The Dynamics of Technologies and International Relations

Approaching U.S.-China Cyber Negotiations from a Technological Endogenous IR-analysis

Olivia Lin S1217992 Leiden University MSc Crisis & Security Management Supervisor: Dr. Vlad Niculescu-Dincă Second reader: Dr. Els de Busser Words: 21.016

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Dr. Vlad Niculescu-Dincă. He was always open for any questions and his quick feedback allowed me to produce this thesis. I would also like to thank my sisters Xiaoqing Vogelaar-Lin and Xiaodan Lin for their feedback and Christie Ebeling for her unconditional support and understanding in the process of writing this thesis. This accomplishment would have not been the same without them. Thank you.

2 Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations ...... 5 1. Introduction ...... 6 2. Theoretical Framework ...... 8 2.1 International Relations and Technology ...... 8 2.2 Traditional IR Theories ...... 9 2.2.1 Realism ...... 9 2.2.2 Liberalism ...... 10 2.2.3 Constructivism ...... 10 2.3 Approaches to Technology ...... 11 2.3.1 Technological Instrumentalism ...... 11 2.3.2 Technological Essentialism ...... 13 2.3.3 Social Constructionism ...... 16 2.4 Hybrid Approaches ...... 17 2.5 Herrera’s Framework ...... 18 3. Methodology ...... 21 3.1 Research Design ...... 21 3.2 Methods ...... 22 3.3 Operationalisation ...... 26 3.4 Validity and Reliability ...... 27 4. U.S.-China Cyber Negotiations’ Context ...... 29 4.1 Step 1 Identifying the Socio-Technical System ...... 29 4.1.1 Defining Cyberspace ...... 29 4.2 Step 2 Interaction Capacity ...... 34 4.2.1 Conceptualisation of Technologies ...... 35 4.2.2 U.S.-China Cyber Negotiations ...... 38 5. U.S.-China Cyber Negotiations’ Dynamics...... 42 5.1 Regulation and Control ...... 42 5.1.1 Internet Sovereignty ...... 42 5.2 Knowledge Bases ...... 45 5.2.1 Information Sharing ...... 45 5.3 Trust and Security ...... 52 5.3.1 Confidence Building Measures ...... 53 5.4 Insights ...... 55 6. Way Forward...... 57 6.1 Conclusion ...... 57

3 6.2 Limitations ...... 58 6.3 Recommendations...... 59 Bibliography ...... 62 APPENDIX A: Analysis of Selected Documents ...... 72 1. China ...... 72 2. U.S...... 81

4 List of Abbreviations

CAC Cyberspace Administration of China CBMs Confidence Building Measures CICIR China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations CPC Communist Party of China (CPC) CSIS Center for Strategic & International Studies (U.S.) DHS Department of Homeland Security (U.S.) DoD Department of Defense (U.S.) DoJ Department of Justice (U.S.) EC European Commission EU European Union GDPR General Data Protection Regulation ICT Information and Communication Technology IP Intellectual Property ISP Internet Service Provider IT Information Technology IR International Relations LECD Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue NCSS National Cyberspace Security Strategy (China) NSS National Security Strategy (U.S.) RMA Revolution in Military Affairs SCOT Social Construction of Technology STS Science and Technology Studies UNGGE United Nations Group of Governmental Experts UN United Nations U.S. United States

5 1. Introduction

Recent malicious cyber operations, such as WannaCry and NotPetya, have shown that cyberattacks are able to significantly influence the daily lives of individuals by disrupting critical infrastructures such as hospitals, ambulances, and banks (“Ransomware cyber-attack threat escalating”, 2017). The advanced integration of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) into societies have not only created new ways of interaction and influenced both individuals’ lives and the system of international system positively, it has also given room for malicious use of such technologies. As there has been a lack of internationally agreed behaviour on cyberspace regarding such operations, several initiatives to reach a more stable cyberspace have been established that are predominantly based on multilateral collaboration. The United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) is a well-known example, but the initiative failed to reach a consensus in June 2017 while its prior attempts have been more successful (Sukumar, 2017). Even though the involvement of a vast number of actors in such initiatives is desirable, a lack of consensus may also be more likely in such cases, which in turn influences the outcomes of collaborations negatively (Jurrjens & Sizoo, 1997, p.34). Moreover, research on such cooperation mechanisms have primarily been approached from a deterrence perspective (such as Harold, Libicki & Cevallos, 2016). In these approaches, technologies are conceptualised exogenously from the international system, in which technologies are not part of the field of international relations. While such deterrence approaches are valuable given their attempts of explaining international relations, they did not significantly contribute to the achievement of a consensus benefiting the stability of cyberspace as the ongoing malicious use of cyberspace shows.

Given that bilateral agreements might be a more effective tool in achieving a stable cyberspace (Bund & Pawlak, 2017, p.1) and have more potential in establishing political binding agreements that have greater effects in the longer term when they involve more powerful states, this thesis will elaborate on cyber negotiations between the United States (U.S.) and China. A strong consensus between both countries regarding cyberspace will add pressure on the issue and might evoke other countries to commit to bilateral cyber negotiations as well. It is particularly interesting to research the relationships between both states because of President Trump’s perception on cyberspace (Lafrance, 2016) and President Xi’s ambitions on becoming a major actor in cyberspace (Xi, 2017, p.27).

6 In an attempt to approach the bilateral negotiations from an alternative perspective that might lead to a better overall and mutual understanding in each states’ position regarding cyberspace, which in turn might contribute to achieving consensus benefiting cyberspace stability, this thesis proposes a technological endogenous approach to International Relations (IR). In doing so, the research focuses on the role of technologies in an IR context, in which technologies are endogenous to the international system, and makes use of Herrera’s framework (2003) on technological transformations and change in the international system. The research will answer the following explanatory research question:

“How is the role of technologies conceptualized in the dynamics of the U.S.-China negotiations on cyberspace?”

To help answering the main research question, the thesis will be guided by several sub questions: (1) Who are the most prominent actors in the history of cyberspace and the Internet? (2) How is the relationship between technology and the human agent perceived in the U.S. and China? (3) What were previous cyber negotiations and how have they shaped U.S.-China relationships?

Overall, chapter 2 starts with the theoretical framework in which traditional IR theories, technological approaches, and Herrera’s framework (2003) will be discussed. After the third chapter on the methodology, the thesis applies Herrera’s framework to the case under study in which the sub questions will be answered in chapter 4. Subsequently, the main research question will be discussed in chapter 5 after which the way forward is addressed in chapter 6.

Apart from an extension in the academic literature regarding the role of technologies in IR in general, this research offers an alternative perspective in the U.S.-China cyber negotiations. Moreover, the research will benefit society as it might lead to inspirations in approaching and achieving more consensus in international cyber dialogues, which in turn will lead to more stability in cyberspace. Due to the indispensable relevancy of the area and its high impact on society, this thesis will contribute to an ever-evolving field that is of crucial influence on international security.

7 2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 International Relations and Technology In this chapter, the thesis will map dominant approaches in conceptualising the role of technologies in the field of IR, and posits why these approaches alone are limited when examining the role of technologies in the case under study. As the combination of IR and technology is a field that is relatively new, it is useful to address this comprehensive field in order to give the reader a more insightful impression on the developments and applicability of this research, especially as the relationship between technologies and IR is generally thought of to be obvious but is in reality rather under-theorized within IR theory (Herrera, 2002, p.93; McCarthy, 2015, p.2). In general, analyses involving international relations are predominantly approached from a deterrence perspective, including mutual threats in a national security context which are mostly carried out to prevent action (Schelling, 2008, p.x). One of the most common used definitions of politics, “who gets what, when, how” (Laswell, 1936) is inherently based on the distribution of property and power. This view is also shared by Mearsheimer, (2001) who posed that technological resources are often taken as a measurement of the effective power of states. Moreover, Morgenthau (1946) posed that technological development was both productive and destructive (as cited in McCarthy, 2015, p.2), stressing the impact technologies might have on societies and the international system. These scholars conceptualise technologies in terms of material resources and power. More importantly, these conceptualizations treat technologies as an exogenous factor to the international system, which is also done by traditional IR theorists (Herrera, 2003, p.562). This thesis posits a more holistic approach in analysing the dynamics in the U.S.- China negotiations on cyberspace. Before turning to particular technological approaches in which various forms of how technologies are treated in IR contexts are discussed, traditional IR theories will be reflected on first in order to position this thesis more clearly in the IR field. For clarification, the concept of ‘technologies’ used in this thesis includes Information Technology (IT), ICT, and the broader cyberspace in general. The ‘international system’ includes the field of international relations and politics, in which states act and interact with each other in various ways. These concepts will not be under further discussion and are analysed in a ceteris paribus manner.

8 2.2 Traditional IR Theories Existing IR theories treat technologies as an external factor. Overall, they do not reflect on technologies, such as cyberspace, but rather approach those from a specific theme such as security or governance. This section examines realism, liberalism, and constructivism, and how they conceptualise technology.

2.2.1 Realism Realism is primarily state-centred and focuses on their struggle for power and national security in a world of anarchy. Due to the lack of a higher authority, states strive to maximise their security to survive. This focus on self-help and state security creates a situation in which the distribution of power is central within the international system. In general, realists interpretate the use of technologies by states as an advancement of their protection and security (Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.7). In the security realm, it is the dominant paradigm as theories such as deterrence can be used for the analysis of a stable cyberspace, and “whether cyber technologies will be a new source of conflict or of peace” (Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.7). Moreover, Drezner (as cited in Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.11) poses that state interests determine outcomes in international cyber governance. He focuses on the governance of cyberspace, separating international politics from technology. Neorealism, in particular, conceptualises technologies as a force which is able to redistribute power in the system. Waltz (as cited in Herrera, 2003, p.568) poses that military technologies are able to increase military capabilities. Moreover, Goldman (2004) and Newmyer (2010, as cited in Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.20) both perceive information technology as a contribution to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in which IT enhances the military power of states. Whereas Goldman (2004) poses that technology is primarily an ‘efficiency-booster’ to states with mature military capabilities, Newmyer (2010) perceives it as a tool in warfare that is advantageous to weaker actors (as cited in Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.21). The nature of states evokes competitive responses from which a shift in the distribution of power in the international system might follow. As the evolution of technologies is not explained, they are treated exogenously but nevertheless are able to influence international politics.

9 2.2.2 Liberalism Liberalism is mainly focused on institutions and their ability to influence the behaviour of states. Different from the perspectives of realists, states are not central to liberalists and are influenceable by civil society. Liberalists perceive technologies as a way of influencing the behaviour of states in the international arena (Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.7). Moreover, liberalist theories help explain the spread of ideas and the development of civil society with the use of cyberspace (Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.7). To Alden (2003), the differences among and within states in relation to information technology might be perceived as a form of imperialism that only benefits the wealthy (as cited in Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.16). Other liberalist scholars, such as Corrales and Westhoff (2006), argue that it is “the degree to which a regime is economically inward- or outward-looking that determines the strategy it uses toward adopting cyber technology” (as cited in Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.19). All such scholars have adopted positions highlighting the separation between technology and the international system. Neoliberal institutionalism, in particular, conceptualises technology as a means which is able to benefit cooperation and reduce costs (Keohane, 1984 as cited in Herrera, 2003, p.568). Here, technologies are able to impact cooperation between actors and therefore the set- up of the international system, but technologies are still treated as an exogeneous factor (Herrera, 2003).

2.2.3 Constructivism Constructivism focuses on the socially constructed aspects of international relations instead of the material aspects that realist and liberalist theories emphasise. As structures in the international system are based on ideas that are subject to change, constructivists pose that the international system in itself is changeable as well. Constructivists therefore see technologies as an empowerment tool that is able to transform the international system (Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.9). Der Derian (2003), for instance, poses that the combination of technology and the September 11 attacks in 2001 have transformed the national security discourse (as cited in Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.22). The interaction between technology and the international system is further elaborated on through a constructivist perspective by Dartnell (2003) who perceives cyberspace “as a medium through which powerful messages can promote change in individuals’ identities and therefore reshape political boundaries and actors” (as cited in Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.23). While ideas are

10 not able to threaten military structures, they are able to destabilize the international system by changing notions on threat and safety (Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.23). These scholars show that constructivists find technologies important but still treat them exogenously as they conceptualise them in terms of tools and measures. Different from realists and liberalists, constructivists perceive the field of IR and the role of technologies as fields that interact and co-influence each other. Even though it makes less strict separations between the materialistic world that is created by technologies and the social world, which both realism and liberalism do more obviously, technologies are not theorised by constructivists (Herrera, 2003, p.569). They still conceptualise them exogenously, although in less extreme forms than realists and liberalists do.

2.3 Approaches to Technology In general, three ‘forms’ of approaching the role of technologies in relation to IR can be distinguished. Two dominant forms include technological instrumentalism and technological essentialism, which are determinist approaches to technology (McCarthy, 2015, p.19). These determinist approaches consider that technological developments determine society and the way humans live their lives (Niculescu-Dincă, 2016, p.41). Moreover, they attribute to technology “a rationale beyond human sociality and historical processes” (McCarthy, 2015, p.20).

2.3.1 Technological Instrumentalism Technological instrumentalism conceptualises technologies as neutral artefacts and deny a path-dependency of such artefacts. In this approach, the technological artefact does not in themselves produce consequences but change rather arises from actions of the end-user (Scolve, 1995, as cited in Niculescu-Dincă, 2016, p.39) and their use of the objects (McCarthy, 2015, p.21). The human agency is dominant in this approach in which technologies are passive and obedient to the user (Niculescu-Dincă, 2016, p.40). Consequences can therefore be ascribed to the user since technologies remain neutral. However, users of technologies are responsible for actions that involve technologies as they are tools used by human agents for a certain goal. Here, instrumentalists position the human agent as privileged with regard to technologies and conceptualise the potential of technologies equally to how human agents use technologies (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, p.7).

11 A widely used example of this approach to technology in IR is the use of weapons, which are in themselves not inherent offensive or defensive, but only serve such purposes when they are used by human agents in either manner (Jervis, 1978; Leber, 2000, as cited in McCarthy, 2015, p.21). Concerning the use of cyberspace, the instrumentalist perspective does not ascribe to it a role of stimulating democracy or oppression. Because of the neutral nature of technological objects, it is the human agency who decides to make use of such technologies and for which goal they are used. They decide to go towards either more cooperation or conflict and use technologies as an instrument in doing so. While the human agent is central to instrumentalists, they disregard human influence in the development of technologies. Here, technological development and design is often related to “an unavoidable progress” as “technology moves forward in virtue of its internal dynamics” (Niculescu-Dincă, 2016, p.40). Moreover, the responsibility of users in the use of technologies is particularly stressed, thereby ignoring the socio-political context of technological developments (Niculescu-Dincă, 2016, p.42). Even though humans are rational animals, they can be subject to social and political dynamics in relation to technologies. Concerning the design of technologies, the approach also ignores social interaction among human agents, their environments, and the organisations and state they are situated in. Furthermore, the instrumentalist approach suggests that the means of technologies are not able to influence ends or outcomes, and stress “agency in the use of technology but not in their design and creation” (McCarthy, 2015, p.27). The view of technology as being neutral in their nature inherently treats it as an exogeneous factor to the international system, and “limits a full grasp of the nature of power in global politics” (McCarthy, 2015, p.26).

In an IR context, the instrumentalist perspective conceptualises the human agent as the dominant factor who can be ascribed full responsibility for the established international order. As technologies are neutral, it is not technologies that have created opportunities for states to interact and to perform international politics but the human agent who have used technologies as means in doing so. For instance, the non-use and non-existence of the Internet for North Korean citizens is enforced by its regime and is a choice made by the human agent, embodied by the regime. The instrumentalist view poses that the situation will remain that way until the agent would decide differently. Simultaneously, the human agent does not have a role in influencing the development of the Internet, and no changes can be made concerning the technology to adapt it to the wishes of the North Korean regime.

12 This perspective of conceptualising technology is however inadequate in an IR context as it disregards the influence of the human agency in the development of technologies, regardless of its dominance in using technologies. To relate back to the example of weapons, its designers might have developed the mechanisms with an intention: to be able to use them for offensive or defensive purposes, which is essentially a social purpose. In addition, technological advancements have created opportunities to move to better designs for weapons to use them in offensive or defensive ways. Consider the development towards more technically advanced weapons over time, which was driven by a combination of social factors in both the development and use of weapons. As populations desired better ways to defend themselves and to overrule the opponent in war-like situations, human agents sought better designs of these technologies in order to use them more efficiently and effectively.

