Jorge Ramírez Zelaya, Being a Terrorist, 1985

The following document comes from a collection of interviews conducted by two journalists, Dieter Eich and Carlos Rincòn, with members of Contra groups who had been captured by the Sandinistas. Ramírez refers to his work for the FDN (Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense/Nicaraguan Democratic Force), a Contra group fighting the Sandinista government.

Where were you on July 19, 1979?

I was a member of the 5th Company, called “The Casual,” which handled special missions… On July 19, 1979 I had to flee. I fled from the “Campo del Marte” where the 5th Company was located. The top leadership had collapsed, and everyone fended for themselves in our company. I don’t know what else was going on in the National Guard.

I fled to the Argentine embassy. That was the only embassy that I was still able to reach. It was located in the section of called “Las Colinas.” Life in the embassy went on in a completely normal fashion. We were granted all the rights of political refugees. There were approximately 70 people in the embassy, political refugees and members of their families. Many of them were demoralized, and everyone was trying to leave the country in order to start a new life for themselves. I spent nine months in the embassy, and then I emigrated to Argentina. I went alone, without my family. I stayed in Argentina for 15 months. I worked as a security specialist. Since I had been trained in Argentina, I already had connections there…

What sort of training had you had?

I was a graduate of the Military Academy of . In addition, I had taken courses in Panama and Argentina. As a soldier, I was especially interested in secret police activities, heavy weapons, artillery, counterinsurgency, propaganda, guerrilla warfare, sabotage and explosives. After I left the Military Academy, I specialized in security assignments.

Were you also trained as a contra at the 5th School at Ciudad Nueva in Tegucigalpa, which was run by the Argentine military?

I no longer really needed that training. I could brush up on my training there in some ways, although I had already been thoroughly trained. That course of training did make good soldiers for the FDN, and in a short period of time.

Can you remember any of the instructors?

They were really good soldiers, Oswald above all. He was very tough, very well-disciplined and correct. A military trainer of the best kind.

The FDN recruited some former military men who were staying in Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras and the U.S. What was the next step? Didn’t you build up and direct the “La Tercera” base?

You are very well informed! My first assignment was as the deputy leader of a base group—a Task Force (Fuerza de Tarea), as these special units were also called. I was in this camp for two months. At that point we had 70 soldiers and were in a setting-up or construction phase…

As one of the best strategists of the FDN, known as B-1, you were sent by the FDN staff to the Pino-1 Base. There the commander called “El Suicida” had brought together about 1800 men who seemed to be beyond his control. The commanders of the other Task Forces wanted an explanation of why “El Suicida,” with so many men and weapons, wasn’t in a position to take Jalapa. Is it correct that you were supposed to intervene in this situation, and that you also got to know Pedro Javier Núñez Cabezas, “El Muerto,” whom you chose as the only one to work with you in preparing and carrying out the M83 plan?

I was there for only 2 weeks, to work out professional plans for “El Suicida” to take Jalapa. But his training wasn’t sufficient to carry out this mission, and he also had no discipline. He had attacked much too early, in November, when the mission had not been sufficiently thought out or perfected. He invaded La Providencia on his own and promptly got stuck and then had to take a lot of punishment. I criticized him severely for this. There was no strategic point to this attack, and in addition it was an example of a lack of discipline.

In January, the staff of the FDN wanted me to work out a special plan for him—”Plan Managua ‘83” or “M83”—in order to strike a serious blow to the Sandinista regime. But that’s another story. I was given this assignment and I was trapped. That’s how it goes… It was part of the overall strategy of the FDN. Simultaneous with the large-scale offensive by the Task Forces in the north, acts of sabotage were to be carried out in Managua. Plan M83 was supposed to destroy important supply lines, to destroy basic logistical facilities of the Sandinista Army and supplies that were supposed to be sent to the northern battle zones. The acts of sabotage in Nicaragua were supposed to damage the refineries, and thus cripple the whole fuel supply and communications. This was intended to touch a particularly sensitive nerve among the combat forces and the air force. I had learned in Panama how to handle the special explosives which are necessary for this kind of action, and then in Honduras, where I refreshed my knowledge…

But this work didn’t have much to do with what you have described as your duties with the Task Forces.

This assignment was completely different from what I did with the Task Forces. My job was no longer a directly military job. My job—yes, one can say this—was that of a terrorist. Yes, actually that of a terrorist. It was therefore completely different from what I did in the Task Forces. Being a terrorist means preparing and organizing terrorist actions and sabotage here in Managua. Managua was part of Zone 9, just like the regions in the north which each have a number. Each number is assigned to a commander of a Task Force. I gave the orders in Zone 9, that is, in Managua and the area around it. So you can see from this, too, that the assignment was coordinated with the overall FDN strategy.

As one of those responsible for the “Internal Front,” were you also supposed to attack individuals there?

Yes, of course. I was assigned to organize the assassination of various individuals, such as Father D’Escoto, the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, and Nora Astorga, the Deputy Foreign Minister. Father Ernesto Cardenal was also included. Nora Astorga was among them because she played a large, important part in the murder of a general of the National Guard, the number two man on the general staff, General Sánchez. In addition, she presided over the trials of those who were imprisoned after July 19. We planned to assassinate her to show that she was nothing, that she possessed no moral value, no authority to conduct such a trial.

Cardenal and D’Escoto are members of the Sandinista regime, and religious men have no business taking government office, in no government of the world. This assassination plan was intended to generate chaos, terror, so that these people who now wear the robes of office would get their hands off. Do you understand this?—and I want to add that everything is interrelated. It is surely no surprise to you that people are killed every day in Asia, Africa, Europe and America. This is always part of the strategy of a particular group, a particular movement.

But the FDN wants to take political power. Aren’t you afraid of being rejected by the populace because of the terrorism?

It is surely clear to you, too, that terrorism exists throughout the world. It isn’t as if we started it here in Nicaragua. It must, of course, be clear that terrorism is always political, always a political instrument.

But doesn’t the FDN believe that its national and international image will be weakened or damaged by these terrorist actions?

No, I don’t think so. There is a psychological blow, with a great propaganda effect nationally and internationally, that justifies these actions. The end justifies the means—that’s all I can say.

The FDN is kept functional by the financial and military support of the U.S. government. Does it also support terrorist actions?

It is absolutely clear that the movement, any underground movement, is able to survive only with the support of a continental power. Let me give the following example: Arafat is supported by Libya, there is no doubt about this, and we are supported in the same way by the United States. Every revolution is supported by a foreign power.

“Jorge Ramírez Zelaya: The End Justifies the Means,” Dieter Eich and Carlos Rincòn, eds. The : Interviews with Anti-Sandinistas (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications, 1985).