HERBERT P. BIX The North African-Middle East Uprisings from to

REVOLUTIONARY WAVE OF UPRISINGS has swept Over North A and the Middle East, and the and its allies are struggHng to contain it. To place current US actions in Arab countries across the region in their proper context, a historical perspective, with events hned up chronologically, is useful. The US remains the global hegemon: it frames global debate and pos- sesses an unrivaled military machine. Few Arab rulers can remain unaf- fected by its policies. But far from being the sort of hegemon that can dominate through latent force, it must continually fight costly air and ground wars. The inconclusive character of these wars, and the decaying character of its domestic society and economy, reveals a weakened, over- extended power. Because of America's decade-long, unending wars and occupations massive numbers of MusHm civilians have died, while the productive sector of the US economy has steadily contracted. What foHows is a brief sketch, starting with how the European powers shaped the Middle East and until the United States displaced them, then jumping to the present in order to survey the authoritarian regimes in the non-Western societies of Tunisia, , Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya as they confront the rage of anti-regime forces. My central aim is to show that contemporary American-European interventions are best understood not as attempts to protect endangered civihans, as official US rhetoric holds, but as an extension of the logic of empire—continuous with the past and with the ethos of imperiahsm. In each of these instances, control over oil and gas resources is a factor of supreme importance even when their proven reserves are small, as in Tunisia, or rapidly dwindHng, as in Yemen. , Although the Arab peoples' democracy movements this winter and spring may sweep away the current generation of dictators, their out- comes are far less clear than is the dangerous precedent that the US, , and Britain have once again set by resorting to war without first having exhausted all diplomatic alternatives—and without having been

329 THE MASSACHUSETTS REVIEW given "an objective analysis of tbe situation on tbe ground" from the UN Secretary-General's envoy to Libya.' Wbere tbe civil and armed resis- tance to dictatorsbips in various Arab states is headed at this stage cannot be known. But wbat motivates Arab government and anti-government forces and wbat motivates American and European interventionists are critical questions.^ Can tbis moment teacb us anytbing about democracy- deficiency witbin our own system of class rule and economic injustice?

FROM THE EARLY I88OS to tbe end of World War II, British and French colonial rulers, among others, held the Arab peoples of tbe Middle East in subjugation. The only partial exception was Iraq, which Britain granted nominal independence in 1932, then reinvaded in 1941.Weakened by tbe war against Germany, the European imperialists retreated under pressure from the United States, which stepped in to take their place. The creation of Israel as the last "colonial-settler state" (1948) and Israel's expulsion of the indigenous population of Palestine from tbeir land and homes framed one side of the European retreat; the failed Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in collaboration witb Israel, known as tbe Suez Canal crisis (1956), framed the other. European colonialists held on longest in several oil-rich Persian Gulf states and in North Africa. That region was of particular interest to the French, British, and Italians because of its many European settlers and close proximity to Europe. During World War II the US moved decisively to secure the oil fields of and transfer tbe desert kingdom from the British sphere of influence to the emerging hegemony of the US — and of privately owned American oil corporations. President Franklin D. Roosevelt en- tered into a collaboration with the reactionary King (and former desert bandit) Ibn Saud. It was a "lethal embrace" tbat bis successor. President Tru- man, deepened in 1947 by signing secret agreements witb Saud.''Tbere- after Eisenbower, Johnson, and Nixon steadily developed the relationship.'' During the early 1950s,Aramco—the Arabian-American Oil Company, a consortium of oil majors tbrougb wbicb tbe US government acted—tried to break strikes by Saudi oil workers, wbo were petitioning for improved working conditions as well as estabhshing prospectors' claims to oil in the British protectorates of the Persian Gulf.^ In Iran in 1953 the CIA, aided by Britain, overthrew the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mossadegh and installed Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Over the next twenty-six years the Shah ruled with US

330 Herbert P. Bix

support, making some economic reforms but, in the process, crushing domestic resistance and aU remnants of Iranian democracy. Iranian clerics branded him an American puppet. When, in 1979, the Iranian people overthrew the Shah and moved to estabUsh a clerical state, they took their revenge, depriving the US of its Persian Gulf poUceman. In short, the overaU framework for MidcUe East order that American policy planners constructed was essentiaUy a continuation of the Euro- pean model, based on support for absolute monarchs like the Shah of Iran, miUtary dictators, and Saudi Islamist extremism as embodied in the Saudi state with its official reUgion of intolerant, misogynistic Wahhabism.*^ Israel fit into this picture because Pentagon officials considered it a possible base from which to project US power throughout the region— a prospect that Saudi Arabia found unobjectionable. In 1967, Israel cap- tured the West Bank from , the Gaza Strip, Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, and 's Golan Heights, and soon began building iUegal settlements on Palestinian land that it implicitly resolved never to return. Washing- ton's commitment to Israel went hand in hand with its hostiUty to the secular nationalism of Egypt's Gamal Abdel-Nasser, an outspoken enemy of the House of Saud but also a critic of US poUcies. Around this time the US and Israel estabUshed their relationship in its present form, with the US giving it annuaUy biUions of doUars in military and economic aid—amounts that can never satisfy Israel's demands. Two years after the 1967 war. Colonel Muammar Qaddafi seized power in Libya; Hafez Assad instaUed himself in Syria, where his son Bashar al-Assad now rules; the Baathist party took power in Iraq; and in 1970 Nasser died. His successor, Anwar Sadat, moved quickly to implement policies of "peace with Israel and conversion of Egypt into an American client state."^ Israel at first rejected Sadat's 1972 peace offer but after the 1973 war, under pressure from Washington, made concessions. Thus, the Arab military defeats in 1967 brought a new generation of dictators to the fore while strengthening Israel's appetite for colonizing occupied Palestinian land, even though it officiaUy acknowledged the legitimacy of a future Palestinian state.

