa- DART personnel, U.S. embassy officials, andNGO s al- tion on the scope and scale of the disaster, and then ready operating in the area. Within days of tropical converting that information into meaningful assess- cyclone Sidr making landfall in southern Bangla- ments that would identify critical requirements to desh on November 15, 2007, for example, PACOM de- which all could agree. In recent relief efforts, this ployed a twenty-three member HAST to determine problem has been exacerbated by the lack of com- the scope and likely duration of needed support, to mon standards against which first responders can survey the area, and to coordinate response efforts make assessments that would be readily and univer- with various relief organizations providing emergen- sally understood, by the absence of a common tem- cy assistance to those in greatest need (USAID 2007). plate for organizing the information into a common HAST members also traveled to cyclone-affected ar- operational picture, and by the absence as well of eas with USAID/DART and UN assessment teams to a common communications architecture for shar- gain a clearer picture of water and sanitation condi- ing that picture (and the information on which it is tions and to determine appropriate remedies. based) with all participants in the operation. To assist with interagency coordination in the To help acquire critical information and estab- early stages of an operation, a COCOM commander lish a clearer understanding of what needs to be also may establish a humanitarian assistance coordi- done, therefore, the COCOM commander in charge nation center (HACC). HACC staff members generally of an HA/DR operation may deploy at the outset a include civil-military operations planners, plus liai- rapid deployment or crisis action team (or CAT) to son officers (orLNO s) from OFDA, the UN and other the disaster site to assess the situation and provide intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), key NGOs, immediate guidance. The exact composition of the and host nation agencies. Normally, the HACC is only team would depend on the severity of the disaster, a temporary body set up during the early planning and, in some cases, on restrictions based on status- and coordination stages of an HA/DR operation, after of-forces agreements (SOFA), treaties, or informal which it is integrated into the main structure of the agreements that may limit the number and type of Comparison between Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), foreign military personnel permitted in the country. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), and Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) At a minimum, the CAT should include damage as- sessment, logistics, and medical expertise to draw a establishing composition authority function (representatives from) reasonably accurate picture of immediate emergen- affected countries cy requirements. The commander can then use the UN designated indi- US embassy or consulate initial assessments and findings of the CAT to plan vidual of affected coordinates overall re- joint task force how best to organize the overall operation, identi- country, UN, or U.S. lief strategy at the nation- other nonmilitary agencies fy necessary personnel and equipment, and priori- HOC government agency al level private sector assists with interagency co- combatant command tize mission needs for each phase of the operation. ordination and planning at nongovernmental organizations Typically, the CAT also forms the nucleus of the fol- the strategic level. Normal- intergovernmental organizations combatant ly is disestablished once a regional organizations low-on military response. HACC commander HOC or CMOC is established private sector As part of the CAT process, the COCOM command- assists in coordinating ac- joint task force er may also choose to organize and deploy a human- tivities at the operational nongovernmental organizations level with military forc- intergovernmental organizations itarian assistance survey team (HAST) to assess more es, US governmental agen- regional organizations fully the existing conditions and consequent require- cies, nongovernmental US governmental agencies joint task force and intergovernmental or- local government ments for the HA/DR force structure. HASTs survey or component ganizations and regional multinational forces the nature and extent of available water and food, CMOC commander organizations private sector

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Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center agement (GFM) system, which is also discussed in other relief and chapter 3. UN benefit organizations By their very nature, of course, relief mission Doctors of the World JTFs require a greater emphasis than do more com- UNICEF military UN World Save the Children bat-oriented JTFs on combat support and service Food Program CARE support forces, such as engineers and specialists UN High IGOs NGOs in mortuary affairs, logistics, transportation, civil- Commissioner military affairs, legal affairs, medical services, and for Refugees International Rescue public affairs. Civil affairsCA ( ) officers, in particu- CMOC Committee lar, play a crucial role in helping the JTF commander interact with host nation and other civilian author- CIA regional ities. Composed primarily of experts who special- interagency organizations ize in the rule of law, public health and welfare, and OFDA/DART good governance, CA units may be tasked to assess OAS other USG agencies ASEAN infrastructure damage, assist in the development African Union and management of shelters, and provide support to the local civil administration. Moreover, since HA/ operation. Organizationally, a JTF usually manages DR operations often involve the participation of nu- a major foreign relief effort, drawing upon various merous non-military relief groups, CA operators can forward-deployed forces that may be on hand in or serve as primary LNOs, maintaining communication close to the disaster affected area. In that event, an and effective coordination between and among civ- expeditionary strike group (ESG) with an embarked il and military responders. Not surprisingly, some of marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) can often pro- the greatest challenges in managing HA/DR opera- vide an immediate response in support of HA/DR tions have occurred when no U.S. military LNO was operations, while other deployed maritime forces, able to participate in discussions related to the non- including carrier strike groups (CSGs) and maritime military component of a major relief effort. This was pre-positioning force (MPF) elements, may offer ad- apparently the case in the first weeks after the 2004 ditional lift capacity and rapid supply options and Indian Ocean tsunami when no JTF LNOs were able serve as forward staging areas once a broader relief to attend the UN coordination meetings then tak- operation begins to unfold. ing place in Banda Aceh (Saleniko 2006). Of course, as detailed in chapter 3, hospital ships Depending on the type of disaster and the op- can provide emergency, on-site care for disaster vic- erational environment, additional special staff el- tims, while air force units can quickly move critical ements to support logistics, engineering, security, supplies and personnel into the disaster zone via liaison, and coordination, among other functions, both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter platforms. may be set up to assist the JTF commander in car- In time, army units can be moved forward to help rying out the HA/DR mission. If an HA/DR operation conduct search and rescue missions, distribute relief requires extensive engineering support, a subordi- supplies, inspect local facilities and infrastructure, nate JTF may be formed around an existing engineer and provide force protection and security to civil- command or a naval construction regiment. Anoth- ians, relief workers, and the joint force as a whole, er unit common to HA/DR efforts is a civil-military among other missions. From a military perspective, operations center (CMOC), which would be specifi- then, finding the right mix of forces to underwrite cally tasked with coordinating the activities of U.S. the JTF is the key to the success of any HA/DR op- and/or multinational military forces with those of eration, and that mix will vary, at times quite sig- international, regional, local, and host nation civil- nificantly, depending on the type and scale of the ian-run relief agencies. In close cooperation with disaster at hand. Fortunately, the overall process of any OFDA/DART team that may be present, the CMOC identifying the forces required and transferring them would normally act as the primary point of contact to the JTF commander has become smoother and with the JTF for non-military contributors to an HA/ more rapid with adoption of the global force man- DR operation, including NGOs, UN agencies, and var-

Finding the Right Mix Operational Challenges, Civil-Military 78 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s ious IGOs. As such, it would screen, validate, and pri- drawals of U.S. military forces that had deployed to oritize military support requests from these groups, Pakistan to provide earthquake-related assistance, assist non-military partners with access into mili- an operation that was the largest ever of its kind for tary-controlled areas, coordinate civilian relief ef- the U.S. military and one that generated consider- forts with those of the military, and, when the time able goodwill among average Pakistanis. comes, facilitate the transfer of operational respon- Getting this transition right was especially daunt- sibility from military to non-military authorities. ing in Pakistan, where host nation civil and military In some cases, the host nation, the UN, or possi- authorities felt more comfortable dealing directly bly OFDA during a U.S. unilateral operation will also Coordination at the Joint Task Force Level choose to establish a humanitarian operations cen- ter (HOC). TheHOC serves as a senior-level interagen- Ambassador cy and international body that helps to coordinate the overall relief strategy and promote unity of ef- Geographic Combatant Office of Foreign fort among all participants in a large HA/DR oper- Commander Disaster Assistance ation. Because it operates at the national strategic Crisis Action Team Disaster Assistance level, the HOC will normally include senior repre- Humanitarian Assistance Response Team Coordination Center sentatives from the affected country, assisting na- Humanitarian Assistance nongovernmental organizations tions, the UN, NGOs, IGOs, USAID, and the JTF. Among Survey Team intergovernmental organizations chain of Joint Logistics Operations UN agencies other tasks, it identifies emerging logistic require- Center command ments for NGOs, IGOs, and the UN, and submits re- not a quests to the JTF for military support, often through lines of formal the CMOC. Functionally, there is no significant dif- Joint Task Force coordination grouping ference between the CMOC and the HOC, except for the fact that the CMOC is established by and works Civil Military Humanitarian for the joint force commander and his or her JTF. Operations Center Operations Center Unlike the CMOC, however, the HOC is horizontally request for military support structured with no real command and control au- thority, and all participants are equal partners and with the U.S. military, principally via the Disaster ultimately responsible for their own organizations Assistance Center-Pakistan (DAC-PAK) JTF led by and countries. Similarly, a JTF would have no author- RADM LeFever, than with UN, NATO, or USAID/OFDA ity to make decisions regarding the precise structure personnel. In part this was because of the poten- and activities of the HOC. tially unstable security environment in areas hit by In addition to ensuring adequate civil-military the earthquake, and in part because of the limited coordination in the midst of an HA/DR operation, civilian infrastructure within Pakistan at the time accomplishing the transition from military to ci- for coordinating and managing humanitarian re- vilian management at the tail end in as positive a lief. Moreover, compared to the procedures followed manner as possible remains central to the overall during operation Unified Assistance (orOUA ) in re- success of such an effort. This is vital to establishing sponse to the Indian Ocean tsunami (when military the conditions and encouraging the attitudes with- and civilian response planners assigned to the for- in the assisted nation, or nations, that will allow for ward headquarters in Thailand often worked hand- a longer-term engagement with that nation or na- in-hand in the same conference room), the DAC-PAK tions, both by U.S. military forces (principally via se- operation featured a less direct and more limited curity cooperation activities) and by USAID teams form of civil-military interaction. In theory, USAID/ (by means of economic assistance and reconstruc- OFDA was still in charge on the U.S. side, but in prac- tion projects) in support of wider-ranging American tice its lead agency role was much less clear, and rep- foreign policy and security goals. Presumably, this resentatives from participating civil relief agencies was at least part of the rationale behind the first-ever worked mostly in a separate facility from their U.S. visit to Pakistan in 2006 by the chairman of the U.S. military counterparts. Joint Chiefs of Staff on the occasion of the first with-

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As a result, non-military responders (and even itary to plug into, and one that can assist the mili- some non-U.S. military responders) were less well tary’s disengagement from the operation. Of course, integrated into the DAC-PAK decision-making pro- prior to transferring relief efforts from military to ci- cess than they were in the OUA (and overall tsuna- vilian management, the JTF commander should also mi response) decision process, making the eventual review the tasks performed by the joint force and transition to a more civilian-run effort that much determine whether these tasks can be transferred harder. Looking back on it, even DoD has acknowl- or should simply be terminated. This review process edged that the DAC-PAK structure was a result of should help the commander, again working in close the specific and somewhat unique conditions that consultation with other U. S. government agencies, existed in Pakistan, and that it was not likely to be to identify host nation or other civilian organizations a preferred approach for relief operations and civil- most capable of assuming responsibility for certain military coordination in more stable environments. tasks before handing over final control. Indeed, given the importance of shifting to a civilian It is important to note as well that transferring lead for longer-term rebuilding efforts, an OSD af- relief efforts from military to civilian management ter-action report on the Pakistan operation stressed does not mean an end to military involvement or that future JTFs and military support teams ought an end to the operation itself. Beyond the particular to “engage Embassy capabilities as much as possi- hand-off, numerous tasks could be undertaken by ble” and “ensure all USG efforts are in support of [an military forces to help promote the long-term reha- OFDA lead] in determining appropriate responses in bilitation and recovery of a disaster-stricken coun- order to maximize the efficacy of joint efforts and try. First, retaining at least a small force of military to minimize the military footprint”. One proposal officers and technicians in country to assist civilian made for improving such coordination was to im- and host nation agencies could help to fill any im- plement more staff exchanges between military and mediate capability gaps that arise once the bulk of OFDA personnel, and to do so at the Washington, the military forces withdraws. Moreover, the abil- D.C., regional COCOM, country team, and field lev- ity to leave behind useful equipment and to train els (Hand 2006). locals in its use also facilitates long-term rehabil- Another key recommendation that dovetails with itation efforts and extends the beneficial effect of the concept of continuous operations discussed ear- U.S. assistance and presumably the goodwill so gen- lier was that planning for the transition from mil- erated. Of course, before handing over any equip- itary-led to civilian-led relief activities – and for ment, U.S. forces should confirm that local staffs are, the eventual termination of all military operations in fact, adequately trained and equipped to operate – should occur as early as possible. A comprehen- and maintain donated assets. Even the best inten- sive transition plan should also define specific mile- tions can have bad results, as demonstrated by the stones, such as the restoration of public facilities and inability of the Pakistanis (as discussed in chapter the provision of adequate food, shelter, and medical 3) to sustain the U.S. Army’s 212th MASH unit once care, that must be met prior to the termination or it was donated. hand-over of the mission. Toward that end, the JTF Emphasis should be placed, moreover, on the team should work in close cooperation with sup- transfer of skills and techniques, not simply on the porting COCOM staff,USAID /OFDA, and host nation donation of equipment. Rather than introduce a lev- and other participating agencies from day one to set el of care that a host nation would not likely be able in place a plan for the continuity of long-term relief to continue on its own, transition and hand-over ac- operations – including a shift from direct emergen- tivities should be designed to local standards and cy assistance to post-disaster capacity building and aim to build up local capabilities gradually. What development – once military forces have withdrawn must be avoided at all costs is the creation of a tem- from the operation. TheUN cluster system, a frame- porary infrastructure parallel to, and, to some ex- work introduced in 2005 in which engaged humani- tent, even competing with, indigenous capabilities tarian agencies are grouped in particular sectors or that would collapse soon after U.S. military teams areas of activity (and discussed further in chapter 5), are pulled out of country. In this sense, the “medical provides a natural and logical structure for the mil- ship plus” deployments described in chapter 3 and

Finding the Right Mix Operational Challenges, Civil-Military 80 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s later in the COCOM section of this chapter, which call ten led to confusion and misconceptions as to what for considerable advance planning aimed at inte- each community’s best capabilities are, how quickly grating NGO and military-led humanitarian activities (or not) each can respond in an evolving operation, with a focus on capacity-building ashore (in addition what the most effective division of labor between to emergency medical treatment), are ideal models them might be over time, and what, at any point in to follow. Such deployments would be a perfect way, time, either group is actually doing. Clearing away moreover, to follow up on a disaster-triggered emer- such confusion and correcting such misconceptions gency response via a “return visit” to provide target- will be key to achieving a more rapid and effective re- ed assistance to sustain programs begun during the sponse to future disasters and to encouraging a real immediate post-disaster timeframe. unity of effort over the course of an operation.5 This will require, in turn, a more concerted 5 Although technology can be helpful, the effort to embed into practice civil-mili- 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy points out that a paramount element in effective Ongoing Challenges to tary lessons observed during past opera- emergency response “lies in achieving uni- Civil-Military Coordination tions, but still not fully learned, if future ty of effort across a range of agencies,” es- operations are to go more smoothly. In- pecially ones that have not often had to As the above discussion makes clear, many of the ad- deed, thinking about and taking steps to collaborate in years past (Office of the Pres- justments that could and should be made to improve ident of the United States 2006, 48). maintain CMCoord across the lifecycle of future disaster relief operations, as well as follow-on an event – from first response to last act of assistance humanitarian assistance projects, revolve around ef- – remains central to the concept of continuous oper- forts to enhance civil-military coordination (or CM- ations that is so vital to a well-managed relief effort, Coord). This is the case in part because the civil and since it is the military sprinters who buy the time that military communities engaged in such efforts are the civilian marathoners need to fully mobilize and each essential contributors, and can not provide ef- eventually assume command in the recovery and re- fective relief entirely on their own. But it is also true construction phase of an HA/DR operation. because both communities adhere to very different As for how best to organize and manage a major operational cultures and priorities and operate un- multinational, interagency relief effort once it is un- der different codes of conduct. As a result, they can derway, the institutional structure and CONOPS used sometimes work at cross purposes. in OUA after the Indian Ocean tsunami proved to be Military units are often referred to as the “sprint- a successful framework. The initialJTF 536 that de- ers,” first to respond when assistance is requested ployed to Utapao, Thailand, drawn mainly from U.S. and first to arrive with robust organizational and Marine units based in Japan, transformed into Com- managerial skills, though they usually have a rela- bined Support Force (CSF) 536 as the military oper- tively short- or near-term perspective, such as “just ation became more multilateral. At the same time, getting the job at hand done.” Military responders a parallel organization known as the Combined Co- also tend to work hierarchically, to worry about force ordination Center (CCC) – composed of representa- protection (which can inhibit the provision of as- tives from the many UN agencies, State Department sistance), and to prefer secure and controlled in- and foreign ministry groups, and private NGOs that formation flow (which may hamper CMCoord). On eventually joined the operation – was set up to help the other hand, civil humanitarian agencies, be they coordinate the civilian aspects of the relief effort governmental offices orNGO s, are the “marathoners,” with the military aspects, with CSF 536 remaining slow to arrive in force, but able in time to bring to in charge of overall day-to-day operations. By and bear enormous depth of expertise, which they gen- large, this CSF-CCC model and the CONOPS devel- erally prefer to apply according to a long-term relief oped around it worked well, although the set-up was and recovery perspective. In so doing, moreover, they also highly ad hoc and “learn as you go” by nature in tend to prefer flat organizational structures, reach- the absence of a commonly agreed-to template on ing decisions by consensus, open (non-secure) lines how best to organize and manage such a multifac- of communication, and a neutral, mediation-style eted, combined, and interagency enterprise. More- approach to resolving conflicts. over, since the operational conditions that shape a These differences in culture, while not necessari- relief effort will vary from disaster to disaster, it re- ly incompatible in a disaster relief situation, have of-

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mains to be seen – as the DAC-PAK experience noted strict their role to providing infrastructure or logisti- earlier illustrated – how widely applicable the CSF- cal support and “leave the relief work [that is, getting CCC format will be to other relief efforts in the future. critical supplies and care to communities in need] It does provide, nonetheless, at least one practical to the professionals” (Schoff 2007). Early agreement example of how civil and military responses can be on a common assessment, the appropriate level of effectively coordinated, and why such coordination response, and the best way to implement that re- should be encouraged, whatever the specific oper- sponse, therefore, could go a long way toward mini- ational conditions. mizing tensions over lead and supporting roles (and Whether or not a CSF-CCC model is followed, get- transitions between these roles). ting an accurate joint needs assessment up front that Of course, once an operation is underway, mili- both military and civilian responders can agree on tary personnel, many of whom may have little (if any) is also critical to boosting the level of CMCoord in a training specifically geared toHA/DR operations, may disaster relief and humanitarian assistance opera- be inclined to fill what they see as leadership vacu- tion. One of the benefits that would result would be ums by integrating NGO resources and capabilities a far greater capacity for both sides to coordinate into a “more orderly” military effort. In that event, more effectively in managing the classic pull-push however, the seemingly mundane issues of military dynamic of disaster relief, where nations in need and contracting and cross-servicing, lines of command first responders try to reach back to assisting nations and communication, bureaucratic approvals, liabil- and aid organizations to pull needed capabilities for- ity, and rules governing classified information can ward, and then, as the magnitude of the problem be- frequently frustrate otherwise productive collabora- comes better understood based on a more precise tion. Additionally, CMCoord can be hindered as well assessment of needs, those same assisting nations by the fact that nations struck by a sudden disaster and aid organizations begin to push essential sup- often find it easier to coordinate with a single, con- plies and capabilities forward as fast as possible in solidated JTF-type military organization than with the volume and format required. Getting a better the numerous and diverse IGOs and NGOs, which handle on this “demand pull-supply push” dynamic may well total as many as two hundred or three hun- through improved civil-military assessment tech- dred separate agencies during the surge and relief niques – including a coordinated re-assessment of phases of a major disaster response. Governments changing needs at different points during a crisis – also tend to prefer the strict hierarchical structures would be a major step forward, since short circuits of military units, which usually guarantee that re- in the process have led to an unnecessary duplica- quests made to the commander will filter down to tion of effort and a waste of scarce resources in many all relevant personnel and be followed (Wiharta et past HA/DR operations. al. 2008). So, quite apart from better dialogue be- Assessments along these lines, however, remain tween responders, fixing theCMC oord problem may elusive. Efforts to develop more precise assessment also require better channels for joint military and tools and procedures have increased in recent years civilian responder communication with local gov- within the humanitarian community, particularly ernment authorities, possibly via a strategic plan- with respect to improving information sharing be- ning cell that would bring all three groups together tween differentUN agencies and other aid organiza- over the course of an operation. tions. Still lacking is a consistent and wider-ranging Following on from this last point, improved civil- attempt on the part of the humanitarian sector to military communications across the board as early involve military responders – and vice versa – more on in an operation as possible – and preferably well directly and regularly in such collaborative assess- before through pre-disaster training – will be vital to ments, so as to avoid capability gaps or duplication promoting more effective HA/DR responses. In this of deployed assets in a joint HA/DR effort. Moreover, context, moreover, the civil humanitarian commu- while non-military responders and NGOs recognize nity has much that it can contribute to the improve- the value of contributions made by military forces ment of military operations that is often overlooked. in foreign disaster relief operations, they still would For example, even though many key logistics-relat- generally prefer that the military units involved re- ed assets, such as cargo aircraft, supply ships, and

Finding the Right Mix Operational Challenges, Civil-Military 82 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s specialized mapping and satellite imaging technol- flict, and they are sensitive to any potential dam- ogies, are concentrated in the military, military per- age to this metaphysical space that may be caused sonnel may not be very familiar with the best use of by being too closely associated with a national mili- such assets in civil disaster situations (Center of Ex- tary force. One need look no further than the events cellence in Disaster Management and Humanitari- in Georgia in August 2008 for a contemporary ex- an Assistance 2005). Integrating more experienced ample of the misgivings humanitarian workers may civilian responders, such as OCHA representatives express when military units assume, in their view, from the UN and/or OFDA experts from USAID, into too direct a role in a relief effort at a time when the military disaster assessment and planning activi- security situation in the assisted nation remains ties from the start, therefore, would probably help unstable. In this specific case, rather than simply to ensure quicker dissemination of the most urgent authorizing DoD and military support for a relief information on humanitarian needs to all potential effort in Georgia led byUSAID and OFDA, President responders, as well as a more considered response to Bush placed DoD and U.S. military forces directly in those specific needs. It could also help to ensure that charge of the relief operation. As a result, a num- military assets assigned to HA/DR missions are bet- ber of relief agencies already operating in Georgia ter prepared to operate in a foreign disaster setting expressed opposition to this decision, arguing that where USG, IGO, and NGO civilians all play a leading it would render their own efforts to help the Geor- (if not the lead) role. gian people less effective (and certainly more sus- That said, even with greater efforts to improve pect in the eyes of Russian forces), as they would communications and to prepare the military for now be seen as part and parcel of an American mil- operating more effectively in a disaster relief envi- itary operation rather than as a non-partisan relief ronment, concerns within the humanitarian com- program (Wood 2008). munity over a higher military profile in future relief Even when the overall relief effort remains civil- efforts will not be resolved over night. Indeed, as ian-led, some NGOs, especially those with a long- military forces become more comfortable in their standing presence in a particular country, may disaster relief role and are called upon more fre- continue to fear that close cooperation with the mil- quently to provide such assistance, many in the civil itary could undercut their neutrality and increase humanitarian relief community have become pro- to an unacceptable level the risks they will inevita- portionately more worried that the delivery of re- bly face if conditions become unstable. Others may lief supplies and emergency assistance will, in fact, try to avoid military contact altogether, especially become “overly militarized.” This, they fear, could if it appears that their donor base and/or the local then blur the traditional distinction that has been authorities oppose the use of armed forces to pro- maintained between the military and non-military vide humanitarian relief. Further on this last point, domains of emergency response, leading to a con- officials in an assisted nation may complicate ef- traction in what relief workers refer to as “human- fective CMCoord by raising suspicions, however un- itarian space.” When this happens, they go on to founded, that military units engaged in relief work argue, the neutrality of relief workers in the field are actually conducting intelligence operations un- may be compromised, and their physical security der a humanitarian mantle. Fears along these lines more seriously threatened. likely contributed to the reluctance of the junta in The concept of humanitarian space, of course, Myanmar to endorse a full-fledged civil-military re- does not refer to a physical space within which NGOs lief after cyclone Nargis in May 2008. The potential and UN agencies operate, but rather to the freedom for host nation interference along these lines exists they generally enjoy to deliver assistance without as well even in planned humanitarian assistance ef- interference and independently from national po- forts approved in advance by the government of the litical or strategic interests, adhering throughout to assisted country. For example, even though he had the three core humanitarian action principles of hu- signed off on the visits, Nicaraguan President Dan- manity, neutrality, and impartiality (UN General As- iel Ortega called into question the “good deeds” di- sembly 1991). Aid agencies and workers rely on this mension of the USS Kearsarge’s humanitarian port humanitarian space for their safety in areas of con- visits to his country in August 2008 by suggesting

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that personnel aboard the ship were probably en- equipment, dug deep holes, and pushed all the de- gaged in espionage (Axe 2008).6 bris into large pits. The job was done much faster, of According to CMCoord analysts, another factor course, but it proved to be more expensive (factor- that sometimes dampens the enthusiasm of the hu- ing in the cost to mobilize the men and equipment), manitarian community for HA/DR efforts led large- and it may well have undermined the village’s abil- 6 Most likely, Ortega was miffed that the ly by U.S. military forces is the rath- ity (and desire) to mobilize in support of an overall Kearsarge deployment, like the USNS Comfort’s er high-intensity approach that it recovery effort. tour of Caribbean, Central, and South American countries in 2007, was generating considerable believes the United States too often In a similar example from the 2005 Pakistan good press for the U.S. military, and creating adopts when it gets involved in a com- earthquake response, U.S. forces came under criti- much goodwill among the communities served plex civil support operation, including cism from a number of NGOs for taking on projects, by medical teams on board the ship. Political- the American preference to retain di- such as the design and construction of local school ly, it would have been unwise for him to oppose such a visit, but he also probably wished to take rect command over all of its military buildings, without consulting local relief workers, some of the glow off the project (Axe 2008). assets and to avoid relinquishing na- thereby ignoring NGO efforts already underway to tional control to any international or- engage the local community in projects that would ganization or authority (Landon and Hayes). Such help to build local capacity over the longer haul and an approach contrasts sharply with that proposed provide cash-for-work opportunities (Schoff 2007). by the UN’s Oslo Guidelines and related documents, Situations like this, whether they occur during a di- which argue that civil humanitarian agencies ought saster relief operation or as part of a planned human- to retain the formal lead in disaster relief operations, itarian mission undertaken by a COCOM, do little to at both the operational and policy levels, particularly alter the view held by many NGO and other non-mil- when the disaster zone is also experiencing an out- itary aid providers that their military counterparts break or threat of armed conflict (UNOCHA 2004). often act in an arrogant manner, uninformed about Ongoing differences, therefore, in the way that U.S. and insensitive to the socio-cultural dynamics of the military commanders, on the one hand, and UN or communities they are trying to assist. In this sense, NGO officials, on the other, believe a foreign disaster greater priority should be assigned in the future to relief effort ought to be led and managed could make embedding foreign-area specialists and linguists it virtually impossible for both communities to agree into the response teams organized by the military, on a standard approach to CMCoord that could be including both military and non-military personnel followed in almost all joint relief operations. with experience in humanitarian assistance. This Within the humanitarian community, however, should include, experts on both sides of the civil- resistance to military involvement in disaster relief military divide suggest, more serious efforts among activities is not so much about whether or not the the American military services to develop a larger military should participate but rather about how cadre of soldiers and sailors trained both in foreign and when it should do so. More specifically, just language and foreign area studies and in HA/DR and because the military can do something, it is often wider-ranging stability operations. Until that time, argued by civil relief workers, doesn’t mean that it finding the right balance between and among mil- should. One example often noted in the humanitari- itary and non-military contributions to relief op- an community relates to a village cleanup operation erations – and maintaining proper CMCoord – will in Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami. During the ear- remain a very tricky business, especially in the case ly reconstruction phase of the relief effort, a group of post-disaster reconstruction initiatives and good- of NGOs was assisting local villagers with the labor- will missions aimed at the hearts and minds of com- intensive process of separating wreckage piece by munities where the image of the United States (and piece, creating piles of different materials that could the West, more generally) may be poor. be reused, recycled, burned, or discarded. The op- The vast pool of unique capabilities and resourc- eration involved a large and diverse segment of the es that the private sector can bring to foreign disas- village population, creating a communal sense of re- ter relief operations presents yet another coordina- building, and each worker earned a small wage that tion challenge to all participants, but a challenge contributed wealth to his or her family. Within a few that could be converted, if handled properly, into days, however, a military detail came in with heavy increased opportunities for success. In a number of

Finding the Right Mix Operational Challenges, Civil-Military 84 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s operational sectors, for example, private companies cation restrictions, limited distribution rules, and can offer civilian emergency responders support ca- software/hardware incompatibilities (See http:// pabilities similar to those provided by the military, www.strongangel3.net/). Many of the recommen- including in the areas of satellite communication dations proposed involve relatively simple changes links, airlift, warehousing, and ground transporta- in communications technologies and use proto- tion, as discussed in chapter 3. Moreover, business- cols that exploit non-military, commercially avail- es are relatively unburdened by chain-of-command, able systems to create information networks that legal red tape, and other bureaucratic hurdles that both military teams and their civilian partners in an can at times constrain effective military engagement HA/DR operation could use, and that would be far with civil authorities and non-military organizations. better suited as well to the austere field conditions Looking ahead, then, one of the more promising lines common in foreign disaster operational environ- of investigation for HA/DR planners, military and ci- ments. Among other measures, the recommenda- vilian alike, is to explore more fully how and under tions include providing forward military elements what circumstances private sector contributions can with portable commercial satellite communications supplement and stand in place of military support. equipment and adequate bandwidth access to en- At the same time, from a U.S. national perspective, sure reliable communications with all responders, USAID/OFDA and DoD officials need to put in place using wireless networking technologies (such as Wi- better mechanisms for working together with the Max/Wi-Fi) to provide blanket internet coverage corporate sector to identify specific areas of support throughout a theater of operations that all parties (such as logistics, transportation, communications, could tap into, and distributing internationally com- engineering, and medical services) where private- patible GSM cell phones to military and civil person- public collaboration can and should be further de- nel (including host- and assisting-nation personnel) veloped with an eye toward achieving greater CMCo- with features that would allow economical bidirec- ord (and better overall results) in the field. tional (both local and international) calls (Strong Fortunately, some steps in this direction have Angel Team 2006.) been taken and produced positive, if still some- In addition to the Strong Angel initiatives, a num- what limited, results. In the United States, the Strong ber of other private sector efforts have sprung up in Angel series of disaster management exercises and recent years with the twin goals of 1) creating infor- demonstrations, for example, has helped to identify mation portals and data management systems to and test new and emerging technologies developed support CMCoord in HA/DR operations and 2) or- in the private sector, by both nonprofit and com- ganizing business community assets and expertise mercial enterprises, that can help to facilitate in- to provide targeted assistance to both civilian and formation sharing and communications across the military disaster response groups. This would in- civil-military divide in crisis situations. This is a pri- clude, as discussed in some detail in chapter 3, the vate, unofficial activity that nonetheless includes the work of the World Economic Forum and its Disas- participation of military specialists, DoD civilian per- ter Resource Network, the Partnership for Disaster sonnel, first responders, corporate leaders, andNGO Response of the Business Roundtable, and the Busi- representatives. The most recent event, Strong Angel ness Civic Leadership Center at the U.S. Chamber of III, was held in San Diego in August 2006 and sim- Commerce. Just as important as these and similar ulated a worldwide viral pandemic that stretched efforts to make sure that the best technologies and emergency response efforts toward the breaking business practices are available to disaster respond- point, just as a terrorist network launched a wave ers, however, are the steps now being taken by the of cyber-attacks that disabled communications UN, the U.S. State Department, DoD, the military throughout the United States. commands, and even NGOs to bring military and Strong Angel III highlighted in particular a num- non-military disaster relief practitioners together ber of technical and procedural solutions to the for face-to-face information exchanges, joint train- problems forward military commanders often have ing, and tabletop exercises. For in the end, it is re- in getting crucial data to host nation officials and lationships – not technologies or software – that to non-military relief providers because of classifi- may play the most critical role in maintaining bet-

