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Uriah Kriegel Curriculum Vitae

Research Areas

• Areas of specialty: of , , Brentano • Areas of competence: Metaethics, Epistemology, History of , Early Modern Philosophy, Metaphilosophy, Normative , Philosophy of Cognitive • Areas of interest: Philosophy of Language, General , Applied Ethics, , Ancient Philosophy, Medieval Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Asian Philosophy

Employment

• Professor, Department of Philosophy, Rice University, 2019- • “Directeur de recherche” (full-time research position), CNRS/Jean Nicod Institute, 2012-2019 • Tenured Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, 2010-2012 • Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, 2003-2010 (concurrently 2005-2008: SESQUI Fellow, University of Sydney)

Education

• Ph.D., Brown University (1998-2003); dissertation: “Conscious Content” (advisor: Jaegwon Kim) • M.A., Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1996-1998) • B.A., Tel Aviv University (1993-1996)

Publications

Authored books

• Brentano’s Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value. Oxford: , 2018. • The Varieties of . New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. • The Sources of . New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. • Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. [French translation of Ch.1 reprinted in A. Dewalque and C. Gauvry (eds.), Conscience et représentation. Paris: Vrin, 2016.]

Edited books and journal issues

• Oxford Studies in , Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. • Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. • Routledge Handbook of and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge, 2017. • “Brentano.” Special Issue of , January 2017. • Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. London and New York: Routledge, 2013. • Phenomenal Intentionality. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. • “Phenomenal Intentionality Past and Present.” Special Issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive 12, 2013. • “Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness.” Special Issue of The Monist, April 2008. (Co-edited with Terry Horgan.) • “Moral Phenomenology.” Special Issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8, 2007. • Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press/Bradford Books, 2006. (Co-edited with Kenneth Williford.) • “Consciousness and Self-Representation: A Symposium.” Psyche, 2006.

Peer-reviewed articles

• “Moral Judgment and the Content-Attitude Distinction.” Forthcoming in . • “The Concreteness of Objects: An Argument against Mereological Bundle Theory.” Forthcoming in . • “The Intentional Structure of Moods.” ’ Imprint 19 (49) (2019): 1-19. • “The Value of Consciousness.” 79 (2019): 503-520.

2 • “Essentialist Plenitude and the Semantics of Proper Names.” Metaphysics 2 (2019): 16-25. • “What is ? A Dialogue.” 53 (2019): 49-65. • “Introverted Empiricism: How We Get Our Grip on the Ultimate Nature of Objects, Properties, and Causation.” Metaphilosophy 50 (2019): 688-707. • “Dignāga’s Argument for the Awareness Principle: An Analytic Refinement.” Philosophy East & West 69 (2019): 144-156. • “Brentano’s Dual-Framing Theory of Consciousness.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2018): 79-98. • “Cognitivism about and the Alleged Opacity of Emotional Content.” Philosophical Studies 173 (2016): 315-320. • “Philosophy as Total Axiomatics: Serious Metaphysics, Scrutability Bases, and Aesthetic Evaluation.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2016): 272-290. • “Brentano’s Mature Theory of Intentionality.” Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (2) (2016): 1-15. • “Experiencing the Present.” Analysis 75 (2015): 407-413. • “ and Thing: Brentano’s Reism as Truthmaker Nominalism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2015): 153-180. • “Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion.” European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2014): 420-442. • “The Epistemological Challenge of Revisionary Metaphysics.” Philosophers’ Imprint 13 (June 2013): 1-30. • “Entertaining as a : A Non-Reductive Characterization.” American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2013): 1-22. • “Justifying Desires.” Metaphilosophy 44 (2013): 335-349. • “Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, and the Alief/Belief Distinction.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2012): 469-486. • “Kantian .” Philosophical Papers 41 (2012): 23-56. • “Two Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology.” Dialectica 65 (2011): 177-204. • “Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology.” Philosophical Studies 143 (2009): 357-381. • “Temporally Token-Reflexive Experiences.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2009): 585-618. • “Composition as a Secondary Quality.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2008): 359-383. • “Real Narrow Content.” Mind and Language 23 (2008): 304-328. • (With Angela Coventry.) “Locke on Consciousness.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (2008): 221-242. • (With Nicole Hassoun.) “Consciousness and the Moral Permissibility of Infanticide.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2008): 45-55. • “A Cross-Order Integration Hypothesis for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.” Consciousness and 16 (2007): 897-912.