2.3.2 Technological Essentialism Different from technological instrumentalism, technological essentialism conceptualises technologies as path dependent and biased instead of inherently neutral. Technologies are privileged in respect to its users, who are rather subject to technological transformations (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, p.10) and are not free to use technological objects. This approach argues that technological artefacts are inherently powerful and are able to cause social change (McCarthy, 2015, p.29), and to act independent of society (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, p.3). Rather than being neutral, as instrumentalists argue, technological objects inherently carry characteristics that cause change and lead to definitive outcomes (McCarthy, 2015, pp.20, 29). In general, technological essentialist literature can be divided into two strands: the so-called techno-optimists, who pose that ICTs lead to more democracy in IR, and techno- pessimists, who pose that ICTs lead to more oppression (McCarthy, 2015, p.29). The optimists argue that it is not the use of technological objects by human agents that spread democracy, but the technology itself. The pessimists, however, stress power as a form of domination (McCarthy, 2015, p.30). For instance, Der Derian (2003, as cited in McCarthy, 2015, p.31) poses that ICTs structure human agencies as the technologies “have overcome our ability to interpret events”, excluding the human agent, and therefore impose that “effects are beyond human control” (McCarthy, 2015, p.31). It is not human action anymore that causes change but rather technology itself. Other IR scholars, such as Keohane and Nye (1998, as cited in McCarthy, 2015, p.22), pose that IT in particular have played a dominant role in “changing the nature of the

13 international system”. As technologies have set a context of “increased information flows and thus increased transparency, pushing state interactions towards more cooperative forms” (Keohane, 2002, p.10, as cited in McCarthy, 2015, p.23), they changed “the nature of power in the international system (…)” and diffused “power to a larger number of actors in the international system” (Nye, 2010, as cited in McCarthy, 2015, p.23). Heidegger (1977, p.9) goes further by posing that technologies are overtaking the social world as human agents have become objects of technologies. Similar to technological instrumentalism, the essentialist approach poses that human agents are not able to change the internal dynamics of technological developments (McCarthy, 2015, p.30). The influence of the human agent is however diminished in many aspects as it is technologies that are dominant in determining outcomes. While it poses that human agents are important as they are “bearers of technological structures”, they are not able to change the structures (McCarthy, 2015, p.32). Technologies are therefore not neutral and regulate the state of being in all contexts. Furthermore, the essentialist approach also conceptualises technology as a separate field from the human agent, treating technology as an exogeneous factor rather than as part of the international system. Moreover, it denigrates the human agency and to what extent it is able to determine outcomes.

In an IR context, the essentialist perspective conceptualises technologies as the dominant factor driving change in the international system. It is cyberspace, for example, that creates opportunities for states to interact and to perform international politics. It is not the human agent that decided it would make use of cyberspace to create such interaction opportunities, but the technology itself that has determined the outcome of opportunities due to its biased nature. An example of this approach in the conceptualisation of technology in an IR context involves a YouTube interview with then President Obama in 2015, in which he said the following about North Korea: “We will keep on ratcheting the pressure, but part of what’s happening is that…the Internet, over time is going to be penetrating this country…And it is very hard to sustain that kind of brutal authoritarian regime in this modern world. Information ends up seeping in over time and bringing about change, and that’s something that we are constantly looking for ways to accelerate.” (Foster-Carter, 2015). In his statement, Obama adopts a clear technological essentialist view in which he subscribes a dominant position to technology, to which human agents have minimal influence. This essentialist view is limited

14 as it does not acknowledge the power of the human agent in diplomacy or of influencing the situation regarding North Korea, which the instrumentalist approach overemphasises. The technological essentialist view of conceptualising technology is however inadequate in an IR context as it disregards the power of the human agency in both the development of technologies and the freedom to use them by overemphasising the position of technologies. Despite of the overwhelming possibilities of technologies and its presence in many aspects of life, the human agent is able to make rational decisions. When considering the historical context of the development of technologies, which essentialists do not incorporate, in relation to rational choice, as in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, it is clear that the human agent is able to influence its use of technologies. The Cuban missile crisis involved a situation in which the confrontation between the United States and the then Soviet Union reached a momentum in which a nuclear war could be an outcome if human agents did not influence the situation by acting rationally. While technologies have contributed to efficiencies in war-like situations or may have created scenarios that would not exist without technologies, such as the nuclear elements in the Cuban missile crisis, the human factor is still able to influence the outcome as they decide to commit to the use of nuclear weapons. Both technologies and human agents are therefore a factor in the dynamics of the international system. The determinist approach to technology is not able to explain these dynamics adequately due to its exogenous conceptualisation of technologies.

The discussed determinist approaches to technology can be associated with more materialist theories including forms of realism and liberalism as discussed above (Herrera, 2003, p.567). They are inadequate for analysing the role of technologies in IR for several reasons. First, they treat technology as an exogenous factor to the social world or disregards this context overall. Both technological instrumentalism and technological determinism separate technologies and the international system. Second, technological determinism separates technology from values. Whereas, essentialists pose that “the meaning of technology is pre-determined”, instrumentalists posit that technologies are answers to the needs of societies (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, p.14). Third, both approaches stress the use of technologies in particular and do not focus on the development of technologies and the human influence on the development, which is equally relevant when assessing technologies. Fourth, the historical dimension is not significantly discussed in the determinist approaches and rather obscured by depicting technologies as a progress (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, p.12). For instance, instrumentalists

15 conceptualise technologies as means of which human agents defines its outcomes, and its history can therefore “be defined as the adaptation of such means to society’s needs and a resulting increase in human agency” (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, p.12). Essentialists, however, conceptualise the emergence of technologies as “adaptive responses to the limits of existing systems through a kind of evolution” (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, p.12). Though different, both approaches do not elaborate further on the history of the development of technologies and rather treat it as given. All in all, the determinist approaches fail to include social, political or historical dimensions and contexts of technology. Accordingly, they are inadequate for assessing the relationship between IR and technologies, especially as IR is inherently build on developments in those dimensions. Moreover, the international system includes various perspectives and human values, and technologies are usually designed in different contexts and places throughout the world. As these designs might have various consequences for different groups (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, p.15), it is necessary to take the development of technologies into account. The lack of focus on this aspect stress that determinist approaches alone are inadequate for analysing the role of technologies in IR contexts.

2.3.3 Social Constructionism A third form of approaching technology makes use of the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) perspective, which is also called social constructionism or social determinism, and is part of Science and Technology Studies (STS).

This approach can be positioned in between technological instrumentalism on the one hand and technological essentialism on the other hand as it includes path-dependency of technologies but also acknowledges human influence in the development of the artefacts (McCarthy, 2015, p.33). Different from the determinist approaches to technology, this form approaches the relationship between IR and technological development by encompassing the social construction of technologies (McCarthy, 2015, p.32), and can therefore be perceived to be the closest to traditional constructivist IR theory. Both approaches pose that the social world is created by human agents, their interests and choices (Herrera, 2003, p.572). Whereas traditional IR constructivism focuses on the construction of social identities and how they construct actor behaviour, SCOT focuses on social forces who construct technologies and does not dwell on the effects of those social forces on technologies (Herrera, 2003, p.567).

16 In SCOT, technology is designed and developed by multiple actors that are each able to give and adopt various meanings to the object (Niculescu-Dincă, 2016, p.44), stressing an ‘interpretive flexibility’ of technologies (Herrera, 2003, p.573). Importantly, both the use and development of technologies are “culturally contested processes, shaped by social, ethical and political choices” (Niculescu-Dincă, 2016, p.43). This form treats technology rather as a social process in which technology is entrenched in the social environment and conceptualises technologies in ways where human values are built into (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, pp.10,14). The main difference of this SCOT approach from the technological determinist approaches is that technology is inherently part of the international system and is not treated as an exogenous factor to the system (McCarthy, 2015, p.33). Instead of an exogenous context, technological development rather takes place in social and historical contexts, relating to these contexts as the development carries on (McCarthy, 2015, p.33). Moreover, the process of technological development is non-linear, and its outcome is a combination of several political decisions that have been made along the way (McCarthy, 2015, p.33). As Herrera (2006, p.34- 36) notes, the use of technological artefacts by human agents have been constructed by earlier technological developments, and thus by prior political decisions. The human choice and interest has developed and shaped new technologies, during which the aspects of innovation have been well thought of (Herrera, 2003, p.572).

Social constructionism conceptualises technology differently than technological determinism and proposes a more endogenous approach to technologies. SCOT alone is however inadequate in analysing the role of technologies in IR. While they emphasise the role of human agents in the design of technologies, they try to explain the development of technologies without discussing the implications and effects of them in detail (Herrera, 2003, p.573).

2.4 Hybrid Approaches Several authors have proposed alternative approaches on conceptualising technologies, that include both technological determinist views and SCOT. For instance, Feenberg (2002) poses that technology is not neutral or a unique object. With his critical theory of technology, he argues that technological objects embody in their design the purpose for which they are built, and thus are able to guide or push development in a specific direction (McCarthy, 2015, p.152). Moreover, Feenberg “overcomes the unnecessary dualism between instrumentalism and essentialism – or structure and agency – via his understanding of technological artefacts as

17 ‘biased but ambivalent’” (2002, as cited in McCarthy, 2015, p.152), meaning that technologies can push the international system into certain directions but are not fully independent from the human agency. He bridges the gap between determinist approaches and social constructionism by absorbing elements of both approaches into his theory. Herrera (2003) proposes a social-technical approach which integrates both technological determinism and SCOT, intending to strike a balance between SCOT and technological determinism (Herrera, 2003, p.580). Defining technologies as “socio-technical systems” in which they are both social and technical products, he poses that technologies possess characteristics that are socially originated (SCOT), create social effects (technological determinism), and are formed by human agents and their interests (SCOT) while simultaneously resisting these human intentions (technological determinism) (Herrera, 2003, p.575). Moreover, Herrera (2003, p.573) argues that technologies can have political effects as they are able to create or close off political action mechanisms thereby creating definitive outcomes. Simultaneously, such technologies consist of choices and interests of human agents including underlying reasons that have been subject to their creation (Herrera, 2003, p.575). Based on these assumptions, Herrera (2003) has developed a framework that proposes a form of analysis in which cases can be researched in an attempt to describe the relevancy of technology to international politics. As Herrera’s work forms a “central reference point” in the research of technologies and IR theory (McCarthy, 2015, p.36), this thesis will apply Herrera’s framework in the analysis of U.S.-China cyber negotiations connecting the role of technologies and the international system in a holistic approach. Before turning to the methodological chapter, the next section will elaborate on Herrera’s framework.

2.5 Herrera’s Framework In this section, the thesis addresses an alternative perspective in approaching technologies in an IR context, in which technological transformations and change in the international system are connected in Herrera’s framework (2003, p.559). He can be classified as a scholar of the constructivist school as he regards technology as inherently political in which “the construction of technologies is subject to political contestation and technology can be understood as a certain kind of practical knowledge, embedded in material artefacts and in the institutions built to manage them” (2003, p.559). Technology is not exogenous to the international system, but rather systemic and political (Herrera, 2003, p.562), and must be perceived as part of the system

18 itself. Simultaneously, technology forms states within the international system, and the international system in itself. This constructivist view is different from realist theories who can explain states’ use of technologies in terms of security and response (Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.6), or liberalist theories who pose that accessibility and control of cyberspace might shape the behaviour of states (Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.7). Moreover, Herrera advocates an indeterminate view of technologies and poses that “the technology and the politics are inextricably intertwined” (2002, p.93). Furthermore, he poses that integrating socio-technical systems into IR theory creates new ways of perceiving technologies in an IR perspective (Herrera, 2003, p.580), of which the effects will be drawn upon in this thesis.

In his framework, Herrera (2003, p.584) proposes two steps in analysing the relationship between technological change and IR to better understand the connection between both fields. Whereas Herrera centralises technological change in general, this research focuses on technological change in context of Sino-American negotiations and its dynamics instead. The first step focuses on the development of internationally relevant technologies and their dependence on various domestic and international factors (Herrera, 2003, p.584). In this step, the emergence of the socio-technical system within the international system is being identified (Herrera, 2003, p.586). It explores the international context of the developing system including the important players and their interests and objectives (Herrera, 2003, p.584). In other words, technologies are conceptualised as politics, in which the development of technologies are subject to political deliberations (Herrera, 2003, p.560). Similar to the SCOT approach as described above, Herrera (2003, p.560) poses that technologies are political because political debates influence the construction, and thus the development, of technologies. The second step focuses on the political impact and maturation of the identified technological system (Herrera, 2003, p.586). This step makes use of the argument of Buzan and Little (2000) on interaction capacity, in which technology is conceptualised as a crucial part of the international system (as cited in Herrera, 2003, p.561). In that sense, the capacity of actors to interact is not just part of the actors themselves but is part of the system (Herrera, 2003, p.561). Here, technology has a significant role in the set-up and composition of the capacity of actors to interact in the international system (Herrera, 2003, p.561). It is technologies that are able to determine the interaction capacity of the international system. This

19 thesis will analyse this interaction capacity at the level of the bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and China.

Herrera’s framework has been developed for the understanding of technological change in the context of IR and system transformation. This thesis makes use of the foundations of the framework but applies it in a different way in order to analyse how technologies are conceptualised in the dynamics of the U.S.-China negotiations on cyberspace. Like Herrera, it will discuss the development of the socio-technical system, cyberspace in particular, in the first step. The second step involves the interaction capacity and the political impact of the socio- technical system, but this research will in particular analyse how the states under discussion conceptualise technologies and what U.S.-China cyber negotiations have followed from the political impact of the system. Subsequently, it will research the dynamics of U.S.-China cyber negotiations in which a technological endogenous IR-analysis is applied that is inspired by Herrera’s framework. Whereas Herrera (2003, p.559) “draws attention to political debate over the shape and content of a global information infrastructure” this thesis will particularly draw attention to the bilateral negotiations on cyberspace between the U.S. and China, proposing an alternative approach in analysing the role of technologies in the identified context. Before applying Herrera’s framework and the technological endogenous IR-analysis to the case under discussion, the methodology of the research will be discussed in the next chapter.

20 3. Methodology

3.1 Research Design This thesis makes use of the adequate research strategy selection as identified by Yin on the basis of three criteria: form of research question, whether the research requires control of behavioural events, and whether the research focuses on contemporary events (Yin, 2003, p.5). It is clear that the form of the research question includes a ‘how’ question and that it is not required to have control over the behavioural events, such as the negotiations under discussion, during the research. Moreover, the case under study includes contemporary events, but also historical events which have to be addressed in order to answer the main research question. As direct observation of the events is not part of the research and primary sources of the negotiations are relatively well documented and accessible via the Internet (Yin, 2003, p.8), this research makes use of a case study research strategy.

This research involves a qualitative holistic case study design in which the unit of analysis is the conceptualisation of technologies in an IR context, and the unit of observation are the U.S. and China. Their negotiations on cyberspace comprise the case under study. Not only does a case study gives deeper insight into the process of the subject under study, it also allows for a more intensive research (Lijphart, 1971, p.691). The decision to examine the case under study is made for various reasons. First, the negotiations offer a setting in which the intersection of the international system and technologies becomes clear. Second, the subject of these negotiations, cyberspace, is a contemporary and dynamic issue which is continuously under development. Third, the negotiations involve the U.S. and China who are major players in both the international system and cyberspace who can influence the behaviour of other actors in the system. Fourth, the states under study are based on different political systems and cultural values, which makes it interesting to analyse and compare each state’s conceptualisation of technologies.

The research is deductively conducted, in which Herrera’s framework is used to answer the main research question and to offer an alternative perspective on the specific field. In chapter 4.1, sub question 1 will be answered in the first step of Herrera’s framework in which an overview of the historical aspects of cyberspace, and in particular the Internet, is given. In the second step of Herrera’s framework, both sub question 2 and 3 will be answered. In chapter

21 4.2.1 sub question 2 is explored by analysing selected documents with the operationalised concepts as elaborated on further in this methodological chapter. Sub question 3 is explored in chapter 4.2.2, in which an overview will be given on previous and current cyber negotiations and their outcome documents, and how they have shaped U.S.-China relationships. Chapter 5 will apply a technological endogenous IR-analysis to the case under question and answers the main research question. Section 3.2 will further elaborate on the specific methods in conducting the research.

The possible limitations of the research include documents that are not available to the public and therefore cannot be subject to the research. These might include classified information or documents that are only shared with those directly involved with the negotiations. As not all information can be found via open source, this might limit the quality of the research. Moreover, the conceptualisations of technologies by both states under study include opinions and positions that may be subject to change. If these positions change during the analysis or at the publication of the research, this will have consequences for the reliability of the research. However, the validity and replicability of the research will not be affected in such a case even though the analysis could be different. Section 3.4 elaborates on both the validity and reliability of the research.

3.2 Methods To collect the relevant data that is needed to answer the sub questions and main research question, various documents have been selected. This process has included document analysis, in which the researcher has reviewed the relevancy of various documents based on the subject under study. The analysis of the research and the application of the framework are described as clearly as possible so that the research is replicable using the same or different sources.

To understand the dynamics in the U.S.-China cyber negotiations, this thesis will include a short analysis of the existing system of cyberspace and its historical aspects, as Herrera (2003, p.579) has argued for, which is necessary when explaining the effects of the cyberspace. This is conducted by answering the first sub question in section 4.1. In doing so, academic articles are part of the analysis from which relevant information is selected in order to provide an overview of the most prominent actors in the history of cyberspace.