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ter coordination and communication between the powerful impact HA/DR assistance can have on the civil and military communities tasked with HA/DR public attitudes of assisted communities and na- responsibilities. Only by knowing “who’s who” and tions, it is essential to frame a positive and accu- “who does what” in both communities – and what rate message about the operation and make sure it their specific relevance is to the mission at hand – is explained to and understood by various targeted can future teams deployed in response to a foreign audiences. Ignoring this task, moreover, would pro- disaster have the best chance of avoiding the CM- vide greater opportunities to those who might be Coord problems that have complicated past opera- opposed to such efforts – and, more specifically, to tions, including the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the accumulation of goodwill by the United States 2005 Pakistan earthquake responses. and its allies/partner states that their contributions In many ways, the most useful type of activity may generate – to shape the story that surrounds to develop better relationships would be a regular the operation. An active public outreach program is series of multilateral and multinational disaster important as well to clear away the confusion and management exercises with both planning and op- uncertainty that often arises in a disaster response erational components that would bring all the likely situation about the level of damage, the status of participants together, both military and civilian, on the relief effort, and developments to come. It also an annual or biannual basis. This has, in fact, been may be needed to dispel wild rumors that sometimes the intent behind PACOM’s annual Cobra Gold exer- are passed along when military units are seen un- cise (discussed further under “COCOM Platforms and dertaking a task that seems odd to the local popu- Programs to Promote Collaboration,” below), which lation, as happened when well-digging teams from is held each year in and around Thailand and was CENTCOM’s Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Af- credited with helping to lay the operational ground- rica (CJTF-HOA) were thought to be building mis- work for the OUA tsunami response in 2004. Going sile silos. So, too, when responding to rumors and, forward, the objective of future events in the same more importantly, providing up-to-date reports to vein must be to rehearse HA/DR planning and oper- the public on a relief effort that is underway, the best ations as often and realistically as possible, and to results, from a credibility perspective, are likely to include as many first responders and relief agencies be achieved when the information streams from civ- as possible. For military participants, a key priority il and military responders are carefully coordinated should be to become more fully familiar with, and and as fully in synch as possible. develop closer ties to, USAID/OFDA, UN, IGO, and NGO To the extent that HA/DR operations provide le- personnel, as they are the people to whom the mil- gitimate vehicles for U.S. public diplomacy cam- itary will hand the long-term recovery and recon- paigns (that is, efforts to influence foreign attitudes struction roles. In the words of one U.S. expert with about America as whole), the public affairs strategies experience in both the military and civil response and statements of the State Department, USAID, and worlds, these people represent, in no small measure, DoD must clearly be integrated and synchronized. the “the military’s ticket home.” (Baltazar 2006). For Special care must be taken as well to transmit the civilian responders, a primary goal should be to learn common message or messages without distortion as much as they possibly can about how the military down the chain of command to the operators in the does adaptive planning, given that very few non-mil- field – principally, localUSAID and OFDA operatives itary disaster relief planners are as skilled as their on the civilian side, and COCOM commanders and military counterparts are in reacting to unanticipat- forward-deployed units on the military side. If CM- ed events or in adjusting to (and creating) alterna- Coord like this at the national level can be expand- tive courses of action. But again, the main point for ed to include public affairs coordination with the all parties would be to rehearse as often, as realis- UN, OCHA, and other appropriate organizations at tically, and as inclusively as possible. the international level, so much the better. The key, Finally, CMCoord could benefit enormously from however, is to have a properly prepared message or closer attention by civil and military responders set of messages to deliver. alike to the public affairs and strategic communi- cations dimension of a joint operation. Given the

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ter event (as it may take time for U.S. and allied first COCOM Platforms and Programs to responders to reach these rather distant lands in Promote Collaboration force), and then to cooperate on a smoother interop- erable basis with external assistance efforts once The regionalCOCOM s provide some of the most use- foreign military assets, international agencies, and ful collaborative platforms and programs for help- NGOs arrive on the scene (see http://www.combine- ing civilian and military responders get to know dendeavor.net and Kuecra 2006). each other better, thereby creating the personal Finally, NORTHCOM, which includes Canada, Mex- relationships and real-world experiences that will ico, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well minimize tensions and misunderstandings across as the continental United States (CONUS), in its AOR, the civil-military divide. An in-depth review of all has played an active role in the promotion of disaster COCOM efforts that might apply, of course, is beyond relief preparedness on a North American-wide scale, the scope of this study, and, in any event, unneces- and it is now turning its attention to closer coopera- sary to the main point being made – namely, that tion with SOUTHCOM on a similar initiative for the Ca- the regional COCOMs provide some of the best lab- ribbean region. As the COCOM responsible for provid- oratories for developing HA/DR skills and for refin- ing defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) in the ing them through real-world practice. This section event of a CONUS-based disaster, NORTHCOM has also of the chapter, therefore, focuses on the activities of been quite forward-leaning in developing innovative three COCOMs – namely, PACOM, SOUTHCOM, and AF- mechanisms – such as the PSMAs described earlier RICOM – that have emerged as particularly skilled in this chapter – for improving civil-military coordi- practitioners in the realm of HA/DR planning and nation well before a disaster ever strikes. NORTHCOM operations. has taken a lead as well in encouraging public-pri- Of course, while PACOM, SOUTHCOM, and AFRI- vate sector collaboration in disaster relief manage- COM stand out in this area (as discussed further be- ment, and it was one of the firstCOCOM s to recognize low), other commands are also active in the HA/DR the need for a specific directorate at the command field, and are developing useful platforms and pro- level to help promote a whole-of-government, inter- cedures to facilitate relief operations. For example, agency approach to disaster relief planning, as well EUCOM has sponsored fourteen annual Combined as homeland defense writ large. Endeavor exercises that have brought together NATO For PACOM, SOUTHCOM, and AFRICOM in partic- and Partnership for Peace members to test com- ular, however, the HA/DR mission remains central, munications and information systems interoper- and each has undertaken or is considering sever- ability in the context of HA/DR and peacekeeping al especially useful and promising activities. These operations. It has also helped to sponsor the an- three are excellent examples of what some in DoD nual Southeast European Disaster Relief Prepared- call “engagement commands,” meaning that their ness Conference organized by the George C. Marshall focus is primarily on peacetime engagement with Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany. countries in their areas of responsibility (or AORs) On a more operational note, as of January 2008, EU- rather than on active combat operations. Such en- COM is hosting four-month rotational deployments gagement, moreover, is based principally on their of C-17 Globemaster III cargo planes at Ramstein Air theater security cooperation programs, and these, Base in Germany as a way to expedite rapid response in turn, continue to accord HA/DR operations (and missions – including HA/DR-related airlift – within preparations to undertake them) top priority. What and beyond EUCOM’s AOR. For its part, CENTCOM es- follows is a selective survey of plans and undertak- tablished a regional disaster management center of ings being pursued by these three commands. excellence for the Horn of Africa in in 2006, and it has plans for similar centers in Kazakhstan to U.S. Pacific Command cover Central and South Asia and in Jordan to cov- PACOM’s AOR, which covers the largest geograph- er the Middle East/Arab Gulf region. The principal ic area of all COCOM AORs, remains especially sus- thrust of the centers will be to improve the ability ceptible to a range of devastating natural disasters. of countries involved to respond more effectively on Typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis, which in their own during the initial phase of a local disas-

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turn can cause additional crises such as mudslides PACOM’s ability to respond promptly to regional or flooding, have greatly affected the region in re- disasters such as Fengshen, and to work effectively cent years, causing numerous deaths, injuries, and with civil and military authorities in countries that displaced persons, as well as substantial damage it assists, owes much to the emphasis successive PA- to local infrastructure. As a result, PACOM has in- COM commanders have placed on advance planning creasingly emphasized HA/DR missions and capaci- for such events. As a result, PACOM has emerged over ty building in its joint exercises with partner nations the years as a pioneer in disaster preparedness pro- and in the military training of its component com- grams, developing a number of multilateral initia- mands. More specifically, through multilateral ini- tives and cooperative mechanisms to help facilitate tiatives, joint and combined exercises, and direct rapid and well-coordinated disaster relief respons- responses to regional disasters, PACOM builds part- es. Among the more successful efforts in this regard ner-nation capabilities for responding to disasters, is the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team improves U.S. HA/DR interoperability with these na- (MPAT), a grouping of experts from some thirty-three tions, and provides its military personnel with in- Asia-Pacific countries who meet regularly to discuss valuable operational experience in the HA/DR realm. and test ways to improve crisis response capabilities At the same time, by providing both emergency and and interoperability. In existence since 1999, MPAT longer-term assistance to communities in need, PA- conducts exercises, workshops, and seminars that COM efforts in that regard help to promote goodwill attract senior personnel from a number of UN, IGO, toward the United States within its AOR. regional, and NGO agencies, such as the World Health In June 2008, for example, PACOM provided a wide Organization, Doctors Without Borders, the Inter- range of assistance to the Republic of the Philippines national Committee of the Red Cross, and OCHA, as as it struggled to recover from the effects typhoon well as representatives from MPAT member states. Fengshen (Frank). Fengshen hit the Philippines on The MPAT program is staffed by a core group of ex- June 20, leaving torrential rain, flooding, and mud- perienced military and non-military personnel, and slides in its wake. The typhoon affected thousands in the event of a major relief effortPACOM can draw of people, leaving hundreds dead and injured. PA- on the MPAT framework to rapidly augment a mul- COM responded to a request from the Filipino gov- tinational force headquarters with the requisite ex- ernment for urgent help by sending the USS Ronald pertise in communications, intelligence, medicine, Reagan Carrier Strike Group (CSG), which arrived engineering, and logistics. in the Sulu Sea on June 25, 2008. The CSG support- The MPAT team, in fact, provided critical oper- ed national and provincial Filipino authorities, the ational elements to OUA in response to the Indian Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Di- Ocean tsunami, and it is poised to do the same for saster Coordinating Council, and the Philippine Na- future large-scale relief efforts in the Asia-Pacific re- tional Red Cross, by conducting search and rescue gion. Additionally, all non-U.S. military liaison offi- missions and a variety of disaster recovery opera- cers assigned to OUA’s CSF 536 force in Utapao, and tions, all of which were coordinated closely with lo- most of the non-military representatives housed in cal USAID representatives (Embassy of the United the CCC, were MPAT-trained. The personal relation- States in 2008). From the USS Ronald Reagan, ships and habits of cooperation developed during Carrier Air Wing 14 provided relief workers with crit- MPAT training expedited the stand-up of both head- ical heavy lift capability, including C-2A Greyhound quarters, and assured a higher degree of military-to- cargo aircraft, while Helicopter Anti-Submarine military and civil-military cooperation than would Squadron 4 supplied HH-60H and SH-60F Seahawk otherwise have been the case. MPAT seeks to con- helicopters to reach less accessible areas. Also fly- tinue and to improve the facilitation of cooperation ing humanitarian missions were Seahawk helicop- through MPAT’s annual scenario-driven exercises, ters dispatched from the USS Chancellorsville, USS where attendees gather to practice and refine a se- Howard, USS Thach, and USS Gridley. Altogether, air- ries of common operating procedures for multilat- craft and helicopters from the CSG flew 332 sorties eral operations, thereby gaining valuable training and delivered over five hundred thousand pounds experience and taking major steps toward broader of supplies ( 208). multinational interoperability. Indeed, the overall

Finding the Right Mix Operational Challenges, Civil-Military 88 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s success of the CSF-CCC structure can be traced in files and after-action reports on all major disaster large part to the lessons learned and relationships response efforts in the region, and it appears to be forged in Cobra Gold, an annual, multilateral civ- evolving toward becoming a one-stop repository for il-military MPAT exercise that focuses on humani- Asia-Pacific disaster management case studies. As tarian assistance, disaster relief, and peacekeeping. such, APAN stands out as a potentially invaluable Begun in 1982 as a bilateral exchange between the tool for sharing key lessons observed and/or learned Royal Thai Armed Forces and the U.S. military, Co- with regional military and non-military registered bra Gold now draws together more than a dozen users (see www2.apan-info.net/apan).7 countries for an annual series of command post ex- The only resource that could compete withAPAN ercises, field training, and civic action projects (Co- to become the repository of choice within PACOM’s bra Gold 2008). AOR on disaster relief matters is the website main- MPAT planners also developed and continue to tained by PACOM’s Center of Excellence (COE) in update a document entitled the Multinational Force Disaster Management and Humanitar- 7 Additional disaster response information- Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP) in order ian Assistance, commonly referred to sharing networks that may also prove useful in the future include, among others, the UN’s to help guide future combined operations other as simply the COE. As an organization, OCHA-managed Relief Web, the web of the UN than war, including HA/DR contingencies, within the COE focuses a bit more specifically Inter-Agency Secretariat of the Internation- the Asia-Pacific region. The document, which tar- than APAN does on civil-military coor- al Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR), gets commanders and staffs who plan and execute dination and the promotion of greater the Australian Disaster Information Network (AusDIN), the Japan-based International Re- MNF missions within UN, coalition, and/or smaller awareness among military, civil gov- covery Platform (IRP), and the Thailand-based combined force frameworks, is intentionally broad ernmental, IO, IGO, and NGO disaster Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC). in nature to allow for flexibility in application. As responders regarding their respective roles and ca- such, the MNF SOP serves as a guide for the establish- pabilities. Toward that end, it publishes a profession- ment of a generic combined joint task force (CJTF), al journal called Liaison dedicated to the analysis of integrating doctrine, processes, lessons learned, and current developments in the HA/DR world that may other inputs from nations participating in the MPAT help to facilitate effective civil-military collabora- program. In short, the MNF SOP aims to reduce the tion in support of humanitarian relief. TheCOE also ad hoc nature of multinational crisis action planning sponsors independent research on CMCoord-relat- and to increase the speed of response, while boosting ed matters, including with respect to peacekeeping, as well interoperability, unity of effort, and mission consequence management (in response to nuclear, effectiveness. It is also worth noting that the docu- biological, or chemical events), and counter-terror- ment is not a binding international agreement be- ism, as well as disaster relief. It is the COE’s website, tween the participating nations, but merely a set of however, that stands out as the most useful resource standing procedures and guidelines. for educating the relief community as a whole and The Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN) represents keeping it up to date regarding recent policy re- another PACOM-sponsored initiative that proved forms, relevant experiences in the field, and prom- beneficial during the 2004 tsunami relief effort. As ising technology trends. Like the APAN website, the noted briefly in chapter 3, APAN is an interactive COE site posts detailed case histories of recent relief website allowing registered subscribers to share in- efforts in the region, but it also posts daily reports formation relevant to the planning and execution of on current and developing disasters and the various multilateral operations. During OUA, APAN main- national and international responses they have trig- tained a world-class site with the most up-to-date gered. Its reports on the Myanmar and Sichuan relief and comprehensive information available on an un- efforts in 2008, for example, were among the most classified basis on all aspects of the operation. As a comprehensive available on an open-source basis. result, it became a primary source for the many reg- In addition to the COE, two other Hawaii-based istered NGOs and business groups involved in the re- institutions have emerged as increasingly valuable lief effort, and it has since triggered the creation of platforms that PACOM can (and does) draw on to a number of other internet-based information por- become better prepared for HA/DR missions and to tals and technical resource centers (Dorsett 2005, promote preparedness among potential Asia-Pacif- 15). APAN has also established detailed electronic ic partners. The first is the Asia-Pacific Center for

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Security Studies (APCSS), a DoD-funded academic operations in PACOM’s AOR, providing a common pic- institute based in Honolulu that sponsors a range ture of disaster response needs and requirements of security studies-oriented training programs and that can be viewed (and discussed online) by all us- workshops for senior military and civilian officials ers, including NGOs, businesses, and others not tra- from the United States and Asia-Pacific nations. ditionally seen as working with or within military The focus is on building relationships among future commands and structures. Not surprisingly, a sim- leaders and decision-makers, and pursuing this goal ilar model is envisioned for the George C. Marshall with an eye on the rising importance of multilateral Center for Security Studies in Europe as a way to SSTR missions, including international HA/DR op- promote HA/DR cooperation within (and around) erations, is seen by the APCSS as a top priority. The EUCOM’s AOR (King 2007, USPACOM 2007). second is the Pacific Disaster Center PDC( ), which In addition to collaborative mechanisms dis- is managed by the University of Hawaii and focuses cussed above, PACOM also relies on regular joint more on the science and technology aspects of di- exercises and field training activities with key Asia- saster preparedness, providing hazard risk and vul- Pacific partner countries to boost regional expertise nerability assessments, hazard mitigation planning, and interoperability in the HA/DR realm. As noted geospatial data and information sharing, and inter- in earlier chapters, PACOM, like other regional CO- net-based communications technology to clients at COMs, makes a special effort to build into its TSC the state, national, regional, and international levels. program each year a number of bilateral and mul- Both groups address more fully a community of in- tilateral exercises that center on honing U.S. and terest and influence – the broader national security allied skills in the conduct of disaster relief and var- community in the case of APCSS, and the more tech- ious humanitarian assistance operations. This in- nology-minded element within the disaster manage- cludes practice in providing emergency relief on a ment community for the PDC – that the COE is less collaborative basis in the face of a sudden onset nat- able to reach with its NGO and civil-military coor- ural disaster (such as an earthquake or typhoon), as dination focus. well as more binational and multinational civic ac- Further on this last point, it is worth noting as tion programs scheduled well in advance that in- well that DoD has sought in recent years to maxi- volve road construction, the building of schools and mize the separate contributions of all three orga- clinics, and training local medics, among other ca- nizations, as well as those of other HA/DR-relevant pacity-building initiatives. Taken together, such ex- groups with a link to PACOM (e.g., MPAT, APAN, and ercises help to establish personal relationships and the Maui High Performance Computing Center, or habits of cooperation that will be essential to actu- MHPCC), by combining them into an integrated, in- al relief efforts in the future, while creating a knowl- ternet-based “network of networks.” One result of edge base among likely responders on appropriate this effort was the creation of the Asia-Pacific Collab- procedures to follow that would apply to a range of orative Security Consortium (APCSC), which hosts contingencies. The importance of the Cobra Gold an online information portal that gives registered series in building the personal ties and testing the users from the governmental, NGO, and academic operational procedures that underwrote the OUA ef- communities of Asia-Pacific countries more imme- fort in 2004-05 is, as noted earlier, but one clear ex- diate access to the analyses generated and tools de- ample (Elleman 2006, 28). veloped by consortium members, including those At times, moreover, joint exercises can transform listed above. The data provided, of course, ranges themselves into actual HA/DR operations. As not- across a spectrum of critical security issues, but the ed in chapter 3, in February 2006 the annual U.S.- importance and challenge of preparing for and, if re- Philippine Balikatan exercise – which was designed quired, conducting timely and effective disaster re- specifically as a humanitarian assistance training lief is one of the key issues addressed at the specific program – shifted directly into a real-life relief effort request of DoD. In near future, the APCSC, often re- as a devastating series of mudslides wrought havoc ferred to as the “Hawaii model” for data fusion and on the island of Leyte just as U.S and Filipino forces information sharing, is likely to become a one-stop were assembling to begin the exercise (GlobalSecuri- source for advice and guidance on HA/DR plans and ty.org). Within hours of arriving in Subic Bay on Feb-

Finding the Right Mix Operational Challenges, Civil-Military 90 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s ruary 17, forward-deployed U.S. Marine forces and Zealand, and the Repub- Pacific Partnership amphibious ships assigned to Balikatan 2006 were lic of Korea. This time, dispatched to Leyte to provide immediate assistance the Mercy made sched- (water, food, shelter, medical supplies, and search uled stops in the Phil- and rescue teams) to the area’s mudslide victims. ippines, Vietnam, the Vietnam Phillipines Micronesia Had it not been for the Balikatan deployments and Federated States of Mi- the habits of U.S.-Filipino cooperation established cronesia, Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea through previous exercises in the series, the loss- and Papua New Guinea es sustained would surely have been worse and the in support of numerous relief as a whole much slower to materialize. Sim- pre-planned medical ilarly, Cobra Gold 2008, also designed primarily as and engineering proj- Timor Leste a HA/DR-type exercise, was almost perfectly timed ects (Horvath 2008), but and structured to help support initial U.S. and re- it was ready and able as 2007 USS Peleliu gional efforts to respond to the damage caused by well – as it was on previ- 2008 USNS Mercy cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. As it happened, resis- ous tours – to meet un- tance by the ruling junta in Myanmar to outside as- expected calls for emer- sistance slowed the provision of foreign emergency gency aid, as it did after typhoon Fengshen hit the relief and minimized its overall scale, but the fact Philippines (Kruzel 2008). that HA/DR-related military forces were already in the area as part of the Cobra Gold exercise certain- U.S. Southern Command ly helped to speed the supply of aid that was even- Just as PACOM does, Southern Com- 8 SOUTHCOM has stopped using the tradi- tually approved. mand (SOUTHCOM) places consider- tional COCOM term “area of responsibility” (or “AOR”) and replaced it with the term “area of Finally, PACOM’s ongoing series of medical ship able emphasis on the conduct of HA/ focus” (“AOF”). Apparently, “AOR” was viewed deployments deserve brief mention. These deploy- DR operations within its sprawling area rather unfavorably by many regional partner ments are now organized as part of the command’s of focus (AOF)8, which is as prone to a countries, as it implied (in their eyes) an un- new Pacific Partnership initiative and constitute a variety of natural disasters as the Asia- welcome degree of U.S. military responsibili- ty and control in the region as a whole. “AOF” core element of its theater security cooperation, or Pacific region is. In 2007, for example, is seen as a more appropriate term at a time TSC, program. They have already been discussed at SOUTHCOM launched no fewer than sev- when SOUTHCOM’s primary focus is on build- length in chapters 2 and 3, with special attention giv- en substantial disaster relief efforts in ing cooperative partnerships with Caribbe- an, Central, and South American states. en to their utility in building local capacity to man- response to February floods in Bolivia, age future disasters while creating substantial good- an August earthquake in Peru, the impact of hurri- will toward the United States and its military forces. cane Felix in Nicaragua in September, and the dam- Suffice it to say here that the latest deployment, cen- age inflicted by tropical storm Noel in the Dominican tered around a five-month tour of the Western Pa- Republic in November. Specific operations covered cific and Southeast Asia by theUSNS Mercy hospital the gamut from a single (though still vital) C-130 Her- ship, was a perfect example of the collaborative ca- cules cargo flight to Bolivia carryingUSAID relief sup- pacity-building missions now favored by the region- plies to flood-damaged communities to multi-unit al COCOMs and the U.S. Navy, involving a diverse ar- joint force operations conducted over several days ray of military, civil, NGO, and allied/partner nation in support of a much larger-scale effort, such as the experts performing a variety of medical, veterinary, response to Felix. Moreover, given the frequency of engineering, and broader humanitarian assistance such disasters and the disruption they often cause tasks. In addition to navy, air force, and army per- to local infrastructure, many of SOUTHCOM’s lon- sonnel, this particular crew included, for example, ger-term capacity-building projects in the AOF are representatives from the U.S. Public Health Service, focused on disaster risk reduction and the promo- nonprofit andNGO groups like the San Diego-based tion of disaster prevention measures. Toward that International Relief Team and the Pre-Dental Society specific end, in 2007SOUTHCOM initiated as many as of University of at San Diego, and a host one hundred separate projects in twenty-five coun- of countries from the greater Asia-Pacific region, in- tries (USSOUTHCOM 2008a). cluding Australia, Canada, Chile, India, Japan, New

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As for the scope of a larger-scale SOUTHCOM- gency operations centers, relief supply warehouses, led disaster response, the command’s efforts in the and potable water production facilities. Once a di- wake of hurricane Felix provide, as implied above, a saster strikes, HAP funds may also be used to pro- useful illustration. After Felix hit Nicaragua’s north- cure and/or transport critical equipment that may east coast on September 4, 2007, a humanitarian as- be in short supply, such as the heavy engineering sessment team from SOUTHCOM’s JTF-Bravo – about and excavation equipment it provided to help Nica- which more is said later – arrived on September 5 raguan communities dig out from the massive mud- with two CH-47 Chinook helicopters that flew fif- slide triggered by in October 2005. teen sorties, airlifted 126,000 pounds of relief sup- TheHAP program has been extremely useful as well plies, and evacuated twenty-four people. The next in promoting regional efforts to strengthen cooper- day the amphibious ship USS Wasp arrived with sev- ation and collaboration in the disaster relief field, eral MH-53 Sea Dragon and SH-60 Seahawk helicop- supporting a number of projects sponsored by the ters that flew fifty-one sorties, ferrying more than Central American Natural Disaster Prevention Co- 89,000 pounds of aid supplies and evacuating ten ordination Center, the Andean Committee for Disas- people. On September 8 an air force C-130 airlifted ter Management and Prevention, and the Caribbean 26,000 pounds of USAID supplies (including plastic Disaster Emergency Response Agency. sheeting used for shelter, hygiene kits, and blankets), Another carefully planned initiative that helps to on September 9 the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts build local capacity to manage and reduce the im- relieved the Wasp, and between September 9 and pact of disasters, while also addressing immediate 14 two SH-60 Seahawk helicopters from the Rob- humanitarian needs, is the series of “medical ship erts transported 45,000 pounds of aid and evacu- plus” deployments conducted as part of SOUTHCOM’s ated twenty-four people. From September 12 to 18 a Continuing Promise program. Similar to PACOM’s marine corps KC-130 transported 93,000 pounds of Pacific Partnership, these cruises have become ex- aid and substantial amounts of fuel for the JTF-Bra- traordinarily useful test-beds for improving and vo helicopters. Finally, between September 14 and extending civil-military and public-private collabo- 18, two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters that arrived ration in support of foreign humanitarian assistance, with a second JTF-Bravo team (the first having de- building a cadre of relief providers who will have a parted on September 9) flew fifty-four sorties, air- much better idea of how and with whom to cooper- lifting more than 110,000 pounds of relief supplies ate when disasters arise that require their support. and evacuating six people. So, even though SOUTH- To the extent that the activities ashore – which, as COM has very few assigned forces regularly under its noted in chapter 3, have become an increasingly im- command, it has acquired a great deal of experience portant component of these deployments – help to in cobbling together, on short notice, a diverse mix build local defenses against the effects of sudden of available units tailored to the task at hand. disasters, these cruises can also go a long way to- As for SOUTHCOM’s more programmed initiatives ward reducing (as the HAP projects do) the overall in the HA and HCA realms, one of the most success- cost and socio-economic disruption that may result ful efforts is the Humanitarian Assistance and Di- from such disasters, which in turn can hold down saster Preparedness Program, commonly known as the level of overall assistance required from outside HAP. With a primary focus on building prepared- agencies. On occasion, programmed tours can pro- ness before disasters strike, HAP managers assigned vide as well real-world experience in disaster relief to SOUTHCOM’s country-specific security coopera- when a disaster unexpectedly erupts in the midst tion teams work closely with partner nation offi- of a deployment, as happened in September 2008 cials to build up local disaster response capabilities when USS Kearsarge was diverted from its sched- and to develop local infrastructure that will help uled port visits as part of SOUTHCOM’s Continuing to minimize the impact of disasters that do occur. Promise 2008 program to provide emergency hur- HAP funds are made available, for example, for first ricane relief to Haiti. responder, firefighter, search and rescue, and inci- With regard to the deployments planned for Con- dent command training (often conducted in concert tinuing Promise 2008, they involve, as touched on with OFDA), as well as for the construction of emer- briefly in chapter 3, separate Pacific and Atlantic

Finding the Right Mix Operational Challenges, Civil-Military 92 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s Continuing Promise 2008 (April-November) USS Boxer USS Kearsarge Pacific Phase (April-June) – El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru Atlantic Phase (August-November) – The USS Boxer’ s medical and dental team consisted of more than 150 mil- Nicaragua, Colombia, Panama, Domini- itary medical professionals and NGO personnel. can Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and 60 Seabees from the Navy’s Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit Guyana (CBMU) 303 provided robust construction capabilities Crew of about 1,200 sailors, more than Treated 24,000 Patients 150 embarked air and sealift personnel Completed 127 Surgeries 150 military and Public Health Ser- Dispensed 40,000 medications vice medical professionals Completed 14,000 dental procedures 66 repairs to biomedical equipment in the various clinics and hospitals Representatives from , Canada, France, Provided veterinarian treatment to 2,900 animals , and Spain also participated Provided training, such as CPR, nutrition, and first aid, to 18,000 students 60 military engineering and construction troops Seabees from CBMU 303 renovated eight schools, a church, and repaired roads 20 Seabees from CBMU 202 and 40 Air- Health Care Services Engineering Services men from Air Force 5th Civil Engineer Squad- Medical Care Public Health Initiatives Building repairs and ron Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force General and specialty surgical care Immunizations improvements Treated 47,000 Patients Primary and consultative care for children De-worming New construction Completed 221 Surgeries and adults Food and water systems assessments Utility system repairs and construc- Dispensed 81,300 medications OB/GYN consultative care Structural assessments tion/technical assistance Completed 198,600 dental, medi- Dental care Assistance in establishing public health Pier, road, and bridge repair or Ophthalmologic services systems construction cal and optometric procedures Optometric services Epidemiologic/Public Health consultation Drainage projects Provided veterinarian treat- Medical/nursing education Veterinary Services Infrastructure Support ment to 5,600 animals Mutual education Large animal focus-livestock/food chain Basic biomedical repair Mid-wife training Care and immunizations Engineering assessments Basic nursing skill training Working animals Water/sewer system assessments Structural assessments

Ocean tours by two differentWasp -class amphibious for the LHDs are longer (averaging about two weeks) assault ships, the USS Boxer and the Kearsarge, each and involve more activity ashore than was the case of which sailed with about 60 military engineering with the Comfort’s tour. Whether grey- or white-hull and construction troops and some 150 military and based, however, future Continuing Promise deploy- civilian medical and dental professionals (including ments will continue to offer a unique platform for NGO and foreign experts). The San Diego-basedBox - practicing cooperative skills across the civil-mili- er conducted the Pacific leg of the operation from tary divide that will be sorely needed in the event April to June and visited El Salvador, Guatemala, of a real HA/DR emergency. and Peru, treating some 24,000 patients, complet- To some degree, similar skills, especially in the ing 127 surgeries, performing 14,000 dental proce- medical support and construction sectors, can be dures, providing veterinary care to 2,900 animals, nurtured as well by SOUTHCOM’s ongoing humani- and offeringCPR , nutrition, and first aid training to tarian assistance exercises, most notably via the New 18,000 students in 123 classes. In addition, a team of Horizons and Beyond the Horizons exercise series. 60 Seabees from the Navy’s Construction Battalion New Horizons, conducted successfully for more than Maintenance Unit (CBMU) 303 completed a number two decades now, is an annual series of joint and of construction projects, including the renovation combined exercises that SOUTHCOM conducts in Lat- of eight schools and a church and various road re- in American and Caribbean nations, the primary aim pairs. The Norfolk-basedKearsarge was assigned the being to improve joint training readiness among U.S. Atlantic leg, leaving in early August on a cruise that engineer, medical, and combat service support units lasted through November and took it to Nicaragua, through humanitarian and civic assistance, or HCA, Colombia, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Trin- activities. Program-wise, each New Horizons deploy- idad and Tobago, and Guyana. No doubt, the Kear- ment tends to last three to four months and to focus sarge trip provided services and built goodwill equal on the construction of needed infrastructure, such in scale (if not higher) than that provided by the as schools, clinics, and water wells, and on providing Boxer and by the USNS Comfort in 2007 (USSOUTH- medical and public health services to rural, under- COM 2008b). In fact, the Boxer and Kearsarge tours privileged communities. Every effort is made, more- are likely to have a broader and more lasting effect over, to pair the U.S. troops involved (generally some than the Comfort did in 2007, as the country visits three hundred to four hundred personnel) with coun-

