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Home , First Libyan Civil War, Mohamed Bouazizi, Muammar Gaddafi

30 Med.2011 Keys few careful observers missed the increasing frustra- increasing the missed observers careful few many,to surprise a was revolution ’s Although come the hallmark of regional “façade democracies.” be- had that repression political of and pauperisation combination a in rooted was anger ordinary Egyptians’ 1977, of Uprising” January “First the ing tations. Much like in the Tunisian protests, and echo- expec- optimistic most anyone’s beyond successful be to out turned which – (MB) Brotherhood Muslim the by spurned and parties, traditional by ignored regime, the by opposed – January 25 on onstration bour and civil society organisations called for a dem- Egypt’s “January Revolution.” There, independent la- was which of successful most far thus and known but a string of uprisings across the region, the best- revolution, Tunisian the only not sparked 2010 ber Decem- 17 on self-immolation Bouazizi’s Mohamed ranean neighbourhoodasawhole. Mediter- the and region Arab the on impact its and Revolution” “Egyptian the of significance the state over- to impossible is it – polity the within cial”role “spe- a retain will army the whether or implemented be will system democratic fully a whether – future country’s the regarding uncertainties Despite ing. upris- popular a by end an to brought was Mubarak quake, as the almost 30-year rule of President Hosni earth- political veritable a by shaken was system cal politi- Egyptian the 2011, of months first the During Macquarie University, Sydney International Relations Department ofModernHistory Lecturer Gennaro Gervasio University of Aberdeen Department ofPolitics andInternationalRelations Lecturer A Revolution a of Consequences and Causes Would-be Egypt’sJanuaryUprising:Second The NewEraoftheArabWorld ndrea T eti , Politics and im priual te M’ – n h hat of health the in- in macroeconomic certain while economy: – Egypt’s IMF’s the particularly – mism opti- Western belied trends economic Long-term course, thesuccessofTunisian revolutionitself. of and, spikes, price food (global) corruption, pose ex- to wanting for Said Khaled of and forces’torture security state (tawreeth), Presidency “ barak’s attempt at having his son Gamal “inherit” the 2005 the Mu- primarily since issues, Spring,”trigger of series a and repression political ing of increas- façade of reality a masking institutions the democratic class, middle the of pauperisation impoverishment of poorer sectors of society and the the towards trends ongoing factors: of kinds three nificance of Egypt’s revolution can already be drawn. herald, some important lessons on the roots and sig- uprisings these changes enduring what clear from Others hope to emulate their success. While it is far gains. their consolidate to struggling now are Egypt tinian Occupied Territories. Protesters in and Pales- the and Arabia Saudi , , rocco, in Mo- protests significant mention to not latterly – show and Bahrain, , , in volts re- subsequent as underestimated, be not should impact regional potential revolution’s Egyptian The ouster. Mubarak’s in resulted factionalism regime and pressure popular of combination a and on, ing rely- up ended had regime the fear the outweighed change for desire and frustration Egyptians’ 28th, 25 January, and even more significantly on Friday the 2006 that were the result of this marginalisation. On increased civil society and trade union activism since the or decade past the over people ordinary of tion The causes The and Police R oots oftheUprising:EconomicStagnation of the uprising lay in a combination of combination a in lay uprising the of R epression selves sceptical about the degree to which such ac- Although some of these groups’ leaders were them- labour. and society civil straddled which Rights, Social and ic Law Econom- for Organisation Egyptian the Mubarak and Centre Hisham the Services, Worker and Union Trade for Centre the like groups of made be should mention Particular popularity. and activism in increased – etc. Rights, Human for Organisation Egyptian the Rights, Personal for Initiative Egyptian – the groups rights human and a of important range kum ciety groups, such as as such groups, ciety so- civil Moreover, mobilising. and organising with experience valuable provided also but popularity, unions’ these boosted only not strikes These bined. com- years four were previous the there in than 2010, strikes In more on. 2006 from strikes tive) effec- (increasingly of number increasing an ised organ- unions trade independent illegal technically In particular, activism. in political increase a marked saw society Egyptian of sectors certain parallel, In proved irksome as well, attemptsat “succession” as successor. Amongst thearmy attempt toanointhissonGamal irritated by Mubarak’s blatant of societywere increasingly Both workers andwidersectors ated ordinaryEgyptians. exasper- further 2010 over – riots” “bread sparked already had which – flour as such staples on dies subsi- cut to pressure with combined prices food in of wage low) abysmally (already the since particularly day, per $2 under or on live who tians they were of little benefit to the nearly 40% of Egyp- Certainly, resentment. popular considerable caused whom of enrichment the elites, business connected in- helped GDP,crease narrow,favoured clearly they politically have may policies privatisation While bells. sounded have to ought – pauperisation unemployment, a population bulge, and middle class youth increased particularly – others deficit), ac- count current the in decrease and GDP in increase steady a showing (e.g. positive very were dicators (We See You), the April 6th Youth Movement Movement Youth 6th April the You), See (We LE400 ($68) was never enforced. The rise The enforced. never was ($68) LE400 Kifaya! Kifaya! (Enough!), (Enough!),