22 In addition to the proposed framework of Herrera, this thesis will analyse how both the U.S. and China conceptualise technologies. This is conducted by answering the second sub question in section 4.2.1. In doing so, various documents have been selected that would provide a good overview of the position of the state under question. The aim was to find a relatively equal number of sources which were of equal importance, including legislation, an important presidential speech in an official setting, another speech which is less official, and a national strategy on cyberspace. By including these sources of various origins in the analysis, the way the states under study conceptualise technologies are well represented, and therefore more reliable as the analysis does not rely on only one type of source. Moreover, the maximum timeframe of the selected documents has been set to 2,5 years. This means that only documents that are not older than 2,5 years have been selected so that this research can be considered to be contemporary. For China, these included the following five documents: (1) Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China (Cybersecurity Law of China, 2016). This legislation was selected as it is the most recent Chinese legislation on cyberspace; (2) President Xi Jinping’s speech during the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Xi, 2017). This speech was selected as the National Congress of the CPC is one of the most prominent events in Chinese politics and can therefore be perceived as relatively equal of importance to the State of the Union; (3) President Xi’s speech at the 2018 Boao Forum for Asia (Xi, 2018). This speech has been selected as this keynote speech of the President has stressed technologies in an economic perspective, providing an interesting view of China on cyberspace; (4) China’s Strategic Thinking on Building Power in Cyberspace (Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), 2017). This CPC journal’s article outlines Chinese thinking on cyberspace and is therefore relevant for this analysis; (5) National Cyberspace Security Strategy (NCSS) (CAC, 2016). This strategy has been selected as it represents the general view of China on cyberspace. For the U.S., these included the following six documents: (1) Presidential Executive Order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure (The White House, 2017b). This executive order was selected as it is the most recent U.S. executive order on cyberspace and the closest to legislation; (2) President Donald Trump’s State of the Union speech (The White House, 2018). This speech was selected as the State of the Union is one of the most prominent speeches in which the President of the U.S. addresses the members of Congress and other Americans; (3) The first Trump-Clinton presidential debate (Lafrance, 2016). This debate is under study as it is one of the few debates

23 in which Trump openly and specifically talks about cyberspace; (4) National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) (The White House, 2017a). The NSS is selected as it represents the general security strategy of the US. As the U.S. position on cyberspace is addressed in the NSS, this document has been selected; (5) National Defense Strategy of The United States of America (U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), 2018). As the U.S. has published several strategies in which cyberspace is mentioned, their defense strategy has been selected as well; (6) Command Vision for US Cyber Command (U.S. Cyber Command, 2018). The U.S. Cyber Command has recently published a new vision regarding its position on cyberspace. This document has been selected due to its specific focus on the U.S. position on cyberspace. All sources have been found by using the online searching engine Google and the online University Library, in which relevant documents or speeches of both the U.S. and China relating to technologies and cyberspace have been searched upon. The selected U.S. documents comprise of one executive order, one official speech, one debate, two national strategies and one vision. The selected China documents comprise of one law, two speeches, one party journal article, and one strategy. These have been selected as these documents contained clear positions of the state regarding cyberspace or are important to include, such as the State of the Union of the U.S. To answer sub question 2, content analysis has been applied in which technology related sentences of the selected documents, as discussed above, have been identified that include one of the indicators as set out in section 3.3 of this chapter, after which the sentences are categorized as technological instrumentalism, technological essentialism or SCOT (see appendix A). These concepts indicate the way the U.S. and China conceptualise the relationship between technology and the human agent. This type of analysis offers the data which is needed to answer the sub question and indirectly the main research question. In order to refer more easily to these documents, they will be referred to as ‘selected documents’ from here on.

For the third sub question, previous and current U.S.-China negotiations on cyberspace have been shortly discussed. They include four different negotiations, of which some have several sequences. As some have been called dialogues, this research will refer to them either as negotiations or dialogues from here on. The dialogues under study will include the following negotiations: (1) the track 1.5 U.S.-China Cybersecurity Dialogue which has been held by the U.S. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) and the China Institutes of

24 Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), of which nine to eleven sequences have taken place; (2) the Obama-Xi agreement; (3) U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogues on Combating Cybercrimes and Related Issues, of which three sequences have taken place; (4) the U.S.-China Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue (LECD).

In order to answer the main research question, chapter 5 will analyse various outcome documents of the four distinguished negotiations as mentioned above. These include the following documents: (1) the Joint Statement that has been published by the track 1.5 U.S.- China Cybersecurity Dialogue (CSIS & CICIR, 2012); (2) the Obama-Xi Agreement (The White House, 2015), of which the cybersecurity agreements are under research only; (3) three Joint Summary of Outcomes by the U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogues on Combating Cybercrimes and Related Issues (U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2015; 2016a; 2016b); and (4) Summary of Outcomes of the first LECD (U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), 2017). In order to refer more easily to these documents, they will be referred to as ‘outcome documents’ from here on. On these six outcome documents a content analysis has been conducted, of which overlapping themes were distinguished. These include: (1) Regulation and Control, of which internet sovereignty is a subtheme; (2) Knowledge Bases, of which information sharing and Intellectual Property (IP) are subthemes; and (3) Trust and Security of which Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) is a subtheme. These themes could only be distinguished based on the six outcome documents of the negotiations under discussion. By relating those selected themes to the eleven selected documents of the U.S. and China that have been under study in the second sub question, it was possible to conduct a technological endogenous IR-analysis, which essentially analyses technologies from an endogenous perspective in relation to IR. Here, technologies are not conceptualised exogenously from the international system but are rather perceived to be existent in the international system, and thus endogenously, in which technologies and IR co-influence each other.

Sub question 1 and 3 will give the reader more understanding of the setting and context of the research. To answer sub questions 2 the thesis will analyse to what extent the concepts of technological determinism and SCOT are applied in the selected documents under analysis. In doing so and in support of the technological endogenous IR-analysis, the next section will operationalise these concepts.

25

3.3 Operationalisation The definitions of the concepts under study have been discussed in more detail in the theoretical framework. This section therefore only explains how the concepts of technological instrumentalism, technological essentialism and SCOT are measured in the research.

The indicators as defined in the table below are measured in the selected documents as discussed in the section above. One of these indicators should be addressed in these selected documents in order to be qualified as one of the operationalised concepts. These concepts are approaches that can be separated from each other. Moreover, the indicators are aspects of an approach which cannot be part of a different approach. Therefore, the research is internally consistent.

Table 1 Operationalisation Concepts Indicators Sources Technological - Human agent is perceived to be dominant in using the Selected documents Instrumentalism artefact - Human agent is responsible for actions - Human agent cannot influence the development of the artefact - Technologies are perceived to be neutral Technological - Human agent is subject to biased technologies Selected documents Essentialism - Technologies are responsible for actions - Human agent cannot influence the development of the artefact - Technologies are able to cause social change and definitive outcomes SCOT - Technologies are developed by human agents Selected documents - Human agent makes choices about how and what to innovate - Technologies and its effects are shaped by human interest, and by political and economic power

26 - Interpretive flexibility: different groups associate different meanings with artefacts

3.4 Validity and Reliability This section discusses the validity and reliability of the research.

Validity includes the question whether what was intended to be measured in the research was actually measured. There are various forms of validity. Construct validity evaluates whether the correct operational measures are used for the identified concepts (Yin, 2003, p.34). As the operationalization of the concepts as been discussed in the section above includes indicators that are derived from the definition of the concepts, construct validity is not considered as an issue in this research. Internal validity includes whether the research method, as in this case document analysis and content analysis, and data analysis are valid for reaching its conclusion and thus for answering the main research question. The selection of documents to answer sub question 2 has been carried out by the researcher of this thesis and might therefore be subject to bias. Even though the selected documents might be chosen by another researcher as well, the level of importance of the selected documents is ascribed by the researcher and might therefore be biased. The selected documents are however mostly official documents which can be generally perceived to be important, as is in the case of national strategies, legislation and official speeches during major political events. The deductive method of research in which existing theoretical approaches, including technological determinism, SCOT and Herrera’s framework, are used, enhance the internal validity of the research, as they are existing approaches that reflect ways of conceptualising technologies. Furthermore, the outcome documents under analysis are the only available documents that could be found on the dialogues under discussion and are therefore not subject to bias. External validity assesses whether the identified findings can be generalised. As the research includes a holistic single case study design, in which the position of two distinctive states are researched, the study is not considered to be generalisable. As that is neither the intention of the research, this is not perceived to be an issue.

Assessing the reliability of the research includes the question of whether the produced outcome in this research would be the same if the research would be conducted again. If the selected

27 documents would remain the same, a replicability of the research could lead to a similar outcome as is produced in this research. However, as a different timeframe could lead to the selection of other documents that are more recent than those used in this research, a different outcome might emerge. Moreover, the positions of the states under analyses can be subject to change and different presidents than those under subject in this research might also produce different outcomes. Finally, as the negotiations are ongoing and the field of cyberspace in under continuous development, new outcome documents can also lead to different outcomes.

28 4. U.S.-China Cyber Negotiations’ Context Conform Herrera’s framework, this chapter approaches the case under study in two steps by (1) identifying the socio-technical system; and (2) determining the interaction capacity of both China and the U.S.

4.1 Step 1 Identifying the Socio-Technical System This section identifies the socio-technical system which is at the basis of the analysis: cyberspace. It is guided by the first sub question: “who are the most prominent actors in the history of cyberspace and the Internet?” and highlights American and Chinese roles in the socio-technical system. It is important to identify the system as it affects the interaction capacity of the states under discussion.

The socio-technical system is identified by Herrera as “the mix of material and social institutions that cohere around artifacts” (2003, p.578). It includes technologies that are embedded in social systems and involves the unit of analysis in which technologies are used in social settings (Herrera, 2003, p.578). In particular, the socio-technical system under analysis is cyberspace and its position in the system of international relations. Whereas this section reflects on its development, the following section will discuss its effects on the states under discussion.

4.1.1 Defining Cyberspace Defining cyberspace is a difficult task as no common definition exists (“Cyber Definitions”, n.d.). China does not officially define cyberspace, but in its NCSS, it refers to “a cyberspace” that is “composed of the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems, automatized controls systems, digital equipment and the applications, services and data they carry” (CAC, 2016). Similarly, the U.S. defines cyberspace “as the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries” (The White House, 2008, p.3). On a more independent note, the Merriam-Webster dictionary defines cyberspace as “the online world of computer networks and especially the Internet” (Definition of Cyberspace, n.d.). All three definitions include tangible elements on which virtual elements exist, implying that information is a necessary component and that the Internet takes up only a part of this cyberspace.

29 Furthermore, cyberspace is not considered to be geographically located and might rather be perceived as a broader hemisphere which comprises the earth in its entirety (Barlow, 1996). It might even be posed that cyberspace is a parallel domain to the international system as structured in the physical world, in which an office would equate to an individual computer and both the ocean and highway system would equate to the Internet (Jacobs, 1999). From an endogenous perspective it should rather be posed that the socio-technical system of cyberspace is intrinsically part of the international system and should not be treated exogenously to it. To clarify the identification of the socio-technical system, it is however relevant to distinguish features of the system, including the various layers it is built upon. Van den Berg et al. (2014) identified three layers of cyberspace including (1) the core technical layer that is based on TCP/IP1, (2) a socio-technical layer in which interaction takes place between those active in cyberspace and data processing systems, and (3) a governance layer, through which the technical and socio-technical layer are governed by both human actors and organisations (p.2). This thesis focuses on the outer governance layer in which both the U.S. and China are governing actors. The technical and socio-technical layer are however crucial elements for cyberspace to exist and for the third layer to be valuable and must therefore be taken into account as well. As the socio-technical system of cyberspace is a very broad term and cannot be wholly encompassed in the research, this section discusses a dominant part of cyberspace: the Internet. It is as Gibson described: “the virtual world behind the computer screen” (Gibson,

1984, as cited in Naughton, 2016, p.12).2

Cyberspace and the Internet greatly impact both the daily lives of individuals and the functioning of the international system. As has been posed by the Chinese NCSS it has been “comprehensively changing people’s ways of production and life, and is profoundly influencing humankinds’ social historical development process”, stressing the impact cyberspace is having on all aspects of people’s lives (CAC, 2016). Its influence stretches even broader as “they increasingly penetrate into political, economic, cultural, social, ecological, national defense, and other areas.” (CAC, 2017). The U.S. NSS also highlights the impact of the socio-technical system and that humankind has become dependent “on computer-driven and interconnected technologies” (The White House, 2017a, p.13).

1 The section below elaborates on TCP/IP 2 The exact distinctions and boundaries between cyberspace and the Internet are not under analysis in this thesis and will therefore not be further elaborated on

30 The complex system of cyberspace includes technologies and protocols that enable activities that can be legitimate or malicious (U.S. Cyber Command, 2018, p.4). The danger of this dependency on such systems has been acknowledged by both states as the Chinese NCSS posed that “cyber penetrations harm political security” (CAC, 2016), thereby stressing the impact on the political realm, and the U.S. NSS warned that “as our reliance on computers and connectivity increases, we become increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks” (The White House, 2017a, p.13). The impact of cyberspace and the Internet and the possibilities to conduct malicious activities require policies that deal with such issues. Any changes in the architecture of cyberspace will therefore not only impact the daily lives of individuals, but also affect states. Apart from the impact the socio-technical system has had on both the lives of individuals and states, it has also been a platform for businesses who ascribe large part of their success to cyberspace. Online social networking services are part of this group that include Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter, who were respectively established in 2004, 2003 and 2006. Apart from these companies, American-based businesses as Apple, Google, Yahoo, Amazon and Microsoft have also gained power through cyberspace and continuously influence the daily lives of many people throughout the world (Naughton, 2016, p.19). The development of the socio-technical system has thus not only influenced these companies in their growth, these businesses also affected the further development of the Internet itself and continue to do so.

To understand the context of the socio-technical system and to properly conduct endogenous technological-IR analysis in which technologies are not treated exogenously from the international system, it is relevant to shortly describe the historical development of the Internet.

4.1.2 The Internet When reviewing the roots of the Internet it is striking that state actors have played an important role in its establishment and development. It was the U.S. government who desired a communications system during the arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Cold War (Naughton, 2016, p.7). While it has not developed the network by itself, many American researchers were urged to do so, after which the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) was created that was increasingly used as a communications network by a select group of researchers and computer scientists. It was the development of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP) that allowed the “possibility of organic growth: as long as a given network ‘spoke’ TCP/IP (as it were) it was free to join

31 the Internet” (Naughton, 2016, p.10). Even though it has been researchers that developed these protocols that connected networks to the overarching network, it was the U.S. Pentagon who required hosts to adopt this so-called lingua franca, marking January 1983 as the start of the Internet as known and used today (Naughton, 2016, p.10). Until then, the Internet was only available to a select group of people. Only when TCP/IP protocols became available to the computer industry in the U.S. market, however, and a new network, the Computer Science Network (CSNET), was created, became the Internet available to a broader range of people (Naughton, 2016, p.11). The transfer of Internet service to commercial Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that would provide it to users became the turning point of the commercialisation of the Internet. Still, it was the American government who made the Commercial Internet Exchange feasible that became the central component of the Internet (Naughton, 2016, p.12). Furthermore, research that established the basis for the World Wide Web was conducted by American and Swiss researchers (Naughton, 2016, p.13). When reflecting on the evolution of the Internet, it might be argued that the network, and therefore a large part of cyberspace, has mostly been an American or western creation as it has been based on American values during its establishment (“Will the Internet always be American?”, n.d.). Not only was it affected by western researchers, it was also influenced by the U.S. government.

As the development of the Internet shows, the socio-technical system holds an infrastructure which is unfinished as technological developments and political debates on the issue continue to take place. As Herrera poses, the “developments of the system are wrapped up in, actually defined by, political contestation” (2003, p.587). Consider, for instance, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that was enforced on 25 May 2018 and includes a set of rules regarding data protection in which “people have more control over their personal data” and “businesses benefit from a level playing field” (“2018 reform of EU data protection rules”, n.d.). The GDPR is the successor of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC that was implemented in the European Union (EU) in October 1995. A renewal of the directive was needed as the socio-technical system had changed tremendously since its implementation as social media was not existent yet and only one per cent of the European population made use of the Internet (“How did we get here?”, n.d.). Moreover, the Cambridge Analytica revelations, which involved a company that had compiled data of Facebook profiles for election purposes, (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018) had particularly caused a “data protection reform” according to the European Commission (EC) (EC, n.d.). In this case, the developments of the

32 socio-technical system have made political contestation needed, after which new policies have been implemented. With the implementation of the GDPR, the socio-technical system will have to change its infrastructure as it has to adhere to new policies relating to user information. This case shows that it is not technologies that shape politics only, but that “the technologies themselves are being shaped by politics” as well (Herrera, 2003, p.587). Moreover, as the system is still in development, there is still a flexibility in the design in which political contestation can continue to shape the system.

