Naval Shipwrecks in Indonesia Natali Pearson Phd Candidate, University of Sydney E-Mail: [email protected]
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Proceedings of the 3rd Asia-Pacific Regional Conference on Underwater Cultural Heritage Brian Fahy, Sila Tripati, Veronica Walker-Vadillo, Bill Jeffery, Jun Kimura Editors 2017 Volume 2 640 Naval shipwrecks in Indonesia Natali Pearson PhD Candidate, University of Sydney E-mail: [email protected] Abstract This paper examines naval heritage in Indonesian waters, focusing on HMAS Perth (I) and other Allied vessels that sank in the Java Sea and the Sunda Strait in 1942, and argues for a re-consideration of what we understand by value and loss as it relates to this heritage. While the recent (2013-2017) illicit salvaging of these wrecks for scrap-metal has prompted international criticisms, an examination of Indonesia’s colonial and post- war history serves to contextualise what the international community sees as ambivalence towards these wrecks, while also suggesting a wider apportioning of responsibility. Furthermore, a historical perspective demonstrates that the salvaging of objects from HMAS Perth dates to the 1960s. Some of these activities, including David Burchell’s 1967 expedition and more recent interactions with the site by divers and other stakeholders, can be understood as ‘cultural impacts’. But other early salvaging, such as that which resulted in the profit-motivated recovery of HMAS Perth’s two bells, can be seen as an early precursor to the larger- scale salvaging we see today. The paper concludes by advocating a new approach that accepts neither non-disturbance nor the inevitability of loss, but instead prioritises the advance, judicious removal of symbolic objects from threatened warship wrecks. Key words: Indonesia, HMAS Perth (I), Sunda Strait, Java Sea, USS Houston, World War II, illicit salvage, protection and preservation, naval heritage, bells. Introduction During World War II (WWII), hundreds of ships (and lives) were lost in naval battles in the waters of the Asia-Pacific as Allied forces sought to prevent or delay the arrival of the Japanese. The recent industrial-scale salvaging of wrecked Allied vessels in the Java Sea and the Sunda Strait has brought these wrecks to the attention of the international community, 1152 and prompted renewed calls for an urgent rethink on how to protect and preserve naval heritage in Indonesia. This paper examines one of these wrecks, that of HMAS Perth (I),1 which, together with USS Houston,2 sank on 1 March 1942 after unexpectedly encountering a large Japanese imperial fleet in the Sunda Strait. Since then, efforts to protect and preserve HMAS Perth have been complicated not only by issues of ownership, access and responsibility, but also by contradictory understandings of how naval wrecks are valued in Indonesia. My intention here is to expand the notion of what constitutes value beyond the apparently irreconcilable dichotomy of ‘wreck as heritage’ or ‘wreck as commodity’, and to do so by focusing on objects salvaged from HMAS Perth. In particular, I focus my attention on the ship’s two bells, both of which were illicitly salvaged from the wreck in the 1960s or 1970s, and, following negotiations, returned to Australia. These bells are now housed in public safekeeping institutions, at the Australian War Memorial (AWM) in Canberra and at Perth Town Hall. As the ‘soul’3 of the ship, the bells remain important touchstones for survivors and descendants while also providing opportunities for new audiences to encounter, in a material way, HMAS Perth. How, and by whom, are the complex and competing notions of ownership and value – of wreck as historical informant, war grave,4 or commodity – ascribed? Which of history, memory, or money should take priority, and does this change over time? Who is invested, who is responsible, and what are the consequences of these diverging valuations and concepts of ownership? How else can these wrecks be valued? To address these questions, I consider the recent (2013-2017) illicit salvaging of HMAS Perth and other Allied wrecks in Indonesian waters, particularly the international community’s criticisms that Indonesia has neither the capacity nor the willingness to protect and preserve these 1153 wrecks. My examination of Indonesia’s colonial and wartime histories offers an alternative perspective that calls into question these international criticisms and suggests a wider apportioning of responsibility. I then turn to the re-discovery of HMAS Perth in 1967, and the subsequent salvaging of the wreck by Australian diver David Burchell and others. Within this context, I demonstrate that the recent illicit salvaging constitutes not a departure from, but a continuation of, previous interventions and interactions with these underwater sites. At the same time, I contend, some