From Pragmatics to Enactive Cognition

A new paradigm for the development of musical semiotics

Paper by

Rubén López Cano Escola Superior de Música de Catalunya University of Valladolid

Rubén López Cano 2004

Los contenidos de este texto están bajo una licencia Creative Commons. Consúltela antes de usarlo.

The content on this text is under a Creative Commons license. Consult it before using this article.

Cómo citar este artículo: How to cite this article: López Cano, Rubén. 2004. “From Pragmatics to Enactive Cognition. A new paradigm for the development of musical semiotics”. Paper presented at Second International Symposium on Musical Language Sciences . Current Trends on Musical Language Sciences, especially on the Language Sciences Webs and Transversalities Questions. Saint-Rémy-de-Provence, October 14-17, 2004 (Consultado o descargado [día, mes y año]) (Accessed [Day Month Year of access]) From Pragmatics to Enactive Cognition Rubén López Cano

1. Introduction

Semioticians are often concerned about the fact that Peirce’s semiotic principles, particularly the interpretant notion which sustains the unlimited semiosis concept, may be understood in psychological terms. Their contention being that the sign is a system in its own right, capable of ensuring its interpretability without need for the intervention of a natural or artificial mind to do the task (Eco 1972 and Veivo 2001). Nevertheless, recent cognitive sciences have taught us there is no need to be a psychologist in order to talk about the mind. Cognitive Science is a domain encompassing anthropology, linguistics, psychology, philosophy of the mind, the neurosciences, artificial intelligence and semiotics.1 The development of cross-studies enables learning about the mind and its processes from a multidimensional perspective. Moreover, scholars such as Umberto Eco (1999) himself, acknowledge nowadays that Peirce can be understood from a metaphysical-cosmogonic standpoint as well as from a cognitive one.2

Cognitive musicology is a disciplinary domain that grows parallel to musical semiotics. Recent research shows how productive it would be to work at once with semiotic and cognitive theories and concepts in order to achieve a better understanding of musical signification processes. This is especially true in the case of those enquiries about the role of the body and action in the musical cognition and signification (cf. Hatten 1994 and 2004, Echard 1999a, 1999b and 2000, Windsor 1995 and López Cano 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003a, 2003b 2004a, 2004b and Forthcoming). The development of cognitive musical semiotics requires lending to the semiotic debate of music some of the main topics, concepts and ideas from the cognitive sciences and philosophy of the mind. In this paper I will present some of the theoretical consequences resulting from the insertion of musical semiotic research into the scope of the enactive, ecological or dynamic approaches to the study of cognition. This new approach will allow for a transition from the study of the pragmatic dimension of music

1 For an introduction to the Cognitive Science see Gardner (1982 and 1985), Varela (1988) and Eckardt, (1993). For an overview of some research lines of Cognitive musicology and Cognitive musical semiotics see López Cano (2002b). 2 For an interpretation of Peirce’s semiotics from the point of view of the Cognitive Science see Eckardt (1993: 145-159). Rubén López Cano 2004 2

From Pragmatics to Enactive Cognition Rubén López Cano semiotics to an entire musical semiotic based both, in action and embodied cognition. It’s a matter of favouring the study of “musical language” with a different set of tools from those of the semiotics of language.

2. Some approaches to the study of the mind.

We should first point out the four main paradigms in the study of mind and cognitive processes: classical cognitivism, connectionism, radical constructivism and the enactivistc, ecological or dynamic approaches.

1. Classical Cognitivism: this approach defines the mind as a centralised computer. Perception is understood as an input process. The senses (regarded as peripheral units) are passive recipients of data from an external environment. These data are transformed into discrete symbolic units known as mental representations or mental images. Symbolic units represent, one by one, each of the elements of the external and pre- existent reality. The symbolic units are processed by the centralised computational mind to produce an output perceivable by means of the external behaviour. Central-computational mind governs all the elements of cognition, takes the whole of the decisions and sends instructions to the other parts of the external body. In this approach, mind appears as isolated from body and environment. Moreover, external data are objective and prior to mind processes.3 Most part of semiotic studies work within the scope of classical cognitivism.