Despite of the predominantly American influence in the development of the Internet, the network has mostly been perceived of as an international network (Naughton, 2016, p.21). There is however a difference in the manner to which users are connected to the Internet in various parts of the world (Deibert, 2008, p.323). The expansion of the network towards other cultures has created tensions as the Internet was initially built on American values, such as the freedom of expression, which was not always acceptable to other cultures that made use of the network (Naughton, 2016, p.21). Here, the difference between China and the U.S. is substantial. The institutional context in which the system was initially developed has been of great importance to its architecture. As the Internet expanded towards China, it further developed in a context that was different from which it was initially in designed. Here, the cultures of respectively China and the U.S. might have created different views regarding the involved technologies, in which an interpretive flexibility of technologies, as stressed by Herrera (2003, p.573) might have been present. The Chinese regime has different perceptions regarding the freedom of expression and press than the American government (“Freedom of the Press 2017”, China profile; U.S. profile, n.d.). For instance, non-Chinese (social) media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Google are banned, while Chinese are favoured, such as WeChat, which parent company is Tencent, and Alibaba (Deibert, 2015, p.12). It is no coincidence it seems, that the three mentioned platforms are all headquartered on American soil and have been established by U.S. citizens (Facebook, n.d.; Google, n.d.; Twitter, n.d.). Moreover, some argue that the Internet has been balkanised, meaning that the network has split into locally controlled subnetworks, as in the case of China (Naughton, 2016, p.21). The country has the largest Internet market with the most Internet users, but its government has controlled the network in terms of content and surveillance (Naughton, 2016, p.21). The technical mechanisms to do so, have been dubbed as China’s Great Firewall (Brown & Yung, 2017b). In addition, it has established the Great Cannon, which is not only able to

33 monitor internet traffic but is also able to hijack and redirect that traffic (Franceschi-Bicchierai, 2015). In both mechanisms, China has made use of the flexibility of the architecture of the Internet to do so. The extensive number of nodes that are part of the Internet act as gateways and present opportunities for filtering and surveillance measures that can be used out of technological, cultural, political or economic reasons (Deibert, 2008, p.324). As such measures are frequently exploited, for instance in China, Deibert poses that it might be “more accurate to characterize the internet as a network of filters and chokepoints” (2008, p.324). Moreover, Chinese based media or applications are often used for surveillance mechanisms in which they search for politically sensitive content (Deibert, 2015, p.12). Ironically, however, it is American based firms who have provided sophisticated internet content-filtering services while American technology companies used to promote open access in all parts of the world (Deibert, 2008, p.330). The context in which the Internet can be used is not similar in the U.S. when compared to China. According to the Internet Freedom Index, the U.S. scores 21 out of 100 points, whereas China scores 87 out of 100 (Freedom House, 2017)3 . Here, the index has measured the “level of internet and digital media freedom” of states, and the level of freedom in the U.S. is therefore higher than China (Freedom House, 2017, p.35). Moreover, the manipulation tactics regarding social media have been measured by the Index as well. Those specifically show the different Internet environment of both states as political bots and fake news around elections are most frequently conducted in the U.S., whereas paid government commentators, progovernment media and propaganda, and hijacked accounts are most frequently used tactics in China (Freedom House, 2017, p.10). These differences show that the functioning of the network largely depend on domestic and international factors, as posed by Herrera (2003, p.584). It also demonstrates that the use of the network is differently experienced and geographically dependent whereas the socio-technical system is in fact not geographically bound.

4.2 Step 2 Interaction Capacity This section looks at the interaction capacity of the U.S. and China and studies how both states conceptualise the relationship between technology and the human agent. In doing so, several documents have been selected and analysed in which the manner of conceptualising the role of

3 The numerical score ranges from 0 points (most free) to 100 (least free) (Freedom House, 2017, p.28)

34 technologies are distinguished. Moreover, this section connects the characteristics of the emerging system as identified in the previous section with possible international political outcomes (Herrera, 2003, p.586) by shortly discussing the existing Sino-American negotiations under analysis on which the next chapter will elaborate.

Interaction capacity comprises the conceptualisation of technologies as crucial part of the international system (Buzan and Little, 2000, as cited in Herrera, 2003, p.561). Here, the capacity to interact is inherently part of the socio-technical system. This means that it is not just the capacity of states themselves to be able to make use of the Internet or cyberspace to interact. It is the technological part of the socio-technical system that has an important role in this composition and capacity of doing so (Herrera, 2003, p.561). This technological part does not only determine the possibility to interact, but also shapes the context in which it is possible. The bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and China, which are under analysis in this section, have become possible due to this interaction capacity. The agreements made in these dialogues are not only about the technologies that are part of the socio-technical system, the technologies themselves also shape the extent to which interaction between both states is possible. For instance, information exchange is not only done via this socio-technical system but is also one of the subjects under discussion in the dialogues.

4.2.1 Conceptualisation of Technologies For this research, various documents of both the U.S. and China have been selected of which the relevant texts on technology have been distinguished and classified according to the discussed approaches: technological instrumentalism, technological instrumentalism and SCOT (see Appendix A). The tables below show the quantification of these statements and their classification accordingly. Table 2 China Selected documents Tech. Tech. SCOT Total analysed Instrumentalism Essentialism sentences of document 1a) China’s Cybersecurity Law4 5 0 0 5 1b) President Xi’s speech 7 3 12 22 during the 19th Party Congress5 1c) Xi Boao Forum Asia 2 1 1 4 Speech6

4 Cybersecurity Law of China, 2016 5 Xi, 2017 6 Xi, 2018

35 1d) Party Journal7 5 3 3 11 1e) NCSS8 4 6 2 12 Total analysed sentences per 23 13 18 54 technological approach Percentage of total analysed 42,6% 24,1% 33,3% 100% sentences of document

Table 3 U.S. Selected documents Tech. Tech. SCOT Total analysed Instrumentalism Essentialism sentences of document 2a) State of the Union speech9 3 0 1 4 2b) Cybersecurity executive 3 0 2 5 order10 2c) President Trump’s ideas on 2 1 1 4 cyberspace during debates11 2d) NSS12 5 4 5 14 2e) DoD Strategy13 3 6 2 11 2g) U.S. Cyber Command 6 2 0 8 Vision14 Total analysed sentences per 22 13 11 36 technological approach Percentage of total analysed 61,1% 36,1% 30,6% 100% sentences of document

As this research focuses on negotiations between the U.S. and China, these will especially be reflected on in the next chapter. This section touches upon the conceptualisation of technologies of the states under discussion in the selected documents in particular.

The selected documents include statements, related to technologies, that can be classified into one of the technological approaches as discussed in chapter 2. Both states have acknowledged the ongoing trend of an increased importance of cyberspace and the simultaneous threat it evokes given its influence and penetration into all sectors of individuals’ lives (NCSS; The White House, 2017a, p.13). These acknowledgements have a technological essentialist character, in which both strategies conceptualise technologies in a determinist manner posing that the human agent is subject to these technologies.

7 CAC, 2017 8 CAC, 2016 9 The White House, 2018 10 The White House, 2017b 11 Lafrance, 2016 12 The White House, 2017a 13 DoD, 2018 14 U.S. Cyber Command, 2018

36 Despite of this mutual perspective regarding the development of cyberspace, both states seem to stress the strengthening of their own innovations, capabilities, and tools with regard to the socio-technical system. President Xi, for instance, argued in his speech during the

19th Party Congress in October 2017 that the Chinese society “will work faster to build China into a manufacturer of quality and develop advanced manufacturing, promote further integration of the internet, big data, and artificial intelligence with the real economy” (Xi, 2017, p.26) and that “we should aim for the frontiers of science and technology, strengthen basic research, and make major breakthroughs in pioneering basic research and groundbreaking and original innovations” (Xi, 2017, p.27). Moreover, the U.S. NSS also posed to “improve America’s technological edge in energy, including nuclear technology, next-generation nuclear reactors, better batteries, advanced computing, carbon-capture technologies, and opportunities at the energy-water nexus. The United States will continue to lead in innovative and efficient energy technologies, recognizing the economic and environmental benefits to end users.” (The White House, 2017a, p.23). In these statements, both states have put forward a SCOT approach in which they emphasised the human influence in the development of technologies. Furthermore, both states have also conceptualised technologies in a technological instrumentalist manner. President Xi, for instance, posed during his speech at the Boao Forum Asia that “we should promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, uphold the multilateral trading system, and jointly foster new technologies” (Xi, 2018). Moreover, the U.S. NSS argued that “many countries now view cyber capabilities as tools for projecting influence, and some use cyber tools to protect and extend their autocratic regimes” (The White House, 2017a, p.31). In both statements the human agent and its dominance are emphasised as they are able to decide how to use the non-biased and neutral technologies and are not subject to them.

From the selected documents, some remarkable insights could be observed. First, both states conceptualised technologies predominantly in a technological instrumentalist manner (see table 2 and 3), in which the human agent was perceived of as the dominant actor in relation to technologies. Although other statements of the selected documents have also been classified into other technological approaches, the dominant conceptualisation in technological instrumentalist forms shows that both China and the U.S. ascribe a big role to the human agent in relation to technologies. As the differences are not out of proportion, it cannot be posed that

37 China and the U.S. suggest that technologies are inherently neutral as the technological instrumentalist approach puts forward. Second, the classification shows that the number of statements regarding technologies and cyberspace made by President Trump (four) was not frequent compared to President Xi (seventeen). As possibly not all speeches or remarks of both presidents have been published might explain this difference. Moreover, the longer term of office held by President Xi can be a reason as well. Finally, it is remarkable that both states have explicitly included an “othering” element in their statements in which they target another actor. For instance, the Chinese NCSS posed that “international competition in cyberspace is rapidly unfolding. At the international level, there is strife for the control of strategic resources in cyberspace, to occupy norm-setting power and strategic commanding heights, and a competition in pursuit of the strategic initiative that is growing more fierce every day” (CAC, 2016). Also, the U.S. posed that “adversaries exploit and weaponize vulnerabilities to steal wealth and intellectual property, manipulate information, and create malicious software capable of disrupting or destroying systems.” (U.S. Cyber Command, 2018, p.4). Such language and positions can be a basis for cooperation in which both states might form a front towards a third actor, were it not for their difficult relationship status. An essential difference here is that whereas China highlights threats from non-state actors, the U.S. perceives state actors, Russia and China in particular, as the main threats to cybersecurity (Brown & Yung, 2017b). These positions make cooperation on cyber issues particularly difficult, and the topic of intellectual property is such an issue on which will be elaborated further in the next chapter.

Despite the complicated relationship between the U.S. and China, both states are still willing to cooperate. The next section discusses the previous and ongoing dialogues which will be analysed in chapter 5.

4.2.2 U.S.-China Cyber Negotiations This section shortly discusses previous and current cyber negotiations between the U.S. and China that are relevant for the research. It is guided by the third sub question: “what were previous cyber negotiations and how have they shaped U.S.-China relationships?” As the next chapter will discuss their outcomes in dept, this section will only shortly describe their setting.

38 The first negotiation under discussion includes the track 1.5 U.S.-China Cybersecurity Dialogue held by CSIS and CICIR. These institutions are respectively an American think tank and a research institute associated with the Chinese Ministry of State Security. As track 1.5 diplomacy concerns a situation in which official and non-official actors cooperate, the dialogue includes both U.S. and Chinese officials and scholars in the field of cybersecurity. The dialogues have been accompanied by track 2 Sino-U.S. Cybersecurity dialogues. Different from track 1.5 diplomacy, track 2 diplomacy includes non-officials only and have a more informal character. The goals of the track 1.5 U.S.-China Cybersecurity Dialogue include: reducing misperceptions, increasing transparency and understanding each states’ cybersecurity approaches, and identifying potential areas for cooperation (“Track 1.5 U.S.-China”, n.d.). Although the CSIS website poses that only nine formal meetings have been held since 2009, of which the last was in February 2015 (“Track 1.5 U.S.-China”, n.d.), others pose that more recent ones have occurred as well including two 1.5 dialogues in 2017 (Segal, 2017). Apart from the agenda for to each session as published on the CSIS website (“Track 1.5 U.S.-China”, n.d.), the only publication containing outcomes has been the Joint Statement that was released in June 2012 (CSIS & CICIR, 2012). This will also be the document under discussion and includes areas of general agreement, unresolved areas, and next steps. The second dialogue under discussion includes the Obama-Xi agreement that was made during the Chinese State Visit to the U.S. between President Xi and then President Obama in September 2015. Here, cybersecurity was one of the addressed topics concerning the strengthening of bilateral relations between the two states (The White House, 2015). It is only those points of agreements that will be under discussion in this research, but to which will be referred to as the Obama-Xi agreement from here on for easier reference. While the agreement has been regarded both with hesitation and optimism, it has been the first agreement containing any concrete initiations (Brown & Yung, 2017a). The points of agreement regarding cybersecurity included: (1) timely responses to requests for information and assistance on, among others, cyber activities; (2) no “conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors”; (3) common effort for the identifications of norms of state behaviour in cyberspace; (4) establishment of a high-level joint dialogue regarding the fight against cybercrime and related issues (The White House, 2015).

39 The third dialogue under discussion includes the three U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogues on Combating Cybercrimes and Related Issues that took place on 1 December 2015, 14 June 2016, and 8 December 2016. The establishment of the dialogue was decided on in the Obama-Xi agreement. Each dialogue has produced a summary of outcomes which will be analyzed in this thesis. These include points of agreements regarding guidelines for combatting cybercrime, tabletop exercises, a hotline mechanism and the enhancement of cooperation regarding cyber-enabled crime, network protection, information sharing, the establishment of a senior experts group, and dialogue continuity (DHS, 2015; 2016a; 2016b). The final dialogue under discussion is the U.S.-China Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue (LECD), of which the first edition took place on 4 October 2017. Its outcomes have been summarized in a two-page document and discussed four topics, including repatriation, counter-narcotics, cybercrime and cybersecurity, and fugitives (DoJ, 2017). Of these, only the third topic, which involved cybercrime and cybersecurity is of interest to this thesis and included five agreements: (1) the continuation of implementing the Obama-Xi consensus on cybersecurity cooperation between the U.S. and China in 2015; (2) reiteration of the valid of all documents on consensus and cooperation that followed from the three meetings of the U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogue on Combating Cybercrimes and Related Issues; (3) the intention of improving cooperation on cybercrime, and responding in a timely manner to ‘Mutual Legal Assistance requests’; (4) the continuation of cooperation between the U.S. and China “on network protection, including maintaining and enhancing cybersecurity information sharing, as well as considering future efforts on cybersecurity of critical infrastructure”; and (5) the mutual intention of maintaining and making full use “of the established hotline mechanism for addressing urgent cybercrime and network protection issues pertaining to significant cybersecurity incidents, and to communicate in a timely way at the leadership level or working level, as needed” (DoJ, 2017). In order to refer more easily to these points of agreements, they will be referred to as the LECD agreements from here on.

These four dialogues are of interest to general U.S.-China relationships as it has greatly been defined by mutual blame regarding interference and intrusion in each other’s state affairs. These relationships are predominantly defined by their contrasting perspectives on various issues. Whereas China was primarily blamed for its corporate espionage activities, for instance, the U.S. was blamed for its intelligence gathering for national security purposes (Brown & Yung, 2017a). Moreover, the U.S. is seeking to continue raising the importance of its

40 democratic values, in particular with regard to freedom of expression, while China rather regards cyberspace as a means for competition with the U.S. (Brown & Yung, 2017a). Furthermore, China advocates for sovereignty in cyberspace (“China internet”, 2015), while the U.S. rather promotes an open infrastructure (The White House, 2011). The Obama-Xi agreement was installed after a low point in the cyber relationship of both states as the U.S. had indicted five Chinese officers of the army for stealing U.S. companies’ trade secrets for the benefit of Chinese firms in 2014 (Schmidt & Sanger, 2014). Whereas it has been the Obama-Xi agreement that has concretized an agreement regarding such interference, in particular regarding intrusions in corporate cases, the circumstances have changed since President Trump took office and ordered for an investigation in China’s trade practices (“Trump orders review”, 2017). On this issue of intellectual property, as well as internet sovereignty, information sharing and confidence building measures, will the next chapter elaborate.

41 5. U.S.-China Cyber Negotiations’ Dynamics The previous chapter has described both the history of cyberspace, and in particular the Internet, and existing negotiations between the U.S. and China on cyberspace. This chapter will discuss the outcome documents of those negotiations in the light of Herrera’s framework and on how the U.S. and China have conceptualised technologies. Taken together, this chapter provides an overview of the dynamics of U.S.-China negotiations on cyberspace, and how these are related to the selected documents and their perception regarding the role of technologies. From the documents under analysis, three broad themes can be identified on which the international political system and technologies impact one another. These include (1) the regulation and control; (2) knowledge bases; and (3) trust and security. Moreover, several subthemes have been identified which fit into the three broader themes, including internet sovereignty, information sharing, intellectual property, and CBMs.

5.1 Regulation and Control 5.1.1 Internet Sovereignty In this thesis, Internet sovereignty is perceived to be a collective term including positions and policies of states with regard to the Internet and to what extent they claim sovereignty over, parts of, the Internet. Often, such policies touch upon the democracy and rights of citizens as this section will show.

