The Battle For By Clive Sharplin (Associate member)

"There must be a beginning of any great matter, but the continuing until it be thoroughly finished yields the true glory." Sir Francis Drake 1587 - Vice Admiral and celebrated navigator of the first Elizabethan era 1540-1596

This article celebrates the 75th Anniversary of the Battle for Crete recognised by the Admiralty as having taken place from 15th May to 27th May 1941 (note 3) and attempts to describe the part played in it by HMS Ajax.(note 4)

Due to the number of involved, their complex manoeuvres and dispositions, their various strategic assignments, the sheer number of actions both singly and as part of specific groups together with eye witness observations this account must because of space restrictions in this journal be severely limited in size and content. The author, however, sincerely hopes that it will at best give an insight or snapshot of one of the ’s most iconic ships, HMS Ajax, in what was a very important, desperate battle, actually a campaign, with huge losses of ships and men, an excruciatingly sad battle of World War 2. While technically a defeat because Crete was lost I would argue that no blame should be laid at the Royal Navy’s doormat, the Royal Navy acquitted itself in the finest traditions of its long history and did everything they were asked to do and much more at a great cost which I believe Cunningham similarly argued in his report to the Admiralty. The fleet had carried an army from North Africa to Greece, evacuated it from Greece to Crete, and then evacuated it from Crete back to North Africa fighting every inch of the way. Yes Crete was lost but in this loss they managed to achieve other objectives which lent a positive influence to the allies’ future conduct of the war. As a result Hitler abandoned his plan to invade and Sicily and any future deployment of Parachutist troops as too expensive in men and equipment. Any blame for the loss of Crete I consider should be on the shoulders of the senior military commanders particularly Major General Freberg’s failure as Divisional Field Officer, his men deserved better. For the students of the minutiae of the Crete campaign at sea I can do no better than to refer them to the C-in-C Mediterranean Admiral Sir A B Cunningham’s full report to the Admiralty as published on 24th May 1948 as a supplement to The gazette P 3103 – 3119. This account refers only to the naval side, for an appreciation of the army’s position there are several excellent books on the subject. (Refer to bibliography).

This battle was of a different type to any other that had ever been fought by any Navy before and its form, intensity and ferocity was not to be repeated until that fought between Japan and the western alliance principally the USA in the Pacific theatre of WW2. The significant difference was that a powerful fleet with plenty of sea room to manoeuvre was to fight a virtually impossible war against an almost overwhelming air force comprising both the German Luftwaffe and the Italian Air Royale who between them could muster well over 2000 aircraft. With virtually no allied air cover the axis powers enjoyed total air superiority which put the ships under persistent attack in a battle that was to become a campaign spread over some six weeks. While there were some -to-ship actions the major conflict was between the combined German and Italian aircraft and Royal Naval ships who were poorly armed to defend themselves (note 5) and the lack of this defensive capability compounded by almost non-existent allied aircraft. It must be recognised that at this stage of the war nearly all of the Royal Navy’s ships were extremely vulnerable to air attack due to the mistaken belief by the Admiralty that they had been adequately equipped with regard to their armament. The reverse had quickly and horribly become apparent. During the spring of 1940 the effectiveness of German air attacks in all its forms in actions off Norway against ships demonstrated just how completely the Admiralty had grossly underestimated the ability of their ships to defend themselves against aerial attack with a lack of anti-aircraft (AA) guns and their control equipment.

As April 1941 opened Ajax was still in the Mediterranean where together with other Fleet units

1 she had been used to carry some 58,000 Troops from North Africa to Greece to bolster the hard pressed Greek Army against an expected invasion by Nazi Germany’s army which had swept through the Balkans like an unimpeded juggernaut and was now targeting Crete. Malta was still under siege and the Royal Naval forces were now mostly operating from a base in , a distance of 406.7 Miles (654.5 kms). Intelligence source from Ultra indicated an invasion of the Island of Crete by Nazi Germany in early May 1941 (note 6).

In these actions around Crete the Axis air attacks were so vicious in their frequency and numbers of aircraft employed to the point of being on the verge of overwhelming. The British ships expended huge amounts of ammunition such that their defensive firepower was always a major consideration and often became restricted. Even their main armament was used in spite of its insufficient elevation limits. Several ships actually exhausted all of their ammunition and had to resort to firing signal and practice shells.

