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Michael J. Almeida 1 MICHAEL J. ALMEIDA UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO • DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND CLASSICS • SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 78249 • (210) 458-7748 • [email protected] HTTPS://PHILPEOPLE.ORG/PROFILES/MIKE-ALMEIDA HTTPS://MIKEALMEIDA.WEEBLY.COM/ EDUCATION Ph. D. The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH B. A. Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, MA TEACHING EXPERIENCE 2004-present Professor of Philosophy University of Texas at San Antonio 2007-2014 Chair, Professor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy and Classics University of Texas at San Antonio 1996-2003 Associate Professor of Philosophy University of Texas at San Antonio 1990-1995 Assistant Professor of Philosophy University of Texas at San Antonio AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION Philosophy of Religion, Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, Metaphysics AREAS OF COMPETENCE Ethical Theory, Modal Logic PUBLICATIONS Books • Cosmological Arguments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) • Freedom, God, and Worlds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) • The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings (London: Routledge, 2008) 2 • Imperceptible Harms and Benefits (ed.) M.J. Almeida (Dordrecht-Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000). Articles • 'Deontic Problems with Prohibition Dilemmas' Logique et Analyse, No. 127-128 (1989) 163-175 • 'Deontic Logic and the Possibility of Moral Conflict' Erkenntnis, 33 (1990) 51-71 • 'The Paradoxes of Feldman's Neo-Utilitarianism' Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70 (1992) 455-468. • 'Collective Rationality and Simple Utilitarian Theories' Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review XXXIII (1994) 363-375 • 'Refuting van Inwagen's "Refutation": Evidentialism Again' International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1998) 23-29 • 'Too Much (and Not Enough) of a Good Thing: How Agent Neutral Theories Fail in Prisoner's Dilemmas' Philosophical Studies 94, No. 3 (1999) 309-328 • 'Rule Utilitarianism and the Right to Die' in (eds.) Robert Almeder and James Humber, Is There a Duty to Die? Volume XVII Biomedical Ethics Review (New York: Humana Press Co., 1999) 81-97. • 'Utility Pumps and the Value of Partial Compliance' in (ed.) M.J. Almeida, Imperceptible Harms and Benefits (Dordrecht-Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000) 95-110. • 'Why We Ought to be a Little Less Beneficent' Analysis 60 No. 1 (2000) 97-106 • 'Opportunistic Carnivorism', (with M. Bernstein) Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 17, No. 2, (2000) 205-212 • 'Introduction' in (ed.) M. J. Almeida, Imperceptible Harms and Benefits (Dordrecht- Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000) pp. ix - xiii • 'A New Cosmological Argument Undone' (with N. Judisch) International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Vol. 51, (2002) 55-64. 3 • 'Rowe’s Argument from Freedom' International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Vol. 52 (2003a) 83-91 • 'Lucky Libertarianism' (with M. Bernstein) Philosophical Studies 113, No. 2: (2003b) 93-119. • 'Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments from Evil' (with G. Oppy) Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol.81, No. 4, (2003c) 496-516. • 'A Paradox for Significant Freedom' International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 54 (2003d) 175-184 • 'Marginal Cases and the Moral Status of Embryos' in (eds.) Robert Almeder and James Humber, Stem Cell Research Volume XXI Biomedical Ethics Review (New York: Humana Press Co., 2004a) 25-42. • 'Ideal Worlds and the Transworld Untrustworthy' Religious Studies Vol. 40, No. 1 (2004b) 113-123 • 'Evidential Arguments from Evil and Skeptical Theism' (with G. Oppy) Philo Vol. 8, No. 2 Fall-Winter (2004c) 84 - 94 • 'Supervenience and Property-Identical Divine Command Theory' Religious Studies Vol. 40 No. 3 (2004d) 323-333 • 'The New Evidential Argument Defeated' Philo Vol. 7, No. 1 Spring-Summer (2005a) 22-35 • 'Is it Impossible to be Moral?' Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review Vol. XLVI (2005b) 3-14 • 'Is it Impossible to Relieve Suffering?' (with M. Bernstein) Philosophia Vol. 32, Nos. 1-4 (2005c) 313-324 • 'Reply to Trakakis and Nagasawa' (with G. Oppy) Ars Disputandi Vol. 5 (2005d) 5-11 • 'Infinitely Improving Worlds' Philo Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring-Summer (2005e) 37-45 • 'Evidential Arguments from Evil' in Arguing About Gods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) (w/ G. Oppy) 289 – 313 4 • 'On Stone’s Evidential Atheism' Theoria Vol. 76, No. 1 (2006b) 5-22 • 'The Unreal Problem of No Best World' Philo Vol. 9, No. 2 (2006c) 103-112 • 'Rowe’s Argument from Improvability' Philosophical Papers Vol. 31, No. 6, (2006a) 1-26 • 'Martin on Miracles' Philo Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring-Summer 2007 • 'On Vague Eschatology' Faith and Philosophy Vol. (25) No. 4 (2008) 359-375 • 'On Evil's Vague Necessity', Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume II Jon Kvanvig (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009a) 1-16. • 'Critically Muddled: Reply to Carrier' Philo Vol. 11, No. 1 (2009b) • 'Rollbacks, Endorsements, and Indeterminism', The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd edition, ed. Robert Kane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010a) 484-498 (with M. Bernstein). • 'Two Challenges to Moral Nihilism' The Monist Vol. 93 (2010b) 96-105 • 'Chance, Epistemic Probability, and Saving Lives: Reply to Bradley' Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2010c) 1-7. • 'O'Connor's Permissive Multiverse' Philosophia Christi Vol. 12, No. 2 (2010d) 297-308. • 'Theistic Modal Realism?', Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume III Jon Kvanvig (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 1-15. • 'The Logical Problem of Evil Regained', Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume XXXVI: “The Concept of Evil.” (2012) 163-176. • 'Skeptical Theism and Undercutting Defeaters', in T. Dougherty and J. McBrayer (eds.) New Essays on Skeptical Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 115- 131. 5 • 'Best Worlds and Multiverses' in Klaas Kraay (ed.), God and the Multiverse: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Perspectives, (London: Routledge, 2014). 149-161 • 'C. S. Lewis is Great But You Should Be Reading Alvin Plantinga', The Critique (2015) 1 – 13. • 'Bringing About Perfect Worlds', in K. Timpe and D. Speak (eds.) Free Will and Theism: Connections, Contingencies and Concerns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 195 – 213. • 'Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense', in David Hunt and H. McCann (eds.) Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Free Will in Perfect Being Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 56 – 70. • 'Theistic Modal Realism I: The Challenge of Theistic Actualism', Philosophy Compass Vol. 12, (2017) 1 - 14 • 'Theistic Modal Realism II: Theoretical Benefits', Philosophy Compass Vol. 12 (2017) 1 – 17. • 'A posteriori Anselmianism', Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 36, Issue 4 (2017) 599–607 • 'The Multiverse and Divine Creation', Special Issue on Theodicy, Religions 8 (12) (2017) 1 – 10 • 'Endurantism, Fixity, and Fatalism', Symposium on Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will, in Science, Religion and Culture 4(2): (2018) 47-55. • 'What Norms or Values Define Excellent Philosophy of Religion?' www.PhilosophyOfReligion.org (March 2018) • 'Actuality and Anselm', in Graham Oppy (ed.) Ontological Arguments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) 155-175. o ' Unrestricted Actualization and Perfect Worlds: A Reply to Langtry', Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion (ed.) Dean Zimmerman, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming) o 'Absolute Explanations and Theistic Modal Realism', in Kirk Loughheed (ed.) The Axiology of Theism (Oxford: Bloomsbury, forthcoming) o 'Comments on Oppy', in Kirk Loughheed (ed.) The Axiology of Theism (Oxford: Bloomsbury, forthcoming) 6 o 'Comments on Dumsday', in Kirk Loughheed (ed.) The Axiology of Theism (Oxford: Bloomsbury, forthcoming) o 'Comments on Hendricks', in Kirk Loughheed (ed.) The Axiology of Theism (Oxford: Bloomsbury, forthcoming) o 'Reply to Oppy, Dumsday, and Hendricks', in Kirk Loughheed (ed.) The Axiology of Theism (Oxford: Bloomsbury, forthcoming) RESEARCH IN PROGRESS _____________________________________________________________ 'Against Agnosticism' 'Single Assassin Grim Reapers' 'Necessary Gratuitous Evils' 'Salmon's Paradox Resolved' 'Chisholm's Paradox and Divine Omnipotence' ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES 'Perfect Being Theology' Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion (forthcoming) BOOK REVIEWS _____________________________________________________________ Free Will and Universal Causality W. Matthews Grant, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019) European Journal for Philosophy of Religion (forthcoming) Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen John A. Keller (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) Faith and Philosophy, 35 (2) (2018) 264-271 (3900 wrds.) God, Modality, and Morality William E. Mann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2016, 3500 wrds.) The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account T. Ryan Byerly (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014) International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (2015) 255-259. 7 God, Reason, and Reality Anselm Ramelow (ed.) (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 2014) Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2014) God and Moral Law: On the Theistic Explanation of Morality Mark C. Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2012) God and Necessity Brian Leftow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 64, No. 254 (2014) 152-4 A Frightening Love: Recasting the Problem of Evil Andrew Gleeson (Basingstoke:
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