GLANCE AHEAD FOUR DECADES and more to the aging of these dicta- torial regimes. The spontaneous uprisings of the past three months have toppled some dictators and shaken the regimes of others. The revolts now stretch from North Africa and Egypt to Jordan (6.5 million resi-

331 THE MASSACHUSETTS REVIEW dents) and densely populated Syria (22 million residents), and from tbe beartland of tbe Arabian Peninsula to tbe Gulf states, wbere tbey tbreaten tbe older dictators ofYemen and Babrain and deepen Saudi King Abdul- lab's insecurity.Tbe protesters bave suffered tbousands of casualties bnt, by continuing to make progressive, democratic demands, tbey bave bad tbe positive effect of undermining America's imperial arcbitecture of Middle East control, which rests ultimately on military force. Tbe uprisings started in Tunisia, wbicb bas a modest liberal tradition dating back to tbe nineteentb century, wben its rulers were tbe first in Africa to abolisb slavery (1841) and later were tbe first to adopt a written constitution (1864).^ Tunisian bberabsm, bowever, existed alongside a mucb stronger state-police tradition. Tunisia gained its independence from France peacefully in 1956, and tbereafter its citizens endured two reformist dictatorsbips: tbat of Habib Bourguiba and tbe racketeer wbo replaced bim in 1987, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. During tbese decades, Tunisia registered steady economic growtb, wbile indigenous social, economic, and psycbological processes prepared tbe sou for tbe eventual overtbrow of dictatorial rule. Leading tbe way were educated students, lawyers belonging to tbe Tunisian Bar Associa- tion, and small progressive parties wbo bad continually protested Ben Ali's rule. Tben tbe grassroots activists of Tunisia's General Union of Labor joined in, followed at tbe very last minute by tbe federation's national leaders. Tbe local unionists witb tbeir radical economic demands made a buge difference.'' Ben Ali transmitted power tbrougb bis secret pobce and tbe national- ist party, tbe Constitutional Democratic Rally. But tbe resistance of tbe vanguard, wbo bad mastered new tecbnologies of communication, faued to ignite a mass cbain reaction untu December 2010, wben a poor street vendor, Mobamed Bouazizi, wbo bad been slapped in tbe face not by a policeman but by a policewoman, later immolated bimself to protest bis mistreatment by tbe government.'" As journalist Steve CoU noted, Bouazizi's self-sacrifice was tbe precipitating event; a few weeks after be died (Jan. 4, 2011) and sbortly after tbe army bad deserted Ben Ali, tbe dictator was on bis way to exile in Saudi Arabia. Galvanized by Ben Ali's departui-e and joined by middle-class profes- sionals, tbe unemployed, and Islamist Ennabda party, tbe young Tunisian revolutionaries continued tbeir peaceful public protests and sit-ins until tbey bad forced tbe elderly prime ministers of two interim governments (Mobamed Gbannoucbi and ) to resign. Tbeir "second

332 Herbert P. Bix revolution" appeared to secure promises tbat most of tbeir demands would be realized. In tbe offing is a new constitution tbat is to be ^vritten by a National Council to be elected in July; a promise bas been made to dis- solve tbe secret poHce; some press freedoms are being aHowed, and an Islamist Ennabda party, related to Egypt's MusHm Brotberbood, bas been legaHzed." But if tbe promises are not kept and problems of gross econom- ic inequality, bigb youtb unemployment, and exploitative labor contracts remain unaddressed, tbe can restart at any time. Tbe US lost good wiH in Tunisia by its many years of support for Ben Ali's regime, its relative suence in reaction to bis ouster, and tbe State De- partment's lack of entbusiasm for tbe very idea of a young Arab people acting from below to sbape tbeir own brand of democracy

FROM TUNISIA, tbe Arab democratic revolution spread to Egypt. Cairo's Tabrir Square demonstrations, wbicb began in late January 2011, were tben emulated across tbe entire region. Citizens in otber Arab countries wbere unmet social needs bad accumulated took to tbe streets. As in Tunisia, tbe protesters gatbered strengtb from a vast array of groups.'^ In Egypt tbese included:

• People who demonstrated solidarity with the second Palestinian uprising of 2000 and later opposed the US assault and occupation of Iraq; • Leaders and activists in Egypt's free (nongovernment sanctioned) labor movement; • Associations of urban youth movements; • Members of the middle class; • Leaders of civil society movements such as (Enough!) and the popular, liberal Mohamed ElBaradei, as well as representatives of the previously banned .

Tbe Muslim Brotberbood, tbe largest opposition group, bas evolved over many decades from a reactionary organization of Pan-Islamic fundamen- talists into an organization composed primarily of doctors, engineers, and otber professionals for wbom civil society concerns are paramount and religious ones appear secondary, tbougb wbetber tbey reaHy are is anotber matter. Brotberbood leaders have multiple tendencies; some of its young activists oppose tbe army's leadersbip, otbers support it. Many of tbese leading players barbored few illusions about tbe neutrality of tbe national army. PoHce and military repression in tbe name of stability