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terpart units in the host nation, as a way (again) to nities for follow-up projects and support activities build local expertise and to develop habits of cooper- in the same countries over a three-year period. Un- ation that may prove handy in future joint and com- der this new framework, much greater emphasis bined operations, including HA/DR missions. will be placed on careful advance planning among The medical components of New Horizon exer- participating CONUS-based contingents (principally cises are often (though not always) conducted as National Guard and reserve units) and within host medical readiness training exercises (MEDRETEs), nations to produce a phased plan of action. Typi- which, as discussed briefly in chapter 3, bring to- cally, this would include a year or two of prepara- gether teams of military doctors, nurses, dentists, tory work, a year of initial activities, and a year or and veterinarians for targeted, short duration train- two of follow-up efforts to sustain, expand, and/or ing in real-world settings. Given their interaction refurbish what was done before. Most U.S. person- with local medical care providers and host nation nel will deploy for only a two-week period (which health-related ministries, as well as with the com- accords with normal Guard and reserve training cy- munities served, MEDRETEs often have a very pos- cles), though some reserves will stay longer. Individ- itive public relations and goodwill impact. In 2007, ual exercises, however, will usually last for several SOUTHCOM conducted sixty-six MEDRETEs in thir- months. Moreover, for certain types of activities for teen countries throughout Central and South Ameri- which it makes sense (such as the medical and pub- ca and the Caribbean, at an estimated cost of nearly lic health initiatives), projects may be pursued on a $3 million. Combined, these exercises provided med- regional, as well as a country-specific, basis. ical care to more than two hundred thousand indi- For the U.S. personnel involved, the end result of viduals, completed some three thousand surgical the Beyond the Horizons approach should be broad- procedures, and treated over seventy-five thousand er familiarity with the overall process of deploying animals (See USSOUTHCOM 2008a). and redeploying to the countries they are assist- The chart below provides a snapshot of the types ing, a better feel for the operational environment of activities likely to be undertaken by New Horizons and the potential challenges that could arise with- overall in any one year; it summarizes the five exer- in these countries, and closer relationships with the cises conducted in 2007 in Nicaragua, Belize, Guate- local civilian and military personnel with whom they mala, Panama and Bolivia (USSOUTHCOM 2007a). work. All of this, of course, would also improve the In 2008, SOUTHCOM also began a new HAC ex- prospects for a successful multinational operation, ercise program known as Beyond the Horizon that including a disaster response, sometime in the fu- builds on and integrates New Horizons with the dual ture within the assisted country and/or involving its objectives of boosting the training benefits for U.S. troops and experts who have participated in Beyond troops involved and extending the level of assistance the Horizons exercises in an operation elsewhere in provided to host nations via HAC activities. In con- the region. In the meantime, the countries hosting trast to New Horizons exercises, which focus on a the exercises will receive more comprehensive sup- series of new individual events in different countries port and greater opportunities for capacity building. each year, Beyond the Horizons provides opportu- Inaugural activities in 2008 are slated to include the 5 exercises in 5 countries: a snapshot of New Horizons in 2007 Dates Main Location ~ U.S. Troops Building Projects Executive agent Two-room school Nicaragua Feb. – May Santa Teresa 250 Five-room clinic 12 AF (Air Forces Southern) Belize Mar. – May District of Orange Walk 450 4 two-room schools U.S. Army South Three-room school Two-room school 2 clinics Guatemala Mar. – Jun. San Marcos 450 Dig 3 wells U.S. Army South Add 7 classrooms on 3 schools Province of Bocas 2 health facilities Panama Mar. – May Del Toro 450 Improve 2 rural roads U.S. Army South Bolivia July – Sept. Villa Bush TBD 3 MEDRETEs 12 AF (Air Forces Southern)

Finding the Right Mix Operational Challenges, Civil-Military 94 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s construction of schools and clinics and the conduct As noted briefly in chapter 3, in its role as the host of MEDRETEs in Honduras, Trinidad and Tobago, and COCOM for the global fleet station (GFS) pilot project9, Suriname, together with the opening phases of the SOUTHCOM has also had access to the High Speed program’s very first three-year project efforts in Be- Vessel (HSV)-2 Swift catamaran, one of the world’s lize, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Pan- most advanced naval vessels and one that has prov- ama (USSOUTHCOM 2008c). en to be quite useful as a platform for humanitari- As for specificSOUTHCOM -tied military units that an assistance (as well as for training partner nation have been central to HA/DR operations in the AOF military personnel). Over a six-month period in 2007, (or may be in the future), the most noteworthy is for example, the Swift visited Belize, the Dominican JTF-Bravo. This unit of six hundred troops was for- Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicara- mally established in 1984 at Soto Cano Air Base (a gua, and Panama, completing close to forty thou- C-5-capable airfield) in Honduras in response to a sand hours of expert-level exchanges in such areas 1983 request from the Honduran government to in- as leadership, small-boat operations, port security, crease the size and number of U.S.-Honduran com- and small-unit tactics. At the same time, in collabo- bined training exercises conducted in Honduras. ration with Project Handclasp (a Navy humanitarian JTF-Bravo was originally given command and con- assistance project that transports aid on Navy ships trol of U.S. forces and exercises based in the coun- on a space-available basis), it delivered to these coun- try, but over the years its mission has expanded to tries some twenty thousand pounds of medical and include HA/DR, counter-narcotics, and counter-ter- food supplies (USSOUTH- 9 GFS is part of the chief of naval operations’ vision for the rorism operations, among others. The unit has de- COM 2007b). So, while future, where navies, coast guards, and civilian services join together to promote common interests as well as cross-train- ployed repeatedly in recent years throughout the not assets over which ing. More specifically, GFS is a proposal to use ships and riv- Caribbean and both Central and South America in SOUTHCOM currently erine boats around the world to establish a persistent sea response to a wide variety of natural and manmade enjoys permanent con- base of operations that would allow U.S. Navy personnel to as- disasters, including tropical storm Noel in November trol, the Swift and oth- sist and promote goodwill with other nations’ maritime ser- vices with a minimal footprint ashore. Focusing primarily on 2007, hurricane Felix in September 2007, and hur- er ships participating peacetime operations, GFS platforms can help to increase re- ricane Dean in August 2007. With an organic army in GFS proof-of-concept gional maritime security through cooperative efforts with battalion, medical element (MEDEL), and air force activities – such as the joint, inter-agency, and multinational partners, as well as with NGOs. From its offshore sea base, eachGFS can serve as a aviation battalion, including access to as many as USNS Grasp rescue and self-contained headquarters for regional operations with the fourteen Black Hawk helicopters and six Chinooks, salvage ship – will pro- capacity to repair and service all ships, small craft, and air- JTF-Bravo teams are among SOUTHCOM’s most ca- vide at least an occa- craft assigned. For partner nation engagement purposes, a GFS could also provide classroom space, limited medical fa- pable and responsive HA/DR assets. As one of the sional means by which cilities, an information fusion center, and some combat ser- few forward-deployed units permanently assigned to to advance the com- vice support capability (see U.S. Southern Command 2007c). the command, JTF-Bravo teams are also quite often mand’s HA/DR priori- 10 The 2008 GFS deployment involved a four-month de- the first troops on the scene, sometimes even pro- ties.10 Of course, should ployment in SOUTHCOM’s AOF by the USNS Grasp, a res- cue and salvage ship maintained by the Military Sealift viding the initial damage assessment as a SOUTH- a GFS be deployed in Command (MSC). Apart from building U.S.-partner-coun- COM HAST. When disasters occur at some distance SOUTHCOM’s AOF on a try working relationships, the training provided by Grasp from Honduras and/or require a larger-scale first more regular basis after personnel in the mission areas of dive operations, un- response, JTF-Bravo can call on CONUS-based cargo the pilot project phase, derwater construction, underwater wreck assessment, and maritime rescue should be useful both to disaster re- planes to airlift its helicopters, medical personnel, it would almost certain- sponse and post-disaster recovery and reconstruction. support troops, and relief supplies forward, as hap- ly emerge as a more valu- pened during tropical storm Noel when a C-5 Gal- able and consistently utilized tool for promoting axy from the New York Air National Guard flew two these same priorities. JTF Black Hawks and nineteen soldiers to the Do- Finally, it is worth noting that SOUTHCOM as a minican Republic. Moreover, when not engaged in whole is transforming into a new, interagency-ori- emergency missions, JTF-Bravo teams are regularly ented command structure that should help to facil- engaged in SOUTHCOM’s HA/DR-oriented exercises, itate HA/DR-focused collaboration in the AOF and such as the New Horizons and Beyond the Horizons make future operations more effective. The result series already discussed. of a study begun in early 2006 by former SOUTHCOM commander General Bantz Craddock, USA, this shift

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is aimed at making the command more responsive AFRICOM (which is discussed below). Within the to the security challenges of the post-Cold War and SOUTHCOM structure, the real-world model for this post-9/11 world in which stability operations and whole-of-government approach can be found in the “prosperity-generating activities” – including, once command’s Joint Interagency Task Force South (JI- again, HA/DR operations and a broad range of civil ATF-South) based in Key West, which has overseen support missions – are as important as classic con- air and maritime support for counter-drug missions ventional warfighting operations (Miles 2008, 3). Or- in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of , and the east- ganizationally, this has led to the appointment of two ern Pacific for almost two decades.JIATF -South in- deputies to the commander – a three-star military tegrates DoD and military staff with personnel from deputy focused on military operations and an am- the Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Agency, Cus- bassador-rank civilian deputy focused on civil-mil- toms and Border Protection, the CIA, the FBI, and the itary operations. Below the senior commanders, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, among oth- traditional J-coded staff structure (J-2, J-3, J-5, and er groups, and it has become, in many ways, a “post- so on) has been realigned to reflect a more strate- er child” for interagency collaboration. So, while not gy-focused structure tied to current operations in specifically focused onHA/DR -type missions, JIATF- the AOF (such as security cooperation, humanitari- South is pointing the way to new frameworks and an assistance, and counter-terrorism) rather than to operational platforms that could (and likely will) be supporting large troop movements (for which the J- adapted to these missions as SOUTHCOM (and oth- codes were ideally designed). These new mission-ori- er regional COCOMs) prepare more deliberately for ented directorates are led by both senior executive the growing number of non-traditional security risks service (SES) civilians and general-rank officers, and with which they must grapple. the directorates themselves are staffed (or will be) as much by civilian experts (many of whom come from U.S. Africa Command the broader interagency community) as by military As noted above, AFRICOM, which became DoD’s new- personnel. The formation of the new Interagency IA( ) est regional COCOM in October 2007 (and reached Directorate, moreover, is meant to ensure broader full operational capacity in October 2008), will also and smoother public-private collaboration in SOUTH- function as an interagency-focused, civil-military COM operations (including with NGOs and the corpo- command. As such, its primary focus will be on rate world), as well as cooperation with non-military peacetime engagement with African partner coun- governmental organizations at the national, region- tries as a way to help promote stability, build local al, and international levels, all of which is (or may security capabilities, and eradicate poor living con- be) critical to effectiveHA/DR operations. ditions – such as the lack of clean water and food, Operationally, the increased focus on civil-mili- inadequate health care, and limited educational fa- tary relations and on civilian staff drawn from non- cilities – that may breed civil unrest and possibly DoD agencies affirms the fact – underscored inD oD’s even create opportunities for terrorist activities. For newly updated National Defense Strategy document, AFRICOM, as for PACOM and SOUTHCOM, innovative released in June 2008 – that the challenges of the theater security cooperation, or TSC, is likely to be- twenty-first century cannot be addressed byD oD and come the key tool for pursuing peacetime engage- the military alone, but require a “whole-of-govern- ment as the new command becomes more active. ment” approach (U.S. Department of Defense 2008, Just as they are in PACOM’s AOR and SOUTHCOM’s 17-18). Such an approach, according to the new Na- AOF, moreover, TSC projects in AFRICOM’s AOR will tional Defense Strategy, “is only possible when every be aimed largely at strengthening the capacity of government department and agency understands local states to collaborate with U.S. and other mil- the core competencies, roles, missions, and capa- itary forces in support of common security tasks, bilities of its partners and works together to achieve including patrolling coastal waters, protecting crit- common goals.” The document goes on to note that ical economic infrastructure, halting , stanch- major steps in this direction have been taken with ing weapons proliferation, and uncovering terrorist the expansion of SOUTHCOM’s interagency compo- networks. At the same time, TSC efforts led by AF- sition and the creation of U.S. Africa Command, or RICOM, like similar efforts undertaken by the oth-

Finding the Right Mix Operational Challenges, Civil-Military 96 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s er COCOMs, will also provide useful opportunities networks that have sought to establish safe havens to boost the ability of the states so engaged to re- in two of Africa’s most vulnerable regions – namely, spond to and weather the consequences of sudden the Sahel (with a focus on Mauritania, Mali, Niger, onset crises, including natural and manmade disas- and Chad) and the Horn of Africa (encompassing Ke- ters, both of which are fairly common on the Afri- nya, , , Eritrea, Djibouti, and Ethiopia). can continent. Apart from helping those states with which the Unit- In time, therefore, cooperative security activities ed States is actively engaged to improve their over- managed by AFRICOM should yield platforms for im- all CT capabilities, OEF-TS and CJTF-HOA programs proving HA/DR readiness and operations that are as try to address as well the root causes of local dis- useful as those already developed and being lever- satisfaction that often provide an opening for radi- aged to good effect byPACOM and SOUTHCOM. AFRI- calization by terrorist groups. Hence, as suggested COM’s ability to move in this direction will no doubt above with regard to AFRICOM as a whole, OEF-TS be helped by the fact that it will begin operations and CJTF-HOA teams on the ground are as likely to with an interagency- and CMCoord-based organiza- be found digging wells, building schools, and provid- tional structure designed from the start to encour- ing emergency medical assistance as they are to be age and support stability operations (of which HA/ interdicting terrorist supply lines, and this non-mil- DR operations are an integral part) and civic aid mis- itary, HA/DR-oriented dimension of their missions sions (which generally improve local capabilities in will certainly be maintained now that both efforts the HA/DR realm). Like SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM will have been transferred to AFRICOM control. have a deputy commander for civil-military activi- The first trulyAFRICOM -launched mission to test ties and a staff structure optimized in part for pre- the new command’s commitment to building rela- cisely those types of activities. When fully staffed, tionships with key countries on the continent – and the command will have more civilians in key posi- developing, in the process, new platforms for con- tions than any other command (one Joint Staff gen- ducting HA/DR operations – was the seven-month eral has called it “combatant command plus”), and it deployment (beginning in October 2007) of the USS will focus as much on non-military means, such as Fort McHenry dock landing ship and the USS Swift humanitarian assistance and community relations catamaran to the Gulf of Guinea in support of a GFS (COMREL) in African partner nations, as it will on the deployment dubbed the Africa Partnership Station military tools at its disposal to support joint and/or (APS). Similar to the Swift and Grasp deployments by combined military exercises and operations (Aero- SOUTHCOM, the aim of APS was to confirm the feasi- space Daily & Defense Report 2007). Indeed, as one bility and value of using at-sea platforms to provide AFRICOM officer has described it, “our mission is training to the maritime services of the countries vis- 95 percent at least civil affairs,” and military forc- ited, and to conduct civic aid, community relations es assigned to the command will spend much of missions, and emergency assistance (when neces- their time drilling wells, building hospitals, train- sary), with a minimal footprint ashore. Apart from ing medics, and responding to local tragedies, such U.S. military and Coast Guard personnel, participat- as a collapsed building in or a capsized ferry ing ships carried troops and sailors (as trainers or in Djibouti (Kristof 2007). observers) from Cameroon, , France, Ger- Given that its AOR is cobbled together from ele- many, Ghana, Italy, Nigeria, , Spain, and the ments of the EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM AORs, , plus civilian experts from USAID, AFRICOM has inherited a number of military mis- the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra- sions and support roles previously managed by these tion (NOAA), and Project HOPE (among other NGOs). commands – including EUCOM’s operation Endur- As the primary APS platform, the Fort McHenry alone ing Freedom Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) and CENTCOM’s visited eighteen ports of call in ten countries (in- CJTF-HOA – that bring to AFRICOM a good deal of cluding Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, experience in the civil support realm. Established Sao Tome and Principe, and Senegal); trained more as post-9/11 counter-terrorist (CT) initiatives, both than seventeen hundred maritime professionals in OEF-TS and CJTF-HOA focus on detecting, disrupt- skills ranging from small-boat handling, port secu- ing, and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist rity, and maritime law and damage control to non-

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commissioned officer leadership; and helped Project ed for HA/DR operations and other less tradition- Handclasp deliver more than one million high-nu- al contingencies. tritional meals, twenty-five pallets of medicine, hy- In summary, then, while AFRICOM at the mo- 11 Amphibious ships like the Fort McHen- giene, and educational supplies, and over ment has a limited track record compared to those ry are particularly well suited to perform sus- $100,000 worth of hospital beds and med- of PACOM and SOUTHCOM, it is poised, based on the tained operations on a regional basis in coastal 11 waters, as well as crisis responses to sud- ical equipment (Stratchko 2008, 1-2). In command’s structure, mission priorities, and APS ex- den events that may occur on land, as they this sense, Fort McHenry performed su- perience, to become a more prominent player with have substantial berthing for students, space perbly as the lead ship for precisely the regard to HA/DR planning and operations. Moreover, for classrooms, helicopters and air-cush- type of multinational, interagency, civil- given its much larger and (presumably) more influ- ioned landing craft for transporting person- nel and supplies to and from the ship, and a military operation one might expect to see ential civilian staff, it may actually be able to achieve shallow draft that facilitates operations close in response to a major foreign disaster. the higher levels of civil-military coordination that to shore when required (Stratchko 2008 1). When in port, moreover, crew from virtually all HA/DR specialists (in and out of govern- both the Fort McHenry and the Swift completed over ment) agree are needed to improve future relief oper- twenty community relations and special construc- ations, but which none of the other regional COCOMs tion projects in the countries visited, ranging from have yet been able to reach, or are likely to reach any the replacement of a school roof in Gabon, major time soon. As a result, even though AFRICOM is a renovations to a shelter in Senegal for runaway chil- brand new contributor to the HA/DR field, it could dren, and the vaccination of the local pet population very well end up being the most influential. against rabies in Monrovia, Liberia, to the building of picnic tables for a school Sao Tome and Princi- pe (USS Fort McHenry Public Affairs 2007). Of even Conclusion more direct relevance to this study, in a late March Perhaps the most fundamental conclusion to draw 2008 APS-tied exercise off the coast of Monrovia, the from the themes discussed in this chapter is one that Fort McHenry and Swift joined up with two U.S. cargo was stated at the very beginning: that while there is and maritime pre-positioning force ships – namely, no single playbook for HA/DR operations that would the USNS 2nd Lieutenant John P. Bobo and the USNS apply for all scenarios in all settings, the U.S. mili- Lance Corporal Roy M. Wheat – to test a new ship- tary and its civilian counterparts in the foreign hu- to-shore delivery system for transferring vehicles, manitarian assistance world have amassed enough heavy equipment, and humanitarian relief supplies experience on what works and what doesn’t to de- ashore in the event of a large-scale disaster or oth- velop some fairly specific guidelines that would hold er emergency when traditional harbor facilities may up in most situations. There is, for example, broad not be available. During the exercise, sailors from the agreement on both sides of the civil-military divide Bobo and the Wheat assembled an advanced roll-on/ regarding the key phases in a relief effort (from first roll-off delivery platform made up of barges and fer- response to reconstruction), how transitions from ries, cargo from the Bobo, the Wheat, and the Fort one phase to another should ideally be handled, and McHenry was transferred to the Swift, and the Swift various organizational structures and procedures transported it to Monrovia for distribution to var- that can facilitate CMCoord in each phase. A thread ious schools and medical clinics in Liberia (Sealift that runs through all operationally minded discus- Logistics Command Europe 2008). One interesting sions, moreover, is the overarching importance of result of the exercise was a decision by AFRICOM building and maintaining personal relationships to become more actively involved in DoD studies among all the key players. Second only to that is now reviewing the content and location of pre-po- the need for the civilian responder community and sitioned war reserve material (PWRM) deployed on the military responder community each to more ful- ships like the Bobo and the Wheat with an eye to- ly understand what the other can provide by way of ward ensuring that the supplies on board – which are critical skills and capabilities, the procedures that now optimized for supporting conventional combat govern their availability, and the unique institution- operations – will be reconfigured to include addi- al cultures that define how they are used. If this lev- tional supplies and equipment that would be need- el of civil-military understanding can be achieved at the national level (and there really is no reason

Finding the Right Mix Operational Challenges, Civil-Military 98 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s why it can’t), then the prospects of achieving it will and organizations. It is to this topic that we now be that much higher at the broader bi-national and turn in chapter 5. multinational levels with key international partners

References Aerospace Daily & Defense Report. 2007. African command like- ly to have more civilians, but not more troops. February 8. David Axe. 2008. Soft power for hard problems. Washington Times, September 7. Tom Baltazar, Office of Military Affairs, USAID. 2006. Unpublished briefing on relations between the military and NGOs, presented at a workshop organized by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, in Washington, D.C., December 12. Lt. General Robert R. “Rusty” Blackman, USMC. 2005. Presentation at Cobra Gold 2005 disaster re- lief workshop, May 8. As reported in PACOM’s Executive Summary Report on the workshop, 6-9. Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. 2005. Record of Discussion from the Senior Leaders Symposium on Civil, Mili- tary and Interagency Cooperation, Honolulu, Hawaii, February 22-23. Cobra Gold 2008. History. Cobra Gold ’08. http://www1.apan-info.net/cobragold/History/tabid/2811/Default.aspx. Rear Admiral David “Jack” Dorsett, USN. 2005. Tsunami! Information shar- ing in the wake of destruction. Joint Force Quarterly, no. 39 (October). Bruce A. Elleman. 2006. Waves of hope: The U.S. Navy’s response to the tsunami in northern In- donesia. Naval War College Newport Papers 28. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press. Embassy of the United States in Manila. 2008. U.S. continues to support Philippine disaster relief in ty- phoon Frank aftermath. June 27. http://manila.usembassy.gov/wwwhs476.html. Ron Flanders. 2008. USS Ronald Reagan carrier group departs Philippines after helping typhoon victims. Navy.mil, July 3. http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=38237. GlobalSecurity.org. Balikatan. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/balikatan.htm. Bailey Hand, OSD Stability Operations. 2006. Pakistan earthquake response: Af- ter action trip: Recommendations. Unpublished briefing. March. Damien Horvath. 2008. USNS Mercy deploys for Pacific Partnership 2008.Navy NewsStand, May 2. Joint Staff. 2006. Joint operations. Joint Publication 3-0. 17 September. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf, p. IV-25. Stephen Jordan, ed. 2006. From relief to recovery: The 2005 U.S. business response to the Southeast Asia tsu- nami and Gulf Coast hurricanes. Business Civil Leadership Center. http://www.uschamber.com/bclc/media/newsletter/mar_apr.

Finding the Right Mix Operational Challenges, Civil-Military 99 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s James J. Landon and Richard E. Hayes. National approaches to civil-military coordination in peace and humanitarian assistance operations. http://www.dodccrp.org/files/landon_hayes.htm. Colonel Charles King, USA. 2007. Unpublished point paper on the Hawaii Model study. February. Nicholas D. Kristof. 2007. Aid workers with guns. New York Times, March 4. John J. Kruzel. 2008. USNS Mercy provides relief in Southeast Asia. American Forces Press Service, June 27. Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service. 2005. US military, partners making ‘real difference’ in Indi- an Ocean. GlobalSecurity.org, January 7. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/01/mil-050107-afps01.htm. ———. 2008. SOUTHCOM transformation promotes new approach to regional challenges. August 26. http://www.southcom.mil/appssc/news.php?storyId=1323. Office of the President of the United States. 2006. The National Secu- rity Strategy of the United States of America. March. James L. Schoff. 2007. In times of crisis: Global and local civil-military disaster relief coordina- tion in the United States and Japan. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, interim report. April. Sealift Logistics Command Europe. 2008. Military Sealift Command ships prepare for sea-basing exer- cise in Africa. Navy.mil, March 20. http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=35884. Joel Selanikio, M.D. 2006. What we have here is a failure to coordinate: Lessons learned, problems ob- served in the response to the tsunami. Liaison 3, no. 3. Center of Excellence DMHA. http://coe-dmha.org/Liaison/Vol_3No_3/Dept10.htm. Specialist 2nd Class R.J. Stratchko. USN. 2008. USS Fort McHenry returns from Africa Partnership Station maiden deployment. May 5. Milcom Monitoring Post. http://mt-milcom.blogspot.com/2008/05/uss-fort-mchenry-returns-from-africa.html. Strong Angel Team. 2006. Stability, security, transition, and reconstruc- tion: Observations and recommendations from the field. Version 20061107:1.1nc. http://www.strongangel3.net/files/sstr_20061107_web.pdf. UN General Assembly. 1991. Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian agency as- sistance of the United Nations. A/RES/46/182, 78th plenary meeting, December 19. UNOCHA. 2004. Civil-military relationship in complex emergencies. An IASC Reference Paper. June 28. UNOCHA. 2007 Guidelines on the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief - “Oslo Guidelines.” Updated Nov. 2006, rev. 1.1, Nov. 2007. http://ochaonline.un.org/AboutOCHA/Organigramme/EmergencyServicesBranchESB/Civil- MilitaryCoordinationSection/PolicyGuidanceandPublications/tabid/1403/Default.aspx. U.S. Department of Defense. 2006. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Feb- ruary 6. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf. ———. 2008. National Defense Strategy. June. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf. USAID. 2007. Bangladesh – Cyclone. November 23. http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/documents/cyclone_sidr/112307-bangladesh_fs3.pdf. USNORTHCOM. 2008. Prescripted mission assignments. Unclassified briefing. August. USPACOM. 2005. USPACOM: Operation Unified Assistance les- sons learned, Unpublished Powerpoint presentation. June. 7. USPACOM. 2007. The Hawaii Model study: an unclassified infor- mation brief for Commander, USPACOM. April 6.

Finding the Right Mix Operational Challenges, Civil-Military 100 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s USS Fort McHenry Public Affairs. 2007. Africa partnership station kicks off. Navy.mil, October 30. http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=32899. USSOUTHCOM 2007a. New Horizons 2007. September 12. http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFiles.php?id=11. ———. 2007b. U.S. Navy’s global fleet station deployment to region complete. October 2. http://www.southcom.mil/appssc/news.php?storyId=837. ———.2007c. Global fleet station pilot 2007 deployment (April - Sept.). April 30. http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=393. ———. 2008a. Humanitarian assistance. June 13. http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/humanitarianAssistance.php. ———. 2008b. Continuing Promise. July 1. http://www.southcom.mil/appssc/factFiles.php?idA=53. ———. 2008c. Beyond the Horizon. July 8. http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFiles.php?id=46. Sharon Wiharta, Hassan Ahmad, Jean-Yves Haine, Josefina Lofgren, and Tim Randal, 2008. The effective- ness of foreign military assets in a natural disaster response. Stockholm International Peace Research In- stitute (SIPRI). http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=358#. David Wood. 2008. Relief agencies decry military role. Baltimore Sun, August 28.