2. Connectionism: this approach considers the mind as a self-organized reality that emerges from the interaction of complex local neural networks. Connectionism avoids the concepts of mental images and symbolic process. Here, the system concentrates itself in the local relationships of the network. The mind, as an emergent and self- organised entity, has not the same proprieties of the neural network components. The causal link between parts and the whole breaks any

3 For the historical development of Classical Cognitivism see Gardner (1985). For one application of this paradigm into music see Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983). Rubén López Cano 2004 3

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trace of linearity. It becomes complex and maybe chaotic.4 Currently, connectionism receives a great deal of attention by those musical researchers working on Artificial Intelligence and technological developments. In such approach the role of semiotics is uncertain.

3. Radical constructivism: here, external reality is an invention, a kind of projection of the inner mind organization determined by cultural constructions and subjective impulses of individuals.5 This approach is really fruitful for those semiotic researchers rooted on Umwelt theory and biosemiotcs by Uexküll (1957) (cf. Martinelli 2002 and 2003 and Reybrouck 2001 and 2004).

4. Enactivistic, Ecological or Dynamic Approaches. For these theories, cognition is not the representation of an external “objective” ready-made world, nor is the projection of an internal subjective order. The world emerges from the action of the organism with/into the environment. According to this approach, the body is not a perceptual intermediary between the mind and the external “objective” reality. Since mind belongs to body and vice versa, body action is cognition itself at least for an emergent mind. Cognitive structures emerge from recurrent sensory- motor strategies used in the exploration of the environment. Perception (including musical perception) is not an input process, but a guideline for the action. It is not the passive catching of external data but the guide for cognitive exploration of environmental energy fluctuations. In such a process, mind, body and environment, form a global unity.6

Although enactivism has some contact points with radical constructivism, one is not tantamount with the other. As far as enactivism is concerned, cognition occurs by means of ensembling, as if two elements of a puzzle, a

4 The “bible” of the connectionist approach is Rumelhart and and McClelland (1986). Two different application of this paradigm to the music research are made by Todd and Loy (1991) and Kiss and Abdeljelil (2004). 5 For an introduction to Radical Constructivism see Watzlawick and Krieg, (1994) and Foerster (1974). Reybrouck (2001) applies this paradigm to his approach to the semiotics of the enactive listening. 6 For the Enactivistic Approach see Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991), Maturana and Varela (1987) and Maturana (1988). An application to musical semiotics of Enactive principles is made by López Cano (2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b and Forthcoming). Rubén López Cano 2004 4

From Pragmatics to Enactive Cognition Rubén López Cano cognitive competence with the environment. The internal cognitive constructions of the subject alone are not sufficient and require to be inserted in the environment. Subject and environment are codeterminant. The mind is that which emerges from that ensembling. The notions of codetermination between organism and environment are already present in theoretical developments such as Neisser’s perceptual circle and Uexküll’s functional circle7 (figures1 and 2).

Figure 1. Neiser’s Perceptual cycle (Neisser 1976:21).

Perceptual world

Receptor

Perceptual cue carrier

Perceptual organ Subject

Objective connecting structure

Object Operational cue carrier Operational organ Effector

Operational world

Figure 2. Uexküll’s functional cycle (Uexküll’1992).

3. Enactive semiosis in music.

Enactivism rebukes the concept of mental images insofar they represent a ready-made reality, though it doesn’t deny the mind’s role as sign producer.

7 The former is the basis of Robert Hatten’s (1994) cognitive musical semiotics. The latter is of the enactive listening by Mark Reybrouck (2001). Rubén López Cano 2004 5

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How is the symbolic nature of music to be understood from this conception? Music is one of the most complex symbolic activities of the human being. However, music is semiotic not only because it expresses the values, ideas myths, obsessions and identity cues of one group or society (Merriam 1964, Tarasti 1979), nor because music reproduces the cognitive ways people use to organise themselves in social groups (Blacking 1973). Music is not only a sign representation of these elements. Music is semiotic also because it offers privileged paths for the construction of subjective and social reality as well as individual and collective memory (cf. Frith, 1987, Middleton 1990, Vila, 1996).