333 THE MASSACHUSETTS REVIEW energized rather than quieted them. They made universal demands, in secular language, calHng for poHtical rights, economic justice, and equaHty. They sought an end to torture and police repression, trials, and punish- ment for all who had committed crimes against the people, starting with Mubarak, and an entirely new constitution. Essentially, they sought insti- tutional reform and democratic forms of government within which they could pursue their lives in dignity." Now look closer at Egypt. Here, to save itself from the threat of de- mocracy, the army forced President —Sadat's successor who had ruled with unstinting US support for thirty years—to transfer power to the army leadership. The army leaders engaged the democratic movement in dialogue only at a distance. On , they held a ref- erendum on constitutional amendments where estabHshed political or- ganizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and remnants of Mubarak's National , revealed their strength. More Hberal, secular groups did poorly, and forty-one percent of eHgible voters abstained.''' The referendum results failed to reflect the sentiments of the vast ma- jority of democratic protesters and left Egypt with an imperial presiden- cy. What they revealed was the army's success thus far in controlling the pace and content of reform. Egypt, with more than 82 million people, is the largest Arab state and one of the most strategically important; it is also the cultural leader and former unifier of the Arab world. Moreover, Egypt is central to the tacit collaboration of all other Arab nations with Israel. Early elections and efforts to pass legislation stripping workers of their right to strike are signs that a second democratic revolution in Egypt has more hurdles to overcome than in Tunisia. To put it blundy, there are deep roots to the Egyptian system of eco- nomic exploitation, private plunder, and secret surveillance of dissidents operated by both Sadat and Mubarak. Although Egypt's miHtary rulers and privileged eHtes have made selective purges of a few millionaire oHgarchs associated with Mubarak's misrule, such as the steel magnate Ahmed Ezz, they have also been able to resist popular attempts to dismantle the social .basis of the dictatorship. The military commanders have not abcHcated as they should but instead merely promised to allow "an elected civiHan gov- ernment to ... build a free democratic state," whue at present ruHng by fiat.'^ This persistence of miHtary rule is the first structural obstacle that Egypt's oppressed people face as milHons protest nationwide and struggle to move their peaceful revolution forward. The miHtary—in firm control of the transition but without Mubarak—is not the solution.""

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Tbe second obstacle facing Egypt and, more generally, tbe democratic revolts sweeping Nortb Africa and the entire Middle East arises from the deceitful, ambiguous US response to tbem. Wherever the ideas and norms of the democratic wave spread—Yemen, Bahrain, Oman, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, and —the administration of President bas advocated "dialogue" but refrained from strongly and unequivocally supporting tbe popular will.''' Iran was tbe only exception. In all other countries, US pohcy planners aimed at help- ing the dictators to restore "stability" quickly while allowing Israel to use the Arab uprisings to accelerate its annexation of more Palestinian land and property—thus guaranteeing, as a result, more regional instability. In Egypt tbe US administration publicly acknowledged the aspira- tions to freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy while tacitly supporting very limited reforms that may eventually check the democratic process and shore up the military-dominated status quo. In Bahrain,Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, Obama merely requested tbe dictators to sbow restraint. Wben tbey ignored bim and unleasbed counterrevolutionary violence against tbeir own citizens, Obama continued to assist tbem. Only in ou- and gas-ricb Libya did tbe US, Britain, and France—eacb for its own domestic pohtical reasons—unleasb military force to oust a re- viled dictator Why did it seem perfectly proper for white, Christian, former colonialist powers not to sanction the "friendly, cooperative and useful" ty- rants in oil-rich Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen while these same powers were taking the extreme step of initiating war against the no longer usefiil Qaddafi—a dictator who threatened only his domestic enemies and had recently made huge concessions, including joining the US "," in order to get back in Western good graces? Tbis deserves comment.'*

BUT FIRST CONSIDER TWO of this year's other revolts around this stra- tegic, water-scarce,"chmatically challenged" region.'^ Bahrain is a tiny island kingdom with a population of less tban 1,000,000 nationals and 235,000 nonnationals. The ruling family had its tribal roots in Saudi Arabia. King Hamad al-Kbalifa and his family, wbom tbe British once cultivated, are Sunni and may be considered a colonial Saudi transplant.^"With the aid of imported Sunnis who serve in the military and police forces, the dynasty rules over an overwhelmingly Shi'ite majority population, against which it discriminates in employ- ment, housing, and government.

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Young Bahraini protesters, their numbers growing steadily over the past month, are calUng for freedom and reform. They want to end the KhaUfa monarchy, which has lost aU legitimacy, and estabUsh a repubUc. But Bahrain is a piUar of US miUtary control in the Gulf region. It pro- vides the US Fifth Fleet with a large hase from which to threaten Iran and control the flow of oil through the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Sea. Together with the other absolute monarchies in the region, Bahrain is also an important market for the US arms industry. In this particular oil-producing and refining state, with its vital regional banking industry, Saudi Arabia, the Obama administration, and the KhaUfa dynasty are one in wanting to suppress democratic "regime change" from below. Thus, when King Hamad bin Isa al-KhaUfa declared a state of emer- gency and refused to make any substantive concessions to the demonstra- tors, Obama was forced to deplore his actions publicly hut did not recaU the US ambassador to Manama or threaten . When the protesters' ranks continued to sweU into the hundreds of thousands, Obama tacitly agreed to Saudi Arabia's invasion of the island (March 14) with a thousand troops, in direct violation of the UN Charter and the basic democratic principle of self-determination. Since then the royal family of Bahrain has implemented a reign of terror, banned Shi'ite op- position parties, attacked Shi'ite hospitals, kiUed and arrested doctors en masse, and ordered the arrest of several hundred democracy protesters; unknown numbers have already been kiUed and tortured in an effort to stifle poUtical dissent.^' Consider next Yemen's poUtical crisis.Yemen is an impoverished, deep- ly reUgious society of over 22 milUon people, with high adult iUiteracy, low per capita GDP, and sharp internal divisions. Here strongman dicta- tor-for-Ufe President AU AbduUah Saleh has ruled for thirty-three years through a nationwide system of corruption and "direct payoffs to tribal leaders" who exercise political authority and also receive money from the Saudi government. Saleh has done virtuaUy nothing to advance the of the majority of Yemenis, though he has permitted an official opposition to exist. ^^ Now, after six of eighteen provinces broke away from his government, and many of his senior bureaucrats, diplomats, and highest-ranking mili- tary leaders abandoned him to side with the Shi'ite majority population, Saleh is struggUng to hold on to power.^^ The Shi'ite majority seeks his immediate ouster, the dissolution of his ruUng party, and the estabUshment of a republic that will respect human rights. Saleh's army and security