3 • “Gray Matters.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (2007): 96-116. • (With David Jehle.) “An Argument Against Dispositionalist HOT Theory.” Philosophical Psychology 19 (2006): 462-476. • “Naturalizing Subjective Character.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2005): 23-56. • “Tropes and Facts.” Metaphysica 6 (2005): 83-90. • “The Status of Appearances Revisited.” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2005): 287-304. • “The Functional Role of Consciousness: A Phenomenological Approach.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2004): 171-193. • “Consciousness and Self-consciousness.” The Monist 87 (2004): 185-209. • “Moore’s Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief.” 61 (2004): 99-121. • “Trope Theory and the Metaphysics of Appearances.” American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2004): 5-20. • “Is Intentionality Dependent upon Consciousness?” Philosophical Studies 116 (2003): 271-307. • “The New Mysterianism and the Thesis of Cognitive Closure.” Acta Analytica 18 (2003): 177-191. • “Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2003): 103-132. [Reprinted with Epilogue in M. Antonelli and F. Boccaccini (ed.), Franz Brentano: Critical Assessment Vol. 2. London: Routledge, forthcoming.] • “Consciousness, Higher-Order Content, and the Individuation of Vehicles.” Synthese 134 (2003): 477-504. • “Intrinsic Theory and the Content of Inner Awareness.” Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2003): 171-198. • “Consciousness as Sensory Quality and as Implicit Self-Awareness.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (2003): 1-26. • “Phenomenal Content.” Erkenntnis 57 (2002): 175-198. • “Emotional Content.” Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2002): 213-230. • “Ethical Internalism and Purely Internal Rationality.” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2002): 49-59. • “PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.” Philosophical Psychology 15 (2002): 55-64. • “Consciousness, Permanent Self-Awareness, and Higher-Order Monitoring.” Dialogue 41 (2002): 517-540. • “Normativity and Rationality: Bernard Williams on Reasons for Action.” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1999): 281- 292.

Invited articles

4 • “The Epistemology of Intentionality: Notional Constituents vs. Direct Grasp.” Forthcoming in Inquiry. (Symposium on M. Textor, Brentano’s Mind.) • (With Tricia Magalotti.) “Emotion, Epistemic Assessability, and Double Intentionality.” Forthcoming in Topoi. (Special issue: Double Intentionality) • (With Anna Giustina.) “Two Kinds of .” Forthcoming in J. Weisberg (ed.), Qualitative Consciousness: Themes from the Work of David Rosenthal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. • “Indignation, Appreciation, and the Unity of Moral Experience.” Forthcoming in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. (Special issue: Moral Phenomenology) • “Brentano on Consciousness, Intentionality, Value, Will, and Emotion: Reply to Symposiasts.” Forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy. • “Précis of Brentano’s Philosophical System.” Forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy. • (With Mark Timmons.) “The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons.” Forthcoming in R. Dean and O. Sensen (eds.), Respect. Oxford: Oxford University Press. • “The Three Circles of Consciousness.” Forthcoming in M. Guillot and M. Garcia- Carpintero (eds.), The Sense of Mineness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. • “Nominalism and Material Plenitude.” Res Philosophica 98 (2021): 91-114. • “Moral Experience: Its Existence, Describability, and Significance.” Forthcoming in C. Erhard and T. Keiling (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Phenomenology of Agency (pp. 396-411). London and New York: Routledge (2020). • “Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness.” In U. Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness (pp. 261-276). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press (2020). • “The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling.” In C. Limbeck-Lilienau and F. Stadler (eds.), The (pp. 149- 170). Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter (2019). • “Phenomenal Intentionality and the Perception/Cognition Divide.” In A. Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, , Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar (pp. 167- 183). London and New York: Routledge (2019). • “Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis?” In A. Gzrankowski and M. Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality (pp. 192-213). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press (2018). • “Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis: Experimental Philosophy’s Place under the Sun.” In D. Rose (ed.), Experimental Metaphysics (pp. 7-46). London and New York: Bloomsbury (2017). • “Brentano’s Philosophical Program.” In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School (pp. 21-32). London and New York: Routledge (2017).

