Kriegel's CV, Organized
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Uriah Kriegel Curriculum Vitae Research Areas • Areas of specialty: Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, Brentano • Areas of competence: Metaethics, Epistemology, History of Analytic Philosophy, Early Modern Philosophy, Metaphilosophy, Normative Ethics, Philosophy of Cognitive Science • Areas of interest: Philosophy of Language, General Philosophy of Science, Applied Ethics, Aesthetics, Ancient Philosophy, Medieval Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Asian Philosophy Employment • Professor, Department of Philosophy, Rice University, 2019- • “Directeur de recherche” (full-time research position), CNRS/Jean Nicod Institute, 2012-2019 • Tenured Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, 2010-2012 • Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, 2003-2010 (concurrently 2005-2008: SESQUI Fellow, University of Sydney) Education • Ph.D., Brown University (1998-2003); dissertation: “Conscious Content” (advisor: Jaegwon Kim) • M.A., Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1996-1998) • B.A., Tel Aviv University (1993-1996) Publications Authored books • Brentano’s Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. • The Varieties of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. • The Sources of Intentionality. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. • Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. [French translation of Ch.1 reprinted in A. Dewalque and C. Gauvry (eds.), Conscience et représentation. Paris: Vrin, 2016.] Edited books and journal issues • Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. • Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. • Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge, 2017. • “Brentano.” Special Issue of The Monist, January 2017. • Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. London and New York: Routledge, 2013. • Phenomenal Intentionality. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. • “Phenomenal Intentionality Past and Present.” Special Issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12, 2013. • “Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness.” Special Issue of The Monist, April 2008. (Co-edited with Terry Horgan.) • “Moral Phenomenology.” Special Issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8, 2007. • Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press/Bradford Books, 2006. (Co-edited with Kenneth Williford.) • “Consciousness and Self-Representation: A Symposium.” Psyche, 2006. Peer-reviewed articles • “Moral Judgment and the Content-Attitude Distinction.” Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies. • “The Concreteness of Objects: An Argument against Mereological Bundle Theory.” Forthcoming in Synthese. • “The Intentional Structure of Moods.” Philosophers’ Imprint 19 (49) (2019): 1-19. • “The Value of Consciousness.” Analysis 79 (2019): 503-520. 2 • “Essentialist Plenitude and the Semantics of Proper Names.” Metaphysics 2 (2019): 16-25. • “What is Ontology? A Dialogue.” Think 53 (2019): 49-65. • “Introverted Empiricism: How We Get Our Grip on the Ultimate Nature of Objects, Properties, and Causation.” Metaphilosophy 50 (2019): 688-707. • “Dignāga’s Argument for the Awareness Principle: An Analytic Refinement.” Philosophy East & West 69 (2019): 144-156. • “Brentano’s Dual-Framing Theory of Consciousness.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2018): 79-98. • “Cognitivism about Emotion and the Alleged Opacity of Emotional Content.” Philosophical Studies 173 (2016): 315-320. • “Philosophy as Total Axiomatics: Serious Metaphysics, Scrutability Bases, and Aesthetic Evaluation.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2016): 272-290. • “Brentano’s Mature Theory of Intentionality.” Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (2) (2016): 1-15. • “Experiencing the Present.” Analysis 75 (2015): 407-413. • “Thought and Thing: Brentano’s Reism as Truthmaker Nominalism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2015): 153-180. • “Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion.” European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2014): 420-442. • “The Epistemological Challenge of Revisionary Metaphysics.” Philosophers’ Imprint 13 (June 2013): 1-30. • “Entertaining as a Propositional Attitude: A Non-Reductive Characterization.” American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2013): 1-22. • “Justifying Desires.” Metaphilosophy 44 (2013): 335-349. • “Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, and the Alief/Belief Distinction.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2012): 469-486. • “Kantian Monism.” Philosophical Papers 41 (2012): 23-56. • “Two Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology.” Dialectica 65 (2011): 177-204. • “Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology.” Philosophical Studies 143 (2009): 357-381. • “Temporally Token-Reflexive Experiences.