The painting below displays just one of a whole host of such unbridled actions that occurred in the Mediterranean during this period of World War 2 with virtually no air cover protection for Royal Naval forces from the ferocity of the onslaught waged upon them by the German Luftwaffe

As Greece fell to the German Army advancing through the Balkans on the night of April 24th the evacuation of allied troops became inevitable. The Royal Navy, including Ajax, started to evacuate about 30,000 troops, principally ANZAC with some British and Greek, carrying them southwards to the island of Crete. It became another Dunkirk. Ajax evacuated, among others, elements of the 6th New Zealand Brigade, 2/3 Australian Battalion and last of all, on April 29th, ‘Tom’ Baillie-Grohman RN (who was attached to the Staff of the General Officer Commanding Middle East) together with New Zealand’s Major-General Bernard ‘Tiny’ Freberg VC, 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, who would soon take command of all allied military forces on Crete. The allied forces arrived on Crete to be taunted by Nazi radio propaganda broadcasts that they had been landed on the ‘Isle of Doom’. These broadcasts were prophetic as Ajax and the other naval ships found themselves only a few weeks later being called in to evacuate the allied forces they had so recently landed on the island while also being asked to defend it from a German seaborne invasion.

On May 20th after four days of continuous bombing German airborne forces began “Operation Merkur”, their invasion of Crete. Admiral A.B. (Andrew Browne) Cunningham, Commander-in- Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, or ‘ABC’ as he became known in the Royal Navy, had on May 19th issued instructions for night sweeps of the Aegean to challenge the expected seaborne invasion.

Daylight of May 21st found Ajax, under the command of Captain E. D. (Desmond) B. McCarthy, heading to the South West of Antikithera, beyond the southern tip of Greece, as part of Force D under the command of recently appointed Flag Officer, Rear-Admiral Irvine G. Glennie, in the Dido, together with the cruiser Orion and four , Hasty, Hereward, Kimberley and Janus (note 8). Imperial was bombed seven days later on the 28th and so extensively damaged that she was deliberately sunk by Hotspur to prevent her from falling into enemy hands. Having swept the Maleme, Canea and Kissamo Bay areas of the Cretan coast the previous night they had investigated what proved to be false reports of enemy seaborne landings at Heraklion, the squadron was heading to join other ships of the fleet in a major concentration of naval forces to defend the island. On Ajax at 0800 the ships log recorded the weather conditions as 'sea state 11, wind westerly force 3, visibility good, and position 35.27N/22.32E.' The log shows that the sea state would rise to 21, wind strengthen slightly to force 4 west by north-west and visibility to become excellent by noon.

In his book “Crete 1941, The Battle at Sea”, David A Thomas wrote: 'The daylight hours of May 21st were to witness violent and prolonged battles between and the bombers.' Frank Pearce in “Sea War, Great Naval Battles of World War 2” wrote: '... the air was filled with the

2 drone of approaching aircraft. They came in droves.... it seemed impossible that any ship could survive such a massive attack.' The Admiralty official record described it in “The Med, The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean 1939-45” as “the air attacks reached a crescendo the following day (May 21st) when our ships were bombed in every conceivable way from dawn to dusk”. The Admiralty Account of Naval Operations: April 1941 to January 1943 (from which some of this article is sourced) gives a most vivid description on page 29: 'In this and subsequent bombings, every form of attack was made on the ships; high level, single and formation; massed bombing by Junkers (Stukas) 87s and 88s and Heinkel 111s; high-speed horizontal attacks by Messerschmitts, or shallow dives at a height of a few hundred feet, aircraft returned to their adjoining airfields (in Greece), bombed up, ammunitioned, refuelled and returned independently to the attack. Admiral Cunningham the C-in-C in his memoirs refers to this period of tragedy in Cretan waters as “a disastrous period in our naval history, a period of great tension and anxiety such as I have never experienced before or since”.