It is well-known that China and the U.S. have diverse policies concerning the Internet. Both states have applied different beliefs and rights regarding the freedom of citizens to the use of the Internet in general. For instance, a study of the political scientist Gary King showed censorship patterns that were conducted by the Chinese government, in which he concluded that individuals who attempt to urge for collective gathering, both in opposition to or in support of the Chinese government, are censored by the Chinese state (King, Pan & Roberts, 2014, p.891). This censorship policy is part of the so-called Great Firewall and is different from American Internet policies, which actions “are bound by its Constitution, which guarantees the right of free speech, and by its international commitments, including the UN Charter on Human Rights” (CSIS & CICIR, 2012). In the Joint Statement of CSIS and CICIR (2012), China argues for “the need for recognition of sovereignty as a basic principle for cybersecurity” and additionally proposes a Code of which an element should “respect rights of countries to manage relevant networks and

42 oppose hegemony in cyberspace” (CSIS & CICIR, 2012). Moreover, China seems to justify its regulation of the Internet by posing that the Internet consists of sovereign states, and therefore the basic principles of the sovereignty of states should be accepted and that “the rules of the real world must apply to cyberspace” (CSIS & CICIR, 2012). The U.S. has however argued for an open Internet policy with its ‘net neutrality’ policies as initiated by then President Obama in 2014. These included rules that would prohibit Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from blocking or slowing down content for Internet users (The White House, 2014). Even though President Trump planned to make an end to these net neutrality rules (Griffin, 2017), the differences in Internet policies between both states are still apparent as have been acknowledged by the states themselves as they argued that national sovereignty in cyberspace should be subject to further discussion (CSIS & CICIR, 2012). As their engagement in the negotiations show, their willingness to come to an agreement is apparent, but the road towards it seems rather difficult given their diverse views. Apart from the Joint Statement (2012) however, other dialogues under discussion have not touched upon this topic in particular. Nevertheless, the selected documents of the U.S. and China that have been analysed include clear positions regarding Internet sovereignty. For instance, article 46 of China’s Cybersecurity Law includes measures relating to cybercrime and poses that “all individuals and organizations shall be responsible for their use of websites and must not establish websites or communications groups for use in perpetrating fraud, imparting criminal methods, the creation or sale of prohibited or controlled items, or other unlawful activities” (Cybersecurity Law of China, 2016). This article governs Chinese citizens’ use of the Internet by prohibiting actions, guiding citizens’ behaviour and restricting its access to information. Moreover, by posing that “cyberspace is a new territory for national sovereignty” (CAC, 2016) it seems that China’s will to impose control over the Internet is clear. Remarkably, however, China’s will for control is not very different from the American perspective. Whereas China expresses its sovereignty on the Internet by controlling its citizens, the U.S. seems to do so by pursuing certain values, such as the freedom of expression. Freedom House, for instance, is a U.S. government funded organization which reports yearly on internet freedom around the world (“About Freedom on the Net”, n.d.). Moreover, in its Cybersecurity Executive Order, President Trump posed that “it is the policy of the executive branch to promote an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet that fosters efficiency, innovation, communication, and economic prosperity, while respecting

43 privacy and guarding against disruption, fraud, and theft” (The White House, 2017b). While, at first glance, this seems to be just and protective of the American citizens, the U.S. still seems to pursue some form of control over, part of, the Internet by its mere policy to do so. The most striking revelation include the Snowden leaks in which global surveillance programs that were run by the American government were revealed (“Surveillance programs”, n.d.). These programs contained communications data of citizens which seems like a form of U.S. governmental control on citizens and their use of cyberspace. Whereas such programs are closely related to the security theme involving attempts to combat cybercrime and terrorism and have been triggered by post-9/11 security concerns (Herrera, 2003, p.587), it is a notorious example of possible pursuit of American control over cyberspace.

Even though different, both China’s and U.S.’ form of governmental control on its citizens and their use of the Internet, are forms of control regarding cyberspace. It is such policies, and thus politics, of both states that shape the further development of cyberspace and the Internet. This is done through both national politics, in which China and the U.S. seem to impose different forms of control, and international politics, as attempts of agreements or negotiations involve discussions regarding this theme. The selected documents and outcome documents alone are not sufficient for adequate analysis regarding the role of technologies in the dynamics of Internet sovereignty. The history and context of cyberspace, and its relationship with regard to politics should be taken into account as well. As chapter 4 showed, the Internet has been predominantly developed from and based on American values and perspectives. During the early stages of development, it has been American politics that have made decisions that determined the development of the Internet. Subsequently, the shape and design of the Internet has evoked policies as implemented by both the U.S. and China as described above. The American policies seems to strive for a continuation of the freedom of citizens to use the Internet, while it’s surveillance policies and China’s censorship policies are reactions to the way the Internet as a technological object, including its technical layer, has evolved. In other words, the discussed policies as carried out today have been influenced by the development of the Internet itself. In turn, it is these policies which will shape the further development of the Internet. This view contrasts the tone as has been put forward by both the American and Chinese policies. For instance, article 46 of China’s Cybersecurity Law includes a technological instrumentalist view, as it stresses the responsibility of the human agent in using

44 the Internet and implies a guide to how humans should use the Internet (Cybersecurity Law of China, 2016). While it is usually the objective of legislation to guide citizens’ behaviour towards a certain direction, China’s Cybersecurity Law (2016) in general includes a predominantly technological instrumentalist approach, which is inadequate alone for a technological endogenous IR-analysis. Not only does such a technological instrumentalist approach imply that technologies are completely neutral, which they are not considering their political shaping, it also implies that human agents have no influence in the development of the Internet. Moreover, the U.S. Cybersecurity Executive Order (The White House, 2017b) has implied a mainly SCOT approach, in which it overemphasizes the human agent. Like a technological instrumentalist approach, a SCOT approach alone is also inadequate for a technological endogenous IR-analysis as it fails to address the effects of technologies in detail. Both approaches fail to include the context and to adopt a technological endogenous view concerning the mutual embedded relationship that politics and technology hold.

5.2 Knowledge Bases Despite the global character of cyberspace, each state still holds their own so-called knowledge base. It possesses knowledge over certain technologies or best practices which other countries do not retain. By maintaining such knowledge bases by enforcing regulating policies, the open character of cyberspace becomes one that is bordered. This theme includes the subthemes information sharing and intellectual property. Information sharing attempts to overcome such borders, whereas intellectual property is part of those knowledge bases. Both subthemes involve political and technological interaction between the U.S. and China and are significant factors in influencing the international system and cyberspace to move toward a situation of either global democracy or bordered enclaves (Herrera, 2003, p.589).

5.2.1 Information Sharing Information sharing is one of the prominent topics under discussion and is highlighted in all analysed dialogues. The exchange of information includes, among others, cybercrime, malicious cyber activities, investigations, incidents, and cyber threat information (CSIS & CICIR, 2012; The White House, 2015; DHS, 2015; 2016a; 2016b; DoJ, 2017).

Starting in the 1.5 track diplomacy dialogue, the Joint Statement of 2012 acknowledged that both parties were willing to commit to a similar coordinating process as the existing exchange

45 of technical information mechanism between national CERTs of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (CSIS & CICIR, 2012). The same statement also included the interest of exchanges on the topic of cybercrime between law enforcement officials of the U.S. and China (CSIS & CICIR, 2012). In the Obama-Xi agreement in 2015, an indirect suggestion regarding information sharing was included in which requests for information regarding malicious cyber activities should be responded to by both states (The White House, 2015). Furthermore, the outcome document of the second U.S.-China Cybercrime and Related Issues dialogue posed that both sides aimed “to conduct routine exchanges” and to “enhance case investigations and information exchange related to cybercrime and other malicious cyber activities; exchange information and develop cooperation in cybercrime investigations and cyber incidents of mutual concern; hold a workshop to discuss how to enhance information exchanges and handling related to Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (MLAA); and share cyber threat information on a regular basis, including increasing information sharing of malicious software samples and related analysis reports.” (DHS, 2016a). The third joint dialogue in December 2016 reaffirmed information sharing and stressed, again, the intention of both states to share information related to cybercrime (DHS, 2016b). The dialogue also proposed “to engage in regular reciprocal sharing of malicious IP addresses, malware samples, analytic products, and other network protection information” (DHS, 2016b). In this case, the regularity of information sharing is not specified, which does not enhance the information sharing practices. Moreover, both states also agreed “to assess the effectiveness of information shared and provide substantive feedback to each side regarding the utility of that information” (DHS, 2016b). Finally, the dialogue also wished to include information exchange on “countering the use of the Internet for terrorist and other criminal purposes” (DHS, 2016b). During the LECD in October 2017, an agreement was decided upon to continue the maintenance and enhancement of information exchange regarding cybersecurity in general (DoJ, 2017). Furthermore, the dialogue raised the importance of sharing cybercrime related information exchange, which was perceived to be important and was repeated in previous dialogues as well (DoJ, 2017).

The acknowledged importance regarding information sharing has been featured in the selected documents as well. For instance, article 12 of China’s Cybersecurity Law poses that the state “guarantees the lawful, orderly and free circulation of network information”, implicitly

46 referring to information sharing (Cybersecurity Law of China, 2016). Moreover, during the Boao Forum Asia, President Xi encouraged “normal technological exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and foreign enterprises”, stressing information sharing in the private sector (Xi, 2018). Different from the selected documents concerned with China, the selected documents on the U.S. do not stress the relevancy of or mention information sharing. This is striking given the democratic system of the U.S., which usually implies a higher likeliness in providing policy-relevant data (Hollyer, Rosendorff & Vreeland, 2011, p.1202). Though the lack of referral to information sharing in the selected documents of the U.S. does not say anything about their willingness to share information in general, it is still noteworthy that the U.S. have not stressed the relevancy of it.

Different from the selected U.S. documents, the repeated relevancy of information sharing in the dialogues, especially with regard to cybercrime or cyber threats, is apparent and highlight the close relationship between politics and technologies. It has been the character of cyberspace, including its anonymity, ease and widespread use, which has contributed to the emergence of cybercrime (Herrera, 2003, p.590). Due to the non-geographical bounded characteristic of cyberspace, such crimes might take place more easily across borders. Perhaps in reaction to this feature of cyberspace, the discussed dialogues have stressed the relevancy of imposing information sharing across states. Politics, as is propagated through information sharing policies here, is a reaction to features of the technology itself. If implemented successfully, these policies will contribute to the decrease of cybercrimes or increased chance of being caught and will shape the design of cyberspace in turn. It might therefore be argued that information exchange policies have been initiated because of the effects of cyberspace, which gave rise to the notion of cybercrime in the first place. This mutual embedded relationship between politics and technologies has become apparent in the analysis above. An analysis of, for instance, China’s policies on information sharing alone, as has been mentioned above, is not adequate as such an approach would not include the context in which cyberspace has been developed. Both statements of China’s Cybersecurity Law (2016) and President Xi’s speech during the Boao Forum Asia (Xi, 2018), as mentioned above, are technological instrumentalist approaches and adopt a predominantly human agent perspective. An analysis based on such approaches alone are inadequate as technologies are analysed exogenously in relation to international politics.

47 5.2.2 Intellectual Property Like information sharing, Intellectual Property (IP) has been addressed in all dialogues under discussion. In the Joint Statement already, CSIS has argued for the “observance of existing commitments on the protection of intellectual property” for the benefit of increasing stability in cyberspace (CSIS & CICIR, 2012). The reaction of its Chinese counterparts has however not been captured in the statement, which makes it difficult to analyse China’s position regarding the topic. Nevertheless, the Obama-Xi consensus of 2015 included an agreement concerning intellectual property: “that neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors” (The White House, 2015). This agreement has been perceived to be a surprise for many due to the sensitive issue of IP (Brown & Yung, 2017a). The agreement has been strengthened by the commitment of both states to enhance cooperation on “theft of trade secrets” during the first Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues (DHS, 2015). IP has been given a lot of attention to as it was also raised in the two dialogues following the first joint dialogue in December 2015 (DHS, 2016a; 2016b). The second and third dialogue posed respectively that “both sides commit to prioritize cooperation on combatting cyber-enabled intellectual property (IP) theft for commercial gain” (DHS, 2016a) and “to refrain from cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors” (DHS, 2016b). Finally, the topic has also been raised in the LECD agreements as part of the reiteration of committing to the Obama-Xi agreement of 2015 (DoJ, 2017).

The topic of IP has been mentioned in the selected documents as well by both China and the U.S. For instance, President Xi argued that “we will foster a culture of innovation, and strengthen the creation, protection, and application of intellectual property. We should cultivate a large number of world-class scientists and technologists in strategically important fields, scientific and technological leaders, and young scientists and engineers, as well as high- performing innovation teams.” (Xi, 2017, p.27). With this statement, he attaches great importance to IP, and stresses the need for China to strengthen its development regarding IP. President Xi emphasised this statement during his speech at the Boao Forum Asia by posing to

48 “protect the lawful IPR15 owned by foreign enterprises in China. At the same time, we hope foreign governments will also improve protection of Chinese IPR” (Xi, 2018). Different in this speech is the importance of protecting foreign IP as well, thereby highlighting the agreements on IP that have been made in the Obama-Xi consensus and the negotiations thereafter. What is striking then, is the aggressive tone of the U.S. in their NSS regarding IP (The White House, 2017a). Regardless of the negotiations and agreements made, the NSS posed that “every year, competitors such as China steal U.S. intellectual property valued at hundreds of billions of dollars. Stealing proprietary technology and early-stage ideas allows competitors to unfairly tap into the innovation of free societies” (The White House, 2017a, p.21). This position has been proceeded with various statements that have been issued by the White House over the first course of 2018. Whereas in August 2017 President Trump had ordered for an investigation in China’s trade practices (“Trump orders review”, 2017), China had announced a nationwide campaign on improving protection of foreign IP rights (Lim, 2018). The results of and actions following the investigation were announced in a Presidential Memorandum released by the White House on 22 March 2018 (The White House, 2018a). The Memorandum consisted of various findings including required technology transfer from American to Chinese Companies, systematic Chinese investment in U.S. companies in order “to obtain cutting-edge technologies and intellectual property and to generate large-scale technology transfer in industries deemed important by Chinese government industrial plans”, and that China has unauthorized access to intellectual property because of intrusions into and theft from U.S companies’ computer networks (The White House, 2018a). Following the findings, which include renewed accusations of IP theft, the Memorandum urges, among others, for increased tariffs on Chinese goods and an investment restriction (The White House, 2018a). President Trump has linked the “tremendous intellectual property theft situation (…), which likewise is hundreds of billions of dollars to the context of the U.S. trade deficit (The White House, 2018b). Moreover, President Trump proposed a trade action regarding the IP theft that “could be about $60 billion” which would benefit its trade deficit (The White House, 2018b). The actions have been dubbed to be of reciprocal nature and are acts against China’s intimidation regarding American technology (The White House, 2018b). In a following statement released by the White House on 29 May 2018, it was announced that “the United States will implement specific investment restrictions and

15 Intellectual Property Rights

49 enhanced export controls for Chinese persons and entities related to the acquisition of industrially significant technology” (The White House, 2018c). Moreover, it announced that “Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United States will impose a 25 percent tariff on $50 billion of goods imported from China containing industrially significant technology” and “implement specific investment restrictions and enhanced export controls for Chinese persons and entities related to the acquisition of industrially significant technology” (The White House, 2018c). Both lists will be expected to be released in June 2018.

The announced measures and tone of the U.S. is peculiar given the agreements made in the negotiations on IP. By naming and shaming China in its recent NSS (The White House, 2017a) and the announced measures in the Memorandum and Statement released in respectively March and May 2018 (The White House, 2018a; 2018c), the U.S. risks the progress of an agreement concerning IP as has been committed to during the dialogues under discussion. However, if China indeed continued to steal American IP, it risks the progress even more. These developments in the international system show that the debate on IP is a sensitive and ongoing one, and despite the Obama-Xi agreement it has rather emerged towards a trade war than towards reconciliation. Especially as China has announced countermeasures in reply to the announced American tariffs (Landler & Tankersley, 2018). The actuality of the topic and additional tensions between American and Chinese tech companies offer extra reasons for a thorough analysis regarding the IP issue. One example of such tensions includes a measure of the American government in April 2018, which was argued not to be connected to the IP issue according to a U.S. Commerce Department official, but involved a violation on a sanction settlement including North Korea and Iran (Mozur & Swanson, 2018). The measure concerned a U.S. ban on China’s second-largest telecommunications equipment producer ZTE Corporation and by locking the company out of using parts of American technology for seven years (Department of Commerce (DoC), 2018), ZTE Corporation has recently experienced severe drawbacks including a suspension of all major operations that could mean a potential collapse of the company (Gao & Lau, 2018). Together with the IP issue, these measures have added fuel to the fire on the trade clash between the U.S. and China.

These additional tensions stress the importance to apply a technological endogenous IR- analysis in which technologies and politics are not analysed exogeneous from each other. An

50 analysis based on a SCOT or technological instrumentalist view, as has been identified in the selected documents, is not adequate alone. The statement of the NSS on IP (The White House, 2017a), as mentioned above, is predominantly based on a technological instrumentalist position, highlighting the human agent and its dominance in using technologies. The statement of President Xi during the Boao Forum Asia (Xi, 2018) is also conceptualised from a technological instrumentalist position as it points to the possibilities of human agents or governments in protecting IPR. Different from these positions is President Xi’s initial argument during the 19th Party Congress in 2017, which includes a SCOT position as it notes that China is able to develop IP on its own, or at least has ambitions to do so (Xi, 2017, p.27). Furthermore, the statements made by the U.S. government in 2018 (The White House, 2018a; 2018c) include SCOT approaches as they assume that the human agent, China in this case, has shaped the development of its technologies by obtaining IP and technologies from American companies. Simultaneously, they also seem to include technological instrumentalist approaches as it concerns the obtainment, theft, and application of U.S. IP in Chinese companies, stressing the dominance of the human agent in its use of technologies. As IP contains “creations of the mind” (Clark & Hagan, 2018), and thus are human agents’ creations and influences, statements referring to IP are inherently based on SCOT approaches, including the obtainment, theft or application of IP. Such statements conceptualise IP and technologies exogenously from politics and disregard the mutual embedded relationship between politics and technologies, which is inadequate. A technological endogenous IR-analysis would be more adequate as it takes into account the context in which the issue has developed. It is for example U.S. politics which has shaped the architecture of the Internet and cyberspace today. The architecture has allowed (corporate) espionage to take place, of which China, according to the U.S., has made use of to conduct its IP theft. Differently said, U.S. politics, through its influence on the characteristics of cyberspace, might have given room to IP theft. Furthermore, the Chinese economy has developed greatly over the last few decades and threatens to catch up with and affect the U.S. economy (Amadeo, 2018; Bradsher, 2018; Scott & Sam, 2016). The fear of the dependency of American companies on Chinese manufacturers might also influence U.S. policies. Such fears have been mentioned by a Senate Republican and referred to Huawei in particular, which success has ranked the company third in the global smartphone market with regard to its market share (Chafkin & Brustein, 2018). These fears are emphasised as the Memorandum of 22 March 2018 also included that IP theft was conducted “to support China’s strategic

51 development goals, including its science and technology advancement, military modernization, and economic development” (The White House, 2018a). As the Chinese economy’s future is considered to be dependent on its technology sector (McDonough, 2018), such policies might make sense. Finally, the shift in presidency has also affected the implication of U.S. policies regarding IP. As Nocera (2018) posed, the “U.S. was winning war against China’s intellectual Property Theft. Then Trump took office.” President Trump did not only perceive Chinese promises in the Obama-Xi agreement of 2015 to be hollow (Landler & Tankersley, 2018), he also accused Obama that the U.S. had “lost control of things that we used to have control over” (Lafrance, 2016).