minimum monthly minimum Shayfeen- regime corruption precisely because he was an an was citizen. he “ordinary” because precisely of corruption symbol regime powerful a became Said but on June, 25 El-Baradei Muhammad by attended also was which of largest the Alexandria, pro- native his in mass tests evi- organised had groups he Opposition which of dence. corruption police of case a expose to seeking merely rather but activist, cal politi- a not was Said because but brutality, sheer its for just not an outcry, provoked on 6 June andria Khaled forces. in Alex- security assassination his is exemplary: case the Said’s by power of routine abuse in increase the was issue trigger Another not extendtoMubarak’sson. did loyalties personal irksome; “succession”proved at attempts well, as army the Amongst successor. as Gamal son his anoint to attempt blatant barak’s wider and workers both Mu- by irritated increasingly were society of sectors that clear was it ment, move- political broader a into translate could tivism provide the regime with an excuse to crack down on to expected widely were themselves elections The power. to since came ever Mubarak since ever elections particularly, and, Nasser of functions primary the of one been has that legitimacy democratic of leaf the fig of regime the depriving in effective very have been could boycott a Such Brotherhood. Muslim the major within “reformists” the including every group, political by abandoned then but backed first was he December, early and November of end the for planned elections a parliamentary the been of have boycott could what proposed he when that was credibility of loss this of effect side A Anger.” of “Friday or January, 28 of eve the on began, tests pro- after days three returning only uprising, uary from away Jan- the of beginning the frequently missed he Indeed, Egypt. being by friends few won El-Baradei family, his and him smear to regime the by enough feared and 2011. many, by for embraced Initially expected elections presidential the in – candidacy Mubarak a against ning run- to publicly committed effectively and Egypt to return to Energy decided Atomic El-Baradei Muhammad Agency International the as of ferment head political former considerable saw February Elections T he “El- B aradei Effect” and the Parliamentary père père or or fils –

31 Med.2011 Keys 32 Med.2011 Keys fecting all major cities. The government uses , mercenaries militias, uses af- government The forces cities. loyalist major and all rebels fecting between demands, conflict political armed and an to social leads various in out with breaks movement, other revolt The in popular Libya. intensify Bahrain), protest Syria, to (, calls countries and mobilization social While earlier. days several president vice the to powers his delegated having despite this and protesters, of fury the roused having after February, 11 on down steps Mubarak Hosni now, until years 30 for Egypt of president The strikes. and sit-ins several after February 24 on decree presidential by lifted is guerrillas Islamist against fight to 1993 in imposed gency, emer- of state The police. riot brave people 2,000 Some regime.” the of is the fall want a power “the people murderer” and “the democratic,” and free “Algeria of Democracy slogans the and to demonstrations Change for calls for (CNCD) Coordination National the , In suspended. are (RCD), Rally Democratic Constitutional the party, ruling former the of activities the Tunisia and in process transition the launches government interim The – 2011 February control. government beyond tool mobilization social effective an be to other proving are in networks Social multiply countries. Arab protests and rapidly mounts tension the Egypt, In the revolution”. the of “guarantor as meantime, acts army Tunisian the In posts. key the retains administration outgoing the which in but heads, opposition three of entry the by ment”marked govern- unity “national a forms and presidency interim the over takes Ghannouchi Mohamed Minister Prime power. unshared of years 23 after movement protest the of pressure the under country Ali the Ben leaves January, 15 on goal: first its attains Revolution Jasmine The – 2011 January forces. security with clashes to rise giving unemployment, and living of cost high the against protest of waves of spread the by marked thus is the in December of month The Egypt. and Tunisia in revolts trigger elections parliamentary of results the and Bouzid, Sidi from peddler vegetable and fruit Tunisian young a Bouazizi, Mohamed of self-immolation The D East. Middle the and North of all the countries of almost the stability are affecting tension religious inter- and minorities against discrimination social unemployment, basic services, providing in inefficiency and corruption Governmental income. disposable in fall the and crisis food in 2007-2008 the rise following prices the by damaged conditions, living improved as such mands, de- other are there freedom, greater and reform political for demands to In the the addition region. shaking protests and growing the multiple Arab as such events, many many by demonstrated as in climax, a to came countries society of sectors large by felt unease profound The - January ece mber 2010 – – 2010 mber N ove mber 2010 – – 2010 mber T he he T he he D eto R R evo evo nators lution lution lution lution B ack T riu T ground Events ground riu mphs in in mphs CH mphs in Egypt in mphs AN GES I GES T uni N sia