336 Herbert P. Bix pobce bave.already killed scores of protesters and wounded bundreds of otbers in Yemen's capital Sana'a and otber parts of tbe country. Nevertheless, at tbe end of Marcb, men, women, and cbildren in tbe bundreds of tbousands still "packed tbe streets of cities tbrougbout Yemen" demanding Saleb's departure and tbe dissolution of bis entire regime.^"* By mid-April tbe unofficial opposition, in wbicb women, university students, and prominent Islamists participate, felt confident enougb to issue an ultimatum for Saleb to leave office in two weeks, tbougb no consequences were specified." Meanwbile Saleb's US backed repression intensifies and tbe protests escalate, tbougb in tbe opinion of journabst Dexter Filkins, tbey remain relatively peaceful.^'' AFP reports, bowever, tbat Yemeni tribal factions, far from remaining peaceful, are figbting back against Saleb and bave killed nearly a score of bis soldiers and captured many more.^^ Wbat determines Obama's response to Saleb's crusbing of dissent in Yemen is Yemen's geopolitical utiHty and George W Busb's "global war on terror" policy. Saleb bas given CIA operatives a free band to conduct tbeir activities alongside US special counterinsurgency forces. Witb bis support, tbe US runs secret drone assassination operations inside Yemen. According to journalist Jeremy Scabill, American deatb squads, wbicb operate in scores of countries, maintain "a 'bit list' of [Yemeni citizens] targeted for kill or capture." Tbe list also includes Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-American Hving inYemen.^** On December 17,2009, a US cruise missile carrying cluster bombs, banned by international convention, killed from fifty-five to over sixty Yemenis, mosdy civilians, in tbe soutbern Yemeni village of al-Ma'laja. Since tben tbe Obama administration bas poured over a bundred million dollars in economic and military aid into Yemen to reinforce Saleb's repression of bis own people. To say tbat tbe US bas lost good will in Yemen and Babrain because of its diplomacy of double standards and active defense of violently repres- sive regimes would be a gross understatement. But in rieb, oü-and-gas-exporting Libya—witb a small population es- timated at 6.5 rmUion and tbe bigbest per capita GDP in Africa—tbe US response bas obviously been different. Before tbe popular insurrection, Qaddafi bad abandoned bis efforts to develop nuclear weapons and was serving tbe interests of tbe Western powers, especially tbe European ou companies wbo get most of tbeir oil from Libya. His regime was also ac- commodating Cbina's state ou firms,wbic b import a mucb smaller amount of Libyan crude oil, and granting tbem tbe rigbt to explore and develop

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Libyan ou fields and to work on scores of projects in the oil sector. These countries and corporations were grateful to Qaddafi for his cooperation.^' When initially peaceful, unarmed protesters demanded the ouster of their leader and his corrupt regime, Qaddafi and sons—Uke KhaUfa in Bahrain and Saleh in Yemen—made no concessions to them. Disorga- nized rebel miUtias then took up arms and gained control of Libya's eastern coastal cities, where the ou oudets are. (This is part of the region once known as , formerly a colony of , and site of the famous World War II duels between British forces and the German army under General Rommel.) The smaUer pro-Qaddafi forces retreated but soon re- grouped. Using weapons suppUed by French, British, Italian, and Russian arms dealers, they took the offensive.^° Anti-regime insurgents suffered thousands of casualties but managed to seize and hold several cities and towns in the east, including , the second-largest city and long a center of monarchist, anti-Qaddafi sentiment and recently of revolt. With Qaddafi's forces controUing the capital, TripoU, and slowly roUing back poorly armed, poorly led, untrained insurgents, the US and NATO leaders may have reasoned that neither a Libyan civil war of attrition nor aUowing Qaddafi to reconquer part of the country would serve their interests.'" Ruling out a diplomatic solution that would have left Qaddafi in power, they calculated that they could wage war by (a) lying to their citizens, telUng them other than what they intended or hoped to achieve—if they even knew themselves; (b) going through the UN Security Council and NATO, and (c) imposing upon Libya a cooperative — CIA and Pentagon-trained—leadership vetted by themselves. The "last minute," hastily organized, US-led miUtary intervention in the Libyan crisis took place after Obama had already secretly ordered CIA operatives to gather intelUgence and conduct operations inside Libya in support of the insurrectionary forces, and had decided on a justification for his action.^^ Obama went before the American people and told them that he had acted because Qaddafi threatened the inhabitants of Benghazi with an indiscriminate massacre, though he offered no concrete, specific evidence to support this charge.^^ In fact, Qaddafi's troops were targeting rebel positions rather than civiUans; and contrary to Obama's claim, the dictator never threatened a civilian massacre. He even offered amnesty and an escape route to Egypt to rebels who discarded their arms.^'' The charge made by ideologists in the Obama administration that Qaddafi contemplated a general massacre and even genocide is certainly unproven and quite Ukely untrue.

