Transfor Through

TABLE OF CONTENTS

4 JFTC Towards New Challenges „Transformation Interview with the JFTC Commander 4 Brigadier General Grabowski Through Training“ 8 Resolute Support to Resolute Support Joint Force Training Centre sets The aim of this magazine is to provide a forum for Publishing Institution: standards for new pre-deployment exchange of information and expertise among training Joint Force Training Centre Bydgoszcz (JFTC) training and educational institutions across NATO in the area of training, military professional education, and Managing director: related technological support. In the context of The Brigadier General László SZABÓ, 10 Resolute Support NATO “Smart Defense” approach, there is growing JFTC Deputy Commander / Chief of Staff Advisory Training importance for cooperation with partner states and 8 international organizations, such as the United Nations, Chief Editor: 14 2015 CWIX is Fuelling the Evolution of the European Union, the Organization for Security MAJ Goran PIJETLOVIC, Chief PAO JFTC, JFTC - Advisory Training and Cooperation in Europe and others. With the above Spokesperson COM JFTC in mind, the JFTC invites authors from countries and Editorial Board: 16 JFTC and NCIA institutions beyond the NATO environment, to publish The Team Behind CWIX 2015 in the Transformation Through Training magazine. Mrs. Kamila SIERZPUTOWSKA, PhD, Kazimierz Wielki The magazine will focus on the best practices in the University, Poland areas of command and staff training, professional 18 Modelling and Simulation in the Exercise BG Ing. Jaromír ZŮNA, MSc., PhD, Director of the Logistics military education, simulations and simulation Agency, Army of the Czech Republic Process - How to Demystify the Devil technologies, distributed training, military training development as well as other related areas. The JFTC Advisory Committee: 21 The Treason Files also welcomes recommendations for the application Ms. Radosława KUBICZEK, Public Affairs Specialist Countering the Threat from British of the most recent experience and lessons learned Mr. Tomasz OCIŃSKI, JFTC Language Specialist Nationals - Loyal to Forces beyond the from ongoing operations, training events and recent Crown innovations in the field of simulations and information Editorial Contact Information: technologies. The magazine will also briefly cover Public Affairs Office the life of the international community at the JFTC 32 Major Lessons from COIN efforts Joint Force Training Centre with the aim of promoting the centre within NATO ul. Szubińska 2 in Iraq and Afghanistan and How to and among the partner nations. The magazine will be Bydgoszcz, 85-915, Poland. Use Them in the Future published twice a year, during the spring and fall, by 14 E-mail: pao@jftc.nato.int the NATO Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz.

39 Together in NATO © 15th Anniversary of Poland in NATO - JFTC 2015 Celebrations in the Kujawsko-Pomorskie ISSN: 2084-8358 The articles published in this magazine Region represent opinions of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of 42 In Retrospect - Life at the JFTC Scan the QR code with your NATO. mobile device. This will take you to the archive of Transformation 32 Through Training magazine.

2 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS

4 JFTC Towards New Challenges „Transformation Interview with the JFTC Commander 4 Brigadier General Grabowski Through Training“ 8 Resolute Support to Resolute Support Joint Force Training Centre sets The aim of this magazine is to provide a forum for Publishing Institution: standards for new pre-deployment exchange of information and expertise among training Joint Force Training Centre Bydgoszcz (JFTC) training and educational institutions across NATO in the area of training, military professional education, and Managing director: related technological support. In the context of The Brigadier General László SZABÓ, 10 Resolute Support NATO “Smart Defense” approach, there is growing JFTC Deputy Commander / Chief of Staff Advisory Training importance for cooperation with partner states and 8 international organizations, such as the United Nations, Chief Editor: 14 2015 CWIX is Fuelling the Evolution of the European Union, the Organization for Security MAJ Goran PIJETLOVIC, Chief PAO JFTC, JFTC - Advisory Training and Cooperation in Europe and others. With the above Spokesperson COM JFTC in mind, the JFTC invites authors from countries and Editorial Board: 16 JFTC and NCIA institutions beyond the NATO environment, to publish The Team Behind CWIX 2015 in the Transformation Through Training magazine. Mrs. Kamila SIERZPUTOWSKA, PhD, Kazimierz Wielki The magazine will focus on the best practices in the University, Poland areas of command and staff training, professional 18 Modelling and Simulation in the Exercise BG Ing. Jaromír ZŮNA, MSc., PhD, Director of the Logistics military education, simulations and simulation Agency, Army of the Czech Republic Process - How to Demystify the Devil technologies, distributed training, military training development as well as other related areas. The JFTC Advisory Committee: 21 The Treason Files also welcomes recommendations for the application Ms. Radosława KUBICZEK, Public Affairs Specialist Countering the Threat from British of the most recent experience and lessons learned Mr. Tomasz OCIŃSKI, JFTC Language Specialist Nationals - Loyal to Forces beyond the from ongoing operations, training events and recent Crown innovations in the field of simulations and information Editorial Contact Information: technologies. The magazine will also briefly cover Public Affairs Office the life of the international community at the JFTC 32 Major Lessons from COIN efforts Joint Force Training Centre with the aim of promoting the centre within NATO ul. Szubińska 2 in Iraq and Afghanistan and How to and among the partner nations. The magazine will be Bydgoszcz, 85-915, Poland. Use Them in the Future published twice a year, during the spring and fall, by 14 E-mail: [email protected] the NATO Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz.

2 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 3 JFTC Towards New Challenges Interview with the JFTC Commander Brigadier General Grabowski

Sir, last year the Joint Force Training – how many people participated in events A new, completely different, non-combat this test and it was a faultless performance. duties in the combat ISAF mission, now we Also areas which we are requested to support Centre celebrated its 10th anniversary. conducted by the JFTC, how many people Resolute Support (RS) mission was launched Thus I can say with complete certainty, that are preparing them for a train-advise-assist have changed. ISAF required training for You have been the Commander of the unit we trained, in which areas, what training and its future members are also trained by the JFTC made very good use of the past ten mission, which additionally is held in a Headquarters and their staffs. Now we are for 1,5 year. You took the helm of the JFTC events, exercises, experiments, courses and the JFTC. What is more, completely new years. combat-environment. The fact that a soldier training advisors and trainers to advise in in a very interesting time – the change of conferences were executed throughout that challenges appear, like training for the Very was good in a combat mission doesn’t mean the areas of mission execution, planning, mission in Afghanistan, new challenges time. My assessment can in fact be based High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), You said that this moment, full of new that he would make a good trainer or advisor. support, reporting system, etc. appeared. How do you asses readiness of on what I have observed since I became for NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU), challenges, ‘verified the professionalism’. This is exactly where our role starts. We have In most areas related to combat preparation, your centre to respond to today’s needs of the JFTC Commander. And I have to admit Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) and many How? changed the training system, revised it and Afghan soldiers are now ready. NATO troops the Alliance? Did the JFTC make a good that it is a very interesting time. The ISAF others. Let’s focus on the new Afghan mission for a thanks to it we can demonstrate how to utilize that we have trained are to show them use of the past decade? combat mission in Afghanistan, supported Each of these new tasks is a test for the JFTC moment. We had to shift our way of thinking soldiers’ combat skills in the train-advise- how to be two, three steps ahead – how to I will not talk about numbers, statistics, as we by the JFTC in terms of Headquarters’ and and its staff. This evolving situation verifies towards a totally new direction. Before, assist reality, how to transform these skills plan budget for upcoming years, equipment did it last year – we summarized the ten years their staffs’ preparation, came to an end. the professionalism of our centre – we passed we trained HQ’s staffs that fulfilled their into advisory qualities. modernization, how to prepare for new

4 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 5 JFTC Towards New Challenges Interview with the JFTC Commander Brigadier General Grabowski

4 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 5 operations, cooperate with allies, etc. defending their own territory. What we have how this, as you mentioned yourself, small I want to underline that meeting new training to take care of is how to prepare defence in team, can handle it? needs and circumstances was possible only a coalition. The JFTC is ready to respond to Huge support comes from contractors. thanks to the JFTC staff’s professionalism. tasks in this regard. Approximately 30, and during bigger exercises even more, cooperate with us. We can execute Training for future participants of the How do you see the JFTC’s role in this our Program of Work thanks to devotion of the Afghan mission is, however, only a part of area? JFTC permanent staff, the contractors, but also the JFTC’s work. VJTF - a “spearhead force” within the NATO thanks to the JFTC Support Unit and the NCI That’s true. Another relatively new challenge Response Force (NRF) was designed to Agency Communications and Information the JFTC is successfully coping with is the be able to deploy to respond to a security Systems Support Unit Bydgoszcz. We have Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). NATO threat within days. Rapid deployment of the to remember that our work is much more is currently in the transition period from its VJTF will be facilitated by NFIUs - small than just training executed in Bydgoszcz. Our engagement in Afghanistan into a newer command and control and reception units that staff travels a lot - in support of other training model which is better suited to its near are being established in Bulgaria, Estonia, events conducted all over the world, to and mid-term missions. The Alliance will Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. participate in various conferences, recce visits maintain its capability of performing its core My intention is to merge training for the in the theatre, where they collect current data tasks and it will also keep a high level of its VJTF’s brigade with the one for the NFIU. indispensable for preparation and execution forces’ readiness. To help achieve this, Allied Cooperation implemented already during the of up-to-date training. It is quite common, Leaders have set out the goal of modern, training phase will enable integration of the that the JFTC employees devote their free tightly connected NATO Forces 2020 that two new structures - that may have different time so that the JFTC tasks are executed on will be properly equipped, trained, exercised, procedures, regulations or be equipped with the highest possible level. and led. The CFI’s task is to help maintain different command and control, liaison Now, when the JFTC is facing new challenges, NATO readiness and combat effectiveness systems - so that they could cooperate the needs regarding the manpower will grow. which can be achieved through increased effectively and fulfil their tasks. We will need experts in new areas and more education and training, exercises, and better personnel to support training. On one hand we use of technology. When you talk about adjusting to the will use contractors, subject matter experts, this was not an issue, we always kept the to a large scale, possibly even distributed and done in Bydgoszcz. It happens very often The JFTC closely cooperates with its parent new reality, one may have an impression who will augment the centre’s staff depending two types of exercise separate, using JTLS at exercise involving multiple training audience that commanding generals who visit us for the command, Allied Command Transformation that these changes are being implemented on current needs. On the other hand, we have the JWC for joint operational level exercises at multiple locations using a complex first time observe what we do here, in what (ACT), other training units as well as with seamlessly, without any problems. Is it to invest in our permanent personnel – here I and JCATS at our centre for below joint simulation driven synthetic environment. In conditions, what tools or equipment we use, Nations in order to identify requirements, really so? mean training and courses for JFTC members operational and Afghan Mission training. short, our work load will grow exponentially also SMEs who cooperate with us and they test the existing potential, identify Experience of the JFTC staff guarantees as well as increasing the centre’s Peacetime Today and in the foreseeable future we have in scope and complexity in the upcoming see clearly that training at the JFTC is simply shortages, and propose possible solutions completion of new tasks. However, it is true Establishment. This is also my key task for to integrate multiple levels of training into a months. Of course we have been anticipating irreplaceable. Only with the JFTC is the NATO aiming at achieving the CFI goals. And here that challenges we face, are sometimes very the months to come – to prepare the JFTC single comprehensive exercise which means this for some time. The Wargaming Branch training programme complete. comes the CWIX - the annual Coalition demanding. But this is what professionalism core staff that will enable us to complete new these two systems must be linked. Although was shaping the battlefield for example by Eleven years ago the JFTC was established Warrior Interoperability eXploration, is about – we have to be, and we are, flexible tasks with full professionalism. previously more ambitious project to federate participating in the Modeling and Simulations as a smaller element of the NATO training eXperimentation, eXamination, eXercise and open for the new. We receive orders the two simulations as a whole have failed functional area in CWIX and by conducting network. We have become one of the key which is one of the most important CFI which we fulfil, and the way we do it is Human factor is one thing, and what about I think we can this time succeed by limiting simulation tests using the South East players and our presence and work are an events which we have hosted annually since highly appreciated by our customers. the infrastructure, tools the JFTC uses in the data that has to be exchanged between the European Exercise and Training Network indispensable part of the Alliance’s training 2011. This is the training that engages “Transformation through Training” – this is execution of training? Were or are changes two systems by using new technical support Exercise Balkan Bridges 2015 that prepared system. most NATO nations and also many partner the JFTC’s motto. Although it refers mainly in those areas equally challenging? tools and services. Thus we can use our us for many of the challenges that we will I would like to use this opportunity to countries who come to Bydgoszcz to to transformation the Alliance undergoes Our largest challenge is combining Simulation experience with JCATS – the JFTC is the face with NRF/VJTF training. Our goal is thank and to congratulate my staff. They check the level of interoperability between thanks to training, it also describes changes, systems that support exercises on different NATO custodian of JCATS - to support the to provide a state of the art training support deserve appreciation for their hard work, their command, control, communications, development the JFTC staff goes through levels. This centre was designed to handle evolving mission. to set the stage for exercises reflecting the professionalism and devotion every day, computers and intelligence systems and and how the centre adjusts to current needs primarily exercises below Joint Operational The training for VJTF and NFIU will make operational reality (train as you operate). however, not every day do I have a possibility ones that other nations use. The JFTC meets thanks to practice. The JFTC is a relatively level, and for that we have a great system our work much more challenging on the to express my gratitude and admiration for high standards required to execute this small unit, however, it is, without a question called JCATS (Joint Conflict And Tactical one hand. On the other, we can prove that If you were to describe the position of what they do. I would like the JFTC staff to extremely challenging event. and doubt, a showcase of NATO training. Simulation system). It does a great job at providing and using our given capabilities the JFTC in the NATO training network, feel proud of what we are achieving and to We cannot forget either about the VJTF. brigade and below and can even be stretched the JFTC can make a difference for the level where would it be? Would execution of know that our work is highly respected in The geopolitical situation in the Eastern Talking about numbers – the JFTC to corps level. Although joint operational level of training execution. The new exercises, NATO training programme be possible the Alliance and the difference it makes is Europe forces NATO nations to change consists of 107 posts only. Conducting and is not our primary task we do have JTLS (Joint in particular VJTF, are far more CAX and without the JFTC? invaluable. ■ certain concepts, strategies and doctrines hosting so many training events, exercises, Theater Level Simulation) which is excellent CIS extensive than those the JFTC has been Possible? – maybe yes. What I am sure of, is related to their own security. In critical areas courses, experiments with total audience for that purpose. The two simulations were involved in by now. We’re going to go from that the quality of NATO training would be Questions asked by of operation NATO nations are capable of between 4 and 6 thousand people a year – never designed to work together. In the past, simple CIS support at a single location incomparably lower without what is undertaken the JFTC Public Affairs Office

6 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 7 operations, cooperate with allies, etc. defending their own territory. What we have how this, as you mentioned yourself, small I want to underline that meeting new training to take care of is how to prepare defence in team, can handle it? needs and circumstances was possible only a coalition. The JFTC is ready to respond to Huge support comes from contractors. thanks to the JFTC staff’s professionalism. tasks in this regard. Approximately 30, and during bigger exercises even more, cooperate with us. We can execute Training for future participants of the How do you see the JFTC’s role in this our Program of Work thanks to devotion of the Afghan mission is, however, only a part of area? JFTC permanent staff, the contractors, but also the JFTC’s work. VJTF - a “spearhead force” within the NATO thanks to the JFTC Support Unit and the NCI That’s true. Another relatively new challenge Response Force (NRF) was designed to Agency Communications and Information the JFTC is successfully coping with is the be able to deploy to respond to a security Systems Support Unit Bydgoszcz. We have Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). NATO threat within days. Rapid deployment of the to remember that our work is much more is currently in the transition period from its VJTF will be facilitated by NFIUs - small than just training executed in Bydgoszcz. Our engagement in Afghanistan into a newer command and control and reception units that staff travels a lot - in support of other training model which is better suited to its near are being established in Bulgaria, Estonia, events conducted all over the world, to and mid-term missions. The Alliance will Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. participate in various conferences, recce visits maintain its capability of performing its core My intention is to merge training for the in the theatre, where they collect current data tasks and it will also keep a high level of its VJTF’s brigade with the one for the NFIU. indispensable for preparation and execution forces’ readiness. To help achieve this, Allied Cooperation implemented already during the of up-to-date training. It is quite common, Leaders have set out the goal of modern, training phase will enable integration of the that the JFTC employees devote their free tightly connected NATO Forces 2020 that two new structures - that may have different time so that the JFTC tasks are executed on will be properly equipped, trained, exercised, procedures, regulations or be equipped with the highest possible level. and led. The CFI’s task is to help maintain different command and control, liaison Now, when the JFTC is facing new challenges, NATO readiness and combat effectiveness systems - so that they could cooperate the needs regarding the manpower will grow. which can be achieved through increased effectively and fulfil their tasks. We will need experts in new areas and more education and training, exercises, and better personnel to support training. On one hand we use of technology. When you talk about adjusting to the will use contractors, subject matter experts, this was not an issue, we always kept the to a large scale, possibly even distributed and done in Bydgoszcz. It happens very often The JFTC closely cooperates with its parent new reality, one may have an impression who will augment the centre’s staff depending two types of exercise separate, using JTLS at exercise involving multiple training audience that commanding generals who visit us for the command, Allied Command Transformation that these changes are being implemented on current needs. On the other hand, we have the JWC for joint operational level exercises at multiple locations using a complex first time observe what we do here, in what (ACT), other training units as well as with seamlessly, without any problems. Is it to invest in our permanent personnel – here I and JCATS at our centre for below joint simulation driven synthetic environment. In conditions, what tools or equipment we use, Nations in order to identify requirements, really so? mean training and courses for JFTC members operational and Afghan Mission training. short, our work load will grow exponentially also SMEs who cooperate with us and they test the existing potential, identify Experience of the JFTC staff guarantees as well as increasing the centre’s Peacetime Today and in the foreseeable future we have in scope and complexity in the upcoming see clearly that training at the JFTC is simply shortages, and propose possible solutions completion of new tasks. However, it is true Establishment. This is also my key task for to integrate multiple levels of training into a months. Of course we have been anticipating irreplaceable. Only with the JFTC is the NATO aiming at achieving the CFI goals. And here that challenges we face, are sometimes very the months to come – to prepare the JFTC single comprehensive exercise which means this for some time. The Wargaming Branch training programme complete. comes the CWIX - the annual Coalition demanding. But this is what professionalism core staff that will enable us to complete new these two systems must be linked. Although was shaping the battlefield for example by Eleven years ago the JFTC was established Warrior Interoperability eXploration, is about – we have to be, and we are, flexible tasks with full professionalism. previously more ambitious project to federate participating in the Modeling and Simulations as a smaller element of the NATO training eXperimentation, eXamination, eXercise and open for the new. We receive orders the two simulations as a whole have failed functional area in CWIX and by conducting network. We have become one of the key which is one of the most important CFI which we fulfil, and the way we do it is Human factor is one thing, and what about I think we can this time succeed by limiting simulation tests using the South East players and our presence and work are an events which we have hosted annually since highly appreciated by our customers. the infrastructure, tools the JFTC uses in the data that has to be exchanged between the European Exercise and Training Network indispensable part of the Alliance’s training 2011. This is the training that engages “Transformation through Training” – this is execution of training? Were or are changes two systems by using new technical support Exercise Balkan Bridges 2015 that prepared system. most NATO nations and also many partner the JFTC’s motto. Although it refers mainly in those areas equally challenging? tools and services. Thus we can use our us for many of the challenges that we will I would like to use this opportunity to countries who come to Bydgoszcz to to transformation the Alliance undergoes Our largest challenge is combining Simulation experience with JCATS – the JFTC is the face with NRF/VJTF training. Our goal is thank and to congratulate my staff. They check the level of interoperability between thanks to training, it also describes changes, systems that support exercises on different NATO custodian of JCATS - to support the to provide a state of the art training support deserve appreciation for their hard work, their command, control, communications, development the JFTC staff goes through levels. This centre was designed to handle evolving mission. to set the stage for exercises reflecting the professionalism and devotion every day, computers and intelligence systems and and how the centre adjusts to current needs primarily exercises below Joint Operational The training for VJTF and NFIU will make operational reality (train as you operate). however, not every day do I have a possibility ones that other nations use. The JFTC meets thanks to practice. The JFTC is a relatively level, and for that we have a great system our work much more challenging on the to express my gratitude and admiration for high standards required to execute this small unit, however, it is, without a question called JCATS (Joint Conflict And Tactical one hand. On the other, we can prove that If you were to describe the position of what they do. I would like the JFTC staff to extremely challenging event. and doubt, a showcase of NATO training. Simulation system). It does a great job at providing and using our given capabilities the JFTC in the NATO training network, feel proud of what we are achieving and to We cannot forget either about the VJTF. brigade and below and can even be stretched the JFTC can make a difference for the level where would it be? Would execution of know that our work is highly respected in The geopolitical situation in the Eastern Talking about numbers – the JFTC to corps level. Although joint operational level of training execution. The new exercises, NATO training programme be possible the Alliance and the difference it makes is Europe forces NATO nations to change consists of 107 posts only. Conducting and is not our primary task we do have JTLS (Joint in particular VJTF, are far more CAX and without the JFTC? invaluable. ■ certain concepts, strategies and doctrines hosting so many training events, exercises, Theater Level Simulation) which is excellent CIS extensive than those the JFTC has been Possible? – maybe yes. What I am sure of, is related to their own security. In critical areas courses, experiments with total audience for that purpose. The two simulations were involved in by now. We’re going to go from that the quality of NATO training would be Questions asked by of operation NATO nations are capable of between 4 and 6 thousand people a year – never designed to work together. In the past, simple CIS support at a single location incomparably lower without what is undertaken the JFTC Public Affairs Office

6 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 7 Resolute Support to Resolute Support Joint Force Training Centre sets standards for new pre-deployment training

during the exercises, created a professional the event was about building capable, Bydgoszcz, Poland. Half of them were training event that met current needs and confident and cohesive staff, thus creating supporting the next Resolute Support challenges the Alliance faced. effective new HQ. The TAATs on the other Training Event and preparing others for ■ MAJ Goran Pijetlovic, German Army, hand received a standardized preparation the new challenges in Afghanistan and JFTC Public Affairs Officer and Spokesperson COM JFTC Execution for their mission of training, advising and the other half were getting ready for their Ms. Radoslawa Kubiczek, Polish Civilian, assisting their Afghan counterparts and deployment. JFTC Public Affairs Specialist In July 2014, the JFTC conducted the national and regional institutions. During his visit to the training Train Advise Assist Command-North/ Train In November 2014, the Centre area, General Hans-Lothar Domrӧse, the Advise Assist Team (TAAC-N/ TAAT) prepared and executed the first Resolute Commander of the Joint Force Command Training Event. It was not Resolute Support Support TE. Within this exercise, Brunssum, thanked the JFTC Commander training in its current shape, however, it specifically aimed at preparing soldiers for and his staff for the commitment: had been designed for soldiers who were the new mission, advisors and staff both “I could not think of a better facility than going to serve in the first structures of from the Resolute Support Headquarters this in Bydgoszcz. (…) It is best suited for In late 2014 and early 2015 media mission. This was the starting point of a JFTC specialists had to plan, prepare and the new mission. More than 100 soldiers and from Train, Advise, Assist Command training”. all over the world reported on the change planning and tailoring process of the new execute a completely new exercise. from 12 NATO and Partnership for Peace (TAAC) East were trained. “I’m delighted to be back in Poland, to be in NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan. training so it would meet new challenges Nations were trained in this first combined Again in January and February 2015 back in this wonderful training facility in The ISAF combat mission came to an end and needs of the non-combat mission in Tailoring new exercise pre-deployment training. For the future close to 400 people from 27 NATO and Bydgoszcz. It’s a great pleasure to see the and was followed by a new allied endeavor Afghanistan. members of the TAAC-N Headquarters partner nations worked hand in hand in progress that has been achieved here”. ■ - the Resolute Support (RS) mission with The new training had to focus The key element of the preparation the aim of training, advising and assisting primarily on the functionally based train, phase was knowledge base. In the first step Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) advise and assist roles assigned within it was crucial to understand how internal and other institutions on a national level. Afghan ministries, institutions and at procedures in Afghanistan worked and to find Although it was only a short message the ANSF Corps level. Headquarters out about the main challenges that Afghan in majority of the broadcasts, this change personnel dedicated to work in the RS institutions, ministries and ANSF faced. had a fundamental meaning for the Alliance HQ in Kabul, as well as those working Focused on these, teams of planners from the and thus had a vast impact on both the in the regional Train, Advise and Assist JFTC Training Division visited Afghanistan soldiers deployed to Afghanistan and Commands (TAACs) and their advisors several times in order to get a realistic picture institutions responsible for their preparation were to receive the final part of their of the future mission. In theatre they had a for the mission. training before leaving for Afghanistan. chance to build up their knowledge base and Brigadier General Wojciech Grabowski, the JFTC Commander, pointed out main changes and challenges during However, shifting the centre of gravity interact with staff members and advisors in the preparation phase of the future Resolute Support training: New task for JFTC from preparation for a combat mission, the HQs in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. All with the task of establishing a secure the information gathered plus interaction and "First of all we have to change our attitudes. We had to significantly change our training strategy. I will stress it again – the In January 2014 the Joint Force environment, to teaching soldiers how communication laid a perfect foundation for Resolute Support is not a combat mission, but it is a Train, Advice and Assist mission in a combat environment. Those two things Training Centre (JFTC) that formerly to train, advise and assist their Afghan generating a realistic and up-to-date exercise must be combined. Earlier, during the ISAF mission, the troops going to Afghanistan had helicopters, wheeled armored vehicles focused mainly on ISAF pre-deployment counterparts and representatives of scenario for the future JFTC training audience. or aircrafts with them. Now the advisors, their experience and the knowledge we are providing them with are the main weapon training, was given the responsibility ministries and other institutions, was a big A combination of all these with the in-theatre system." for preparing future members of the RS leap into a totally new direction. Therefore Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) support

8 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 9 Resolute Support to Resolute Support Joint Force Training Centre sets standards for new pre-deployment training

8 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 9 Resolute Support Advisory Training

Mistakes can be made in training, lessons JFTC advisory training is to permit the RS training designed to maintain and improve learnt and then additional practice provided advisors to practice acting as functional the Advisor’s proficiency in mission- in order to achieve a competent level of experts, and then in time advise in support essential tasks comprised of responsibilities from several functional areas / directorates ■ MAJ Ronald Roy, Canadian Army, proficiency. Advising requires formalized of ANDSF units in theatre. RS Advisors training to develop those special sets of can also provide a liaison capability / divisions. The training aim for the RS JFTC Training Division techniques used by any military advisor. This between ANDSF and NATO forces in order advisors during the BST is to prepare article will explore the JFTC advisory training to coordinate the planning of operations. for future operations with a focus on model and uncover how these special sets of The JFTC Advisor Training Model understanding NATO concepts and tasks advising techniques are utilized and practiced consists of three distinct parts - Mission in theatre. These SMEs led and monitored within the RS Training Events. Specific Training (MST), Battle Staff tasks include interaction with their Afghan RS advisors are employed at all levels Training (BST) and then the Battle Staff partners on a daily basis, interacting with of command from the Training Advise Training plus (BST+). the RS HQ staff on a daily or weekly basis, In July 2014, the JFTC executed its first Assist Command (TAAC) up through to the being involved in Operational Planning Train Advise Assist Team (TAAT) training in RS HQ and into the Ministries of Defense JFTC Advisor Training Model Teams (OPT) within RS HQ, and tracking support of Resolute Support. There have been and Interior. The RS advisors are NATO observations / problems through the RS three subsequent training events since then personnel from various countries that are HQ Staff process. The BST + is the last (Resolute Support (RS) 14-2, RS 15-1 and to be assigned to specific key personnel module provided by JFTC, again at the RS 15-2) with an average of 70 advisors per within each ANDSF Corps Headquarters, tactical level. During this last phase the RS training event. Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior MST BST BST+ advisors take the lead (SMEs now take a For the purpose of this article an (Commanders, G1 thru G6 staff officers backseat role) and now integrate with both Advisor is a person who gives an opinion or and other key like functions). During their ANDSF counterparts and the wider a suggestion to an equally experienced person JFTC Training Events, RS advisors are MST is the first module provided by Staff through the provision of FRAGO to about what or how something could be done grouped in teams of eight and are led by a JFTC and is at the tactical level. It consists initiate interaction in a vignette format. but does not makes decisions about how the Recently Redeployed SME or a Contractor of a combination of specified lectures, A Vignette is a brief description, events or activates are executed. A mentor SME. The Recently Redeployed SME panel discussion and briefings delivered by account or short action which evokes is a person who teaches or gives help and or a Contractor SME main function is to the SMEs on specific topics dealing with a reaction or initiates staff work. The advice to a less experienced and often younger provide a forum in which an exchange the pre-deployment training and focused on use of this training method exposes the person but does not makes decisions about of information and experience can occur the theatre environment. During this part training audience to new approaches how the events or activities are executed. between the SME and the RS advisor. First of the training, RS advisors’ are focused on and creates discussion. Vignettes also To say that anyone who is a Subject and foremost the RS advisors are members initiating internal team SOPs, developing provide for a deeper understanding of Matter Expert (SME) in a field or branch of their National Military organization and team spirit, preparing for the BST and the influences culture awareness, honour can then become an advisor is to veer from not that of Afghanistan. The RS advisors liaison with the Staff. BST is the second and respect has within any professional the truth. Advising is an acquired skill are trained to associate themselves with module provided by the JFTC, again at relationship. These sessions allow for or ability that requires specialist training. their ANDSF counterparts and are only the tactical level, and is a demonstration SMEs to introduce specific tools and (Some of the skills or abilities are stated in a conduit between Coalition Forces and phase led by SMEs. The BST provides tips to support the preparation of the the following figure. USIP Slide the ANDSF. The primary focus of the the training audience with an integrated interaction. This situation brings together

10 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 11 Resolute Support Advisory Training

10 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 11 actual advisors and their interpreters with Through respectful and honest real Afghan staff officers from various discussions / interactions, the RS advisors Afghan Regions and, using these current in attempt to establish common ground, theatre scenarios, tasks them to produce or thus permitting him/ her to gain the trust discuss a way for resolution. This formula between his/her ANDSF Partner. RS results in Advisors interacting with their advisors from theatre have noted that ANDSF partners by way of arranged face every conversation is a negotiation and to face daily meetings, thus establishing a that they are never really off duty. There professional relationship. The RS advisors are situations where the RS advisors were utilize his/her listening skills to develop required to be humble and empathize with trust, credibility and confidence which their Afghan counter partner in order to will result in them being able to influence maintain the advisor/ advisee relationship. his/her ANDSF partner. JFTC Training Events encourage RS During the BST and BST+, there Advisors to be curious as to how the current are 42 vignettes covering all issues Afghan system/ procedures function from corrupting to female recruiting to within theatre, the creation of an Afghan logistical support problems to budgets to technical or practical solution to the issue. planning operations. These 42 vignettes The increase in culture awareness is key are divided into two groups. Group one to any successful engagement for an RS This approach is taught and practiced were no longer available to support value to their advisee and thus increase furthermore they learn that Afghan failures (24 Vignettes) is designated as Senior advisor. He/she gains this knowledge during each interaction within each the ANDSF; instead, their weapons their influence on their primary advisee. are not their failures and that all RS Advisor interactions and results in follow- through observations and being open- training event at the JFTC. are their enthusiasm, sense of humor Success is always in terms of little steps. advisors are not there to win the argument on meetings between RS HQ senior staff minded while in Afghanistan. Coalition Each interaction requires many and daily commitment in seeing the They are most definitely evolutionary each time. RS Advisors are professional and/or Afghan partners. The second Force culture and way of operating is hours of preparatory work for the ANDSF succeed in establishing a long steps rather than revolutionary ones. competent officers and the requirement group (18 Vignettes) is designated as not necessarily appropriate or acceptable team and even more patience when term sustainable solution to all issue. Through this interactive and tested for specialized advisory training at JFTC stand-alone interaction and no further staff to our Afghan partners. Patience, working with their Afghan partners. By recommending realistic goals model the JFTC is able to impart key is of benefit to them in order that they action is required after the interaction has understanding and flexibility of approach It is said that “we westerners have a within the Afghan ways and means, training messages. Training audiences learn can understand their Afghan counterparts been completed. For all 42 vignettes, in the RS advisor are essential elements to watch but an Afghan has all the time”. the RS advisors maintained rapport, that they are not commanders but honest and achieve mission success of “Train/ all team members are in the room when a successful interaction. The Figure below The RS advisors have to learn that gain credibility, demonstrate their brokers for their Afghan counterparts, Advise/ Assist”. ■ the interaction between the Afghan illustrates this developmental model. ISAF weapons and combat enablers and advisor occurs – whilst only two training audience are actually involved, the others as observers (or as our Afghan partners describe them “Ghosts in the Room”). After each interaction there is a consolidated after action review. All team members, the Afghan partner and interpreter are present for the review. All RS advisors learn from each other’s positive and negative points for each interaction. The RS advisors not only built their relationship on each interaction but also their confidence. The vignettes were staged in progressively harder and more complex issues so that the RS advisors were always challenged in their advisory skills. The most complex and challenging vignettes involve the political / religious / ethic and gender issues, indeed, these are typically assigned to the most experienced Senior Advisors so as to not destroy the less experience advisors’ as they gain confidence.