Finding the Right Mix Operational Challenges, Civil-Military 101 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms c5hapter Key Partnerships and Platforms for International Cooperation

Leveraging Existing Mechanisms and Relationships in Support of HA/DR Operations

As emphasized in preceding chapters, the United can be used to facilitate relief operations, highlight- States will rarely be acting alone when it becomes ing where appropriate recent reforms that have been involved in – and deploys military forces to – HA/DR made – as well as additional adjustments that still activities overseas. Larger-scale disasters, for exam- could be made – to promote more effective inter- ple, invariably require a multilateral, multination- national cooperation. With regard to individual al, and intergovernmental response across the full countries with which the United States may coor- spectrum of operations, including the recovery and dinate, the focus is on America’s key non-Europe- reconstruction phase as well as the emergency relief an friends and allies, namely, Australia, Singapore, phase. In these circumstances, the key to success the ROK, Japan, and Canada, as opportunities for may rest as much in America’s ability to coordinate European partnership will be covered adequately effectively and develop a sensible division of labor in the NATO and EU sections of this chapter. A brief with other contributing nations and organizations discussion of the opportunities for collaborating on (be they governmental, NGO, civilian, or military) as HA/DR matters with India and China is also includ- it does in improving the overall response capabili- ed, given the strategic importance of both countries ties of the United States. This may be the case even and their growing interest in contributing to for- with respect to small- or medium-sized efforts in eign HA/DR missions, at least at the Asia-Pacific re- which the United States is acting alone and/or is gional level. Taken as whole, these separate lines the predominant national contributor, as the UN, of inquiry should provide a reasonably complete regional organizations, and even private sector or picture of the main players in future relief efforts volunteer agencies often have important niche roles to which the United States might contribute. It is to play in such situations. Having a better sense be- hoped that the analysis will also shed light on the forehand, therefore, of the other likely contributors, prospects for integrating the individual (and poten- their comparative strengths and weaknesses, and tially competing) efforts of the many agencies and the ways in which U.S. responders can best integrate institutions that now tend to get involved in such with and/or leverage the capabilities of these vari- efforts into a more concerted and, hence, more ef- ous groups should be a top priority for HA/DR plan- fective approach. ners and decision makers in Washington. This chapter provides a summary assessment of the primary organizations and partner countries UN Structures and Procedures with which the U.S. HA/DR community is likely to Of course, the UN system as a whole – and the Of- collaborate. It includes a review of the mechanisms fice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs now in place at the UN, NATO, the EU, and the Asso- (OCHA) in particular – stands out as the primary ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (or ASEAN) that international organization with which and through

Finding the Right Mix

102 t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s which the United States and other donor nations co- and regional disaster response ad- 1 Membership on the IASC includes all UN oper- ordinate their HA/DR activities. Various UN agencies visors in Africa, the Caribbean and ational humanitarian agencies, with standing in- vitations to participate sent to the International have long been in the business of providing human- Latin America, the Middle East, and Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Internation- itarian assistance and coordinating member state the Asia-Pacific area. All told by 2008 al Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent So- responses in the event of natural disasters and OCHA maintained a staff of close to cieties (IFRC), the International Organization of complex emergencies that are beyond the capaci- sixteen hundred in forty countries, Migration (IOM), the Office of the High Commis- sioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the representa- ties of the affected nation, but OCHA itself was not located principally at fifty field of- tive of the secretary-general on the human rights established until 1998. To lead OCHA, the UN creat- fices and six regional offices. of internally displaced persons (IDPs), the World ed an under secretary generalship for humanitari- Though a disaster-affected nation Bank, and three primary NGO consortia: the In- ternational Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), an affairs, and the person who holds this post also receiving UN assistance always re- the American Council for Voluntary Internation- serves as the UN’s overall emergency relief coordina- tains the formal lead in a relief opera- al Action (or InterAction), and the Steering Com- tor (ERC). At the UN Secretariat level, the ERC chairs tion, OCHA assumes the primary role mittee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR). the key policy-making mechanisms in the HA/DR in soliciting financial support from 2 The decision on whether and who to ap- realm, including the Inter-Agency Standing Com- the international community and in point as humanitarian coordinator is made by 1 the emergency relief coordinator (ERC), in con- mittee (IASC) , which develops common guidelines organizing and coordinating the dis- sultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Com- and standards for humanitarian operations, and tribution of UN-solicited donor sup- mittee (http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/ the Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs port via the HC and the appropriate content/about/default.asp?print=True). As not- (ECHA), which develops common UN positions on country team. OCHA support to the ed, the RC and HC roles may also be performed by the same person (see UNOCHA 2007, 4). humanitarian issues. Operations in the field, how- HC, who might also be the RC who ever, are managed through a network of field offic- heads the country team, could include technical as- es that support UN humanitarian coordinators (or sistance in identifying specific relief needs, match- HCs) appointed to lead a particular relief effort and ing available donors to those needs, and developing country teams led by a resident coordinator (RC), an overall contingency plan from initial relief to re- as well as by a number of regional support offices covery and reconstruction.2 Donor support is raised

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Under-Secretary-General/ Emergency Relief Coordinator ISDR Secretariat Executive Office/ Assistant Secretary-General/ Administrative Office Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator

Director, OCHA New York Coordination and Response Director, OCHA CERF Secretariat Division (CRD) Disaster preparedness Secretariat for the Trust Country desks work with CMCS and PHA Displacement and protection support Fund for Human Security Field Management and Support Humanitarian reform support Donor & External Relations Support to humanitarian coordinators IASC Secretariat IASC/ECHA Secretariat

Policy Development & Studies Branch OCHA Field and External Relations & Emergency Services Branch Field Action and Coordinator Policy Regional offices Support Mobilization field coordination Promotion of the Humanitarian Agenda regional disaster relief Branch support section Unit (PHA) works with CMCS on policy advisors UN CMCoord logistics support unit and legal aspects of CMCoord officers civil military coordination section (CMCS) CMCS is the OHCA focal point for civil military Advocacy and Information coordination. CMCS con- Management Branch ducts UN CMCoord courses, participates in military Integrated Regional exercises, and maintains a central register. Information Networks

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by OCHA headquarters via the consolidated appeals OCHA also funds the Global Disaster Alert and process (CAP), a part of the UN’s consolidated hu- Coordination System (GDACS), a web-based platform manitarian action plan (CHAP), which allows the that consolidates in one place a broad array of on- UN to appeal directly to the international commu- line disaster information management systems, in- nity on behalf of a country (or countries) in need. On cluding those referenced above, but integrating as average some fifteen appeals are launched annual- well those developed by other partner organizations, ly, and these may be supplemented, in the case of such as the United States Geological Survey (USGS). sudden-onset disasters, by special flash appeals that Pooling these diverse data streams, GDACS alerts the generally cover a three- to six-month period. OCHA international community to natural, technological, also manages the Central Emergency Response Fund or environmental disasters that occur worldwide, (CERF), composed of voluntary contributions from and provides information sharing and updating member states, the private sector, foundations, and tools that are useful to response coordination dur- individuals, that can be used to help jump-start a ing the immediate relief phase. This includes capa- relief effort to ensure a timely response. bilities for tracking media reports, producing and In response to a sudden disaster or humanitari- cataloguing maps of the disaster zone and surround- an emergency, OCHA can deploy a special team of di- ing areas, and linking to V-OSOCC discussion threads saster management personnel within twelve to for- to allow disaster managers to exchange information, ty-eight hours. Managed by the Field Coordination coordinate relief efforts, and ensure interoperability Support Section (FCSS), a UN disaster assessment in near-real time. In addition to its information por- and coordination (UNDAC) unit would rush to the site, tals, OCHA also maintains and manages, via its Civ- assess the situation, and assist local authorities in co- il-Military Coordination Section (CMCS), the Central ordinating international response efforts. Most im- Register of Disaster Management Capacities, a data- portantly, UNDACs run an on-site operations coordi- base of potentially available personnel and disaster nation center (OSOCC) and an internet-based virtual management assets within the UN system and from 3 3 OCHA’s Central Register is actually composed OSOCC (V-OSOCC) to facilitate the imme- contributing governments and NGOs. Last but not of five directories listing specific disaster man- diate exchange of information between least, OCHA offersOCHA Online, an internet platform agement assets and three personnel directories for key points of contact (POCs). The asset-orient- responding governments and organiza- that (among other things) helps businesses identi- ed directories include a search and rescue directo- tions during the relief operation. OCHA fy ways in which they can help UN-sponsored re- ry, a directory of military and civil defense assets also administers ReliefWeb, which is an lief efforts. (MCDA), a list of emergency stockpiles of disaster open, online gateway to relevant infor- As noted in earlier chapters, ready access to relief items, a roster of disaster management ex- pertise, and a directory of advanced technologies mation, including documents and digi- detailed satellite images and related geographic for disaster response (ATDR). ThePOC directories tal maps, on complex emergencies and information is of enormous importance to first re- include one that lists focal points and legislation natural disasters worldwide. ReliefWeb sponders as they struggle to understand and mea- for customs facilitation in the event of an inter- national emergency response, a list of nation- provides as well twenty-four hour cov- sure the scale and scope of a disaster. Largely for al and international POCs for disaster response erage of current relief, preparedness, this reason, the UN introduced its own satellite data information, and a list of major donors of emer- and prevention activities as they unfold. service in the 1990s called UNOSAT to provide the gency humanitarian assistance (see UNOCHA). Moreover, the site’s map center moni- international community – especially developing tors ongoing HA/DR operations with satellite and countries with limited national means – with pre- digital images, and then sorts (and catalogues) the cisely this type of support. Based since 2002 at the data so developed by country, region, or issue, in- European Organization for Nuclear Research (com- cluding damage and needs assessments, food securi- monly referred to by its French acronym, CERN) near ty, refugee movement, and security. Additional OCHA Geneva to take advantage of CERN’s IT infrastruc- online information exchange tools include its Inte- ture and network connectivity, UNOSAT works close- grated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) news ly with UN field workers, satellite imagery experts, website and HumanitarianInfo.org, both of which geographers, database programmers, and internet post daily situation updates to keep relief workers communications specialists to deliver images twen- and decision makers fully abreast of developments ty-four hours a day through a web-based geograph- across various disaster zones. ic interface or imagery data bank. On December 29, 2004, for example, three days after the tsuna-

Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for 104 International Cooperation t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s mi tragedy, UNOSAT posted online and distributed humanitarian cargo and relief workers within the to the field local and region-wide damage assess- crisis area; managing the import, receipt, dispatch, ment maps retrieved from thirteen different satel- and tracking of relief commodities; coordinating lites. These maps provided detailed measurements the use of available warehouse capacity; and, upon of the topography of the affected coastal areas, as- request, assessing the condition of roads, bridges, sisting relief workers in planning their responses. A airports, ports, and other logistical infrastructure. UNOSAT report on roads and bridges damaged by the Generally, the UNJLC website posts up-to-date in- tsunami also proved to be extremely helpful in sub- formation about the accessibility of entry points, sequent efforts to rebuild transportation networks, customs and visa requirements, in-country ware- so UNOSAT can be a useful collaborator in the re- housing availability, and appropriate contact in- covery phase of a disaster relief operation as well formation for commercial partners involved in the as in the initial emergency response phase (Ham- relief operation. The UNJLC also maintains an air- merle and Cremel 2005). operations cell to coordinate the use of all air assets During a relief operation, OCHA’s Logistics Sup- made available under UN auspices for the common port Unit (LSU) is responsible for the actual procure- use of UN agencies, international organizations, and ment and delivery of emergency relief goods from NGOs. When necessary, the United Nations Human- donor countries and organizations and from OCHA itarian Air Service (UNHAS), which, like the UNJLC, stockpiles, which are located in the United Nations is administered by the WFP, charters aircraft for ei- Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) in Brindisi, ther passenger or cargo operations. During the ear- Italy. TheLSU also supports the broader internation- ly stages of an emergency, UNHAS headquarters in al community with logistics-related support, such Rome sends out an assessment team to evaluate as customs facilitation, establishing common ware- the situation and assess local aviation infrastructure housing, identifying delivery routes, and managing and fuel support. If the decision to engage UNHAS is transport schedules. Toward that end, it is responsi- made, the WFP, in close cooperation with the UNJLC, ble for managing two sections of the OCHA Central compiles the needs of participating humanitarian Register, namely those related to emergency relief organizations and charters the necessary aircraft stockpiles and customs facilitation (for shipping re- to transport personnel and commodities, includ- lief supplies via different countries). In addition to ing MCDA. the LSU, the United Nations Joint Logistics Center TheWFP drew on both the UNJLC and the UNHAS (UNJLC), created in 2002 by the IASC under the custo- to launch two major operations during the 2004 tsu- dianship of the World Food Program (WFP), provides nami to relieve airport congestion and to coordinate logistical and supply chain support to UN agencies the receipt and delivery of relief supplies from the and to other humanitarian organizations respond- airfields to distribution points farther afield. The ing to large-scale emergencies, such as the 2004 In- first operation provided logistical support to set dian Ocean tsunami and 2005 Pakistan earthquake. up mobile storage tents and a base camp for relief If it seems that logistical activities will make up a workers in Banda Aceh, to facilitate the delivery of significant part of anHA/DR mission, OCHA may de- landing craft and water purification units, and to ploy UNJLC staff within twenty-four hours of a cri- transport a mine action team to Sri Lanka. The sec- sis to help organize the logistics of the various relief ond operation provided air support to the disaster 4 Staffing is primari- organizations involved and to help coordinate with region as a whole, including teams to manage aid ly handled through sec- 4 onded staff from other non-humanitarian agencies, such as the military. distribution at key air terminals and a passenger ser- humanitarian agencies The decision to send UNJLC staff depends on the vice to ferry humanitarian personnel from country within the UN system. scale of the crisis, the capabilities of relief agencies to country. In a similar vein, after the Pakistan earth- already involved, preliminary situation assessments, quake, WFP aviation experts established a main of- the extent of bottlenecks, and the possible use of fice in Islamabad and sub-offices in Muzaffarabad, military or civil defense assets (MCDA). Bagh, and Chattaplain, all of which helped UNHAS That said, once it becomes involved, UNJLC pri- to provide passenger service and air transport ca- marily serves as an information provider. Its re- pacity for the delivery of food, medicine, and sup- sponsibilities include scheduling the movement of port equipment. Given the constraints on road and

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rail access to isolated communities, UNHAS played ples of humanitarian assistance (humanity, neutral- an especially useful role in securing additional trans- ity, and impartiality), and they offer useful advice port helicopters, including sixteen MI8s, two MI26s, regarding the types of humanitarian activities that two KA-32s, and four CH-47 Chinooks from the U.S. are most appropriate to support with internation- Army, two CH-53 H Super Stallions from Germany, al military resources. For example, the guidelines and two UH-60 Black Hawks from the Australian encourage military forces to provide infrastructure Army (UNJLC; UNJLC 2006). support such as road repair, power generation, and When MCDA are deployed for use in humanitari- airspace management, but they discourage the di- an emergencies, OCHA’s Civil-Military Coordination rect distribution of goods and services by military 5 MCDA include standby re- Section (CMCS) usually serves as the focal point for personnel to the affected population, fearing that lief personnel, equipment, integrating these assets into the overall relief mis- such actions may erode the traditional lead role supplies, and even servic- 5 es (such as weather reports) sion. To ensure effective civil-military coordination that humanitarian relief organizations play in this provided by foreign govern- (or CMCoord) in the field, the unit regularly conducts respect. To avoid confusion as to who is in charge, ments and militaries during CMCoord courses and participates in military train- the guidelines recommend as well that humanitar- a disaster relief operation. ing exercises with other civil humanitarian actors. ian actors maintain the lead role in humanitarian The unit also embeds CMCoord officers within -de relief operations as a whole (particularly in areas ployed teams to serve as liaisons for governments, also seized in conflict), and that military support organizations, and militaries contributing to or re- only be solicited and provided when comparable quiring MCDA support during an operation. During civilian alternatives are unavailable. the tsunami response, for example, OCHA had CM- It is with respect to this last point – that military Coord officers in Sri Lanka (Colombo), Indonesia support be, in fact, a last resort – that some difficul- (Banda Aceh, Meuleboh, Medan, and Jakarta), and ties still arise. First, there is considerable confusion Thailand (Bangkok and Utapao). Not surprisingly, and some degree of disagreement over what precise- the CMCS also manages the OCHA Central Register ly “last resort” means. If it means last to be asked discussed earlier, which includes the list of MCDA no matter what the conditions, many countries, assets that could theoretically be made available donors and recipients of aid alike, would probably by various member states that participate in that find such a definition unacceptable and downright particular register. In this particular arena, howev- dangerous, especially in cases of extreme emergency. er, the CMCS has enjoyed little real-world success, as For them, an ability to provide the necessary assis- contributing nations almost always prefer to chan- tance as soon as possible, particularly in the initial nel their provision of military and civil defense as- phase of a relief effort, should be the primary crite- sets to a disaster area via pre-negotiated bilateral rion for selecting a civil or military option. Viewed arrangements with the countries to which these as- from this angle, it is often the military that is bet- sets will be deployed or via standby agreements they ter able to respond in a timely manner, given its in- may have established with regional organizations or herent capacity to take decisive action with little even UN agencies. advance warning and the likelihood that it may al- Another activity in which the CMCS has so far had ready be forward-deployed in a high state of readi- only partial success is its work in support of updat- ness close to the scene of a disaster. In contrast, it ing the UN’s 1994 Guidelines on the Use of Foreign could take an unnecessarily long time to locate, mo- Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief bilize, and deploy civilian alternatives. Second, given (or the Oslo Guidelines), for which the CMCS serves the time it could take to ensure (in the words of the as custodian. Given the steady increase in recent Oslo Guidelines) that “all possible civilian options” years in national military participation in HA/DR have been exhausted and that military assets real- operations (which brought with it a blurring of civ- ly offer “unique capability and availability,” urgently il and military roles in such operations), the idea of needed assistance could be delayed for largely bu- updating the 1994 Guidelines certainly made sense, reaucratic reasons at the very time it is most need- and the final product – released byOCHA in Novem- ed. For both reasons, a military option may be best ber 2007 – has much to recommend it. The revised in time-urgent situations, even if it is not a “last re- guidelines continue to emphasize the core princi- sort.” It may well be advisable, however, to apply the

Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for 106 International Cooperation t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s last-resort principle more strictly in the later recov- manitarian agencies to respond in particular sectors ery and reconstruction phases of a disaster response, or areas of activity, with each cluster having a clear- when civilian alternatives have had sufficient time ly designated and accountable lead. In this way, it to mobilize and deploy, and the humanitarian com- was hoped that much of the freelancing and dupli- munity as a whole generally assumes the leading role cation of effort that occurred far too often during (Wiharta et al. 2008). the tsunami response could be avoided. By map- Together with the earlier mentioned desire of con- ping the response capacities of national, region- tributing nations to channel their military aid in HA/ al, and international actors, the UN grouped civil DR operations directly to the country in need (pref- and military stakeholders into those clusters deal- erably on a bilateral basis), national reservations re- ing with either services (logistics, emergency tele- garding last resort have in practice tended to limit communications, and data communications), relief the UN’s role in CMCoord activities, despite its ex- and assistance (emergency shelter, health, nutrition, pertise in this arena. Hence, while the UN would pre- water, sanitation, and hygiene), or cross-cutting is- fer that member states allow their military assets to sues (early recovery, camp coordination and man- be directed by OSOCC personnel and procedures in agement, and protection). The first real opportunity order to facilitate coordination, this rarely happens. to implement this concept at the field level and to Of the approximately thirty-five countries providing test its viability as a framework for coordinating an 6 provid- military assets during the 2004 tsunami relief effort, emergency response came with the Pakistani earth- ed three Super Puma helicop- only Switzerland and Denmark agreed to place their quake in October 2005. Within the first twenty-four ters, flight crew, logistics, and military assets under UN direction (Hobson 2005).6 hours of the operation, OCHA established ten clus- ground personnel, and Den- Unfortunately, while it may speed the provision of ters in Islamabad: Food and Nutrition, Water and mark offered a C-130 Her- cules aircraft, flight crew, assistance, the reluctance of donor states to put mil- Sanitation, Health, Emergency Shelter, Early Re- and some support per- itary assets under UN direction can also complicate covery and Reconstruction, Logistics, IT Telecom- sonnel (Hobson 2005). relief efforts, since national contributions to human- munications, Camp Management and Protection, itarian operations are often not known to the UN in and Education. Each of the four regional UNDAC the initial stages of the disaster response, making it field presences also established cluster sites, called difficult for UN officials to accurately assess evolv- “humanitarian hubs.” Ac- UN Response To Pakistan Earthquake ing requirements, including the most effective mix cording to a U.S. military The Cluster Approach of civilian and military support. As a result, relief op- after-action assessment, UN Cluster Managing UN Agency erations have often suffered from what would seem the cluster system was Relief and Assistance to be avoidable logistical bottlenecks, duplication useful in that while the Emergency Shelter IOM, UNHCR, UNDP of assistance efforts in some locations, and supply “regular [cluster] meet- Health WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA shortages in other places. Moreover, protracted ne- ings allowed for the rais- Nutrition WFP, UNICEF Water, Sanitation & Hygiene UNICEF gotiations between contributing and assisted na- ing of issues that could not Services tions over such matters as landing authorizations wait for the appropriate Logistics WFP and customs clearance for supplies transported by forum…high-level direct Emergency Telecommunications WFP military platforms have delayed the transit of goods contacts were also estab- Cross-cutting Issues and equipment for emergency assistance. The tsu- lished and maintained to Early Recovery UNDP nami response experience in particular revealed a troubleshoot urgent prob- Camp Coordination and UNHCR, number of troubling weaknesses in the coordina- lems.” The report further Management IOM, UNDP Protection UNHCR, UNICEF tion of military and civilian assets and logistics, as noted that the cluster sys- Education UNICEF, UNESCO well as gaps in capacity and communication in sec- tem appeared to establish Operational Hubs tors such as water and sanitation, shelter and camp a multinational/multilat- Bagh Mansehra Batagram Muzaffarabad management, and recovery planning. eral structure that mili- Logistics Hubs In response, the UN conducted a series of reviews tary components would Abbotabad Islamabad Bagh Kahuta on humanitarian action, which led to the develop- normally find it easier to Batagram Mansehra ment of the UN cluster system in September 2005. plug into. Chatter Plain Muzaffarabad The new framework divided different aspects of a re- Of course, the Pakistan Source: “Pakistan: UN Achievements – One Year Later,” Re- liefWeb, October 9, 2006, available at http://www.reliefweb. lief operation into clusters of similarly engaged hu- experience also revealed a int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EGUA-6UELKY?OpenDocument

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number of shortfalls in the cluster approach that tic geographic area, and, on an exceptional basis, in will need to be (and are being) fixed. An internal areas outside NATO’s boundaries, as was the case UN evaluation pointed to a near universal lack of with respect to Pakistan in 2005.8 Headed by NATO’s 7 Created in 1997, the EAPC brings to- clarity among both responders and host director of civil emergency planning (CEP), the EAD- gether twenty-six NATO member states nation authorities over what the clus- RCC includes seconded staff fromNATO and partner and twenty-four partner countries for di- alogue and consultation on politi- ter approach really entailed, a tendency countries. A permanent UN liaison officer works in cal and security-related issues. towards “over-clusterization” in which EADRCC to ensure close cooperation with OCHA in 8 On May 29, 1998, the EAPC min- some clusters were established where times of crisis. Additional personnel from NATO or isters endorsed the EAPC policy, En- there was no need for assistance, and the from EAPC delegations to NATO may join EADRCC hanced Practical Cooperation in the Field of International Disaster Relief. traditional danger of imposing yet anoth- staff as needed to help during ongoing disaster re- er layer of bureaucracy and coordination lief operations. In close coordination with OCHA’s 9 NATO currently maintains the EAPC In- ventory of National CBR Consequence Man- onto an already complicated organiza- CMCS, the EADRCC also maintains a directory of des- agement Capabilities, which lists key response tional setting. This same UN assessment ignated national experts in disaster response who capabilities that participating EAPC countries concluded, nonetheless, that despite the can be called on to support the center in the event might volunteer to a NATO operation in the “teething problems” experienced dur- of a major crisis. event of a CBRN attack against civilian popula- tions. Inventory categories have for some time ing its first application, the “cluster ap- Since its creation, EADRCC has organized and co- included predictable assets in the areas of de- proach did successfully provide a single ordinated a wide variety of assistance from NATO tection, decontamination, protective equip- and recognizable framework for coordi- members to disaster zones in, among other coun- ment, communications, and medical care, but recent additions include cargo/airlift, aerial nation, collaboration, decision-making, tries, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, the For- firefighting and spillage containment, inland and practical solutions in a chaotic oper- mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), transport, and ocean shipping capabilities. ational environment.” UN authorities and Turkey, Portugal, , and, more recently, the This is, it must be stressed, only a list of possi- ble options, and an incomplete one at that. The the broader humanitarian relief commu- United States (after Katrina) and, of course, Paki- fact that it exists and is occasionally updated nity (including HA/DR experts in the mili- stan. The EADRCC also organizes a variety of NATO in no way means that the assets so listed will tary), therefore, will continue to refine the workshops, exercises, and related training opportu- actually be available for any given catastrophe. cluster concept and to promote it as an in- nities, all of which may offer quite useful vehicles for tegral tool for improving disaster responses in the improving the planning and conduct of future disas- years ahead. Indeed, as noted in the section on pri- ter response operations, including the more effective vate sector support in chapter 3, the clusters now integration of non-NATO partner nations, including authorized by the IASC – all of which have been as- Russia, into future NATO-led relief efforts. Recent ac- signed a specificUN agency (such as the WPF, UNDP, tivities have included a series of field exercises, the UNHCR, or WHO) – have emerged as logical points of latest of which, dubbed exercise UUSIMAA 2008, was entry into the HA/DR network for U.S. and foreign held in early June 2008 in . The goal of exer- companies that seek a more prominent and effec- cise UUSIMAA 2008 was to test NATO consequence tive role in disaster relief. management capabilities, especially with regard to containing potential damage from a chemical, bi- NATO Structures and Procedures ological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident.9 NATO too contains a relatively mature and insti- In addition to the EADRCC (which is largely a head- tutionalized framework for international disaster quarters-based coordination body), the EAPC also relief efforts (see NATO 2001). Impressed by UN ar- established the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response guments that the end of the Cold War opened new Unit (EADRU) to deploy to a disaster site in support opportunities to use military assets in support of of a disaster-affected country and relevant inter- disaster relief operations, NATO developed policy national organizations. EADRU is a non-standing, guidance on a range of civil emergency prepared- multinational mix of civilian and military elements, ness topics throughout the 1990s, and in 1998, un- such as search and rescue specialists, medical teams, der the auspices of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and transport assets, which are volunteered by EAPC Council (EAPC)7, it created the Euro-Atlantic Di- countries in response to an emergency. While de- saster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) to ployed, national elements of EADRU remain under direct NATO disaster relief efforts in response to nat- their respective national control. ural and man-made disasters within the Euro-Atlan-

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When a major disaster strikes in the Euro-Atlantic abad, jointly led by Pakistani government officials area, EADRCC maintains a twenty-four-hour watch and the UN. and stands ready to respond to the crisis if requested In addition to EADRU, the NATO Response Force to do so by the disaster-stricken nation. According (NRF), declared fully operational in November 2006, to EADRCC guidelines, requests for assistance should has emerged as an agile, deployable unit that is avail- include an initial assessment of the damage, a de- able to assist in the conduct of a NATO-supported scription of all available national assets, and a list of disaster relief operation. Elements of the NRF, in- the type and quantity of relief items needed, includ- cluding command and control structures (centered ing requests for specialized personnel and services. around a deployable joint task force headquarters), Once the affected country reaches out toEADRCC for engineering units, transport helicopters, and field assistance, and after consulting with OCHA, EADRCC hospitals, were deployed to the United States and forwards the request for assistance to all NATO and Pakistan to assist with the aftermath of hurricane partner countries, which communicate their offers Katrina and the Pakistan earthquake, though the of assistance to EADRCC. Since the primary role of first real operational deployment was the latter ef- EADRCC is to coordinate rather than direct the in- fort. Designed as a multinational rapid reaction and ternational response, individual nations may choose technologically advanced force made up of land, air, to provide assistance directly to the affected coun- sea, and special forces components (with logisticians, try rather than through EADRU. Either way, EADRCC medical units, and communications specialists at- coordinates NATO’s disaster response and keeps a tached), the NRF is expected to total some twenty- record of the relief items delivered and the type of five thousand troops at full strength, able to begin assistance still required to avoid later duplications deployment after five days’ notice and to sustain it- in assistance efforts or supply shortages. Moreover, self for operations lasting thirty days or longer if re- EADRCC publishes daily situation reports on the di- supplied. It is meant, moreover, to be capable of per- saster and posts them on the NATO web site. forming a wide spectrum of combat and non-combat Standing operating procedures (SOPs) for EAD- missions, including evacuations, disaster manage- RCC and EADRU were developed to define the Al- ment, humanitarian assistance, and counterterror- liance’s roles and responsibilities throughout the ism operations. In time, the NRF could also be called lifecycle of a disaster relief operation, including upon to deploy with NATO’s Multinational Chemical, guidance on the deployment of national military Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense 10 See Pfaltzgraff and Weitz and civilian assets in accordance with status of forc- Battalion in the event of disasters involving the re- (2004, 12-24) for a detailed discussion of various NATO es agreements and cross-border arrangements. The lease of hazardous materials, but currently the - plans and capabilities rele- SOPs also describe the types of disaster response ca- ion itself is rather poorly equipped and inadequately vant to disaster response op- pabilities donor countries should expect to provide prepared.10 Moreover, while the Pakistan deployment erations in general and CBRN in the event of a major crisis, such as aerial map- has lent the NRF a relatively high profile insofar as incidents in particular. ping, communications (via cable, satellite, and sig- HA/DR-type operations are concerned, Allied plan- nal means), medical help, logistics support, air and ners at SHAPE are quick to add that it is still meant to sea transport, search and rescue, and assistance serve as a high-inten- Requests for Assistance to NATO-EADRCC with water and sanitation. Moreover, the SOPs high- sity combat unit when consults with UN/OCHA regarding light the primary role of the UN in coordinating the necessary, and should Host Nation the action to be taken by the EADRCC international disaster relief operation. Since EAD- not be unduly pegged request for assistance UN/OCHA RCC is intended only to complement and support as a force keyed princi-

UN efforts regardless of the type or degree of NATO pally to lesser contin- EADRCC involvement in the relief operation, it consults with gencies and civil sup- offers of forward RFA and informs OCHA of its actions prior to and during port missions. assistance a disaster response, and recognizes UN Oslo Guide- That said, to iron NATO and Partner Countries lines on the use of military and civil defense assets out a number of glitch- NATO members and partner countries in disaster relief. During the Pakistan earthquake es first revealed in the may provide assistance directly relief operation, for instance, NATO personnel par- Pakistan deployment, EADRU DEPLOYMENT ticipated in the coordination meetings held in Islam- NATO officials are now

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11 NATO owns a fleet of Airborne Warn- contemplating creating a single NRF lo- sial) lesson learned for the NRF, however, is the need ing and Control System (AWACS) E-3A ra- gistics command that would be respon- for NATO to raise some common funding (at the Al- dar aircraft and three trainer/cargo planes. The E-3A aircraft conduct airborne sur- sible for deploying material and person- liance level) for NRF deployments, since, according veillance and provide command, control, and nel and for coordinating transport and current procedures, the nation that is in command communications support for NATO opera- supply storage. It would also be tasked of the NRF rotation when a disaster strikes would be tions, while the TCAs support the NAEW&CF with upgrading NRF training and certi- largely responsible for covering the costs of any de- and are used for pilot training and car- go and passenger transport support. fication exercises to include more realis- ployments. In the words of NATO Secretary General tic contingencies in the areas of logistics, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, this arrangement seemed “like transportation, information sharing, host nation sen- a reverse lottery…if your numbers come up [while sitivities, and the eventual transfer of authority (in you happen to be in the rotation], you actually lose a disaster relief setting) from military to civil agen- money,” and it must be more forthrightly addressed cies. Perhaps the most important (and controver- if NATO countries are to remain committed to the NRF and its core missions, among them response to NATO Contributions To Pakistan Relief disasters outside the NATO region. Capability Country Activity Notes Apart from (and before) sending the Air Bridge Denmark 3,500 tons of aid delivered to Pakistan Airfields used: France with 170 flights: - Ramstein (Germany) NRF, NATO also deployed in Pakistan its Germany - 4 water purifiers - Incirlik (Turkey) Trainer Cargo Aircraft (TCA) from the Greece - 34 tons of medical supplies Incirlik mainly carried sup- Italy - 1,840 kitchens plies donated by UNHCR NATO Airborne Early Warning and Con- Turkey - 16,820 stoves Transportation cost roughly trol Force (NAEW&CF) to establish an air United Kingdom - 17,941 tents $20 million United States - 31,504 mattresses bridge from the Ramstein Air Base in Ger- - 49,800 sleeping bags many to Pakistan to deliver critical re- - 345,000 vaccines - 505,272 blankets lief items, including food, first-aid kits, Field Hospital Netherlands Field Hospital: One Mobile Field Hospital medical supplies, power generators, and and Mobile Czech Republic - 4,890 patients treated from the Netherlands water purification units.11 On October 16, Units France - 160 major surgeries 4 Ambulances United Kingdom Mobile Units: 2005, two days after the first NATO air- Portugal - 3,424 patients treated lift landed in Islamabad with over seven tons of supplies, NATO chartered an AN- Air Support – Germany Helicopters transported 1,750 tons for 4 German CH-53 helicopters In Theatre relief aid 1 Luxembourg medical 124-100 aircraft to deliver an additional France Helicopters evacuated 7,650 disaster helicopter forty-five tons of relief material SHAPE( victims French ground handling Aviation fuel farm (operated by a team 2006). Three days later,NATO established French unit) in Abbottabad carried Helicopters from the US and a second air bridge from Turkey to Islam- out over 1,000 military and civilian UK were diverted from Af- refuelings ghanistan to assist with re- abad and immediately deployed C-130s lief efforts from France, the United Kingdom, Ita- Engineers Italy Constructed 110 shelters in support of Brought 30 medium- and 25 ly, and Greece. Together, the air bridges – the Pakistani Army Operation Win- heavyweight vehicles into Spain ter Race the area which constituted the largest airlift oper- United Kingdom Repaired 60 kilometers of road and re- Canadian DART team start- ation in NATO history – were utilized by Canada moved 41,500 cubic meters of debris in ed under bilateral agreement the cities of Arja and Bagh but became part of the NATO both EAPC and non-EAPC nations (Mal- Slovenia Distributed 267 cubic meters of drink- mission ta and Bosnia and Herzegovina), as well ing water as by the UNHCR, WFP, and OCHA, and Upgraded a spring water distribution and storage system airlifted over 3,500 tons of relief aid to Is- Repaired schools and medical facilities lamabad. From there, NATO helicopters NATO HQ A Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF), 17 NATO countries sent over flew to remote mountainous villages to In Theatre known as the NATO Disaster Relief 1,200 persons to Pakistan Team (NDRT), comprised of personnel deliver donated goods, stopping to pick from Joint Command (JC) , to- up and evacuate victims when possible. gether with NATO Response Force (NRF) Land Component Command (LCC) HQ In the end, NATO helicopters transport- Valencia were in theatre ed more than 1,750 tons of relief goods to Donations All 26 NATO Donations consisted of mon- remote mountain villages and evacuated nations ey and/or material over 7,650 disaster victims (NATO 2007). Source: NATO, “All NATO Countries Contribute to Pakistan Relief,” February 8, 2006, avail- able from http://www.nato.int/SHAPE/news/2005/pakistan_contributions.htm In total, over seventeen NATO countries

Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for 110 International Cooperation t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s sent twelve hundred forces and one thousand engi- inition of what types of MCDA support could qualify neers and other specialists to assist in relief efforts as official development assistance, such an approach in Pakistan, and EADRCC worked closely with the is unlikely to appeal to other member states. host country and with relevant national aid-coor- In addition to funding constraints, few guidelines dinating bodies and military authorities to help en- or institutional mechanisms are in place to direct sure a coordinated response. NATO’s involvement or coordination with other or- Eager to enhance NATO airlift capacity in the ganizations, namely the UN and EU, in humanitarian wake of the air bridge operation, in 2006 the Alliance and disaster relief activities. Other than a UN liaison approved a multinational contract, referred to as the officer stationed atEADRCC , collaboration between Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS), to allow the two organizations in response to a 12 SALIS participating countries in- participating countries (led by Germany) to char- large-scale disaster or humanitarian clude Canada, the Czech Republic, Den- mark, Germany, Finland, France, Hungary, ter up to six AN-124-100 transport aircraft capable crisis is quite informal and ad hoc. True, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, , Po- 12 of handling cargo weighing up to 120 tons. In June NATO recognizes the primary role of the land, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Swe- 2007, NATO allies agreed as well to set up a second UN in international response, but how den, and the United Kingdom. program, the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) ini- closely do NATO military planners or 13 SAC participating countries in- tiative, to acquire and manage C-17 strategic trans- EADRU staffers really coordinate their clude the Czech Republic, Denmark, Es- tonia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, , port aircraft on behalf of fifteenNATO countries and efforts with UN staff on the ground, es- Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Po- 13 two NATO partner countries. Under the plan, three pecially since NATO military assets re- land, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slo- C-17s will be purchased and based at Papa Air Base main under the command and control venia, , and the United States. in Hungary, with delivery of the first aircraft planned of the contributing nation? Similarly, the relation- for November 2008 and the remaining two by mid- ship between NATO and EU disaster response mecha- 2009. The C-17s will be used for national airlift pur- nisms lacks clarity. As each organization seeks ways poses, but could also be allocated for NATO, EU, and to develop its own rapid reaction capabilities and to UN-led operations, or for other international purpos- improve its civil-military responses to sudden cri- es, with (again) humanitarian airlift and disaster re- ses, existing ties between NATO, UN, and EU mecha- lief missions being a likely contingency. nisms, along with other regional and international Finally, other than the SOPs mentioned above, few organizations, should be strengthened to avoid di- guidelines or institutional mechanisms are in place vergent operating procedures, wasted resources, and to direct NATO’s involvement in humanitarian and competition. disaster relief activities, or to address the necessary Fortunately, there is an emerging consensus funding requirements for the use of military capabil- among NATO policy makers and defense planners ities during such operations. At present, each mem- on the need to develop a broader and more coop- ber country contributing military assets bears the erative approach to international relief and recon- financial burden of its engagement, just as the ro- struction efforts that can maximize (and render tation leader must for NRF deployments (whatever more effective) the contributions of diverse inter- the mission). However, unless an appropriate fund- agency and intergovernmental organizations. This ing mechanism is developed, the costs of deploying has led, in turn, to serious discussion among the national military assets (such as transport helicop- allies of what is now called the “comprehensive ap- ters) in support of NATO-approved HA/DR missions proach,” according to which the diverse array of na- could be too great for all but a few NATO countries, tional, international, and NGO institutions that find nearly all of whom face the prospect of declining bud- themselves increasingly involved in stability oper- gets for defense operations. Only one or two NATO ations and civil support missions (including HA/ members (principally the United Kingdom and the DR efforts) take more concrete steps to coordinate Netherlands) have been able to draw upon their bud- and integrate their individual efforts in support of gets for international development assistance to help a common plan. The basic idea here is that conflict cover disaster relief-related military expenses, and resolution, disaster recovery, and post-conflict re- such support could certainly be justified when the construction require a far more sustained effort at UN calls for or endorses the HA/DR effort in question. civil-military collaboration than has generally been However, without a much broader NATO-wide redef- the case so far, and that more vigorous NATO efforts

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to promote such collaboration in concert with the steadily more active in the crisis management and UN, the EU, and the OSCE (at a minimum) should be disaster response realms, undertaking a range of civ- encouraged. Ideally, this would allow a more sensi- il support and humanitarian missions in a widening ble and concerted division of labor among security- array of global hot spots, including Iraq, Afghani- minded organizations, with NATO bringing to bear stan, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Darfur, its comparative advantages in the military response Colombia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. But the spheres and the others assuming lead roles in the EU has been in the HA/DR business for some time areas of socio-economic development and political now, having established the European Community reform, including the strengthening of civic societ- Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) department in 1992 to de- ies in countries in transition. liver rapid emergency assistance to victims of natu- So far, little progress has been made toward set- ral disasters or conflict-induced crises outside the ting in place an institutional architecture for a com- EU. Since ECHO lacks the resources and equipment prehensive approach, in part because not all allies necessary to transport emergency relief supplies on want to see NATO move in this direction. That said, its own, it has partnered over the years with over to facilitate CMCoord in the context of a multi-agen- two hundred NGOs and specialized agencies, such cy, international HA/DR operation, a number of NATO as CARE, Aviation Sans Frontières, Oxfam, the Inter- member states (with Denmark, the Netherlands, and national Red Cross, the World Health Organization the United States leading the pack) have begun to (WHO), and the World Food Program (WFP), to deliv- suggest a series of steps that could be taken to at er assistance to regions hit by unexpected disasters. least lay the foundations for such a structure. In the ECHO funds facilitate the delivery of aid, support relative near-term, this could include the appoint- short-term rehabilitation and recovery programs, ment of liaison officers (LNOs) and other staff ex- and finance disaster prevention and training pro- changes between and among the various institutions grams. Moreover, to help coordinate efforts on the noted above, and the regular organization of train- ground in response to a crisis, ECHO may deploy a ing programs and exercises that would include rep- team of experts to the disaster site to monitor the resentatives from each group. Efforts along these activities and interaction of its partners in order to lines to build a cadre of staff officers drawn from avoid any duplication of activities in some areas and NATO, the EU, the OSCE, and the UN who understand funding gaps in others. the capabilities and procedures of each other’s or- The European Commission recently adopted the ganizations could be reinforced with a wider pub- Primary Emergency procedure, which allows the lic information campaign to explain the advantages Commission to release ECHO funds to partner orga- of a comprehensive-approach strategy. More ambi- nizations through fast-track budgetary procedures tious initiatives further down the line might include within twenty-four to forty-eight hours after the on- creating a standing multilateral staff of all the ma- set of a humanitarian crisis for the purchase and jor international security organizations, developing delivery of emergency relief supplies, such as food, a permanent assembly (similar to the UN’s IASC) of clothing, shelter, medical provisions, and water sup- these organizations and key NGOs and other private- plies. Within hours of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, sector groups that are active in HA/DR efforts and for example, ECHO donated €3.6 million (or almost stability operations, and convening annual multi- $4.5 million at 2005 exchange rates) in fast-track aid lateral meetings to discuss current operations, les- for immediate emergency relief, focusing especially sons learned, and future requirements (Yost 2007; on medical services and supplies, shelter, food and Petersen and Binnendijk 2007). blankets (European Commission 2005a). Four days later, an additional €10 million (almost $12.5 million at the 2005 rate) was allocated to partner organi- European Union Structures and zations to provide urgent relief supplies, including Procedures winterized shelters, primary healthcare, hygiene kits, and communications systems. One of ECHO’s The attitude of the EU leadership toward the com- NGO partners, Télécoms sans Frontières (TSF), ar- prehensive-approach concept will be critical to its rived in Islamabad within a day of the disaster and success or failure as the EU, like NATO, has become

Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for 112 International Cooperation t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s established a telecommunications center near the sponders, both military and civilian, to move in with heliport with internet connection, telephone, fax, “self-contained and self-sustaining capabilities” was and technical assistance (European Commission critical. According to the report, “the anticipated 2005b). TSF also helped rescuers from other agen- second and third wave of casualties was prevent- cies exchange information and coordinate activities ed as a result of the well coordinated team efforts in the hard-hit areas of Muzaffarabad, , and by the civilian, military, national and internation- Mansehra (European Commission 2005c). In addi- al medical and public health actors on the ground” tion, ECHO supported relief logistics by financing the (Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and WFP’s helicopter operations, as well as efforts by the Humanitarian Assistance 2006a). EU 14 As discussed earlier, the UNJLC is an in- UNJLC and Atlas Logistique to provide road trans- funding was central to the success of teragency logistics coordination facil- ity for emergency response established port and storage to local and international human- these efforts. In later stages of the re- in 2002 under the custodianship of the 14 itarian organizations. The total financial package lief efforts in Pakistan, when cases of World Food Program (WFP). Atlas Logis- in response to the Pakistan earthquake, channeled diarrhea emerged in refugee camps, the tique is a nonprofit organization special- through thirty-six operational partners, reached UN high commissioner for refugees de- izing in logistics and technical support. €98.6 million, or some $124 million at the 2006 ex- ployed mobile teams funded by ECHO change rate (European Commission 2006). Overall and the United Kingdom’s Department for Interna- EU funding (by the Commission and member states) tional Development (DFID) to fix water and sanita- reached around €600 million ($753.4 million at the tion problems, preempting a potential outbreak of 2006 rate) of which €171 million ($215 million) was more serious water-borne diseases (Center of Ex- for humanitarian actions . cellence in Disaster Management and Humanitari- In addition to funding relief activities during the an Assistance 2006b). initial rescue phase, ECHO supports long-term reha- The ECHO-DIPECHO structure, of course, is fo- bilitation and recovery projects such as camp man- cused solely on responding to foreign disasters agement, potable water and sanitation projects, and and humanitarian crises. In order to mobilize EU disaster prevention. ECHO’s disaster preparedness resources more effectively for incidents 15 Membership in the Mechanism is open program, DIPECHO, promotes disaster prevention within EU territory, as well as beyond to all EU member states. In addition to the twenty-seven EU member states already in- projects in high-risk countries and regions prone to it, the EU established the Civil Protec- volved in the Mechanism, Iceland, Liech- earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, or droughts, pro- tion Mechanism (CPM) within the EU tenstein, and Norway also have joined. viding technical assistance and funds for capaci- Commission in 2001.15 At the heart of ty-building, training, and early warning projects. the Mechanism is the Civil Protection Unit (CPU) DIPECHO has also helped to establish the EU’s Glob- and its Monitoring and Information Center (MIC), al Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) which serves as a twenty-four/seven communica- system, which monitors natural and man-made ca- tions hub for participating states to access and share tastrophes to improve an EU-wide capacity to pre- information on the availability of resources and the dict and respond to environmental emergencies, as types of assistance offered and required at any given well as the EU’s Global Disaster Alert and Coordina- point in time. At the sudden onset of a disaster ei- tion System (GDACS), which provides real-time alerts ther inside or outside the EU, the MIC can respond on natural disasters and information tools to facili- by appointing a coordination and assessment team tate response coordination, including media moni- to travel to the disaster site to identify local needs, toring and map catalogues. once it has received a formal written request for as- ECHO’s support of WHO’s disease early warning sistance via a fax or email. TheMIC then informs the system, established in the aftermath of the Paki- countries participating in the Mechanism of the type stan earthquake, will help international health of- of assistance needed. These countries in turn noti- ficials to respond more promptly and effectively to fy the MIC what resources they can provide, includ- potential communicable-disease outbreaks. In the ing both supplies and expert personnel. Serving as a specific case of Pakistan, eleven health-related proj- one-stop clearinghouse for information on EU sup- ects were supported throughout the affected regions port options, the MIC helps to establish a direct line (Cosgrave and Nam 2007, 29-31). A U.S. military as- of communication between the affected and assist- sessment later noted that the ability of medical re- ing countries, and it monitors the delivery and dis-

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Requests for Assistance to EU Civil Protection Mechanism there is no agreement among EU members on com- Host Nation mon warning signs for either type of disaster that a request for new warning system can be built to monitor. assistance Country accepts or rejects Following the tsunami tragedy, the EU proposed EU President offer; sends further requests. various measures to improve the Mechanism and MIC sends offer consult if crisis outside the EU to host nation maximize the impact of its assistance, such as im- proving access to EU military and civil defense assets for disaster relief and pre-positioning equipment for Monitoring and Information Center immediate deployment upon request for assistance. appoints team The European Commission is already funding United forwards on the ground Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and WHO efforts offers of request for EU assessment team assistance assistance to pre-position basic emergency items in regional hubs, and discussions are underway to develop sim- EU Member States ilar programs with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Addi- Civil Protection Mechanism

EU tional measures along these lines to build up the di- saster prevention and relief capabilities of both the CPU/MIC network and individual member states can tribution of all civil protection assistance, such as be expected following the EU’s approval of a new Civ- water pumps, firefighting equipment, sand bags, dis- il Protection Financial Instrument in March 2007, infectants, blankets, and technical experts. For di- which set aside €4 million (about $5.6 million at sasters within EU territory, the CPU and MIC can act the 2007 exchange rate) for this particular purpose on their own (operating in an “in community” sta- in the EU’s 2008 budget (European Union 2007a). tus for the Commission), but for non-EU incidents Beyond these efforts, the European Union Military they must consult closely with the EU presidency to Staff EUMS( ) is attempting to identify and catalogue secure formal approval (given the potential politi- which military skills and assets of EU member states cal implications of a foreign operation). are ideal for disaster response operations overall, Since the different response methodologies based on the transportability, all-terrain adaptabil- 16 These and related efforts to track and orga- used by individual EU member states ity, and practicality of such assets, as well as on the nize EU-country military assets that would be may hamper multilateral coordination conditions of their availability and deployment.16 To useful in a range of plausible disaster scenarios were first outlined at theEU ’s informal defense in the field, the CPU and MIC sponsor this end, the EUMS has established air transport and ministerial in on March 6, 2006, by a variety of civil protection (CP) im- maritime transport coordination centers in Eind- Javier Solana, the EU’s high representative for provement projects aimed at boosting hoven and Athens, but they have not yet been ful- common foreign and security policy (CFSP). See coordination through broader expe- ly tested in the context of real-world operations. So, Solana (2006). Both military and non-military EU initiatives of note are summarized in Com- rience sharing, better early warning too, the EUMS has participated in several meetings mission of the European Communities (2005). procedures, investment in up-to-date with CPU and MIC staff to clarify procedures and de- logistical capabilities, and the selective advance ne- velop agreed templates for forwarding requests for gotiation of airlift and other transport support. Both military support from EU civil authorities to EUMS groups also sponsor regular training programs, sim- officials (interview 2007c). ulation exercises, and expert exchanges in an effort During the summer of 2007, the CP Mechanism to enhance member state interoperability and to was activated thirteen times within a two-month pe- advance a common culture of emergency response. riod in response to a series of devastating wildfires With regard to early warning more specifically, the that raged through Cyprus, Italy, the Former Yugo- CPU is pushing for a new multi-hazard alert system slav Republic of Macedonia, Bulgaria, Albania, and stationed within the MIC that would be patterned Greece. At the time, the response to the wildfires on Japan’s early warning system and designed to pro- on Greece’s Peloponnese peninsula was the largest vide earlier and more accurate warnings of potential operation ever undertaken by the Mechanism in an earthquakes and tsunamis in the southern and Med- EU member state. Mechanism-participating states iterranean regions of the EU zone. As yet, however, (along with , Russia, and Turkey) contributed

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Canadair water-tanker planes, water-carrying heli- 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2006 mudslides in copters, firefighting all-terrain vehicles, and rescue the Philippines, and the 2008 cyclone that struck workers. However, despite the Mechanism’s timely Myanmar, point to the need for greater prepared- and overwhelming support to Greece, the response ness, better reaction time, and smoother coordina- identified significant shortcomings in Europe’s crisis tion among vulnerable states in the region. With management capabilities. For one thing, coordina- this objective in mind, therefore, the Association tion between and among various national civil pro- of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a key regional tection structures appeared to be quite low, which platform that marked its fortieth anniversary in 2007, remains a potential problem area. In an effort to im- has stepped up its efforts to encourage multilateral prove Europe’s collective response capacity, there- cooperation on disaster relief and more effective ef- fore, EU parliamentarians increasingly have called forts at disaster preparedness (includ- 17 In May 2006, Michel Barnier, former for the creation of a permanent civil protection rap- ing improved capabilities for better French minister for foreign affairs and for- mer member of the European Commission, id reaction force maintained at the EU level to tackle emergency response) among its mem- issued a report, “For a European Civil Protec- natural disasters, and possibly terrorist attacks and ber states. Indeed, the inaugural ASE- tion Force: Europe Aid” (also known as the industrial accidents.17 Critics of this proposal argue AN defense ministers’ meeting held in Barnier Report), that outlined twelve propos- nonetheless that EU efforts should focus first and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in May 2006 als for improving EU crisis response capaci- ties. Specifically, the report advocated a more foremost on prevention and preparedness at the na- identified disaster risk reduction as an integrated European approach to crisis man- tional and local levels rather than on the creation of immediate security challenge and re- agement and the creation of a European civil a European civil protection force with region-wide gional relief cooperation as one of the protection force. This idea was revisited af- ter the 2007 wildfires in Greece. However, the responsibilities. core issues on which defense officials Greek initiative for enhancing European coop- By way of a compromise measure, however, the should focus (Caballero-Anthony 2006). eration for the prevention of and response to European Council did approve in November 2007 a More recently, in July 2008, the ASEAN natural disasters and emergencies was with- drawn after several EU member states, name- plan to develop (with funds from the new Civil Pro- Regional Forum (ARF), a broader group ly , Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, tection Financial Instrument) up to thirteen disaster composed of ASEAN members and other Sweden, and the UK, called for a greater fo- response modules based on deployable units in key countries (including the United States) cus on prevention and preparedness at the na- capability areas (European Union 2007b). Modules interested in the security of the region, tional and local (as opposed to EU) level. 18 Current ARF members include all ten ASE- now being organized include special units for wa- agreed on the need for common guide- AN members, plus Australia, Bangladesh, Can- ter pumping/purification, aerial firefighting, earth- lines and cooperative mechanisms to ada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, quake response, urban search and rescue, medical promote and direct joint relief opera- Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Paki- assistance and evacuation, emergency shelter, CBRN tions (Tang 2008).18 stan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, and the United States. detection and sampling, and search and rescue in ASEAN HA/DR initiatives, however, CBRN conditions. The modules will be maintained have been in the works for some time now, although at the national level, but kept ready to deploy on they are still inadequately supported. These efforts short notice anywhere in the EU zone (and even received a significant boost in member support af- beyond) and capable of self-sufficient operations ter the Indian Ocean tsunami. At a special meet- once deployed. Particular emphasis in this first ing convened in January 2005, for example, in the round of module development is being given to re- immediate aftermath of the tsunami, ASEAN mem- sponse capabilities that would be especially useful ber countries signed the Joint Declaration on Action in the event of cross-border disasters that would af- to Strengthen Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Re- fect more than one country (such as forest fires, oil construction, and Prevention, which was followed spills, and earthquakes). In this way, near-term in- in July 2005 by the adoption of the seminal ASEAN tra-EU improvements will also advance the EU’s ca- Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergen- pacity and that of its member states to respond in cy Response (or the AADMER). The agreement aims areas beyond the EU zone. to provide a comprehensive regional framework for joint response and cooperation across the full life cycle of disaster management and to encourage an ASEAN Initiatives integrated, multi-hazard approach that involves all Recent large-scale humanitarian relief efforts in stakeholders, links national initiatives with regional Southeast Asia, such as those launched after the and international networks, and establishes region-

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al structures and mechanisms, such as the ASEAN to the entire ASEAN region, operating together with Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance an improved, real-time seismographic network and on Disaster Management (the AHA Center) and the Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis ASEAN Disaster Management and Emergency Relief (DART)19 sensors (UNESCO 2006). 19 This particular DART, of course, has Fund (ASEAN Secretariat 2006). Under the AADMER agreement, ASEAN mem- nothing to do with the various first re- Although the AADMER agreement ber nations have also started formulating region- sponder units referred to by the same ac- ronym that are currently fielded by the will only enter into force following al standby arrangements and standard operating United States, Singapore, and Canada. ratification by all ten ASEAN member procedures (called SASOPs) for joint disaster relief 20 Created in 2003, the ASEAN Committee states, many of the provisions are al- operations that would use both military and civil- on Disaster Management (ACDM) is composed ready being implemented. For exam- ian personnel and assets. Work also proceeds on of the heads of agencies and organizations in each ASEAN country that are responsible for ple, ASEAN has launched the Disaster efforts to establish a network of pre-designated en- disaster management. TheACDM formulates Information Sharing and Communica- try points to facilitate the movement of relief items programs and organizes regional emergency tions Network (DISCNet) in collabora- across borders and to expedite customs and immi- response activities, such as the ARDEX exer- tion with the Maui-based Pacific Disas- gration clearance (ASEAN Committee on Disaster cises, as part of the AADMER agreement and with the assistance of the ASEAN Secretariat. ter Center (PDC), a center for applied Management). In addition, a regional online data- science, information, and technology base and inventory of member-state disaster relief mentioned in chapter 4 as a component of the Ha- skills and assets, including a search and rescue di- waii model. As part of DISCNet, all disaster-related rectory, called the ASEAN Standby Arrangements websites from each ASEAN country were successful- for Disaster Relief and Emergency Response, is be- ly linked together in early 2005 (Pacific Disaster Cen- ing compiled. Data on the regional standby arrange- ter 2005). To further enhance strategic information ments will be managed, updated, and coordinated sharing, in 2005 ASEAN and PDC completed a com- by the AHA Center, scheduled to be operational by prehensive information and communications tech- 2009 (ASEAN 2005). nology (ICT) assessment of all ten ASEAN states as a In a concerted effort to further improve region- way to help identify regional information and tech- al preparedness and networking capabilities, and nology gaps, strengthen national ICT infrastructures, to test the applicability of the SASOPs, ASEAN has and determine the minimum investment required for initiated regular series of regional disaster emer- regional interconnectivity on disaster management gency response simulation exercises, code-named (GSDI 2006). In a related achievement of the DISCNet ARDEX. The first-ever ASEAN field simulation expe- collaboration, ASEAN launched the Online Southeast rience (ARDEX-05) based on a major earthquake Asia Disaster Inventory (OSADI) database in late Oc- scenario was held in Malaysia in September 2005, tober 2007. The web-based system, the first of its kind followed by an exercise in 2006 (ARDEX-06) simu- in the region, compiles historical records of disasters lating a flashflood in and a third disas- in ASEAN member states, as well as hazard maps and ter exercise (ARDEX-07) that mobilized area search other disaster-related spatial data, and it would al- and rescue teams in response to the simulated col- low emergency personnel throughout Southeast Asia lapse of a high-rise apartment building in Singapore. to catalogue and share critical disaster relief infor- Following on from a tabletop simulation hosted by mation. Another region-wide endeavor, the Indian Indonesia in May 2008, the ARDEX-08 disaster ex- Ocean Tsunami Warning System (IOTWS), became ercise, held in Thailand in late August 2008, tested active in 2006, and boasts the capability to receive ASEAN’s capacity to respond to a potentially devas- and distribute tsunami advisories around the clock tating typhoon. TheASEAN Committee on Disaster ASEAN Standby Arrangements for Disaster Management (ACDM)20 conducts the field simula- Relief and Emergency Response tion events in collaboration with the UN’s OCHA net- Categories of information required to establish and work, including participants from the UN Disaster maintain the inventory of earmarked assets and ca- pacities for the regional standby arrangements Assessment and Coordination team, the Internation- Emergency Response / al Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Soci- Search and Rescue Military and Civilian Assets eties, the UN International Strategy for Disaster Emergency Stockpiles of Disaster Management Expertise Disaster Relief Items and Technologies Reduction (ISDR), and other longstanding partners Source: ASEAN Secretariat and support agencies. In addition, ASEAN receives

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ASEAN Institutional Arrangements meetings of heads of government/state

ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM) ASEAN Ministerial Meetings ASEAN Secretary-General of Foreign Ministers on Disaster Management (AMMDM)

ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) ASEAN Committee on Disaster ASEAN Secretariat Management (ACDM) (Bureau for Resources Development) regular technical support from the Thailand-based in the development of more robust HA/DR capabil- Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC), a di- ities among ASEAN countries. A current initiative saster response information sharing network. Tak- in this regard is the U.S. proposal, first presented in en together, these various planning and simulation August 2007, for the creation of a joint disaster re- exercises provide useful opportunities for increas- lief force under the auspices of the ARF, to be estab- ing emergency preparedness and building mobiliza- lished within eighteen months and aimed at moving tion capabilities in this disaster-prone part of the the forum “away from seminars to actual coopera- world. So, too, they have generated important op- tion” (Christopher Hill 2007). According to the pro- erationally minded lessons on multilateral cooper- posal, American military forces would collaborate ation that will help facilitate the implementation of directly with the forces of member countries (some AADMER objectives. of which have not yet had the opportunity to work As noted briefly already, the ASEAN Regional Fo- together) in actual exercises, based on challenging rum, or ARF, is another regional instrument that scenarios (such as a 2004-like tsunami crisis), to ad- could become quite useful for disaster relief plan- dress the region’s top disaster response needs. As a ning, especially with respect to potential military key first step a U.S.-developed ARF live exercise on support. Established to foster more direct dialogue disaster relief (using ARF Standard Operating Pro- on security-related matters among ASEAN members cedures) has been scheduled for early 2009 in the and other key Asia-Pacific nations, the ARF has en- Philippines. couraged broader exchanges on, and coordination That said, the Plan of Action to Implement the with respect to, national disaster response, emergen- ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership 2006-2011, signed cy relief, and maritime search and rescue capabili- in July 2006, constitutes the most comprehensive ties (Australian Government Department of Foreign initiative to strengthen bilateral relations between Affairs and Trade). Specific achievements of theARF ASEAN and the United States (Pitsuwan 2008). Ac- include organizing a series of training activities, con- cording to the agreement, the United States will ducting an inventory of early warning systems, de- supply ASEAN member countries with training and veloping a matrix of past cooperation in disaster simulation support based on the Incident Command relief among member countries, and drafting guide- System (ICS) developed for U.S. homeland security lines for post-disaster roles and responsibilities (In- purposes. Washington will also provide regular sup- ternational Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2004). By port to ASEAN members in the information and com- drawing participation in its annual meetings from munications technology (ICT) realm, and it pledged senior levels of the various ministries of foreign af- to invest in a capacity-building program to improve fairs, defense, and disaster management, among oth- ASEAN member capabilities to prevent, respond to, ers, the ARF has provided a unique and authoritative and recover from natural disasters (White House Of- platform for discussing the multiple aspects of HA/ fice of the Press Secretary 2007a; BBC Asia Pacific DR planning in a multilateral setting. 2006). Toward this end, the U.S. Agency for Interna- In this context, the ARF has emerged as a partic- tional Development (USAID) announced in Septem- ularly useful vehicle for promoting U.S. participation, ber 2007 an indefinite quantity contract capped at and that of its closest regional allies and partners, $150 million to support ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Part-

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nership activities over the near term future (Pitsu- mar following tropical cyclone Nargis, which struck wan 2008). the country in May 2008. ASEAN continues to steer It will take some time, of course, for these pro- the response activities of the so-called ASEAN-Myan- posed improvements to take shape. The 2004 Indi- mar-UN Tripartite Core Group (TCG) that was estab- an Ocean tsunami exposed the lack of preparedness lished after the cyclone to coordinate, facilitate, and of ASEAN countries for large-scale calamities, as monitor the flow of international assistance into well as their limited ability to respond in a collec- Myanmar. In addition, the ASEAN Secretariat dis- tive manner. More specifically, the tsunami demon- patched a special emergency rapid assessment team strated that a key reason why a regional emergency (ERAT) to the disaster zone. Comprised of experts response could not be deployed rapidly and effec- in the fields of relief coordination, water and san- tively was the lack of a regional coordination sys- itation, health, logistics, and food, the assessment 21 Despite the 9.0 magnitude of the earth- tem to identify and mobilize available team has helped to target aid provided by the ASEAN quake that caused the tsunami, no coun- resources in support of a coherent re- countries to areas where it was most needed (Asian try in the region issued an international warning, and Indonesia’s meteorologi- sponse effort, ranging from problem Development Bank 2008). ASEAN members Indone- 21 cal department was reportedly not even recognition to problem solution. Sim- sia, Laos, Malaysia, and Singapore alone mobilized aware of it until informed by local resi- ilarly, the Philippine mudslide relief ef- several tons of emergency relief items such as food, dents (Pacific Disaster Center 2006). fort in early 2006 underscored the need blankets, water and water purification tablets, tents, for closer coordination among a complex communi- groundsheets, clothing, and medical supplies for the ty of international responders, as well as the impor- hardest-hit areas. The Philippines dispatched C-130 tance of incorporating the participation of foreign transport planes with over $300,000 in desperately military forces and assets in disaster relief opera- needed relief goods, and Thailand, which emerged tions to bolster the speed and efficiency of response. as the main logistical and organizational hub for the Indeed, the recently launched AADMER specifically relief effort, donated $12.3 million in cash and in- recognizes that establishing regional protocols to kind aid to Myanmar, provided medical teams, and expedite the deployment of foreign military forces airlifted more than $400,000 worth of food, drink- to help ASEAN nations cope with major disasters ing water, and medical and shelter supplies (Center could be a key to future relief efforts. for Excellence in Disaster Management and Human- In terms of its capacity to respond effectively to itarian Assistance 2008a). disasters, ASEAN has also received criticism in re- Looking ahead, ASEAN is exploring the experi- cent years for being “mostly an enterprise for region- ence, applicability, and transferability of successful al reconciliation,” and for having a loosely structured European disaster response mechanisms, such as institutional framework mainly geared towards fa- NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordina- cilitating an environment for trust and confidence tion Center and its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response building among its members, rather than the devel- Unit, as it considers how best to strengthen existing opment of robust, disaster-driven, specialized exper- institutions and cooperative frameworks in the di- tise (Hew 2005). Despite their limited capabilities saster preparedness realm. The hope is that theEAD - and ad hoc responses to past crises, however, ASE- RCC/EADRU network, as well as the EU’s MIC and CPM AN members did demonstrate that they could act structure, will point the way to reforms that ASEAN and work together during the relief efforts following could take to help identify disaster relief needs at a the May 2006 Central Java (Indonesia) earthquake. regional level and to encourage a closer coordina- Assisting teams from the ASEAN member countries tion of member state response capabilities (Cabal- were among the first to respond to the area with lero-Anthony 2006). In that respect, the first-ever search and rescue teams, food, medical assistance, ASEAN charter, adopted in November 2007, would and other emergency supplies, as well as with cash (if implemented) formalize and transform the As- contributions (ASEAN 2006). sociation from a consensus-based organization to Perhaps more impressively, ASEAN recently took a rules-based one. In so doing, it could strengthen 22 The current ASEAN Secretariat lacks suffi- the lead in organizing the delivery of the ASEAN Secretariat22 to such a degree that ASEAN cient staff and funding to address its burgeon- aid to an estimated 2.5 million survi- might evolve into a more responsive and effective ing agenda of activities, thus undermining the overall effectiveness of ASEAN’s initiatives. vors in the devastated areas of Myan- regional union, particularly with respect to disas-

Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for 118 International Cooperation t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s ter preparedness, planning, and response capaci- assets of the Australian Defense Force (ADF) in re- ties (Manila Times 2007a). sponse to disasters occurring in the Asia-Pacific and Melanesian regions, including the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, but farther afield as well, as in the case of Key Non-European Allied and Partner the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. Country Capabilities Australia’s response to international contingen- cies is managed by Emergency Management Austra- In addition to existing regional and multinational lia (EMA), located in the Ministry of Defense, under platforms for HA/DR collaboration, there are a num- the direction of the Australian Agency for Interna- ber of non-NATO and non-EU national programs for tional Development (AusAID), which normally funds foreign disaster assistance that could provide (and, the Australian response to an overseas disaster. In in fact, have provided) effective mechanisms for bi- the aftermath of an emergency, EMA activates the lateral cooperation with the United States and its Commonwealth Government Overseas Disaster As- military forces, as well as with other countries and sistance Plan (AUSASSIST Plan), which details the their military forces. Not surprising, many of the principles and procedures involved in coordinating more robust programs in this context have been the provision of humanitarian aid (Australian Gov- developed by American allies and partner states in ernment Emergency Management Australia 2004). the Asia-Pacific region, most of which have become ADF assets are often mobilized under the plan and increasingly interested in building up their HA/DR made available to transport resources and to pro- capabilities in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean vide equipment, personnel, and expertise, such as tsunami and, more recently, cyclone Nargis in Myan- medical assistance. In the absence of a dedicated mar and China’s Sichuan earthquake in May 2008. ADF disaster relief unit to call upon in times of cri- As detailed in the country reviews that follow, Aus- sis, units and task forces are drawn directly from tralia, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the ADF, with the early-entry elements of the Austra- Canada are likely to remain the most attractive and lian Army’s three health support battalions of three competent partners in the near to mid-term, given hundred troops each typically the first to deploy to their longstanding traditions of collaboration with the scene of a disaster, followed soon by combat en- the United States and, to some extent, with each gineering and other military units (Hobson 2005). other. Understanding more fully the extent of their The chart below provides a graphic overview of Aus- HA/DR capabilities at the national level, then, is the tralia’s overall decision process for overseas HA/DR first step to developing a more realistic sense of what operations. they may be willing to do in cooperation with the United States, be it in a bilateral, trilateral, mini-lateral, or broader Decision Process for Australia’s AUSASSIST Plan multilateral framework. request for assistance request forwarded to Minister for foreign from affected country AusAID for assessment affairs or delegate to Australian head and approval approval is sought Australia of mission Australia, long a leader in providing if physical or technical humanitarian assistance and emer- response approved, Emergency attorney general gency relief, maintains the capacity Management Australia (EMA) approval sought requested to coordinate to respond rapidly to international disasters, especially when they oc- cur in countries within Australia’s EMA advises AusAID the appropriate Commonwealth Commonwealth agencies or other agencies are tasked to seek ministerial approval immediate vicinity. Australia is per- carry out requests haps the most proactive contributor AusAID will usually fund of military assets to international approved response humanitarian missions in the Asia- tasked agency is provided with EMA provides AusAID with Pacific region (Wiharta et al. 2008). contact details of point of regular situation reports contact affected country As such, it has frequently deployed the wide-ranging capabilities and

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Among the factors that determine activation of needed to provide essential relief, is seen in Can- the AUSASSIST Plan are the extent and nature of the berra as an especially important contribution, and foreign crisis, its likely effect on long-term develop- one that is central to ensuring that only those mil- ment efforts, the scale of existing local capacity to itary assets that are truly necessary and appropri- cope with the emergency, Australia’s comparative ad- ate to the task at hand are actually deployed. During vantage in providing assistance, the level of response the tsunami responses, for example, it was through from other donors, and the scope of local commu- such an assessment that the Australians were able nity involvement (Commonwealth Secretariat 1999). to determine that using the army’s UH-1H Iroquois Special focus and the highest priority are allocated to (Huey) helicopters would be more effective than emergency situations in the Asia-Pacific region, and the more sophisticated and combat-capable S-70- in particular those countries where Canberra already A-9 Black Hawks, because the former required less has an ongoing bilateral assistance program. time to prepare for dispatch, were quicker to pre- Australia quickly emerged as a member of the so- pare for air transport once in theater, and required called core group of nations (along with the United a smaller logistics support footprint (Hobson 2005). States, Japan, and India) that took the lead in pro- Moreover, the Iroquois produced less downward air viding the critical direction and organizational mo- turbulence (or downwash), which proved to be an mentum that launched the international response important feature when operating close to the af- to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Within a week fected populations. after the disaster, Australia had established a pres- Beyond Australia’s crucial response to the Indian ence in the hardest-hit areas and ultimately ranked Ocean tsunami, the country has contributed signifi- as the second-largest donor government (after the cantly to other recent emergency response efforts. It United States) in the tsunami relief effort, pledging launched a large relief operation in the wake of the nearly $1 billion in assistance (Jordan 2006). As part massive March 2005 earthquake in Sumatra, provid- of operation Sumatra Assist, the formal name for ing a range of emergency supplies (infant formula, Canberra’s support for the tsunami relief effort, the cooking sets, hygiene kits, kerosene fuel), along with ADF provided critical emergency provisions (water, food, water, shelter equipment, medical personnel, tents, medical supplies, blankets, etc.), a water pu- and malaria prevention services, and transport rification plant, a field hospital, air traffic control- and logistical support (Australian Government Au- lers, logisticians, Australian Army helicopters and sAID). Furthermore, following the devastating 2005 engineers, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) C-130 earthquake in Pakistan, the Australian military de- Hercules and Boeing 707 transport aircraft (for ferry- ployed helicopters, tanker and cargo aircraft, and ing equipment, stores, and personnel to the stricken ADF medical and support personnel who focused on areas), and the ’s HMAS Kanimbla am- vital health care assistance to those affected.RAAF phibious landing ship, later converted into a floating B-707 and C-130 Hercules aircraft conducted the ini- logistics base from which food and fresh provisions tial strategic airlift, while army-owned Black Hawk were delivered ashore in landing craft or via helicop- helicopters provided essential transport of teams ter (Hobson 2005). Within a month, over one thou- and supplies into Pakistan’s more remote and diffi- 23 The ADF official- sand ADF troops had delivered an estimated twelve cult-to-reach areas, undeterred by the mountainous ly withdrew its assets hundred tons of humanitarian aid by air to tsuna- terrain and limited road access (Aerospace Daily and on March 25, 2005. mi victims in the most heavily affected areas (Rob- Defense Report 2005). ert Hill 2005).23 As part of Canberra’s response to disasters in 2008, The Australian government relies considerably on Australia pledged some $24 million in financial assis- the ADF in responding to overseas relief operations tance to meet the humanitarian needs of the people because of the timeliness, special skills and training, of Myanmar following the devastating cyclone that capacity for quick reaction, and relative self-suffi- struck that country in May 2008 (Sydney Morning ciency of its military personnel in a disaster environ- Herald 2008). In addition, an RAAF C-17 Globemas- ment. The ability of the military forces to provide a ter aircraft transported two SA330J Puma helicop- time-urgent and accurate assessment of the situa- ters to be used by the WFP’s UNHAS effort aimed at tion within the disaster zone, and of the capabilities delivering aid to the most heavily affected areas in

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Myanmar. By late June 2008, moreover, the ADF had operation, which would “cut through the bureaucra- provided over thirty tons of emergency provisions cy so that we can transform our forces better, share for the cyclone victims, including much-needed wa- technology better,” and take military collaboration ter containers, water purification tablets, bedding, between the two countries even further (White blankets, tarpaulins, and medical supplies (Austra- House Office of the Press Secretary 2007b). One lian Government Dept. of Defense 2008). Australia important component of U.S.-Australian defense also contributed a team of medical specialists to ties, according to the new treaty, would include en- work in partnership with a 250-member joint as- hanced cooperation on humanitarian assistance sessment team brought together by ASEAN under and disaster relief, possibly involving the pre-posi- a UN-brokered agreement with the junta in Myan- tioning in Australia of stores, provisions, and equip- mar (PDMIN 2008). ment that would be available for ready use in U.S. After the catastrophic May 2008 earthquake in and/or joint disaster relief missions within the re- China’s Sichuan Province, the Australian govern- gion (Ferguson and Matthews 2007). ment was quick as well to donate some $2 million The Australian government already maintains an to the Red Cross and the Red Cross Society of Chi- ongoing liaison with the United States and the U.S. na to help underwrite emergency relief efforts. As in Navy, whereby the two countries frequently work Myanmar, Canberra’s contribution was used to pro- and exercise together to enhance the interopera- vide essential supplies, such as tents, blankets, jer- bility standards between Australian and U.S. forc- ry cans, and water purification tablets, and to help es. The joint Australia-U.S. Talisman Sabre exercise, fund Red Cross medical teams and critical medi- Australia’s largest annual military training activity, cal supplies (Smith 2008a). Additionally, the Aus- involves a wide range of maritime operations, and tralian government offered the practical assistance in 2007 it focused on the need for joint training and and proven capabilities of its expert urban search effective interoperability in the realm of humani- and rescue teams. tarian assistance (Hetherington 2007). The bilater- Complementing its national framework and ar- al exercise allows Australia and the United States rangements for overseas disaster assistance is Aus- to deploy rapidly together and on very short notice tralia’s leading role in the ASEAN Regional Forum for operational missions, as in the case of the 2004 (ARF), which acts as the principal platform for se- tsunami response (Lockwood 2007). In March 2007, curity dialogue in Asia and whose focus has evolved moreover, Australia concluded the breakthrough Ja- to include cooperation in the areas of disaster re- pan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooper- sponse, emergency relief, and marine search and res- ation (JDSC) in which each country recognized the cue. In 2007, Australia elected to serve as a “shepherd” other as an indispensable partner in the region and (along with the United States, China, the EU, Indone- laid out priority areas for practical cooperation be- sia, and Malaysia) to coordinate all interim efforts tween Australia and Japan, including disaster relief and take forward the ARF’s work on disaster relief (Kamiol 2007). The Australian government is also capabilities (Salvosa 2007). As part of this initia- deepening its close trilateral partnership with the tive, Australia and Indonesia are preparing to estab- United States and Japan, and in June 2008, Washing- lish standard operating procedures (SOPs) through ton, Canberra, and Tokyo agreed to a new disaster a desktop exercise in 2008, to be followed in early relief pact that aims to ensure a “coordinated and 2009 (as noted in the ASEAN section of this chap- instantaneous” response (including the best use of ter) by the planned first-ever live ARF disaster re- their respective military assets) to future disasters lief exercise, which will be developed by the United in the Asia-Pacific region (Smith 2008b). The specif- States and the Philippines (Australian Government ic guidelines of the disaster accord are scheduled for Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade). completion in late 2008. Australia is also involved in a number of other Canberra is an active member as well of the Five bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral strategic coop- Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), a maritime se- eration initiatives focused on disaster relief. In Sep- curity and air defense initiative linking it with Ma- tember 2007, Canberra and Washington signed the laysia, Singapore, New Zealand, and the United Australia-United States Treaty on Defense Trade Co- Kingdom, whose focus has grown to include the

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development of readiness, capacity building, and capable assets in the provision of effective HA/DR interoperability among its members in the area of assistance (Jane’s Defence Weekly 2007). HA/DR operations (Kamiol 2006). So, too, Austra- lia works closely with France and New Zealand un- Singapore der a trilateral arrangement known as FRANZ to While taking part in several recent multilateral ef- respond to a range of emergencies in the South Pa- forts, Singapore has demonstrated a special aptitude cific. FRANZ ensures that resources (such as relief for HA/DR operations and a growing willingness to transportation and finances for reconstruction) are participate in such missions. Although Singapore deployed effectively and without duplication, and it focuses its HA/DR capabilities on crises occurring has proved to be a useful tool for improving disas- in Southeast Asia, the wealthy city-state also engag- ter preparedness and coordination within the region es when necessary (and requested) in HA/DR opera- (Commonwealth Secretariat 1999). Further, Emer- tions beyond this geographic perimeter, venturing gency Management Australia maintains an active into nearby regions such as South Asia, Central Asia, partnership with Indonesia’s disaster coordination and the Middle East. Although the Singapore Armed authority, BAKORNAS, to provide Australian techni- Forces (SAF) and the Singapore Civil Defense Force cal assistance and expertise in the areas of disaster (SCDF), the main tools the government employs dur- response, recovery, and prevention. ing disaster situations, are small in number, their Australia’s forces offered immediate support and capabilities have proven to be robust, flexible, and humanitarian relief to the Philippines following the professional. Southern Leyte floods and typhoon Reming in 2006. Singapore can provide multilateral disaster relief In addition, the ADF has provided important disaster efforts with capabilities spanning a wide spectrum management training to the Filipino armed forces of competencies, from experienced liaison officers (Manila Times 2007b). In this regard, Australia re- to forensic specialists, peacekeepers, and elite di- cently concluded a Status of Visiting Forces Agree- saster assistance and rescue teams (DARTs). Singa- ment (SOVFA) with the Philippines. The agreement pore’s political structure allows the government to codifies a bilateral security cooperation initiative make decisions and execute directives quickly, thus that is expected to facilitate closer military collabo- enabling its well-trained military and relevant gov- ration between the two countries on crisis response ernment agencies to respond to disasters on a case- planning and preparedness, including, among other by-case basis with streamlined coordination, all of tasks, capacity building, training, and exercises fo- which results in greater efficiency. As stated by Sin- cused on strengthening regional disaster relief ca- gapore’s former chief of defense force, Rear Admiral pabilities and expertise. Lui Tuck Yew, “Over the years, the Singapore Armed Recent defense-related developments in Austra- Forces (SAF) and the Singapore Civil Defense Force lia have centered as well on a re-posturing of the ADF (SCDF) have built up their disaster relief capabilities to make it a more agile, responsive, and multifunc- and are well trained to respond to any eventualities” tional expeditionary force that is no longer focused (MINDEF Singapore 2002). Moreover, Singapore’s on continental defense, but can be called upon to emergency services remain on constant alert. The respond quickly to a wide range of missions beyond SAF, for example, maintains a force at “minimal ca- Australia’s shores, from antiterrorism and interna- pabilities at a high readiness level” composed of pre- tional peace operations to regional assistance and packed medical and humanitarian supplies and two disaster relief missions. As part of the ongoing devel- to three medical teams (Hobson 2005). opment and improvement of significant capacities As a result, Singapore has emerged as a leader and to support this re-posturing, the Australian military pioneer in HA/DR operations, and the government has begun upgrading its amphibious force and is in continuously seeks to improve its capabilities. The the process of acquiring two new landing helicopter military, for instance, is currently exploring various dock (LHD) ships. No doubt, in addition to respond- ways to use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in di- ing to security challenges in the region, the LHDs will saster relief operations (Boey 2008). Singapore also serve, as the U.S. Navy’s LHDs already do, as highly hosted the ASEAN ARF seminar on humanitarian as- sistance and disaster relief, and has co-hosted with

Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for 122 International Cooperation t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s the United States since August 2000 the ARF Com- The personnel Singapore dispatched to Indone- bined Humanitarian Assistance Response Training sia included a medical team trained and equipped Course. The international community has taken to provide surgical, pediatric, and public health ser- note of Singapore’s emerging role in HA/DR opera- vices and advice, as well as combat engineers and tions and its tested expertise in the field. As a result, civil-military relations teams in order to facilitate nations around the world increasingly look to Singa- civil-military coordination (CMCoord). Singapore pore for training purposes, prompting the SCDF to opened up its air and naval installations to relief establish the Civil Defense Academy to train person- agencies and the UN, along with office space, ware- nel for HA/DR operations. The academy has trained houses, and other facilities used for logistical pur- rescue units from Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, Cape poses. Singapore also provided generators, a crane, Verde, Cyprus, Ghana, Jordan, Laos, Malaysia, the and ambulances (Singapore Ministry of Foreign Af- Maldives, Malta, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Tai- fairs 2005). The approximately fifteen hundred in- wan, among others. dividuals working on behalf of Singapore exhibited Singapore has also signed memoranda of under- professionalism and sensitivity. According to Lieu- standing (MoUs) with China and Japan in the hope tenant Colonel Leonard Tan, Singapore’s highly of facilitating joint training and unit exchanges with trained troops and relief personnel made a great both countries (Singapore Civil Defense Force). In effort to understand Indonesia’s unique needs and addition to engaging in bilateral joint training re- emphasized the importance of connecting in a sen- gimes, Singapore has also participated in past Co- sitive and appropriate manner with tsunami survi- bra Gold exercises, the annual multilateral training vors. For example, personnel never threw food off exercise managed by USPACOM and hosted by Thai- of trucks, and SAF soldiers were instructed to re- land that aims to improve regional interoperability move their sunglasses when speaking to an individ- and enhance cooperative working relationships. As ual victim (Tan 2006). noted in earlier sections of this study, Cobra Gold Singapore also sent relief aid and personnel to has played a central role in laying the foundation several tsunami-hit areas and/or relief coordination for effective multinationalHA/DR operations in the centers. In addition to the SAF liaison officer sta- Asia-Pacific region. tioned in Banda Aceh in Sumatra, Singapore sta- Surveying past HA/DR operations to which Sin- tioned an additional SAF liaison officer, complying gapore contributed helps as well to identify the with a PACOM-made request, at the headquarters of capabilities Singapore is likely to bring to future mul- Combined Support Force (CSF) 536 in Utapao, Thai- tilateral HA/DR efforts. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsu- land, serving as a coordinator and planner within nami disaster, in response to which the SAF engaged the Combined Coordination Center, or CCC (Koh on an unprecedented scale, provides perhaps the 2006). Singapore supplied Thailand with two Chi- best and most comprehensive example. All branch- nook helicopters and two Super Puma helicopters, es of the military were involved as well as the SCDF. as well as with an SCDF team, a forensic expert team, Soon after the tsunami hit the beaches of Indone- and other specialists. Singapore also provided sub- sia, the government of Singapore contacted the In- stantial aid to other nations struggling in the di- donesian government and established direct lines saster’s wake, including Sri Lanka and the Maldives. of communication. Following a day of coordination, Indeed, the government of Singapore, joined by the an air force C-130 loaded with relief supplies flew private sector and longstanding relief groups such to Indonesia, followed the next day by two Chinook as the Singapore Red Cross Society, Temasek Hold- and two Super Puma helicopters (Tan 2006). Singa- ings, the Salvation Army (Singapore), YMCA (Singa- pore later provided six Chinook helicopters, the use pore), Mercy Relief, Bright Hill Monastery, World of three helicopter landing ships, two mobile field Vision (Singapore), Habitat for Humanity (Singa- hospitals, and a mobile air traffic control tower ac- pore), and the Singapore Scout Association, donat- companied by two air traffic control coordination ed millions for disaster relief (Singapore Ministry of teams (Hobson 2005). Singapore also donated sub- Foreign Affairs 2005). NGOs also physically and ma- stantial relief and medical supplies (Singapore Min- terially engaged in HA/DR operations. For example, istry of Foreign Affairs 2005).

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the Singapore Sinhala Association built homes in manitarian assistance… Since Korea had assistance Sri Lanka (Yap 2006). from the international community, it’s right to give But the tsunami disaster is not the only major ca- something back” (Kang 2007). For example, among tastrophe that Singapore has responded to in recent the thirty countries that claimed membership in the years. When the 2005 earthquake struck Kashmir, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel- Singapore immediately sent a DART along with oth- opment (OECD) in 2004, the ROK contributed $7.6 per er medical specialists. NGOs based in Singapore and capita in overseas assistance, compared with the av- branches of the government and military were also erage of $80 per capita contributed by the twenty- heavily involved. So, too, the SAF has sent medical two-members of the OECD’s Development Assistance and engineer teams to central Afghanistan as part Committee (Korea Times 2005a). Furthermore, the of the New Zealand-run Provincial Reconstruction government only increased its assistance for victims Team (PRT), and the medical unit took the initia- of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami from the initial tive to establish a dental clinic in Bamiyan (Pereira offer of $600,000 following significant public pres- 2007). Moreover, in addition to operational involve- sure to do so (Korea Times 2005a). ment, Singapore, having established relations with Given the ROK’s elevated geopolitical stature, ROK Afghanistan in June 2006, has aided in the buttress- officials have begun to take note of the increased ing of Afghanistan’s academic institutions. Singa- pressure on Seoul to contribute and the country’s pore’s International Centre for Political Violence and heightened sense of international responsibilities. Terrorism Research, for example, helped establish During an IFPA workshop in 2006, for example, a the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies in Kabul, South Korean government official asserted that, Afghanistan’s first independent research institution since South Korea was now one of the largest econ- (Karzai n.d.). omies in the world, South Koreans were finally real- izing they need to be less parochial in their interests The Republic of Korea ROK( ) and government leaders were making a more con- Given its understandable focus on the stability of the certed effort to think globally (IFPA 2005). Similarly, Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea (ROK) tra- at the fifteenth-anniversary celebration of the Korea ditionally has maintained a rather arms-length at- International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in 2006, titude toward participating in international HA/DR the government expressed an interest in achieving operations, especially if the operations require mil- a level of overseas humanitarian assistance that ri- itary deployments outside the Asia-Pacific region. valed that of other developed countries. TheROK gov- As the ROK economy has grown to become the elev- ernment in fact confirmed in that same year its in- 24 ROK presently deploys enth-largest in the world, however, this attitude has tention to raise the ratio of assistance to national peacekeepers on the India- begun to change to one of welcoming greater partic- income from 0.06 percent to 0.1 percent by 2009 and Pakistan border and in Geor- gia, Lebanon, East Timor ipation in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions to 0.25 percent by 2015 (Lee 2006). Officials have gone and other conflict-prone both within the Asia-Pacific region and well beyond on to suggest that the government examine not just countries and regions. it (Ministry of National Defense of the ROK).24 the volume of assistance provided, but also the quali- The case for a greater effort on theROK ’s part was ty. In an interview with the Korea Herald, KOICA pres- recently put forward rather forcefully by UN Under- ident Shin Jang-bum made the point that “[while] we secretary General John Holmes, who spoke in 2007 cannot compete in quantity with advanced coun- at Kyung Hee University in Seoul in his capacity as tries with the limited amounts available for official humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordi- development assistance, we must instead differenti- nator at the UN. Noting that only 0.06 percent of ate ourselves by giving tailor-made and high-quality the ROK’s “income” was allocated for official devel- assistance to third countries” (Lee 2006). opment assistance, Holmes argued that Seoul, giv- With that goal in mind, the ROK has taken a num- en its current wealth, could clearly do much better ber of steps in recent years to improve its ability to (Lee 2006). “I’m here,” Holmes made clear, “to host contribute effectively to HA/DR missions overseas. donors to establish a new partnership in Asia for TheROK is a member of the Multinational Planning humanitarian assistance. Considering Korean eco- Augmentation Team (MPAT) managed by USPACOM, nomic power, Korea can play a significant role in hu- and it has participated in numerous MPAT-spon-

Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for 124 International Cooperation t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s sored and/or -supported HA/DR exercises, includ- the political turmoil that surrounded Kenya’s con- ing Cobra Gold (see MPAT). In 2006, the ROK was tentious elections (Yonhap News Agency 2008), and participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum when on May 2, 2008, after cyclone Nargis struck Myan- the ARF drafted a statement regarding the need for mar, South Korea responded by pledging $2.5 million better advance planning to deal with crisis manage- in aid and sending a thirty-member medical team ment and rapid response during disasters and emer- that was still active in Myanmar in late June (Cen- gencies. At that time, Seoul endorsed the ARF’s ef- ter for Excellence in Disaster Management and Hu- forts to develop standard operating procedures for manitarian Assistance 2008b). Finally, the ROK of- civil-military coordination during HA/DR operations, fered immediate assistance to China following the and to construct a database of military assets ASEAN May 2008 earthquake in Sichuan Province, sending members can in theory supply to assist overseas HA/ a disaster relief team, money, and aid packages con- DR (ChinaDaily.com 2006). In a similar vein, the ROK sisting of tents and blankets (Associated Press 2008). donated $5 million in 2006 and $2 million 2007 to Some of the equipment was delivered by ROK mil- the UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), itary cargo planes (Korea.net 2008). Dispatched by which was launched in March 2006 in order to expe- the National Emergency Management Agency, the dite urgently needed relief anywhere in the world. In forty-one-person disaster relief team received help the past two years, CERF effectively distributed $600 from two sniffer dogs and worked with state-of-the- million in funds to fifty-nine countries experiencing art technology, including digital endoscope camer- a variety of humanitarian crises (Park 2007). as (Agence France-Presse 2008). Furthermore, Pres- In response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, ident Lee Myung-bak visited Sichuan Province, the the ROK government eventually pledged $50 million first foreign president to tour the site of the devas- to aid tsunami victims, as well as to assist the ROK tation (Korea.net 2008). Ministry of Health and Welfare in dispatching medi- But examples of the ROK’s expanding ability to re- cal and epidemic control teams to the region. By Jan- spond to natural disasters swiftly and effectively can uary 2005, ROK medical teams were treating an av- also be found closer to home. In late 2007, for exam- erage of 410 patients per day (Yonhap News Agency ple, Seoul was faced with the need to contain with- 2005a), while ROK military aircraft and ships helped out delay an off-shore oil spill that posed a risk of to transport rescue teams and to resupply them in significant ecological damage. On December 7, 2007, the field (Yonhap News Agency 2005b). In response to the Hebei Spirit, a 146,000-ton oil tanker registered in the tsunami, the ROK also Major ROK Disaster Relief and Reconstruction Assistance pledged to donate $1 mil- Damage Assistance lion to the WHO fund for Casualties Displaced Damage Relief Assistance Reconstruction tsunami relief efforts, the 24 emergen- Earthquake cy rescuers $400,000 in cash seventh-largest donation in Iran, 16 reconstruc- $50,000 for res- $0.75 million for December 2003 by a country to WHO’s tsu- 41,000 deaths tion workers cue team house construction $34.35 million in nami-targeted aid budget 31 emergency bilateral assistance (Korea Times 2005b). Lat- Tsunami rescuers $2 million in cash $6 million in multi- er in 2006, following the in Indian Ocean, 32 medical staff $500,000 for res- lateral assistance December 2004 34 member facili- cue team $4.65 million for massive earthquake in In- ties recovery team $500,000 for NGO and oth- donesia, the ROK deployed 230,000 deaths 5 million $10.73 billion 96 volunteers NGO support er support $500,000 in cash a fifteen-member medical $200,000 for res- team to the disaster zone cue team Earthquake 4 pilots $500,000 in kind (Bang 2006). Additional- in Pakistan, 12 rescuers $450,000 for multi- ly, in 2008 the ROK pro- October 2005 10 medical staff lateral assistance 73,000 deaths 39 emergency $300,000 for vided $200,000, delivered 67,000 injured 280,000 $4-5 billion workers NGO support $2.05 million through the World Food Landslide Program and the UN De- in Philippines, 6,697 $500,0o0 in cash partment of Humanitari- February 2006 1,700 deaths evacuated $100,000 in kind $400,000 $500,000 in cash an Affairs, to Kenya during Earthquake 151,068 $100,000 for in Indonesia, 6,217 deaths houses 19 emergency re- rescue team May 2006 18,372 injured destroyed $3 billion lief workers $400,000 in kind $1 million Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for 125 International Cooperation t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s

Types of ROK Assistance for Disaster Relief and Reconstruction six new frigates (Ulsan-I class FFX) that will also be Amount Percentage capable of operating helicopters. Moreover, the na- Type of Assistance $US thousands (%) Remarks vy’s amphibious capability will improve significant- Training 4,749 6.8 53 training for two countries Two experts of IT and economy to ly once the new thirteen-thousand-ton LPX landing Dispatch of experts 78 0.1 Afghanistan ship Dokdo becomes fully operational and outfitted. Development studies 81 0.1 Design of a roundabout road in Arbil The ship is designed to carry seven hundred marines, Aid in kind 26,903 38 Support to three countries Infrastructure support 31,815 46 26 projects in 8 countries ten helicopters, ten main battle tanks, and two high- Partnerships with NGOs 1,313 2 13 projects in 3 countries speed air-cushioned landing craft, and two more LPX 16 projects for 15 countries and one ships in addition to the Dokdo are expected to en- Emergency relief 4,907 7 international organization ter service within the next few years. Together with the KHP systems, the KDX , and the heli- Hong Kong, collided with an 11,800-ton barge owned copter-compatible frigates, the LPXs will greatly en- by Samsung Heavy Industries five miles off the Kore- hance the ROK’s ability to support long term, over- an coast and ninety-three miles southwest of Seoul. seas HA/DR operations (Dorschner 2007). As a result of the accident, 10,500 tons of crude oil leaked into the Yellow Sea. TheROK government de- Japan clared the event a disaster and responded quick- The Japanese government’s involvement in HA/DR ly. The accident occurred at 7:15 a.m., and by noon operations began in 1953, when Japan contributed twelve coast guard patrol ships and three contami- to UN aid for Palestinian refugees (Watanabe). Since nation control ships had arrived on the scene (MO- then, Japan has steadily increased and broadened its MAF 2007). Over the course of the next three days, participation in the HA/DR realm, with funds allo- the ROK government mobilized thousands of troops, cated for humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping volunteers, and specialists, and an array of heavy still rising in recent years despite decreases in the equipment, including some one hundred ships, six total Official Development AssistanceODA ( ) budget. helicopters, and oil absorbing equipment (Guk jeong For example, Japan’s commitment to humanitari- 2007). The participation of a number of foreign re- an assistance in 2001 was $212 million out of ODA’s sponse teams (including one from Japan and one $9.8 billion. In 2004-05, humanitarian assistance from the EU) provided Seoul with a useful oppor- and post-conflict reconstruction aid was pegged tunity to improve as well its ability to coordinate a at $735 million, while the total ODA budget fell to multilateral and multinational operation. $7.8 billion (Watanabe). The Ministry of Foreign Af- Based on lessons learned from these and other fairs (MOFA), which oversees the government’s con- recent HA/DR responses, the ROK Ministry of Nation- tribution to international humanitarian assistance, al Defense (MND) is slowly taking steps to acquire has also adjusted its organizational structure to ex- additional capabilities that will boost the military’s pedite ODA decisions, including those related to for- utility and effectiveness in futureHA/DR operations, eign disaster assistance. In 2006, MOFA created the be they conducted close to home territory and fur- International Cooperation Bureau out of the Eco- ther afield. Such expansion is part of the MND’s De- nomic Cooperation Bureau and certain elements of fense Reform 2020 initiative, a program that seeks to MOFA’s Global Issues Department, and the Overseas modernize the military and prepare it for a broader Disaster Assistance Division (similar to OFDA in the range of off-peninsula operations. Platform acquisi- United States) was placed within the Internation- tions that could prove to be especially helpful in this al Cooperation Bureau. Additional adjustments are regard include the Korean Helicopter Program (KHP), planned for the coming year, all of which will lend a $1.38 billion partnership between EADS Eurocop- HA/DR programming a higher profile. ter and Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), focused at Japanese disaster relief teams, trained and man- present on developing an eight-ton utility helicopter. aged by the Japan International Cooperation Agency So, too, the ROK Navy is undergoing a massive over- (JICA) and dispatched by MOFA, are critical to Japan’s haul, steadily building up a more robust blue-water response capabilities. These are pre-registered, vol- capability. By 2015, the navy plans to concentrate unteer-based civilian teams of medical and search- the fleet around thirteen KDX destroyers, each ca- and-rescue (SAR) professionals who are prepared to pable of operating two helicopters, as well as at least

Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for 126 International Cooperation t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s be dispatched anywhere in the world within forty- units to call upon in times of crisis, they can request eight hours. JICA’s disaster relief program divides the support from the nation’s self-defense forces. Japan’s teams into three types: 1) rescue teams, to search for SDF averaged well over eight hundred domestic di- missing people, rescue victims, and provide first aid; saster relief operations annually from 2002 to 2007, 2) medical teams; and 3) non-medical expert teams, demonstrating how often it assists local responders often including engineers or other specialists who with emergency transportation, search and rescue can assist with stopgap measures to help protect the operations, and firefighting activities. population and speed recovery, and whose expertise It was only in 1996 that disaster relief support ac- corresponds to specific types of disasters. tivities were first designated as one of three primary Because of post-war security frameworks and le- roles for the SDF. SDF involvement in international gal considerations, Japan’s involvement in HA/DR op- disaster relief operations will no doubt continue and erations was long limited primarily to responding will likely grow over time, not only because politi- to natural disasters. The 1987 law governing the de- cians and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) want to see ployment of disaster relief teams, formerly known this happen, but also because the public increasing- as the Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Di- ly approves of this trend. Cabinet Office polls from saster Relief Teams (or the JDR Law), set forth the 1991, 1998, and 2006 tested public support for the conditions under which Japan could provide assis- SDF’s activities in international disaster relief, dem- tance in an international HA/DR setting and lim- onstrating a growth in support from about 54 per- ited as well the scale and scope of that assistance. cent in 1991 to over 90 percent in 2006. Opposition In 1992, however, the Japanese government passed dropped from just over 30 percent to less than 6 per- the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Na- cent (Yoshizaki 2006). As a result, the MOD and SDF tions Peacekeeping Operations (the so-called PKO have been rigorously studying CMCoord issues over Law), enabling Japan to participate in UN peace- the past few years, knowing civil-military coordina- keeping and international humanitarian relief op- tion is crucial to effectiveHA/DR operations. The two erations. More importantly for the purposes of this most recent (annual) Tokyo Defense Fo- 25 The annual Tokyo Defense Forum involves study, the law also permits Japan for the first time rum conferences, for example, were fo- military and defense officials from roughly two dozen countries (including Australia, Cam- to deploy SDF forces under special circumstances cused exclusively on CMCoord and di- bodia, Canada, China, India, Pakistan, Korea, 25 and arrangements (Watanabe). Then, in 2003, Japan saster relief operations. The same was Russia, the United States), as well as represen- revised the Official Development Assistance Char- true for the Asia Pacific Security Semi- tatives from the UN OCHA, the European Union, ter, originally approved by the Cabinet in 1992, to in- nar hosted in 2005 by Japan’s National and the ASEAN Secretariat. See Japan Minis- try of Defense (2006) for a summary of the Elev- clude post-conflict humanitarian relief operations. Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), as enth Tokyo Defense Forum in October 2006. The charter reads, “The objectives of Japan’sODA are well as for recent initiatives organized to contribute to the peace and development of the by Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF). In this international community, and thereby to help en- context, Japan’s SDF is creating a new central read- sure Japan’s own security and prosperity” (Ministry iness force as part of the GSDF that would presum- of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2003). ably speed an overseas deployment. An interesting Working within the political constraints noted point from an alliance perspective is that this new above, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have none- rapid reaction force will eventually be co-located theless proved themselves to be well equipped to with U.S. military personnel at Camp Zama in Ja- tackle some of the world’s most complex HA/DR op- pan, after new facilities are constructed a few years erations. The SDF as a whole has gained consider- from now, offering unique U.S.-Japanese coordina- able experience executing missions at home when tion opportunities. responding to the many domestic natural disasters Recent diplomatic overtures and defense acqui- that occur yearly in Japan. Emergency services are sitions suggest that Japan is looking to expand its highly centralized in Japan, meaning that local po- role in international disaster relief even further. For lice and fire department personnel operate under a example, in March 2007, Japan and Australia signed national administrative and policy-making umbrel- the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Co- la. Although Japan’s forty-seven prefecture govern- operation. The document mentions various aspects ments do not have their own national guard-type of human security multiple times throughout the

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text, including disaster relief. One section states, “Ja- operations in 2001, largely at the initiative of MOFA, pan and Australia will also strengthen their coop- and it offers a system to provide emergency relief in eration through the United Nations and other in- natural disasters and refugee situations more quick- ternational and regional organizations and through ly and efficiently than had previously been possible. activities such as peacekeeping and humanitarian re- It serves as a platform for NGOs to mobilize and to lief operations” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan carry out immediate relief activities, and it provides 2007a). Japan is also readying its navy for the entry a way for these NGOs to pool resources for initial as- of its new helicopter-carrying . Beginning sessments at a disaster site and for operational- and in 2009, four new 13,500-ton DDH Hyuga-class ships policy-oriented interaction with UN agencies and will come into service. Japan’s new flagships, which international organizations. Its activities are fund- many consider similar to a light carrier or an am- ed primarily through support from the government phibious assault ship because of their flat-top con- and, to a smaller extent, by contributions from cor- figuration and size, include theFCS -3, a smaller vari- porations and individuals. ant of the AEGIS radar system, and can service up Japan Platform members have provided assis- to eleven aircraft. The Hyuga-class destroyer, set to tance in Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, Liberia, Afghanistan, replace the Haruna-class and Shirane-class destroy- and Iraq, as well as during the Indian Ocean tsuna- ers, is armed with surface-to-air missiles, ASW tor- mi. Their ability to organize collectively in close as- pedoes, and two Phalanx air defense systems (Min- sociation with MOFA has been critical to improving nick 2007). The expansion of theSDF ’s naval fleet to their overall capabilities, in particular their capacity include more sophisticated ships capable of launch- to respond quickly. This collective approach, however, ing multiple aircraft, thereby enhancing its air capa- also means that a consensus is often hard to achieve bilities over greater distances, indicates an interest among its members with regard to CMCoord and the in increasing SDF participation in international and SDF. A number of Japanese NGOs are ideologically expeditionary-minded operations. opposed to SDF involvement in missions overseas, Japanese NGOs also engage in both domestic and whatever their configuration, which limits the de- international HA/DR. The primary mechanism by gree of direct dialogue between Japan Platform and which Japanese NGOs participate in overseas disas- the SDF. This is problematic because most Japanese ter relief missions is through Japan Platform and its NGOs possess limited financial and logistical strength, NGO unit, consisting of about twenty-four participat- and some form of partnership with the SDF in terms ing NGOs, such as Peace Winds Japan, Japan Mine Ac- of logistics and communications could be particu- tion Service, the Japanese Red Cross Society, JEN, and larly helpful to Japanese civilian actors. The leader- Shanti Volunteer Association. Japan Platform began ship at Japan Platform is trying to bridge this gap by Structure of Japan Platform working with MOFA, the MOD, and the beneficiaries (refugees, afflicted people) SDF to identify certain specific disas- ter relief scenarios that would be least controversial and hence could bene- Japan Platform (JPF) fit in the nearer-term from closer civ- government Board of Directors business community ministry of Japan Business Federation il-military and interagency coordina- foreign affairs Standing Committee private corporation tion and cooperation. decide on activities to promote To provide a sense of scale re- intellectual circle private foundations area studies consortium Japan Foundation Center garding some of the Japanese gov- Secretariat ernment’s recent relief contribu- local governments NGO unit citizens, students tions, Japan responded to the tsunami Hiroshima prefecture (25 organizations) student networks implementation of by pledging $540 million, donating emergency relief twenty thousand tons of rice, sending international aid organizations mass media (United Nations) media advisory panel twelve medical and relief teams, and deploying its largest-ever disaster re- aid communities in Japan and abroad lief contingent. The Japan Defense Agency (or JDA, before it became the

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MOD in 2007) and the SDF quickly understood the ed swiftly to support South Korea in its fight to min- scope of the U.S. military response to the tsunami di- imize the damage, and Japan participated in this saster as it was being ramped up in Honolulu, since response by dispatching a team of seven experts a Japanese liaison officer is permanently stationed to advise South Korea on oil removal. Additional- at PACOM. The United States was seeking Japanese ly, Japan provided key supplies and equipment, in- participation in the operation, and the JDA was keen cluding oil-absorbents (Ministry of Foreign Affairs to join. TheJDA could immediately order three Mari- of Japan 2007b). time Self-Defense Force (MSDF) ships, which were in On May 2, 2008, when tropical cyclone Nargis dec- the region already, to assist with rescue operations, imated southwestern Myanmar (affecting over two but it needed a request from the affected country to million people one way or another), Japan was also enable deployment within sovereign borders, and quick to respond with both financial and material as- that required help from MOFA. sistance (Center for Excellence in Disaster Manage- In addition, the SDF could not be dispatched with- ment and Humanitarian Assistance 2008c), eventu- out a request to the JDA chief by the foreign minister, ally pledging some $12.7 million in relief aid (Center as per Japan’s JDR Law. In the end, more than sixteen for Excellence in Disaster Management and Human- hundred SDF personnel were sent to the affected re- itarian Assistance 2008b). Days after the cyclone hit gion, including three senior military officers (from Myanmar’s coast, moreover, Japan sent supplies to the Joint Staff Office) tasked with helping to organize Myanmar, such as tents and electric generators (Min- the aid effort on the ground. A C-130 cargo plane was istry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2008a). On May 11, also sent to Indonesia with forty SDF personnel to Japan sent a second batch of supplies consisting of transport relief supplies. To coordinate with the U.S. blankets, plastic sheeting, and jerry cans. A third de- military and other governments in the operation, Ja- livery arrived on May 17, and Myanmar received addi- pan sent about twenty individuals to the regional op- tional blankets, power generators, and water tanks erating headquarters at Utapao, Thailand. Similarly, (JICA 2008a). In addition to supplies and financial in response to the Pakistan earthquake, Japan provid- aid, Japan also sent a medical team. The JDR-spon- ed about $20 million in emergency grant assistance sored medical team, which consisted of four doc- and dispatched four SDF helicopters, two C-130 car- tors, seven nurses, one pharmacist, five medical co- go planes, and over one hundred SDF personnel to ordinators, and five logistical coordinators, treated help with relief deliveries, among other assistance. twelve hundred patients in Labutta, which is locat- The government also followed up with a $100 million ed in the southern region of the Irrawaddy district. loan for recovery and rehabilitation efforts. When the medical team returned to Japan, it left be- Since its involvement in Southeast Asia and Pak- hind equipment that could be used by other medi- istan, Japan has made significant contributions to cal professionals still operating in the country (Min- several other disaster relief operations. It was quick istry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2008b). to respond, for example, to the December 2007 oil Japan’s tsunami relief efforts also benefited great- spill off the coast of South Korea caused by the colli- ly from JICA’s global infrastructure, which proved sion of the Hong Kong-registered tanker, Hebei Spirit, instrumental in aiding Japanese planes en route to and an 11,800-ton barge owned by Samsung Heavy Myanmar. Japanese planes delivering supplies load- Industries, which was being towed at the time by a ed their cargo at a permanent JDR-arranged base fa- tugboat. As noted earlier, the accident caused 10,500 cility in Singapore (JICA 2008b). JICA also maintains tons of crude oil to leak into the Yellow Sea, thereby an office in Myanmar, staffed by more than thirty creating an ecological disaster of major proportions. professionals charged with coordinating coopera- Kim Jong-sik, an official with the ROK’s Ministry of tive humanitarian efforts (JICA 2008a). Although the Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, expressed the anxi- medical team redeployed back home in June 2008, ety many Koreans harbored when he professed to a Japan remains engaged, and is working through a French news agency, “We are worried about an eco- number of NGOs, such as the UN Children’s Fund, logical disaster…If we fail to contain the spread, it the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refu- is feared [it will] inflict serious damage to the coast” gees, and the World Food Program (Ministry of For- (BBC News 2007). The international community act- eign Affairs of Japan 2008c).

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Japan also aided China after the devastating May more than $3 billion budget intended for aid. Fur- 2008 earthquake in Sichuan Province. With over six- thermore, on specific interagency assignments,CIDA ty thousand confirmed dead, tens of thousands more often controls the largest budget and serves as the missing, and hundreds of thousands injured, this principal facilitator and distributor of Canada’s for- particular earthquake remains one of the most dev- eign assistance. For example, in addition to CIDA’s astating in China’s recent memory. Japan’s chief gov- contribution to feed 1.3 million victims of the 2004 ernment spokesman, Nobutaka Machimura, spoke Indian Ocean tsunami through the WFP and the in- days after the earthquake occurred to announce that ternational community, CIDA also coordinated aid China had requested assistance and that Japan was and several humanitarian groups during the recon- ready to help. The firstJDR team arrived in China on struction process, managing $383 million of Canada’s May 15, just three days after the event, and it included total $425 million commitment (CIDA 2008). specialists from the Fire and Disaster Management Canada often employs its military, the Canadi- Agency, the National Police Agency, the Coast Guard, an Forces (CF), to execute HA/DR operations over- and the Foreign Ministry, as well as medical profes- seas. The CF proves well equipped to conduct such sionals (International Herald Tribune 2008). Perhaps operations and highly experienced in the full spec- more significantly, this team was the first foreign -as trum of HA/DR efforts, performing missions with sistance team China permitted to enter the coun- professionalism and demonstrating a high level of try (Toy 2008). A second team, consisting of twenty- competency. TheCF ’s long track record includes en- nine specialists, arrived in China shortly thereafter gagement in , Haiti, Bosnia, Italy, and Sri to complement the first team, consisting of thirty- Lanka. Following a severe hurricane season in the one specialists, already on the ground (JICA 2008c). United States, the CF provided Florida with assis- In addition to the JDR teams, Japan also sent a med- tance (National Defense and the Canadian Forces ical team of twenty-three doctors, nurses, pharma- 1998). At present, the military remains committed cists, and medical coordinators (JICA 2008d). Aside to assisting NATO forces in Afghanistan, and Cana- from sending personnel, Japan donated as well large da’s Expeditionary Force Command (EFC) is active- volumes of relief supplies, including seven hundred ly involved in reconstruction efforts. In August 2005, tents provided by JICA in addition to the one hundred Canada assumed command of 330 staff members supplied by the MOD and SDF (People’s Daily Online as part of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction 2008). JICA also provided blankets, plastic sheeting, Team (PRT). The team, in concert with twenty-five sleeping mats, generators, water purification equip- other PRTs in Afghanistan, aims to provide secu- ment, and water cans (JICA 2008c). Finally, Japan do- rity, improve governance, and support sustainable nated some $1.7 million in emergency grants to the development projects – civil support missions that China-directed efforts of the International Federa- require skills and capabilities similar to those need- tion of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (Min- ed for HA/DR operations (Foreign Affairs and Inter- istry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2008d). national Trade Canada 2005). Canada’s Disaster Assistance Response Team Canada (DART), which maintains a troop of approximately In the world of HA/DR operations, Canada retains two hundred Canadian soldiers and specialists avail- a multitude of capabilities and considerable expe- able to respond to a disaster occurring anywhere rience in the field resulting from its involvement in in the world, constitutes the CF’s premier unit ded- both domestic emergency situations and its respons- icated to tackling the most difficult HA/DR opera- es to disasters overseas. On the international front, tions. DART engages in HA/DR operations by first the Canadian International Development Agency dispatching a twelve-person reconnaissance team. (CIDA), formed in 1968 with the objective of helping Once committed, DART’s headquarters, composed to reduce global poverty, serves as Canada’s princi- of about forty-five staff members, draws upon its en- pal distributor of aid and as a key interagency coor- gineer, medical, and defense and security platoons, dinator. Canada allocates the largest percentage of each consisting of approximately forty professionals, its total international aid contribution to CIDA. In and its twenty-person logistics platoon, to provide FY 2005-06, CIDA received 78 percent of Canada’s aid and support in a disaster area. DART, which is

Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for 130 International Cooperation t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s based out of Canadian Forces Base Trenton in Ontar- 7,620 medical patients, transported approximately io, can sustain itself on assignment in a disaster area 70,000 individuals across a river to safety, and helped for up to forty days. Established in 1996 in response to repair local infrastructure damaged caused by to the Rwanda genocide, DART receives an annual the disaster (CBC News 2005). Later on, in the fall of budget of $500,000 as well as additional funding for 2005, Canada deployed DART to Pakistan to aid in specific missions, such as the $15 million supplemen- that relief effort, distributing in a period of less than tal to support its work in Turkey in 1999. When DART two months some five hundred tons of humanitari- enters a disaster area, the team works to provide an aid supplies. The team also purified and distrib- basic medical care (the team can serve 250 outpa- uted more than 3 million liters of water and treated tients and 10 inpatients per day as well as provide a more than 11,000 patients for a variety of medical lab, a pharmacy, preventive care, and limited obstet- conditions (Foreign Affairs and International Trade rics and hydration services); produce safe drinking Canada 2007). water (the team can produce fifty thousand liters of In addition to the HA/DR assets provided by the water per day); repair basic infrastructure; and im- government and the CF, other facilitators of human- prove communications (CBC News 2005). itarian assistance, such as the Canadian Red Cross Canada’s rapid-response team has proven itself (CRC), greatly bolster Canada’s capabilities. TheCRC capable of successfully handling difficult missions. has participated in many disaster relief operations When Canada sent a DART contingency to Serdivan, and crises overseas, including emergencies in Mo- Turkey, to help the Turkish people recover from the zambique and El Salvador, as well as aiding the re- aftermath of the August 1999 earthquake that killed lief efforts in the United States following hurricane over ten thousand people and caused immense in- Katrina. In recent months, the CRC has become in- frastructure damage, the DART staff treated more volved in numerous relief efforts, including those re- than 5,000 patients, produced more than 2.5 million lated to cyclones striking Eastern Africa, the Chadian liters of purified water, helped to repair damaged refugee crisis, the China snow disaster, the Darfur infrastructure, and provided temporary immediate crisis in Sudan, and floods in Bangladesh. In order shelter to displaced persons (National Defense and to support CRC efforts, the organization created the the Canadian Forces 2007). Responding to the 2004 Rapid Response Centre’s Emergency Operations Sup- Indian Ocean tsunami, DART personnel established port Centre (EOSC) in October 1999 to help facili- a base in Ampara, Sri Lanka, and treated more than tate and deliver emergency relief services globally. Chain of Command for Disaster Relief within Canadian Forces Minister National Defense

Chief of the Defense Staff

Vice Chief of the Defense Staff Strategic Environment Chiefs Dir, Joint Staff Deputy Chief Chief of the Chief of the Land Staff Maritime Staff Op Special Operation Group Canada Command Defense Staff support Deputy Minister Chief of the DComd CANCOM JTF 2 National Defense Air Staff JNBCD Coy HQ staff Canadian Expeditionary Joint Air TF 6 regional HQs JATF Forces Command

SOF Aviation Assistant Deputy J-Staff Ministers SOF Trg Unit Mission Specific Task Forces Assistant Deputy Minister SOF CSS Unit (human resources- Standing Contingency military) Task Forces SOF Reserves DART

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The EOSC, funded by CIDA’s International Human- ally help to create new networks for even wider co- itarian Assistance Program, offers training cours- operation. Any assessment of cooperative ties and es for international relief workers and maintains a platforms that might be more fully developed as a warehouse filled with disaster relief supplies, ready means to advance disaster preparedness and set in to be shipped anywhere in the world within twen- place better response options would therefore be in- ty-four hours. EOSC also provides logistical support complete without at least a cursory reference to In- for CIDA assessment teams by operating a database dia’s and China’s perspectives on these matters. cataloguing the resources available to Canada in spe- Having acquired substantial experience in the cific countries that remain susceptible to natural di- HA/DR realm based on years of managing a host of sasters (Canadian Red Cross 2006). domestic disasters, India, for example, has become TheCRC also participates in several forums ded- a more frequent contributor to foreign disaster re- icated to resolving challenges associated with pro- lief efforts, at least at the regional level. Along with viding disaster relief. One such forum is the Policy Australia, the United States, and Japan, India was Action Group on Emergency Response, which aims a founding member of the core group of nations to improve information sharing and analysis regard- that took the lead in organizing the international re- ing the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Several sponse to the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. NGOs and government agencies have joined the CRC A few months later, in July 2005, New Delhi joined in this forum to create a network of partners. Some Washington in launching the U.S.-India Disaster Re- of the primary participants include Alternatives, Ca- lief Initiative, which aims to provide a framework for nadian Foodgrains Bank, Canadian Lutheran’s World the two nations to “strengthen their military capa- Relief, Canadian Red Cross, CARE Canada, Médecins bilities to respond effectively to future disasters by Sans Frontières Canada, Mennonite Central Com- conducting joint and combined military exercises” mittee, Oxfam Canada, Save the Children Canada, (U.S. Department of State 2005). Since then, among the Canadian Centre for International Studies and other efforts, India has deployed ships from the In- Cooperation, World Vision Canada, the CIDA’s In- dian navy with relief supplies and other assistance ternational Humanitarian Assistance Program, and to Bangladesh in November 2007 after cyclone Sidre the Department of Foreign Affairs and Internation- and to Myanmar in May 2008 after cyclone Nargis. al Trade’s Humanitarian Affairs Section (Canadian Current plans to expand its naval capacity over the Red Cross 2006). next several years, to include the activation of a re- furbished Russian , the acquisition of A Final Note on India and China ASW and troop transport helicopters, the construc- The five countries reviewed above –Australia, Singa- tion of an indigenously developed carrier, and the pore, the ROK, Japan, and Canada – stand out as the fielding of new long-range patrol boats and mari- most likely non-European national-level partners time surveillance aircraft, should substantially im- for the United States in the organization and exe- prove India’s overall response capability, as well as cution of joint HA/DR operations, whether they are its ability to contribute usefully to multilateral HA/ conducted on a bilateral, trilateral, or broader mul- DR missions (India Defence 2007a, 2007b). Expand- tilateral basis. This is especially true with respect to ing U.S.-Indian naval cooperation, which has encom- operations in the Asia-Pacific region, though Can- passed multilateral exercises in the Bay of Bengal ada has partnered with the United States (and will to which Australia, Singapore, and Japan have also likely do so again) on a more global level, including, contributed, should provide a practical framework not surprisingly, in North and South America. That for exercises and training regimes that have an HA/ said, a number of countries of rising strategic impor- DR component (Herman 2007). tance – most notably, India and China – are emerg- In time, China’s newfound interest in HA/DR ing as more prominent players in regional HA/DR collaboration could have an even more profound planning activities, and future bilateral and multi- impact, especially with respect to the potential pro- lateral cooperation with these – and possibly other vision of Chinese military support to relief opera- countries that profess a growing interest in boosting tions overseas. Until quite recently, authorities in local capabilities in the HA/DR arena – may eventu- Beijing have consistently opposed the deployment

Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for 132 International Cooperation t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) units in support finally got under way in 2005 with a U.S. delegation of foreign HA/DR missions, despite the fact that the visiting Chengdu. This led to at least two additional PLA, like its Indian counterpart, has a long and quite exchanges, including a 2006 visit by PLA officers to extensive history of responding to domestic disas- U.S. Army Pacific USARPAC( ) headquar- 26 China provided relief supplies and cash to- ters.26 Prompted perhaps by its own experience as a ters in Hawaii and a 2007 return visit to taling some $83.1 million to the countries af- fected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, some recipient of quite useful foreign military assistance China by the American side. According $6.2 million to Pakistan after the 2005 earth- after the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, as well as to U.S. military officers involved in the quake, and some $11 million to Myanmar af- by a growing recognition that improving its capac- meetings, PLA participants have been ter cyclone Nargis. On the other hand, it did ity to provide such assistance could boost its dip- quite positive about future Chinese mil- not offer to send any PLA ships (which now in- clude a Type 920 hospital ship) or any other mil- lomatic profile in the region and pave the way to itary support (when requested) for in- itary units that have gained some experience broader military cooperation with other nations on ternational relief efforts, support that over the years in disaster relief operations by a relatively non-controversial set of activities, Chi- could include the dispatch of a special participating in responses to disasters within China. Since the 2004 tsunami relief effort, how- na has begun to change its tune. At a mid-June 2008 PLA urban rescue team that was demon- ever, Chinese authorities, including senior PLA workshop in Shijiazhuang, China, sponsored by the strated for the American visitors during commanders, have begun to question this tra- PLA’s Field Army Commanding Academy, for exam- the discussions held in China. Chinese ditional reluctance to deploy military forces in support of foreign HA/DR missions, fearing that ple, Chinese officials floated the idea of developing interest in collaborating in the HA/DR it may give the impression that China is unwill- SOPs for organizing and coordinating military sup- arena was also confirmed in talks held ing to do all that it can to assist neighboring port for disaster relief operations by the armed forc- in Beijing in April 2007 between an IFPA countries in the throes of a humanitarian cri- es of the ASEAN member states, China, Japan, and delegation and various PLA experts, as sis. So, too, in view of the goodwill such deploy- ments have generated for the United States and the ROK, or the so-called “10 plus 3” countries (Xin- part of the field research for this study other countries that have provided military sup- hua News Agency 2008). At approximately the same (interview 2007a, 2007b). port to foreign HA/DR missions, officials in Bei- time, the foreign ministers of China, South Korea, Clearly, given the broad maritime ex- jing increasingly appear to recognize that such support could play an important role in China’s and Japan agreed at a meeting in Tokyo on the need panses of the Asian-Pacific region, both broader diplomatic initiatives in the region. to develop a mechanism to encourage trilateral co- Sino-American and U.S.-Indian cooper- operation on disaster prevention and management. ation on HA/DR matters could be advanced as well Toward that end, senior officials from the disaster by the participation of China and India in the Glob- management agencies of all three countries are ex- al Maritime Partnership (GMP) championed by the pected to meet soon to discuss concrete measures U.S. Navy (discussed in chapter 3). The HA/DR mis- for closer cooperation, including standing arrange- sion area, it will be recalled, has been singled out in ments for the dispatch of rescue teams to assist one the Navy’s New Maritime Strategy as an ideal set of another in the event of an earthquake, typhoon, or activities around which to build GMP initiatives, and similar calamity (Chosun Ilbo 2008). there is no denying that China and India could use- China’s efforts to encourage HA/DR collabora- fully pursue HA/DR-relevant training and exercises, tion at the 10-plus-3 and trilateral levels could get a should they wish to do so, via a GMP format as they welcome boost as well from ongoing dialogues be- field more robust naval capabilities. Obviously, given tween China and the United States on HA/DR les- the rising level of U.S.-Indian naval cooperation al- sons learned and potential areas for bilateral col- ready in train, this will be easier for India to do than laboration. Initial discussions in this vein apparently it will be for China, and, as noted above, first steps were begun in 1998 when Presidents Clinton and Ji- in this direction have already been taken. The more ang Zemin agreed that the PLA and the U.S. military limited character of Sino-American naval cooper- should “share information and discuss issues relat- ation and the PLA’s cautious approach to GMP col- ed to their respective experiences in the areas of hu- laboration almost certainly guarantee slower prog- manitarian assistance and disaster relief ” as part of a ress on this particular front. That said, when briefed broader series of military-to-military exchanges (PRC in 2007 on the GMP by U.S. Admiral Michael Mullen, Embassy in the United States 1998). Sino-American then the chief of naval operations, the commander cooperation on the HA/DR front was put on hold (as of the PLA Navy (PLAN), Vice Admiral Wu Shengli, ex- were military exchanges overall) following the May pressed interest in further discussions on how Chi- 1999 bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade and na might usefully participate. Future Navy and PLAN the March 2001 EP-3/F-8 incident, but the program exchanges on the GMP, therefore, could provide an

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especially productive platform from which to pro- but they need to be institutionalized and accorded mote Chinese readiness to deploy military forces in higher priority. support of bilateral and multilateral HA/DR opera- Of course, the absence of a NATO-like security or- tions (McVadon forthcoming). ganization in the Asian-Pacific region would make Conclusion a similar initiative harder to advance with Ameri- ca’s Asian-Pacific friends and allies, but even here Based on the analysis set forth in this chapter, much there are signs of progress on which to build. As could and should be done to improve U.S. collabo- mentioned earlier in this chapter, at the fifteenth- ration with key foreign partners, including the UN, anniversary meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum NATO, the EU, ASEAN, and longstanding allies, as in July 2008, the foreign ministers of the member well as emerging regional powers. For example, if states, which include the United States, agreed on the roadblocks that now prevent closer NATO-EU col- the need to use the ARF framework to better coor- laboration in the HA/DR arena could be removed dinate their responses to regional disasters, such as (roadblocks that are largely rooted in the EU dis- cyclone Nargis and the Sichuan earthquake. More pute over allowing Turkey some level of participation specifically, they agreed to “explore the feasibility” in the European Defense Agency, or EDA),27 Ameri- of creating an ARF mechanism for promoting HA/ ca’s ability to deploy its national assets and exper- DR civil-military coordination, and they endorsed a 27 For useful background on the nature of tise in concert with both organizations proposal by the Philippines and the United States this dispute and its impact on NATO-EU se- would be vastly improved. Whether or curity collaboration, see Hall (2008). to conduct an ARF-wide disaster relief exercise be- not a solution to the EDA problem can fore the ARF’s 2009 ministerial meeting (Tang 2008). be found remains to be seen, but a more vigorous In conjunction with various bilateral and trilater- U.S. diplomatic effort to help broker such a solution al efforts already supported by the United States to – and thereby open the door to broader NATO-EU-U.S. help encourage regional collaboration, these new cooperation on HA/DR and other civil support ac- ARF initiatives could be of immense value in help- tivities – would certainly seem appropriate. Failing ing to build HA/DR capabilities – including steps that, a more regular series of exchanges on national to enhance disaster preparedness and prevention HA/DR policies, procedures, and capability needs at – in a part of the world where they are still sore- the NATO level alone would likely lead to improved ly needed. transatlantic coordination and collaboration. Inter- mittent dialogues along these lines have been held,

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Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for 140 International Cooperation c6hapter Summary Conclusions & Recommendations