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For tbe past montb US and NATO air forces bave been maintaining "no-fly zones" over a buge country, twice tbe size of Egypt. To aid tbe Benghazi leaders and tbe insurgent volunteers, tbey are using naval fire and guided missiles tipped witb cancer-causing depleted uranium, and also dropping five-bundred-pound bombs and smaller cluster bombs on tbe loyalist forces. US planes, including low-flying AC-130 gunsbips tbat partially substitute for troops on tbe ground, flew more sorties tban all tbe otber Allies togetber. Into late April, after tbe US said it would play only a "support role," its warplanes were still flying sorties. In tbe process, tbe US and NATO are destroying Libya's dual-use (military and civilian) infrastructure tbat Qaddafi developed. Roads, air- fields, and ports tbat are part of Libya's nationalized oil-refining infra- structure, as well as private bomes and bospitals, bave suffered extensive damage. Inexorably, tbe war is leading to wbat few Libyans want: ever- greater degrees of outside intervention; growing civilian casualties on botb sides; refugees forced from tbeir bomes; scbools, universities, and bospitals bombed; and tbe implantation of a transitional client government to rule over tbe oü-ricb eastern provinces. NATO, largely funded by tbe US, France, and Britain but waging war only as an adjunct of US power, provides cover for tbis open-ended war. So too does tbe repeatedly violated UN Security Council Reso- lution 1973, wbicb "autborizes Member States ... to take all necessary measures... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under tbreat of attack . . . wbile excluding a foreign occupation force of any form in any part of Libyan territory." But tbe policy is regime cbange, crafted by bigbly conservative governments and pubbcly justified as a virtuous bumanitarian intervention. Little did Obama, Cameron, and Sarkozy tbink tbat tbeir pobcy of intervention migbt end disastrously—witb Qaddafi banging on, just as Saddam Hussein bung on in Iraq until an all-out American-Britisb war of aggression toppled bim and, in tbe pro- cess, destroyed Iraq.'^ To resume: wbat tbese successive Western responses to tbe massive break in different Arab autbority structures actually reveal is tbe pseu- do-"realism" and double standards of Western poHtical ebtes and tbeir spokespersons in tbe media. Just as in Yemen and Babrain, tbey sbow tbe strong powers' contempt for tbe self-determination of Arab peoples. In tbe Arabian Peninsula and nearby Gulf, wbere tbe Saudis exercise bege- mony, tbe US response did not involve direct mibtary intervention; in Libya it does.

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Since the tyrants in Bahrain and Yemen are just as bad if not worse tban Qaddafi, tbe difference hes not in Qaddafi's nature as a murderous, erratic dictator but in bis unrehabihty as a chent wiUing to do the bid- ding ofWasbington, London, or Paris. Qaddafi had already lost legitimacy abroad and been tbe target of multiple US assassination attempts for bis support of terrorists. More recently, his attempts to unite the whole Afri- can continent using a single new currency—the gold dinar—outside the dollar and euro zone, earned the ire of French president Nicholas Sarkozy, who in 2007 had suggested his own plan for a French-dominated union of states sharing a Mediterranean coastHne. Qaddafi, who understood the rationale bebind France's Mediterranean Union plan, countered, in effect, that Paris must regard the Africans as fools.Thus it was no surprise that the same Sarkozy who condemned Qaddafi, with his huge holdings of gold and his pan-African vision, as a danger to mankind's financial security, was also the frrst European leader to extend formal diplomatic recognition to the Benghazi rebels.^*" Clearly, Qaddafi's rogue nationalism is tbe reason wby Western leaders bave long demonized bim as a loose cannon.When the highly fluid pohti- cal situation in the Middle East gave the imperialist triumvirate a chance to get rid of a tyrant wbo has at times acted as a genuinely independent nationahst, ratber than a loyal proxy wuhng to sell cheap labor to help French firms compete with the Germans, they seized it.^^ Another difference has to do with Libya's geographical location. Lying between Tunisia and Egypt, where popular uprisings continue and out- comes remain unclear, Libya serves as a platform for projecting Western military power more deeply into tbe African continent. More particu- larly, to prevent revolutions from below, or to restrain tbem wben tbey bave already occurred and are making radical economic demands for a decent minimum wage, the Pentagon's "African Command" and NATO may have envisioned launching future interventions with Libya as a staging base. Tbe willingness of Britain's conservative Prime Minister David Cam- eron and France's Sarkozy, eacb for bis own reasons, to take tbe lead in waging aerial warfare against Libya, sbould not obscure tbe unwillingness of tbe world's most economically dynamic nations — Cbina, , Brazil, and —to support tbe war The BRIC nations, joined by , issued "a joint declaration against Western-led in Libya." In contrast to the US, growth in the BRIC nations is not military-driven.

