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Assessing the Islamic State in Libya

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Assessing the Islamic State in Libya O Europol Public Information Assessing the Islamic State in Libya The current situation in Libya and its implications for the terrorism threat in Europe AUTHOR Inga Kristina Trauthig This paper was presented at the 3rd conference of the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) Advisory Network on terrorism and propaganda, 9-10 April 2019, at Europol’s headquarters in The Hague. The views ex- pressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of Europol. O Europol Public Information Inga Kristina Trauthig Inga Kristina Trauthig is a Research Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and a PhD candidate at the War Studies De- partment both at King’s College London. Her research focusses on the changing Islamist landscape in post-Qaddafi Libya and its political impli- cations. Inga has commented for German and international media on the current dynamics in Libya and has had work published by the British Jour- nal for Middle Eastern Studies and International Sociology Reviews, among others. 2 O Europol Public Information Contents 1. IS Interests in Libya 5 a. The Bigger Picture 5 b. The Libyan Environment 6 2. Current Status of IS in Libya 7 3. Relevance of Findings 12 a. Libya’s Geographical Importance 12 b. Libya as a Transit Country with proximity to sub-Saharan Africa 12 c. Libya’s Insecure Future 16 4. Conclusion 16 References 17 3 O Europol Public Information The so-called Islamic State (IS) in Libya has regained the spot- light in 2019, directing international attention to the restless country. Having been driven out of its stronghold in the coastal area of Sirte in late 2016, IS has become a point of reference in attempts by groups within the country to discredit those they are fighting, a way of identifying the enemy. The critical ques- tion now is “What is IS doing?” Is it an organisation in the pro- cess of “regrouping” and regaining strength, potentially even controlling territory? Or is it an uncoordinated bundle of indi- viduals facing asymmetric threats that will always inhibit its lo- cal success? From this, additional questions arise: what are the implications for the terrorism threat in Europe, what with Libya being so close to European shores? These, among oth- ers, are the main questions this paper seeks to address. Eight years have passed since the start of the February Revolution that culminated in the bloody overthrow of the Qaddafi regime in October 2011. Muammar al-Qaddafi had ruled Libya, supported by various alliances, for 42 years. Since his overthrow, initi- ated by local forces and supported by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the country has experienced almost a decade of turmoil. In Libya today, structures are divided. These divisions are found markedly in the dis- puted political system but also pervade into the military formations and economic set- up of the country. Politically, the country is split into various institutions claiming legiti- macy and exercising control in different regions. This division is impactful, given that the country has a territorial size eleven times that of neighbouring Tunisia, with large parts constituting desert terrain, and a population of only about six million people, just little more than half that of Tunisia. As of April 2019, the Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli in western Libya and headed by Fayez al-Serraj is the only internationally recognised governing body. Despite low levels of legitimacy in the country, limited geographical reach, the lack of a loyal military and competing institutions like the parliament in the east of Libya (situated in Tobruk), the GNA has, up to this current period, been able to act as a Libyan government, particularly on the international stage. The main defector and competing power player that has emerged is the self-declared General Khalifa Haftar, who is linked to the parliament in Tobruk. He was appointed Head of the Libyan National Army (LNA) or, in the more precise Arabic translation, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.1 Over the course of early 2019 and culminating in advances towards Tripoli in early April 2019, Khalifa Haftar and the LNA have begun to “take control” of Libya’s southern region, breaching out from the group’s eastern nucleus that it captured after violent fighting in the cities of Benghazi and Derna. On 4 April 2019, the LNA forces took the town of Gharyan, 100 km south of Tripoli before advanc- ing to the city’s outskirts. Shortly after, the LNA declared operation “Flood of dignity”,2 which deployed thousands of men and heavy artillery to the West with the stated aim 1 al-quwwāt al-musallaḥa al-ʿarabiyya al-lībiyya. However, they promote themselves as Libyan National Army and are usually referred to by this name, especially by international commenta- tors, as it sounds more inclusive for not emphasising the allegedly Arab character. 