5.3 Trust and Security Security is based on trust issues. When one state or individual does not trust the actions of the other, it often has consequences for its perception of security. Especially in cyberspace, which is largely perceived to be a field in which technological developments are ongoing and therefore to be a field which is constantly in flux, are security and trust issues intertwined. Indeed, some pose that it threatens the nation-state’s future and individuals as they increasingly are dependent on cyberspace (Herrera, 2003, pp.589, 591). It is not surprising, therefore, that the trust element is found across all dialogues under discussion and might be perceived to be the basis upon which the relationship between the U.S. and China is built. Prior to the 1.5 track diplomacy dialogue, both sides found that misperceptions on either side were high (CSIS & CICIR, 2012). Both China and the U.S. seemed to acknowledge the importance of trust, however, as they committed to diminish those misperceptions and tensions by increasing “transparency of both countries’ authorities and understanding on how each country approaches cybersecurity” (CSIS & CICIR, 2012). Moreover, both states have shared similar concerns regarding the risk of non-state actors in cyberspace and the necessity to limit their gain in cyber capabilities and to reduce risks of conflict (CSIS & CICIR, 2012). These non-state actors mainly comprise cybercriminals or terrorists and weaken not only the security of the state, but also influence the level of trust of citizens concerning their political system (Herrera, 2003, p.590). The harm on the security of both states and individuals has been stressed in the security strategies of both the U.S. and China as well. The U.S. NSS, for instance, posed that “the spread of accurate and inexpensive weapons and the use of cyber tools have allowed state and non-state competitors to harm the United States across various domains.” (The White House, 2017a, p.27). Moreover, China

52 posed in its NCSS that “cyber penetrations harm political security. (…) The use of networks to interfere in the internal political affairs of other countries, to attack other countries’ political systems, incite social unrest, subvert other countries’ regimes, as well as large-scale cyber surveillance, cyber espionage and other such activities gravely harm national political security and users’ information security.” (CAC, 2016). It is not odd, therefore, that the proposal on Sino-American cooperation regarding cybercrime is also based on an “othering” aspect in which a third actor is targeted, enhancing a mutual interest or purpose of both the U.S. and China.

5.3.1 Confidence Building Measures Measures that structure and strengthen security internationally, include CBMs which are able “to enhance trust and cooperation and reduce the risk of conflict” (United Nations (UN), 2015, p.9). Like information sharing and intellectual property, the establishment of CBMs in the international system is a recurrent theme throughout all dialogues under discussion. This is a positive reiteration as it stresses the importance of CBMs and the willingness of both states to strengthen international security in the overall discussion regarding cyberspace. Already during the joint statement in 2012, both sides were willing to commit to some kind of CBMs for responsible behaviour in cyberspace and started exploring ideas (CSIS & CICIR, 2012). Throughout the dialogue it was acknowledged that “further discussion and refinement” was needed, indicating an initial lack of agreement on the proposals raised (CSIS & CICIR, 2012). However, the joint statement fails to address what both states think of the suggestions and proposals, which makes it hard for academia to analyse the positions. The 2015 Obama-Xi consensus also captured the topic of norms in cyberspace by committing “to make common effort to further identify and promote appropriate norms of state behaviour in cyberspace within the international community” (The White House, 2015). Furthermore, the second U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogues on Combating Cybercrimes and Related Issues included an agreement on the establishment of a senior experts group on “International Norms in Cyberspace and Related Issues”, which was a follow-up of the Obama-Xi agreement in 2015 as well (DHS, 2016a). Whereas these dialogues highlight the establishment of CBMs, the development or progress of actual CBMs has not been noted or elaborated on throughout the dialogues itself. Moreover, most negotiations regarding CBMs have also been done in different cooperation mechanisms, but it is remarkable that no reference has been made towards such mechanisms,

53 like the UNGGE report of 2015 (UN, 2015) during which both China and the U.S. were involved. Regardless of their similar concerns regarding the risk of conflict and threat to security in the selected documents of both states, none mention the necessity of establishing norms or CBMs. This is striking given the importance both sides seem to attach to CBMs following the dialogues.

When analysing trust and security in the case of CBMs, it is important to, like the prior sections, involve the context and to apply a technological endogenous IR-analysis. Without the development of the Internet and cyberspace and all technologies that go with it, which are shaped by politics, it was not possible for states or non-state actors to maliciously use such technologies and to question trust and security of both states and individuals. As the architecture of the Internet and cyberspace includes options to operate anonymously, malicious actors were able to do so more easily. In order to safeguard international security, the establishment of CBMs were necessary. The statement of the U.S.’ NSS on the spread of cyber tools, as mentioned above, concerns a conceptualization in technological essentialist terms (The White House, 2017a, p.27). It treats technology exogenous in relation to politics and is therefore not adequate for analysis alone. Technologies are not exclusively biased but have also been shaped by politics and human agents. The same goes for the statement of the Chinese NCSS on the use of networks for interference (CAC, 2016), which includes a technological instrumentalist conceptualisation. Like the US’ NSS statement, it treats technology exogenous in relation to politics, but instead of a biased view regarding technologies, the Chinese statement perceives the human agent as the dominant actor in using technologies. Neither statement, however, acknowledges the human influence in the development of such technologies, and are therefore incomplete for analysis alone. Regardless of the necessity and importance of CBMs, they are non-technological measures for strengthening international security. Given their flexibility and potentiality in use, technological means can also be applied for strengthening security against technologies themselves. As posed by Herrera (2003, p.591), “if these threats are caused by information technology, the same technology is also available as part of the solution. Technology can either counter the threat (greater surveillance), or the technology that causes the threat can be altered to make it less so (making Internet anonymity impossible).” Technologies include not only the possibilities of humans to choose how and what to use, they are also able to influence their development. A technological determinist approach alone is therefore inadequate.

54

5.4 Insights The analysis has argued that exogenous approaches are not adequate for assessing the issues under discussion and proposed a technological endogenous-IR analysis that has led to the following insights. First, both the U.S. and China seem to express some way of control over the Internet and its users regardless of their diverse policies and cultural mindsets. Whereas China monitors its citizens by applying the so-called Great Firewall and Great Cannon, the U.S. seems to assure certain American values, including the freedom of expression. Surveillance programs as exposed by Edward Snowden emphasise this form of control. Here, the design of the Internet has influenced both U.S. and Chinese policies regarding their mechanisms of control. In turn, these policies will influence the future development of both the Internet and cyberspace. Second, regardless of the emphasis on information sharing as has been put forward in all outcome documents of the dialogues under discussion, information sharing has not been referred to or was acknowledged in the selected documents of the U.S. This is remarkable given the democratic system of the U.S., while China did refer to the importance of information sharing in the selected documents. Third, the infrastructure of cyberspace, in particular its anonymity, ease and widespread use, has contributed to the emergence of cybercrime. Here, technologies have given room to the development of a phenomena of which political contestation has led to the policy of information sharing. When implemented successfully, this will change the future course of cyberspace in turn. Fourth, the topic of IP is an important issue which largely shapes the negotiations on cyberspace and the general relationship between the U.S. and China. While China addresses the issue in both its speeches under discussion with a national interest perspective, the U.S. uses a more aggressive tone in its NSS and condemns China for stealing U.S.’ IP.16 Although the thesis has not researched to what extent the so-called IP theft is still ongoing, the selected documents show that the U.S. is hostile towards China regardless of the agreements made. Moreover, the announced measures by President Trump (The White House, 2018a; 2018c) include far-reaching measures that go against the agreements in the outcome documents, which are not beneficial for stability in the international system.

16 Importantly, the research does not make accusations regarding IP theft but only assesses those comments made in the documents under analysis.

55 Fifth, the architecture of cyberspace that was partly shaped by U.S. policies have allowed for the possibility of (corporate) espionage and IP theft. It is these structures of which have been made use of in the conduct of such espionage. Interestingly, the announced measures of the U.S. (The White House, 2018a; 2018c) that might hit the Chinese economy on sectors which are not directly related to this espionage. Indirectly, these sectors might have been built following the possible IP theft. What is striking here is that the announced measures by President Trump (The White House, 2018a; 2018c) have broader effects on the overall international political system and does not target cyberspace or technologies only. In turn, these effects can lead to political contestation affecting the development of technologies in the longer term. Sixth, throughout the dialogues under discussion, various difficulties including procedural and political ones can be lead back to trust issues. These include response problems on information requests, discussions on refraining from (corporate) espionage and IP issues. Thus, it might be argued that most agreements and intentions are built on trust. A small misstep here can easily lead to mistrust, which in turn destabilizes relationships. Seventh, CBMs are acknowledged by both states under discussion to be important and have been discussed in the dialogues. They are initiated in order to increase international security. It is therefore interesting that none of the selected documents have urged for the establishment of these measures. Despite of the lack of this acknowledgement in these selected documents, the political contestation regarding CBMs in the dialogues were necessary due to the characteristics of cyberspace that gave room to the conduct of malicious activities, which lead to the threat to international security. Furthermore, CBMs are non-technological measures that are a diplomatic tool for attempts to reach international stability. Given the flexibility of technologies however, technological measures can also be applied for both malicious and legitimate purposes in which the same technology might be used for either securing the international system or threatening it.

56 6. Way Forward

6.1 Conclusion This research has discussed the role of technologies in the U.S.-China cyber negotiations. It has shown how national and international policy measures have been influenced by, but at the same time affected the development of technologies in the international system. It was able to do so by analysing both the selected documents comprising the national policies and positions of both the U.S. and China regarding technologies, and the international aspect by discussing the Sino-American negotiations regarding cyberspace. In doing so, this research has attempted to bridge the gap between technologies and the field of international relations and brought together the national and international political aspects of both the U.S. and China related to cyberspace.

With the help of Herrera’s framework, the main research question could be answered in chapter 5, which created a better understanding of the connection of technologies and the field of international relations. In the first step, this thesis showed that cyberspace is inherently political as the way the socio-technical system is constructed has been determined by political contestation while it simultaneously influences the international system. The Sino-American negotiations, for instance, are a conspicuous example of the politicization of technologies, as it shows that the actual basis on which politics has been executed, is only present because of the development of cyberspace as is existent today. The second step has shown that cyberspace is inherently part of the international political system. The interaction capacities of both the U.S. and China are dependent on these technologies without which no action can be enacted on cyberspace. Indeed, they are part of the international system and have created an environment in which the negotiations under discussion could be initiated. Based on Herrera’s framework, the selected documents and the outcome documents of the negotiations, key themes could be identified, including internet sovereignty, information sharing, intellectual property, and confidence building measures. These have been analysed according to an endogenous technological-IR analysis, and by doing so, has bridged the technological approaches of instrumentalism, essentialism and SCOT. The various themes have showed that cyberspace is not only subject to political decision-making, but that it is also a driver for political debate.

57 In conclusion, the research has clarified both the role of technologies in the negotiations on cyberspace between the U.S. and China, and in the statements of the states themselves. The presented alternative analysis, the so-called technological endogenous IR-analysis, has showed that the overall context regarding technologies must be taken into account when assessing technologies and IR. They should not be discussed exogenously from the international political system but must be treated endogenously. In doing so, not only the human (and thus political) influence on the development of technologies is taken into account, but also the effect of technologies on the international system as they are political in their nature. By offering a perspective that has not been based on deterrence, the research has proposed an alternative that might help the academic community to create more holistic assessments of dialogues regarding cyberspace and to give more all-encompassing advice of cyberspace issues. Moreover, policy makers might make use of the technological endogenous IR-analysis in the set-up of dossiers for officials that deal with the issue under discussion. Furthermore, this alternative form of analysis might contribute to the overall and mutual understanding of the issue and, in turn, might contribute to some form of consensus in the longer term in the benefit of cyberspace stability. Even though this thesis has not assessed the effectiveness of bilateral agreements in achieving stability in cyberspace, the proposed alternative analysis should be taken into account when doing so and when approaching such negotiations in general.

6.2 Limitations Even though the research has showed that a technological endogenous IR-analysis is more adequate when approaching the field of technologies and IR, limitations of the research should be acknowledged as well. Concerning the case study, the selected documents made it possible to get a clear view of the conceptualisation of technologies of both the U.S. and China. For the technological endogenous IR-analysis to have a stronger basis, these selected documents should be expanded in future research. Given that the documents have only been a selection of the available documents, these should be expanded in order to increase validity. Moreover, the outcome documents did not contain much information regarding the agreements reached or the process of such agreements. For more insightful analysis of the issue under discussion, these should be more comprehensive. As some documents might not be available to the public due to classified information, a partly incomplete analysis might be apparent.

58 Furthermore, the case study under question is only one way of studying the issue and a similar technological endogenous IR-analysis could also be applied for other states or institutions. This particular case study is however interesting given the current developments in the field. As it is an ongoing debate, a similar analysis in the future might lead to different outcomes due to changing positions of states and the dynamics of political contestation. Not only is such future research needed, the continuous development in both the technological field as the political realm make such a research relevant. Given the discussed limitations, the following section offers recommendations to both the academic community as well as the officials taking place in bilateral negotiations, in order to strengthen technological endogenous IR-analysis and the understanding of the fields of technologies and IR.

6.3 Recommendations So far, this research has contributed to the academic literature on technologies and IR by offering an alternative analysis on approaching cases that touch upon both fields. More research is however needed to fill this gap in the literature and in order to strengthen the proposed technological endogenous IR-analysis, this section offers several recommendations.

1. Offer greater transparency Overall, there is a lack in the number and transparency of reporting on the progress of the negotiations in the case under analysis and what specific measures or objectives have been raised by either side. For instance, no outcomes of the CSIS and CICIR track 1.5 dialogue could be found apart from the Joint Statement (2012). This is not only contradicting the agreement between both parties on “greater public awareness of the discussions over cybersecurity” (CSIS & CICIR, 2012), but also thwarts the quality of conducted research regarding such dialogues. By offering greater transparency by more frequent reporting on both the outcomes of the dialogue and greater details on what issues have been spoken of, technological endogenous IR-analyses will be strengthened. It will not only create more opportunities for professionals to reflect on the processes and to share expertise on a solicited and unsolicited basis, in turn it might also benefit negotiations, enhance stability in cyberspace and lead to greater public awareness.

59 2. Enhance consistency Throughout the dialogues that have been analysed some agreements have been made that are not consistent as promises were made that could not be detected in future outcome documents. For instance, both the Joint Statement (CSIS &CICIR, 2012) and the third U.S.-China High- Level Joint Dialogues on Combating Cybercrimes and Related Issues (DHS, 2016b) promised to respectively release a research report and that a fourth dialogue would take place. However, neither of these commitments have been put into practice so far, which can influence the level of trust among both officials of the states under discussion and researchers analysing the negotiations. In addition, CSIS and CICIR (2012) proposed to release “an agenda for future cooperation and issues in cybersecurity” within a year after the joint statement of 2012, but this agenda cannot be found. As this document has not been published is especially contrary to what it would provide: “awareness of the progress made to date” (CSIS & CICIR, 2012). Although it might be possible that these documents have only been published among those who were directly involved in the dialogues, such an awareness on the progress of the dialogues have not been raised among those outside that community. Moreover, such unfulfilled promises and inconsistency do not enhance the level of trust either.

3. Establish a timeframe Part of obtaining trust and enhancing communication effectiveness includes a clear demarcation of the timeframe of which agreements are part of. To respond to requests by both states ‘in a timely manner’ has been mentioned several times in the agreements under discussion. A timely manner is however rather vague and implies that no consensus could be reached on what that timeframe would entail. As it was also one of the objectives of the U.S.- China High-Level Joint Dialogues on Combating Cybercrimes and Related Issues “to review the timeliness and quality of responses to requests for information and assistance with respect to cybercrime or other malicious cyber activities” (DHS, 2015), a timely manner is neither qualitative or effective.

4. Create a comprehensive overview of all dialogues When conducting research for this thesis, no overview could be found on all existing dialogues relating to cyberspace between the U.S. and China. As such a comprehensive overview would enhance awareness and understanding among researchers, policymakers and those who are interested in the subject, it is relevant to create such an overview. This will not only benefit

60 those who are directly involved in the dialogues but also increases transparency and consistency in such negotiations.