On the morning of the 21st May at 0825 the Ajax ship’s log reads the order ‘Hands to repel aircraft stations’ was given to confront an imminent attack by Heinkel 111 bombers. At 0915 the log reads ‘Attacked by ten Ju 87 dive bombers, several very near misses with bombs, damage to port shafts’. Ajax was working up to high speed commencing an evasive hard turn as her orders were ‘manoeuvre to avoid (air attack)’. This attack ceased at 0922, the whole action had lasted just seven minutes although it must have seemed like an eternity to Ajax’s crew. A little later at 1050 another pair of Stukas attacked. The J-Class Juno came under a high-level attack from Italian CANT Z.1007 aircraft from 50th group, one hit found a magazine causing three huge mortal explosions which literally split her in two, (note 9) she sank in less than two minutes 30 nautical miles south-east of Crete. Juno had survived 3 hours of continuous bombing, 6 officers and 91 ratings were picked up by the destroyers Kingston, Kandahar and Nubian, but 170 crew were lost. Then in the afternoon there was another ferocious attack that lasted for 2½ hours followed by a further attack that evening all of which were beaten off.

The first lieutenant of the destroyer Hotspur, Lieutenant Hugh Hodgkinson D.S.C. R.N. was to later write that at five that afternoon (May 21st) they received their orders for the following night. There were reports from our long-range reconnaissance of large fleets of Caiques and transports escorted by destroyers making down the Aegean steering towards Suda Bay. Hotspur together with other destroyers were to escort Ajax, Orion and Dido under Rear-Admiral Glennie to go look for them. A second force consisting of Fiji, Gloucester and two destroyers were to screen the entrance though the Kithira Channel to prevent any Italian forces breaking in from the west, while the main battle fleet with their destroyer screen remained farther to the south-west to act as general support if required. Cunningham decided to add yet more ships to the expected action by sending out from Alexandria yet another squadron comprising the four , Naiad, the Australian , Carlisle and Calcutta.

So during the night of the 21st/22nd there were two battleships, nine cruisers and about twenty destroyers operating around Crete. At 11:30 pm Glennie’s squadron of cruisers including Ajax met a large number of enemy groups, which long-range reconnaissance had earlier detected, consisting of many caiques and several small steamers packed with German troops escorted by destroyers and torpedo boats, as steering towards Suda Bay and even managed to surprise a destroyer before it could get away.

But chivalry was not to be abroad this night and Glennie’s squadron created sheer mayhem among the enemy. Cunningham reported his ships as having “conducted themselves with zest and energy”. Hodgkinson described the scene as, “a fairly gruesome spectacle” lit by flashes from each gun salvo, the caiques pitifully loaded with helpless soldiers. Destroyers darting here and there snapping and tearing like a team of wolves who had broken into a flock of sheep. One after firing torpedoes was hit by gunfire from Dido then blown up by gunfire from Ajax. Every gun was blazing, pom-poms and machine guns riddling the caiques, German soldiers

3 weighed down by their personal kit leaping into the sea, between the roar of guns Hodgkinson and others on Hotspur’s could hear unearthly yells of doomed men mixed with the last cries of drowning men. The cruisers were ramming all they could catch - ramming to preserve ammunition. It was appalling slaughter but if Hitler liked to send these men to an obvious doom it was Hodgkinson wrote not “really our fault”. He also proved to be a witness of something my father had told me just once of that night but of which I had never previously seen any confirmation. Hodgkinson saw Ajax appear out of the fray with half a caique wrapped around her bow throwing up a huge bow wave, my father had told me that despite a series of manoeuvres the caique could not be shaken off and remained wrapped around Ajax’s bow to be removed upon her return to Alexandria by which time he had said the overwhelming odour was almost unbearable. This is probably the same event reported by Vincent O’Hara in his ‘Struggle for the Middle Sea’ (P120) where he reports Ajax bending her bow by ramming a caique. Cunningham reported an estimated 4,000 German troops were drowned and that the first attempted invasion of Crete by sea was completely frustrated. A second flotilla of German troops were withdrawn by their high command and taken back to rather than risk further loss of life.