12 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 13 actual advisors and their interpreters with Through respectful and honest real Afghan staff officers from various discussions / interactions, the RS advisors Afghan Regions and, using these current in attempt to establish common ground, theatre scenarios, tasks them to produce or thus permitting him/ her to gain the trust discuss a way for resolution. This formula between his/her ANDSF Partner. RS results in Advisors interacting with their advisors from theatre have noted that ANDSF partners by way of arranged face every conversation is a negotiation and to face daily meetings, thus establishing a that they are never really off duty. There professional relationship. The RS advisors are situations where the RS advisors were utilize his/her listening skills to develop required to be humble and empathize with trust, credibility and confidence which their Afghan counter partner in order to will result in them being able to influence maintain the advisor/ advisee relationship. his/her ANDSF partner. JFTC Training Events encourage RS During the BST and BST+, there Advisors to be curious as to how the current are 42 vignettes covering all issues Afghan system/ procedures function from corrupting to female recruiting to within theatre, the creation of an Afghan logistical support problems to budgets to technical or practical solution to the issue. planning operations. These 42 vignettes The increase in culture awareness is key are divided into two groups. Group one to any successful engagement for an RS This approach is taught and practiced were no longer available to support value to their advisee and thus increase furthermore they learn that Afghan failures (24 Vignettes) is designated as Senior advisor. He/she gains this knowledge during each interaction within each the ANDSF; instead, their weapons their influence on their primary advisee. are not their failures and that all RS Advisor interactions and results in follow- through observations and being open- training event at the JFTC. are their enthusiasm, sense of humor Success is always in terms of little steps. advisors are not there to win the argument on meetings between RS HQ senior staff minded while in Afghanistan. Coalition Each interaction requires many and daily commitment in seeing the They are most definitely evolutionary each time. RS Advisors are professional and/or Afghan partners. The second Force culture and way of operating is hours of preparatory work for the ANDSF succeed in establishing a long steps rather than revolutionary ones. competent officers and the requirement group (18 Vignettes) is designated as not necessarily appropriate or acceptable team and even more patience when term sustainable solution to all issue. Through this interactive and tested for specialized advisory training at JFTC stand-alone interaction and no further staff to our Afghan partners. Patience, working with their Afghan partners. By recommending realistic goals model the JFTC is able to impart key is of benefit to them in order that they action is required after the interaction has understanding and flexibility of approach It is said that “we westerners have a within the Afghan ways and means, training messages. Training audiences learn can understand their Afghan counterparts been completed. For all 42 vignettes, in the RS advisor are essential elements to watch but an Afghan has all the time”. the RS advisors maintained rapport, that they are not commanders but honest and achieve mission success of “Train/ all team members are in the room when a successful interaction. The Figure below The RS advisors have to learn that gain credibility, demonstrate their brokers for their Afghan counterparts, Advise/ Assist”. ■ the interaction between the Afghan illustrates this developmental model. ISAF weapons and combat enablers and advisor occurs – whilst only two training audience are actually involved, the others as observers (or as our Afghan partners describe them “Ghosts in the Room”). After each interaction there is a consolidated after action review. All team members, the Afghan partner and interpreter are present for the review. All RS advisors learn from each other’s positive and negative points for each interaction. The RS advisors not only built their relationship on each interaction but also their confidence. The vignettes were staged in progressively harder and more complex issues so that the RS advisors were always challenged in their advisory skills. The most complex and challenging vignettes involve the political / religious / ethic and gender issues, indeed, these are typically assigned to the most experienced Senior Advisors so as to not destroy the less experience advisors’ as they gain confidence.

12 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 13 2015 CWIX is Fuelling the Evolution of JFTC

■ MAJ Alex Vershinin, US Army, CD&E Section Head, JFTC Training Support Division

Another edition of the annual SACT- to expanded cloud. The JFTC has kept the level training and National tactical level led Coalition Warrior Interoperability pace with the industry’s embrace of the training. CWIX is the one event where eXploration, eXperimentation, eXamination, virtualization technology. For the third the JFTC can test the systems and develop eXercise (CWIX) opened on 8 June year in a row we offered participating procedures that support the future training 2015. For this key event, 21 Nations nations vCloud service for their testing events. It is in this role, aided by residence and NATO agencies came together needs. The benefits were tremendous. experience and CWIX triggered flexibility to the Joint Force Training Centre The nations could configure their systems that makes the JFTC the future place for (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland, for ahead of time from remote locations, training NATO’s most current formation, three weeks to test interoperability of saving time which was then used for more the VJTF. their communication systems, as well tests. They needed less equipment hence The future of CWIX looks bright. as Modelling and Simulation (M&S) lower transportation costs. Over the years This year alone, six additional NATO platforms. Over the last two decades CWIX facilitated steady expansion to the nations have expressed interest in joining NATO has grown to 28 nations. At the cloud service to generate room for more CWIX. Among those nations are such same time national command and control clients. Eventually our goal is to place long term members as Spain as well systems have grown in complexity the majority of CWIX participants on the as newer members such as Albania, especially since all NATO nations have cloud servers. Slovakia and the Baltic States. Even the pursued their own unique command The growth of vCloud at CWIX EU and the newest NATO partners such and control systems. CWIX is the one fuels our evolution at the JFTC. Not only as Montenegro have started looking at place where NATO nations can come does the expanding vCloud service expand CWIX as an event important to their together and technically test their ability our technical ability to host more clients, future. to operate together. This interoperability generating larger and more realistic Undoubtedly the growth of CWIX is the backbone of multinational NATO exercises but it also builds up our staff will bring new challenges as the capability operation. Without it no future NATO expertise at bridging national and NATO and network capacity at JFTC will be mission can be successful. systems. One of the JFTC’s functions is a stretched but the experienced and highly CWIX 2015 spurred JFTC efforts Gateway between NATO Joint Operational skilled JFTC CWIX team will take it on. ■

14 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 15 2015 CWIX is Fuelling the Evolution of JFTC

■ MAJ Alex Vershinin, US Army, CD&E Section Head, JFTC Training Support Division

14 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 15 JFTC and NCIA The Team Behind CWIX 2015

■ MAJ Alex Vershinin, US Army, CD&E Section Head, JFTC Training Support Division

It has already been five years since period, CWIX brought together engineers, Control (C2) networks. During the Afghan configure their virtualized systems from more companies and organizations processed, NCIA, which owned and operated most of the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) technicians and operational users, from 21 mission it took several years to create their locations in advance of arriving at stored and maintained their data on the cloud the JFTC’s technical infrastructure, was able became the home for the Coalition Nations and Agencies, to test interoperability Afghan Mission Network. It allowed the JFTC. They did not have to bring their accessing it remotely from different locations. to fully integrate with the JFTC battle lab, Warrior Interoperability eXploration, between different information systems in entire ISAF coalition sharing real time own hardware and instead relied on virtual After 2 years of testing and exploring the which was owned and operated by JFTC eXperimentation and eXamination eXercise Bydgoszcz, Poland and 21 testing sites information across the entire coalition and infrastructure available at JFTC. This potentials of this technology, JFTC together Wargaming branch. Whenever one of the (CWIX). Before this year’s edition of distributed throughout Europe and North was vital to ISAF’s success. The CFI and conserved the physical space, saved energy, with NCIA CSU Bydgoszcz fielded with Agencies had a short fall in one area, it was CWIX, the Centre was working hand in America. They brought together 181 the FMN seek to capitalize on successes of reduced heat output and shipping costs of success vCloud Director that is has opened its able to immediately rely on its partner to hand with the NATO Communications capability configurationsin key testing areas the Afghan Mission Network, capture its moving expensive equipment. doors for more CWIX participants. backfill the gap, providing seamless service to and Information Agency CIS Support Unit of Cyber Defense, the Federated Mission lessons and create a framework for future Furthermore, IaaS (Infrastructure as the CWIX community. Bydgoszcz (NCIA CSU Bydgoszcz) to Networking, and Friendly Force Tracking. deployable networks which can be set up in a Service) service model implemented at Cooperation make major refinements to the exercise by a matter of months instead of years, giving JFTC reached out beyond that. It is believed Future improving the money saving cloud services Why CWIX? NATO rapid crisis response ability. CWIX that on-demand infrastructure provisioning, NCIA and JFTC, represented by at the JFTC facility in Bydgoszcz, Poland. is where the concept takes life and nations resource pooling together with dynamic Training Support Division, have reached an The future of CWIX is bright. The Through close cooperation the team in The importance of CWIX cannot have a chance to test, document and refine resources reassigning and flexibility it unprecedented level of cooperation. NCIA’s event furthers the NATO’s interoperability Poland has made sure that the future be understated. It is the largest annual the interoperability of their C2 systems. offered, changed the model of CWIX efforts were led by its Interface and Integration and promotes the closer integration of of CWIX and allied interoperability will NATO approved event of its kind. CWIX capabilities experimentation and testing. It Engineer Waldemar Slifarski. Thanks to him the Alliance. Together the Bydgoszcz continue to remain a success. is designed to bring about continuous The cloud service at CWIX sped up the capabilities deployment and and his technical support team, together with team of NCIA and JFTC will continue improvement in interoperability for the reconfiguration process, extended the Fulvio Postogna, a JFTC CIS engineer, the to improve the smooth running of this What is CWIX? Alliance and Partner Nations. It is one of the The cloud service for CWIX experimentation windows and provided new service provided by technical infrastructure important event. Within the cloud area driving test beds for the “Smart Defense” was started in 2013 with the twin aim performance and productivity indicators. at JFTC has greatly improved. What was the next targets are PaaS (Platform as a CWIX is a Military Committee concept and the “Connected Forces of reducing the hardware shipment and The second aim of JFTC IaaS most striking was the ability of JFTC’s CIS Service) and SaaS (Software as a Service) directed annual program designed to Initiative” (CFI). It builds interoperability promoting mobile computing field in implementation was to promote cloud branch and NCIA to work together, share service models that are more advanced support the continuous improvement to and facilitates a common framework for NATO. In obvious terms of practical computing within NATO. Over the recent expertise and exploit their respective strengths cloud computing capabilities, aiming at interoperability for the Alliance and Partner Alliance members and Partner Nations equipment reduction, cloud service years cloud computing has become one of the at just the right place. It allowed CWIX making the JFTC infrastructure even more Nations. In 2015 over the three week to “plug and play” their Command and is invaluable. It allowed the nations to main driving forces in the industry. More and to be a success every year. For example, attractive to the CWIX participants. ■

16 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 17 JFTC and NCIA The Team Behind CWIX 2015

■ MAJ Alex Vershinin, US Army, CD&E Section Head, JFTC Training Support Division

16 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 17 making process by the TA is simplified M&S’s Role in Training & Exercise Planning & Management Tools. and significantly improved; thereby greatly Exercise These primary tools are used everywhere. Modelling and Simulation increasing the successful outcome of the See the above graphic regarding the stages overall exercise. M&S tools can be divided into four and phases of their use. The Joint Exercise It is too technical. M&S has kept up categories: Management Module (JEMM) is a planner with all the technical advances of the time. As tool for structuring exercise scenarios and in the Exercise Process soon as a new application has proven itself in (1) Exercise Planning & Management defining action timing. Other planning tools the commercial sector, the M&S community Tools are the Training Objective Management quickly follows suit in incorporating that (2) Constructive Simulation Systems & Module (TOMM), and the EXCON technology to its models. Case in point: the Ancillary Tools De-Confliction Matrix. How to Demystify the Devil use of virtual software (known by many as (3) Interfaces to C2 & Functional Area the cloud) has revolutionized the ability of Services Constructive Simulation Systems & distributing M&S to customers who normally (4) Experimentation & Analysis Tools Ancillary Tools. These simulation systems do not have the resources to support such are used for Stages 2 & 3; and also in Phase distributions. But too much technology is not This would be a good time to be reminded of III. The simulations at the JFTC include: (1) bad; when it is utilized for the simplification the stages and phases of the NATO Training the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation of efforts conducted by the TA. M&S is Doctrine (Directive 75-3), which are as (JCATS) for Operational/Tactical level ■ David Dominicci, US Civilian, constantly striving to achieve that goal. follows: training; (2) the Virtual Battle Space (VBS) It increases the risk of failure. JFTC Training Support Division On for Tactical/Individual level training; and the contrary, M&S actually reduces the risk lastly (3) the Joint Theater Level Simulation Stage 1: Concept & Specification of failure from the TA perspective; because Development (JTLS). The Exercise Information Services M&S can inform the EXCON of anticipated Stage 2: Planning & Product (EXIS) platform is for managing information problems ahead of time, so that they can Development from multiple M&S systems and providing alter scenarios in order to minimize the risk Stage 3: Operational Conduct – With the tools in exercise planning and execution Welcome to an introduction to contrary to the Commander’s wishes (such audience. Remember, all the TA should see is of failure. M&S can also solve potential Following Four Phases: processes; and is a vital link between the Modelling and Simulation (M&S), and how as inadvertent blue-on-blue engagements; the COP; not any of the M&S that feeds that problems quickly, which in turn insures that Phase I: Foundation Training EXCON and the TA. it assists in a NATO training and exercise destruction of a high-value unit, etc.). COP. the CAX stays on track of achieving all the Phase II: Crisis Response Planning event scenario. Our intent is to give you TOs set out for the TA. Phase III: Execution Interfaces to C2 & Functional Area a better understanding of M&S; and how What M&S is Not Preconceived Notions about Phase IV: Assessment Services. These interfaces are used in Stage How Does M&S Make it improves the goal of meeting all the M&S Stage 4: Analysis & Reporting 3 and Phase III as denoted above. In addition a Difference Training Objectives (TOs) for the Training Something to be afraid of. M&S to EXIS, another interface is the Networked Audience (TA) during a particular event. In is computers; and yes, there are still many It is too complex and hard to How the M&S tools fit into the NATO Interoperable Real-Time Information Services other words, to demystify the devil of M&S among us that are leery of relying on technical understand. There are many in the military It increases the quality of products. Stages and Phases are not easy to describe; (NIRIS) system. from your psyche. tools. But the bottom line is that technology that have the opinion that M&S in a CAX is By products we mean all the resources that therefore, the below graphic shows the Experimentation and analysis tools. EXIS, has and will continue to improve the quality of too hard for a regular soldier to comprehend. insure that only the highest quality training relationship that each of the tool categories JEMM, and batch files from JCATS are tools What is M&S life of everyone who embraces it. That cannot be further from the truth. The is provided to the TA. Achieving the best has to each one: used by the Observers/Trainers (O/Ts) in A compromise to training objectives. fact-of-the-matter is that, for the TA, M&S possible COP is just a function of this. M&S is a technical capability to To make it clear, M&S is a tool to achieve is transparent to them. Unless the TA is Through joint cooperation by the Training provide realistic conditions of field action the ultimate outcome of any Computer- providing augmentees as “Pucksters” (model Division (TD) and the Training Support in a synthetic way. To put it another way, Assisted Exercise (CAX); which is meeting operators) to the Exercise Control (EXCON) Division (TSD) at the Joint Force Training it is the art of using tools, physical and or surpassing the assigned TOs for the TA. section of the CAX, there is no need to even Centre (JFTC), the quality of the Training to conceptual models, and computer hardware Every CAX is built toward the successful be aware that M&S is being utilized; let alone meet the TOs are insured; which ultimately and software, in order to create artificial completion of the exercise TOs; never the having to be trained in an applicable Model. means better trained soldiers. realism in a training environment. other way around. This leads us to the next notion. The Training Audience gets a more It is an essential element to Extra work for unclear reasons with It will make our life too complicated. realistic experience; which means better achieving the goal of “Train as you no reward. Yes, M&S is a lot of work; but Many think that the TA’s daily routines will Training. By M&S providing as much Fight”. It may be viewed as cliché, but not on the part of the TA. A simulation center be complicated because of M&S; when in realism to the scenarios as possible, which the best training has always been when uses multiple resources in manpower and fact the opposite is true. M&S exists to in turn translates to better training to all that the most realism takes place, to include machines that they bring to bear in order to provide a realistic COP of the Battlefield. make up the TA. M&S also provides more all the uncertainties associated within the provide a realistic Common Operating Picture Any Command & Control expert will tell efficient operation of the EXCON, primarily “Fog of War”. M&S provides that realism, (COP) to the TA, while at the same time you that when the COP is kept accurately in its role of insuring de-confliction of complete with some outcomes that may be maintaining an M&S transparency to that and expediently updated, the decision- scenarios; maximizing mobility of units; etc.

18 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 19 making process by the TA is simplified M&S’s Role in Training & Exercise Planning & Management Tools. and significantly improved; thereby greatly Exercise These primary tools are used everywhere. Modelling and Simulation increasing the successful outcome of the See the above graphic regarding the stages overall exercise. M&S tools can be divided into four and phases of their use. The Joint Exercise It is too technical. M&S has kept up categories: Management Module (JEMM) is a planner with all the technical advances of the time. As tool for structuring exercise scenarios and in the Exercise Process soon as a new application has proven itself in (1) Exercise Planning & Management defining action timing. Other planning tools the commercial sector, the M&S community Tools are the Training Objective Management quickly follows suit in incorporating that (2) Constructive Simulation Systems & Module (TOMM), and the EXCON technology to its models. Case in point: the Ancillary Tools De-Confliction Matrix. How to Demystify the Devil use of virtual software (known by many as (3) Interfaces to C2 & Functional Area the cloud) has revolutionized the ability of Services Constructive Simulation Systems & distributing M&S to customers who normally (4) Experimentation & Analysis Tools Ancillary Tools. These simulation systems do not have the resources to support such are used for Stages 2 & 3; and also in Phase distributions. But too much technology is not This would be a good time to be reminded of III. The simulations at the JFTC include: (1) bad; when it is utilized for the simplification the stages and phases of the NATO Training the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation of efforts conducted by the TA. M&S is Doctrine (Directive 75-3), which are as (JCATS) for Operational/Tactical level ■ David Dominicci, US Civilian, constantly striving to achieve that goal. follows: training; (2) the Virtual Battle Space (VBS) It increases the risk of failure. JFTC Training Support Division On for Tactical/Individual level training; and the contrary, M&S actually reduces the risk lastly (3) the Joint Theater Level Simulation Stage 1: Concept & Specification of failure from the TA perspective; because Development (JTLS). The Exercise Information Services M&S can inform the EXCON of anticipated Stage 2: Planning & Product (EXIS) platform is for managing information problems ahead of time, so that they can Development from multiple M&S systems and providing alter scenarios in order to minimize the risk Stage 3: Operational Conduct – With the tools in exercise planning and execution Welcome to an introduction to contrary to the Commander’s wishes (such audience. Remember, all the TA should see is of failure. M&S can also solve potential Following Four Phases: processes; and is a vital link between the Modelling and Simulation (M&S), and how as inadvertent blue-on-blue engagements; the COP; not any of the M&S that feeds that problems quickly, which in turn insures that Phase I: Foundation Training EXCON and the TA. it assists in a NATO training and exercise destruction of a high-value unit, etc.). COP. the CAX stays on track of achieving all the Phase II: Crisis Response Planning event scenario. Our intent is to give you TOs set out for the TA. Phase III: Execution Interfaces to C2 & Functional Area a better understanding of M&S; and how What M&S is Not Preconceived Notions about Phase IV: Assessment Services. These interfaces are used in Stage How Does M&S Make it improves the goal of meeting all the M&S Stage 4: Analysis & Reporting 3 and Phase III as denoted above. In addition a Difference Training Objectives (TOs) for the Training Something to be afraid of. M&S to EXIS, another interface is the Networked Audience (TA) during a particular event. In is computers; and yes, there are still many It is too complex and hard to How the M&S tools fit into the NATO Interoperable Real-Time Information Services other words, to demystify the devil of M&S among us that are leery of relying on technical understand. There are many in the military It increases the quality of products. Stages and Phases are not easy to describe; (NIRIS) system. from your psyche. tools. But the bottom line is that technology that have the opinion that M&S in a CAX is By products we mean all the resources that therefore, the below graphic shows the Experimentation and analysis tools. EXIS, has and will continue to improve the quality of too hard for a regular soldier to comprehend. insure that only the highest quality training relationship that each of the tool categories JEMM, and batch files from JCATS are tools What is M&S life of everyone who embraces it. That cannot be further from the truth. The is provided to the TA. Achieving the best has to each one: used by the Observers/Trainers (O/Ts) in A compromise to training objectives. fact-of-the-matter is that, for the TA, M&S possible COP is just a function of this. M&S is a technical capability to To make it clear, M&S is a tool to achieve is transparent to them. Unless the TA is Through joint cooperation by the Training provide realistic conditions of field action the ultimate outcome of any Computer- providing augmentees as “Pucksters” (model Division (TD) and the Training Support in a synthetic way. To put it another way, Assisted Exercise (CAX); which is meeting operators) to the Exercise Control (EXCON) Division (TSD) at the Joint Force Training it is the art of using tools, physical and or surpassing the assigned TOs for the TA. section of the CAX, there is no need to even Centre (JFTC), the quality of the Training to conceptual models, and computer hardware Every CAX is built toward the successful be aware that M&S is being utilized; let alone meet the TOs are insured; which ultimately and software, in order to create artificial completion of the exercise TOs; never the having to be trained in an applicable Model. means better trained soldiers. realism in a training environment. other way around. This leads us to the next notion. The Training Audience gets a more It is an essential element to Extra work for unclear reasons with It will make our life too complicated. realistic experience; which means better achieving the goal of “Train as you no reward. Yes, M&S is a lot of work; but Many think that the TA’s daily routines will Training. By M&S providing as much Fight”. It may be viewed as cliché, but not on the part of the TA. A simulation center be complicated because of M&S; when in realism to the scenarios as possible, which the best training has always been when uses multiple resources in manpower and fact the opposite is true. M&S exists to in turn translates to better training to all that the most realism takes place, to include machines that they bring to bear in order to provide a realistic COP of the Battlefield. make up the TA. M&S also provides more all the uncertainties associated within the provide a realistic Common Operating Picture Any Command & Control expert will tell efficient operation of the EXCON, primarily “Fog of War”. M&S provides that realism, (COP) to the TA, while at the same time you that when the COP is kept accurately in its role of insuring de-confliction of complete with some outcomes that may be maintaining an M&S transparency to that and expediently updated, the decision- scenarios; maximizing mobility of units; etc.