All in all, these recommendations are not only interrelated but will also contribute to future research on the role of technologies in U.S.-China cyber negotiations. Such research might influence further development of cyberspace and, in turn, enhance security and stability in the international system.

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65 Laswell, H.D. (1936). Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: Whittlesey House Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. The American Political Science Association, 65(3), 682-693 Lim, A. (2018, February 21). China's nationwide campaign to protect foreign companies' IP rights. Lexology. Retrieved from https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4e57b2d5-7aea-4c1e-8f8b- c51b9663a60b McCarthy, D.R. (2015). Power, Information Technology, and International Relations Theory. The Power and Politics of US Foreign Policy and Internet. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan McDonough, M. (2018, May 4). Attacking China’s Tech Companies Will Backfire. Bloomberg. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-05-04/attacking- china-s-tech-companies-will-backfire Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Morgenthau, H. (1946). Scientific Man versus Power Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press Mozur, P. & Swanson, A. (2018, April 16). Chinese Tech Company Blocked From Buying American Components. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/16/technology/chinese-tech-company- blocked-from-buying-american-components.html Naughton, J. (2016). The evolution of the Internet: from military experiment to General Purpose Technology. Journal of Cyber Policy, 1(1), 5-28 Newmyer, J. (2010). The Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics. Journal of Strategic Studies, 33(4), 483-504 Niculescu-Dincă, V. (2016). Policing Matter(s): towards a sedimentology of suspicion in technologically mediated surveillance. Maastricht: Datawyse/Universitaire Pers Maastricht Nocera, J. (2018, April 10). U.S. Was Winning War Against China's Intellectual Property Theft. Bloomberg. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04- 10/trump-ensures-china-s-intellectual-property-theft-won-t-be-solved People’s Republic of China (2016, December). National Cyberspace Security Strategy. Translated by Rogier Creemers. Retrieved from

66 https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2016/12/27/national-cyberspace- security-strategy/ People’s Republic of China. (2016, November). Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China. Revised and edited by Paul Triolo. Retrieved from https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2016/11/07/cybersecurity-law-of- the-peoples-republic-of-china/ Ransomware cyber-attack threat escalating – Europol. (2017, May 14). BCC. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39913630 Reardon, R., & Choucri, N. (2012). The Role of Cyberspace in International Relations: A View of the Literature. Paper Prepared for the 2012 ISA Annual Convention, San Diego, April 1, 2012. Retrieved from https://ecir.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/%5BReardon%2C%20Choucri% 5D%202012%20The%20Role%20of%20Cyberspace%20in%20International%20 Relations.pdf Schelling, T.C. (2008). Arms and Influence. With a New Preface and Afterword. New Haven: Yale University Press Schmidt, M.S. & Sanger, D.E. (2014, May 19). 5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-with- cyberspying.html Scott, M. & Sam, C. (2016, May 12). Here’s How Fast China’s Economy Is Catching Up to the U.S. Bloomberg. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016- us-vs-china-economy/ Segal, A. (2017, November 17). An Update on U.S.-China Cybersecurity Relations. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/blog/update-us-china- cybersecurity-relations Sukumar, A.M. (2017, July 4). The UN GGE Failed. Is International Law in Cyberspace Doomed As Well? Lawfare. Retrieved from https://lawfareblog.com/un-gge- failed-international-law-cyberspace-doomed-well Surveillance programs. (n.d.). Retrieved June 1, 2018, from Edward Snowden website: https://www.edwardsnowden.com/surveillance-programs/

67 The White House. (2018, January 30). President Donald J. Trump’s State of the Union Address. The White House. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings- statements/president-donald-j-trumps-state-union-address/ The White House. (2018a, March 22). Presidential Memorandum on the Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 Investigation. The White House. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum- actions-united-states-related-section-301-investigation/ The White House. (2018b, March 22). Remarks by President Trump at Signing of a Presidential Memorandum Targeting China’s Economic Aggression. The White House. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks- president-trump-signing-presidential-memorandum-targeting-chinas-economic- aggression/ The White House. (2018c, May 29). Statement on Steps to Protect Domestic Technology and Intellectual Property from China’s Discriminatory and Burdensome Trade Practices. The White House. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-steps-protect- domestic-technology-intellectual-property-chinas-discriminatory-burdensome- trade-practices/ The White House. (2017a, December). National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The White House. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp- content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf The White House. (2017b, May 11). Presidential Executive Order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure. The White House. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential- executive-order-strengthening-cybersecurity-federal-networks-critical- infrastructure/ The White House. (2015, September 25). FACTSHEET: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States. The White House. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet- president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states The White House. (2014). The President’s message on net neutrality. The White House. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/node/323681

68 The White House. (2011). International Strategy for Cyberspace. The White House. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international _strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf The White House. (2008, January 8). National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-54. The White House. Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-54.pdf Track 1.5 U.S.-China Cyber Security Dialogue. (n.d.). Retrieved June 1, 2018, from CSIS website: https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy- program/cybersecurity-and-governance/other-projects-cybersecurity/track-1 Trump orders review of China's trade practices. (2017, August 15). BBC. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/business-40810381 Twitter. (n.d.). Company. Retrieved June 1, 2018, from Twitter website: https://about.twitter.com/en_us/company.html 2018 reform of EU data protection rules. (n.d.). Retrieved June 1, 2018, from European Commission (EC) website: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/justice-and- fundamental-rights/data-protection/2018-reform-eu-data-protection- rules_en#background United Nations (UN), General Assembly. (2015). Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=r ja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjrw4nR3MnbAhULLVAKHYDVBp8QFgg1MAA& url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.universiteitleiden.nl%2Fbinaries%2Fcontent%2Fass ets%2Fgovernance-and-global-affairs%2Fisga%2F2015-un-gge- report.docx&usg=AOvVaw2LYRfvJuxULbbuLemvKsx4 U.S. Cyber Command. (2018). Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority. Command Vision for US Cyber Command. Retrieved from https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4419681/Command-Vision-for- USCYBERCOM-23-Mar-18.pdf U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC). (2018). Order activating suspended denial order relating to Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation and ZTE Kangxun Telecommunications LTD. DoC. Retrieved from https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/zte_denial_order.pdf

69 U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). (2018). Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America. Retrieved from https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense- Strategy-Summary.pdf U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (2015, December 2). First U.S.-China High- Level Joint Dialogue On Cybercrime And Related Issues Summary Of Outcomes. DHS. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/12/02/first-us-china-high- level-joint-dialogue-cybercrime-and-related-issues-summary U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (2016a, June 15). Second U.S.-China Cybercrime and Related Issues High Level Joint Dialogue. DHS. https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/06/15/second-us-china-cybercrime-and-related- issues-high-level-joint-dialogue U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (2016b, December 8). Third U.S.-China High- Level Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues. DHS. https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/12/08/third-us-china-high-level-joint-dialogue- cybercrime-and-related-issues U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ). (2017, October 6). First U.S.-China Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue. Summary of Outcomes. DoJ. Retrieved from https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/first-us-china-law-enforcement-and- cybersecurity-dialogue Van den Berg, J., Van Zoggel, J., Snels, M., Van Leeuwen, M., Boeke, S., Van Koppen, L., Van der Lubbe, J., Van den Berg, B. & De Bos, T. (2014). On (the emergence of) cyber security science and its challenges for cyber security education. NATO STO/IST-122 Symposium in Tallin, 1-10 Will the Internet always be American? (n.d.). Retrieved June 1, 2018, from New America website: https://www.newamerica.org/future-tense/events/will-internet-always- be-american/ Xi, J. (2018, April 11). Transcript: President Xi Addresses the 2018 Boao Forum for Asia in Hainan. US-China Perception Monitor. Retrieved from https://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2018/04/11/transcript-president-xi-addresses-2018- boao-forum-asia-hainan/ Xi, J. (2017, October 18). Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese

70 Characteristics for a New Era. Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China October 18, 2017. Xinhuanet. Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_ National_Congress.pdf Yin, R.K. (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage

71 APPENDIX A: Analysis of Selected Documents

1. China

1a) China’s Cybersecurity Law (Cybersecurity Law of China, 2016) No. Text Categorization 1 “Article 12: The State protects the rights of citizens, legal Tech. Instrumentalism persons, and other organizations to use the Internet in accordance with the law; it promotes widespread Internet access, raises the level of network services, provides secure and convenient network services to society, and guarantees the lawful, orderly and free circulation of network information” 2 “Article 19: All levels’ of people’s governments and their Tech. Instrumentalism relevant departments shall organize and carry out regular cybersecurity publicity and education, and guide and stimulate relevant units in properly carrying out cybersecurity publicity and education work.” 3 “Article 21: The State shall implement a cybersecurity Tech. Instrumentalism multi-level protection system (cyber-MLPS). Network operators shall perform the following security protection duties according to the requirements of the cybersecurity multi-level protection system to ensure the network avoids interference, damage or unauthorized access, and to prevent network data leaks, theft or falsification: (…)” 4 “Article 31: The State implements key protection of public Tech. Instrumentalism communication and information services, power, traffic, water resources, finance, public service, e-government, and other critical information infrastructure that if destroyed, loses function, or experiences leakage of data might seriously endanger national security, national welfare and the people’s livelihood, or the public interest, on the basis of the cybersecurity multi-level protection system. The State Council will formulate the specific scope and security protection measures for critical information infrastructure. The State encourages operators of networks outside the [designated] critical information infrastructure systems to voluntarily participate in the critical information infrastructure protection system.” 5 “Article 46: All individuals and organizations shall be Tech. Instrumentalism responsible for their use of websites and must not establish websites or communications groups for use in perpetrating fraud, imparting criminal methods, the creation or sale of prohibited or controlled items, or other unlawful activities, and websites must not be exploited to publish information related to perpetrating fraud, the creation or sale of

72 prohibited or controlled items, or other unlawful activities.”

1b) President Xi’s speech during the 19th Party Congress in October 2017 (Xi, 2017)

No. Text Categorization 1 “Through devoting great energy to implementing the SCOT innovation-driven development strategy, we have seen much accomplished toward making China a country of innovators, with major advances made in science and technology, (…)” (p.2) 2 “the Party has united and led all the Chinese people in a Tech. Instrumentalism tireless struggle, propelling China into a leading position in terms of economic and technological strength, defense capabilities, and composite national strength.” (p.9) 3 “As well as this, to uphold and develop socialism with SCOT Chinese characteristics, we should, based on new practice, undertake theoretical analysis and produce policy guidance on the economy, political affairs, rule of law, science and technology, culture, education, the wellbeing of our people, ethnic and religious affairs, social development, ecological conservation, national security, defense and the armed forces, the principle of “one country, two systems” and national reunification, the united front, foreign affairs, and Party building.” (p.15) 4 “To realize the Party’s goal of building a powerful military Tech. Instrumentalism in the new era, we must fully implement the fundamental principles and systems of Party leadership over the military, and see that Party strategy on strengthening military capabilities for the new era guides work to build national defense and the armed forces. We must continue to enhance the political loyalty of the armed forces, strengthen them through reform and technology (…)” (p.21) 5 “In the first stage from 2020 to 2035, we will build on the Tech. Instrumentalism foundation created by the moderately prosperous society with a further 15 years of hard work to see that socialist modernization is basically realized. The vision is that by the end of this stage, the following goals will have been met: China’s economic and technological strength has increased significantly. China has become a global leader in innovation.” (p.24) 6 “We need to raise total factor productivity and accelerate the SCOT building of an industrial system that promotes coordinated development of the real economy with technological innovation, modern finance, and human resources.” (p.26) 7 “We will work faster to build China into a manufacturer of SCOT quality and develop advanced manufacturing, promote further integration of the internet, big data, and artificial intelligence with the real economy, and foster new growth

73 areas and drivers of growth in medium-high end consumption, innovation-driven development, the green and low-carbon economy, the sharing economy, modern supply chains, and human capital services. We will support traditional industries in upgrading themselves and accelerate development of modern service industries to elevate them to international standards. We will move Chinese industries up to the medium-high end of the global value chain, and foster a number of world-class advanced manufacturing clusters.” (p.26) 8 “We will strengthen infrastructure networks for water SCOT conservancy, railways, highways, waterways, aviation, pipelines, power grids, information, and logistics. We will continue efforts to cut overcapacity, reduce excess inventory, deleverage, lower costs, and strengthen areas of weakness, and work to achieve a dynamic balance between supply and demand by improving the allocation of available resources and increasing high-quality supply” (p.26) 9 “Innovation is the primary driving force behind Tech. Essentialism development; it is the strategic underpinning for building a modernized economy.” (p.27) 10 “We should aim for the frontiers of science and technology, SCOT strengthen basic research, and make major breakthroughs in pioneering basic research and groundbreaking and original innovations.” (p.27) 11 “We will strengthen basic research in applied sciences, SCOT launch major national science and technology projects, and prioritize innovation in key generic technologies, cutting- edge frontier technologies, modern engineering technologies, and disruptive technologies. These efforts will provide powerful support for building China’s strength in science and technology, product quality, aerospace, cyberspace, and transportation; and for building a digital China and a smart society.” (p.27) 12 “We will improve our national innovation system and boost SCOT our strategic scientific and technological strength. We will further reform the management system for science and technology, and develop a market-oriented system for technological innovation in which enterprises are the main players and synergy is created through the joint efforts of enterprises, universities, and research institutes.” (p.27) 13 “We will support innovation by small and medium-sized Tech. Instrumentalism enterprises and encourage the application of advances in science and technology.” (p.27) 14 “We will foster a culture of innovation, and strengthen the SCOT creation, protection, and application of intellectual property. We should cultivate a large number of world-class scientists and technologists in strategically important fields, scientific and technological leaders, and young scientists and

74 engineers, as well as high-performing innovation teams.” (p.27) 15 “We will provide more and better online content and put in Tech. Instrumentalism place a system for integrated internet management to ensure a clean cyberspace. We will implement the system of responsibility for ideological work, and further consolidate our positions and improve management in this field. We will distinguish between matters of political principle, issues of understanding and thinking, and academic viewpoints, but we must oppose and resist various erroneous views with a clear stand.” (p.37) 16 “We will step up efforts to establish a legal and policy SCOT framework that promotes green production and consumption, and promote a sound economic structure that facilitates green, low-carbon, and circular development. We will create a market-based system for green technology innovation, develop green finance, and spur the development of energy-saving and environmental protection industries as well as clean production and clean energy industries. We will promote a revolution in energy production and consumption, and build an energy sector that is clean, low-carbon, safe, and efficient.” (p.45) 17 “We must keep it firm in our minds that technology is the Tech. Essentialism core combat capability (…)” (p.48) 18 “(…) encourage innovations in major technologies, and SCOT conduct innovations independently. We will strengthen the system for training military personnel, and make our people’s forces more innovative.” (p.48) 19 “We will speed up implementation of major projects, deepen Tech. Instrumentalism reform of defense-related science, technology, and industry, achieve greater military-civilian integration, and build integrated national strategies and strategic capabilities.” (p.48) 20 “We will improve our national defense mobilization system, SCOT and build a strong, well-structured, and modern border defense, coastal defense, and air defense. We will establish an administration for veterans; we will protect the legitimate rights and interests of military personnel and their families; and we will make military service an occupation that enjoys public respect. We will carry out further reforms to build a modernized armed police force.” (p.49) 21 “And yet, as a world we face growing uncertainties and Tech. Essentialism destabilizing factors. Global economic growth lacks energy; the gap between rich and poor continues to widen; hotspot issues arise often in some regions; and unconventional security threats like terrorism, cyber-insecurity, major infectious diseases, and climate change continue to spread. As human beings we have many common challenges to face.” (p.52)

75 22 “We should be good reformers and pioneers. We should be Tech. Instrumentalism enterprising, work creatively in light of actual conditions, and adeptly apply information technology, including the internet, in our work.” (p.62)

1c) Xi Boao Forum Asia Speech (Xi, 2018) No. Text Categorization 1 “The world is undergoing a new round of major Tech. Essentialism development, great change and profound readjustment. Humankind still faces many instabilities and uncertainties. The new round of technological and industrial revolution brings fresh opportunities and presents unprecedented challenges.” 2 “— With the future in mind, we need to engage in Tech. Instrumentalism cooperation for win-win results. We should stay committed to openness, connectivity and mutual benefits, build an open global economy, and reinforce cooperation within the G20, APEC and other multilateral frameworks. We should promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, uphold the multilateral trading system, and jointly foster new technologies, new industries and new forms and models of business. This way, we will make economic globalization more open, inclusive, balanced and beneficial to all.” 3 “The Chinese people will continue to take bold steps in SCOT innovation to boost development” 4 “We encourage normal technological exchanges and Tech. Instrumentalism cooperation between Chinese and foreign enterprises, and protect the lawful IPR owned by foreign enterprises in China. At the same time, we hope foreign governments will also improve protection of Chinese IPR.”

1d) Party Journal (CAC, 2017) No. Text Categorization 1 “The online and offline worlds must form concentric circles, Tech. Instrumentalism and, under the leadership of the Party, mobilize the people of all nationalities, mobilize all aspects of enthusiasm, to jointly realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the struggle for the China Dream.” 2 “From a global perspective, cybersecurity threats and risks Tech. Essentialism are increasingly prominent, and they increasingly penetrate into political, economic, cultural, social, ecological, national defense, and other areas.” 3 “We use informatization to cultivate new kinetic energy, and Tech. Instrumentalism use the new kinetic energy to promote new development, giving full play to the impact of information technology on economic and social development, so that hundreds of millions of people have more of a sense of sharing in the results of Internet development.”