There is no spot more naked under heaven than the (of a ship) as a stick of bombs falls slanting towards it. The assailant may be the size of a gnat on the rim of a far off cloud; it may be a raid approaching from four quarters, roaring down with machine guns and cannon spraying the decks with explosive shell; the bombs may fall unheralded out of the blinding Mediterranean sun or low-lying cloud; they may burst on the surface of the sea, flinging a myriad of steel splinters abroad, killing or wounding everybody in their path, piercing anything but armour; they may burst under the surface, throwing up the water in the semblance of gigantic monoliths that, as they collapse, deluge the pom-poms and machine-guns and their crews, and flood the ventilation trunks. These explosions lift the ship as if a giant had kicked her, wrenching the steering gear, straining frames and plates. They are called near-misses, and the men, watching the bombs scream down at the ship, thank God for them as the alternative to a direct hit.'

For those of the crew below decks in the ship's magazines, machinery spaces, engine and rooms devoid of a view of what was actually happening in the attacks on their ship it was particularly harrowing and stressful. One officer (note 10) whose ship was similarly attacked in the same battle that day described it thus: "During a prolonged bombing attack such as we endured, engine room and boiler rooms resemble the inside of a giant’s kettle against which a sledge hammer is being beaten with uncertain aim. Sometimes there was an almighty clang; sometimes the giant in his frustration, seemed to pick up the kettle and shake and even kick it. The officer detailed to broadcast (from the ship’s bridge) a running commentary suffered a breakdown during the battle so we heard little below but through the noise and heat (which might easily have been up to 40o C) of the machinery spaces we came to understand something of what was happening on deck …. we could hear our 5.25-inch turrets opening fire which told us aircraft were attacking. Next, the bridge telegraphs might signal Full Speed and we would see the rudder indicator move … at the moment the bombs release. This would be followed by the sound of the short-range as the bomber pulled out of his dive … we learned to interpret by the ensuing shake or shudder or clang the success or otherwise of our navigators’ avoiding action.

“From time to time my chief or I would visit the boiler rooms. Here, for hour after hour after frightening hour, with ears popping from air pressure the young stokers knew and heard little of what was going on apart from the obvious near misses and scream of the boiler room fans. On their alertness, as they watched for orders to open or shut off oil sprayers to the furnaces, depended the precise supply of steam available to meet sudden changes of speed ordered ... on which (the ship’s) survival depended" (note 11). There is an authoritative source which writes of the extreme mental stress which the crew below decks experienced causing some 60 crew members being hospitalised with mental issues, (but not defined where treated on-shore or in the ship) we would now describe this as PTSD {post-traumatic stress disorder, an illness not then diagnosed). Cunningham may have in fact been referring to this in his final report to the Admiralty

4 in which he wrote “no more could have been asked. (note 11) Losses and damage were sustained which would normally only occur during a major fleet action, in which the enemy fleet might be expected to suffer greater losses than our own. In this case the enemy fleet did not appear (though it had many favourable opportunities for doing so) and the battle was fought between ships and aircraft”.

May 22nd proved to be a day of sorrow for the Royal Navy summed up by a quotation from PO Ray Parkin who was there on that day in HMAS Perth who wrote in his biography “You cannot combat aircraft only with ships. The enemy’s reserve’ seemed inexhaustible”. A not surprising comment when later estimates of the German Order of Battle put their aircraft strength as being about 700 dive bombers and fighter bombers, 180 fighters, 500 transports and 80 troop gliders. With their airfields being as close as ten minutes flying time away from the naval action it was so easy for them to attack, unload their bombs and return to base to refuel and re-arm to then make a further sortie and if this wasn’t enough the Italians could muster 2,000 aircraft, just thirty minutes flying time away. An absolute aerial armada. In the ensuing mêlée 10 caiques were sunk, their troops killed or thrown into the sea and the Italian destroyer Lupo damaged.

One week later on May 28th, Ajax received a direct bomb hit causing a fire and 20 men were seriously wounded. The damage forced her to be detached from the action to return to base. The task of defending Crete ultimately proved fruitless at a dreadful cost to the Royal Navy with 2,252 men dead and 430 wounded (note 11). Ajax lost 11 dead and had 38 wounded. 9 ships were sunk - 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers. 18 were damaged including 2 battleships, the only , 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers, some so badly that they could not be repaired within the Mediterranean facilities capabilities and were despatched to other repair locations such as in South Africa, even to the USA.