T HE HE ARA B W OR L D March 2011 – In Libya, Libya, In – 2011 March demonstrators. repress the to committees revolutionary its and Nigeria and from cial reforms. cial so- and political “radical” and law” of in “rule demand Rabat, in protesters which Parliament the of front in events March democracy 6 the strengthen following to order in Constitution the of Revision the for Committee Advisory an up sets VI Mohammed King Morocco, In Mauritania). and Algeria (Syria, unrest social repress countries Other well. as of participation the with States, United the Kingdom and United the , by led countries of a by Libya in undertaken are operations military authorization, UN the with ance accord- In country. the over zone a no-fly of green establishment the for light the giving 1973, Resolution UN adopts Council Security the March, 17 On one. by one strongholds rebel the taking around, tion situa- the turn to manage al-Gaddafi Muammar to loyal troops Libyan Egypt, and in Tunisia advance processes transition difficult the While leave office in case of defeat. of case in office leave would father his that indicating months, three within supervision tional interna- under elections free holding proposes Gaddafi, sons, Gaddafi’s of one Al-Islam Saif fighting, heavy endure to continues Libya As its Presents – 2011 June Morocco political all and prisoners. Brotherhood Muslim the of members for May, 31 including on amnesty general a although declares guns, al-Assad Bashar machine President and the tanks of sends army centre the the in where country especially continues, repression the Syria, In events. of beginning the since killed been have people 10,000 over that estimated is It operations. al-Arab Saif son, his NATOin against youngest strikes air grandchildren his of three and Gaddafi, Gaddafi’s Muammar leader Libyan of death the and back pushed being forces loyalist by marked is Spring Stalemate a at War Civil Libyan – 2011 May time. this at verified be not can arrests and injuries deaths, in toll the Watch, Rights Human NGO the to According party. ruling the of members 230 over of resignation the to leading demonstrators, and residents on fire open to hesitate and not do and tanks vehicles, by armoured backed protest, the of point the focal Deraa, entered of city particularly rebel forces Security orders. government under by the forces armed repression violent despite to tends all cities, major ex- mid-March in began that movement protest popular the Syria, In uprisings. February and January the during demonstrators against violence of use the into investigation an of part as April 13 on days 15 for detained are Gamal and Alaa sons two his and Mubarak Hosni President Egyptian Former A : : pri A

l 2011 – Syrian Protest Spreading Protest Syrian – 2011 l BR IEF CH RON O L O R GY evo lution lution D T raf urn t Constitutional t Constitutional s into Civil War Civil into s (continue) R efo rm extent thatwas evennecessary. the to – hypocrisy regime’s the of Egyptians nary ordi- reminded certainly elections’result the farcical two weeks before the start of the , they did not quite provide a breaking point, less than of fear growing the and tions elec- presidential 2011 the on was attention Most the undecided. guard”and “old “Gamalites,”the between split way three- a then by was what emphasising stituency, con- same the in – four to up sometimes – dates In the 2010 elections, the NDP often ran two candi- “independents.” as elected was party parliamentary NDP the half roughly 2005, In ranks. party rejoin to NDP incumbents ran and won as independents, only to “businessmen”his and Gamal sidelined when allies, opposed guard” “old the marginalise to tempt at- first the during 2005 in clear became This pline. ture eventually made it difficult to impose party disci- its pliability to , but precisely this fea- buying opposition,” “official the to attractive proved weak- fundamental NDP the patronage, access to tool key a as nesses: regime’s the of one revealed tions in favour of their opponents. Thus, the elections elec- rigged had party the that complained didates surreal producing opposition, can- NDP which in constituencies certain in scenes the of – complicit members not if – complacent of favour in tions elec- rig to attempted NDP the round, second the even more grotesque than the sheer majority: during was outside result The it. within one no certainly and one Egypt, no fooled expected” wasn’t it cause be- none, won Brotherhood the while seats, of jority ma- the won NDP the that people] “it [to shock a was that claim Nazif’s Ahmed Minister ex-Prime as such statements Brazen (NDP). Party Democratic farcically a National ruling Mubarak’s for (93.1%) majority in large resulted they event, the In MB. the for embezzlement. for euros million 45 of fines and prison in years 35 to absentia in tenced sen- are wife his and Ali Ben President Tunisian ousted June, 21 On reigns. “chaos” as long as reforms any out ruling while dialogue” “national for calls groups, armed and forces security Syrian between violence and tension of context a in turn, in al-Assad, Bashar July. 1 on referendum a to the submitted be will for reform draft The parties. political powers and minister prime increased establishes which reform, of constitutional outcome the announces VI Mohammed Morocco, in June 17 On CH AN GES I GES bt while but tawreeth, N