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Most of the southern and central African governments have also shied away from abetting the Libyan civil war, ignited by Western intervention and deepening daily. Both sides in the Libyan fight have slaughtered a small, unknown number of the 2.5 million migrant workers brought in by Qaddafi from sub-Saharan Africa and Egypt. Racist sentiment does exist and was vented particularly against the workers and soldiers whom Qaddafi hired to work in the oil fields and to staff his armed forces. But just who is "African" on the African continent? Libya is both an African and an Arab state, one in which Islam is strong but coexists with other, older religious belief systems. The migrants, most of whom worked in Benghazi and other rebel-held areas, where their pay from the Libyan government's whoUy-owned Central Bank was cut off, fled by land, sea, and air to avoid being caught up in the chaos of civil war.''^ Other migrants have been stranded in and in the large, rebel- held port city of Misurata (population approximately 300,000), which is surrounded and under bombardment from government loyalists. But here too Qaddafi's forces, according to data released by , are "not deliberately massacring civilians but rather narrowly tar- geting the armed rebels who fight against his government."'" European responses to the Libyan rebeUion have ehcited strong do- mestic support for intervention from liberals, social-democrats, greens, and conservatives in Britain and France, though not Germany, which ab- stained from the vote on UN Resolution 1973. Germany, Hke , wants to put diplomacy first and to its credit will have nothing to do with irresponsible, American-led geopolitics in Africa, which aims to have the rebels prevail.'"'The long-term effect of the Libyan intervention may well be the breakup of NATO, which should have died with the . By contrast, the embattled, unpopular Sarkozy, soon to face an elec- tion, hoped to benefit politically by taking the lead on the Libya issue, which in France as in Italy is also an immigration issue. Although Sar- kozy talks about solidarity with Libyans, he has closed France's borders to young migrants fleeing Libya and Tunisia and taken steps to make France's Muslim minority second-class citizens. In Italy too the immi- gration issue is also marked by racist oppression against both Africans and white Europeans from the east. Immigration looms large and is a source of friction with both Germany and France. The latter country in particular disapproved of Prime Minister 's deal with Qaddafi that aüowed tens of thousands of migrants fleeing Libya to travel into the EU countries.

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In tbe US, wbat Htde pubHc debate tbere is bas centered on tbe essential lawlessness of tbe imperial presidency. Obama and bis inner circle, despite tbeir divisions, have committed tbe US to a tbird preventive, iHegitimate, unwinnable, and immoral war in order to cbange a foreign country's govern- ing process from tbe outside. Obama acted unilateraHy, witb tbe knowledge tbat be was in flagrant violation of tbe Constitution and tbe War Powers Act. In 2007, "be told tbe Boston Globe tbat 'the president does not have power under tbe Constitution to unilaterally autborize a miHtary attack in a situation tbat does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to tbe nation.""" But as an imperial president be knew be could act witbout any constitutional autbority or congressional autborization, or even any domestic debate, not to mention an exit strategy. Obama and tbe otber veto-bearing Security CouncH members also violated tbe UN Cbarter's requirement tbat aH diplomatic proposals for resolving tbe conflict be pursued before resorting to force. As constitutional scbolar and writer Glenn Greenwald bas noted, Obama's speecb on Libya to tbe American people (Marcb 28) invoked bis own beHef in tbe tribal myth of "American exceptionaHsm." Many Americans mistakenly beHeve tbeir country is God's gift to tbe world and tbat tbey are a freedom-loving people wbose elected leaders protect tbe oppressed and cbampion bumanity's common good. Caugbt in tbe grip of this ideology tbey aHow tbeir leaders to intervene in tbe domestic affairs of any sovereign nation in tbe world and to wage war for "bumanitarian purposes." Obama, propagating tbis reHgion of American exceptionaHsm, can be counted on to take tbe side of empire and expedi- ency over any ideal tbat be pubHcly professes, including tbe ideal of tbe general pubHc welfare. Tbus Obama's rbetoric is no more than false pretense, an expression of bis own inberent deceitfulness. Before going to war, bis administration bad already reimposed economic sanctions on Libya, frozen its assets in the US, and referred Qaddafi's case to tbe International Criminal Court, tbereby closing off tbe pobtical-exile option tbat bad been aHowed Tunisia's dictator. Prior to attacking Libya on tbe ground of preventing a "bloodbatb," Obama also wanted to distinguisb bimself from Busb, wbo bad initiaHy ignored tbe UN wben be invaded Iraq.That meant seeking a UN resolution. In order to secure one be needed fuH sup- port, and yet only balf of tbe League's twenty-two member states would go along. Tbat Egypt, Tunisia, and Lebanon, in wbicb HizbuHab is part of tbe government, refused to sanction tbe intervention suggests bow complicated tbe situation was from tbe onset."*^

342 Herbert P. Bix

The solution was to cut a deal with the House of Saud, which con- troUed the whose members also belonged to the Arab League. According to journalist Pepe Escobar, the supposition made by some diplomats at the UN is that the administration, acting through Secretary of State Clinton, agreed to the Saudi invasion of Bah- rain in order to crush its democracy movement "in exchange for a 'yes' vote by the Arab League for a no-fly zone over Libya—the main ratio- nale that led the Security Council to pass Resolution 1973.'"'^ This cynical move, coming three days after Saudi troops and tanks had entered Bahrain, may have given Obama the diplomatic cover he needed. The Obama administration is presently forging a "holy aUiance" of old Libyan monarchists, former jihadists from the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which had once fought Qaddafi, Libyan rebels from the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (originaUy based in ), military of- ficers trained in the US, various Libyan exiles who have established a Transitional National Council with the aim of reshaping Libya's nation- aUzed oil sector, and the CIA-connected Colonel KhaUfa Hifter.'*'* These dubious people, rather than the popular democratic " Youth movement," which led the young volunteers in their revolt in Benghazi, are being groomed to take control in a partitioned Libya. As in Iraq, the US aim is regime change, and the risk of failure is just as great, because those whom Washington and its aUies support are coUaborators with im- periaUsm, lacking the mantle of nationaUsts. Meanwhile, the Libyan military and poUtical situation has stalemated. Forces loyal to the Libyan government fight on, making gains in some places, retreating in others.The longer this situation continues the more people are forced to take sides. Had Qaddafi in the past not used his oil wealth to create programs of economic and social welfare, and if those welfare programs had not been ongoing, sustaining the lives of many Libyan citizens, it is unlikely his forces would have remained loyal or that his regime would be supported hy Libyans in many towns and vil- lages.'*' The US and NATO are splitting Libya in two, because they, not to mention the rebels, have ruled out, for the time being, a political solu- tion that leaves Qaddafi in place; the logic of the situation is driving the triumvirate to put more forces on the ground, despite the explicit text of Security Councu Resolution 1973 and Obama's worthless promises.''^ Taken together, the peaceful democratic protests, the armed insurrec- tions facilitated by ceU phones and sateUite images, and the barbaric