2 “Libya: 'Our army is coming to you' - LNA forces advance on Tripoli”, LNA spokesperson al-Mis- mari, 6 April 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3_uArUx4po 4 O Europol Public Information of capturing the capital and “eradicating terrorism”. The GNA proclaimed the counter- offensive “Volcano of anger”, spearheaded by a group of loosely-aligned militias. Whilst to some extent caught by surprise, the military groups in Tripoli were relatively swift in arranging defensive mechanisms, and even fraternising following the counter- mobilisation of western Libyan forces. Previously, high hopes were pinned on the United Nations (UN)-brokered “National Conference”, scheduled for 14-16 April 2019, which was supposed to gather all key stakeholders and lay the groundwork for inclusive elections and a move towards a po- litical solution. However, there has always been doubt about the willingness to change the current system in light of the people that benefited from the status quo. With the LNA’s latest moves, the chances for a peaceful transition and compromises appear even lower. At the time of writing, the military offensive on Tripoli has turned into a stalemate with constant shifting skirmishes on the outskirts of Libya’s capital. In general, the economic development, like the political development, remains hos- tage to the military developments, most significantly the LNA advances. The persisting but frail operational status – which can be described as an elite bargain – between the two rival administrations in the eastern and western parts of Libya, combined with their economic interdependence, are in peril as a result of the latest power moves by Haftar. Such is the context for this paper. It assesses the strength of IS in Libya, with a sub- sidary focus on the implications for security in Europe. The study examines the activi- ties of IS in Libya on the ground between March 2018 through March 2019, as well as its European incursions. In pursuit of this objective, two sets of research questions will be raised. Firstly, why does IS have an interest in Libya and how does that manifest it- self? And secondly, what are the previous linkages between IS in Libya and the attacks in Europe, and what is IS’s future in Libya given the concurrent security implications for Europe? The paper will consider existing grievances in Libya, the security vacuum(s) and Libya’s geographical appeal. An understanding of the overall situation in Libya is relevant for this paper, as well as for the assessment of the security threats originating from Libya. IS does not operate in a vacuum but rather manoeuvres strategically, trying to capitalise on local opportunity structures. 1. IS Interests in Libya a. The Bigger Picture For IS the notion of enhancing its footprint via media output to signal its strength after territorial defeats is vitally important for its survival and continued appeal. Some ana- lysts argue that it is even more important than it is for other terrorist groups as “prop- aganda production and dissemination is at times considered to be even more im- portant than military jihad”.3 The imperative of conducting (small-scale) attacks and keeping media operations running is part of its well-known slogan of “Remaining and Expanding”.4 Therefore, even after the expulsion from Sirte, IS has had an interest in maintaining its presence in Libya by erecting checkpoints, committing abductions and disseminating propaganda referencing IS activity in Libya via its al-Naba’ newsletter, 3 Charlie Winter, Media Jihad: The Islamic State’s Doctrine for Information Warfare, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 13 February 2017, https://icsr.info/2017/02/13/icsr-re- port-media-jihad-islamic-states-doctrine-information-warfare 4 Mina al-Lami, Where is the Islamic State group still active around the world?, BBC Monitoring, 27 March 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-47691006 5 O Europol Public Information previously also Dabiq5 or propaganda videos in order to defy the image of alleged de- feat. b. The Libyan Environment In addition to IS’s interest in countering their territorial losses in Libya (following addi- tional losses in Iraq and Syria), the situation is fertile and attractive to IS’s organisa- tional strategy. First, different parts of Libya have faced a security vacuum that has fluctuated and been impacted by local developments, as well as foreign interests and interventions. While re-examining the rise of IS in the city of Sirte in 2015, one finds that the key alliances the group formed with some elements of the disgruntled tribes, along with its brutal tactics, were crucial to IS’s success. Sirte, which had originally counted among the least well-off in the country, had been one of Qaddafi’s favoured cities due to linkages with his own heritage and tribal background.
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