18 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 19 many stages and phases (see the graphic EXCON wants them to venture; or redirect them conditions for team building. above), to aid in the After Action Review as necessary if they are drifting off on a tangent. (AAR) process. They can also be used It also allows the TA to maintain situational Citadel Bonus (CIBS) 2015. This Battle for experimenting new future capabilities, awareness and time-space-force consistency Staff Training (BST) event will train the The Treason Files such as EXIS, which is in the last phases of with their units and other coalition partners. Rapid Reaction Corps-France (RRC-FR) in its research and development (R&D); and the refinement of its Integrated Component Mobile O/T, which was tested in a recent Realism and consistency throughout the Command Land (ICC-L) Command Post Countering the Threat from British Nationals Resolute Support (RS) exercise. exercise – Again, making the CAX as real (CP) organization. as possible thru the use of M&S makes the The Advantages of using M&S training seem as realistic as if one was actually Georgia 2016. Still in its planning on the battlefield; without any added manpower. infancy, this event will allow JFTC the Loyal to Forces beyond the Crown For EXCON: Recent exercises at JFTC have utilized live UAV ability to mentor Georgia in the preparation feeds from VBS into the training scenarios; process for hosting a non-NATO operated Proper design of the script – Success or providing that added edge of realism for the TA multinational exercise. failure of any CAX can rest in the successful to utilize and explore further. prior planning of the scenarios; and subsequent Trident Joust 2016. This exercise is for editing as necessary to insure that TOs are to be Proper “Perceived Truth” based on sensors validating NATO’s upcoming Very High achieved. The use of the right tools can make – An accurate “Perceived Truth” is essential to Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). This that a reality. proper training of the TA. No cheating can be is to be a brigade that will be able to deploy allowed. If no sensor exists in a certain area: within 48 hours; part of the NATO Response ■ Christopher McKeating, GBR Civilian Full view of the exercise with the Opposing the units in that area cannot be seen, pure and Force (NRF), NATO’s high-readiness force Forces (OPFOR) – Keeping an accurate COP simple. comprising land, air, sea and Special Forces is essential to the success of any CAX. This units capable of rapid deployment wherever is especially true when it comes to the “Game Upcoming Events Using M&S needed. Truth” view that EXCON sees with the OPFOR. M&S is the engine that feeds that “Game Truth”. South East European Exercise and Training Summary Network (SEEETN) – Balkan Bridges. Total control, and altering as necessary to SEEETN-Balkan Bridges, consisting of M&S does make a difference for insure training objectives are met – EXCON nine NATO and Partner nations, builds on better, more realistic training to the TA, by This essay is an abridged version in the Autumn issue of the JFTC journal. it does not accept British extremism as can edit the scenarios as necessary in order to NATO’s Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) maintaining an accurate COP, and negating of the research to date and has been If you would like to contribute to this the root cause of it. That the response to insure that the TOs are met; M&S can makes in support of national linkages of JFTC with the chance of a latent, or worst yet, blank designed not to argue each position analysis, please send your feedback to the phenomenon entails a ‘generational changes quickly and accurately. the technical capabilities of Albania, Bosnia COP. or provide references, but to elicit [email protected] struggle’ i.e. open-ended conflict with a and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav M&S also insures that the EXCON feedback and guide the ‘reader’ through The research was initiated as vaguely defined enemy, is also rejected: Proper execution of all muscle movements Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Greece, is more efficient in its operation; and can the author’s hypothesis. Although based a consequence of the British Prime ‘learning to live with terrorism’ and – Important events can be planned early and Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Turkey. make quicker decisions on the direction of the on a literary review, the hypothesis is Minister’s declaration that the country having to endure a deep-rooted, meticulously in order to insure their success. exercise, while using fewer personnel. being tested for its qualitative value faces a “greater and deeper threat protracted conflict, with no guarantees, Also, quick and seamless edits can be made Coalition Warrior Interoperability M&S can simulate a complex joint through the commentary of 143 senior to our security than we have known is but one school of thought and does on-the-fly to minimize any deviations. Exploration Experimentation Examination environment, complete with air assets; and professionals and practitioners from before” and that “we are in the midst not have to be the answer – there are Exercise (CWIX) 2015. This exercise can augment that environment with relative across NATO, including British and of a generational struggle.” That the alternatives. Maintaining a consistent picture and control is a North Atlantic Council (NAC) ease, in order to meet the TOs of the TA. American Generals, Admirals and country’s social heritage and cultural The hypothesis is that the of all exercise tasking. Using the EXCON endorsed, Military Committee directed Lastly, M&S is able to support training Ministers of State. Through triangulation capital could be at risk of a long-term phenomenon is a consequence of a De-confliction Matrix the EXCON can be more and Consultation, Command and Control with real troops working with a Headquarters with literary sources and an analysis clash with radicalisation, extremism and global insurgency against the West efficient in its operation. (C3) Board guided Bi-Strategic Command in a joint environment with minimal assets to of any consensus as to the extent of terrorism hence lies at the heart of and that any delay in confronting it (Bi-SC) annual programme designed to bear. the threat and the measures needed this paper and provides the framework as such risks the militarization of Better computer-aided observation support the continuous improvement of Hopefully, we have eliminated any to confront the threat, their comments to: 1) further an understanding of nationals loyal to forces beyond the collections. O/Ts can obtain collections in a interoperability for the Alliance. perceived negative opinions of M&S; or in will be studied to: (1) contextualise the the phenomenon of British citizens Crown. It is further argued that the more timely, accurate, and efficient manner. other words, demystified the M&S devil contemporary nature of the threat and adopting loyalties beyond the Crown, 2) ideological, counter-terrorist approach Resolute Support (RS) 15-3. This exercise from your mind. M&S really is a force the implications of failing to engage it assessing the threat that they pose and to confronting extremism in the United For the TA: is to educate Individual Augmentees (IAs) multiplier that can improve overall training and (2) conceptualise the viability of 3) providing an insight as to how this Kingdom, not only underestimates, but of the TA on the mission specifics of RS throughout NATO; and is very much in suppressing the phenomenon through the threat might best be countered. exacerbates the potential for internecine A proper COP – Maintaining an accurate in Afghanistan; train the TA that will be keeping with the spirit of CFI. Its utility proposed process of ‘defragmenting’. Whilst the research accepts the conflict. The alternative proposed for picture insures that the TA is venturing where the assigned to advisor roles; and lastly create is a win-win for all those involved. ■ The results of this analysis will appear government’s assessment of the threat Britain is to optimize the response to

20 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 21 many stages and phases (see the graphic EXCON wants them to venture; or redirect them conditions for team building. above), to aid in the After Action Review as necessary if they are drifting off on a tangent. (AAR) process. They can also be used It also allows the TA to maintain situational Citadel Bonus (CIBS) 2015. This Battle for experimenting new future capabilities, awareness and time-space-force consistency Staff Training (BST) event will train the The Treason Files such as EXIS, which is in the last phases of with their units and other coalition partners. Rapid Reaction Corps-France (RRC-FR) in its research and development (R&D); and the refinement of its Integrated Component Mobile O/T, which was tested in a recent Realism and consistency throughout the Command Land (ICC-L) Command Post Countering the Threat from British Nationals Resolute Support (RS) exercise. exercise – Again, making the CAX as real (CP) organization. as possible thru the use of M&S makes the The Advantages of using M&S training seem as realistic as if one was actually Georgia 2016. Still in its planning on the battlefield; without any added manpower. infancy, this event will allow JFTC the Loyal to Forces beyond the Crown For EXCON: Recent exercises at JFTC have utilized live UAV ability to mentor Georgia in the preparation feeds from VBS into the training scenarios; process for hosting a non-NATO operated Proper design of the script – Success or providing that added edge of realism for the TA multinational exercise. failure of any CAX can rest in the successful to utilize and explore further. prior planning of the scenarios; and subsequent Trident Joust 2016. This exercise is for editing as necessary to insure that TOs are to be Proper “Perceived Truth” based on sensors validating NATO’s upcoming Very High achieved. The use of the right tools can make – An accurate “Perceived Truth” is essential to Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). This that a reality. proper training of the TA. No cheating can be is to be a brigade that will be able to deploy allowed. If no sensor exists in a certain area: within 48 hours; part of the NATO Response ■ Christopher McKeating, GBR Civilian Full view of the exercise with the Opposing the units in that area cannot be seen, pure and Force (NRF), NATO’s high-readiness force Forces (OPFOR) – Keeping an accurate COP simple. comprising land, air, sea and Special Forces is essential to the success of any CAX. This units capable of rapid deployment wherever is especially true when it comes to the “Game Upcoming Events Using M&S needed. Truth” view that EXCON sees with the OPFOR. M&S is the engine that feeds that “Game Truth”. South East European Exercise and Training Summary Network (SEEETN) – Balkan Bridges. Total control, and altering as necessary to SEEETN-Balkan Bridges, consisting of M&S does make a difference for insure training objectives are met – EXCON nine NATO and Partner nations, builds on better, more realistic training to the TA, by This essay is an abridged version in the Autumn issue of the JFTC journal. it does not accept British extremism as can edit the scenarios as necessary in order to NATO’s Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) maintaining an accurate COP, and negating of the research to date and has been If you would like to contribute to this the root cause of it. That the response to insure that the TOs are met; M&S can makes in support of national linkages of JFTC with the chance of a latent, or worst yet, blank designed not to argue each position analysis, please send your feedback to the phenomenon entails a ‘generational changes quickly and accurately. the technical capabilities of Albania, Bosnia COP. or provide references, but to elicit [email protected] struggle’ i.e. open-ended conflict with a and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav M&S also insures that the EXCON feedback and guide the ‘reader’ through The research was initiated as vaguely defined enemy, is also rejected: Proper execution of all muscle movements Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Greece, is more efficient in its operation; and can the author’s hypothesis. Although based a consequence of the British Prime ‘learning to live with terrorism’ and – Important events can be planned early and Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Turkey. make quicker decisions on the direction of the on a literary review, the hypothesis is Minister’s declaration that the country having to endure a deep-rooted, meticulously in order to insure their success. exercise, while using fewer personnel. being tested for its qualitative value faces a “greater and deeper threat protracted conflict, with no guarantees, Also, quick and seamless edits can be made Coalition Warrior Interoperability M&S can simulate a complex joint through the commentary of 143 senior to our security than we have known is but one school of thought and does on-the-fly to minimize any deviations. Exploration Experimentation Examination environment, complete with air assets; and professionals and practitioners from before” and that “we are in the midst not have to be the answer – there are Exercise (CWIX) 2015. This exercise can augment that environment with relative across NATO, including British and of a generational struggle.” That the alternatives. Maintaining a consistent picture and control is a North Atlantic Council (NAC) ease, in order to meet the TOs of the TA. American Generals, Admirals and country’s social heritage and cultural The hypothesis is that the of all exercise tasking. Using the EXCON endorsed, Military Committee directed Lastly, M&S is able to support training Ministers of State. Through triangulation capital could be at risk of a long-term phenomenon is a consequence of a De-confliction Matrix the EXCON can be more and Consultation, Command and Control with real troops working with a Headquarters with literary sources and an analysis clash with radicalisation, extremism and global insurgency against the West efficient in its operation. (C3) Board guided Bi-Strategic Command in a joint environment with minimal assets to of any consensus as to the extent of terrorism hence lies at the heart of and that any delay in confronting it (Bi-SC) annual programme designed to bear. the threat and the measures needed this paper and provides the framework as such risks the militarization of Better computer-aided observation support the continuous improvement of Hopefully, we have eliminated any to confront the threat, their comments to: 1) further an understanding of nationals loyal to forces beyond the collections. O/Ts can obtain collections in a interoperability for the Alliance. perceived negative opinions of M&S; or in will be studied to: (1) contextualise the the phenomenon of British citizens Crown. It is further argued that the more timely, accurate, and efficient manner. other words, demystified the M&S devil contemporary nature of the threat and adopting loyalties beyond the Crown, 2) ideological, counter-terrorist approach Resolute Support (RS) 15-3. This exercise from your mind. M&S really is a force the implications of failing to engage it assessing the threat that they pose and to confronting extremism in the United For the TA: is to educate Individual Augmentees (IAs) multiplier that can improve overall training and (2) conceptualise the viability of 3) providing an insight as to how this Kingdom, not only underestimates, but of the TA on the mission specifics of RS throughout NATO; and is very much in suppressing the phenomenon through the threat might best be countered. exacerbates the potential for internecine A proper COP – Maintaining an accurate in Afghanistan; train the TA that will be keeping with the spirit of CFI. Its utility proposed process of ‘defragmenting’. Whilst the research accepts the conflict. The alternative proposed for picture insures that the TA is venturing where the assigned to advisor roles; and lastly create is a win-win for all those involved. ■ The results of this analysis will appear government’s assessment of the threat Britain is to optimize the response to

20 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 21 the threat by ‘defragmenting’ it and consequences of misinterpreting state- sedition but, as evidenced in the United military force by each government of historical parameters in which the war of immediate significance – compared thus accelerating the end-game. sponsored espionage, sabotage and acts Kingdom’s battle for the allegiance the day and the concurrent policies itself was eventually waged. Indeed to the few thousand Irish Catholics that ‘Defragmenting’ is a liberal, muscular of insurgency as acts of terrorism. of British Catholics, reversing it. In of emancipation and acquiescence of the accelerated rate, at which each served Napoleon for example, no less response to the threat that works by: Part IV proposes that, to reverse the short, qualifications on allegiance to generations past that secured the country generation actually set out to crush any than 200,000 had served the Crown 1) concatenating the individual politicization and radicalization of the Crown are not unprecedented in and silenced the murderous echoes of Catholic dissent, is readily apparent. by Wellington’s victory at Waterloo in historic bonds of allegiance that exist British nationals (Muslim and non- the United Kingdom and there are Catesby’s ‘Gunpowder Plot’. In short, From the Jacobite Rising to the Easter 1815. Indeed, by the 1830s, a good half between the immigrant populations of Muslim), the threat needs to be political, historical and theological with every Catholic ‘generational Rising, time has always been primary of the rank and file of the British Army Great Britain and the Crown and 2) ‘defragmented’. Part V propounds the parallels from which to derive policy. struggle’, time and political adroitness and the luxury of a waiting game or a were made up of Anglo-Irish Catholic taking political responsibility for the use of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces to The history of Catholic emancipation have been of the essence and it is from victory dependent on the passing of a blood. In short, despite the legitimate immediate mobilisation and protection protect the communities held hostage and the lighting of bonfires is but one. this perspective that the analogy is both generation, an uncertain, unwarranted fear of insurrection with many of of any community that has been by British militants and, through a Indeed, the hundreds of thousands relevant and important. and, arguably, unprecedented and the revolutions of the Enlightenment targeted by a foreign force. In short, the revised Covenant with the nation, of Catholics who have worn a King’s As with many internal conflicts dangerous concept. having either collapsed against the old exposition of non-contiguous threats to transforming the country’s relationship uniform over the centuries epitomize this however, today’s insurgency is being To put this threat to the state into regimes of Catholic Europe or indulged the United Kingdom by the extraction with the international community. analogy and clearly demonstrate what reacted to out of context and within perspective, more than half a million in the regicide and wholesale slaughter of front-line populations from the can be achieved by the encompassing artificial constructs that not only Catholics served with foreign powers of its ruling families, the drive towards theatre of potential conflict and the PART I nature of the British Crown and its belie the applicability of lessons from against their King in the years leading emancipation and allegiance to the overwriting of any extant, political unique ability to transcend politics and historical precedents but distort the up to the 1790s and millions more Crown continued unabated. The reason content that is exploitable. Such an Wild Geese & Jackals religion and consolidate the diverse nature of the threat from one with were in empathy. Indeed, in the first for this was not because of public initiative, compacted and protected and often competing identities of its abstraction to one without. In doing half of the century, over a 100,000 had demand or any egalitarian calling, by a strengthening in the Covenant La Menace Générale: This nationals; were a Papist power to so, it has become near impossible to been killed and wounded in foreign but that the political development of between Her Majesty’s Armed Forces paper concurs with the government’s threaten British interests today, there determine which values are necessary service. The import of the analogy Britain had been staked and rested and the nation, would enable those assessment of the threat as ‘severe’ would be no question as to the loyalty to balance the equation of threat and however is not to highlight the terrific upon delivering an alternative to communities targeted to reconstruct and that an attack on the interests and of the country’s six million strong the arithmetic of the accumulative, numbers involved but to show how the combat what was readily becoming a around the key components of assets of the United Kingdom is ‘highly Catholic population. This achievement individual efforts of generations past phenomenon of foreign fighters was common enemy and an obstacle to the mainstream institutions and build likely’. It is argued that this is not due is not because of Shakespeare, has been lost. The result is that instead reversed and the speed with which, step progressive expansion of the Empire. a better, more secure, liberally to extremism but a lack of investment Rome or the stigma of historic acts of a conventional adversary with threads by step, the loyalty of Catholics was This political commitment to orientated, integrated and united in the Crown, the institutions of the of terrorism and insurrection but, for of reference and a common anthology, secured - despite a century in which reformation (as opposed to segregation) Kingdom. Commonwealth and Her Majesty’s the majority of Catholics, centuries the conflict has been divorced from Catholics rebelled on no less than in the early 19th century not only The paper is presented in Armed Forces, the metamorphosis of of allegiance, patriotism and military its roots and left to culture on its six occasions and extreme, redolent, liberated the country from religious five parts: Part I is an analogical Islamic State, Al Qaeda’s chrysalis and service to a shared ideal – a history own theological indifferences. The flagrant and radical displays of treason, intolerance and buried the prejudices discussion on the general threat and the aggregation and mobilisation of and a constitutional compromise which zeitgeist of the ‘generational struggle’ a rising immigrant population and of its recusant inheritance, but enabled why the phenomenon is rooted in a Muslim organizations and non-violent has culminated in an identity that today with radical Islam in the United political necessity ensured that ways Britain to counter the aggressive, anti- ‘transnational insurgency’ and not extremists into powerful social and eclipses the boundaries of race, religion Kingdom has hence become typified were found that negotiated the paths Catholic sentiment that had stifled the extremism – how the United Kingdom political constructs. In brief, it is and politics. and influenced not by political action between the different visions of the concept of a unified state and release has been targeted by a foreign enemy because British militants are in the Although the allegiance of but by political reaction and, in relative religion’s adherents and united the millions of English, Welsh, Scots and as a frontline in a global, asymmetrical process of re-positioning their forces British Catholics has involved a series terms, an Asquith-like policy of non- Kingdom’s populations. Irish nationals from loyalties that their war and why military led, counter- from the well-defined battlefields of of tumultuous periods of internal strife engagement. Although the Papist and Relief fellow countrymen had perceived to insurgency measures are needed on contemporary state-sponsored terrorism this in no way implies, as with the To return to the analogy, at no Acts bear the scars of the tempestuous be tantamount to treason. By the time the home-front. Part II contests the and subversion to the relatively ‘generational struggle’ against British point, at least not until the Home Rule nature of these paths, their application of the Great War when the allegiance strategy of a ‘generational struggle’ – unknown quantities of 21st century Jihadists, that the potential for treason Crisis in British Ireland, was such led directly towards the dismantling of entire populations was required it is argued that this policy will lead insurgency warfare. was countered through any protracted a strategic response to the Catholic of the penal laws and to policies that and alongside hundreds of thousands to the para-militarization of militant It is concluded that, to counter policy of attrition. Indeed, whilst the threat one of either isolation or a ensured the demise of the spiritual of Muslim volunteers, a generation forces, the polarization of Muslim the threat, demonstrable, public acts banner of anointed princes may indeed policy of containment in which an and communal influence of foreign of Irish, Scots, Welsh, English and communities and a surge in apocalyptic of allegiance to the Queen and the seem to have been obsoleted by time acceptable, sustainable level of powers. By doing so the country was foreign Catholics answered the call and behaviour and ‘treasonous’ rhetoric. celebration of historical deeds of alone (in hindsight) and usurped and violence was the ultimate goal. Even able to reign in the political outcasts enlisted to fight for the shared values Part III demonstrates why counter- incontrovertible and abiding loyalty by supplanted by the comparative irony of with the IRA’s ‘Long War’, sixty that allegiances and oaths to the Crown and commonality that this reformed terrorism measures underestimate Muslims to the institutions of the state their historical predilection for terror years later, it would be disingenuous had hitherto engineered by default and concept of ‘King and Country’ had and exacerbate the threat from are key. The monarchy and the shared and political zealotry, this is not the to negate the cumulative effect of encompass Catholic powers into the come to represent. militants in the United Kingdom - the history of the nation are seen as not only case - it was the culmination of the attempts by previous generations to apparatus of the state. The fruits of the Simply put, in a short period of implications for the country and the fundamental to stifling the dissent and direct and immediate deployment of counter the stalemate directly and the process were evident from the outset and time, temporal and spiritual allegiances

22 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 23 the threat by ‘defragmenting’ it and consequences of misinterpreting state- sedition but, as evidenced in the United military force by each government of historical parameters in which the war of immediate significance – compared thus accelerating the end-game. sponsored espionage, sabotage and acts Kingdom’s battle for the allegiance the day and the concurrent policies itself was eventually waged. Indeed to the few thousand Irish Catholics that ‘Defragmenting’ is a liberal, muscular of insurgency as acts of terrorism. of British Catholics, reversing it. In of emancipation and acquiescence of the accelerated rate, at which each served Napoleon for example, no less response to the threat that works by: Part IV proposes that, to reverse the short, qualifications on allegiance to generations past that secured the country generation actually set out to crush any than 200,000 had served the Crown 1) concatenating the individual politicization and radicalization of the Crown are not unprecedented in and silenced the murderous echoes of Catholic dissent, is readily apparent. by Wellington’s victory at Waterloo in historic bonds of allegiance that exist British nationals (Muslim and non- the United Kingdom and there are Catesby’s ‘Gunpowder Plot’. In short, From the Jacobite Rising to the Easter 1815. Indeed, by the 1830s, a good half between the immigrant populations of Muslim), the threat needs to be political, historical and theological with every Catholic ‘generational Rising, time has always been primary of the rank and file of the British Army Great Britain and the Crown and 2) ‘defragmented’. Part V propounds the parallels from which to derive policy. struggle’, time and political adroitness and the luxury of a waiting game or a were made up of Anglo-Irish Catholic taking political responsibility for the use of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces to The history of Catholic emancipation have been of the essence and it is from victory dependent on the passing of a blood. In short, despite the legitimate immediate mobilisation and protection protect the communities held hostage and the lighting of bonfires is but one. this perspective that the analogy is both generation, an uncertain, unwarranted fear of insurrection with many of of any community that has been by British militants and, through a Indeed, the hundreds of thousands relevant and important. and, arguably, unprecedented and the revolutions of the Enlightenment targeted by a foreign force. In short, the revised Covenant with the nation, of Catholics who have worn a King’s As with many internal conflicts dangerous concept. having either collapsed against the old exposition of non-contiguous threats to transforming the country’s relationship uniform over the centuries epitomize this however, today’s insurgency is being To put this threat to the state into regimes of Catholic Europe or indulged the United Kingdom by the extraction with the international community. analogy and clearly demonstrate what reacted to out of context and within perspective, more than half a million in the regicide and wholesale slaughter of front-line populations from the can be achieved by the encompassing artificial constructs that not only Catholics served with foreign powers of its ruling families, the drive towards theatre of potential conflict and the PART I nature of the British Crown and its belie the applicability of lessons from against their King in the years leading emancipation and allegiance to the overwriting of any extant, political unique ability to transcend politics and historical precedents but distort the up to the 1790s and millions more Crown continued unabated. The reason content that is exploitable. Such an Wild Geese & Jackals religion and consolidate the diverse nature of the threat from one with were in empathy. Indeed, in the first for this was not because of public initiative, compacted and protected and often competing identities of its abstraction to one without. In doing half of the century, over a 100,000 had demand or any egalitarian calling, by a strengthening in the Covenant La Menace Générale: This nationals; were a Papist power to so, it has become near impossible to been killed and wounded in foreign but that the political development of between Her Majesty’s Armed Forces paper concurs with the government’s threaten British interests today, there determine which values are necessary service. The import of the analogy Britain had been staked and rested and the nation, would enable those assessment of the threat as ‘severe’ would be no question as to the loyalty to balance the equation of threat and however is not to highlight the terrific upon delivering an alternative to communities targeted to reconstruct and that an attack on the interests and of the country’s six million strong the arithmetic of the accumulative, numbers involved but to show how the combat what was readily becoming a around the key components of assets of the United Kingdom is ‘highly Catholic population. This achievement individual efforts of generations past phenomenon of foreign fighters was common enemy and an obstacle to the mainstream institutions and build likely’. It is argued that this is not due is not because of Shakespeare, has been lost. The result is that instead reversed and the speed with which, step progressive expansion of the Empire. a better, more secure, liberally to extremism but a lack of investment Rome or the stigma of historic acts of a conventional adversary with threads by step, the loyalty of Catholics was This political commitment to orientated, integrated and united in the Crown, the institutions of the of terrorism and insurrection but, for of reference and a common anthology, secured - despite a century in which reformation (as opposed to segregation) Kingdom. Commonwealth and Her Majesty’s the majority of Catholics, centuries the conflict has been divorced from Catholics rebelled on no less than in the early 19th century not only The paper is presented in Armed Forces, the metamorphosis of of allegiance, patriotism and military its roots and left to culture on its six occasions and extreme, redolent, liberated the country from religious five parts: Part I is an analogical Islamic State, Al Qaeda’s chrysalis and service to a shared ideal – a history own theological indifferences. The flagrant and radical displays of treason, intolerance and buried the prejudices discussion on the general threat and the aggregation and mobilisation of and a constitutional compromise which zeitgeist of the ‘generational struggle’ a rising immigrant population and of its recusant inheritance, but enabled why the phenomenon is rooted in a Muslim organizations and non-violent has culminated in an identity that today with radical Islam in the United political necessity ensured that ways Britain to counter the aggressive, anti- ‘transnational insurgency’ and not extremists into powerful social and eclipses the boundaries of race, religion Kingdom has hence become typified were found that negotiated the paths Catholic sentiment that had stifled the extremism – how the United Kingdom political constructs. In brief, it is and politics. and influenced not by political action between the different visions of the concept of a unified state and release has been targeted by a foreign enemy because British militants are in the Although the allegiance of but by political reaction and, in relative religion’s adherents and united the millions of English, Welsh, Scots and as a frontline in a global, asymmetrical process of re-positioning their forces British Catholics has involved a series terms, an Asquith-like policy of non- Kingdom’s populations. Irish nationals from loyalties that their war and why military led, counter- from the well-defined battlefields of of tumultuous periods of internal strife engagement. Although the Papist and Relief fellow countrymen had perceived to insurgency measures are needed on contemporary state-sponsored terrorism this in no way implies, as with the To return to the analogy, at no Acts bear the scars of the tempestuous be tantamount to treason. By the time the home-front. Part II contests the and subversion to the relatively ‘generational struggle’ against British point, at least not until the Home Rule nature of these paths, their application of the Great War when the allegiance strategy of a ‘generational struggle’ – unknown quantities of 21st century Jihadists, that the potential for treason Crisis in British Ireland, was such led directly towards the dismantling of entire populations was required it is argued that this policy will lead insurgency warfare. was countered through any protracted a strategic response to the Catholic of the penal laws and to policies that and alongside hundreds of thousands to the para-militarization of militant It is concluded that, to counter policy of attrition. Indeed, whilst the threat one of either isolation or a ensured the demise of the spiritual of Muslim volunteers, a generation forces, the polarization of Muslim the threat, demonstrable, public acts banner of anointed princes may indeed policy of containment in which an and communal influence of foreign of Irish, Scots, Welsh, English and communities and a surge in apocalyptic of allegiance to the Queen and the seem to have been obsoleted by time acceptable, sustainable level of powers. By doing so the country was foreign Catholics answered the call and behaviour and ‘treasonous’ rhetoric. celebration of historical deeds of alone (in hindsight) and usurped and violence was the ultimate goal. Even able to reign in the political outcasts enlisted to fight for the shared values Part III demonstrates why counter- incontrovertible and abiding loyalty by supplanted by the comparative irony of with the IRA’s ‘Long War’, sixty that allegiances and oaths to the Crown and commonality that this reformed terrorism measures underestimate Muslims to the institutions of the state their historical predilection for terror years later, it would be disingenuous had hitherto engineered by default and concept of ‘King and Country’ had and exacerbate the threat from are key. The monarchy and the shared and political zealotry, this is not the to negate the cumulative effect of encompass Catholic powers into the come to represent. militants in the United Kingdom - the history of the nation are seen as not only case - it was the culmination of the attempts by previous generations to apparatus of the state. The fruits of the Simply put, in a short period of implications for the country and the fundamental to stifling the dissent and direct and immediate deployment of counter the stalemate directly and the process were evident from the outset and time, temporal and spiritual allegiances