5 • “Reductive Representationalism and Emotional Phenomenology.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (2017): 41-59. (Special issue: Phenomenology of Affective Life) • (With Anna Giustina.) “Fact-Introspection, Thing-Introspection, and Inner Awareness.” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2017): 143-164. (Special issue: Consciousness and Inner Awareness) • “Brentano’s of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference-Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental.” In C. Pincock and S. Lapointe (eds.), Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy (pp. 197-228). London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2017. • “Dignity and the Phenomenology of Recognition-Respect.” In J.J. Drummond and S. Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Emotional Experiences: Ethical and Social Significance (pp. 121-136). London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017. • “Brentano’s Evaluative-Attitudinal Account of Will and Emotion.” Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger 142 (2017): 529-548. (Special issue: Centenary of Brentano’s Death) • “Brentano’s Latter-day Monism.” Brentano Studien 14 (2016): 69-77. • “Reply to Symposiasts.” Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2016): 279-285. • “Précis of The Varieties of Consciousness.” Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2016): 240-246. • “The Character of Cognitive Phenomenology.” In T. Breyer and C. Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking (pp. 25-43). London and New York: Routledge (2015). • “Perception and Imagination: A Sartrean Account.” In S. Miguens, G. Preyer, and C. Bravo Morando (eds.), Prereflective Consciousness: Sartre and of Mind (pp. 245-276). London: Routledge (2015). • (With Dan Zahavi.) “For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not.” In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou, and W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology (pp. 36-53). London and New York: Routledge (2015). • “Existence, Fundamentality, and the Scope of Ontology.” Argumenta 1 (2015): 97-109. (Inaugural issue of the journal of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy) • (With Benjamin Kozuch.) “Correlation, Causation, Constitution: On the Interplay between the Philosophy and Science of Consciousness.” In S.M. Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness (pp. 400-417). Amsterdam: John Benjamins (2015). • (with Alexandre Billon.) “Jaspers’ Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.” In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness (pp. 29-54). Cambridge MA: MIT Press (2015). • “How to Speak of Existence.” In S. Lapointe (ed.), Themes from Ontology, Mind, and : Essays in Honor of Peter Simons (pp. 81-106). Leiden: Brill (2015).

6 • “L’empirisme introspectif : un coup d'œil sous la voile des phénomènes”. Philosophie NO 124 (2015): 53-79. (Special issue: Phenomena). • “A Hesitant Defense of Introspection.” Philosophical Studies 165 (2013): 1165- 1176. • “Two Notions of .” In U. Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind (pp. 161-179). London and New York: Routledge (2013). • “The Philosophy of Mind: Current and Perennial Controversies.” In U. Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind (pp. 1-13). London: Routledge (2013). • “The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.” In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality (pp. 1-26). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press (2013). • “ Conative Phenomenology: Lessons from Ricœur.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (2013): 537-558. (Special issue: Phenomenal Intentionality Past and Present) • “Brentano’s Most Striking Thesis: No Representation without Self- Representation.” In D. Fisette and G. Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano (pp. 23-40). Amsterdam: Rodopi (2013). • “Animal Rights: A Non-Consequentialist Approach.” In K. Petrus and M. Wild (eds.), Animal and Animal Ethics (pp. 231-247). Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag (2013). • “In Defense of Self-Representationalism: Reply to Critics.” Philosophical Studies 159 (2012): 475-484. • “Précis of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.” Philosophical Studies 159 (2012): 443-445. • “Personal-Level Representation.” In G. Preyer and S. Miguens (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity (pp. 77-114). Frankfurt: Ontos (2012). • “The Veil of Abstracta.” Philosophical Issues 21 (2011): 245-267. • “Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content.” In T. Bayne and M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology (pp. 79-102). Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011). • “Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap.” In J. Liu and J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self (pp. 51-75). Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press (2011). • “Intentionality and Normativity.” Philosophical Issues 20 (2010): 185-208. • “Interpretation: Its Scope and Limits.” In A. Hazlett (ed.), New Waves in Metaphysics (pp. 111-135). London: Palgrave-Macmillan (2010). • “The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects.” Philosophical Studies 141 (2008): 79-95. (Special issue: Ontological Commitment) • (With Terry Horgan.) “Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind.” The Monist 91 (2008): 353-380. (Special issue: Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness)