early interventions – namely Burchell’s – can be better characterised as ‘cultural impacts’, to use a term from McKinnon.5 I also account for the environmental value of wrecks such as HMAS Perth, which was once home to an abundance of coral reefs and marine animals, and the resulting benefits for local communities. The paper concludes by asking whether loss is inevitable as part of the ‘process’ of heritage, and considers the extent to which stakeholders’ aversion to such loss is based on what Cornelius Holtorf calls a paradigm of conservation.6 Rejecting this, I advocate for a new approach that accepts neither non-disturbance nor the inevitability of loss, and instead prioritises the advance, judicious removal of symbolic objects from threatened warship wrecks. Illicit salvaging in Indonesia, 2013-2017 In 2013, reports emerged of a salvage barge equipped with a ‘massive’ crane and claw above the wreck of HMAS Perth.7 Known as a grab dredger or a claw barge, its purpose was commercial: the sheer quantity of metal on a naval ship means that a salvaged wreck can be worth up to AUD$1million.8 By 2017, Australian and Indonesian maritime archaeologists revealed that only approximately 40 percent of HMAS Perth remained in situ, with evidence of large-scale salvage on the site.9 1154 The destruction of HMAS Perth is indicative of a broader trend in Southeast Asia: illicit salvagers are becoming increasingly audacious and sophisticated in their activities.10 In the Java Sea, Allied wrecks have been not only damaged but completely removed.11 The wrecks lay close to one of Indonesia’s largest naval bases, and suspicious activity – not to mention visible environmental impacts such as oil spills – is unlikely to have gone unnoticed by passing marine craft. Recent illicit salvaging activities are non-state affairs, undertaken covertly and without seeking permission. Industrial surface platforms enable the armed, international crew to remain above water and monitor for the presence of authorities while the metal is pulled up indiscriminately from the seabed.12 No regard is shown for the presence of human remains, symbolic objects, unexploded ordnance or oil tanks. When news broke about the missing Dutch wrecks in the Java Sea, head of Arkenas (Pusat Penelitian Arkeologi Nasional, or the National Archaeological Centre of Indonesia), Bambang Budi Utomo, said: “The Dutch government cannot blame the Indonesian government because they never asked us to protect those ships. As there was no agreement or announcement, when the ships go missing, it is not our responsibility.”13 Chief of Indonesia’s Navy Information Office, Colonel Gig Jonias Mozes Sipasulta, confirmed Indonesia’s view that foreign governments should have done more to protect the wrecks: “The Indonesian navy cannot monitor all areas all the time. If they ask why the ships are missing, I’m going to ask them back, why didn’t they guard the ships?”14 Even though Indonesia was not directly implicated, its initial defensiveness was seen as indicative of local attitudes that wartime naval wrecks were the heritage – and therefore the moral and financial 1155 responsibility – of the flag States. Indonesia’s eventual acquiescence to calls for an international investigation into the missing Java Sea wrecks did little to mitigate broader perceptions that this issue, and the threats posed to other wrecks in Indonesian waters, was a low priority. Historical context Indonesia’s response to the missing wrecks clearly failed to meet international expectations. However, a historical perspective can provide an alternative narrative in which these wrecks are re-considered in light of Indonesia’s post-war, post-colonial priorities. While such a perspective does not absolve Indonesia, it does, I believe, go some way towards explaining Indonesia’s ambivalent attitude towards ‘those ships.’15 The Indonesian archipelago has been at the centre of inter- and intra- regional maritime activities for centuries. Europeans began participating in maritime trade and commerce from the 16th century onwards. By the early 19th century the Dutch had extended their colonial reach across the Dutch East Indies, with power centred in Java. This authority was threatened during World War II when these archipelagic waters became the final staging ground for Japanese ambitions in Asia. In mid-February 1942, the colony was under pressure on all sides. Singapore had fallen; days later, Darwin was heavily bombed. Parts of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Sumatra and Timor were already under Japanese occupation. Desperate to retain Java, Allied forces assembled a fleet of ships under American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) command. During the Battle of the Java Sea on 27 February 1942, two Dutch cruisers and three destroyers either sank or were crippled.16 Two surviving ships