22 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 23 were no longer viewed as contradictory religious phenomenon and Al Qaeda’s How far counter-terrorism to foster any degree of confidence in subject based content and bereft of any of this ‘global insurgency’ and those assertions but complimentary and chrysalis, from its defeat at Tora Bora measures will be of any value upon its capacity to reverse the offensive relevance to the United Kingdom, its empathetic to it is based, but the trans- intrinsically British concepts of to its return as the Praetorian, Hydra- a resurgence of attacks in the United and protect its Muslim and non-Muslim history, its Muslim communities, the national nature of the insurgency, the nationhood. Citizenship was now like vanguard of Revolutionary Islam, Kingdom is hence largely dependent communities. legacy of their British ancestry and the lack of opportunities to serve, the founded and expressed in terms of has not only devalued the concept on the number of allegiances nurtured Politically, this has been compounded theologies and philosophies of the Wild vulnerability of British Muslims to civic engagement and the theological of British nationhood but, indirectly, to counter the narrative of this by a lack of pragmatism and experience Geese and Jackals that reside within foreign dogmata and the historical flaws and historical barriers to serving the the efficacy of the British Crown to platform. Unfortunately, however, a in the implementation of well- them. in the arguments and counter arguments Crown had been obsoleted. By the last establish any capacity for uniting its ‘generational’ outlook and the episodic intentioned but ill-thought-out As such, Islam in the United for their deference to forces beyond the decade of Victoria’s reign, with some peoples against them - the threat today approach of focusing on terrorists to initiatives to counter the threat Kingdom has been manipulated and Crown. The centre of gravity in this war two thirds of the country’s Army being hence stems from a lack of investment counter terrorism pays scant regard to from identified individuals and, as a exploited by forces that have, to the is no longer Iraq or Afghanistan but, made up of Irish Catholic descent, the in consolidating the intrinsic value of winning the hearts and minds of the consequence, mistakes that have further detriment of their constituents, taken along with the United Kingdom’s belief paradox was complete. The relevance a British heritage, the teaching of the constituent masses - the individuals exacerbated the situation, namely: issues beyond their mandate and in herself and her history, the Islamic of this to British Muslims is clear in Empire’s Muslim legacy and deploying that are jailed, killed or ‘de-radicalized’ 1) the aggregation and characterization held the historic bonds of traditional world yet to fall to the insurgents and that, for much of the 19th and 20th at home and abroad against what has are simply replaced. It is therefore of Muslim community leaders and allegiances to ransom. In short, the the continued export of their war to the centuries, the greatest influence on become an internationally established argued that, to counter the nature of the their ‘moderate’ forces as quasi- identity of British Muslims has been front-lines of the British home-lands – the political development of Islam has challenge to it. Without such investment threat at large, the focus needs to be secular, politically correct constructs hijacked and the relationships between battlefields that are increasingly being equally been of British origin. a flight of Wild Geese to the new re-adjusted and the enemy re-targeted with benign, foreign aspirations and the United Kingdom and the many shaped by the propaganda of Al Qaeda Indeed, from the 18th Century Caliphate will be but the beginning: through the peripheral, thematic and complaisant, theocratic overtones; Muslim communities that have strong and the Caliphate. on, the journey from ‘caliphate to at some point, in the near future, the immediate lens of counter-insurgency 2) the failure to see Al Qaeda’s ties to the Crown, terrorized. The loyalty There will be grave consequences nation-state’ was largely defined by current schism between Al Qaeda and and counter-subversion initiatives – chrysalis, its separatist-insurgent of Muslims today is hence presumed by for Great Britain should the government British history, particularly so after the Caliphate will be bridged and, tactical alternatives that, by overwriting forces and the Caliphate as attractive, many to be of a de-territorialised nature fail to take the initiative and continue 1917 with General Allenby’s capture through a network of well-entrenched any political content that is exploitable rational, comprehensible and realistic in which the fraternity of Islam over- to misinterpret the perniciousness of of Jerusalem and the death knell of and fledgling insurgencies, the Jackals and providing permanent, one-way exit- alternatives for many British Muslims rides any allegiance to the Crown and these combatants and the trans-national the Ottoman Empire - by default, the will re-surface. strategies for entire populations, would and 3) a lack of investment in the the authentic voice of British Muslims nature of the global insurgency. With British had become, in many ways, The basis for this and what makes negate the value of the communities Crown, the Commonwealth and the is that of a small, highly politicised the aggregation and mobilisation an Islamic power per se themselves this so very different a threat and so targeted by the enemy. human capital of Her Majesty’s Armed elite. of British Muslims and non-violent and masters over the destiny of over very dangerous a threat is not just the Unfortunately, despite the furore Forces – errors that, for a large portion With the consequences of this extremists into powerful social and half of the world’s Muslims. As such, epic, international nature of Islamic over the involvement of British Muslim of the electorate, have allowed state- being compounded by mass immigration political constructs and the religious the historical context of the United State’s metamorphosis or Al Qaeda’s communities in terrorism, there have sponsored terrorism and espionage to the result has been the generic isolation resonance and geopolitical significance Kingdom’s influence on modern appetite for political tyranny and as yet been no significant inroads to eclipse the tentative bonds that had, and public, wholesale ‘quarantine’ of of Islamic State and Al Qaeda, it is Islam is key to not only defining and terror, but the apocalyptic expectations actually understanding the parallels until recently, held the remnants of the Muslims en masse from their historical with utmost urgency that the initiative understanding the threat from British and revolutionary inclinations with with historic insurgencies and the depth Muslim community’s allegiance and milieu, their cultural heritage and their is not handed to the enemy and that the citizens loyal to forces beyond the which legions of ordinary citizens and to which this phenomenon threatens the kept any arguably intrinsic threat (if it British lineage: Khudadad Khan VC threat to Great Britain is finally (and Crown, but countering it. insurgent forces from across the world country. As a result, the ‘generational had hitherto existed) at bay. is testament to this fact. As too are formally) identified and recognized All this is not, however, to have identified with Islamic State. struggle’ has become a strategy in itself Much of this was due to the fact Muhammad Aslam, Abdullah Khan, for what it is - a global, core driven suggest that the root cause of the Moreover, as with the terror-regimes of - an indictment of this government’s that the issues surrounding Islam in Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Usman and insurgency that has rooted itself at threat to Great Britain today is a late 18th century France, the progressive investment in thwarting the threat and the United Kingdom have been too the many others whose allegiance and different levels, on different fronts and disenfranchised Islamic population, depravity of the violence associated an error of judgement that has caused controversial, too contested and too bodies lie alongside those who died at different locations in the minds and depleted of a history and torn between with the politicization of 21st century counter-terrorism measures to lack the fast moving for any grounded academic from Australia, Canada, India, South hearts of many British citizens. Not the suffering of lost brothers and the Islam has become an intrinsic part of political and military courage needed research to effectively engage or Africa and the United Kingdom at only have the Islamists undermined and inalienable demands of their Protestant, the Jihadist’s creed and the acceptance, to rally Muslims around the Crown parallel i.e. provide any real-time Ypres. Forgotten are the ‘Red Eagles’ challenged the British concept, they Christian, British heritage. It is endorsement and glorification of it a and engage effectively the hysteria insights to those having to make value who, despite 4 Victoria Crosses and have offered a viable alternative. patently not - merely that the key to quantifying factor in their religiosity that emanates from the heart of this judgments based on the given threat. Wavell’s insistence that the division In tandem with this, the countering it lies in the perception and fervour - the founding of the insurgency. In turn, opportunities to In effect, policy has therefore been would go down as, “one of the greatest interpretation of the phenomenon as that it might be and that this (and what Caliphate and Al Qaeda’s continued capitalise on Britain’s history and its supplemented with ideological, out- fighting formations in British history”, the consequence of two Gulf Wars, ‘King and Country’ represents today) penchant for terrorism has, simply put, wealth of experience with minority dated, academic debates that rarely few in England can even recall. artificially removed from the context is what has brought the allegiance morphed into a convincing, political groups and insurgent forces have venture beyond the semantics of ‘new It is consequently imperative of the West’s long standing struggle of British Muslims into question. and theological manifesto for not only subsequently been missed and the terrorism’ and ‘Islamic radicalisation’ – for policy-makers to be aware of not with Islam and its colonial history has Islamic State’s metamorphosis, from the young, but the disenfranchised and British state has lost not just many of cyclical and academic discussions that just the strengths and weaknesses of fuelled not only Islamic State’s ‘quest’ a relatively subjunctive epithet to a the enraged. its citizens but its ability and credibility are more often than not void of any new the research upon which knowledge to manifest prophecies and the lethality

24 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 25 were no longer viewed as contradictory religious phenomenon and Al Qaeda’s How far counter-terrorism to foster any degree of confidence in subject based content and bereft of any of this ‘global insurgency’ and those assertions but complimentary and chrysalis, from its defeat at Tora Bora measures will be of any value upon its capacity to reverse the offensive relevance to the United Kingdom, its empathetic to it is based, but the trans- intrinsically British concepts of to its return as the Praetorian, Hydra- a resurgence of attacks in the United and protect its Muslim and non-Muslim history, its Muslim communities, the national nature of the insurgency, the nationhood. Citizenship was now like vanguard of Revolutionary Islam, Kingdom is hence largely dependent communities. legacy of their British ancestry and the lack of opportunities to serve, the founded and expressed in terms of has not only devalued the concept on the number of allegiances nurtured Politically, this has been compounded theologies and philosophies of the Wild vulnerability of British Muslims to civic engagement and the theological of British nationhood but, indirectly, to counter the narrative of this by a lack of pragmatism and experience Geese and Jackals that reside within foreign dogmata and the historical flaws and historical barriers to serving the the efficacy of the British Crown to platform. Unfortunately, however, a in the implementation of well- them. in the arguments and counter arguments Crown had been obsoleted. By the last establish any capacity for uniting its ‘generational’ outlook and the episodic intentioned but ill-thought-out As such, Islam in the United for their deference to forces beyond the decade of Victoria’s reign, with some peoples against them - the threat today approach of focusing on terrorists to initiatives to counter the threat Kingdom has been manipulated and Crown. The centre of gravity in this war two thirds of the country’s Army being hence stems from a lack of investment counter terrorism pays scant regard to from identified individuals and, as a exploited by forces that have, to the is no longer Iraq or Afghanistan but, made up of Irish Catholic descent, the in consolidating the intrinsic value of winning the hearts and minds of the consequence, mistakes that have further detriment of their constituents, taken along with the United Kingdom’s belief paradox was complete. The relevance a British heritage, the teaching of the constituent masses - the individuals exacerbated the situation, namely: issues beyond their mandate and in herself and her history, the Islamic of this to British Muslims is clear in Empire’s Muslim legacy and deploying that are jailed, killed or ‘de-radicalized’ 1) the aggregation and characterization held the historic bonds of traditional world yet to fall to the insurgents and that, for much of the 19th and 20th at home and abroad against what has are simply replaced. It is therefore of Muslim community leaders and allegiances to ransom. In short, the the continued export of their war to the centuries, the greatest influence on become an internationally established argued that, to counter the nature of the their ‘moderate’ forces as quasi- identity of British Muslims has been front-lines of the British home-lands – the political development of Islam has challenge to it. Without such investment threat at large, the focus needs to be secular, politically correct constructs hijacked and the relationships between battlefields that are increasingly being equally been of British origin. a flight of Wild Geese to the new re-adjusted and the enemy re-targeted with benign, foreign aspirations and the United Kingdom and the many shaped by the propaganda of Al Qaeda Indeed, from the 18th Century Caliphate will be but the beginning: through the peripheral, thematic and complaisant, theocratic overtones; Muslim communities that have strong and the Caliphate. on, the journey from ‘caliphate to at some point, in the near future, the immediate lens of counter-insurgency 2) the failure to see Al Qaeda’s ties to the Crown, terrorized. The loyalty There will be grave consequences nation-state’ was largely defined by current schism between Al Qaeda and and counter-subversion initiatives – chrysalis, its separatist-insurgent of Muslims today is hence presumed by for Great Britain should the government British history, particularly so after the Caliphate will be bridged and, tactical alternatives that, by overwriting forces and the Caliphate as attractive, many to be of a de-territorialised nature fail to take the initiative and continue 1917 with General Allenby’s capture through a network of well-entrenched any political content that is exploitable rational, comprehensible and realistic in which the fraternity of Islam over- to misinterpret the perniciousness of of Jerusalem and the death knell of and fledgling insurgencies, the Jackals and providing permanent, one-way exit- alternatives for many British Muslims rides any allegiance to the Crown and these combatants and the trans-national the Ottoman Empire - by default, the will re-surface. strategies for entire populations, would and 3) a lack of investment in the the authentic voice of British Muslims nature of the global insurgency. With British had become, in many ways, The basis for this and what makes negate the value of the communities Crown, the Commonwealth and the is that of a small, highly politicised the aggregation and mobilisation an Islamic power per se themselves this so very different a threat and so targeted by the enemy. human capital of Her Majesty’s Armed elite. of British Muslims and non-violent and masters over the destiny of over very dangerous a threat is not just the Unfortunately, despite the furore Forces – errors that, for a large portion With the consequences of this extremists into powerful social and half of the world’s Muslims. As such, epic, international nature of Islamic over the involvement of British Muslim of the electorate, have allowed state- being compounded by mass immigration political constructs and the religious the historical context of the United State’s metamorphosis or Al Qaeda’s communities in terrorism, there have sponsored terrorism and espionage to the result has been the generic isolation resonance and geopolitical significance Kingdom’s influence on modern appetite for political tyranny and as yet been no significant inroads to eclipse the tentative bonds that had, and public, wholesale ‘quarantine’ of of Islamic State and Al Qaeda, it is Islam is key to not only defining and terror, but the apocalyptic expectations actually understanding the parallels until recently, held the remnants of the Muslims en masse from their historical with utmost urgency that the initiative understanding the threat from British and revolutionary inclinations with with historic insurgencies and the depth Muslim community’s allegiance and milieu, their cultural heritage and their is not handed to the enemy and that the citizens loyal to forces beyond the which legions of ordinary citizens and to which this phenomenon threatens the kept any arguably intrinsic threat (if it British lineage: Khudadad Khan VC threat to Great Britain is finally (and Crown, but countering it. insurgent forces from across the world country. As a result, the ‘generational had hitherto existed) at bay. is testament to this fact. As too are formally) identified and recognized All this is not, however, to have identified with Islamic State. struggle’ has become a strategy in itself Much of this was due to the fact Muhammad Aslam, Abdullah Khan, for what it is - a global, core driven suggest that the root cause of the Moreover, as with the terror-regimes of - an indictment of this government’s that the issues surrounding Islam in Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Usman and insurgency that has rooted itself at threat to Great Britain today is a late 18th century France, the progressive investment in thwarting the threat and the United Kingdom have been too the many others whose allegiance and different levels, on different fronts and disenfranchised Islamic population, depravity of the violence associated an error of judgement that has caused controversial, too contested and too bodies lie alongside those who died at different locations in the minds and depleted of a history and torn between with the politicization of 21st century counter-terrorism measures to lack the fast moving for any grounded academic from Australia, Canada, India, South hearts of many British citizens. Not the suffering of lost brothers and the Islam has become an intrinsic part of political and military courage needed research to effectively engage or Africa and the United Kingdom at only have the Islamists undermined and inalienable demands of their Protestant, the Jihadist’s creed and the acceptance, to rally Muslims around the Crown parallel i.e. provide any real-time Ypres. Forgotten are the ‘Red Eagles’ challenged the British concept, they Christian, British heritage. It is endorsement and glorification of it a and engage effectively the hysteria insights to those having to make value who, despite 4 Victoria Crosses and have offered a viable alternative. patently not - merely that the key to quantifying factor in their religiosity that emanates from the heart of this judgments based on the given threat. Wavell’s insistence that the division In tandem with this, the countering it lies in the perception and fervour - the founding of the insurgency. In turn, opportunities to In effect, policy has therefore been would go down as, “one of the greatest interpretation of the phenomenon as that it might be and that this (and what Caliphate and Al Qaeda’s continued capitalise on Britain’s history and its supplemented with ideological, out- fighting formations in British history”, the consequence of two Gulf Wars, ‘King and Country’ represents today) penchant for terrorism has, simply put, wealth of experience with minority dated, academic debates that rarely few in England can even recall. artificially removed from the context is what has brought the allegiance morphed into a convincing, political groups and insurgent forces have venture beyond the semantics of ‘new It is consequently imperative of the West’s long standing struggle of British Muslims into question. and theological manifesto for not only subsequently been missed and the terrorism’ and ‘Islamic radicalisation’ – for policy-makers to be aware of not with Islam and its colonial history has Islamic State’s metamorphosis, from the young, but the disenfranchised and British state has lost not just many of cyclical and academic discussions that just the strengths and weaknesses of fuelled not only Islamic State’s ‘quest’ a relatively subjunctive epithet to a the enraged. its citizens but its ability and credibility are more often than not void of any new the research upon which knowledge to manifest prophecies and the lethality

24 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 25 of Al Qaeda’s ‘crusade’ to reconquer policy and the Woolwich slaying. What an offensive against the West beyond hence, any legitimacy in drawing people but, perversely, to win their legacies for the British and that, as ‘lost’ territories and cities, but terrorism linked the murder to Britain’s policies the territorial boundaries of the British parallels with historic manifestations of hearts and minds. Countering the threat a result of it, the deployment of the itself and Huntington’s flames of an era abroad was the manifestation of state and to take the fight to the enemy, Islamic terrorism has been dismissed. to the UK from foreign forces hence army is often seen as a last resort, the characterized by cultural conflict. To be enemy forces on the streets of Britain the consensus needs to be deeper than Indeed, an appetite has developed for involves recognizing that Islamic State precedents for not utilizing the armed frank, with the United States fighting a and treason. Intrinsically, however, a reaction to the spill-over and blow- analyses of it as ‘exceptional’ and and Al Qaeda have evolved beyond the services of the Crown in the ‘Home- war that started in 2001 and Al Qaeda Johnston was right – regardless of back from Iraq, Libya, Syria and Israel that it can only be destroyed by war. concepts of current analyses. United, Front War’ are few and far between, and Islamic State fighting a war that foreign policy, as Britain has been and deeper than a policy of hunkering Understanding the threat in reverse, they command the hearts and minds particularly if applied in an indirect started in the 7th Century, positions targeted in a global insurgency against down and holding course. as a global insurgency that cannot be of millions of people across the globe manner and that the mandate is to on a ‘generational conflict’ not only the international powers of the 21st And this is where the crux of contained (never mind destroyed) by today and, far from the product or ‘defragment’ the threat and counter any appear naïve in 2015, but positively century, she (along with Russia, the question lies: unless absolute, war, would enable the emplacement consequence of foreign policy over the insurgency as opposed to any terrorism. dated. America, France, Australia and countering the foreign threat by of an architecture that engages not the last two decades or the proliferation in In short, due to their experience and Moreover, the modernity of Islamic Canada) will be attacked. Irrespective targeting terrorists not only fails to theology of Islam or the nature of its failing states, have a much deeper and that the state needs to be seen to State’s application of revolutionary of arguments to the counter, the United undermine the rationale behind the militancy, but the political reality of intricate history. The success of Islamic be protecting its people, a role has tradition has made a mockery of this Kingdom, like the United States, is insurgent forces engaged in political what is merely an alliance against the State and Al Qaeda and the threat to unfolded for the Armed Services that and not only further compounded the a threat to the insurgency by its very violence, but exacerbates the potential Jahili world. the United Kingdom is not so much is not just unprecedented, but unique in paradoxical nature of this conflict but, existence and to suggest otherwise is to for that rationale to morph, particularly To propose that ‘home-grown’ their ability to tear down borders and the history of modern Britain - in not through its ability to transcend borders underestimate the adversarial nature of at home. In short, in that counter- terrorism does not exist and that establish frontlines or position on the just leading efforts to win the hearts and engage symmetrically, brought the the enemy, the power of modern Britain terrorism is generally reactive and, by manifestations of it are of an inherently apex of the see-saws of major powers and minds of Muslims abroad, but in concept of a clash with Islam closer and a cousinry with the Islamic world definition, employed ex post facto, it is foreign lineage is a bold statement - it is their capacity to encompass the leading them at home: replacing the to reality. In fear of their own Muslim that no other Western country comes not designed to counter the intangible, but, from the perspective of countering annals of a people’s history. supplementary efforts of police led populations, the West’s insistence as close to. idiosyncratic traits of an insurgent it, a new one and one in which the The Home-front: Because Al counter-terrorism doctrine with military to the secular nature of the terror has, Whilst a change in policy towards Israel force. Counter-insurgency, however, is dynamics and importance of allegiance Qaeda and Islamic State have moved so led counter-insurgency measures that ironically, compounded this threat and or Iraq for example might shift the so and is not only proactive and geared are readily apparent. With Islamic State far beyond the paradigm of terrorism proactively target the populations most led not only to misinterpretations of the frontlines of the global insurgency at an towards the root causes of a political now an international singularity with per se, the rise of militant Islam in the vulnerable to the militants and where language spoken by Islamic State and Al operational level and pacify a number struggle, but the heart of a struggle. legions from Khandahar to Marrakesh UK has largely gone unnoticed and, the skills of disaggregation, denying Qaeda, but miscalculations as to their of militants intent on individual acts of Unfortunately, in that such measures and Al Qaeda a network of increasingly as a consequence, taken place under ground, interdicting links, exploiting intentions. By staking the argument terrorism in the UK, it would not affect would require the mobilisation of not para-militarised webs, the onus on the radar of counter-terrorism forces. local actors and returning entire on a skewer of political correctness the theological justification for political just the military and the police forces the British government needs to be Artificial parameters on variations communities to modes of ‘normal and dubious theological grounds, violence as espoused by Al Qaeda and of the UK but the state, it is also more reversed: from one of de-radicalising of Islam and levels of radicalization interaction’ are key. centuries of conflict with Islam have Islamic State, or the mechanics of radical and overtly confrontational individual Muslims and countering have left the security forces fighting been dismissed. More dangerously, the their ideologies. Capitulating to the (in the paradigm of this proposal, charges of ‘home-grown’ terrorism to a legion of ghosts. Without addressing PART II West’s ability to win the argument violence and arbitrary dictat of foreign counter-insurgency would translate to protecting its Muslims wholesale – in this and the further politicisation of has been assumed. Regardless of its forces is hence unlikely in itself to the mobilisation of the state itself to essence, a shift from the apprehension British Muslims, the risk is a move by British Terrorism & the religious rhetoric and that the language reverse any extant threat to Britain protect its citizenry). of specific perpetrators to the defeat the militants from deploying terrorists Plurality of the State of Islamic State has more in common and not only risks the consolidation With regards to the last two and marginalisation of the insurgents’ to employing them – a move from with the verbiage of 20th century of political Islam as a global force but decades, the reason the rationale strategy and the undermining of the the phenomenon of British ‘terrorists’ The Generational Struggle: The fascism than the magnificent courts the strengthening of radical positions for counter-terrorism as opposed to ideological effect that entices British to ‘British terrorism’. If this process Prime Minister’s calls for a less tolerant of Harun al Rashid or the Golden within the UK itself. counter-insurgency became the vehicle Muslims to the banner and political is allowed to complete, the ability society (in the context of values) and a Age of Baghdad’s Abbasid Caliphs, This is not, however, to say that through which to counter mainstream zealotry of foreign princes. to engage the threat will be reduced ‘generational struggle’ against Islamic understanding that the theological a re-positioning of British power is analyses of Al Qaeda and, later, Islamic Basically, the nature of the beyond the control of civil forces and extremism have not only contributed to and religious basis for the terror is futile. Indeed, a glance at the sub-text State, is not because of any reluctance insurgency has graduated from a centred on grievances that, ultimately, a culture of political conformity that has inherent and real (and nothing new) is of the insurgency not only enables to engage terrorism politically or that singular threat to that of a community either do not exist or that involve escalated confrontation, but a counter- fundamental to exploiting it. insights as to the need for reform, the terrorism was unprecedented, but threat and, through cross-pollination, apocalyptic demands - an insurgency terrorism strategy that has become A Foreign Enemy: When the but the vulnerability of the country because there was little architecture in from a national threat to an ‘ummaic’ that transcends any counter-terrorism dependent on it. One reason for this is Mayor of London said, in the wake of to forces beyond the Crown and the place to enable readily, comprehensive threat. Islamic terrorism has taken on measures and that, by the very nature that, in an attempt to foster mainstream the execution of Fusilier Rigby that it is, potential benefits of weighing anchor understandings of the scale or nature a life beyond that designed to counter of its violence and stance will (at some beliefs, an attempt by the government “wrong to try to draw any link between on the remnants of the 20th century of the Islamic insurgency. Al Qaeda it and metamorphosed beyond the point) require direct military action. to manufacture a collective of secular this murder and British foreign policy”, and forging ahead into the 21st. To and the horrors of the Caliphate have parameters of counter-terrorism. The Although the negative values has undermined both the he was mistaken - there is a clear better understand the threat to Britain, catapulted Islamic violence beyond horror of the latest manifestation is consequences of military action in foundations of British democracy and connection between British foreign to push what has become a frontline in the tenets of ‘ordinary’ terrorism and that it is designed not to terrorize Northern Ireland have left enduring the inclusive, pluralistic traditions of

26 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 27 of Al Qaeda’s ‘crusade’ to reconquer policy and the Woolwich slaying. What an offensive against the West beyond hence, any legitimacy in drawing people but, perversely, to win their legacies for the British and that, as ‘lost’ territories and cities, but terrorism linked the murder to Britain’s policies the territorial boundaries of the British parallels with historic manifestations of hearts and minds. Countering the threat a result of it, the deployment of the itself and Huntington’s flames of an era abroad was the manifestation of state and to take the fight to the enemy, Islamic terrorism has been dismissed. to the UK from foreign forces hence army is often seen as a last resort, the characterized by cultural conflict. To be enemy forces on the streets of Britain the consensus needs to be deeper than Indeed, an appetite has developed for involves recognizing that Islamic State precedents for not utilizing the armed frank, with the United States fighting a and treason. Intrinsically, however, a reaction to the spill-over and blow- analyses of it as ‘exceptional’ and and Al Qaeda have evolved beyond the services of the Crown in the ‘Home- war that started in 2001 and Al Qaeda Johnston was right – regardless of back from Iraq, Libya, Syria and Israel that it can only be destroyed by war. concepts of current analyses. United, Front War’ are few and far between, and Islamic State fighting a war that foreign policy, as Britain has been and deeper than a policy of hunkering Understanding the threat in reverse, they command the hearts and minds particularly if applied in an indirect started in the 7th Century, positions targeted in a global insurgency against down and holding course. as a global insurgency that cannot be of millions of people across the globe manner and that the mandate is to on a ‘generational conflict’ not only the international powers of the 21st And this is where the crux of contained (never mind destroyed) by today and, far from the product or ‘defragment’ the threat and counter any appear naïve in 2015, but positively century, she (along with Russia, the question lies: unless absolute, war, would enable the emplacement consequence of foreign policy over the insurgency as opposed to any terrorism. dated. America, France, Australia and countering the foreign threat by of an architecture that engages not the last two decades or the proliferation in In short, due to their experience and Moreover, the modernity of Islamic Canada) will be attacked. Irrespective targeting terrorists not only fails to theology of Islam or the nature of its failing states, have a much deeper and that the state needs to be seen to State’s application of revolutionary of arguments to the counter, the United undermine the rationale behind the militancy, but the political reality of intricate history. The success of Islamic be protecting its people, a role has tradition has made a mockery of this Kingdom, like the United States, is insurgent forces engaged in political what is merely an alliance against the State and Al Qaeda and the threat to unfolded for the Armed Services that and not only further compounded the a threat to the insurgency by its very violence, but exacerbates the potential Jahili world. the United Kingdom is not so much is not just unprecedented, but unique in paradoxical nature of this conflict but, existence and to suggest otherwise is to for that rationale to morph, particularly To propose that ‘home-grown’ their ability to tear down borders and the history of modern Britain - in not through its ability to transcend borders underestimate the adversarial nature of at home. In short, in that counter- terrorism does not exist and that establish frontlines or position on the just leading efforts to win the hearts and engage symmetrically, brought the the enemy, the power of modern Britain terrorism is generally reactive and, by manifestations of it are of an inherently apex of the see-saws of major powers and minds of Muslims abroad, but in concept of a clash with Islam closer and a cousinry with the Islamic world definition, employed ex post facto, it is foreign lineage is a bold statement - it is their capacity to encompass the leading them at home: replacing the to reality. In fear of their own Muslim that no other Western country comes not designed to counter the intangible, but, from the perspective of countering annals of a people’s history. supplementary efforts of police led populations, the West’s insistence as close to. idiosyncratic traits of an insurgent it, a new one and one in which the The Home-front: Because Al counter-terrorism doctrine with military to the secular nature of the terror has, Whilst a change in policy towards Israel force. Counter-insurgency, however, is dynamics and importance of allegiance Qaeda and Islamic State have moved so led counter-insurgency measures that ironically, compounded this threat and or Iraq for example might shift the so and is not only proactive and geared are readily apparent. With Islamic State far beyond the paradigm of terrorism proactively target the populations most led not only to misinterpretations of the frontlines of the global insurgency at an towards the root causes of a political now an international singularity with per se, the rise of militant Islam in the vulnerable to the militants and where language spoken by Islamic State and Al operational level and pacify a number struggle, but the heart of a struggle. legions from Khandahar to Marrakesh UK has largely gone unnoticed and, the skills of disaggregation, denying Qaeda, but miscalculations as to their of militants intent on individual acts of Unfortunately, in that such measures and Al Qaeda a network of increasingly as a consequence, taken place under ground, interdicting links, exploiting intentions. By staking the argument terrorism in the UK, it would not affect would require the mobilisation of not para-militarised webs, the onus on the radar of counter-terrorism forces. local actors and returning entire on a skewer of political correctness the theological justification for political just the military and the police forces the British government needs to be Artificial parameters on variations communities to modes of ‘normal and dubious theological grounds, violence as espoused by Al Qaeda and of the UK but the state, it is also more reversed: from one of de-radicalising of Islam and levels of radicalization interaction’ are key. centuries of conflict with Islam have Islamic State, or the mechanics of radical and overtly confrontational individual Muslims and countering have left the security forces fighting been dismissed. More dangerously, the their ideologies. Capitulating to the (in the paradigm of this proposal, charges of ‘home-grown’ terrorism to a legion of ghosts. Without addressing PART II West’s ability to win the argument violence and arbitrary dictat of foreign counter-insurgency would translate to protecting its Muslims wholesale – in this and the further politicisation of has been assumed. Regardless of its forces is hence unlikely in itself to the mobilisation of the state itself to essence, a shift from the apprehension British Muslims, the risk is a move by British Terrorism & the religious rhetoric and that the language reverse any extant threat to Britain protect its citizenry). of specific perpetrators to the defeat the militants from deploying terrorists Plurality of the State of Islamic State has more in common and not only risks the consolidation With regards to the last two and marginalisation of the insurgents’ to employing them – a move from with the verbiage of 20th century of political Islam as a global force but decades, the reason the rationale strategy and the undermining of the the phenomenon of British ‘terrorists’ The Generational Struggle: The fascism than the magnificent courts the strengthening of radical positions for counter-terrorism as opposed to ideological effect that entices British to ‘British terrorism’. If this process Prime Minister’s calls for a less tolerant of Harun al Rashid or the Golden within the UK itself. counter-insurgency became the vehicle Muslims to the banner and political is allowed to complete, the ability society (in the context of values) and a Age of Baghdad’s Abbasid Caliphs, This is not, however, to say that through which to counter mainstream zealotry of foreign princes. to engage the threat will be reduced ‘generational struggle’ against Islamic understanding that the theological a re-positioning of British power is analyses of Al Qaeda and, later, Islamic Basically, the nature of the beyond the control of civil forces and extremism have not only contributed to and religious basis for the terror is futile. Indeed, a glance at the sub-text State, is not because of any reluctance insurgency has graduated from a centred on grievances that, ultimately, a culture of political conformity that has inherent and real (and nothing new) is of the insurgency not only enables to engage terrorism politically or that singular threat to that of a community either do not exist or that involve escalated confrontation, but a counter- fundamental to exploiting it. insights as to the need for reform, the terrorism was unprecedented, but threat and, through cross-pollination, apocalyptic demands - an insurgency terrorism strategy that has become A Foreign Enemy: When the but the vulnerability of the country because there was little architecture in from a national threat to an ‘ummaic’ that transcends any counter-terrorism dependent on it. One reason for this is Mayor of London said, in the wake of to forces beyond the Crown and the place to enable readily, comprehensive threat. Islamic terrorism has taken on measures and that, by the very nature that, in an attempt to foster mainstream the execution of Fusilier Rigby that it is, potential benefits of weighing anchor understandings of the scale or nature a life beyond that designed to counter of its violence and stance will (at some beliefs, an attempt by the government “wrong to try to draw any link between on the remnants of the 20th century of the Islamic insurgency. Al Qaeda it and metamorphosed beyond the point) require direct military action. to manufacture a collective of secular this murder and British foreign policy”, and forging ahead into the 21st. To and the horrors of the Caliphate have parameters of counter-terrorism. The Although the negative values has undermined both the he was mistaken - there is a clear better understand the threat to Britain, catapulted Islamic violence beyond horror of the latest manifestation is consequences of military action in foundations of British democracy and connection between British foreign to push what has become a frontline in the tenets of ‘ordinary’ terrorism and that it is designed not to terrorize Northern Ireland have left enduring the inclusive, pluralistic traditions of