Given the prospect of more frequent foreign disas- address the grievances that often lie at the heart of ters and humanitarian crises in the years ahead, and insurgencies and fuel the discontent of communi- considering the astronomical costs they could im- ties on which terrorists depend and prey (U.S. De- pose – approaching $300 billion per year by 2050 partment of Defense 2008). – unless major steps are taken to reduce current vul- In his July 15, 2008, speech, Secretary Gates also nerabilities, military support for HA/DR operations warned against what he described as a “creeping will remain a key component of American diploma- militarization” of American foreign policy, as the cy and national security planning for some time to U.S. military becomes more involved in a range of come. Apart from their very specific roles in disas- activities overseas that were viewed in the past as ter prevention and management, moreover, HA/DR “the exclusive province of civilian agencies and or- planning and training initiatives undertaken by DoD ganizations.” Faced with this trend, it is perhaps and the military services should help as well to de- understandable, he went on to suggest, that civil- fine an overarching national security strategy better ian experts at the State Department and USAID, for suited to the challenges of the twenty-first century example, might express resentment over the larger than relying on the direct application of military role now being assumed by America’s armed forces force alone. This is especially true with respect to in stability operations and the civil support realm the challenges of global terrorism, irregular warfare, overall, including HA/DR operations. But civil-mil- and other less traditional threats, given the empha- itary discord based on the military’s perceived in- sis of HA/DR initiatives on CMCoord, civil support trusion into the civil sector, he added, need not and missions, and both interagency and multilateral col- should not be the end result, so long as there is ef- laboration. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates fective coordination between the two communities stressed in a speech to the U.S. Global Leadership and a “clear understanding…of how they fit, or in Campaign on July 15, 2008, America and its friends some cases don’t fit, together.” In addition, Secretary and allies “cannot kill or capture [their] way to vic- Gates pointed to the new interagency structure of tory” in the battles against transnational terrorists SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM – and to the civil-support and other extremists, many of whom find safe ha- focus of their current operations – as examples of vens and pools of willing recruits in failed or failing the kind of collaborative organization and program- states (which are often the result, it might be added, ming that are needed in today’s world where “the of natural or man-made disasters.) What is needed, lines separating war, peace, diplomacy, and devel- he went on to suggest, is a more integrated strategic opment have become more blurred, and no longer approach that pulls together military, civilian, gov- fit the neat organizational charts of the twentieth ernmental, private sector, national, and internation- century.” He didn’t explicitly say so, but an obvious al capabilities in a combined, multifaceted effort to implication of his statements is that the efforts now

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being made by DoD, the military services, and the civil and military HA/DR communities, each of the COCOMs – and examined in-depth throughout this chapters in this study identified a number of poli- study – to prepare for and contribute more effective- cy and organizational reforms, operational adjust- ly to foreign disaster relief and humanitarian assis- ments, and capability developments that, if adopted, tance missions are entirely consistent with and, to could lead to more cost-effectiveHA/DR operations some extent, leading this shift toward a new par- in the future. At this point, repeating each and every adigm in civil-military relations to address future recommendation would be unnecessarily tedious security risks. and duplicative. What follows, therefore, is a sum- A key conclusion to draw from this study, there- mary and synthesis of several of the study’s more fore, is that continued debate across the civil-mil- important and broadly applicable findings and pol- itary divide over who should or shouldn’t take the icy suggestions. lead in any particular HA/DR mission will miss the main point – namely, that both civil and military Process for Requesting Military Aid responders have much to contribute, and that the Clearly, current efforts to reform and institution- primary question to answer is how their joint contri- alize the State-DoD process for requesting mil- butions can be maximized in the context of a com- itary support in the event of a foreign disaster mon effort, not who has (or should have) the leading must be sustained. This is the best way to make role. Based on the analyses presented in the pre- sure that future requests are in fact necessary ceding chapters, it also safe to conclude that the and properly framed, and that the support re- answer to this question rests as much on the rela- quested is provided in as expeditious a manner tionships that have been (or will be) built between as possible. Operationally, this also means that the civil and military HA/DR communities – and the dual-track Executive Secretariat and letter on the insight these ties provide each communi- of commitment process discussed in chapter 2 ty into the strengths and weaknesses of the other should be retained in order to provide prompt – as on the actual skills and capabilities that either coverage across the full spectrum of small-, me- can bring to bear on a specific HA/DR-related task. dium-, and large-scale disasters. At the same If the right relationships can be established and time, given the current emphasis on not undu- maintained between civil and military responders ly taxing DoD agencies and military units that by means of regular and realistic joint training, ex- may already be overstretched, it would be use- ercises, and education, then the issue of “who does ful as well to find a way factor into the official what when” will become far less compelling. Hence, decision process a better sense for how the pri- as emphasized in chapter 4, creating more opportu- vate sector might also be able to contribute to nities to train, exercise, and learn together in ways a disaster response beyond its traditional sup- that attract robust interagency, public-private, mul- port in the air- and sealift sectors. tilateral, and multinational participation should be viewed by the entire HA/DR community as perhaps Local Capacity Building the single most important step it could take to make Apart from emergency relief once disaster sure that future relief efforts are as effective as pos- strikes, military assistance programs focused sible. Moreover, given that DoD’s funding levels are on local capacity building in disaster-prone re- far higher than State’s, and given the importance gions both before and after any disaster occurs of integrated civil support missions to current and are becoming an increasingly important com- emerging security challenges (over and above grow- ponent of HA/DR operations as a whole. For ing and more specific demands for military support this reason alone, additional efforts to coordi- to HA/DR efforts), it might be the better part of wis- nate growing levels of military aid more closely dom for DoD and the regional COCOMs to provide with State Department foreign assistance pro- the money to make civil-military exchanges along grams aimed at building up local capabilities to these lines a reality. prevent and/or manage future disasters will be Beyond more vigorous and sustained initiatives essential to help minimize (if not eliminate) pro- to build deeper and stronger bonds between the grammatic duplication and other inefficiencies

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that have bedeviled past DoD and State efforts for American conventional force management to provide civil support overseas to the same under the GFM system. On the other hand, sim- recipients concurrently. DoD’s decision to pro- ply assuming, as many DoD and military plan- vide USAID and other State Department officials ners still do, that a business-as-usual approach with opportunities to review via the internet CO- to the management of U.S. general purpose forc- COM security cooperation plans has been espe- es will be sufficient to ensure the availability of cially helpful in this regard, and further efforts the right mix of assets when, where, and in the should be encouraged to improve transparen- scale and format needed once a disaster occurs, cy between both departments insofar as emer- would be equally misguided. More dedicated ef- gency relief and development assistance plans forts should be made, therefore, to prepare in ad- are concerned. vance military platforms and units that might In the same vein, increases in the FY 09 OH- be tasked with HA/DR duties, given their unique DACA budget to support both capacity-building operational attributes, location, readiness lev- programs in partner countries and foreign di- els, and past deployments in support of similar saster relief, together with projected increases non-warfighting missions. Establishing a ros- for DoD-funded humanitarian assistance (HA) ter of DoD and service personnel experienced in FY 10, should help to ensure that HA/DR-re- in HA/DR operations that all COCOMs could tap lated activities continue to play a central role into and that would be regularly updated also in COCOM security cooperation programs. That makes a good deal of sense. said, financial support is still not sufficient to At the COCOM level, it might also be pos- allow the COCOMs to do all that they could and sible to attach to the HA/DR concept plans should do in this arena. Hence, boosting over- (CONPLANs) and operational plans (OPLANs) de- all OHDACA funding to a level of $100 million to veloped by the COCOM staffs a detailed check- $120 million per year – still a small amount in list of the types of military units and assets that terms of the overall DoD budget – would go a would be required to effectively execute these long way toward eliminating the shortfalls CO- plans. If one wished to take this approach one COMs continue to confront in trying to cover the step further, such lists could be generated in costs of programmed projects, while responding what is called TPFDL (time-phased force deploy- as well to emergencies and to useful opportu- ment list) format, which would include details nities for collaboration with allies and partner on the transportation requirements for moving countries that arise somewhat unexpectedly. In- certain units or types of units (and the supplies deed, unscheduled and unanticipated opportu- and equipment they may need) to a designat- nities to collaborate with other countries in the ed port of debarkation. Attaching such a list to HA/DR realm are sometimes more promising an HA/DR CONPLAN or OPLAN should not in than scheduled events, but current DoD bud- any way suggest that the units and items listed geting policies and planning cycles provide lit- would actually be assigned to (or programmed tle financial support or flexibility to underwrite for) the mission described. It would, howev- or take advantage of such options. er, get the COCOMs to begin to think more con- cretely and in realistic operational terms well Planning and Preparing for the Unexpected beforehand about what might be needed, in- Since every relief effort is a situation-specific cluding items and expertise (for example, family event requiring a fairly tailored response (based healthcare specialists) that would not be readi- on the nature and location of the disaster that ly available as a matter of standard planning for has occurred), maintaining some form of pre- combat operations. ordained inventory or earmarked list of essen- Approached from a more mission-specific tial military capabilities and skills that might be angle, military readiness could also be advanced held in reserve or kept in standby status for HA/ via the development of pre-scripted mission as- DR operations makes little sense. This is especial- signments (PSMAs) for specific capability sets ly true given the current procedures established with a high likelihood of being tapped to sup-

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port a foreign relief effort. Developed byNORTH - any disaster response, whatever the exact na- COM and FEMA as a way to simplify and facilitate ture and scale of the disaster and wherever it the process of providing defense support to civ- may have occurred (although the exact mix of il authorities (DSCA) for particular emergency forces deployed will vary, of course, from inci- tasks during a U.S. homeland-defense contin- dent to incident). Most of these assets and ar- gency, there is no reason why the PSMA con- eas of expertise have proven their worth as well cept could not be applied more broadly to in supporting the non-emergency humanitar- foreign HA/DR scenarios. As outlined in chap- ian assistance and civil support projects that ter 4, each PSMA includes a detailed statement have become so central to the TSC and theater of work, a description of the assets and person- engagement programs of the regional COCOMs. nel required to perform that work, and an esti- Indeed, given their utility across the spectrum of mate of the costs involved, all of which is agreed military operations, these same capabilities are upon in advance by those requesting military often referred to in the military as the “key en- support and those providing it so that both par- ablers,” meaning that they provide the key sup- ties understand well before any request is actu- porting capabilities that enable combat forces ally made what is required capability-wise, and to operate and achieve their objectives, and they what the probable cost would be, when the mil- are equally essential to HA/DR missions, often itary is asked to perform a specific emergency- comprising the bulk of military capabilities related mission. Tasks covered under current deployed in these missions. Assuring the ready PSMA agreements that would be relevant to availability of key enablers where and when they disaster relief overseas include such typical are needed, therefore, should be a primary fo- emergency support missions as providing heli- cus of HA/DR planners and operators alike at copter or fixed-wing airlift, conducting airborne DoD and the COCOMs, as well as among the var- or ground-based air control, supplying various ious service staffs. communications packages to first responders, Unfortunately, that particular task may not removing debris from emergency routes, setting be as easy as it sounds, since the supply of key up fuel distribution centers, and organizing and enablers is frequently not sufficient to meet -de supplying temporary housing. If they adopted mand, given their importance to virtually all a PSMA-type approach similar to NORTHCOM’s, mission assignments. Maintaining adequate in- other regional COCOM commanders in charge ventories and facilitating their use in non-war­ of military capabilities and units likely to be fighting contingencies may be more difficult still called upon to support HA/DR operations be- at a time when American forces are engaged in yond North America would at least have a bet- ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghan- ter feel for the deployment packages required istan, as well as in significant civil support ac- and projected costs involved to perform mis- tivities in both countries. Indeed, for these very sions similar to those listed above within their reasons, key enablers are often viewed by com- own AORs or AOFs. If experts from USAID’s Of- manders in the field as “high demand, low den- fice of Foreign Disaster Assistance could be con- sity” assets and skill sets that by definition may vinced to serve as the FEMA equivalents in this not be available in the numbers or at the level re- process, so much the better. quired. There are also certain types of enabling capabilities – such as heavy transport helicop- Key Enablers ters with a sling load capacity, medical teams As for particular military skills, capabilities, and skilled in pediatric care and women’s health platforms that might be requested for HA/DR- issues, deployable communications networks related duties, this study has highlighted several that both civil and military operators can use – basic categories of assets and expertise – large- that are critical to HA/DR operations, but may ly in the lift, logistics, engineering, communica- not be readily accessible based (again) on a busi- tions, and medical support sectors – that are ness-as-usual force management approach. Go- likely to prove essential at some level for almost ing forward, therefore, a more concerted effort

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should be made across the services and the CO- disaster, for example, corporate assistance has COMs to identify well before they are ever need- been and will continue to be especially valu- ed HA/DR-specific enablers that might not be able in the areas of sophisticated supply chain adequately covered by existing procedures for management, innovative warehouse and dis- assessing (and requesting) future force struc- tribution logistics, and advanced mobile com- ture requirements. munications technologies, as well as in less glamorous (but still vital) realms, such as long- HA/DR-friendly Planning and Programming distance transport, construction and engineer- To some extent, initiatives now being taken by ing support, and air traffic control. As noted in the individual services to strengthen their abil- chapter 3 with respect to the CARE-UPS rela- ities to undertake theater engagement activ- tionship, very effective partnerships are being ities and to build global partnerships should formed between businesses and key relief-mind- help to identify and generate wider support ed NGOs, and joint corporate teams are being for platforms, technologies, and skill sets that organized in critical areas of expertise (such as would also be especially useful in HA/DR-ori- global logistics) to provide emergency help to ented missions. For example, based in part on both national and international civil authorities. a shared desire to re-posture forces to handle Integrated teams from TNT, UPS, and Agility, for more effectively the rising demands of irreg- example, were instrumental in providing a wide ular warfare and stability operations, the Na- range of additional logistical support needed to vy’s global fleet station GFS( ) concept, the Air move essential aid supplies expeditiously into Force’s development of a stand-alone hospital Myanmar after cyclone Nargis, and similar team package that can be airlifted to any crisis or efforts from the private sector can be expect- disaster zone in twenty-four hours (and then ed when disasters like this strike in the future. left behind for the host country to keep), and Commercial support was particularly welcome the Army’s renewed emphasis on counterinsur- in the Nargis case, it is well to remember, given gency training all place a premium on the type the reluctance of the junta in Myanmar to sanc- of civil support and interagency collaboration tion too prominent a role for the U.S. military. capabilities that are also essential for an effec- Tapping more fully into the private sector’s ca- tive HA/DR effort. No doubt, the release ofD oD pabilities – and integrating the corporate world directive 3000.5 in 2005 (which placed stabil- more directly into official governmental plan- ity operations on par with traditional combat ning procedures, as suggested earlier – could operations), together with the approval of the provide a welcome degree of insurance against secretary of defense’s new Guidance for the potential gaps that might emerge in the sup- Employment of Forces in 2008 (which put se- ply of military assets and expertise to HA/DR curity cooperation on equal footing with warf- operations. ighting), should help to encourage this trend toward an HA/DR-friendly approach to service Allies and Partners planning and programming. They should also Of course, as detailed in chapter 5, addition- help to give it doctrinal legitimacy. al support from allies, partner countries, and relief-minded international organizations and The Private Sector NGOs will also be important, as the United States For certain operational sectors, it is also increas- will rarely be operating alone, especially in the ingly apparent that the private sector – especial- wake of larger-scale disasters. This is why it re- ly, though not exclusively, American companies mains so important for American HA/DR plan- – can serve as an alternative source for a num- ners and operators, civil and military alike, to ber of skills, supplies, and capabilities that are develop a keener appreciation for, and to help needed most for HA/DR operations, but which build an institutional architecture in support the military may not always be able to provide of, the comprehensive approach championed in sufficient quantity. In response to a foreign by NATO (but applicable beyond Europe). The

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basic idea here is that conflict resolution, disas- of PACOM’s Pacific Partnership andSOUTHCOM ’s ter recovery, and post-conflict reconstruction Continuing Promise programs stand out as par- require a far more sustained effort at civil-mil- ticularly instructive examples of how theater en- itary collaboration than has generally been the gagement and health diplomacy with an HA/DR case so far, and that more vigorous NATO ef- focus can leverage in a coordinated way con- forts to promote such collaboration in concert tributions from the military, civilian, national, with the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, at a mini- international, governmental, and nongovern- mum, should be encouraged. Ideally, this would mental sectors in support of a common program. allow a more sensible and concerted division In combination with COCOM-directed medical of labor among security-minded organizations readiness training exercises (MEDRETEs) and operating in the Euro-Atlantic zone, with NATO other humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) bringing to bear its comparative advantages in projects, the Pacific Partnership and Continu- the military response spheres and the others as- ing Promise tours – both of which utilize the suming lead roles in the areas of socio-econom- Navy’s two hospital ships and selected amphib- ic development and political reform, including ious assault ships specifically reconfigured for the strengthening of civil societies in countries the mission – have helped to boost opinions of in transition. To be sure, there are those in Eu- America and to improve local living conditions rope who oppose this approach, arguing that in strategically important regions, while also the EU alone should take the lead in civil-sup- enhancing to one degree or another in-coun- port missions (including in disaster relief), but try defenses against future disasters. To the ex- they often go on to propose a similar multilater- tent that these tours and training programs can al approach under a different name that simply offer, as do SOUTHCOM’s Beyond the Horizon leaves out NATO. In any event, whatever name and AFRICOM’s APS efforts described in chap- it is eventually given, an operational strategy ter 4, additional opportunities for return vis- that integrates the collective efforts of multiple its to build upon and sustain projects ashore contributors behind a common plan – and that completed during earlier visits, they can con- “coordinates the coordinators,” in the words of tribute to the well-being and self-sufficiency of one HA/DR practitioner – is the best way ahead, the communities visited in ways that will last and it is one that should be transferable to oth- long after the ships and troops once deployed er regions as well, such as Northeast and South- there have departed. Needless to say, this is east Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and Central and the effect that future service and COCOM ini- South America, where there is at least a rudi- tiatives should seek to achieve via a “diplomacy mentary level of regional organization. of deeds” conducted in cooperation with other HA/DR contributors. New Organizational Approach In conclusion, then, while there is no single for- There is, moreover, a good deal of similarity mat for organizing a successful HA/DR mission that between the comprehensive approach advo- would fit each and every scenario, the recommenda- cated by NATO and the public-private/whole- tions listed above provide a policy framework and of-government concept of operations adopted a set of operational guidelines that would indeed by PACOM, SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM, and (for Can- apply, either in part or as a whole, to the most like- ada and Mexico) NORTHCOM, as they organize ly contingencies requiring military support. If pur- their theater engagement plans with increas- sued in tandem with an emphasis on establishing ing attention to civil-military relations and in- the right relationships between civil and military re- teragency coordination. They are, in this sense, sponders along the lines discussed at the beginning the COCOMs to watch for insight into new or- of this chapter, many of the civil-military turf bat- ganizational models and integrated response tles and operational shortcomings that have compli- plans for HA/DR initiatives overseas. As detailed cated past foreign disaster relief and humanitarian in chapter 3 and chapter 4, for example, the hu- assistance operations can be resolved. Most im- manitarian ship deployments conducted as part portantly, military teams tasked to support such

Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for 146 International Cooperation t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s operations will be much better prepared to do so be focused, as they ought to be, on maximizing the than they would otherwise be, and any concerns contributions of each in accordance with a more that they might be encroaching unnecessarily on fully coordinated plan that balances the demands the responsibilities of civilian HA/DR responders of disaster diplomacy, national security, and inter- would be much diminished. The energies of both national cooperation. the civil and military relief communities could then

Reference U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). 2008. Speech delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates in Washington, D.C. to U.S. Global Leadership Cam- paign. July 15. http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262.

Finding the Right Mix Key Partnerships and Platforms for 147 International Cooperation Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms

CECP Committee Encouraging AADMER ASEAN Agreement on Corporate Philanthropy Disaster Management and Emergency Response CENTCOM Central Command ACC Air Combat Command CERF Central Emergency Response Fund ACRI African Crisis Response Initiative CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program ADF Australian Defence Force CF Canadian Forces ADPC Asian Disaster Preparedness Center CFFC Commander, U.S. Fleet AFRICOM Africa Command Forces Command AHA Center ASEAN Coordinating Center CHAP consolidated humanitarian for Humanitarian Assistance action plan on Disaster Management CIDA Canadian International Air DETs Air Detachments Development Agency AJK Azad Jammu and Kashmir CIDI Center for International AMC Air Mobility Command Disaster Information AOF area of focus CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff AOR area of responsibility CJTF Combined Joint Task Force APAN Asia-Pacific Area Network CJTF-HOA Combined Joint Task Force- APCSC Asia-Pacific Collaborative Horn of Africa Security Consortium CMCoord civil-military coordination APCSS Asia-Pacific Center for CMCS Civil-Military Coordination Section Security Studies CMEP civil-military emergency preparedness APS Africa Partnership Station CMEPCSEE Civil-Military Emergency Planning ARF ASEAN Regional Forum Council for Southeastern Europe ARG amphibious ready group CMM office of conflict management ASEAN Association of Southeast and mitigation Asian Nations CMO office of coalition and AU African Union multinational operations AusAID Australian Agency for CMOC Civil-Military Operations Center International Development CNO chief of naval operations AUSASSIST Plan Australian Government Overseas COCOM combatant command Disaster Assistance Plan COE Center of Excellence AusDIN Australian Disaster COIN counterinsurgency Information Network COMREL community relations AWACS airborne warning and control system CONOPS concept of operations BCLC Business Civic Leadership Center CONPLANs concept/contingency plans B2C Bravo to Sea, naval rotary-wing reorganization program CONUS continental United States C2 command and control CPM Civil Protection Mechanism C3 command, control, and CRC Canadian Red Cross communications CRIF cargo routing information file CA Civil Affairs CSF Combined Support Force CAP Consolidated Appeals Process CSG carrier strike group CAT crisis action team CT counter-terrorist CBMU Construction Battalion CTF coalition/combined task force Maintenance Unit DAC disaster assistance center CBRN chemical, biological, DAC-LOC Disaster Assistance Center radiological, or nuclear Logistics Operations Center CCC Combined Coordination Center DAC-PAK Disaster Assistance Center-Pakistan CCIF Combatant Commanders DART U.S. OFDA disaster assistance Initiative Fund response team CDDOC CENTCOM Deployment and DART Canadian Forces Disaster Distributions Operations Center Assistance Response Team

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148 t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s

DART Deep-ocean Assessment and FESTs forward engineer support teams Reporting of Tsunamis FFE Field Force Engineering DART SCDF disaster assistance FFP Office of Food for Peace and rescue team FISC fleet and industrial supply centers DCCEP Developing Countries FLTFORCOM Fleet Forces Command Combined Exercise Program FORSCOM Forces Command DCMA Deputy to the Commander FPDA for Civil-Military Activities Five Power Defence Arrangement FSI DCMO Deputy to the Commander Foreign Service Institute for Military Operations FYDP Future Years Defense Program DENCAP dental civic action program FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic DEPORD deployment order of Macedonia GDA DESC Defense Energy Support Center Global Development Alliance GDACS DFA Director of Foreign Assistance Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System DFID Department for International GE Development General Electric GEF DISCNet Disaster Information Sharing and Guidance for the Communications Network Employment of Forces GFM DLA Defense Logistics Agency global force management GFMB DoD Department of Defense global force management board GFS DPG Defense Planning Guidance Global Fleet Station GMES DR disaster relief Global Monitoring for Environment and Security DRASTIC Disaster Relief and Strategic GMP Telecommunications Global Maritime Partnership Infrastructure Company GSDF Ground Self-Defense Force DRN Disaster Resource Network HA humanitarian assistance DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency HACC humanitarian assistance DSCA defense support to civil authorities coordination center HAP DSC-P Defense Supply Center Philadelphia Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Preparedness Program EADRCC Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response HAST Coordination Center humanitarian assistance survey team HASTs EADRU Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit humanitarian assistance assessment teams EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council HCA humanitarian and civic assistance ECHA Executive Committee for HCs Humanitarian Affairs Humanitarian Coordinators HDRs ECHO European Community humanitarian daily rations Humanitarian Aid HLS Humanitarian Logistics Software EFC Expeditionary Force Command HMA humanitarian mine action EMA Emergency Management Australia HN host nation ENCAP engineering civic action program HOC Humanitarian Operations Center EOSC Rapid Response Centre’s Emergency HSV High Speed Vessel Operations Support Centre IA Interagency ERAT Emergency Rapid Assessment Team IASC interagency standing committee ERC emergency relief coordinator ICS Incident Command System ERC Exercise Related Construction ICT Information and Communications ESG Expeditionary Strike Group Technology EU European Union IFPA Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis EUCOM European Command IFRC International Federation of Red FAHUM Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias Cross and Red Crescent Societies IGOs FCSS Field Coordination Support Section intergovernmental organizations IHS FDR foreign disaster relief international health specialist IOTWS FDR/ER foreign disaster relief/ Indian Ocean Tsunami emergency response Warning System IRC FEMA Federal Emergency International Rescue Committee Management Agency IRC Internet Relay Chat FEST-A FEST-advance IRIN Integrated Regional FEST-M FEST-main Information Networks

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IRP International Recovery Platform MHPCC Maui High Performance ISDR International Strategy for Computing Center Disaster Reduction MND ROK Ministry of National Defense ITU International MNF SOP Multinational Force Standing Telecommunications Union Operating Procedures IW irregular warfare MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs JC joint chiefs of staff MoU memorandum of understanding JCET joint combined exchange training MPAT Multinational Planning JDA Japan Defense Agency Augmentation Team JDR Law Law Concerning the Dispatch of MPF maritime pre-positioning force Japan Disaster Relief Teams MREs military meals ready to eat JDSC Australia Joint Declaration MSC Military Sealift Command on Security Cooperation MSDF Maritime Self-Defense Force JECC Joint Enabling Capabilities Command NAEW&CF NATO Airborne Early Warning JFCOM Joint Forces Command and Control Force JFP joint force provider NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization JHOC Joint Humanitarian NAVCENT U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Operations Course NAVELSF Naval Expeditionary JIACG Joint Interagency Coordination Group Logistics Support Force JIATF-South Joint Interagency Task Force South NAVSUP Navy Supply Systems Command JICA Japan International NDAA National Defense Authorization Act Cooperation Agency NGO Non-governmental organization JICPAC Joint Intelligence Center Pacific NIDS National Institute for Defense Studies JPASE joint public affairs support element NIPRNET Non-secure Internet Protocol JPG joint planning group Router Network JSF Joint Strike Fighter NMCBs naval mobile construction battalions JSOTF-P Joint Special Operations NOAA National Oceanic and Task Force-Philippines Atmospheric Administration JTF joint task force NOLSC Naval Operational Logistics JTF-Bravo Joint Task Force-Bravo Support Center JUSMAG Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group NORTHCOM Northern Command KAI Korea Aerospace Industries NRCC Naval Regional Contracting Center KFOR NATO operations in Kosovo NRF NATO Response Force KHP Korean Helicopter Program NSC National Security Council KOICA Korea International NSPD national security presidential directive Cooperation Agency O&M operations and maintenance L&TCCI Logistics and Transportation OASD/GSA Office of the assistant secretary of Corporate Citizenship Initiative defense for global security affairs LCACs air cushioned landing craft OCHA Office for the Coordination LCS Littoral Combat Ship of Humanitarian Affairs LET logistics emergency team OCONUS outside the continental United States LFA lead federal agency ODA Official Development Assistance LHD Landing Helicopter Dock ODASD/CMO Office of the deputy assistant LNOs liaison officers secretary of defense for coalition and multinational operations LSU Logistics Support Unit ODASD/PRT Office of the deputy assistant MAGTF marine air-ground task force secretary of defense for MARFORCOM Marine Corps Forces Command partnership strategy MASH Mobile Army Surgical Hospital ODASD/STB Office of the deputy assistant MCDA military or civil defense assets secretary of defense for stability MCOs major combat operations operations capabilities MEDCAP medical civic action program OECD Organization for Economic MEDEL medical element Cooperation and Development MEDRETEs medical readiness training exercises OEF-TS operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara MEF Marine Expeditionary Force OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance MFL U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic OHDACA overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid

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OLU Operational Liaison Unit SES senior executive service OMA Office of Military Affairs SIPRI Stockholm International OPLANs operational plans Peace Research Institute OPTEMPOs operational tempos SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol OSADI Online Southeast Asia Router Network Disaster Inventory SJFHQ-CE standing joint force OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense headquarters-core element OSOCC on-site operations SOCAFRICA Special Operations Command Africa coordination center SOCEUR Special Operations Command Europe OTI Office of Transition Initiatives SOFA status-of-forces agreement OUA operation Unified Assistance SOPs Standing operating procedures OUSD(P) Office of the Under Secretary SOUTHCOM Southern Command of Defense for Policy SOVFA Status of Visiting Forces Agreement PACOM Pacific Command SSTR Stability, Security, Transition, PDC Pacific Disaster Center and Reconstruction PE Personnel Expenses State/PM State’s Bureau of Political- PfP Partnership for Peace Military Affairs PKO Law Law Concerning Cooperation TALCE tanker airlift control element for United Nations TCA Trainer Cargo Aircraft Peacekeeping Operations TCE-D Tele-engineering PM Political-Military Affairs Communications-Deployable POLAD Foreign Policy Advisor TCG Tripartite Core Group POM Program Objective Memorandum TRANSCOM Transportation Command PRT Office of Partnership Strategy TSC theater security cooperation PRT provincial reconstruction team TSCP theater security cooperation plan PSMA pre-scripted mission assignment TSCTI Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism PWRM pre-positioned war reserve material Initiative QDR Quadrennial Defense Review TSD U.S.-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue RAAF Royal Australian Air Force TSF Télécoms sans Frontières RC resident coordinator UAE United Arab Emirates RC reserve components UAVs unmanned aerial vehicles RFA request for assistance UCTs underwater construction teams RFF request for forces UNDAC UN disaster assessment RFF/C request for forces and capabilities and coordination RISEPAK Relief and Information Systems UNDP UN Development Program for Earthquakes in Pakistan UNHAS United Nations Humanitarian RMT response management team Air Service ROK Republic of Korea UNHRD United Nations Humanitarian RPM Bureau of Refugees, Response Depot Population, and Migration UNISDR United Nations International Strategy S/C/R&S Office of the Coordinator for for Natural Disaster Reduction Reconstruction and Stabilization UNJLC United Nations Joint Logistics Center SAC Strategic Airlift Capability USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers SAF Singapore Armed Forces USAF U.S. Air Force SALIS Strategic Airlift Interim Solution USAID U.S. Agency for International SAR search-and-rescue Development SASOP standby arrangements and USARPAC U.S. Army Pacific standard operating procedures USG U.S. Government SCDF Singapore Civil Defence Force USNAVEUR U.S. Naval Forces Europe SDF Self-Defense Forces USPACFLT U.S. Pacific Fleet SECI Southeast European VGF Vodafone Group Foundation Cooperation Initiative VIC virtual information center SEDM Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial V-OSOCC internet-based virtual OSOCC SEDRO Employment of SEEBRIG in Disaster Relief Operations WAN wide area network SEEBRIG Southeast European Brigade WFP World Food Program WHO World Health Organization

Finding the Right Mix

Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms 151 About the Author & Contributors

Dr. Charles M. Perry is vice president and director lence (CSTPV) at the University of St. Andrews in the of studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analy- United Kingdom. Mr. Eisenberg holds an M.Litt. from sis (IFPA). He has written extensively on a variety St. Andrews and a B.A. from Bowdoin College. of national and international security issues, espe- cially with respect to U.S. defense policy, regional security dynamics, alliance relations, and strategic priorities in the post-9/11 security environment. Dr. Perry’s current research focuses largely on the need for greater civil-military coordination and a whole-of-government approach to 21st century se- curity challenges, including those related to home- land defense, foreign disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, security cooperation, and stability op- erations overall. He holds an M.A. in international affairs, an M.A. in law and diplomacy, and a Ph.D. in international politics from The Fletcher School, Tufts University. Marina Travayiakis works as a research associate at IFPA. Her research interests include civil-military affairs, crisis management, and reconstruction and stabilization operations. Ms. Travayiakis holds an M.A. in law and diplomacy from The Fletcher School, Tufts University, where she is currently enrolled as a Ph.D. candidate. Bobby Andersen works as a research associate at IFPA. Her areas of specialization include U.S. de- fense strategy, NATO and European security issues, and regional security developments in the Asia-Pa- cific. Ms. Andersen holds an M.A. in international relations from Boston University. Yaron Eisenberg works as a research associate at IFPA. Previously, he profiled terrorist groups for the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Vio-

Finding the Right Mix

152 t h e In s t i t u t e f o r Fo r e i g n Po l i c y An a l y s i s