7 • “Moral Phenomenology: Foundational Issues.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2008): 1-19. (Special issue: Moral Phenomenology) [Farsi translation in M. Khodadadi (ed.), Prolegomena to Phenomenology of Morals. Tehran: Qoqnoos Publication, 2013.] • “Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality.” Philosophical Perspectives 21 (2007): 307-340. • (With Terry Horgan.) “Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness that We May Know It so Well?” Philosophical Issues 17 (2007): 123-144. • “Philosophical Theories of Consciousness: Contemporary Western Perspectives.” In M. Moscovitch, E. Thompson, and P.D. Zelazo (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness (pp. 35-66). Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP (2007). • “Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness, and Scientific Practice.” In P. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science (pp. 195-217). Amsterdam: North-Holland (2007). • “The Phenomenologically Manifest.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (2007): 115-136. (Special issue: Heterophenomenology) • “The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness.” In U. Kriegel and K.W. Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness (pp. 143- 170). Cambridge MA: MIT Press (2006). [Reprinted in Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2008): 361-384.] • (With Kenneth Williford.) “Introduction: Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness.” In U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness (pp. 1-8). Cambridge MA: MIT Press (2006). • “The Reduction of Conscious Emotion.” Theoria et Historia Scientiarum 9 (2005): 121-151. (Special issue: Emotion)

Reviews, Encyclopedic Entries, Interviews, etc.

• “Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Consciousness?” In U. Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness (pp. 1-13). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press (2020). • (with Philipp von Gall.) “Emotionales Bewusstsein bei Tieren und seine politische Bedeutung – ein agrar-philosophischer Dialog” [“Emotional Awareness in Animals and Its Political Significance: A Dialogue between an Agricultural Economist and a ”]. Tierstudien 17 (2020): 97-107. • “Brentano on Judgment.” In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge (2017). • “Brentano’s Classification of Mental Phenomena.” In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge (2017). • “Introduction.” In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge (2017).

8 • “Comment étudier objectivement la subjectivité” [“How to Study Objectively Subjectivity”]. La Recherche #478 (2013): 83. • “Phenomenal Intentionality Past and Present: Introductory.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (2013): 437-444. (Special issue: Phenomenal Intentionality Past and Present) • “Moral Phenomenology.” In H. Lafollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. [Polish translation in Ruch Filozoficzny 69 (2012): 651-658. Second edition forthcoming in International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd edition.] • “Review of D.M. Armstrong, Sketch of a Systematic Metaphysics.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2012): 189-192. • “Review of E. Schwitzgebel, Perplexities of Consciousness.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2011). • “My Kangaroo.” (Review of K. Farkas, The Subject’s Point of View.) Times Literary Supplement (issue of 20 November 2009). • “Intentionality.” In T. Bayne, A. Cleermans, and P. Wilken (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. • “Mysterianism.” In T. Bayne, A. Cleermans, and P. Wilken (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. • “Review of D. Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 515-519. • “Back to Back.” (Review of D. Hofstadter, I am a Strange Loop.) Times Literary Supplement (issue of 23 March 2007). • “Self-Consciousness.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007). • “Review of N. Georgalis, The Primacy of the Subjective.” Mind 116 (2007): 749- 753. • “Review of M. Rowlands, : Putting Mind and World Back Together Again.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006): 488-490. • “Introduction: Consciousness and Self-Representation.” Psyche (2006). • “Consciousness, Theories of.” Philosophy Compass 1 (2006): 58-64. [Spanish translation in Praxis Filosófica 29 (2007): 179-188.] • “Review of J. Gray, Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem.” Mind 114 (2005): 417-421.