26 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 27 not just Muslim loyalty to the Crown but greater than ‘living with terrorism’: the cohesiveness of any incumbent force, an individual terrorist has terrorism. The reason for this is that by the enemy. Moreover, as a counter- that of many other minorities. Without the pluralistic nature of the country’s insurgency, it not only fails to prosecute immense asymmetrical power and the defragmenting is not about terrorism or insurgency measure, its targets are any alternative for strengthening the democracy, a clash between the secular the weaknesses of these forces but circumstances in which he is most the defence of the realm per se but the deeper than those of counter-terrorism collective identity, calls for integration, and religious forces of the population exacerbates the politics behind likely to employ it to its full effect is sovereignty of the nation’s parts. and include not just the returnees and moderacy and cohesion have hence and a window of opportunity for the them. Whilst jailing terrorists and in a long-term offensive – with 6,000 Under the assumption that the militants, but their parents, their become not only monochrome and enemy to exploit and para-militarise its criminalising their actions may indeed flights going in and out of the UK in integration is the answer to the families and familial links abroad. divisive, but intolerant, dependent on British contingents. be of value to delegitimising their a typical 24 hour period (and in range phenomenon of nationals adopting Given the nature of the task the endorsement of populist votes and cause, it underestimates the intensity of shoulder launched missiles), it is loyalties beyond the Crown, counter- in hand and the controversial nature profoundly dangerous – especially PART III and ferocity of the non-violent conflict merely a question of time. terrorism measures have been of the proposal, the mechanics of for those with their own identities, and overestimates the weight of any In summary, the opportunity to intrinsically designed to thwart the defragmenting the threat need to be traditions, values, religions and Gunpowder, Treason & Plot convictions. employ counter-insurgency measures violent and non-violent ambitions put into perspective. The reason for historic, proven notions of patriotism To divest Islamic terrorism of its could be lost were there to be another of British Muslims questioning the this is that, despite the complexity of and loyalty. Attacks to Come: In that one of political capabilities and strategic reach, mass-casualty attack and the ability world into which they have been born. the phenomenon, the mission is overtly As a result, the ‘generational the most striking features of Islamic it is hence necessary to protect Muslim to reign in the militants with it. The Not only is this counter-productive simple in definition - to win over any struggle’ has become a strategy in itself terrorism is the destabilizing nature populations from any subversive or alternative to the status quo, at present, and an inducement to abandon their constituency that has been infiltrated and an indictment of the commitment of its mere presence, crucial are the insurgent activity and rendezvous with is hence either: to go on the offensive inheritance, but an assault on the by forces beyond the Crown and to to thwarting the Islamic threat on its implications of counter-terrorism the connections outlined above in the and intensify counter-terrorism pluralistic nature of British sovereignty. secure its allegiance. Defragmenting own merits and obtaining the resources measures having failed to adequately Woolwich attack. Both the engagement measures with draconian legislation or, Whilst integration and desegregation has no other ambitions: it is not to needed to rally Muslims around address its religious and apocalyptic of British nationals loyal to forces alternatively, to ‘defragment’ the threat are indeed key to the progression of improve the rights of women within the Crown and directly engage the façade. The extreme to which this has beyond the Crown abroad and the public with a surge of forces and take direct a nation’s identity, neither are about these communities, to improve levels of insurgency. It is hence argued that affected the public is extraordinary interdiction of treasonable activity at control of the lives of the populations the social engineering of a generation education or to reduce any propensity open-ended conflict with a vaguely and turned what was little other home would offer better protection targeted by the terrorists. If the British based on an artificial interpretation of a or predilection for anti-social behaviour defined enemy will continue to lead not than a terrorist organization into a than ‘generational projects’ in social are to develop successful counter- culture. The components of the country or criminal activity. Nor is it to instil just to a surge in apocalyptic behaviour phenomenon with revolutionary, engineering, community policing and insurgency strategies for the country’s are simply too fluid, too complicated, any Anglo-centric notion of justice, and ‘treasonous’ rhetoric from elements global proportions. Counter-terrorism counter-terrorism. The reason for this is built-up, racially diverse, Muslim too diverse and too intricate in their liberty or freedom – none of which of the Muslim population, but the responses to Islamic fundamentalism twofold: 1) Islamic terrorists in the UK communities, its strategists must nature to define, understand and are deemed prerequisites to allegiance. fraying of traditional tensions between have hence not only failed in have as yet to go ‘blind’, in an all-out understand that it is pivotal on such appreciate for them to be stopped in Interpreting the battlespace as a map of groups that have existed peacefully in challenging the façade but in protecting directive to force a crisis of legitimacy an ideological component. Just as Al time, disassembled and reassembled to human terrain and exploiting it for the these islands for many years – groups contemporary views of British Muslims for the government and the targeted Qaeda and Islamic State are competing please a generation. purposes of allegiance alone is not only that have not only characterised the from subversion. Indeed, as one of communities 2) Islamic insurgents for the hearts and minds of British Defragmenting is hence neither proactive but devoid of the religious, pluralistic nature of British democracy the most striking political features have barely developed beyond the Muslims, so too must the Crown. the disassembly nor reassembly of cultural and racial baggage that but the tangled web of loyalties that of the early 20th century was the incipient stage, i.e. because engaging communities but the protection and characterises counter-terrorism. Hence, have held the United Kingdom together repeated destabilizing nature of the insurgency as a foreign, intrinsic, PART IV enhancement of their clock-like instead of attacking civil liberties each for centuries. Given the artificial and militant violence and the reaction or strategic and symbiotic component of components – a protective casing time the country is faced with an untested nature of the doctrine, it is lack of reaction to its realpolitik, the the enemy’s gestalt in its early stages Defragmenting the Threat to prevent the fragmentation of the act of terrorism, defragmenting means believed that the strategy would neither far reaching consequences of Islamic increases the likelihood of an earlier, identities and values that each cog and protecting them - taking advantage of last the test of time nor the economic, terrorism in this century must not be visible and quantifiable victory. The Pragmatic Model: The spring represents and that are crucial to the situation by offering a bridge from political and social impact of a bombing underestimated. The consequences of failing to ultimate aim of defragmentation is not the equilibrium of the nation. The aim the diabolical to the moral and draining campaign. The consequences of focusing on halt the militant forces of Islam are integration or social cohesion, but the is therefore to create a protective cover the enemy of its human resources. It must equally be pointed ‘home-grown terrorism’, as opposed to wrought with danger: an increase in the development of common ground around in which the independent performance Defragmenting is hence an out that the insurgency has, in any the nature of the exported / imported violent rejection of society by Muslims which allegiances to the Crown can be of each component can be accessed and innovative, integrated and strategic case, little concept or appreciation threat, are hence not only cyclical in and the reticent forces of republicanism, rallied when called - it is not designed enhanced for its symbiotic qualities. theory designed to kill an insurgency of the West’s approach to time and that they continue to fail to address an increase in propaganda of the deed, to draw an end to Jihad or the dedication Adapting to the unique dynamics of in its early, embryonic stage. It is has been well embedded for many this politick but vulnerable in that illegalism, demonstrative bloodshed, of oneself to a foreign cause, nor to the threat to these cogs and abandoning a response to a threat that is too decades. Hence, with the ‘generational they can be framed and exploited by terror and wide-scale treason - all assimilate the citizenry of the United the doctrine of counter-terrorism is not, fragmented to cope with in its entirety approach’, the enemy has the advantage the enemy as an anti-Islamic offensive traits of the modern incipient stage Kingdom. Whilst the consequences of however, without collateral damage and, - so spread out amidst the available of time and is able to exploit the policy against what could be portrayed as and responses to long-term counter- defragmenting may provide context for although liberal, is a muscular response data that there are too few contiguous of non-engagement that characterizes an isolated, immigrant, minority terrorism initiatives. It must not be the above, its goals are independent that forcefully takes ownership of and intelligence leads at any one specific the reactive, episodic approach of this population. Furthermore, as counter- forgotten that, as with the strategic of any racial or religious agenda and incorporates into the security apparatus threat to target, to locate, engage and government. What is at risk here is terrorism is not designed to indent upon corporal of a 21st century conventional unconcerned with the root causes of of the state the communities targeted destroy in time. Defragmenting the

28 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 29 not just Muslim loyalty to the Crown but greater than ‘living with terrorism’: the cohesiveness of any incumbent force, an individual terrorist has terrorism. The reason for this is that by the enemy. Moreover, as a counter- that of many other minorities. Without the pluralistic nature of the country’s insurgency, it not only fails to prosecute immense asymmetrical power and the defragmenting is not about terrorism or insurgency measure, its targets are any alternative for strengthening the democracy, a clash between the secular the weaknesses of these forces but circumstances in which he is most the defence of the realm per se but the deeper than those of counter-terrorism collective identity, calls for integration, and religious forces of the population exacerbates the politics behind likely to employ it to its full effect is sovereignty of the nation’s parts. and include not just the returnees and moderacy and cohesion have hence and a window of opportunity for the them. Whilst jailing terrorists and in a long-term offensive – with 6,000 Under the assumption that the militants, but their parents, their become not only monochrome and enemy to exploit and para-militarise its criminalising their actions may indeed flights going in and out of the UK in integration is the answer to the families and familial links abroad. divisive, but intolerant, dependent on British contingents. be of value to delegitimising their a typical 24 hour period (and in range phenomenon of nationals adopting Given the nature of the task the endorsement of populist votes and cause, it underestimates the intensity of shoulder launched missiles), it is loyalties beyond the Crown, counter- in hand and the controversial nature profoundly dangerous – especially PART III and ferocity of the non-violent conflict merely a question of time. terrorism measures have been of the proposal, the mechanics of for those with their own identities, and overestimates the weight of any In summary, the opportunity to intrinsically designed to thwart the defragmenting the threat need to be traditions, values, religions and Gunpowder, Treason & Plot convictions. employ counter-insurgency measures violent and non-violent ambitions put into perspective. The reason for historic, proven notions of patriotism To divest Islamic terrorism of its could be lost were there to be another of British Muslims questioning the this is that, despite the complexity of and loyalty. Attacks to Come: In that one of political capabilities and strategic reach, mass-casualty attack and the ability world into which they have been born. the phenomenon, the mission is overtly As a result, the ‘generational the most striking features of Islamic it is hence necessary to protect Muslim to reign in the militants with it. The Not only is this counter-productive simple in definition - to win over any struggle’ has become a strategy in itself terrorism is the destabilizing nature populations from any subversive or alternative to the status quo, at present, and an inducement to abandon their constituency that has been infiltrated and an indictment of the commitment of its mere presence, crucial are the insurgent activity and rendezvous with is hence either: to go on the offensive inheritance, but an assault on the by forces beyond the Crown and to to thwarting the Islamic threat on its implications of counter-terrorism the connections outlined above in the and intensify counter-terrorism pluralistic nature of British sovereignty. secure its allegiance. Defragmenting own merits and obtaining the resources measures having failed to adequately Woolwich attack. Both the engagement measures with draconian legislation or, Whilst integration and desegregation has no other ambitions: it is not to needed to rally Muslims around address its religious and apocalyptic of British nationals loyal to forces alternatively, to ‘defragment’ the threat are indeed key to the progression of improve the rights of women within the Crown and directly engage the façade. The extreme to which this has beyond the Crown abroad and the public with a surge of forces and take direct a nation’s identity, neither are about these communities, to improve levels of insurgency. It is hence argued that affected the public is extraordinary interdiction of treasonable activity at control of the lives of the populations the social engineering of a generation education or to reduce any propensity open-ended conflict with a vaguely and turned what was little other home would offer better protection targeted by the terrorists. If the British based on an artificial interpretation of a or predilection for anti-social behaviour defined enemy will continue to lead not than a terrorist organization into a than ‘generational projects’ in social are to develop successful counter- culture. The components of the country or criminal activity. Nor is it to instil just to a surge in apocalyptic behaviour phenomenon with revolutionary, engineering, community policing and insurgency strategies for the country’s are simply too fluid, too complicated, any Anglo-centric notion of justice, and ‘treasonous’ rhetoric from elements global proportions. Counter-terrorism counter-terrorism. The reason for this is built-up, racially diverse, Muslim too diverse and too intricate in their liberty or freedom – none of which of the Muslim population, but the responses to Islamic fundamentalism twofold: 1) Islamic terrorists in the UK communities, its strategists must nature to define, understand and are deemed prerequisites to allegiance. fraying of traditional tensions between have hence not only failed in have as yet to go ‘blind’, in an all-out understand that it is pivotal on such appreciate for them to be stopped in Interpreting the battlespace as a map of groups that have existed peacefully in challenging the façade but in protecting directive to force a crisis of legitimacy an ideological component. Just as Al time, disassembled and reassembled to human terrain and exploiting it for the these islands for many years – groups contemporary views of British Muslims for the government and the targeted Qaeda and Islamic State are competing please a generation. purposes of allegiance alone is not only that have not only characterised the from subversion. Indeed, as one of communities 2) Islamic insurgents for the hearts and minds of British Defragmenting is hence neither proactive but devoid of the religious, pluralistic nature of British democracy the most striking political features have barely developed beyond the Muslims, so too must the Crown. the disassembly nor reassembly of cultural and racial baggage that but the tangled web of loyalties that of the early 20th century was the incipient stage, i.e. because engaging communities but the protection and characterises counter-terrorism. Hence, have held the United Kingdom together repeated destabilizing nature of the insurgency as a foreign, intrinsic, PART IV enhancement of their clock-like instead of attacking civil liberties each for centuries. Given the artificial and militant violence and the reaction or strategic and symbiotic component of components – a protective casing time the country is faced with an untested nature of the doctrine, it is lack of reaction to its realpolitik, the the enemy’s gestalt in its early stages Defragmenting the Threat to prevent the fragmentation of the act of terrorism, defragmenting means believed that the strategy would neither far reaching consequences of Islamic increases the likelihood of an earlier, identities and values that each cog and protecting them - taking advantage of last the test of time nor the economic, terrorism in this century must not be visible and quantifiable victory. The Pragmatic Model: The spring represents and that are crucial to the situation by offering a bridge from political and social impact of a bombing underestimated. The consequences of failing to ultimate aim of defragmentation is not the equilibrium of the nation. The aim the diabolical to the moral and draining campaign. The consequences of focusing on halt the militant forces of Islam are integration or social cohesion, but the is therefore to create a protective cover the enemy of its human resources. It must equally be pointed ‘home-grown terrorism’, as opposed to wrought with danger: an increase in the development of common ground around in which the independent performance Defragmenting is hence an out that the insurgency has, in any the nature of the exported / imported violent rejection of society by Muslims which allegiances to the Crown can be of each component can be accessed and innovative, integrated and strategic case, little concept or appreciation threat, are hence not only cyclical in and the reticent forces of republicanism, rallied when called - it is not designed enhanced for its symbiotic qualities. theory designed to kill an insurgency of the West’s approach to time and that they continue to fail to address an increase in propaganda of the deed, to draw an end to Jihad or the dedication Adapting to the unique dynamics of in its early, embryonic stage. It is has been well embedded for many this politick but vulnerable in that illegalism, demonstrative bloodshed, of oneself to a foreign cause, nor to the threat to these cogs and abandoning a response to a threat that is too decades. Hence, with the ‘generational they can be framed and exploited by terror and wide-scale treason - all assimilate the citizenry of the United the doctrine of counter-terrorism is not, fragmented to cope with in its entirety approach’, the enemy has the advantage the enemy as an anti-Islamic offensive traits of the modern incipient stage Kingdom. Whilst the consequences of however, without collateral damage and, - so spread out amidst the available of time and is able to exploit the policy against what could be portrayed as and responses to long-term counter- defragmenting may provide context for although liberal, is a muscular response data that there are too few contiguous of non-engagement that characterizes an isolated, immigrant, minority terrorism initiatives. It must not be the above, its goals are independent that forcefully takes ownership of and intelligence leads at any one specific the reactive, episodic approach of this population. Furthermore, as counter- forgotten that, as with the strategic of any racial or religious agenda and incorporates into the security apparatus threat to target, to locate, engage and government. What is at risk here is terrorism is not designed to indent upon corporal of a 21st century conventional unconcerned with the root causes of of the state the communities targeted destroy in time. Defragmenting the

28 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 29 threat breaks through this data and Great Britain and the Crown. civil-military relations both at home detriment of the Atlantic Alliance and purposes, ‘civilians’. Al Qaeda and inheritance has many precedents and concatenates the strings of intelligence i.e. locating, linking and connecting and abroad. national security, a further process of Islamic State, on the other hand, have can be seen not just in Gove’s legacy to the degree whereby access and values that are fixed and compatible civilianization, privatization and cuts a bloodline and an ideology that is or the nation’s response to the Ebola response times on the ground become with, not mainstream politics or PART V across the armed forces. The problem soaked not in politics or insurrection, crisis, but across the history of the more manageable. Through a process social norms, but allegiance to the with this is that, even if the ‘War of but combat. world. Were Britain to strive to lead of working from both ends of the Crown. The New Covenant the Wastelands’ were to continue ad As a result of a shared experience once again as the world’s first to strings (from the terrorist to the target B) Taking political responsibility infinitum and the détente with Russia and a shared ideology that stems from respond militarily to the needs of those and from the target to the terrorist) for the immediate mobilisation and Civil-Military Relations: That the to last, the enemy have transformed and the battlefields of Bosnia, Chechnya, in help, the might of her neutrality it not only identifies the source of protection of any community that has end of the Cold War reignited colonial, so too have the stakes. The colonial, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria (a lineage would be restored and enhance not just the threat and target, but the likely been targeted by a foreign force through: tribal and religious conflict that had tribal and religious conflicts of the past that has enabled them to survive allegiance at home and pride in the outcome. 1. The enforcement of grass- been dormant for generations has been are no longer contained by dictatorial the onslaughts of two superpowers) defence and foreign aid budgets, but This reflects a very new way roots democracy via a policy of well documented. That it gave birth to regimes, and the borders of yesterday, they have arguably transitioned from her reputation and respect as a power- of understanding the tangible threat political, economic and social the extremism and ethno-nationalist have become today’s frontiers. The ‘civilian-terrorists’ to ‘stateless- broker abroad. to the UK and mobilizing against it; subsidiarity that isolates ‘Islamic terrorism of the Muslim world and is end of age-old alliances and the soldiers’ and cannot be appeased. With One of the most historic concentrating resources on both the Issues’ from ‘Muslim Issues’. the legacy of 70 years of repressive, collapse of proxy-wars have brought an the ‘stateless-soldiers’ of Islamic State, precedents for this actually lie in terrorist and the target as opposed to 2. Handling ‘Muslim Issues’ at their dictatorial regimes and the political, international, conventional and state- the hordes of Cyclopses not only help the remnants of the British Army’s any intangible enemy. It also enables lowest geographical and demographic economic and social ramifications of like element to the modernity of 21st Polyphemus outwit and kill Odysseus, regimental system and is a further practitioners on the ground to tap into level of organisation and dealing with globalization, regional alliances and century political violence that counter- but march on to Ithaca for his Crown. reason as to why the Armed Forces real time intelligence that reflects social problems at the most immediate the diminishing power of nation-states terrorism cannot defeat. Although, at Military engagement hence needs to are a good starting point to rebuilding the human terrain. By defragmenting point of contact. 3. Reconfiguring is less established. However, in the present, British brigades have exactly involve the mobilisation of the nation the country’s allegiances. Given that the exposure and experience of the the political landscape by capitalising context that the ‘wastelands’ of Islam the type of manpower, resources, and its communities in a combined this is a well-documented example of returnees, the sanctuaries within the on the dissipated energy of internal were abandoned in the wake of the equipment and experience to engage offensive – a symbiotic, ideological where the British have failed to take terrorists’ communities and the terrain conflict, sectarian competition and Soviet Empire, the rise of Salafi-Jihad and destroy the armed forces of Islamic advance on the enemy, both at home advantage of their past, it is sufficient of the targets, the Prevent and Protect the extant fault lines of nationality and the race to reverse the perceived State it would, as the threat simply and abroad. to say that, today, alongside the Irish, strands of the Contest Policy would be (Somali, Bengali, Pakistani etc.), onslaught of such powers is far from morphed from Iraq and Syria to the Hence, what Michael Gove Welsh, Scots, English and Nepalese seen not only to be dated, but to have religion (Shia, Sunni, Ahmadi etc.) surprising. ‘Wastelands’ of Somalia, Libya, the achieved with cadet forces in British parade-grounds of the British Army lie fundamental flaws in their ability to and politics (Jihad-nationalists, In this sense, whether the threat Lebanon, Afghanistan, the Maghreb or secondary schools needs to be viewed the ‘abandoned waste-lands’ in which counter Islamic fundamentalism. Jihadi-trans-nationalists etc.). 4. emanates from radicalized Western Aden, indeed even to the barracks from with admiration – and as a blue-print the footsteps of the Sikhs of King There are 3 major components to Investing economically in allegiance based converts, lone wolves, Al Qaeda which the British marched, exhaust the for a much grander strategy in which the George’s Own, the Punjabis of the the process: 1. Defragmenting the threat and encouraging political and social Central, AQAM, Islamic State or the country, divide its populace and leave example set by the NHS and Military Burma Rifles, the Bengali Lancers of from returnees (their competencies) aspirations that reinforce the new ‘Leaderless Jihad’ is a moot point, them defeated. in Sierra Leone is replicated across the Duke of Cambridge’s Own and 2. Defragmenting the threat from their status quo. 5. Germination of the for any attack on the West is but one The threat today must therefore not just the institutions of the state, the Kenyans, the Ugandans and the communities (their constituencies) human product and recycling of the more front in what is an ongoing war not be confused with that of yesterday. but the citizenry: tens of thousands of Somalis of the King’s African Rifles are and, 3. Defragmenting the threat to social product. on a much larger battlefield than the Whilst to contain the monster of workers commissioned with reserve but ghostly echoes of a forgotten time. their targets (their proficiencies). The i.e. the exposure and engagement homelands of the British Isles. It is the type of terrorism that was born and regular soldiers into the national The role of Catholic, Irish, Scots, mechanics of the defensive strands of insurgent forces by dividing the hence of great importance that any between the foundations of the modern and international framework of the Welsh and Nepalese soldiers needs of the policy are hence primarily militants into multiple, antagonistic, drive to reverse the threat to the UK state and its citizenry, a government country’s security apparatus – a Britain to be emphasised up and down the based on an analysis of the terrorists’ sectarian factions and forcing their recognizes the global nature of the would of course be best advised to and a world in which Her Majesty’s country as they, along with the Hindu, competencies in asymmetrical warfare communities into taking public, threat, is international in scope and consider learning how to live with it, Armed Forces and Carriers are first on Muslim and Sikh Regiments (were they and the levels of proficiency that irrevocable and irrecoverable driven by the military; protecting the maintaining its more often than not the horizon to provide aid, engineering to be revived), are an irreproachable would be required to attack targets in stances on position and family. United Kingdom from trans-national benign malevolence, this is only were and sanctuary, a Britain in which Her example of loyalty to the Crown and the United Kingdom. The delivery of C) Enabling those communities conflict and securing the communities it content to feast from a Cyclopic, Majesty’s Armed Forces reflect the the key to both countering the threat that intelligence and the objectives of targeted to reconstruct around the key held hostage by British militants are cave–like existence. With the threat ethnically and culturally diverse nature and enfranchising the ‘enraged’ with the mission would be achieved through components of mainstream institutions but one and the same. that Britain faces, this is not the case. of the nation from which they draw demonstrable, public acts of allegiance control of the sanctuaries within their by a strengthening in the Covenant The consequences of maintaining Britain’s monster has tendrils beyond their strength and a Britain in which and the celebration of historical deeds communities and the ‘castle-building’ between Her Majesty’s Armed Forces the status quo and failing to utilize the state. The main premise for this the profound changes that the country of incontrovertible and abiding loyalty of allegiances throughout them by: and the nation. the mandate of the Armed Forces to is that as national-separatists have a is undergoing are shared. to the institutions of the state. To A) Concatenating the individual i.e. a demonstrable, experienceable protect the country at home and abroad traceable lineage that are inseparable A social return on investment conclude, defragmenting has not historic bonds of allegiance that exist return on the defence budget are the increasing para-militarization from that of the governments they in defence and a foreign policy that only precedents, but established between the immigrant populations of through a radical transformation of of non-military forces and, to the oppose, they remain, to all intents and reflects the might of the country’s precedents. ■