T HE HE ARA B W OR L D : : A

BR this would translate into an uprising – much less a less much – uprising an into translate would this that sense clear no but streets, the in forces curity se- of presence increased an and Egypt, in tension emphatically opposedtheprotests. – MB the and Azhar, the Copts, the – elites gious revolution the of outset the at effective that enough was manipulation such Indeed, society. divide – and therefore more easily control – Egyptian to strategy conscious a of part as flourish to groups through such actions directly or indirectly by allowing extremist Salafi either tensions, sectarian bating exacer- was regime the that suspected: already ers observ- most been what corroborate to have seem that found documents revolution, the of termath By early T stroying all pigs, a crucial source of income for for income of source Coptic crucial a pigs, de- all by stroying flu avian “combat” to action unwarranted nothing to allay such fears when, for example, it took did state The and considerably. tensions the atmosphere worsened new this broke bombing andria Alex- The usual. as extremists” “Muslim than rather situation, their for responsible started regime activists the holding Coptic some elections the fore be- just but year, the throughout in- steadily been creasing had tensions Sectarian 97. injuring and 24 killing January, 1 on Alexandria a in church Coptic outside bomb a of 2010, explosion the by throughout epitomised tensions in despite increases marked anti-sectarian, assertively were protests Surprisingly, tensions. Coptic-Muslim was regime Mubarak’s of maintenance the in factor key Another Confessional Strife? arabe_961199.html www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/les-grandes-etapes-du-printemps- voltes-du-monde-arabe-_NG_-2011-01-31-562740 www.la-croix.com/Actualite/S-informer/Monde/Chronologie-les-re- nologie-l-onde-de-choc-dans-le-monde-arabe.html http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/article/20110221.OBS8431/chro- www.iemed.org/dossiers/tunisia/aegipte.php Sources IEF he Uprising CH RON zabaleen January there was a considerable amount of O L O GY (continuation) , traditional garbage men. In the af- the In men. garbage , traditional all reli-