Presentations

Named and keynote lectures

• “Nominalism and Material Plenitude.” Res Philosophica Speaker Series. Saint Louis University, Saint Louis MO (23 October 2020).

9 • “Advice to Moral Antirealists.” Steinkraus Lecture. SUNY-Oswego, Oswego NY (21 October 2020). • “Brentano’s Dual-Framing Theory of Consciousness.” Keynote, Self-Awareness: A Workshop with Uriah Kriegel. University of Fribourg, Fribourg CH (11 October 2016). • “The Mereology of Consciousness.” Keynote, The Sense of Mineness. Barcelona ES (21 March 2015). • “The Mereology of Consciousness.” Keynote, MindGrad 2014, University of Warwick. Coventry UK (7 December 2014). • 1st Annual Brentano Lectures (4 lectures: “Consciousness”; “Intentionality”; “Being”; “Value”), University of Liège. Liège BL (8-9 May 2014). • “Phenomenal Primitives.” Keynote, 2nd Annual Workshop, Phenomenality and Internalism*. Czech Royal Academy, Prague CZ (23-24 June 2013). (Conference organized around my work.) • “Non-Perceptual Phenomenology.” Keynote, Summer School in Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Copenhagen DK (9 August 2012).

Other talks (last 3 years)

• “Moral Truthmakers and Secondary Qualities.” Secondary Qualities in the Austro-German Tradition. Humboldt University, Berlin DE (March/April 2022). • “The Structure of Phenomenal Justification.” LOGOS Colloquium. University of Barcelona, Barcelona ES (13 January 2021). • “The Structure of Phenomenal Justification.” PRIN Workshop on Consciousness and Intentionality. Turin IT (17 December 2020). • “Consciousness and the Good Life.” London Mind Group. University of London, London UK (12 October 2020). • “Shiny Happy Zombies.” LOGOS. University of Barcelona, Barcelona ES (10 September 2020). • “Shiny Happy Zombies.” MindWorks. University of Texas, Austin TX (31 August 2020). • “Moral Judgment and the Content-Attitude Distinction.” 3rd Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop. Chapel Hill NC (7 March 2020). • “Two Kinds of Introspection.” Cognitive Science Speaker Series, CUNY. New York NY (7 February 2020). • “Moral Judgment Pluralism: A Phenomenological Argument.” Colloquium, Brown University. Providence RI (8 November 2019). • “The Value of Consciousness to the One Who Has It.” The Subjectivity of Experience, UNAM. Mexico City MX (17-18 October 2019). • “Mood and Mode.” Seminar, University of Wurzburg. Wurzburg DE (12 June 2019).