30 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 31 threat breaks through this data and Great Britain and the Crown. civil-military relations both at home detriment of the Atlantic Alliance and purposes, ‘civilians’. Al Qaeda and inheritance has many precedents and concatenates the strings of intelligence i.e. locating, linking and connecting and abroad. national security, a further process of Islamic State, on the other hand, have can be seen not just in Gove’s legacy to the degree whereby access and values that are fixed and compatible civilianization, privatization and cuts a bloodline and an ideology that is or the nation’s response to the Ebola response times on the ground become with, not mainstream politics or PART V across the armed forces. The problem soaked not in politics or insurrection, crisis, but across the history of the more manageable. Through a process social norms, but allegiance to the with this is that, even if the ‘War of but combat. world. Were Britain to strive to lead of working from both ends of the Crown. The New Covenant the Wastelands’ were to continue ad As a result of a shared experience once again as the world’s first to strings (from the terrorist to the target B) Taking political responsibility infinitum and the détente with Russia and a shared ideology that stems from respond militarily to the needs of those and from the target to the terrorist) for the immediate mobilisation and Civil-Military Relations: That the to last, the enemy have transformed and the battlefields of Bosnia, Chechnya, in help, the might of her neutrality it not only identifies the source of protection of any community that has end of the Cold War reignited colonial, so too have the stakes. The colonial, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria (a lineage would be restored and enhance not just the threat and target, but the likely been targeted by a foreign force through: tribal and religious conflict that had tribal and religious conflicts of the past that has enabled them to survive allegiance at home and pride in the outcome. 1. The enforcement of grass- been dormant for generations has been are no longer contained by dictatorial the onslaughts of two superpowers) defence and foreign aid budgets, but This reflects a very new way roots democracy via a policy of well documented. That it gave birth to regimes, and the borders of yesterday, they have arguably transitioned from her reputation and respect as a power- of understanding the tangible threat political, economic and social the extremism and ethno-nationalist have become today’s frontiers. The ‘civilian-terrorists’ to ‘stateless- broker abroad. to the UK and mobilizing against it; subsidiarity that isolates ‘Islamic terrorism of the Muslim world and is end of age-old alliances and the soldiers’ and cannot be appeased. With One of the most historic concentrating resources on both the Issues’ from ‘Muslim Issues’. the legacy of 70 years of repressive, collapse of proxy-wars have brought an the ‘stateless-soldiers’ of Islamic State, precedents for this actually lie in terrorist and the target as opposed to 2. Handling ‘Muslim Issues’ at their dictatorial regimes and the political, international, conventional and state- the hordes of Cyclopses not only help the remnants of the British Army’s any intangible enemy. It also enables lowest geographical and demographic economic and social ramifications of like element to the modernity of 21st Polyphemus outwit and kill Odysseus, regimental system and is a further practitioners on the ground to tap into level of organisation and dealing with globalization, regional alliances and century political violence that counter- but march on to Ithaca for his Crown. reason as to why the Armed Forces real time intelligence that reflects social problems at the most immediate the diminishing power of nation-states terrorism cannot defeat. Although, at Military engagement hence needs to are a good starting point to rebuilding the human terrain. By defragmenting point of contact. 3. Reconfiguring is less established. However, in the present, British brigades have exactly involve the mobilisation of the nation the country’s allegiances. Given that the exposure and experience of the the political landscape by capitalising context that the ‘wastelands’ of Islam the type of manpower, resources, and its communities in a combined this is a well-documented example of returnees, the sanctuaries within the on the dissipated energy of internal were abandoned in the wake of the equipment and experience to engage offensive – a symbiotic, ideological where the British have failed to take terrorists’ communities and the terrain conflict, sectarian competition and Soviet Empire, the rise of Salafi-Jihad and destroy the armed forces of Islamic advance on the enemy, both at home advantage of their past, it is sufficient of the targets, the Prevent and Protect the extant fault lines of nationality and the race to reverse the perceived State it would, as the threat simply and abroad. to say that, today, alongside the Irish, strands of the Contest Policy would be (Somali, Bengali, Pakistani etc.), onslaught of such powers is far from morphed from Iraq and Syria to the Hence, what Michael Gove Welsh, Scots, English and Nepalese seen not only to be dated, but to have religion (Shia, Sunni, Ahmadi etc.) surprising. ‘Wastelands’ of Somalia, Libya, the achieved with cadet forces in British parade-grounds of the British Army lie fundamental flaws in their ability to and politics (Jihad-nationalists, In this sense, whether the threat Lebanon, Afghanistan, the Maghreb or secondary schools needs to be viewed the ‘abandoned waste-lands’ in which counter Islamic fundamentalism. Jihadi-trans-nationalists etc.). 4. emanates from radicalized Western Aden, indeed even to the barracks from with admiration – and as a blue-print the footsteps of the Sikhs of King There are 3 major components to Investing economically in allegiance based converts, lone wolves, Al Qaeda which the British marched, exhaust the for a much grander strategy in which the George’s Own, the Punjabis of the the process: 1. Defragmenting the threat and encouraging political and social Central, AQAM, Islamic State or the country, divide its populace and leave example set by the NHS and Military Burma Rifles, the Bengali Lancers of from returnees (their competencies) aspirations that reinforce the new ‘Leaderless Jihad’ is a moot point, them defeated. in Sierra Leone is replicated across the Duke of Cambridge’s Own and 2. Defragmenting the threat from their status quo. 5. Germination of the for any attack on the West is but one The threat today must therefore not just the institutions of the state, the Kenyans, the Ugandans and the communities (their constituencies) human product and recycling of the more front in what is an ongoing war not be confused with that of yesterday. but the citizenry: tens of thousands of Somalis of the King’s African Rifles are and, 3. Defragmenting the threat to social product. on a much larger battlefield than the Whilst to contain the monster of workers commissioned with reserve but ghostly echoes of a forgotten time. their targets (their proficiencies). The i.e. the exposure and engagement homelands of the British Isles. It is the type of terrorism that was born and regular soldiers into the national The role of Catholic, Irish, Scots, mechanics of the defensive strands of insurgent forces by dividing the hence of great importance that any between the foundations of the modern and international framework of the Welsh and Nepalese soldiers needs of the policy are hence primarily militants into multiple, antagonistic, drive to reverse the threat to the UK state and its citizenry, a government country’s security apparatus – a Britain to be emphasised up and down the based on an analysis of the terrorists’ sectarian factions and forcing their recognizes the global nature of the would of course be best advised to and a world in which Her Majesty’s country as they, along with the Hindu, competencies in asymmetrical warfare communities into taking public, threat, is international in scope and consider learning how to live with it, Armed Forces and Carriers are first on Muslim and Sikh Regiments (were they and the levels of proficiency that irrevocable and irrecoverable driven by the military; protecting the maintaining its more often than not the horizon to provide aid, engineering to be revived), are an irreproachable would be required to attack targets in stances on position and family. United Kingdom from trans-national benign malevolence, this is only were and sanctuary, a Britain in which Her example of loyalty to the Crown and the United Kingdom. The delivery of C) Enabling those communities conflict and securing the communities it content to feast from a Cyclopic, Majesty’s Armed Forces reflect the the key to both countering the threat that intelligence and the objectives of targeted to reconstruct around the key held hostage by British militants are cave–like existence. With the threat ethnically and culturally diverse nature and enfranchising the ‘enraged’ with the mission would be achieved through components of mainstream institutions but one and the same. that Britain faces, this is not the case. of the nation from which they draw demonstrable, public acts of allegiance control of the sanctuaries within their by a strengthening in the Covenant The consequences of maintaining Britain’s monster has tendrils beyond their strength and a Britain in which and the celebration of historical deeds communities and the ‘castle-building’ between Her Majesty’s Armed Forces the status quo and failing to utilize the state. The main premise for this the profound changes that the country of incontrovertible and abiding loyalty of allegiances throughout them by: and the nation. the mandate of the Armed Forces to is that as national-separatists have a is undergoing are shared. to the institutions of the state. To A) Concatenating the individual i.e. a demonstrable, experienceable protect the country at home and abroad traceable lineage that are inseparable A social return on investment conclude, defragmenting has not historic bonds of allegiance that exist return on the defence budget are the increasing para-militarization from that of the governments they in defence and a foreign policy that only precedents, but established between the immigrant populations of through a radical transformation of of non-military forces and, to the oppose, they remain, to all intents and reflects the might of the country’s precedents. ■

30 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 31 The aim of this essay is to identify and indicate what is considered to be an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) methodology for Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of lessons learned (LL). Moreover, understand the difference between the society through their culture. Just because this essay will demonstrate possible ways two is that insurgents try to hit the rival an Afghan says ‘yes’ and nods his head, of how all knowledge gained from past armed and security forces as a whole, while does not necessarily mean that he agrees and contemporary experiences can be terrorists execute individual hits mainly with you - he may just want you to stop implemented and used in an attempt directed against civilian targets. talking. Major Lessons from COIN efforts to facilitate COIN planning procedures However, the main difference is that Culture is the way people behave and overcome problems in the future. terrorists seek to impose a change in the and it is very hard to be determined. In order to achieve this it is important political status mainly through the use Members from different societies often for the readers to familiarize themselves in Iraq and Afghanistan of indirect force, while insurgents try to have different perception of life, religion, with the topic through a short knowledge achieve the same goal in a straightforward justice, social status, sexual orientation update starting with some important way. That means that insurgency has more and gender norms, even different notions definitions. Thereafter, this essay will and How to Use Them in the Future to do with military power and tactics thus, of rationality.7 History provides many proceed further to a deeper analysis by an insurgents want to have absolute control examples of where failure to know, using a logical methodology based on a over the targeted area. Putting it in a less understand or apply the culture of others step by step study through the lens of complex way, insurgents will use terrorism often led to disastrous results.8 Arab the COIN principles, as they have been – armed violence against unarmed people cultural awareness includes a variety adopted by the traditional COIN theory. to intimidate and influence, while in of key elements, all equally important parallel they will also use guerilla – hit such as tribalism and authoritarianism,9 and run tactics to target the government’s hierarchy, institutions, roles and statuses, all, COIN is fundamentally a competition vulnerabilities and convey their values and beliefs, elders, gender, religion, between many groups and is always more ■ MAJ Nikolaos Charalampopoulos, GRC Army, message. Insurgency and terrorism often public protocol, promises and other. Even than two-sided. JFTC Training Division coexist which creates a chaotic security corruption plays a unique role in the Arab environment especially for those involved tradition and culture. As Colonel Juan COIN Planning and Design

in COIN.6 Ayala, a senior adviser to an Iraqi Division, wrote: “Corruption exists. The Iraqis know COIN has to be designed, planned Lessons learned from Iraq and that we know. They know we would never and executed as any other military Afghanistan condone it or report it if we saw it… It operation on condition that its special has been part of life since the sands of characteristics and dynamics should be Introduction through a variety of theoretical approaches insurgency and COIN fall under the same Understanding the environment Mesopotamia… Seeking corruption would prioritized accordingly. The initial strategy in order to describe the military actions subtotal of conflict, known as irregular 2 distract mission focus, severely strain against insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan Nowadays majority of military conflicts taken during the colonial wars. warfare, while in parallel their central issue The use of the term “environment” in sensitive personal relations, and worse, was not new. Actually it was similar to happening on our planet have a form of Today, in the aftermath of the war is all about political power. Therefore, an COIN is used so as to describe all aspects compromise our force protection posture the doctrine employed at the end of the irregular war, while classic warfare between conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, COIN insurgency is a politico-military struggle, that pose a direct or an indirect influence (meaning there would be retaliation)”.10 19th and early 20th centuries during the conventional forces is rather an exception. has become fashionable again. The US with the primacy of the political element. in accomplishment of the mission. In Insurgents by definition will always be colonial wars to pacify acquired territories; This observation has led a number of Army in its relevant field manuals, defines Insurgency and COIN are defined by their all military operations the study of the one step ahead in terms of local knowledge, occupy the territory and establish numerous strategy analysts and practitioners alike insurgency “as an organized movement highly lethal and extraordinary complex environment is of high value. However, in communication and understanding the garrisons, eliminate armed opposition and to conclude that in the future we will aimed at the overthrow of a constituted character, but at the end of the day, case of COIN it has a unique meaning since interests of native communities. Cultural then withdraw the troops.13 Initially there experience a new form of guerilla war, also government through the use of subversion insurgency and COIN are about political 3 it is related to elements that traditionally knowledge enables counterinsurgents’ was not any particular interest within the known as “low intensity conflict”. There is and armed conflict” or in a similar way power, and who owns it. are considered as non-combatant. To be ability to identify in depth the needs of the campaign planning to incorporate concepts a rich bibliography dealing with this type “insurgency is an organized, protracted At this point, further to the more specific, the study of corruption in local population and plan their next steps such as civilian-military cooperation of conflict, however, the use of this special politico-military struggle designed to definitions, it is worth mentioning that there Afghanistan or the gender discrimination accordingly. Moreover, counterinsurgents (CIMIC), psychological operations term was invented by US Army staff officers weaken the control and the legitimacy is no clear borderline between insurgency in Iraq are closer to the field of social will be able to avoid one of the most typical (PYSOPS), public affairs and social/ back in 1981, in a rather failed attempt of an established government, occupying and terrorism. In many cases public sciences rather than to military matters, mistakes made by U.S. planners in Iraq, political internal relations of the country. to develop a new counter-revolutionary power, or other political authority while opinion can hardly distinguish a “terrorist” 4 but in our case it is important to underline which was to impose their ideas of normalcy Nevertheless, these tactics did not allow doctrine, based on experiences gained from increasing insurgent control”. On the from a “rebel” or an “insurgent” from that the COIN campaign requires methods on a foreign cultural problem.11 Therefore, the army to occupy a sizeable part of the the Vietnam guerilla campaign.1 Besides, other hand, “COIN is military, paramilitary a “freedom fighter”. Undoubtedly, there quite different than those applied to a commanders, small unit leaders and territory, the insurgent attacks remained the use of the adjective “low” did not political, economic, psychological, and are conceptual and ideological differences conventional conflict. Operations in Iraq soldiers are highly encouraged to improve constant and the population remained mean to decrease the importance and the civic actions taken by a government to between insurgency and terrorism, but it 5 and Afghanistan highly indicated that their cultural skills through personal mostly negative. lethality of such a conflict but it was used defeat insurgency”. would be useful to identify the differences success requires more than armed security training, engagement with indigenous key It was not until recently, when in order to demonstrate and describe the The constant theme in the afore- between those two forms of asymmetric as it heavily depends on influence and personnel, relationship building, patrolling, coalition forces realized that success is differentiation in terms of power. At the mentioned definitions is the relationship threats, since an insurgency is considered persuasion thus, demands the ability to and other interaction with natives, so as gained mainly by targeting the populace, same period of time, the term “classical between politics and violence. Moreover, as a greatest threat to the established power understand and communicate with local to offset insurgents’ advantages.12 After not the insurgents. In other words, success counterinsurgency” was introduced their main characteristics is that both rather than terrorism. The easiest way to

32 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 33 The aim of this essay is to identify and indicate what is considered to be an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) methodology for Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of lessons learned (LL). Moreover, understand the difference between the society through their culture. Just because this essay will demonstrate possible ways two is that insurgents try to hit the rival an Afghan says ‘yes’ and nods his head, of how all knowledge gained from past armed and security forces as a whole, while does not necessarily mean that he agrees and contemporary experiences can be terrorists execute individual hits mainly with you - he may just want you to stop implemented and used in an attempt directed against civilian targets. talking. Major Lessons from COIN efforts to facilitate COIN planning procedures However, the main difference is that Culture is the way people behave and overcome problems in the future. terrorists seek to impose a change in the and it is very hard to be determined. In order to achieve this it is important political status mainly through the use Members from different societies often for the readers to familiarize themselves in Iraq and Afghanistan of indirect force, while insurgents try to have different perception of life, religion, with the topic through a short knowledge achieve the same goal in a straightforward justice, social status, sexual orientation update starting with some important way. That means that insurgency has more and gender norms, even different notions definitions. Thereafter, this essay will and How to Use Them in the Future to do with military power and tactics thus, of rationality.7 History provides many proceed further to a deeper analysis by an insurgents want to have absolute control examples of where failure to know, using a logical methodology based on a over the targeted area. Putting it in a less understand or apply the culture of others step by step study through the lens of complex way, insurgents will use terrorism often led to disastrous results.8 Arab the COIN principles, as they have been – armed violence against unarmed people cultural awareness includes a variety adopted by the traditional COIN theory. to intimidate and influence, while in of key elements, all equally important parallel they will also use guerilla – hit such as tribalism and authoritarianism,9 and run tactics to target the government’s hierarchy, institutions, roles and statuses, all, COIN is fundamentally a competition vulnerabilities and convey their values and beliefs, elders, gender, religion, between many groups and is always more ■ MAJ Nikolaos Charalampopoulos, GRC Army, message. Insurgency and terrorism often public protocol, promises and other. Even than two-sided. JFTC Training Division coexist which creates a chaotic security corruption plays a unique role in the Arab environment especially for those involved tradition and culture. As Colonel Juan COIN Planning and Design

32 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 33 in COIN comes from winning the hearts insurgency today has the ability to receive actors. The key method that insurgents in credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of local appears to be problematic in Afghanistan and translators. Moreover, they have and minds of the population, where “hearts” support from national and international Iraq and Afghanistan use to legitimize their and international communities. Utilization while in Iraq cannot bring at all the required improved INTEL awareness in coordination means persuading people that their best sources due to its global nature.18 The rise actions are ideas of self-determination and of the local government to work out those synergy.30 Moreover, reality has proven with all international organizations, taking interest are served by counterinsurgents’ of globalization has significantly changed sovereignty, therefore the use of violence issues offers a governmental signature on all that in many cases IOs, GOs, and NGOs advantage from their connections with the success, and “minds” means convincing the way that insurgency is being fought “… from their side is justified as a result of actions. Finally, counterinsurgents need to can perform better if they are allowed to elders and key personnel of a given area, them that counterinsurgents can protect from Madrid to London, and from New chasing a political objective. In addition, know that democracy and elections do not stay outside of the wire, meaning without as 50% of the success of COIN INTEL them. Therefore, the objective, or better say, York to Baghdad, insurgency is leveraged insurgents, through demonstration of moral have the same meaning and do not apply to falling under COIN leader’s command relies on positive relationships with elders the center of gravity in a COIN campaign by a worldwide criminal market, and feeds superiority over state forces try to create their any society of this world as it might have and control.31 Therefore, it would be and religious leaders in tribal areas. Allied must be the people. That was exactly the key off media that broadcasts its violence image of martyrs who are ready to sacrifice little to do with “governments being elected more realistic if we should try to achieve INTEL now emphasizes collection on social point in General Petraeus’ strategy when he and multiplies the latter’s psychological themselves for freedom and independence and governments being popular”.27 No synchronization rather than command and and religious networking by connecting the tasked his forces to primary secure and serve impact”.19 Globalization has also offered of their homeland.23 The idea behind this is doubt, the power given to a democratically control. Otherwise, well-intentioned efforts dots between the tribes, families, businesses, the local population by living with it, as this additional potential to insurgents, such as that the moral justification for the purpose elected government by its populace is may turn into failures and give opportunities and political organizations. Finally, would eventually lead to regional stability, access to a worldwide audience, freedom of a political goal (self-determination and important but this power has to translate for insurgents to undermine the whole international military troops have to accept governmental sustainability and economic of moving and communication, ability to sovereignty) will generate indigenous and into security, law, order, civil services and project. the chaos of not having perfect INTEL in a growth.14 That is to say that, military forces conduct financial transfers without being international sympathizers ready to provide prosperity. COIN environment. Insurgents will always have to get out from the security of their tracked, but above all, globalization support and mainly legitimation for the use Intelligence in COIN surprise them and attack their weakest compounds and actively set their boots allowed them to create and use “active” of violence in order for them to overset the Unity of effort points; what is important is that individual on the ground so as to get in touch with – geographical space sanctuaries and current status.24 One of the major problems in COIN soldiers must identify those weak points and people.15 One can argue that since high-tech “virtual” – internet based sanctuaries that Theoretically, governments described There is no need to mention that unity operations is to track and target an enemy communicate that information effectively.34 surveillance equipment offers comparative facilitated their needs and activities in terms as legitimate rule primarily with blank of effort or unity of command as it is known who is not dressed in military uniforms, advantages there is no reason to put soldiers’ of training, indoctrination, recruitment, acceptance and support of their citizens in military COIN doctrine, plays a special has no trenches or front lines, and is hiding lives at high risk. In this case the answer and regrouping.20 From this point of without the fear of consequences as long role within COIN operations. In Iraq and among populace.32 In a situation like this the Investing Knowledge in Future is that nothing can replace visible force’s view, contemporary COIN must be able to as their activities stay within a reasonably Afghanistan, beside international military only tool available is effective, active and presence, especially when insurgents have mobilize and energize all available support predefined frame. On the other hand, the forces, a great number of governmental accurate intelligence (INTEL). By definition Learn and adopt repeatedly shown that they can immediately at all levels while in parallel it must assume primary responsibility of any government (GO), non-governmental (NGO), and INTEL is vital for all forms of warfare adjust their tactics to new challenges, more initiatives and establish measures in order to is to provide security to its people. In other international organizations (IO) are however, in COIN operations INTEL is “In COIN the side that learns like a balloon that “…you squeeze one end, prevent its rivals from doing the same.21 COIN operations this might be turn out actively involved in the stabilization and encountering an additional theoretical faster and adapts more rapidly, usually and the enemy moves to the other”.16 Finally, time is of critical importance to be problematic and become Achilles’ reconstruction of the entire area thus, unity problem: intelligence versus information. wins”.35 Coalition forces should adopt Another fundamental element in and must be included in the planning as heel. Indeed, no government can claim full of effort must be present at every dimension, Put it in another way, INTEL in COIN has LL as quickly as possible if they want COIN planning procedure is the ability to well. Usually policymakers provide time consent from the governed side unless it is every level, and in any daily activity. In a dual role; from one side it emphasizes to maintain their superiority in the future. involve indigenous forces as a part of the frames and expect troops to be withdrawn able to provide them with security and thus, this case, the challenge to overcome is very collection and analysis on current The study of the two COIN campaigns entire process. In this case there must be a from the theater accordingly, however, it securing populace requires efficient and complex, since we refer to a combat system operational issues based on the traditional in Iraq and Afghanistan corroborates the preparation phase that includes recruiting, should be underlined that COIN is a time continuous employment of security forces. dominated by a number of players, each model “who-when-where-why-how”, while below mentioned conclusion: the decline training and evaluation, and gradually within consuming effort and often its duration is The overall concept is quite challenging of which has a different role and position from the other side it strives to delineate of communist ideology is irreversible, a reasonable period of time indigenous a question without a clear answer.22 As since it requires ability to maintain control within this system, but all of them are skills, characteristics, tactics, and goals of nationalism remains a powerful force and, security forces should participate in mentioned before, COIN is directly related to over an overwhelming force without causing equally important for the stability of the an invisible enemy. Meanwhile, insurgents religious fundamentalism is raged –basically common operations in the light of embedded indigenous populace whose reaction cannot a negative impact to the local populace.25 As system. consciously study and learn from their Muslim, but with the possible creation of partnering, until finally they are capable to be measured in advance. Lack of tactical a response to this action, insurgents will try Collaboration among military and weaknesses in an attempt to become more opposing tendencies in other religions. The plan and execute their own missions. This patience in COIN operations contributes to provoke and undermine the government’s civilian entities might be an answer to adoptive and resilient to COIN methods, methods of the rebels will remain basically will create a negative picture and send the to missed opportunities and intelligence effort by drawing it into a game of attrition this, especially since the military cannot which fact in many cases allow them to be the same, but there will be adjustments to right message to the natives as it will be failures, and sometimes, waiting, collecting where insurgents usually have an advantage solve all COIN related issues on its own one step ahead.33 technological developments. The increasing their own people who fight for them thus, information, reporting and doing nothing is in delegitimizing the state’s efforts.26 due to its structure and mission. Therefore, Lately, INTEL knowledge gained urbanization of the population will lead it will deepen their confidence and enable the best reaction. Practically speaking, insurgents seek troops can be used in a way that will from the theater offered new perspectives in to greater recourse to terrorism, possibly responsibility and accountability.17 When to have the government and coalition forces create a safe path to be followed by civilian terms of sustains and improvements. To start with weapons of mass destruction, but there is an Iraqi-Afghan problem there is Legitimacy do their work for them. This overreaction subject matters that from their side will up, coalition forces realized that despite the as insurgency is politically effective, the an Iraqi-Afghan solution and nothing can is exactly what insurgents are looking for go into deeper waters in their respective fact that operations will be INTEL driven, most important movements are expected to be done unless they decide to take over Insurgents’ primary objective is to so as to drive the populace or international field of expertise.28 Furthermore, the ideal intelligence will come mostly from their use a combination of both methods. How initiatives and rely on their own power until delegitimize the current political system opinion into their hands. Counterinsurgents’ solution would be a COIN leader, military or own efforts, and somehow INTEL must be effective will the insurgents be in the future? they finally manage to isolate and eradicate and its representatives while in parallel bottom-up efforts should align top-down civilian, who should be given authority and pushed down to the lowest level possible, to Technological developments facilitate insurgents from their cause and support. they are seeking ways to legitimize their initiatives dealing with daily civic issues, power to direct all COIN aspects vertically include friendly indigenous forces and vice observation and real-time transmission COIN operations in Iraq and struggle and translate this into sympathy impunity and the negative influence of and horizontally towards the common versa. Thus, all personnel are now considered of information and therefore, impede the Afghanistan have also taught us that and vital support from internal and external parallel structures that attack government’s objective.29 However, this course of action as information collectors to include linguists concentration of large insurgency groups.

34 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 35 in COIN comes from winning the hearts insurgency today has the ability to receive actors. The key method that insurgents in credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of local appears to be problematic in Afghanistan and translators. Moreover, they have and minds of the population, where “hearts” support from national and international Iraq and Afghanistan use to legitimize their and international communities. Utilization while in Iraq cannot bring at all the required improved INTEL awareness in coordination means persuading people that their best sources due to its global nature.18 The rise actions are ideas of self-determination and of the local government to work out those synergy.30 Moreover, reality has proven with all international organizations, taking interest are served by counterinsurgents’ of globalization has significantly changed sovereignty, therefore the use of violence issues offers a governmental signature on all that in many cases IOs, GOs, and NGOs advantage from their connections with the success, and “minds” means convincing the way that insurgency is being fought “… from their side is justified as a result of actions. Finally, counterinsurgents need to can perform better if they are allowed to elders and key personnel of a given area, them that counterinsurgents can protect from Madrid to London, and from New chasing a political objective. In addition, know that democracy and elections do not stay outside of the wire, meaning without as 50% of the success of COIN INTEL them. Therefore, the objective, or better say, York to Baghdad, insurgency is leveraged insurgents, through demonstration of moral have the same meaning and do not apply to falling under COIN leader’s command relies on positive relationships with elders the center of gravity in a COIN campaign by a worldwide criminal market, and feeds superiority over state forces try to create their any society of this world as it might have and control.31 Therefore, it would be and religious leaders in tribal areas. Allied must be the people. That was exactly the key off media that broadcasts its violence image of martyrs who are ready to sacrifice little to do with “governments being elected more realistic if we should try to achieve INTEL now emphasizes collection on social point in General Petraeus’ strategy when he and multiplies the latter’s psychological themselves for freedom and independence and governments being popular”.27 No synchronization rather than command and and religious networking by connecting the tasked his forces to primary secure and serve impact”.19 Globalization has also offered of their homeland.23 The idea behind this is doubt, the power given to a democratically control. Otherwise, well-intentioned efforts dots between the tribes, families, businesses, the local population by living with it, as this additional potential to insurgents, such as that the moral justification for the purpose elected government by its populace is may turn into failures and give opportunities and political organizations. Finally, would eventually lead to regional stability, access to a worldwide audience, freedom of a political goal (self-determination and important but this power has to translate for insurgents to undermine the whole international military troops have to accept governmental sustainability and economic of moving and communication, ability to sovereignty) will generate indigenous and into security, law, order, civil services and project. the chaos of not having perfect INTEL in a growth.14 That is to say that, military forces conduct financial transfers without being international sympathizers ready to provide prosperity. COIN environment. Insurgents will always have to get out from the security of their tracked, but above all, globalization support and mainly legitimation for the use Intelligence in COIN surprise them and attack their weakest compounds and actively set their boots allowed them to create and use “active” of violence in order for them to overset the Unity of effort points; what is important is that individual on the ground so as to get in touch with – geographical space sanctuaries and current status.24 One of the major problems in COIN soldiers must identify those weak points and people.15 One can argue that since high-tech “virtual” – internet based sanctuaries that Theoretically, governments described There is no need to mention that unity operations is to track and target an enemy communicate that information effectively.34 surveillance equipment offers comparative facilitated their needs and activities in terms as legitimate rule primarily with blank of effort or unity of command as it is known who is not dressed in military uniforms, advantages there is no reason to put soldiers’ of training, indoctrination, recruitment, acceptance and support of their citizens in military COIN doctrine, plays a special has no trenches or front lines, and is hiding lives at high risk. In this case the answer and regrouping.20 From this point of without the fear of consequences as long role within COIN operations. In Iraq and among populace.32 In a situation like this the Investing Knowledge in Future is that nothing can replace visible force’s view, contemporary COIN must be able to as their activities stay within a reasonably Afghanistan, beside international military only tool available is effective, active and presence, especially when insurgents have mobilize and energize all available support predefined frame. On the other hand, the forces, a great number of governmental accurate intelligence (INTEL). By definition Learn and adopt repeatedly shown that they can immediately at all levels while in parallel it must assume primary responsibility of any government (GO), non-governmental (NGO), and INTEL is vital for all forms of warfare adjust their tactics to new challenges, more initiatives and establish measures in order to is to provide security to its people. In other international organizations (IO) are however, in COIN operations INTEL is “In COIN the side that learns like a balloon that “…you squeeze one end, prevent its rivals from doing the same.21 COIN operations this might be turn out actively involved in the stabilization and encountering an additional theoretical faster and adapts more rapidly, usually and the enemy moves to the other”.16 Finally, time is of critical importance to be problematic and become Achilles’ reconstruction of the entire area thus, unity problem: intelligence versus information. wins”.35 Coalition forces should adopt Another fundamental element in and must be included in the planning as heel. Indeed, no government can claim full of effort must be present at every dimension, Put it in another way, INTEL in COIN has LL as quickly as possible if they want COIN planning procedure is the ability to well. Usually policymakers provide time consent from the governed side unless it is every level, and in any daily activity. In a dual role; from one side it emphasizes to maintain their superiority in the future. involve indigenous forces as a part of the frames and expect troops to be withdrawn able to provide them with security and thus, this case, the challenge to overcome is very collection and analysis on current The study of the two COIN campaigns entire process. In this case there must be a from the theater accordingly, however, it securing populace requires efficient and complex, since we refer to a combat system operational issues based on the traditional in Iraq and Afghanistan corroborates the preparation phase that includes recruiting, should be underlined that COIN is a time continuous employment of security forces. dominated by a number of players, each model “who-when-where-why-how”, while below mentioned conclusion: the decline training and evaluation, and gradually within consuming effort and often its duration is The overall concept is quite challenging of which has a different role and position from the other side it strives to delineate of communist ideology is irreversible, a reasonable period of time indigenous a question without a clear answer.22 As since it requires ability to maintain control within this system, but all of them are skills, characteristics, tactics, and goals of nationalism remains a powerful force and, security forces should participate in mentioned before, COIN is directly related to over an overwhelming force without causing equally important for the stability of the an invisible enemy. Meanwhile, insurgents religious fundamentalism is raged –basically common operations in the light of embedded indigenous populace whose reaction cannot a negative impact to the local populace.25 As system. consciously study and learn from their Muslim, but with the possible creation of partnering, until finally they are capable to be measured in advance. Lack of tactical a response to this action, insurgents will try Collaboration among military and weaknesses in an attempt to become more opposing tendencies in other religions. The plan and execute their own missions. This patience in COIN operations contributes to provoke and undermine the government’s civilian entities might be an answer to adoptive and resilient to COIN methods, methods of the rebels will remain basically will create a negative picture and send the to missed opportunities and intelligence effort by drawing it into a game of attrition this, especially since the military cannot which fact in many cases allow them to be the same, but there will be adjustments to right message to the natives as it will be failures, and sometimes, waiting, collecting where insurgents usually have an advantage solve all COIN related issues on its own one step ahead.33 technological developments. The increasing their own people who fight for them thus, information, reporting and doing nothing is in delegitimizing the state’s efforts.26 due to its structure and mission. Therefore, Lately, INTEL knowledge gained urbanization of the population will lead it will deepen their confidence and enable the best reaction. Practically speaking, insurgents seek troops can be used in a way that will from the theater offered new perspectives in to greater recourse to terrorism, possibly responsibility and accountability.17 When to have the government and coalition forces create a safe path to be followed by civilian terms of sustains and improvements. To start with weapons of mass destruction, but there is an Iraqi-Afghan problem there is Legitimacy do their work for them. This overreaction subject matters that from their side will up, coalition forces realized that despite the as insurgency is politically effective, the an Iraqi-Afghan solution and nothing can is exactly what insurgents are looking for go into deeper waters in their respective fact that operations will be INTEL driven, most important movements are expected to be done unless they decide to take over Insurgents’ primary objective is to so as to drive the populace or international field of expertise.28 Furthermore, the ideal intelligence will come mostly from their use a combination of both methods. How initiatives and rely on their own power until delegitimize the current political system opinion into their hands. Counterinsurgents’ solution would be a COIN leader, military or own efforts, and somehow INTEL must be effective will the insurgents be in the future? they finally manage to isolate and eradicate and its representatives while in parallel bottom-up efforts should align top-down civilian, who should be given authority and pushed down to the lowest level possible, to Technological developments facilitate insurgents from their cause and support. they are seeking ways to legitimize their initiatives dealing with daily civic issues, power to direct all COIN aspects vertically include friendly indigenous forces and vice observation and real-time transmission COIN operations in Iraq and struggle and translate this into sympathy impunity and the negative influence of and horizontally towards the common versa. Thus, all personnel are now considered of information and therefore, impede the Afghanistan have also taught us that and vital support from internal and external parallel structures that attack government’s objective.29 However, this course of action as information collectors to include linguists concentration of large insurgency groups.