33 Med.2011 Keys 34 Med.2011 Keys itself: General Intelligence Service Chief Omar Sule- regime the within struggles signalled appointments key corruption. Two fight and employment increase , control to remit government’s new the ing announc- Minister, Prime Shafiq Ahmed appointed ening harsher crackdowns. On 29 January, Mubarak sion with co-option, announcing reforms and threat- repres- mix to tactics its adapted then regime The by welcomed were crowds acrossthecountry. protesters, shoot to orders refused apparently having and, in moved Army the and withdrawn had forces security the evening, By ticular, the NDP headquarters, which was set ablaze. of protesters’ anger were police stations and, in par- targets the in confrontations: violent initiating avoiding disciplined extremely were protesters Notably, personnel. security overwhelming simply spaces, lic pub- back took Egypt across protesters when itself, 28th the on came however, tactic, confrontational people arrested. The most spectacular failure of this thousand a over and cut were services phone bile demonstrations for Friday the 28th, Internet and mo- planning forces opposition unified newly With ary. Janu- 26 of hours early the in TahrirSquare re-took they clubs, and bats taser bullets, rubber teargas, cannons, water with protesters of numbers reduced Attacking phase. confrontational second, a entered had forces security the evening, By (TahrirSquare. ) control public spaces, particularly Cairo’s Liberation to demonstrators allowed This protesters. confront scale of demonstrations, the security forces failed to sheer the by surprised First, levels. different on out The protest went through several phases and played wan, Suez,Port Saidandmanyothers. As- El-Kubra, Mahalla Ismailiya, also but exandria, Al- and Cairo in protests with Egypt, across streets the to took number that times ten than more event, the success.”In a be will it online, initiative the port you get a tenth of the 80,000 people or so who sup- “if tweeted example, for El-Amrani, Issandr mentator Notedcom- much. not expect did but significant, be would protest the hoped themselves, ganisers from ordinary Egyptians. Most observers, and the or- Brotherhood, underscoring the gulf separating them Muslim the including elites, political established by ent civil society and trade union groups, but shunned independ- by called was demonstration January 25 The population. apathetic politically a as perceived widely was what in outrage same the sparked none to emulate Bouazizi’s gesture, not least in Cairo, but successful one. Indeed, there were several attempts them fromordinaryEgyptians underscoring thegulfseparating , political elites, includingthe but shunnedby established society andtradeuniongroups, was calledby independentcivil The 25January demonstration to have “blinked” first, calculating that protesters that calculating first, “blinked” have to non qua sine the was repression regime down face to and will sheer compromise to refusal protesters’ the which army,the between in opposition, the and regime the brinkmanship three-way Amr was result scientist The Hamzawy. political and Sawiris Naguib coon ty- business men”including “wise of group claimed self-pro- a to itself Brotherhood the from revolution, the of “leaders” would-be of series a and regime, of the army and intelligence services, parts of the old elements between negotiations back-door the and Egypt, of squares and streets the “tables”: parallel The fate of the uprising was being played out on two response. in days following Egypt across larger even grow demonstrations saw The “ultras.” football and MB the from “heavies” of intervention the by saved parently ap- were protesters to collapse, Close ammunition. and birdshot using as well square as buildings, of the top on from outside from both protesters at cocktails Molotov and rocks throwing thugs regime pro- with assault, night-time all-out an to then and Camel,” the of “Battle so-called the in and thugs hired forces security plain-clothes by assault time to a day- first protesters subjected were Tahrir Square holding February, 2 On inmates. prison listing en- sometimes and freeing and attacks random out carrying by particular in – chaos sow to attempted forces security failed, having confrontation Direct Mubarak andSuleiman. on also but demonstrators, on – leverage as tians Egyp- ordinary amongst reputation forces’ armed (reviled) security forces, while Tantawi could use the Egypt’s to closer reputedly was Suleiman Minster. Prime Deputy appointed also Tantawiwas hammad Mu- Minister Defence and Chief Army and 1981, since vacant President, Vice of post the filled iman of change. Ultimately, the army seems army Ultimately,the change. of Armed Forces (SCAF), now rules in a state of ex- of state a in rules now (SCAF), the Forces Armed of Council Supreme the or military, the parlia- ment, suspended and government, the changed Suleiman, and Mubarak removed effectively Having late keyoppositiongroups. iso- and operandi modus regime’s old the adapt to tion” parties and religious elites – will manage simply “opposi- among figures complacent and military es, NDP,– regime former the forc- of security elements is what the result of the revolution will be or whether this whether tell to early too still is It for. called have protesters that reform structural of step first the is what on agreement affairs, little with of state current the sense a protesting “negative,” in was together them holding bond The experience. any political without even unaffiliated, were protesters most significant, are Islamists and parties unions, as such groups organised between differences and of strengths relative the while that noted be should it and society, Egyptian in forces different many represented themselves Protesters parliament control Egypt’s post-uprising groups closetotheoldregime makes iteasierforestablished most independentgroups, asit elections –hasbeenopposedby considerable speed–thepushfor The onemeasuretaken with “guided” regime. new a under privileges Army’s the maintain to used be could pressure their that and away go not would The removal of removal The Post-Mubarak have splittoformtheirownparties. peatedly challenged the MB’s “old guard,” and some re- have groups these authoritarianism, internal own its and regime, (new) the with compromise to ness willing- its conservatism, leadership’s the protesting leadership. Indeed, in the aftermath of the revolution, bers took part in protests against the wishes of their the Brotherhood’s absence: many of its young mem- underscore to important however, is, It necessary. the primary figures of the old regime old the of figures primary the T ransitions kind f hne was change of