10 • “Nominalistic Truthmakers.” Colloquium, University of Konstanz. Konstanz DE (6 June 2019). • “The Value of Consciousness.” The Value of Consciousness, University of Konstanz. Konstanz DE (4 June 2019). • “Nominalism and Coextensive Properties.” Seminar, Hamburg University. Hamburg DE (14 May 2019). • “The Value of Consciousness.” Colloquium, Ruhr-University Bochum. Bochum DE (7 May 2019). • “Phenomenal Justification.” Seminar, Hamburg University. Hamburg DE (8 April 2019). • “Mood.” Philosophy Club, Rice University. Houston TX (29 October 2018). • “Franz Brentano’s Philosophy.” Workshop, Rice University. Houston TX (26 October 2018). • “Nominalistic Truthmakers.” Colloquium, University of Neuchatel. Neuchatel CH (9 October 2018). • “Grounding for Carnapians.” Colloquium, University of Gothenburg. Gothenburg SE (19 September 2018). • “Finding versus Explaining the NCC.” Consciousness under the Spotlight of Science. Strasbourg FR (30 August 2018). • “The Perception/Cognition Divide: One more Time, with Feeling.” Colloquium, National University of Singapore. Singapore SG (16 January 2018). • “Dual-Process Cognitivist Internalism.” Internalism and Externalism in Analytic Philosophy, IPM School of Analytic Philosophy. Tehran IR (12 September 2017). • “The Perception/Cognition Divide: One more Time, with Feeling.” Plenary, 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Kirchberg AT (11 August 2017). • “Brentanian Foundationalism and the Myth of the Given.” The 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Symposium on Brentano and the Myth of the Given. Kirchberg AT (9 August 2017). • “The Perception/Cognition Divide: One more Time, with Feeling.” Perceptual Awareness Week, Jean Nicod Institute. Paris FR (12 July 2017). • “The Phenomenal Intentionality of Moods.” Intentionality. Sorbonne, Paris FR (1 July 2017). • “Vertical Mereology.” Mereological Composition, Collège de France. Paris FR (29 June 2017). • “Brentanian Monism.” Wholes and parts: Systematical and historical perspectives on the metaphysics of composition, Ecole Normale Superieure. Paris FR (2 June 2017).

Awards

• Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel Research Award, Humboldt Foundation (2018-19): 45,000€

11 • “Prime d’excellence”, CNRS (2014-2018): 14,000€

Grants (external, held in the last 3 years)

• (PI Sven Rosenkrantz.) “Philosophical Problems, Resilience, and Persistent Disagreement.” EU Horizon 2020 Grant, European Research Council (2016- 2020): 3,670,853€ • (PI Gianfranco Soldati.) “Intentionality, Consciousness, and Naturalization.” New Directions in the Study of the Mind grant, Templeton Foundation (2016-18): 10,000£

Teaching and Supervision

Courses Taught (last 3 years)

o “Metaphysics: Material Objects” (Spring 2021), Rice University o “Introduction to Philosophy” (Spring 2021), Rice University o “Moral Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy” (Fall 2020), Rice University o “Metaphysics: The Alphabet of Being” (Spring 2020), Rice University o “The Value of Consciousness and the Consciousness of Value” (Academic Year 2019–20), Rice University (with Charles Siewert) o “The Moral ” (Fall 2019), Rice University o “Consciousness, Emotion, and Imagination” (Spring 2018), École Normale Supérieure (with Tricia Magalotti)

Supervision

• PhD students: o Reuben Sass, fitting attitude accounts of value (expected 2023), Rice University. o Wan Zhang, regret (expected 2023), Rice University (committee). o Logan Wigglesworth, moral understanding (expected 2022), Rice University. o Lorenza D’Angelo, consciousness and welfare (expected 2021), Syracuse University (committee). o Matthias Barker, “The Normativity of Perception and the Perception of Normativity” (2020), University of Texas – Austin (committee). o Tricia Magalotti, “The Epistemic Justification of Emotions” (2019), École Normale Supérieure. (Now: Postdoc, University of Pavia.)