By means of music we are able to articulate the relationships of a group and to impose order and coherence in human experience, especially body and affective experience. Music, as a semiotic tool, helps in the unfolding of the semiosis web by means of which we are able to give continuity to our perception of the world. Music is not only the representation of a world, but a cognitive tool for building it!!! Let’s see the next example. What is Tziran doing? (see example 1)

Example 1. Tziran, music and body.

Lyrics: “It’s burning, it’s ablaze, it’s burning oh! My pumpkin (my poor head)!!!”

Tziran imitates his mother’s hands movements (who is singing behind the camera). Gestures follow verbal instructions that the baby is unable to understand. But he is exploring the space, his body and his movement possibilities with/into music. The construction and first development of his image schemas (Johnson 1987) and sensoriomotor routines and abilities are modelled by music, by the melody inflexions as well as the beat and rhythm of this simple tune. Music is with us from the very beginning of our lives. There is no reason to think music symbolises an ontological reality that comes before it. Music comes with it and takes part of the process of individual and social construction of Rubén López Cano 2004 6

From Pragmatics to Enactive Cognition Rubén López Cano cultural environment. Music is one of the finest adaptation devices of the organism (Reybrouck 2001 and 2004).

4. Musical structures: starting point or the result of musical semiosis?

Usually musicians accept that musical structures are properties intrinsic to and objective of sound objects. In the structuralist era, semiologists used to identify structures as Signifiers (Se) and that to which they referred to as Signified (So). These referals could be intramusical, intermusical and extramusical (Nattiez 1990). From the point of view of enactivism, it is not possible to talk about objective structures nor of acoustic properties intrinsic to sound objects. Structures are not the origin of semiosis but its result and/or part of the cognitive process. Structures are produced by means of the action and intervention of a musical competence in the sound environment. Competence explores the fluctuations of energies in the environment in order to exclusively pick up the information needed to work (Gibson 1966). Music is not a mere grouping of sound objects known as works, nor is it a grouping of conducts, activities and institutions which surround musical activity. Music is also, and above all, a series of cognitive modes, a means to understanding and settling down in the world.

Musical structures are the outcome of certain cognitive operations which the sound environment allows to perform. Ecological theories of perception call these action possibilities offered by the environment with the name of affordances. They are captured by the organism from the first split moment perception occurs. Affordances help to the meaningful organisation of the habitat and to the production of the relationships we establish with it.8 Musical structures are the outcome of a negotiation process between the knowledge of musical competence and the affordances offered by the sound environment. Structures are part of the whole meaning of music.

8 The ecological approaches are based on James Gibson’s Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (1986). For musical applications see Clark (forthcoming), Windsor (1995 and 2004) and López Cano (2002c, 2003b, 2004b and forthcoming). Rubén López Cano 2004 7

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However, what we usually refer to as “extramusical” meaning, belongs to the same level of signification as that of the structures. Affective and kinetic experiences obtained through music are not subsequent to structures. Sometimes, identification of the second is only possible through the first. Musical significance cannot be reduced to binary Se-So relationships. It entails a complex process where many elements and real or virtual phenomena adjoin. Musical structures are the outcome of an exploration conducted by musical competence of its sound environment, which departure point are concepts, categories or cognitive types, allowing for the recollection of information needed to operate (I shall return to these concepts later on). The illusion of objectivity of musical structures is due to the development which musicians have long been effecting of countless interpretations under the cover of visual or verbal artefacts, extremely easy to communicate in an intersubjective manner. These artefacts are so deeply imbedded in the signal network which sustains the world of musicians, that we take for granted the existence of objective musical structures and grant them an ontological rank.