343 THE MASSACHUSETTS REVIEW

American-European response to tbe Libyan revolt connote a bistoric event comparable to tbe long, drawn-out ending of tbe Cold War. Tbe ongoing protests bave estabHsbed powerful new norms and ideas of civic freedom tbat deeply frigbten dictators and monarcbs because tbey make ' tbeir poHce-state tactics of control unworkable. At tbe same time, tbe protests and tbe new norms that are tbe defining cbaracteristics of tbe post-Cold War era furtber weaken tbe entire structure of American domination of Nortb Africa and tbe Middle East. Tbey also reveal NATO's irresponsible decision-making and its weakness as a US-crafted instrument originaHy designed for tbe control of Europe but now ex- panded to serve as an adjunct of American power in tbe waging of iHegal global wars. FinaHy, wby bave tbe Arab revolutions and tbe Western/Saudi-backed counterrevolutions occurred at tbis time and not earHer? Several general factors can be cited. In tbe Arab world generational cbange, rising educational levels, capabilities, and expectations, and bigb youtb unemployment are among tbe most important. Tbe arrival of tbe era of sateHite television and digital tecbnology also play a role. In tbe West, tbe timing bas mucb to do witb tbe imperiaHst powers' fear of losing control, manifested in several ways, starting witb US cHstrust "in tbe dynamics of self-determination.'"'^ From tbe moment tbe demo- cratic revolts erupted, tbe US bas never stopped intervening bebind tbe scenes. Counterrevolutionary movements can intensify in periods of global economic depression. Fear tbat rising oH prices and bigh unem- ployment are slowing growtb in aH but tbe financial sector makes tbe imperialist powers give greater consideration to tbe issue of control over oil resources. Tbis atmospbere also enables big corporations to step up tbe class warfare tbat tbey never stop waging against workers, especiaHy in tbe affluent countries where right-leaning governments pursing anti-people policies presently bold power, sucb as tbe US, Britain, and France. Yet as protests by workers, unionists, and people of aH ages and income levels in tbe US and Europe sbow, tbe democratic spirit comes alive wbenever and wberever people publicly assert tbeir sovereign rigbts. We can indeed learn mucb about ourselves and our leaders from tbe Nortb African and Middle East revolts. Perbaps tbe day wiH come when Ameri- cans too will overcome fear and rise up against the empire.

April 20,2010

344 Herbert P. Bix NOTES ' Mahmood Mamdani, "Libya after the NATO invasion: There can be no quick fix for a Libya caught between a loose-cannon despot and an opportunistic Western intervention," Aljazeera.Net posted April 9, 2011. ^ Gregory White, "It's not because they're Arab," published Feb. 10, 2011, on openDemocracy.net ' Said K. Aburish, The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud (St. Martins Press, 1996), p. 156. •* Michael Klare, Blood and Oil.The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Petroleum Dependency (Metropolitan Books, 2004), pp. 26-55; Alfred E. Eckes, Jr. and Thomas W ZeUer, Globalization and the American Century (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), pp. 114-5. ' Martin Gilbert, 'Never Despair'Winston S. Churchill Í 945-1965 (William Heine- mann. Ltd, 1988), p. 986; Aljuíísh, p. 290. *• Gilbert Achcar; Tlie Arabs and the Holocaust (Metropolitan Books, 2010), pp. 106-7. ' Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians (South End Press, 1983), pp. 64-65. ** "Tunisia—Ghannouchi takeover'unconstitutional'," posted at MENAFN.Com. ^ Yasmine Ryan, "Tunisian revolution yet to solve inequality," posted April 11, 2011, at Aljazeera.Net. '" Steve CoU,"Letter fromTunis:The Casbah —Tunisia's Second Revo- lution," The New Yorker, pp. 34-40; Asa Shabine and Caroline Alexander, "Tunisia's Mebazaa Calls for Election of Council to Write New Constitution," posted March 3,2011. " Jason Ditz, "Tunisia Ends Ban on Islamist Party," posted March 1, 2011, at news.antiwar.com/; Juan Cole,"Its Official: Tunisia Now Freer than the US," posted March 3, 2011, at www.juancole.com '^ Gilbert Achcar interviewed by Farooq Sulehira, Socialist Project, Bulletin No. 459, Feb. 7,2011. " The democracy issue that Egyptian citizens courageously raised under condi- tions of extreme political repression invigorated hope for democratic reform in af- fluent Western countries—where governments, acting in the interests of powerful corporations, pursue egregious domestic and foreign policies. Thus protests in the public squares of Arab cities garnered expressions of sympathy in faraway Madison, Wisconsin, and other American cities. For here too, unaccountable, corrupt govern- ment and extreme economic inequality are the norm, and ruling elites make parts of the middle class and the poor especially pay for their constant abuses of power and office. Although this connection with the so-called Arab street is more contextual than direct, the perception of profound injustice is common to both. ''' ABC News, "Egypt referendum backs constitutional reform," March 21,2011 ; Neil MacFarquhar, "Egyptian Voters Approve Constitutional Changes," New York Times, Much 20,2011. '^ Chris McGreal,"Army and protesters disagree over Egypt's path to democracy," posted Feb. 12, 2011, at guardian.co.uk. '^ Because US taxpayers annually provide $1.3 billion in military aid to Egypt,