12 o Anna Giustina, “Primitive Introspection” (2018), École Normale Supérieure. (Now: Postdoc, University of Liege.) o Michael Bruno, “The Extended Conscious Mind” (2013), University of Arizona (committee). (Now: Assistant Professor, Mississippi State University.) o Benjamin Kozuch, “Merging the Philosophical and Scientific Studies of Consciousness” (2013), University of Arizona. (Now: Associate Professor, University of Alabama.) o Brian Fiala, “Explaining the Explanatory Gap” (2012), University of Arizona (committee). o Anne Steadman, “The Immediacy of Phenomenal and Immediate Implications for ” (2011), University of Arizona. (Now: Attorney.) o Parker Crutchfield, “Perception, Cognition, and Justification” (2011), Arizona State University (committee, external member). (Now: Associate Professor, Western Michigan University.) o Farid Masrour, “Structuralism: In Defense of a Kantian Account of Perceptual Experience” (2008), University of Arizona (committee). (Now: Associate Professor, University of Wisconsin – Madison.) o Stephen Biggs, “Mind and Modality” (2007), University of Arizona (committee). (Now: Associate Professor, Iowa State University.) • Other students: o MA student: Reuben Sass (2020-21), Rice University. o Visiting student (China Scholarship Council): Zhou Yu (Spring 2021), Rice University. o Postdoc: Anna Giustina (2019-20), Rice University. o Postdoc: Andrew Lee (2019-20), Rice University. o MA student: Logan Wigglesworth (2019-20), Rice University. o Postdoc: Takuya Niikawa (2018-20), École Normale Supérieure/Hokkaido University. o Visiting student: Lorenza D’angleo (November–December 2018), Syracuse University. o MA student: Lylian Paquet (2017-18), “Social Mereology: An Argument for Realism in Social Ontology,” École Normale Supérieure. o Visiting student (NYU exchange program): Andrew Lee (Spring 2017, Spring 2018), NYU. o MA student: Michele Odisseas Impagnatiello, “Certainty, Supervenience, Possibility” (2016-17), École Normale Supérieure. o Visiting student (Italian government grant): Daria Vitasovic (Spring 2017), University of Milan. o MA student: Vincent Grandjean, “Truth and Grounding” (2015-16), École Normale Supérieure. o Visiting postdoc: Takuya Niikawa (Fall 2016), Chiba University

13 o Visiting student (Chateaubriand Fellow): Paul Boswell (Spring 2016), University of Michigan. o MA student: Anna Giustina, “Towards a Defence of Phenomenal Knowledge” (2015), EHESS. o Visiting student (Chateaubriand Fellow): Ben Phillips (Fall 2014), City University of New York. o Visiting student (Italian government grant): Davide Bordini (2011-12, Spring 2013), University of Milan. o MA student: Rachel Schneebaum (2012), University of Arizona. o BA student: Steven Gubka, “Zombies and Episodic Memory” (2012), University of Arizona. o MA student: William Leonard (2011), University of Arizona. o MA student: Chris Kahn (2010), University of Arizona. o BA student: Maureen Turner, “The Relationship between Neural Content and Visual Phenomenology” (2010), University of Arizona. o MA student: Brian Fiala (2008), University of Arizona. o MA student: Benjamin Kozuch (2007), University of Arizona. o MA student: Michael Bruno (2006), University of Arizona. o MA student: Farid Masrour (2005), University of Arizona. o MA student: Stephen Biggs (2004), University of Arizona.

Service

Service to the employing institution

• Leadership/research management functions: o Head, Consciousness & Self Team, Jean Nicod Institute, 2012-2019 (managing the activity of an 18-member team, URL: http://www.institutnicod.org/equipes-projets/equipes- 16/article/presentation-team-consciousness?lang=fr&var_mode=calcull) o Associate Director, Center for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona, 2004-2010 (http://www.consciousness.arizona.edu) • Committee work (last 3 years): o Visiting Speakers committee, Rice University, 2019- o University Library committee, Rice University 2020- o Tsanoff Prize committee (best undergraduate philosophy paper), Rice University, Spring 2020 o Steering Committee, MA program in Contemporary Philosophy, École Normale Supérieure, 2015-2018