34 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 35 On the other hand, it should be noted that population, isolation not enforced upon the with us or against us”.43 populace. Nowadays, this course of insurgencies, there are several cases Complex Operations, PRISM 2, No.2, March 2011, the technology is not available in most of population but maintained by and with the The second challenge refers to action is assessed as a high threat level where common ground can be detected pp.169-176 the countries facing insurgency. Physical population.”37 practices used lately by insurgents in terms and it is characterized by a “problematic and therefore, courses of action already Hoffman, B. (2006), Insurgency and superiority of conventional forces against of sending messages to general public both unpredictability”, which undermines morale tested with success can be applied.49 Counterinsurgency in Iraq, Studies in Conflict & the insurgents is obvious, but the analysis Future dynamics in COIN at a national and international levels. It and cohesion among unarmed populace, Consequently, COIN requires a similar Terrorism, 29:2, 103-121 that preceded shows that a lot depends on seems that insurgents have launched a global international and indigenous security forces. approach and therefore we must ensure Johnson, T.H. & Mason, M.C. (2007), Understanding willingness of conventional forces to use Experience gained in theater indicates propaganda campaign in order to apply An IT perpetrator is guided by a variety of that all best practices and LL are equally the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan, Published its superior power and adjust their structure that COIN operations nowadays and in more pressure in the field of non-kinetic complex motivations but basically attackers shared and adopted by friendly forces and by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Research so as to fight “wars amongst people”.36 close future will be dominated by three new operations. Therefore, negative images can be categorized as insurgent manipulated, organizations. Today’s types of insurgency Institute, 71-89 In this context, the growing international dynamics as analyzed below. Shortly after and videos contained imagery of violence, personally motivated, criminally motivated differ from those of the past mainly in Kane, T. & D. Lonsdale (2012), Insurgency & sensitivity for human rights can prevent the commencing of the campaigns in Iraq dead bodies, beheadings, and depictions and for an unknown reason. Whatever terms of motivation and objectives to be Counterinsurgency in Understanding Contemporary conventional forces from using the most and Afghanistan, insurgents started to use of individuals being mishandled are used the reason caused an insider threat attack, achieved. It is important to understand that Strategy, Routledge, pp.239-257 effective methods to combat the insurgents. Islamic fundamentalism as a means to obtain in order to create negativity amongst the insurgents will always claim it and try to use the principles and the means of this complex Kay, S. & Khan, S. (2007), NATO and Counter- Besides, the international interest in human support from local Muslim communities. recipients as they portray a pessimistic image it in their favor. Usually, there is no specific subset of warfare remain unaltered through insurgency: Strategic Liability or Tactical Asset?, rights is manifested most often selectively Later on, during escalation of the conflict, of life. Moreover, this method applies social concept for an IT attack and that is why they ages and therefore, experiences and lessons Contemporary Security Policy, 28:1, 163-181 and in any case where a rebel movement Al-Zawahiri stated that “Victory of Islam pressure and draws political impacts to are characterized by full surprise and shock. gained from the past could be re-examined Kilcullen, D. (2006), Counter-insurgency Redux, transformed from mere annoyance to a will never take place until a Muslim state is civilized countries where human lives are of The latest statistics show that the percentage and appropriately tailored to the needs Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 48:4, 111-130 threat to the established order, then the state established in the manner of the Prophet in high importance and human rights are a part of fatalities caused by this type of action of the contemporary theater of operation. Kiras, J.D. (2013), Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and forces act and ignore international public the heart of the Islamic world, specifically of their culture. This extreme campaign is shows an increasing trend. However, the After all, “what works today may not work Insurgency in Strategy in the Contemporary World, opinion. Consequently, the effectiveness of in the Levant, Egypt, and the neighboring facilitated by today’s information revolution most important remark in this case is again tomorrow, and what works in one location Oxford University Press, 4th edition, pp.173-194 insurgents seems not to differ from that they states of the Peninsula and Iraq”,38 and as today we can see ourselves from different the message sent out by insurgents as the may not work in another”.50 ■ Mills, G. (2007), Ten Counterinsurgency had in the past. But, which will become coalition forces and international public sources what a conflict looks like.44 political capital and impact gained is much Commandments from Afghanistan, Foreign Policy apparent, generalizations have no place in an opinion realized that they witnessed the It is about time for international bigger. Bibliography Research Institute, April 2007 insurgency conflict. beginning of an Islamist rally, a global forces and respective organizations acting Musa, S. (2011), Lessons Learned from Iraq and This conclusion explains why while jihad seeking political violence. Mullahs and in the theater to regain their momentum and Conclusion Betz, D. (2007), Redesigning Land Forces for Wars Afghanistan Operations, Policing and COIN conducting a COIN campaign one should preachers from Arab and non-Arab world confront the enemy without trying to “put amongst the People, Contemporary Security Policy, Operations, Center for Technology & National avoid utilizing purely conventional tactics promised a glorious afterlife to those who lipstick on pigs”.45 Some of the best weapons As mentioned in the previous section, an 28:2, 221-243 Security Policy, 48-66 and viewing the population merely as on were ready to be baptized with the blood of for COIN do not shoot and international insurgency is a persistent, ubiquitous, small, Boot, M. (2013), Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Nagl, J.A. & Burton, B.M. (2010), Thinking Globally lookers or irrelevant; at best local tactical non-believers, and become martyrs.39 As a community needs to use them wisely; dirty and uncomfortable war48 that in case Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present, and Acting Locally: Counterinsurgency Lessons from victories against an ever replenishing result, hundreds of “Muslim brothers” from money for economic and infrastructure of Iraq and Afghanistan reflects the will of Liveright Publishing Corporation, N.Y. 10110 Modern Wars – A Reply to Jones and Smith, Journal of insurgency can be gained in the short term, different parts of the world came to Iraq and development, governance reform, industrial a national – religious group to resort to the Cordesman, A.H. (2006), The Iraq War and Lessons Strategic Studies, 33:1, 123-138 but ultimately a major disaster may ensue. Afghanistan in order to fight in the name and agricultural development, social use of force in order to achieve political for Counterinsurgency, Center for Strategic and Newsletter No. 10-64 (2010), Afghan Culture: On the other hand, indigenous political of their God and of course in support of services development through training and objectives, without necessarily making International Studies, Working Draft, Revised: March Observations, Insights, and Lessons, US Army leaders, police and military forces need insurgency. mentoring programs and many other actions rational estimations about the expected 16, 2006 Combined Arms Center, CALL, September 2010. to be trained and brought onside on the This issue becomes even more critical that could be used to send out an optimistic results. Moreover, it was also stated that Corum, J.S. (2006), Training Indigenous Forces in Petraeus, D. (2010), Counterinsurgency Concepts: broadest possible basis. The population as it has additional consequences in other message and discharge what is regarded by the modern rebel movements are basically Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies, U.S. What We Learned in Iraq, Global Policy, Volume 1, must be actively engaged and the weight global aspects. Nowadays, it has been locals as the “humiliation of occupation”.46 ethnically or religiously motivated since Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute Issue 1, January 2010 of the campaign must be transferred over confirmed that fighters who gained combat The question is for how long armed forces the traditional ideological source of their FM 3-24 (2006), Counterinsurgency, HQ Department Pirnie, B.R. & O’Connell, E. (2008), the local forces. Finally, success will be experience from Iraq and Afghanistan are can hold against the insurgency while the inspiration – Marxism and communism of the US Army, Washington DC, 15 December 2006 Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006), RAND established only by diminishing the also used by terrorist networks in attacks political stakeholders are still occupied by have declined and are no longer valid. The FM 3-24.2 (2009), Tactics in Counterinsurgency, HQ National Defense Research Institute, RAND active support basis for the insurgency, against “Christian West” or in other cases their disastrous indecisiveness. Historically aforementioned fact in combination with Department of the US Army, Washington DC, 21 April Counterinsurgency Study, Vol.2, 35-89 by marginalizing it within the society and they are transferred from one conflict zone speaking, the per capita commitment of the current social and economic discontent 2009 Porter, P. (2006), Shadow Wars: Asymmetric Warfare associating the new government with a to another in accordance with the insurgents’ the USA and NATO ISAF personnel in acts in favor of low-intention conflicts thus, Fishel, J.T. &Corr, E.G. (2013), Thinking and Writing in the Past and Future, Security Dialogue 2006, 37:551 distinct improvement of the general living plans and needs. It cannot be denied that Afghanistan is the lowest since the end of the phenomenon of insurgency is expected About COIN: A Review Essay of Fred Kaplan’s The Thornton, R. (2007), Countering Arab Insurgencies: conditions of the population, as opposed to sanctuaries in western Pakistan were used WWII.47 to be continued in the immediate future. Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the The British Experience, Contemporary Security Policy, those still supporting the anti-government by Taliban groups and Al-Qaeda,40 while in Finally, the third challenge is that To recapitulate, learning and American Way of War, Small Wars Journal, Jul 17 28:1, 7-27 forces. This is a quote from David Galula’s the past disenchanted Islamist groups used of the so-called “green-on-blue” threat or adopting is a never ending procedure that 2013, Small Wars Foundation Thornton, R. (2007), Conclusion: The Way Forward, classic work Counterinsurgency Warfare, Afghanistan as a base for terrorist training.41 else an insider threat (IT) attack which applies in every aspect of human activity. Galula, D. (1964), Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory Contemporary Security Policy, 28:1, 212-219 published in 1964: “A victory is not the The message that insurgents’ are sending occurs from a person or persons who have It also offers a variety of practical lessons, and practice, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, New Utting, K. (2007), The Strategic Information destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s out is that all Muslims must stand united a position of trust among international as well as some specific recommendations York-London Campaign: Lessons from the British Experience in forces…A victory is that plus the permanent against western imperialism and its NATO troops – in contradistinction to a “green- in terms of policy and military doctrine. Glatz, R. (2011), ISAF Lessons Learned: A German Palestine 1945–1948, Contemporary Security Policy, isolation of the insurgent from the representatives,42 and that “you are either on-green” attack which targets native Despite the differences between the two Perspective, National Defense University,Center for 28:1, 42-62

36 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 37 On the other hand, it should be noted that population, isolation not enforced upon the with us or against us”.43 populace. Nowadays, this course of insurgencies, there are several cases Complex Operations, PRISM 2, No.2, March 2011, the technology is not available in most of population but maintained by and with the The second challenge refers to action is assessed as a high threat level where common ground can be detected pp.169-176 the countries facing insurgency. Physical population.”37 practices used lately by insurgents in terms and it is characterized by a “problematic and therefore, courses of action already Hoffman, B. (2006), Insurgency and superiority of conventional forces against of sending messages to general public both unpredictability”, which undermines morale tested with success can be applied.49 Counterinsurgency in Iraq, Studies in Conflict & the insurgents is obvious, but the analysis Future dynamics in COIN at a national and international levels. It and cohesion among unarmed populace, Consequently, COIN requires a similar Terrorism, 29:2, 103-121 that preceded shows that a lot depends on seems that insurgents have launched a global international and indigenous security forces. approach and therefore we must ensure Johnson, T.H. & Mason, M.C. (2007), Understanding willingness of conventional forces to use Experience gained in theater indicates propaganda campaign in order to apply An IT perpetrator is guided by a variety of that all best practices and LL are equally the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan, Published its superior power and adjust their structure that COIN operations nowadays and in more pressure in the field of non-kinetic complex motivations but basically attackers shared and adopted by friendly forces and by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Research so as to fight “wars amongst people”.36 close future will be dominated by three new operations. Therefore, negative images can be categorized as insurgent manipulated, organizations. Today’s types of insurgency Institute, 71-89 In this context, the growing international dynamics as analyzed below. Shortly after and videos contained imagery of violence, personally motivated, criminally motivated differ from those of the past mainly in Kane, T. & D. Lonsdale (2012), Insurgency & sensitivity for human rights can prevent the commencing of the campaigns in Iraq dead bodies, beheadings, and depictions and for an unknown reason. Whatever terms of motivation and objectives to be Counterinsurgency in Understanding Contemporary conventional forces from using the most and Afghanistan, insurgents started to use of individuals being mishandled are used the reason caused an insider threat attack, achieved. It is important to understand that Strategy, Routledge, pp.239-257 effective methods to combat the insurgents. Islamic fundamentalism as a means to obtain in order to create negativity amongst the insurgents will always claim it and try to use the principles and the means of this complex Kay, S. & Khan, S. (2007), NATO and Counter- Besides, the international interest in human support from local Muslim communities. recipients as they portray a pessimistic image it in their favor. Usually, there is no specific subset of warfare remain unaltered through insurgency: Strategic Liability or Tactical Asset?, rights is manifested most often selectively Later on, during escalation of the conflict, of life. Moreover, this method applies social concept for an IT attack and that is why they ages and therefore, experiences and lessons Contemporary Security Policy, 28:1, 163-181 and in any case where a rebel movement Al-Zawahiri stated that “Victory of Islam pressure and draws political impacts to are characterized by full surprise and shock. gained from the past could be re-examined Kilcullen, D. (2006), Counter-insurgency Redux, transformed from mere annoyance to a will never take place until a Muslim state is civilized countries where human lives are of The latest statistics show that the percentage and appropriately tailored to the needs Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 48:4, 111-130 threat to the established order, then the state established in the manner of the Prophet in high importance and human rights are a part of fatalities caused by this type of action of the contemporary theater of operation. Kiras, J.D. (2013), Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and forces act and ignore international public the heart of the Islamic world, specifically of their culture. This extreme campaign is shows an increasing trend. However, the After all, “what works today may not work Insurgency in Strategy in the Contemporary World, opinion. Consequently, the effectiveness of in the Levant, Egypt, and the neighboring facilitated by today’s information revolution most important remark in this case is again tomorrow, and what works in one location Oxford University Press, 4th edition, pp.173-194 insurgents seems not to differ from that they states of the Peninsula and Iraq”,38 and as today we can see ourselves from different the message sent out by insurgents as the may not work in another”.50 ■ Mills, G. (2007), Ten Counterinsurgency had in the past. But, which will become coalition forces and international public sources what a conflict looks like.44 political capital and impact gained is much Commandments from Afghanistan, Foreign Policy apparent, generalizations have no place in an opinion realized that they witnessed the It is about time for international bigger. Bibliography Research Institute, April 2007 insurgency conflict. beginning of an Islamist rally, a global forces and respective organizations acting Musa, S. (2011), Lessons Learned from Iraq and This conclusion explains why while jihad seeking political violence. Mullahs and in the theater to regain their momentum and Conclusion Betz, D. (2007), Redesigning Land Forces for Wars Afghanistan Operations, Policing and COIN conducting a COIN campaign one should preachers from Arab and non-Arab world confront the enemy without trying to “put amongst the People, Contemporary Security Policy, Operations, Center for Technology & National avoid utilizing purely conventional tactics promised a glorious afterlife to those who lipstick on pigs”.45 Some of the best weapons As mentioned in the previous section, an 28:2, 221-243 Security Policy, 48-66 and viewing the population merely as on were ready to be baptized with the blood of for COIN do not shoot and international insurgency is a persistent, ubiquitous, small, Boot, M. (2013), Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Nagl, J.A. & Burton, B.M. (2010), Thinking Globally lookers or irrelevant; at best local tactical non-believers, and become martyrs.39 As a community needs to use them wisely; dirty and uncomfortable war48 that in case Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present, and Acting Locally: Counterinsurgency Lessons from victories against an ever replenishing result, hundreds of “Muslim brothers” from money for economic and infrastructure of Iraq and Afghanistan reflects the will of Liveright Publishing Corporation, N.Y. 10110 Modern Wars – A Reply to Jones and Smith, Journal of insurgency can be gained in the short term, different parts of the world came to Iraq and development, governance reform, industrial a national – religious group to resort to the Cordesman, A.H. (2006), The Iraq War and Lessons Strategic Studies, 33:1, 123-138 but ultimately a major disaster may ensue. Afghanistan in order to fight in the name and agricultural development, social use of force in order to achieve political for Counterinsurgency, Center for Strategic and Newsletter No. 10-64 (2010), Afghan Culture: On the other hand, indigenous political of their God and of course in support of services development through training and objectives, without necessarily making International Studies, Working Draft, Revised: March Observations, Insights, and Lessons, US Army leaders, police and military forces need insurgency. mentoring programs and many other actions rational estimations about the expected 16, 2006 Combined Arms Center, CALL, September 2010. to be trained and brought onside on the This issue becomes even more critical that could be used to send out an optimistic results. Moreover, it was also stated that Corum, J.S. (2006), Training Indigenous Forces in Petraeus, D. (2010), Counterinsurgency Concepts: broadest possible basis. The population as it has additional consequences in other message and discharge what is regarded by the modern rebel movements are basically Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies, U.S. What We Learned in Iraq, Global Policy, Volume 1, must be actively engaged and the weight global aspects. Nowadays, it has been locals as the “humiliation of occupation”.46 ethnically or religiously motivated since Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute Issue 1, January 2010 of the campaign must be transferred over confirmed that fighters who gained combat The question is for how long armed forces the traditional ideological source of their FM 3-24 (2006), Counterinsurgency, HQ Department Pirnie, B.R. & O’Connell, E. (2008), the local forces. Finally, success will be experience from Iraq and Afghanistan are can hold against the insurgency while the inspiration – Marxism and communism of the US Army, Washington DC, 15 December 2006 Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006), RAND established only by diminishing the also used by terrorist networks in attacks political stakeholders are still occupied by have declined and are no longer valid. The FM 3-24.2 (2009), Tactics in Counterinsurgency, HQ National Defense Research Institute, RAND active support basis for the insurgency, against “Christian West” or in other cases their disastrous indecisiveness. Historically aforementioned fact in combination with Department of the US Army, Washington DC, 21 April Counterinsurgency Study, Vol.2, 35-89 by marginalizing it within the society and they are transferred from one conflict zone speaking, the per capita commitment of the current social and economic discontent 2009 Porter, P. (2006), Shadow Wars: Asymmetric Warfare associating the new government with a to another in accordance with the insurgents’ the USA and NATO ISAF personnel in acts in favor of low-intention conflicts thus, Fishel, J.T. &Corr, E.G. (2013), Thinking and Writing in the Past and Future, Security Dialogue 2006, 37:551 distinct improvement of the general living plans and needs. It cannot be denied that Afghanistan is the lowest since the end of the phenomenon of insurgency is expected About COIN: A Review Essay of Fred Kaplan’s The Thornton, R. (2007), Countering Arab Insurgencies: conditions of the population, as opposed to sanctuaries in western Pakistan were used WWII.47 to be continued in the immediate future. Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the The British Experience, Contemporary Security Policy, those still supporting the anti-government by Taliban groups and Al-Qaeda,40 while in Finally, the third challenge is that To recapitulate, learning and American Way of War, Small Wars Journal, Jul 17 28:1, 7-27 forces. This is a quote from David Galula’s the past disenchanted Islamist groups used of the so-called “green-on-blue” threat or adopting is a never ending procedure that 2013, Small Wars Foundation Thornton, R. (2007), Conclusion: The Way Forward, classic work Counterinsurgency Warfare, Afghanistan as a base for terrorist training.41 else an insider threat (IT) attack which applies in every aspect of human activity. Galula, D. (1964), Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory Contemporary Security Policy, 28:1, 212-219 published in 1964: “A victory is not the The message that insurgents’ are sending occurs from a person or persons who have It also offers a variety of practical lessons, and practice, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, New Utting, K. (2007), The Strategic Information destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s out is that all Muslims must stand united a position of trust among international as well as some specific recommendations York-London Campaign: Lessons from the British Experience in forces…A victory is that plus the permanent against western imperialism and its NATO troops – in contradistinction to a “green- in terms of policy and military doctrine. Glatz, R. (2011), ISAF Lessons Learned: A German Palestine 1945–1948, Contemporary Security Policy, isolation of the insurgent from the representatives,42 and that “you are either on-green” attack which targets native Despite the differences between the two Perspective, National Defense University,Center for 28:1, 42-62

36 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 37 Wade, N.M. (2010), The Stability, Peace and to the Present, Liveright Publishing Counterinsurgency in Iraq, Studies in Counterinsurgency Smartbook, The Lighting Press Corporation, (2013) Conflict & Terrorism, 29:2, (2006), p.6 West, B. (2009), Counterinsurgency Lessons 14 34 Together in NATO Musa, S., Lessons Learned from Iraq FM 3-24 (2006),pp.3-25/3-26 from Iraq, March-April 2009, Military Review and Afghanistan Operations, Policing and 35 Ibid, p.ix COIN Operations,(2011), pp.49-50 36 Betz, D., Redesigning Land Forces for 15 FM 3-24 (2006), p.1-27 Wars amongst the People, Contemporary 16 Mills, G., Ten Counterinsurgency Security Policy, 28:2, (2007), p.222 1 Fishel, J.T. &Corr, E.G., Thinking 37 15th Anniversary of Poland in NATO - Commandments from Afghanistan, Galula also highlights that special and Writing About COIN: A Review Foreign Policy Research Institute, (2007), relation exists between insurgents’ Essay of Fred Kaplan’s The Insurgents: p.7 forces and their political organization. Celebrations in the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Region David Petraeus and the Plot to Change 17 Wade, N.M., The Stability, Peace If one of those poles is destroyed, it the American Way of War, Small Wars and Counterinsurgency Smartbook, The will be locally re-created by the other; Journal, (2013), p.2 Lighting Press, (2010), p.3-1 if both are destroyed, they will both be 2 Kilcullen, D., Counter-insurgency 18 Thornton, R., Conclusion: The Way re-created by a new fusion of insurgents Redux, Survival: Global Politics and Forward, Contemporary Security Policy, from the outside. See more: Galula, D., Strategy, 48:4, (2006), p.111 28:1, (2007), p.215 Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 3 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, HQ 19 Porter, P., Shadow Wars: Asymmetric Practice, Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, Department of the US Army, (2006), p.1-1 Warfare in the Past and Future, Security (1964), p.57 4 FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, Dialogue, 37:551, (2006), p.552 38 Ayman Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri HQ Department of the US Army, (2009), 20 Kilcullen(2006), p.3 is the current leader of al-Qaeda. In his p.1-2 21 Ibid, p.9 2005 letter from al- Zawahiri to Zarqawi, 5 FM 3-24 (2006), p.1-1 22 Musa (2011), p.51 seized by US intelligence, he demonstrates 6 Kane, T. & D. Lonsdale, Insurgency 23 Kiras, J.D., Irregular Warfare: Terrorism his ambitions to rein in the Iraqi & Counterinsurgency in Understanding and Insurgency in Strategy in the commander and use global jihad as a mean Contemporary Strategy, Routledge, Contemporary World, Oxford University to gain political capital and apply pressure (2012), pp.241-242 Press, 4th edition, (2013), p.181 to the international community. See more: 7 Newsletter No. 10-64, Afghan Culture: 24 Ibid, p.183 Kiras (2013), p.174 Observations, Insights, and Lessons, US 25 Pirnie, B.R. & O’Connell, E., 39 Ibid, p.190 Army Combined Arms Center, (2010), Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006), 40 West (2009), p.11 pp.1-2 RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Vol.2, 41 Johnson, T.H. & Mason, M.C., 8 Ibid, p.1 (2008), pp.79-80 Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency 9 There are two particular facets of Arab 26 Utting, K., The Strategic Information in Afghanistan, Published by Elsevier culture that merit attention here in regard Campaign: Lessons from the British Limited on behalf of Foreign Research ■ Kamila Sierzputowska, PhD, to the conduct of counterinsurgency Experience in Palestine 1945–1948, Institute, (2007), p.82 Kazimierz Wielki University, Poland operations, See more: Thornton, Contemporary Security Policy, 42 Kay, S. & Khan, S., NATO and R., Conclusion: The Way Forward, 28:1,(2007), p.44 Counter-insurgency: Strategic Liability or Contemporary Security Policy, 28:1, 27 Cordesman, A.H., The Iraq War and Tactical Asset?, Contemporary Security (2007), p.7 Lessons for Counterinsurgency, Center Policy, 28:1, (2007), p.177 10 West, B. (2009), Counterinsurgency for Strategic and International Studies, 43 Thornton (2007), p.215 Lessons from Iraq, March-April 2009, 44 Working Draft, Revised: March 16, Utting (2007), p.43 “Together in NATO” is a program in NATO” program was initiated during the army make and important part of our Military Review, p.7 45 (2006), p.24 Petraeus, D., Counterinsurgency related to the anniversary of Poland’s a special conference in Toruń, formally economy”. 11 Newsletter No. 10-64(2010), pp.1-2 28 Glatz, R., ISAF Lessons Learned: A Concepts: What We Learned in Iraq, joining the North Atlantic Treaty that falls opened by the Region Marshall, Mr. Piotr The conference was devoted mainly 12 Ibid, pp.64-65 German Perspective, National Defense Global Policy, V.1,(2010), p.117 on 2014. It is happening under the patronage Całbecki, on 12 March 2014. While opening to the role of Polish soldiers in international 13 Parallel to that, a number of chapters 46 University, PRISM 2, No.2, (2011), p.176 Nagl, J.A. & Burton, B.M., of the Minister of National Defence and not the conference, he particularly stressed peace keeping formations in troubled parts are used by Boot to describe the 29 Pirnie & O’Connell (2008), p.93 Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: only citizens of the region participate in the following: “We treat the celebrations of the globe. Among participants of the geopolitical situation and the conflicts 30 Mills (2007), p.2 Counterinsurgency Lessons from Modern it, but also youth from “uniform classes” with due respect. We are the region in conference there were representatives occurred in former western colonies 31 Kilcullen (2006), p.10 Wars – A Reply to Jones and Smith, Journal from all over Poland, Polish soldiers and which matters related to the army are and of scholarly environment: LTC ret. PhD which prove that insurgencies or liberal 32 Corum, J.S., Training Indigenous Forces of Strategic Studies, 33:1, (2010), p.128 representatives of other NATO armies from will be of importance not only because Zdzisław Polcikiewicz (Kazimierz Wielki movements have dominated during the 47 in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Johnson & Mason (2007), p.84 our region. significant NATO structures and military University), general Jarosław Wierzcholski, past centuries. See more: Boot, M., 48 Insurgencies, U.S. Army War College, Fishel&Corr (2013), p.1 Local government of the kujawsko- units whose soldiers serve in stabilization the former Commander of the Polish Army Invisible Armies: An Epic History of 49 (2006), p.14 Corum (2006), p.48 pomorskie province is the main organizer of missions all over the world are located, but Artillery and Missile Defence Troops, Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times 33 50 Hoffman, B., Insurgency and Petraeus (2010), p.117 the anniversary celebrations. The “Together also because companies connected with representatives of the fourteen veteran