345 THE MASSACHUSETTS REVIEW second only to Israel, the top Egyptian generals leading the transition to some form of alleged procedural democracy—such as seventy-five-year-old Defense Minister Field Marshall , who heads the Higher Military Council—remain in close contact with the Pentagon and members of Congress, as well as with powerful lobbyists who profit from doing business with their regime. They also enjoy the support of pro-Zionists in all branches of the US government as well as right-wing pundits who back Obama's approach to shaping the Egyptian movement so that it remains responsive to US priorities. " David Bromwich,"The Embarrassments of Empire:Washington Wonders What to Say about Arab Freedom," posted at original.antiwar.com. '" Glenn Greenwald,"The manipulative pro-war argument in Libya," posted March 22, 2011, at Salon.com; Mahmood Mamdani, "Libya after the NATO invasion: There can be no quick fix for a Libya caught between a loose-cannon despot and an opportunistic Western intervention," Aljazeera.Net, posted April 9, 2011. '^ Gregory White, "It's not because they're Arab," published Feb. 10, 2011, on openDemocracy. ^" Shirin Sadeghi,"The Fabrication of Bahrain's Shiite-Sunni Divide," Huffiiigton Post, March 16,2011. ^' Joby Warrick and Michael Birnbaum, "As Bahrain stifles protest movement, US's muted objections draw criticism," Washington Poii, April 15, 2011. ^^ Dexter Filkins, "Letter From Yemen: After the Uprising—Can protesters find a path between dictatorship and anarchy?" The NewYorker (April 11, 2001), pp. 42, 44. ^^ Laura Kasinofand Robert F Worth, "Blast at Factory Follows Yemeni Forces' Pullout," New York Times, March 28, 2011. ^^ Ahmed Al-Haj, "Huge Yemeni crowds press on for president's ouster," posted March 30, 2011, at thestate.com. ^^ Jason Ditz, "Yemen Ultimatum: Opposition Gives Saleh Two Weeks to Leave Office," posted April 14,2011,at antiwar.com. ^'^ DexterFUkins,p. 51. ^' News.antiwar.com. ^^ Jeremy Scahil,"Shhhhh! JSOC is Hiring Interrogators and Covert Operatives for 'Special Access Programs,'" TIte Nation (August 25, 2010). ^' " in Africa: The Real Story," March 23, 2011, posted at www.chinaaf- ricarealstory.com; Gilbert Achcar, "Libya: a legitimate and necessary debate from an anti-imperialist perspective," posted March 25, 2011 at ZNet. Achcar's defense of military intervention is surprisingly error-laden and unconvincing. '" See Defense Industry Daily posted at www.defenseindustrydaily.com and Des Carney for ISN Security Watch, "Arming the Maghreb," posted Nov. 17, 2009 at www.isn.ethz.ch. ^' MERIP Editors, "Of Principle and Peril," posted March 25, 2011 at ZNet. •"^ Jason Ditz, "CIA Ground Forces operating in Libya for'Several Weeks,'" posted at news.antiwar.com •'^ Steve Chapman,"Obama's War of Choice: Did the president mislead the Ameri- can people about Libya?" posted April 4, 2011, at reason.com ^^ Alan J. Kuperman, "False pretense for war in Libya?" posted April 14, 2011, at boston.com. ^' Patrick Cockburn, "Libya's parallels with Iraq under Saddam are truly omi-

346 Herbert P. Bix nous," posted Aprü 13, 2011, at Independent.co.uk. •"' EUen Brown,"Libya all about oil, or central banking?" AsiaTimes online post- ed April 14,2011,at www.atimes.com;Alex Lantier and David North,"LibyanWar: The deepening inter-imperialist conflicts," posted April 16,2011 at Opinion Maker. '' Alex Lantier and David North, "Libyan War: The deepening inter-imperiaHst conflicts," Ibid, pp.3—4. ^" John Heilprin, Karin Laub, "Migrant Workers flee Libya, some robbed on way out," AP, March 5,2011. ^'' Kuperman, "False pretense for war in Libya?" posted April 14,2011, at boston, com. •'" Richard Falk, "Rethinking Germany," posted April 16, 2011, at ZNet. '" Stephen M.Walt,"More to Read About Libya," posted April 14,2011, at Foreign PoHcy.com. *^ On Lebanon's support for the Libyan rebels, see Stephen Shalom, "Nasrallah on Libya," posted April 10, 2011, at ZNet. '*•' Pepe Escobar, "Exposed: The US-Saudi Libya Deal," Asia Times, April 2, 2011, posted at www.atimes.com. '*'' Peter Dale Scott, "Who are the Libyan Freedom Fighters and Their Patrons?" March 26, 2011, posted atjapanfocus.org. "•^ James Petras and Robin E. Abaya,"The Euro-U.S.War on Libya: Official Lies and Misconceptions of Critics," March 2011, posted at www.petras.lahaine.org. '"' Spencer Ackerman, "NATO Chief Opens The Door to Libya Ground Troops," March 29, 2011, posted at www.wired.com. '" Richard Falk, "Gaddafi, Moral Interventionism, Libya, and the Arab Revolu- tionary Moment," posted March 21, 2011 at ZNet.

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