to cused ofdraggingtheirfeet. ac- directly were Tantawi and military the which in “instability.”ing protests first the saw Friday,April, 8 increas- of them accusing by popularity protesters’ core protesters, just as the military attempts to erode amongst support its eroding slowly is military the by resistance Such repealed. been not still has rights, political and civil many suspends which law, gency emer- much-hated the Finally, parliament. uprising – MB and NDP the cially espe- – regime old the to close groups established for easier it makes it as by groups, independent opposed most been has – elections for push the – speed considerable with taken measure one The lution and prevent the military from staying on. voted “yes” in a bid to secure some gains for the revo- forIslamists and remnants of the NDP, although most amendments. Some have interpreted this as a “victory” paltry turnouts during the Mubarak era – approved the voters – a massive 41% of the electorate compared to of 75%aroundproposedwhich amendmentsthe in on calledreferendumwas A days. 100 within ranks own its from electingone“option” parliamentofthe new the afforded rather but compulsory, Assembly terms but not powers and did not presidential make a Constituent limited decisions Its it. replace entirely thanratherdays, ten Constitutiononly the amendin larpressure. AConstitutional Panel was appointed to sawy in early March, but only after considerable popu- MinisterriorMuhammad Wagdi Mansourwith El-Es- Shafiq with the more popular and Inte- Ahmad PM replaced eventually military the and ed, elements of the former regime arrested and prosecut- andrelaxed lawssuspended, media Parliamentwas civil societygroupssuchasApril6th. and unions independent from particularly pressure, interim leadership, but only in response to continued Egypt’s from spontaneously or swiftly either come not have reform “real” of measures Egypt, in form” “re- and normality of semblance a restoring in terest in- military’s the serve which elections, of exception single the with that, clear also is It judiciary. little a to the widespread use of military courts – more than thanks – and legislative part executive, part ception, ny h frain f e pris bt lo splits also but parties, new of formation the only not – activity political of flourishing a is there Egypt The only B eyond theUprising certainties seem to be that in post-uprising

o oto Egypt’s control to post-

35 Med.2011 Keys 36 Med.2011 Keys causes of the uprising must be addressed with long- political and economic the that and strong as well as frail be can systems authoritarian that reminder Egypt’s “Second January Uprising” provides a timely ian groups. relations with Israel, , and Palestin- as such questions on leadership(s) new (potential) pend at least partly on the positions taken by Egypt’s de- will response Their place. first the in revolution the about bringing to contributed that template eral (neo)lib- very the of lens “change”the seen through mostly have but uprisings, the during reform for port sup- to turned EU the and US The investment. ing offer- “new”by the Egypt in foothold a secure to try to quick was and Mubarak supported Arabia Saudi crucial. be also will powers outside of position The term structuralreforms must beaddressedwithlong- political causesoftheuprising strong andthattheeconomic systems canbefrailaswell as reminder thatauthoritarian Uprising” provides atimely Egypt’s “Second January that groups called fortheuprising. labour and society civil independent the and groups), opposition” “decorative other and MB the guard”NDP,also “old (the but the of ments ele- forces, complex security the military, the a between game still is politics Egyptian to central that within Islamist movements, particularly the MB – and B A T T E E economic andpoliticalsubstance. social, its for also but democracy, of trappings mal for- the protesters’for meeting just be not demands will opportunity this to Key groups. Salafist and tive ultra-conserva- of hands the into playing risks tunity limits of Islamist popularity: failing to take this oppor- potential the shown temporarily least at has rising up- The itself. democracy of notion the ultimately discrediting and democracy of for forms popularity non-sectarian of window unexpected an missing of also but uprising, Egypt’s of failure the simply not is so doing not of risk The reforms. structural term B eti eti l l yubi a ibliography -M -G y a , Andrea and Andrea , , Andrea and tics, vol.16,No.2(2011). Uprisings.” Lessons Arab the Authoritarianism: from of Lightness able IB Tauris, 1994. www.almasryalyoum.com/en/print/351032. Masry al-Youm revolution. www.merip.org/mer/mer258/praxis-egyptian- Revolution.” versity inCairoPress,2009. Uni- American The Cairo: Change. of Moment January 2011,http://bit.ly/fZioxF Manipulation.”of Menu the Beyond PoliticalMeaning Elections: democratic t ahdi hobashi , Nazih. , Ae. Prdxs f rb refo-lutions.” Arab of “Paradoxes Asef. , , Rabab and Rabab , Mn. Te rxs f h Egyptian the of Praxis “The Mona. , Over-stating the Arab State. Arab the Over-stating , 258 (2011), (2011), 258 Report, East Middle G G erv erv English Edition, 13 March 2011, asio M asio arfleet , , Gennaro. “Egypt’s Post- Gennaro. “The Unbear- “The Gennaro. , 14 openDemocracy, eierna Poli- Mediterranean , Philip (eds). (eds). Philip . London: Egypt. Al-