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GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE, 1660Th United Nations FIRST COMMITTEE, 1660th GENERAL MEETING ASSEMBLY Tuesday, 21 October 1969, at 3 p_m_ TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION Official Records NEW YORK CONTENTS all ages. In this ever-changing world, the Charter of the United Nations, embodying these fundamental values as Page applicable to international relations, remains the North Agenda item 103: The strengthening of international security (continued) Star. 4. In his speech before the General Assembly on 6 Octo­ Chairman: Mr. Agha SHAHI (Pakistan). ber 1969 my Foreign Minister had the following to say on this subject: "It seems to my delegation that the purposes and AGENDA ITEM 103 principles enshrined in the Charter represent the highest and noblest ideals ever conceived by man. If there is a gap The strengthening of international security (continued) between Charter goals and reality, the reason is that it is (A/7654; A!C.1/L.468) not always easy for man to live up to his most cherished ideals. But this does not mean that he should stop trying. I. Mr. HSUEH (China) (translated from Chinese): My On the contrary, the effective functioning of the United delegation shares the view unanimously held in this Nations demands urgent and serious efforts on the part of Committee that the strengthening of international security its Member States to make a reality of the aims of the is the ultimate and highest objective of the United Nations. Charter. It is the failure of Member States to make good To achieve that objective is the raison d 'etre of our their commitments to the Charter that is responsible for Organization. The work of all organs of United Nations the state of frustration in which the United Nations now must be directed at all times towards that objective. Each finds itself." [ 1779th plenary meeting, para. 72.] resolution adopted and each decision taken by the General Assembly, the Security Council and all the other United 5. My delegation is gratified to find in this debate that an Nations bodies, in accordance with the Charter of the overwhelming majority of delegations hold a similar at­ United Nations, represents or should represent a step closer titude on this point. Having thus briefly stated the basic to the realization of the objective. In other words, views of my delegation on the present item, I should like international security can be strengthened only as a result now to tum to an examination of th~t relevant documents of constant, sustained and unremitting efforts on the part before us. of all Members of United Nations to achieve this purpose. 6. Both the draft appeal to all States of the world 2. There appears neither a magic touch nor a short-cut in [A/C.l/L.468} and the statement of the Soviet delegation this matter. Surely, the question of strengthening inter­ [ 1652nd meeting} introducing the draft appeal are pref­ national security cannot all of a sudden acquire an aced by a reference to the Second World War, out of which important and urgent character at the presegt session of the the United Nations was born. When the Soviet representa­ General Assembly just because an item bearing that title has tive recalled the horrors of that war and the sufferings to been inscribed on its agenda. It is important and urgent at which his country had been subjected, I could not but have all times. a genuine and sincere feeling of sympathy. For my own country, the Republic of China, went through the same 3. To channel all efforts for the strengthening of inter­ horrors, and the Chinese people suffered just as much national security in a single direction, the Charter of the during that war. The Republic of China lost more than United Nations is the sole guide. It sets forth all the three million able-bodied men in the armed forces, in fundamental principles essential for the maintenance of addition to many more millions in civilian casualties. Direct international peace and security and provides for the losses in destroyed properties alone amounted to the machinery to ensure their application. It is a basic equivalent of more than U.S.$31,000 million at the document, comprehensive, well balanced and indivisible. purchasing value of the dollar in the 1940's. We too have Those who seek to promote nationalistic or group or even paid a devastatingly heavy price for the peace which the personal points of view at variance with or extraneous to world has been able to enjoy, however precariously, since the principles of the Charter are fond of referring to the the end of the war. We have contributed to the creation of fact that the world is changing. But that is neither a conditions under which the establishment of the United relevant point nor a new discovery. The world has been Nations was made possible. Indeed, the Republic of China changing since the beginning of the history of mankind. It is second to none in its determination to do everything has never stood still. However, fundamental values common possible for the strengthening of international security and to all men, such as peace,justice and freedom, are valid for for the prevention of another war. A/C .1 /PV .1660 2 General Assembly - Twenty-fourth Session - First Committee 7. The draft appeal before us contains in its substantive the interest of strengthening international security, to abide paragraphs a number of elements, which may be grouped by the resolutions adopted and the decisions taken by the into two categories. The first category consists of elements General Assembly, the Security Council and other organs of which are taken directly from the provisions of the Charter. the United Nations and to seek ways and means to They are, notably, the settlement of all international implement them. It must be recognized that such questions disputes by peaceful means, the granting of independence can be satisfactorily solved only by a democratic procedure to peoples under colonial rule, the establishment of regional in accordance with the Charter in an organization like the security·systems and the convening of periodic meetings of United Nations composed of equally sovereign States the Security Council. I believe that no one disputes the dedicated to peace. If accusations by individual Members need for or the desirability of implementing these provi­ were allowed to fly around that the General Assembly sions of the Charter in the interest of the strengthening of adopted a certain resolution only by the so-called mechani­ international security. My delegation finds no difficulty in cal majority or that the General Assembly failed to adopt a agreeing to the inclusion of these provisions in an appeal certain other resolution only because of alleged pressure that the General Assembly may decide to make. made on the majority, then not only would the majority of the membership be insulted but defiance of the will of the 8. However, my delegation has serious misgivings as to the General Assembly would be encouraged. Such a practice, if desirability of mentioning these provisions of the Charter in not discouraged, would not contribute to the strengthening such an appeal to the exclusion of other provisions of the of international security, but, on the contrary, would tend Charter equally important to the strengthening of inter­ to weaken it. national security. For example, the Charter provides for the settlement of international disputes not only by peaceful 12. In conclusion, my delegation holds no strong views on means, but also in conformity with the principles of justice whether an appeal as proposed should be made by the and international law. The Charter also demands promotion General Assembly. Nothing, not even an appeal by the and encouragement of respect for human rights and for General Assembly, could be more effective for the fundamental freedoms. The Charter further calls for the strengthening of international security than the determina­ creation of conditions of stability and well-being by tion by all Members of the United Nations to live up to promoting higher standards of living, full employment and their pledge given in Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Charter so forth. I do not wish to take the time of the Committee to "fulftl in good faith the obligations assumed by them in by reading out all the provisions of the Charter. But I accordance with the present Charter." But if the General cannot help wondering whether, in receiving an appeal from Assembly should in its wisdom decide to make an appeal, the General Assembly, the world may not be puzzled as to my delegation strongly feels that the appeal should not be why these and other provisions of the Charter are no longer limited to a few provisions of the Charter selected at regarded as important to the strengthening of international random and that in it the General Assembly should not security. pronounce itself in a summary and arbitrary manner on the specific questions that have been or are being dealt with in 9. The second category of elements contained in the draft detail by its special committees. appeal relates to questions that have been or are being dealt with by the various organs of the United Nations, such as 13. Since the Charter is too lengthy and the resolutions the withdrawal of foreign troops, the definition of aggres­ adopted by the United Nations are too numerous to be sion, the principles of friendly relations and co-operation of reproduced in an appeal, my delegation suggests that the States, and United Nations peace-keeping operations. These appeal should be worded in general and simple terms. The questions evidently involve a good deal of concrete detail General Assembly could perhaps appeal to all States of the on which there is a divergence of opinion and which require world to respect the Charter of the United Nations, to careful consideration.
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