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2009): 585-618. • “Composition as a Secondary Quality.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2008): 359-383. • “Real Narrow Content.” Mind and Language 23 (2008): 304-328. • (With Angela Coventry.) “Locke on Consciousness.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (2008): 221-242. • (With Nicole Hassoun.) “Consciousness and the Moral Permissibility of Infanticide.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2008): 45-55. • “A Cross-Order Integration Hypothesis for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.” Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2007): 897-912. 3 • “Gray Matters.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (2007): 96-116. • (With David Jehle.) “An Argument Against Dispositionalist HOT Theory.” Philosophical Psychology 19 (2006): 462-476. • “Naturalizing Subjective Character.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2005): 23-56. • “Tropes and Facts.” Metaphysica 6 (2005): 83-90. • “The Status of Appearances Revisited.” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2005): 287-304. • “The Functional Role of Consciousness: A Phenomenological Approach.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2004): 171-193. • “Consciousness and Self-consciousness.” The Monist 87 (2004): 185-209. • “Moore’s Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief.” Erkenntnis 61 (2004): 99-121. • “Trope Theory and the Metaphysics of Appearances.” American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2004): 5-20. • “Is Intentionality Dependent upon Consciousness?” Philosophical Studies 116 (2003): 271-307. • “The New Mysterianism and the Thesis of Cognitive Closure.” Acta Analytica 18 (2003): 177-191. • “Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2003): 103-132. [Reprinted with Epilogue in M. Antonelli and F. Boccaccini (ed.), Franz Brentano: Critical Assessment Vol. 2. London: Routledge, forthcoming.] • “Consciousness, Higher-Order Content, and the Individuation of Vehicles.” Synthese 134 (2003): 477-504. • “Intrinsic Theory and the Content of Inner Awareness.” Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2003): 171-198. • “Consciousness as Sensory Quality and as Implicit Self-Awareness.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (2003): 1-26. • “Phenomenal Content.” Erkenntnis 57 (2002): 175-198. • “Emotional Content.” Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2002): 213-230. • “Ethical Internalism and Purely Internal Rationality.” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2002): 49-59. • “PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.” Philosophical Psychology 15 (2002): 55-64. • “Consciousness, Permanent Self-Awareness, and Higher-Order Monitoring.” Dialogue 41 (2002): 517-540. • “Normativity and Rationality: Bernard Williams on Reasons for Action.” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1999): 281- 292. Invited articles 4 • “The Epistemology of Intentionality: Notional Constituents vs. Direct Grasp.” Forthcoming in Inquiry. (Symposium on M. Textor, Brentano’s Mind.) • (With Tricia Magalotti.) “Emotion, Epistemic Assessability, and Double Intentionality.” Forthcoming in Topoi. (Special issue: Double Intentionality) • (With Anna Giustina.) “Two Kinds of Introspection.” Forthcoming in J. Weisberg (ed.), Qualitative Consciousness: Themes from the Work of David Rosenthal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. • “Indignation, Appreciation, and the Unity of Moral Experience.” Forthcoming in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. (Special issue: Moral Phenomenology) • “Brentano on Consciousness, Intentionality, Value, Will, and Emotion: Reply to Symposiasts.” Forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy. • “Précis of Brentano’s Philosophical System.” Forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy. • (With Mark Timmons.) “The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons.” Forthcoming in R. Dean and O. Sensen (eds.), Respect. Oxford: Oxford University Press. • “The Three Circles of Consciousness.” Forthcoming in M. Guillot and M. Garcia- Carpintero (eds.), The Sense of Mineness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. • “Nominalism and Material Plenitude.” Res Philosophica 98 (2021): 91-114. • “Moral Experience: Its Existence, Describability, and Significance.” Forthcoming in C. Erhard and T. Keiling (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Phenomenology of Agency (pp. 396-411). London and New York: Routledge (2020). • “Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness.” In U. Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness (pp. 261-276). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press (2020). • “The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling.” In C. Limbeck-Lilienau and F. Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception (pp. 149- 170).