Service to the Profession

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• Editorial: o Editor in Chief: Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind o Editorial Board: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, International Review of Philosophy and Psychology o Category Editor (PhilPapers): Franz Brentano; Self-Representational Theories of Consciousness • Refereeing: o Journals: Philosophical Review, Journal of Philosophy, Noûs, Mind, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, Philosophical Quarterly, Analysis, Philosophers’ Imprint; Synthese, Erkenntnis, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Thought, The Monist, Dialectica, Philosophia; British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Mind and Language, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Journal of Consciousness Studies, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Philosophical Psychology, Psyche, Consciousness and Cognition, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Foundations of Science, Intellectica; Journal of Moral Philosophy, Journal of Value Inquiry; British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Philosophy East & West; Journal of Philosophical Research, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Husserl Studies, Iyyun, Kultura i Wartości; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy o Presses: Oxford University Press, MIT Press, Routledge, Polity Press, Ontos Verlag o Granting agencies: , Canadian Research Council, Danish Research Council, Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Hommes, German Research Foundation (DFG), Israel Science Foundation, The Leverhulme Trust, The Mind Association, Research Foundation – Flanders, Taiwan Ministry of Science and Technology o Universities: Aberdeen University (UK), Australian National University (Australia), Carleton University (Canada), Freie Universität Berlin (Germany), Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel), Institute of Research in Fundamental Sciences (Iran), Lund University (Sweden), National University of Singapore (Singapore), Rutgers University (USA), University of Aix-Marseille (France), University of British Columbia (Canada), University of Calgary (Canada), University of Fribourg (Switzerland), University of Lille-3 (France), University of Luxembourg (Luxembourg), University of Paris – Sorbonne (France), University of New South Wales (Australia), University of Potsdam (Germany), University of Warwick (UK), Yale University (USA)

15 o Organizations: American Philosophical Association, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Society for Exact Philosophy • Event Organization: o “Autumn of Consciousness.” Worldwide Zoom talks, 24 September – 14 December 2020 o “Summer of Consciousness.” Worldwide Zoom talks, 6 May – 19 August 2020 o “The Medical Ethics of Consciousness.” Rice University, Houston TX, 20 February 2020 o “Acquaintance and Direct Grasp.” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 2-6 July 2018 o “Perceptual Awareness Week.” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 10-14 July 2017 o “The Philosophy of Moods.” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 21 June 2017 o “Phenomenal Intentionality.” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 13-4 Mars 2017 o “Self-knowledge.” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 1 July 2016 o “Monism.” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 16-7 May 2016 o “The Guise of the Good.” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 11 April 2016 o “Metaethics Day.” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 26 June 2015 o “Aesthetics Day” (with Jerome Pelletier). Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 22 May 2015 o “La métaéthique autrichienne [Austrian Metaethics].” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 18 May 2015 o “The Phenomenology of Agency.” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 4 May 2015 o “Perception Day.” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 6 November 2014 o “Brentano’s Place in Early Modern Philosophy.” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 20 October 2014 o “Value Theory Day.” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 26 June 2014 o “Epistemology Day.” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 4 June 2014 o “Moral Psychology Day.” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 19 March 2014 o “Metaphysics Day.” Jean Nicod Institute, Paris FR, 28 February 2014 o “Towards a Science of Consciousness 10: Tucson 2012” (organizing committee). Tucson AZ, April 2012 o “Phenomenology, Introspection, and Cognitive Science.” University of Arizona, Tucson AZ, 10 September 2011 o “Towards a Science of Consciousness 9: Tucson 2010” (organizing committee). Tucson AZ, 12-17 April 2010 o “The Nature of Moral Judgment” (with Mark Timmons). University of Arizona, Tucson AZ, 6-8 November 2009

16 o “The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.” University of Arizona, Tucson AZ, 17-19 October 2008 o “Towards a Science of Consciousness 8: Tucson 2008” (organizing committee). Tucson AZ, 8-12 April 2008 o “Time and Consciousness” (with Huw Price and ). University of Sydney, 21-22 July 2006 o “Towards a Science of Consciousness 7: Tucson 2006” (organizing committee). Tucson AZ, 4-9 April 2006 o “Moral Phenomenology” (with Mark Timmons and Terry Horgan). University of Arizona, 3-5 November 2005 o “Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness.” University of Arizona, 18-20 March 2005

Languages

• English (dominant language :: C2) • Hebrew (native speaker :: C2) • French (fluent :: C2) • German (advanced :: C1) • Spanish (beginner :: A2)

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