5. Musical competence: from codes to constraints

Musical competence has been studied from several perspectives.9 However, the most significative theoretical developments have been contributed by Gino Stefani (1982) and Robert Hatten (1994). For Stefani, musical competence is the “capacity to make sense by means of and/or around music” (Stefani 1985: 79). His theoretical model is based on Umberto Eco’s theory of codes (1977: 97–254). Competence is layered according to code families: general codes, musical practices, musical techniques, musical styles and specific works. Stefani’s theory was extremely influential and was a pioneer headway in this approach to the semiotic study of music. Nevertheless, the code notion began

9 There are several approaches to the study musical competence. Among them we find the structural and translinguistic semiology by Nicolas Ruwet (1975) and Jean Jacques Nattiez (1973), the “Folk Musicology” by Leonard Bernstein (1976), the incipient cognitive musicology by Allan Keiler (1978), the Artificial Intelligence research by Otto Laske (1992) and, in an indirect way, the musical style theory by Leonard en Meyer (1989). For a critical study of the historical and theoretical development of this concept in musical semiotics see López Cano (2002b and 2004b). Rubén López Cano 2004 8

From Pragmatics to Enactive Cognition Rubén López Cano to show some remarkable limitations. In the early 1980s, whilst Stefani was publishing his theory of musical competence, Umberto Eco effected a thoroughly sharp self-criticism about his own code theory. Encyclopaedia and, precisely, competence, are among the concepts proposed by Eco to overcome the limitations of that concept (Eco 1990: 289-340).10

However, what’s wrong with the idea of code? The notion of code implies the existence of systematic relationships amongst the elements that compose the music, the rules whereby they combine themselves and the binary stable correlations which articulate throughout (understood as Signifiers) and the extramusical elements (understood as Signifieds).11 Albeit, semioticians often want all works to be the result of stylistic rules, established more or less by a code. Nevertheless, a stylistic description based on this argument rapidly becomes a generous repertoire of exceptions which contravene the rules (Hatten 1982). We then assume that rethorical rules follow basic rules thus altering the latter, and the semiotician becomes a kind of “deputee” who legislates music nonstop.

Recent cognitive approximations suggest that the musical mind is not a mechanism which passively applies clear or definitive rules. Musical competence is a productive, strategical force and, above all, creative. The extent to which one is able to describe the perfection of rules applied to a style is quite irrelevant, for we shall never be able to predict in which way the composer is going to use them within a specific work (Hatten 1990), nor the way it’s going to be interpreted or understood by a determinate listener (Delalande 1989). “Rules or not rules”, that is the question. Competence is a boundless creative force. However, this doesn’t happen haphazardly. Instead of rules or laws, cognitive sciences prefer to talk about constraints. These are action boundaries or borders which direct cognition understood as action. The constraint concept was introduced into the field of studies of musical competence by Robert Hatten. In his opinion, musical competence is the “internalised, possibly tacit, cognitive ability of a listener to understand and

10 For a deep discussion on this theoretical paradox see López Cano (2004b). 11 This is a major claim of Nicolas Ruwet’s method of paradigmatic analysis (Ruwet 1972). Rubén López Cano 2004 9

From Pragmatics to Enactive Cognition Rubén López Cano apply stylistic principles, constraints, types, correlations and strategies of interpretation to the understanding of musical works in that style” (Hatten 1994: 288). Which are these constraints and how do they work?

6. Emergece and selforganization

A complex bundle of diverse constraints and rank interacting simultaneously do intervene in musical cognition. They are, among others, biological constraints, physiological, psychological, anthropological, social, cultural, stylistic, circumstantial, contextual constraints, and so forth. The carthesian-deterministic thought has taught us to understand the world as a taxonomic, lineal and hierarchy organisation, usually arranged from the general to the particular, where the biological role is adjudicated to the general whilst the cultural and circumstancial belong to the most specific (Meyer 1998). Something rather similar occurs with the conception of style proposed by Nattiez: “the musical universals” (whatever that may mean) would occupy the most general domain whilst the style of a specific work would pertain to the most specific (Nattiez 1990: 136) (See Figures 2 and 3).

Nature

Physical world Biological World

Mineral world Other natural phenomena Animal world Vegetal world

Human World Other species world

Bio-anthropological (physiological, psychological, etc., constraints)

Specific constraints of Culture A Specific constraints of Culture B Specific constraints of Culture C

Figure 2. Taxonomical and linear hierarchy of the constraints

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Figure 3. Levels of Stylistic relevancies by Nattiez (Nattiez 1990: 136)

However, epistemological developments such as the complexity theory of Edgar Morin (1981-1992, 1997 and 2000) or cognitive theories such as enactivism (Varela 1988, Varela et al. 1991), have shown us that the world is far more indeterminate than we thought (Prigogine 1997), that the perceptive, logical limitations of the observer influence the way it is described (Matrurana 1988 and 1995-1996) and that many complex processes such as behaviour, the boiling point of water, the movement of birds flocks, the collective tasks of ants or musical cognition are, indeed, emergent and self-organised processes (Clark 1997 and Johnson 2001).