Crete Notes Notes 1. Cunningham was much decorated and highly respected being awarded the DSO with two bars, CB, KCB, Gcb, and promoted to First Sea Lord 1943. In 1945 he was ennobled Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, OM, as well as being awarded many foreign decorations. He was appointed Lord High Steward at the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953. 2. A copy of this photo of in our Association’s archive has inscribed on it the unsigned caption: “The Captain used to smoke a huge pipe and during attacks by German Dive Bombers he could often be seen striding up and down the upper bridge puffing out clouds of smoke, coughing like mad and giving sharp last minute helm and engine orders. Just before the bomb struck, almost, Ajax would turn “on a sixpence” and the bomb exploded yards away.” (March 2012 Association Newsletter, P12) 3. Dates taken from Admiral Cunningham’s report of the Battle to the Admiralty (Supplement to the London Gazette of 24th May 1948) 4. Ajax was a Leander Class launched in 1934, first commissioned in 1938 and had arrived in the Mediterranean following a lengthy repair and refit in Chatham Naval Dockyard after her participation in sinking the German Pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee at the Battle of the River Plate after which public opinion and propaganda had made her an icon of the Royal Navy and a much sought after target of Nazi Germany. She was the seventh Royal Naval Ship to be named Ajax in the last 248 years. These ships were awarded between them a total of 17 Battle honours, and the 1934 light cruiser Ajax was to win the most honours with a total of nine, six of which were won in the Mediterranean campaigns of 1941. Five of these were awarded over a period of just 12 tumultuous months, which included the battle for Crete. This was not single ship action as such but a bitterly fought campaign involving single and multi-ship actions but mainly fighting overwhelming hordes of enemy aircraft which extended over some 6 weeks. 5. It was only in the opening months of 1941 that this was beginning to be rectified with the