38 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 39 Wade, N.M. (2010), The Stability, Peace and to the Present, Liveright Publishing Counterinsurgency in Iraq, Studies in Counterinsurgency Smartbook, The Lighting Press Corporation, (2013) Conflict & Terrorism, 29:2, (2006), p.6 West, B. (2009), Counterinsurgency Lessons 14 34 Together in NATO Musa, S., Lessons Learned from Iraq FM 3-24 (2006),pp.3-25/3-26 from Iraq, March-April 2009, Military Review and Afghanistan Operations, Policing and 35 Ibid, p.ix COIN Operations,(2011), pp.49-50 36 Betz, D., Redesigning Land Forces for 15 FM 3-24 (2006), p.1-27 Wars amongst the People, Contemporary 16 Mills, G., Ten Counterinsurgency Security Policy, 28:2, (2007), p.222 1 Fishel, J.T. &Corr, E.G., Thinking 37 15th Anniversary of Poland in NATO - Commandments from Afghanistan, Galula also highlights that special and Writing About COIN: A Review Foreign Policy Research Institute, (2007), relation exists between insurgents’ Essay of Fred Kaplan’s The Insurgents: p.7 forces and their political organization. Celebrations in the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Region David Petraeus and the Plot to Change 17 Wade, N.M., The Stability, Peace If one of those poles is destroyed, it the American Way of War, Small Wars and Counterinsurgency Smartbook, The will be locally re-created by the other; Journal, (2013), p.2 Lighting Press, (2010), p.3-1 if both are destroyed, they will both be 2 Kilcullen, D., Counter-insurgency 18 Thornton, R., Conclusion: The Way re-created by a new fusion of insurgents Redux, Survival: Global Politics and Forward, Contemporary Security Policy, from the outside. See more: Galula, D., Strategy, 48:4, (2006), p.111 28:1, (2007), p.215 Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 3 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, HQ 19 Porter, P., Shadow Wars: Asymmetric Practice, Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, Department of the US Army, (2006), p.1-1 Warfare in the Past and Future, Security (1964), p.57 4 FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, Dialogue, 37:551, (2006), p.552 38 Ayman Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri HQ Department of the US Army, (2009), 20 Kilcullen(2006), p.3 is the current leader of al-Qaeda. In his p.1-2 21 Ibid, p.9 2005 letter from al- Zawahiri to Zarqawi, 5 FM 3-24 (2006), p.1-1 22 Musa (2011), p.51 seized by US intelligence, he demonstrates 6 Kane, T. & D. Lonsdale, Insurgency 23 Kiras, J.D., Irregular Warfare: Terrorism his ambitions to rein in the Iraqi & Counterinsurgency in Understanding and Insurgency in Strategy in the commander and use global jihad as a mean Contemporary Strategy, Routledge, Contemporary World, Oxford University to gain political capital and apply pressure (2012), pp.241-242 Press, 4th edition, (2013), p.181 to the international community. See more: 7 Newsletter No. 10-64, Afghan Culture: 24 Ibid, p.183 Kiras (2013), p.174 Observations, Insights, and Lessons, US 25 Pirnie, B.R. & O’Connell, E., 39 Ibid, p.190 Army Combined Arms Center, (2010), Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006), 40 West (2009), p.11 pp.1-2 RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Vol.2, 41 Johnson, T.H. & Mason, M.C., 8 Ibid, p.1 (2008), pp.79-80 Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency 9 There are two particular facets of Arab 26 Utting, K., The Strategic Information in Afghanistan, Published by Elsevier culture that merit attention here in regard Campaign: Lessons from the British Limited on behalf of Foreign Research ■ Kamila Sierzputowska, PhD, to the conduct of counterinsurgency Experience in Palestine 1945–1948, Institute, (2007), p.82 Kazimierz Wielki University, Poland operations, See more: Thornton, Contemporary Security Policy, 42 Kay, S. & Khan, S., NATO and R., Conclusion: The Way Forward, 28:1,(2007), p.44 Counter-insurgency: Strategic Liability or Contemporary Security Policy, 28:1, 27 Cordesman, A.H., The Iraq War and Tactical Asset?, Contemporary Security (2007), p.7 Lessons for Counterinsurgency, Center Policy, 28:1, (2007), p.177 10 West, B. (2009), Counterinsurgency for Strategic and International Studies, 43 Thornton (2007), p.215 Lessons from Iraq, March-April 2009, 44 Working Draft, Revised: March 16, Utting (2007), p.43 “Together in NATO” is a program in NATO” program was initiated during the army make and important part of our Military Review, p.7 45 (2006), p.24 Petraeus, D., Counterinsurgency related to the anniversary of Poland’s a special conference in Toruń, formally economy”. 11 Newsletter No. 10-64(2010), pp.1-2 28 Glatz, R., ISAF Lessons Learned: A Concepts: What We Learned in Iraq, joining the North Atlantic Treaty that falls opened by the Region Marshall, Mr. Piotr The conference was devoted mainly 12 Ibid, pp.64-65 German Perspective, National Defense Global Policy, V.1,(2010), p.117 on 2014. It is happening under the patronage Całbecki, on 12 March 2014. While opening to the role of Polish soldiers in international 13 Parallel to that, a number of chapters 46 University, PRISM 2, No.2, (2011), p.176 Nagl, J.A. & Burton, B.M., of the Minister of National Defence and not the conference, he particularly stressed peace keeping formations in troubled parts are used by Boot to describe the 29 Pirnie & O’Connell (2008), p.93 Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: only citizens of the region participate in the following: “We treat the celebrations of the globe. Among participants of the geopolitical situation and the conflicts 30 Mills (2007), p.2 Counterinsurgency Lessons from Modern it, but also youth from “uniform classes” with due respect. We are the region in conference there were representatives occurred in former western colonies 31 Kilcullen (2006), p.10 Wars – A Reply to Jones and Smith, Journal from all over Poland, Polish soldiers and which matters related to the army are and of scholarly environment: LTC ret. PhD which prove that insurgencies or liberal 32 Corum, J.S., Training Indigenous Forces of Strategic Studies, 33:1, (2010), p.128 representatives of other NATO armies from will be of importance not only because Zdzisław Polcikiewicz (Kazimierz Wielki movements have dominated during the 47 in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Johnson & Mason (2007), p.84 our region. significant NATO structures and military University), general Jarosław Wierzcholski, past centuries. See more: Boot, M., 48 Insurgencies, U.S. Army War College, Fishel&Corr (2013), p.1 Local government of the kujawsko- units whose soldiers serve in stabilization the former Commander of the Polish Army Invisible Armies: An Epic History of 49 (2006), p.14 Corum (2006), p.48 pomorskie province is the main organizer of missions all over the world are located, but Artillery and Missile Defence Troops, Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times 33 50 Hoffman, B., Insurgency and Petraeus (2010), p.117 the anniversary celebrations. The “Together also because companies connected with representatives of the fourteen veteran

38 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 39 organizations that cooperate with the The formal part of the session was Young people who participated in hosted participants of the “Together in kujawsko-pomorskie government, officers held in front of the Marshall Office building. the program had a chance to see how NATO” program. The two-day stay that from the NATO Joint Force Training Centre A Polish Army Honorary Company, the army functions. From 7 to 9 May the was coorganized by Polish Artillerist (JFTC) and peace missions veterans. Also Military Band from Toruń, color corps youth were accommodated at the CSAiU Association, the Marshall Office of students and teachers from “uniform of the Artillery and Armament Training barracks. They had to obey the same the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Province and classes” (with curriculums extended by Centre (CSAiU) and kujawsko-pomorskie rules as soldiers. Thanks to courtesy of of course the CSAiU gathered almost subjects related to defence and military province, awarded guests, province council military institutions the youth and region 300 students and their teachers. They services) took part in the conference. They members and other invited guests took citizens could participate in the events came from military classes from upper- were students from 6th High School in part in it. Civilians and soldiers of merit in the premises of the CSAiU in Toruń, secondary schools from the whole Toruń, 8th High School in Bydgoszcz, received Marshall Medals. The head of the the Toruń training ground, the Joint province. Upper-Secondary School Complex in province awarded the medals for significant Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz, 1st To let young people experience Kościelec, the Inowrocław Poviat, School contribution to the state’s security and Logistic Brigade in Bydgoszcz and in reality of military life, they were Complex in Wronie, the Wąbrzeźno Poviat functioning of the regional community and 12th Military Economic Department in accommodated in soldiers’ rooms that and School Complex from Marysin, also for direct and close relations with the Toruń. normally are used by soldiers getting the Włocławek Poviat. There were also community. The Marshall Office of the kujawsko- ready to become the National Reserve students and teachers from the International The next episode of the “Together pomorskie province is a state institution Forces. On the second day the students had School of Bydgoszcz (ISOB). in NATO” celebrations were military that has been actively involved in creating a chance to see the centre’s training basis, During the conference, winners of shows and concurrent events happening a positive image of Polish Armed Forces Province gave their honorary patronage to Third Age, youth and high school teachers artillery museum and equipment used by the 1st Regional Competition of English from 7 to 9 May 2014 in Bydgoszcz and among the society. To achieve this, it the Days of the Kazimierz Wielki University from schools teaching “uniform classes” as the CSAiU soldiers. Rocket launchers, and Knowledge of NATO, organized in Toruń and also a concert performed by the organizes or co-organizes numerous events Political Science Institute held from 12 to 13 well as ISOB students. barrel artillery and also weapons and th Bydgoszcz by the ISOB in cooperation with “Sonata” Warsaw Symphonic Orchestra addressed to children, youth and grown- May 2014. Formal celebrations of the 15 The program included lectures given marksmen’s equipment were elements that the JFTC, received awards. The competition in the Toruń Garrison Church (8 June). ups, like festivities: “Soldier May Picnics”, anniversary of Poland’s joining NATO were by the invited guests, a discussion concerning attracted most interest. was aimed at students of 5th and 6th grades Last year’s program of celebrations “Together in NATO”, “I am EKO”, “It the theme of the Institute Day. effectiveness of NATO operations and The program executed during of primary schools and junior high schools included, among others, formal is Safer with the Army”, meetings and from the area of the kujawsko-pomorskie gatherings, presentations showing competitions for students of military region and Piotr Całbecki, the Marshall, was Poland’s participation in NATO missions, classes in the country, contests on military the honorary patron of the event. simulations of tasks executed during topics (including army songs), etc. The next part of the celebrations of NATO military missions performed by The celebrations of the 15th the 15th anniversary of Poland’s joining their participants, a VTC with soldiers anniversary of Poland’s joining NATO, NATO was the formal part of the regional currently serving on NATO missions, organized within the “Together in NATO” parliament session held on 24 March quizzes, exhibitions and entertainment program, created a great opportunity to 2014. During the session Unitas Durat performances. The participants could invite MPs who deal with defence related Cuiaviano Pomeraniensis – Marshall of also enjoy concerts performed by the issues to visit our region. the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Province Medals “Riwiera” Polish Navy Band, Toruń It must be mentioned here that were awarded. Military Orchestra and Kobranocka band. the kujawsko-pomorskie province is an important point on Poland’s military map. This is where three out of four international NATO structures operating in our country are located, as well as Polish Army units that are fundamental for the country’s defence system. The program of the session co-organized by the Marshall Ofiice included meetings Among others, the celebrations were prognoses for the future, a contest on NATO the celebrations of the anniversary of in the Artillery and Armament Training attended by BG Wojciech Grabowski, the knowledge and NATO diplomatic protocol Poland’s joining NATO ended with a Centre in Toruń, NATO Joint Force JFTC Commander, Janusz Ostoja-Zagórski, workshops organized for members of the concert entitled “Together in NATO” and Training Centre in Bydgoszcz and also in the President of the University, university Scientific Group from the National Security performed by the Military Band from the premises of the Bydgoszcz Military prorectors, PhD Jan Waskan, the Director specialization. There were also theme Toruń and the “Riwiera” Polish Navy th ■ Aviation Plant. of the Political Science Institute, JFTC exhibitions devoted to the 15 anniversary Vocal Band. In Bydgoszcz, on the other hand, representatives, Military Band conducted of Poland’s presence in NATO and 10 years BG Wojciech Grabowski, the Commander by CPT Dominik Sierzputowski, invited of the JFTC in Bydgoszcz. of the NATO Joint Force Training Centre, guests and graduates of the Political Science From 20 to 21 April the Artillery Translated by Tomasz Ociński, and Piotr Całbecki, the Marshall of the Institute, members of the University of the and Armament Training Centre in Toruń JFTC Language Expert

40 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 41 organizations that cooperate with the The formal part of the session was Young people who participated in hosted participants of the “Together in kujawsko-pomorskie government, officers held in front of the Marshall Office building. the program had a chance to see how NATO” program. The two-day stay that from the NATO Joint Force Training Centre A Polish Army Honorary Company, the army functions. From 7 to 9 May the was coorganized by Polish Artillerist (JFTC) and peace missions veterans. Also Military Band from Toruń, color corps youth were accommodated at the CSAiU Association, the Marshall Office of students and teachers from “uniform of the Artillery and Armament Training barracks. They had to obey the same the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Province and classes” (with curriculums extended by Centre (CSAiU) and kujawsko-pomorskie rules as soldiers. Thanks to courtesy of of course the CSAiU gathered almost subjects related to defence and military province, awarded guests, province council military institutions the youth and region 300 students and their teachers. They services) took part in the conference. They members and other invited guests took citizens could participate in the events came from military classes from upper- were students from 6th High School in part in it. Civilians and soldiers of merit in the premises of the CSAiU in Toruń, secondary schools from the whole Toruń, 8th High School in Bydgoszcz, received Marshall Medals. The head of the the Toruń training ground, the Joint province. Upper-Secondary School Complex in province awarded the medals for significant Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz, 1st To let young people experience Kościelec, the Inowrocław Poviat, School contribution to the state’s security and Logistic Brigade in Bydgoszcz and in reality of military life, they were Complex in Wronie, the Wąbrzeźno Poviat functioning of the regional community and 12th Military Economic Department in accommodated in soldiers’ rooms that and School Complex from Marysin, also for direct and close relations with the Toruń. normally are used by soldiers getting the Włocławek Poviat. There were also community. The Marshall Office of the kujawsko- ready to become the National Reserve students and teachers from the International The next episode of the “Together pomorskie province is a state institution Forces. On the second day the students had School of Bydgoszcz (ISOB). in NATO” celebrations were military that has been actively involved in creating a chance to see the centre’s training basis, During the conference, winners of shows and concurrent events happening a positive image of Polish Armed Forces Province gave their honorary patronage to Third Age, youth and high school teachers artillery museum and equipment used by the 1st Regional Competition of English from 7 to 9 May 2014 in Bydgoszcz and among the society. To achieve this, it the Days of the Kazimierz Wielki University from schools teaching “uniform classes” as the CSAiU soldiers. Rocket launchers, and Knowledge of NATO, organized in Toruń and also a concert performed by the organizes or co-organizes numerous events Political Science Institute held from 12 to 13 well as ISOB students. barrel artillery and also weapons and th Bydgoszcz by the ISOB in cooperation with “Sonata” Warsaw Symphonic Orchestra addressed to children, youth and grown- May 2014. Formal celebrations of the 15 The program included lectures given marksmen’s equipment were elements that the JFTC, received awards. The competition in the Toruń Garrison Church (8 June). ups, like festivities: “Soldier May Picnics”, anniversary of Poland’s joining NATO were by the invited guests, a discussion concerning attracted most interest. was aimed at students of 5th and 6th grades Last year’s program of celebrations “Together in NATO”, “I am EKO”, “It the theme of the Institute Day. effectiveness of NATO operations and The program executed during of primary schools and junior high schools included, among others, formal is Safer with the Army”, meetings and from the area of the kujawsko-pomorskie gatherings, presentations showing competitions for students of military region and Piotr Całbecki, the Marshall, was Poland’s participation in NATO missions, classes in the country, contests on military the honorary patron of the event. simulations of tasks executed during topics (including army songs), etc. The next part of the celebrations of NATO military missions performed by The celebrations of the 15th the 15th anniversary of Poland’s joining their participants, a VTC with soldiers anniversary of Poland’s joining NATO, NATO was the formal part of the regional currently serving on NATO missions, organized within the “Together in NATO” parliament session held on 24 March quizzes, exhibitions and entertainment program, created a great opportunity to 2014. During the session Unitas Durat performances. The participants could invite MPs who deal with defence related Cuiaviano Pomeraniensis – Marshall of also enjoy concerts performed by the issues to visit our region. the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Province Medals “Riwiera” Polish Navy Band, Toruń It must be mentioned here that were awarded. Military Orchestra and Kobranocka band. the kujawsko-pomorskie province is an important point on Poland’s military map. This is where three out of four international NATO structures operating in our country are located, as well as Polish Army units that are fundamental for the country’s defence system. The program of the session co-organized by the Marshall Ofiice included meetings Among others, the celebrations were prognoses for the future, a contest on NATO the celebrations of the anniversary of in the Artillery and Armament Training attended by BG Wojciech Grabowski, the knowledge and NATO diplomatic protocol Poland’s joining NATO ended with a Centre in Toruń, NATO Joint Force JFTC Commander, Janusz Ostoja-Zagórski, workshops organized for members of the concert entitled “Together in NATO” and Training Centre in Bydgoszcz and also in the President of the University, university Scientific Group from the National Security performed by the Military Band from the premises of the Bydgoszcz Military prorectors, PhD Jan Waskan, the Director specialization. There were also theme Toruń and the “Riwiera” Polish Navy th ■ Aviation Plant. of the Political Science Institute, JFTC exhibitions devoted to the 15 anniversary Vocal Band. In Bydgoszcz, on the other hand, representatives, Military Band conducted of Poland’s presence in NATO and 10 years BG Wojciech Grabowski, the Commander by CPT Dominik Sierzputowski, invited of the JFTC in Bydgoszcz. of the NATO Joint Force Training Centre, guests and graduates of the Political Science From 20 to 21 April the Artillery Translated by Tomasz Ociński, and Piotr Całbecki, the Marshall of the Institute, members of the University of the and Armament Training Centre in Toruń JFTC Language Expert

40 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 41 In Retrospect Life at JFTC Christmas Event 2014

Close to 200 children gathered at the Joint Force Training Centre compound on 16 The Christmas Event is one of the ACT Deputy December 2014. They arrived at the JFTC JFTC’s most beautiful traditions. It gathers to meet the Santa and filled the compound the whole JFTC family together and creates Chief of Staff with good spirit, colours, joy and laughter. an opportunity to spend wonderful time Together with their parents, members of the among friends, sharing wishes for the Resource and JFTC, the NCIA Squadron Bydgoszcz and upcoming Christmas and New Year. So it the JFTC Support Unit, they celebrated the was this time. Management annual Christmas Event. Altogether around 300 people from Visits JFTC the Bydgoszcz NATO family met next to the beautiful JFTC Christmas Tree. With the Turkish Army Major General Salih sound of beautiful Christmas carols performed Sevil, Allied Command Transformation by the military orchestra and sang by all Deputy Chief of Staff Resource and participants, the lights on the tree were lit. The Management (ACT DCOS R&M) visited the Santa Claus presented all young participants Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC). He met of the event with Christmas presents. with Brigadier General Wojciech Grabowski, the JFTC Commander, and his staff on 19 February 2015. In discussions with the JFTC Commander, Deputy Commander/ Chief of Staff and division heads, General Sevil was provided with detailed information on the centre’s current activities and future 2015 New Year’s 23 events of lower rank, like conferences, Intelligence as well as representatives of the challenges. He also received answers to courses or seminars and 52 other including VIP Host Nation Poland. “We enjoy excellent in-depth questions regarding various aspects Reception visits. The numbers speak for themselves. (…) cooperation with the Voivode Office, Marshal of the JFTC work. During the guided tour of During all the events we hosted more than 3000 Office, City Hall, Local Government, Police, the centre’s compound the ACT DCOS R&M JFTC achievements in 2014 and plans participants.” Military Police, Customs Office and other received a broader picture of the NATO for 2015 were the main topics of the speech The JFTC Commander also underlined institutions. Thank you for all that you do to Bydgoszcz training centre’s capabilities in delivered by Brigadier General Wojciech changes to NATO mission and their influence make our life easier.” support of training. Grabowski, the Joint Force Training Centre on the centre’s work: “In December 2014, Many special and honoured guests The visit took place concurrently (JFTC) Commander, during the traditional New after 13 years, the ISAF mission came to were on hand to celebrate the beginning with the Military Police Senior Non- Year’s reception at the NATO training entity in an end. We have to remember that our of the new year at the JFTC. The Centre Commissioned Officer Course, therefore the Bydgoszcz. The event took place on 14 January training efforts were aimed mainly for the enjoyed the company of Mr. Łukasz Krupa, distinguished guest used the opportunity to 2015 and gathered many distinguished guests, ISAF mission which was replaced by the a Member of Parliament, Mrs. Ewa Mes, meet with representatives of the Military centre’s partners and friends. new mission called Resolute Support. The the Voivode of the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Police Centre of Excellence responsible “The year that we have just left behind character of the support provided for the Province, Mr. Zbigniew Ostrowski, for the event and also to observe how the was in many ways exceptional for our institution. Afghan National Security Forces will also the Deputy Marshal of the Kujawsko- JFTC staff, facility and equipment supported In 2014 we celebrated 10th anniversary of change.” Pomorskie Province, Major General Werner successful accomplishment of the course. establishing the JFTC and for the first time in General Grabowski thanked all those Weisenburger, Commander Armed Forces As Turkey is one of 18 nations the JFTC history the facility was visited by the whose support was an integral part of the Office, Mrs. Anna Mackiewicz, the Deputy represented in the JFTC structure, General President of Poland”- said Genaral Grabowski. JFTC success in 2014, to include the JFTC Mayor of Bydgoszcz and Brigadier General Sevil also met with his compatriots serving “Last year was exceptional also from the point Support Unit, NATO Communications and Ryszard Szczepiński, the Deputy Chief of in Bydgoszcz. of view of the events that we organized – there Information Agency, 3rd NATO Signal the Inspectorate for the Support of the Armed were 6 big events that took place at the JFTC, Battalion, the Allied Command Counter Forces and the Chief of Staff.

42 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 43 In Retrospect Life at JFTC Christmas Event 2014

42 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 43 In Retrospect Life at JFTC JFTC Staff Visits Exploseum

On 6 March 2015 JFTC members visited Exploseum - the museum established in the remains of the premises of the DAG Fabrik Bromberg (the centre of the military technology). It was a factory that supplied the Third Reich. The Exploseum was established under the auspices of the Leon Wyczółkowski District Museum in Bydgoszcz. In the past, the factory, in whose premises the exhibition was founded, produced substances like TNT, nitroglycerine or smokeless powder. It could cover approximately 20% of the Third Reich’s Army’s demand for explosives on the Eastern front. Currently, it is one of the most interesting tourist attractions in Poland. Visiting the complex of seven buildings linked with a network of narrow tunnels and passageways you can feel the spirit of the place, filled with the history of 40 000 workers, prisoners, POWs who were forced to work in the factory.

Polish National The JFTC guests received broad Defence University information regarding the centre, its mission, structure as well as the role and place within Students Discover NATO training programme and network. The JFTC Commander, assisted by his staff, also General Grabowski with his staff JFTC provided the officers with facts and figures EUROCORPS introduced the guests to the centre’s history, related to centre’s main training undertakings structure, mission, current activities and Students of the Defence Policy – especially related to the recent changes Commander at future challenges. They also provided detailed Postgraduate Studies at the Polish National in Afghanistan and the Resolute Support information on JFTC work and engagements Defence University explored the Joint Force mission. A vivid discussion touched upon the JFTC the EUROPORPS representatives were Training Centre (JFTC) on 11 May 2015. challenges the JFTC faced regarding the interested in. During the demonstration of The group, supervised by Lieutenant General continuously changing Alliance’s needs. Lieutenant General Guy the centre’s simulation capabilities, Generals (ret.) PhD Andrzej Tyszkiewicz, met with During the walk around the JFTC Buchsenschmidt, the Commander of the Buchsenschmidt and Przekwas had a chance Brigadier General Wojciech Grabowski, the compound the guests had an opportunity to EUROCORPS, visited the Joint Force to learn what tools the JFTC uses in support JFTC Commander, and with the centre’s staff. see the heart of the centre – the training facility Training Centre (JFTC) on 4 March 2015. of training, how new technologies enhance The visit was incorporated in the programme with its state-of-the-art infrastructure used in Together with Brigadier General Andrzej NATO training as well as how it might of the postgraduate studies. support of training events and exercises. Przekwas, the EUROCORPS Deputy Chief evolve in the future. of Staff Support, he met with Brigadier “Your institution is fully a part of General Wojciech Grabowski, the JFTC an efficient and powerful NATO training Commander, and explored the centre’s process” – General Buchsenschmidt wrote in training capabilities. the JFTC memory book.

44 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 45 In Retrospect Life at JFTC JFTC Staff Visits Exploseum

44 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 45 Open Day for In Retrospect Schools at the Life at JFTC JFTC

Close to 150 students from 5 schools explored the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) on 13 May 2015. It was the first, pilot Open Day for Schools organized by the JFTC and turned out to be a huge success. A meeting with Brigadier General event, gathering a bigger number of young Wojciech Grabowski, the JFTC Commander, people. On 13 May the centre was visited by briefings filled with information about the representatives of Bydgoszcz International North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the School “Sokrates”, two Bydgoszcz junior NATO Bydgoszcz training centre and also high schools (No. 17 and 32) as well as two about Polish Armed Forces missions abroad, uniform classes representing the Manager discussion with officers serving at the High School of Bydgoszcz and Technical JFTC, presentation of simulation tools used College from Szubin. in support of training and a walk through The success of the event was possible the compound – all that was offered to also thanks to the JFTC guests. The centre’s participants of the first Open Day for Schools staff had a pleasure to meet with the youth at the JFTC. The event was a response to a highly interested in military topics and high interest of local schools in the centre’s current global situation. Numerous questions, work. touching upon Alliance’s work, JFTC’s In the past the JFTC hosted smaller activities, soldiers’ careers and life of foreign JFTC Supports stage was held. groups of students interested in the Alliance. staff in Poland, laid a foundation for a vivid, Four days later, on 2 June, Brigadier This time it was decided to prepare a broader fruitful and very substantial discussion. NATO Knowledge General Laszlo Szabo, the JFTC Deputy Commander/ Chief of Staff, met with Competitions participants of the 7th edition of the Municipal NATO Knowledge Competition, Approximately 150 pupils from organized by the Primary School No 38 Kuyavia and Pomerania Region’s primary in Bydgoszcz. The JFTC has supported and junior high schools participated in two this event since its beginning in 2008 and National Military well as main tasks and activities. General all the tools and expertise competitions focused on NATO-related it has already become a tradition that the Grabowski together with Brigadier General needed for a complete and topics. On 29 May and 2 June the Joint Force centre’s Flag Officers take part in the award Representatives Laszlo Szabo, the JFTC Deputy Commander/ professional NATO training. Training Centre’s Commander and Deputy ceremony and congratulate winners. So it Chief of Staff, and division heads presented And this is exactly what Commander/ Chief of Staff awarded the best was this time. Explored JFTC how the centre’s potential and exercises the JFTC offers.” – General participants of both contests. The competition is designed for primary evolved throughout the eleven years and Grabowski stressed. On 29 May Brigadier General Wojciech schools of Bydgoszcz. Its main goal is to what its current place in the NATO training The JFTC guests also Grabowski met with laureates of the second raise young people’s knowledge on NATO’s 15 National Military Representatives program was. The discussions focused on had an opportunity to see the edition of the ''Together in NATO'' English history, the Alliance’s role in global peace (NMR) visited the Joint Force Training Centre new challenges related to both the change of training facility and watch the Language and NATO Competition. The event keeping, good cooperation between NATO (JFTC). They were welcomed and hosted the mission in Afghanistan as well as Very demonstration of modern and aimed at encouraging young people to improve Nations and symbols of both the Alliance by Brigadier General Wojciech Grabowski, High Readiness Joint Task Force and NFIU. sophisticated modelling and their English skills, promoting knowledge of and member nations. This time close to 50 the JFTC Commander, who introduced the General Grabowski underlined that simulation tools used in support NATO, as well as at commemorating Poland’s participants from 9 schools took the challenge guests to the centre and its capabilities. The not only was the JFTC fully equipped and of JFTC training, presented by presence in the Alliance. Over 100 students and verified their knowledge throughout visit took place on 1 June 2015. ready to prepare future members of ongoing the Training Support Division. This gave participated in the first, school phase and the respective phases of the competition. 12 of Vivid discussions and interesting NATO missions for their service but also able them a clear picture of the centre’s high level best of them met in May in the International them made it to the final. After a stiff rivalry, in-depth questions regarding the JFTC’s to train national units requiring professional capabilities. They were also introduced to School of Bydgoszcz (ISOB), where the final laureates of three first places were announced. work and abilities filled in the NMRs’ stay support. “You are more than welcome the Military Police Centre of Excellence (MP at the Bydgoszcz NATO training centre. to come to Bydgoszcz and train in this COE). Colonel Grzegorz Wasielewski, the The visitors, led by the Dean of the NMR specialized environment. You can use your MP COE Director, provided the guests with Echelon, Commodore Frank Sijtsma, were national entities, however, you will not find information on the centre’s work, activities exposed to the JFTC’s mission, structure as all the systems there, nor all the equipment, and structure.

46 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 47 Open Day for In Retrospect Schools at the Life at JFTC JFTC

46 • Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 Transformation Through Training • Issue No: 7 • July 2015 • 47