Self-organised systems originate from the interaction of a great number of local phenomena. Each sector works according to its own local constraints but, when they begin to interact, they propitiate the appearance of an emergent phenomenon which organises itself independently from the local levels: it cannot be explained nor reduced to a logic ruling one of its components. From their observation, one cannot predict the behaviour of the emerging levels. Between both strata here is a fundamental epistemological asymmetry. Even though there exists a causal relationship between both, it eludes the carthesian linearity with which we are used when explaining the world (Clark 1997 and Johnson 2001).

In musical cognition there is a simultaneous interaction of all kinds of constraints.12 Not a single one rules above the rest as the most general or the

12 This model of mind is known by philosophers as interactive dualism of the properties. Contrary to this model is the Materialist approach to mind. It claims the identity between mental states and brain states. For these and other philosophical approaches to models of mind see Churchland (1988). Rubén López Cano 2004 11

From Pragmatics to Enactive Cognition Rubén López Cano most important. This is a fundamental issue which, in order to be understood, requires the development of a new logic and of other ways of thinking (see Figure 4).13

Figure 4. Emergence process in musical competence constraints as a complex system (Adapted from Chris Langton’s graphic [Lewin 1995: 27])

In Georgy Ligety’s (1925) microtonal compositions we can find a good musical example of emergence and self-organising. Lontano (1967), for instance, is a strictly canon-departing composition. Each one of the voices therein follows such astringent counterpoint rules as those of Johaness Ockehem (c. 1410-1497). The length of each note is, however, so extended and the intervalic so narrow that musical competence is unable to effect a poliphonic hearing. Rather, what is perceived are colour spots, a transformed space and textures in movement, suddenly changing their density and extremely hard to categorise (listen to example 2).

13 In this sense, Peirce’s notion of abduction as a complex inference is a first step towards this address. Rubén López Cano 2004 12

From Pragmatics to Enactive Cognition Rubén López Cano

Example 2a. Lontano by Gyogy Ligeti bars 1-8.

; Example 2b. Lontano by Gyogy Ligeti

Hundreds of analysis explain minutiously in which way the counterpoint proceeds in this kind of works, but none is able to adequately conceptualise the mode in which orchestral colour densities are articulated.14

7. Surfing over the musical object by cognitive schemata

As a matter of fact, Ligeti had to alter his composing methods when he ascertained the difficulty of the listener when trying to subsume the music emerging from his rigorous writing. It is not an easy task for our musical ear to categorise the various moments of the subtle timbre transformations. To imagine to what an extent this is so, let’s think of an ordinary listener educated

14 For these kind of analysis see Bernard (1987 and 1984), Griffiths (1983), Reiprich (1978), Rollin (1980) and Michel (1985). Rubén López Cano 2004 13

From Pragmatics to Enactive Cognition Rubén López Cano in our tonal tradition, yet unable to detect in a perfect cadence the moment when V resolves into I. Yet, most of us are able to identify this cadence in the most varied contexts and musical styles, never mind whether it’s an out-of-tune Mexican brass band, a Heavy Metal band or the Berlin Philarmonic Orchestra. The Gamelan musicians from Bali, however, are endowed with such fine timbre categories that use verbal concepts to distinguish among the various styles of combining different metal instruments, timbre which to us appears extremely homogeneous (Tenzer 2000). What’s this assimetry of competences due to?

Our education and musical experience have leaded us to develop a wide, versatile repertoire of the categories, concepts, schemes or cognitive types of a perfect cadence. They enable us to interact cognitively with the tonal harmony. However, we do not appear to have such developed concepts for musical colour and density. We feel more at easy within the tonal music environment because cognitively, we have better elements to adapt to it. Structures do not emanate from the objective properties of sound objects but from cognitive schemata belonging to the musical competence of the subject.