76 4 “If our party cannot traverse the hurdle represented by the Tech. Essentialism Internet, it cannot traverse the hurdle of remaining in power for the long term.” 5 “Use the international Internet to tell a good story of China, Tech. Instrumentalism expanding online international communication to more than 200 countries and regions and more than 1 billion overseas users, further improving the online content landing rate.” 6 “We must grasp the characteristics and laws of the online SCOT public opinion struggle, establish and improve online risk prevention mechanisms, and steadily control all kinds of major public opinion; dare to grasp, dare to control, and dare to wield the bright sword; refute erroneous ideas in a timely manner, comprehensively clean up online rumors, violent videos, and other harmful information; significantly improve public sentiment detection, discernment, and response capabilities; and effectively safeguard national political security.” 7 “Actively use new technologies and new applications to Tech. Instrumentalism effectively guide the progression of online public opinion, grasp the evolution and laws of the online public sentiment, prevent hot issues from involving the economic and social livelihood of the people, and prevent mass incidents and public opinion from becoming online ideological patterns and issues” 8 “General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out: Without Tech. Essentialism cybersecurity there is no national security, and without informatization there is no modernization.” 9 “Accelerate indigenous innovation of core technologies in SCOT the information field. With eyes on the goal of seizing the high ground of information technology systems development, advance high-performance computing, quantum communications, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, big data, core chips, operating systems, and other cutting-edge technological research.” 10 “Successfully build an international platform that is SCOT interoperable between China and the world, and a China platform that shares common governance with the international Internet, advance global Internet governance system change, and play an active role in building a cyberspace community of shared destiny.” 11 “Give full play to the role of workers, youth, women, and Tech. Instrumentalism other groups. Strengthen the role of industry, experts, and think tanks, bringing together the force of all society to push forward the work of cybersecurity and informatization.”

1e) NCSS (CAC, 2016) No. Text Categorization 1 “In the wake of the flying development of the information Tech. Essentialism revolution, a cyberspace composed of the Internet,

77 telecommunications networks, computer systems, automatized control systems, digital equipment and the applications, services and data they carry, is currently comprehensively changing people’s ways of production and life, and is profoundly inflencing humankind’s social historical development process.” 2 “The development of network technologies has broken Tech. Essentialism through constraints of time and space, has expanded the range of communication, innovated communication methods, and triggered a fundamental shift in communication patterns. The Network has become a new channel for people to obtain information, study and interact, and has become a new carrier for the dissemination of humanity’s knowledge.” 3 “In the present world, the network has profoundly Tech. Essentialism penetrated into all aspects of people’s learning, life and work, online education, start-ups, healthcare, shopping, "finance, etc., are becoming more widespread every day, and ever more people exchange ideas, achieve their undertakings and realize their dreams through the network.” 4 “The Internet is becoming more of a leading force for Tech. Essentialism innovation-driven development every day, the broad application of information technologies in all sectors of the national economy has promoted the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries, and has fostered new technologies, new business models, new industries and new models, it has stimulated the adjustment of economic structures and the transformation of economic development methods, infusing the economy and society with a new momentum.” 5 “The network has stimulated cultural exchange and Tech. Essentialism knowledge dissemination, it has liberated the development vitality of culture, promoted cultural innovation and reaction, and enriched people’s spiritual and cultural lives, it has so become a new channel for the dissemination of culture a new means for the provision of public cultural services. Online culture has become an important component part of cultural construction” 6 “The network’s role in improving the national governance Tech. Essentialism system and the modernisation of governance capabilities is becoming more prominent every day, e-government applications are growing ever deeper, government information openness and sharing has promoted government policymaking to become more scientific, democratic and rule of law-based, channels for citizen participation in social governance have been opened up, and they have become important pathways to guarantee citizens’ right to know, right to participate, right to express opinions and right to supervise.”

78 7 “Cyber penetrations harm political security. Political Tech. Instrumentalism stability is the basic precondition for national development and the happiness of the people. The use of networks to interfere in the internal political affairs of other countries, to attack other countries’ political systems, incite social unrest, subvert other countries’ regimes, as well as large-scale cyber surveillance, cyber espionage and other such activities gravely harm national political security and users’ information security.” 8 “International competition in cyberspace is rapidly Tech. Instrumentalism unfolding. At the international level, there is strife for the control of strategic resources in cyberspace, to occupy norm-setting power and strategic commanding heights, and a competition in pursuit of the strategic initiative that is growing more fierce every day. A small number of countries is strengthening a cyber deterrence strategy, aggravating an arms race in cyberspace, and bringing new challenges to global peace.” 9 “Opportunities and challenges coexist in cyberspace, and Tech. Instrumentalism the opportunities are greater than the challenges. We must persist in positive use, scientific development, management according to the law, and enhancing security, persist in safeguarding cybersecurity, use the development potential of cyberspace to the greatest extent, let it extend to China’s 1.3 billion people even better, enrich all of humankind, and persist in safeguarding global peace.” 10 “Implement the cybersecurity talent project, and strengthen Tech. Instrumentalism the establishment of cybersecurity science majors, forge first-rate cybersecurity academies and innovation parks, and create an ecology and an environment beneficial to the fostering of talent, innovation and start-ups. Do the cybersecurity propaganda week activities well, forcefully launch cybersecurity propaganda and education among the whole population. Promote cybersecurity education to enter textbooks, enter schools, and enter classrooms, raise the accomplishments of online media, strengthen cybersecurity consciousness and protection skills among all of society, raise the broad netizens’ ability to distinguish and resist online unlawful and harmful information, online fraud and other such unlawful and criminal activities.” 11 “Cyberspace is a new territory for national sovereignty. SCOT Build cybersecurity protection forces commensurate with our country’s international standing and suited to a strong cyber power, forcefully develop cybersecurity defence means, timely discover and resist cyber intrusions, and cast a firm backup force to safeguard national cybersecurity.” 12 “Through vigorous and effective international cooperation, SCOT establish a multi-lateral, democratic and transparent international Internet governance system, and jointly build a

79 peaceful, secure, open, cooperative and orderly cyberspace.”

80 2. U.S.

2a) State of the Union speech (The White House, 2018) No. Text Categorization 1 “So to every citizen watching at home tonight — no matter Tech. Instrumentalism where you have been, or where you come from, this is your time. If you work hard, if you believe in yourself, if you believe in America, then you can dream anything, you can be anything, and together, we can achieve anything.” 2 “Tonight, I want to talk about what kind of future we are Tech. Instrumentalism going to have, and what kind of Nation we are going to be. All of us, together, as one team, one people, and one American family.” 3 “Together, we can reclaim our building heritage. We will Tech. Instrumentalism build gleaming new roads, bridges, highways, railways, and waterways across our land. And we will do it with American heart, American hands, and American grit.” 4 “As part of our defense, we must modernize and rebuild our SCOT nuclear arsenal, hopefully never having to use it, but making it so strong and powerful that it will deter any acts of aggression. Perhaps someday in the future there will be a magical moment when the countries of the world will get together to eliminate their nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, we are not there yet.”

2b) Cybersecurity executive order (The White House, 2017b) No. Text Categorization 1 “Section 1. Cybersecurity of Federal Networks. Tech. Instrumentalism (a) Policy. The executive branch operates its information technology (IT) on behalf of the American people. Its IT and data should be secured responsibly using all United States Government capabilities. The President will hold heads of executive departments and agencies (agency heads) accountable for managing cybersecurity risk to their enterprises. In addition, because risk management decisions made by agency heads can affect the risk to the executive branch as a whole, and to national security, it is also the policy of the United States to manage cybersecurity risk as an executive branch enterprise.” 2 “(iii) Effective risk management involves more than just SCOT protecting IT and data currently in place. It also requires planning so that maintenance, improvements, and modernization occur in a coordinated way and with appropriate regularity” 3 “(c) Risk Management. Tech. Instrumentalism (i) Agency heads will be held accountable by the President for implementing risk management measures commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm that would result from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,

81 modification, or destruction of IT and data. They will also be held accountable by the President for ensuring that cybersecurity risk management processes are aligned with strategic, operational, and budgetary planning processes, in accordance with chapter 35, subchapter II of title 44, United States Code.” 4 “Sec. 3. Cybersecurity for the Nation. SCOT (a) Policy. To ensure that the internet remains valuable for future generations, it is the policy of the executive branch to promote an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet that fosters efficiency, innovation, communication, and economic prosperity, while respecting privacy and guarding against disruption, fraud, and theft. Further, the United States seeks to support the growth and sustainment of a workforce that is skilled in cybersecurity and related fields as the foundation for achieving our objectives in cyberspace.” 5 “(iii) The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Tech. Instrumentalism Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall: (A) assess the scope and sufficiency of United States efforts to ensure that the United States maintains or increases its advantage in national-security-related cyber capabilities (…)”

2c) President Trump’s ideas on cyberspace during debates (Lafrance, 2016) No. Text Categorization 1 “As far as the cyber, I agree to parts of what Secretary Tech. Instrumentalism Clinton said. We should be better than anybody else, and perhaps we're not. I don't think anybody knows it was Russia that broke into the DNC. She's saying Russia, Russia, Russia, but I don't -- maybe it was. I mean, it could be Russia, but it could also be China. It could also be lots of other people. It also could be somebody sitting on their bed that weighs 400 pounds, OK? You don't know who broke in to DNC.” 2 “Now, whether that was Russia, whether that was China, Tech. Essentialism whether it was another country, we don't know, because the truth is, under President Obama we've lost control of things that we used to have control over.” 3 “We came in with the Internet, we came up with the Internet, SCOT and I think Secretary Clinton and myself would agree very much, when you look at what ISIS is doing with the Internet, they're beating us at our own game. ISIS.” 4 “So we have to get very, very tough on cyber and cyber Tech. Instrumentalism warfare. It is -- it is a huge problem. I have a son. He's 10 years old. He has computers. He is so good with these computers, it's unbelievable. The security aspect of cyber is very, very tough. And maybe it's hardly doable.

82 But I will say, we are not doing the job we should be doing. But that's true throughout our whole governmental society. We have so many things that we have to do better, Lester, and certainly cyber is one of them.”

2d) NSS (The White House, 2017a) No. Text Categorization 1 “Access to technology empowers and emboldens otherwise Tech. Instrumentalism weak states.” (p.3) 2 ““ENHANCE BORDER SECURITY: We will secure our Tech. Instrumentalism borders through the construction of a bor- der wall, the use of multilayered defenses and advanced technology, the employment of addi- tional personnel, and other measures.” (p.10) 3 “America’s response to the challenges and oppor- tunities of Tech. Instrumentalism the cyber era will determine our future prosperity and security” (p.12) 4 “Today, cyberspace offers state and non-state actors the Tech. Essentialism ability to wage campaigns against American political, economic, and secu- rity interests without ever physically crossing our borders.” (p.12) 5 “Federal networks also face threats. These networks allow Tech. Essentialism government agencies to carry out vital func- tions and provide services to the American peo- ple.” (p.12) 6 “Our Federal net- works must be modernized and updated.” SCOT (p.13) 7 “In addition, the daily lives of most Americans rely on Tech. Essentialism computer-driven and interconnected technolo- gies. As our reliance on computers and connectiv- ity increases, we become increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks.” (p.13) 8 “Security was not a major consideration when the Internet SCOT was designed and launched. As it evolves, the government and private sector must design systems that incorporate prevention, protec- tion, and resiliency from the start, not as an after- thought. We must do so in a way that respects free markets, private competition, and the limited but important role of government in enforcing the rule of law. As we build the next generation of dig- ital infrastructure, we have an opportunity to put our experience into practice.” (p.13) 9 “The Internet is an American invention, and it should reflect SCOT our values as it continues to trans- form the future for all nations and all genera- tions. A strong, defensible cyber infrastructure fosters economic growth, protects our liberties, and advances our national security.” (p.13) 10 “Every year, competitors such as China steal U.S. Tech. Instrumentalism intellectual property valued at hundreds of bil- lions of dollars. Stealing proprietary technol- ogy and early-stage

83 ideas allows competitors to unfairly tap into the innovation of free societ- ies.” (p.21) 11 “FURTHER AMERICA’S TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE: SCOT We will improve America’s technological edge in energy, including nuclear technology, next-generation nuclear reactors, better batteries, advanced com- puting, carbon- capture technologies, and opportu- nities at the energy-water nexus. The United States will continue to lead in innovative and efficient energy technologies, recognizing the economic and environmental benefits to end users.” (p.23) 12 “The spread of accu- rate and inexpensive weap- ons and the Tech. Essentialism use of cyber tools have allowed state and non-state competitors to harm the United States across various domains.” (p.27) 13 “The Department of Defense must develop new operational SCOT concepts and capa- bilities to win without assured dominance in air, maritime, land, space, and cyberspace domains, including against those operating below the level of conventional military conflict” (p.29) 14 “Many countries now view cyber capabilities as tools for Tech. Instrumentalism projecting influence, and some use cyber tools to protect and extend their autocratic regimes. Cyberattacks have become a key feature of modern conflict.” (p.31)

2e) DoD Strategy (DoD, 2018) No. Text Categorization 1 “This increasingly complex security environment is defined Tech. Essentialism by rapid technological change, challenges from adversaries in every operating domain, and the impact on current readiness from the longest continuous stretch of armed conflict in our Nation’s history.” (p.1) 2 “The reemergence of long-term strategic competition, rapid Tech. Essentialism dispersion of technologies, and new concepts of warfare and competition that span the entire spectrum of conflict require a Joint Force structured to match this reality.” (p.1) 3 “A more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, Tech. Instrumentalism combined with a robust constellation of allies and partners, will sustain American influence and ensure favorable balances of power that safeguard the free and open international order.” (p.1) 4 “The security environment is also affected by rapid Tech. Essentialism technological advancements and the changing character of war.” (p.3) 5 “New technologies include advanced computing, “big data” Tech. Essentialism analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology — the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.” (p.3)

84 6 “New commercial technology will change society and, Tech. Essentialism ultimately, the character of war.” (p.3) 7 “Rogue regimes, such as North Korea, continue to seek out SCOT or develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – nuclear, chemical, and biological – as well as long range missile capabilities and, in some cases, proliferate these capabilities to malign actors as demonstrated by Iranian ballistic missile exports.” (p.3) 8 “American technological innovation, and a culture of Tech. Essentialism performance will generate decisive and sustained U.S. military advantages.” (p.4) 9 “We must anticipate the implications of new technologies Tech. Instrumentalism on the battlefield, rigorously define the military problems anticipated in future conflict, and foster a culture of experimentation and calculated risk-taking.” (p.7) 10 “We must anticipate how competitors and adversaries will Tech. Instrumentalism employ new operational concepts and technologies to attempt to defeat us, while developing operational concepts to sharpen our competitive advantages and enhance our lethality.” (p.7) 11 “Cultivating a lethal, agile force requires more than just new SCOT technologies and posture changes; it depends on the ability of our warfighters and the Department workforce to integrate new capabilities, adapt warfighting approaches, and change isbusiness practices to achieve mission success. The creativity and talent of the American warfighter is our greatest enduring strength, and one we do not take for granted.” (p.7)

2g) U.S. Cyber Command Vision (U.S. Cyber Command, 2018) No. Text Categorization 1 “WE CAN INFLUENCE AND SHAPE ADVERSARY Tech. Instrumentalism BEHAVIOR THROUGH PERSISTENT, INTEGRATED OPERATIONS.” (p.2) 2 “The spread of technology and communications has enabled Tech. Essentialism new means of influence and coercion.” (p.3) 3 “Disruptive technologies will eventually accelerate our Tech. Essentialism adversaries’ ability to impose costs.” (p.3) 4 “The underlying technologies and protocols of cyberspace Tech. Instrumentalism enable both legitimate and malicious activities. Adversaries exploit and weaponize vulnerabilities to steal wealth and intellectual property, manipulate information, and create malicious software capable of disrupting or destroying systems.” (p.4) 5 “The constant innovation of disruptive technologies offers Tech. Instrumentalism all actors new opportunities for exploitation. In this dynamic environment, the United States must increase resiliency, defend forward as close as possible to the origin of adversary activity, and persistently contest malicious cyberspace

85 actors to generate continuous tactical, operational, and strategic advantage. We achieve success by seizing the initiative, retaining momentum, and disrupting our adversaries’ freedom of action.” (p.4) 6 “Cyberspace capabilities are key to identifying and Tech. Instrumentalism disrupting adversaries’ information operations. They facilitate overmatch of adversary military capabilities in all domains, expanding options for our decision makers and operational commanders, and producing integrated effects.” (p.4) 7 “Integrate cyberspace capabilities and forces into plans and Tech. Instrumentalism operations across all domains” (p.8) 8 “IMPERATIVE 3: Create information advantages to Tech. Instrumentalism support operational outcomes and achieve strategic impact. Enhance information warfare options for Joint Force commanders. Integrate cyberspace operations with information operations. Unify and drive intelligence to support cyberspace operations and information operations. Integrate all intelligence capabilities and products to improve mission outcomes for the Joint Force and the nation.” (p.9)

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