5 almost desperate short term solution of installing 20mm oerlikon guns in ships as they came in for resupply, repair or refit. Governed by manufacturing capacity these guns initially were in such limited numbers the first ships, Galatea, Devonshire and Orion, only received two or three.(Ibid - Raven & Roberts, “British Cruisers of World War Two”, P 324). The written records of those who were there shows many examples of ships’ companies foraging for guns even from captured sources, of suitable calibre to take to mount on their own ships, machine guns were particularly favoured. Achilles, a sister ship to Ajax had her aircraft and aircraft catapult removed in Alexandria to be replaced in that deck space by a twin pom-pom mounting, Ajax underwent similar change thought to be at about the same time and place (location and time not yet proven). So much repair work was carried out including on-the-spot modifications as ships came into port and had sufficient time to allow the work to take place. [From Ajax diary - 13/3/41 Arr. Alex. - during March the catapult was removed and a quad 2pdr gun mounting fitted in its place while the forward 0.5in MGs were moved aft to port and starboard abreast the mainmast. Six captured Italian single Breda 20mm AA guns were installed (2 on the quarterdeck, 2 on the boatdeck forward of the mainmast & 2 abreast the bridge at upper deck level)] 6. Reliable intelligence was being provided by the codebreakers of Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire who were able to decipher the Nazi German Enigma codes. Intelligence from this most secret source were attributed under a disguise as coming from “Ultra”. The existence of Bletchley Park and its function was one of the most closely guarded secrets of the entire war. 7. Extract from HMS Ajax ship’s Log held in National Archive, Kew. 8. The names of the destroyers in company with Ajax during the morning’s “near miss” incident vary across the range of published accounts. Those named in this account are taken from Ajax’s Daily Diary which also states that Hasty and Hereward were replaced by Imperial and Isis later in the day. Vincent O’Hara in his book “The Struggle for the Middle Sea – The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean 1940 – 1945”, P118 -119, agrees with those in Ajax’s Daily Diary as do the Daily Diaries for Kimberley and Hereward. Confusion may also have arisen in that the disposition of the various ships across the four Forces also changed, in fact Force A on one change became Force A1 with a completely different composition of ships. Whereas Forces B, C and D had undergone changes which do not appear to have resulted in their being recoded as for example Force A to A1 had been. Cunningham’s report of May 24th to the Admiralty published as a Supplement to The London Gazette on 24 May 1948, P3106 para 14 (a) states that at “2200 hrs on May 20th the destroyers were Kimberley, Imperial, Isis and Juno”. In this article I have therefore taken the Daily Diaries for Ajax, Kimberley and Hereward to be the primary source documents as I judge it these three ships are most unlikely to have all made the same error. 9. An eye witness describes it as two blazing funeral pyres. 10. Ibid, Bibliography - “The Royal Navy, An Illustrated Social History 1870 - 1982", Page 184. A contemporary account by Admiral Le Bailly, then Senior Engineer Officer in HMS Naiad, a Dido Class Anti-Aircraft Cruiser. Involved in the battle that same day she suffered several air attacks and received some splinter damage and flooding forward. In heavy air attacks the next day 181 bombs were aimed at Naiad causing serious damage including two gun turrets disabled and her speed reduced to 16 knots. On 11 March 1942 she was torpedoed and sunk by German U-Boat U565 south of Crete. 11. At the conclusion of this campaign in August 1941 Admiral Cunningham wrote in his report to the Admiralty: “More than once I felt that the stage had been reached when no more could be asked of officers and men, physically and mentally exhausted by their efforts and by the events of these fateful weeks. It is perhaps even now not realised how nearly the breaking point was reached, but that these men struggled through is the measure of their achievement and I trust that it will not lightly be forgotten. The Mediterranean Fleet paid a heavy price for the achievement. Losses and damage were sustained which would normally only occur during a major fleet action, in which the enemy fleet might be expected to suffer greater losses than our own. In this case the enemy fleet did not appear (though it had many favourable opportunities for doing so) and the battle was fought between ships and aircraft”.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Max Arthur, “Lost Voices of the Royal Navy”, Hodder & Stoughton,2005 Admiral of the Fleet, Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, “A Sailors Odyssey”, Hutchinson, 1951 Alan Clark, “The Fall of Crete”, Cassell Military Paperbacks, 1962 J J Colledge & Ben Warlow, Lt Cdr.R.N. (Retd), “Ships of the Royal Navy”, Casemate, 2010 Mike Carlton, “Cruiser, The Life and Loss of HMAS Perth and Her Crew”, William Heinemann Australia, 2010 Hugh Hodgkinson, ILt Cdr. R.N., DSC, “Before The Tide Turned, The Mediterranean Experience of A British Destroyer Officer in 1941”, George G Harrap & Co Ltd, 1944 Gordon Holman, “The King’s Cruisers”, Hodder & Stoughton, 1947 Donald Macintyre, “The Battle for the Mediterranean”, B.T. Batsford,1964 Ministry of Information, “East of Malta, West Of Suez, The Admiralty Account of the Naval War in the Eastern Mediterranean September 1939 to March 1941”, H.M. Stationary Office, 1943 S.W.C. Pack “The Battle for Crete”, Ian Allan, 1973 Alan Raven & John Roberts, “British Cruisers of World War Two”, Arms & Armour Press, 1945 (London) & Naval Institute Press 1980 (USA) Peter C Smith, “Stukas over the Mediterranean 1940-1945”, Greenhill Books, 1999 Jeff Stevens, “HMS Ajax 1935-49”, Self-Published, 2014 David A Thomas, “Crete, the Battle at Sea”, Cassell, 1972 & Efstathiadis Group, , 1972 Peter Thomson “Anzac Fury” William Heinemann, Australia, 2010 Pattie Wright, “Ray Parkin’s Odyssey”, Pan Macmillan Australia, 2012 Rowland Langmaid, “The Med, The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean 1939 -1945”, The Batchworth Press, 1948 Sharplin Family Archive Vincent O’Hara, “The Struggle for the Middle Sea, the Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean” 1940-1945,Conew, 2009 Ben Warlow, Lt Cdr.R.N. (Retd), “Battle Honours of the Royal Navy”, “Maritime Books”, 2004 Captain John Wells, CBE, DSC, (RN Retd), “The Royal Navy, An illustrated Social History 1870- 1982”, Alan Sutton Publishing, 1994.

Journals Various Newsletters of The HMS Ajax & River Plate Veterans Association. . World at War. #41 April- May 2015.

Digital http://www.naval-history.net/

Acknowledgements Alan Strachan BA Hons History, MA in Maritime History - family archive. Elizabeth Penny, Archive, Administration and Editor Malcolm Collis, Archivist, The HMS Ajax & River Plate Veterans Association.

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