From the perspective of classical cognitivism, structures used to be understood as mental representations of the objective properties of sound objects. Enactivism, however, ensures that our knowledge is not a representation of ready-made external elements but rather the result of negotiation processes between competence and environment. By means of cognitive schemes we surf over musical objects in order to explore them cognitively. They allow competence, together with the musical mind, to integrate in the environment. When this is so, not only structures emerge, but also all those elements usually identified as extramusical meanings. They belong to the same strata of cognition and of sign production. Among other reasons, this is due to the fact that in cognition, mind, body and environment articulate an undividing, continuous and compact oneneness.

How to study musical cognition and semiosis from this perspective? Which type of theoretical instruments has to be developed in order to reflect the complementarity between competence and environment? Which analytical tools will assist in the task of overcoming the reduction of musical semiosis to simple, binary correlations between musical structures (Signifiers) and extramusical Rubén López Cano 2004 14

From Pragmatics to Enactive Cognition Rubén López Cano content (Signifieds). One of the concepts I have been exploring lately refers to the cognitive type.

8. The musical cognitive types

Robert Hatten (1994) introduced his stylistic types notion, based on the dicotomy or continuous process of Peirce’s type-token.15 I have tried to combine this concept with a cognitive type one introduced by Umberto Eco in his book “Kant and the Platypuss: Essays on Language and Cognition” (1990).16

Cognitive musical types are enormous cognitive databases destined to help musical competence to categorise correctly (or effectively) musical objects.17 They also give instructions for the recognition and identification of stylistic tokens, for the way each musical object should be explored as well as instructions for establishing adequate strategies and operations for developing ulterior cognitive processes. The construction of cognitive types for objects in the human mind is closely related to the way in which we interact physically and cognitively with them.18 This includes body interaction with musical objects. We will be able of apply specific cognitive types in the exploration of certain musical object if we are able to detect in it the adequate affordances (López Cano 2002c and 2004b).19 What kind of elements involves cognitive types?

15 David Lidov has pointed out type-token relationship is not a dialectics between two members of an exclusive dichotomy but two phases of the same process (Lidov 1999). 16 This is one of the best theoretical works written by Eco where semiotics issues are discussed into the scope of recent Cognitive Sciences and Philosophy of the mind. Despite of this, it is almost impossible to find references to this book in recent musical semiotics writings even in those which introduces cognitive approaches to musicological inquiries. 17 For an introductory study of categorisation processes in Cognitive Sciences see Gardner (1985) and Margolis and Lawrence (1999). The most important compendium of experimental research on categorisation is in Lakoff (1987). Lakoff and Johnson (1999) develop a philosophical reflection derived from this research. Umberto Eco’s approach to the theme is through the scope of perceptual semiosis (Eco 1999). For the study on categorisation in music see Zbikowski (1995, 1997 y 2002) and De Bellis (1995). For one application to the study of musical genres see López Cano (2002c). 18 According to recent interactive cognitive theories such as the Autopoiesis theory (Maturana 1995-1996 and Maturana and Varela 1980), the enactivistic cognitive approach (Varela, Thomson and Rosh 1992), or Lakoff and Johnson's metaphor and embodied mind philosophy (1980 and 1999), 19 The body interaction with music can be real or virtual. Sometimes it is not possible to define clear borders of real body or its semiotisations. Indeed, in music, body-mind relationships do not Rubén López Cano 2004 15

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• Iconic relations: musical cognitive types can prescribe iconic relations between tokens, not according to a sufficient and necessary list of properties but in correspondence with prototype theory.20 They could be mental images, iconic translations of abstract phenomena, Marr’s 3D images (Marr 1985), general reproductions of morphological features (or salient traits) and also products of propositional rules and instructions (see below).

• Schemata: they contain cognitive schemata as Minsky’s frames and scripts (Minsky 1975 and 1985), flow charts, body action sequences, Johnson’s body image schemata (Johnson 1987), narrative sequences and networks of complex actions such as sensorimotor action in perceptual processes (McAngus Todd, O’Boyle and Lee 1999 and O’Regan 1990).

• Instructions: they include complex systems of propositions, orders and instructions to guide the competence to activate correct strategies or processes, to activate ready-made routines or to “invent” emergent strategies to explore rare tokens.

• Sinaesthesic information: they contain elements of cognitive types of other objects musical and not musical, and other multimedia sources of information such as thymic elements, smells, and tactile, kinetic and thermal qualities.

• Interactive possibilities: they prescribe singular affordances or "performances" (services) of the object: what does the object invite us to

stop in the metaphorical projection of inner embodied image schemata. Recent psychological research has shown that “beat induction process is not a passive process but, rather, a form of sensory -guided action involving all the sensory and motor components that that entails, i.e. major portions of the nervous system and the musculoskeletal system which it controls. Even when musculoskeletal system is not activated, i.e. there is no motor output, the higher supraspinal levels of the system are” (McAngus Todd, O’Boyle and Lee 1999: 5) (In control theory jargon the former is known as the plant and the latter as the controller). Of course, this process is mediated by schemata formed by musculoskeletal system activity. But the body actions involved in this case are much more than mere metaphorical projection: they are real body interventions in musical cognition. 20 For a comprehensive study of prototype theory see Lakoff (1987). Rubén López Cano 2004 16

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do with it? (Gibson 1986, Clarke forthcoming adn Windsor 1995 and 2004). Affordances include body action possibilities (López Cano 2002c) as well as other types of interaction with music, such as the building-up of certain emotions by means of music, kinetic effects, and so on.

• Musical topics: cognitive types are inserted in habitual plots or musical processes, in each genre or type of music. This insert is described in my own approximation to the concept of musical topic (López Cano 2002a and 2004b).

• Open categories: Cognitive types in music are fuzzy concepts (Kosko 1994) (truncated types in Eco’s terminology [Eco 1999]). This means they are not already formed in the musical mind and that they need to be embedded in the environment in order to work musically.

• Changing: They are also extremely sensitive to the cognitive enaction modes; their conformation is subject to the kind of musical activity effected. Hence, for the understanding of a certain work, cognitive types vary depending on whether we are dancing to it, listening in either an emotional or an intellectual way, or analysing it. In this sense, the intervention of the theoretician may render an appearance of nature other than that of a purely musical action.

I have developed and applied this concept elsewhere with extremely interesting results. In some Spanish music of the 17th Century, I have found peculiar tokens of the main cognitive types of the Italian lament style. A simple comparison among the structures of some prototypes of this genre and those of the Spanish repertoire would not have allowed ascertaining this relationship (López Cano 2003b and 2004b) (See Examples 3 and 4).

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b) c)

Examples 3. Some of the main stylistic cognitive types of lamento genre: a) Epanadiplosis in Il lamento d’Arianna by Claudio Monteverdi; b) Descendent tetrachord in Lachrime mie by Barba Strozzi and 3) Anticipatio notae in first bars of Il lamento d’Arianna by Claudio Monteverdi.

a) b)

Examples 4. Unusual tokens of the main Stylistic cognitive types of lamento genre in Ojos pues me desdeñáis by Spanish composer Jose Marín (c. 1618-1699): a) epanalepsis, suspiratio, catabasis, hypobole and pseudo-descendent tetrachord in bars 1-11 b) Anticipatio notae in bars 27-31.

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I am currently working on modelling the cognitive types of Timba, or Cuban hypersalsa, so explicit in the brass-instrumented solos as well as in the sexually enticing dancing movements. Both are musical tokens derived from sexual identity types which rule this genre (López Cano 2004c and 2004d).

9. To finish with...

I am all too aware that the reflections I’ve presented do nothing but fill with wonderment the task of the music semiotician. However, at a time when several approaches to musicology begin to take an interest in the issue of musical signification, it seems to me necessary to go on exploring new ways of investigation. We must take advantage of the interdisciplinary possibilities offered by cross-studies. Moreover, the number of specialists and researchers keen on our subject is constantly soaring, so we can afford to diversify our task within our environment. The challenge is to develop methods which may allow for an ongoing dialogue, so as to prevent stagnant monologues resulting from hyper-specialisation.

Saint-Rémy-de-Provence, October 2004

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