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Chapter 5 - Freedom Versus Determinism

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Chapter 5 - Freedom Versus Determinism Chapter 5 - Freedom versus Determinism General Overview Free will and determinism go to the heart of many philosophical, sociological, psychological, economic and cultural theories and worldviews and are certainly central to any conception of morality. Free will appears to separate us from nature, and yet much recent science tells us that this not so. The concept of causality is central here and instructors will need to carefully address the perplexities and confusions that surround this notion. Also, the author clearly opts for a particular view so, as with the last chapter, you will need to make decisions – assuming that such a thing exists or that they haven’t been made already – about whether to run with the author or not. Class Suggestions This topic can and should be tightly structured and laid out to prevent misunderstandings, especially when discussing the differences between compatibilism and the other positions. I usually begin by asking students whether they chose to come to class today. Almost everyone will agree that they have chosen. You can then begin to sketch out the idea of determinism, getting the key concepts up on the board and explaining how determinism is different from fate, destiny, chance, etc. Using simple examples will draw students into the discussions and you can build in complexity as you go along. Of course the issue of moral responsibility should be stressed here, and asking students what they could and would do if they really believed that everything was determined usually brings this home. Another way of setting up the problem is to ask students whether everything has a cause. If everything has a cause then how can we be held responsible? If, on the other hand, some things are uncaused, then how can we be held responsible for something we didn’t cause? Either way appears to remove us from moral responsibility. Getting them in groups to figure this out can be very productive. 18 Chapter 5 - Freedom versus Determinism Key Concepts: Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Free Will, Determinism, Religious, Predestination, Physical, Biological, Genetic, Causality, Historical, Economic, Psychological, Hard Determinism, Soft Determinism, Indeterminism, Fatalism, Responsibility, Chance, Accident, Destiny Key Questions: 1. Did you use free will in answering this question? Critically examine the arguments for and against. 2. Does everything have a cause? In your answer deal thoroughly with the question of moral responsibility. 3. If God is all knowing there cannot be free will. Discuss. 4. Compatibilism or soft determinism is the view that free will and determinism are compatible. Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of this view. 5. Which position is the best here and on what grounds? Chapter Summary Are human beings ‘free’ to make moral decisions or are they ‘determined’ by forces outside of them? The meaning of determinism Determinism means universal causation. For everything that occurs there is a corresponding cause. If this is true, how could we hold people responsible for what they cannot help doing? Types and theories of determinism Religious determinism – predestination Religious determinism derives from attributes of God or Allah: all knowing, all-powerful being. God determines the course of events. This raises – apart from huge issues of proof – the problem of evil and the problem of salvation. Scientific determinism Science is founded on universal causation and such causation means that there is no freedom. Physical science and physical determinism Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) is greatest exponent of physical determinism. Universe is governed by mechanical laws. Human beings are parts of that universe. Some argue that humans are not just physical and question physics that suggests a ‘freedom’ even at the most basic non-conscious level of the universe (atoms, molecules). Biological and genetic determinism Charles Darwin (1809-1882) argued that species evolve through ‘selection’ of the ‘fittest.’ Modern genetics complements this theory. Both physical and biological determinism leave no room for a ‘mental’ or ‘spiritual’ side to our existence. Social-cultural determinism Historical or cultural determinism Hegel (1770-1831). World history is manifestation of ‘absolute mind’ realizing itself. Character and action are determined by culture. Problems 1. Difficult to prove 2. Culture may influence but may not fully determine actions. Economic or social determinism Karl Marx (1818-1883). Followed Hegel but argued that history is determined economically and socially. People are determined by class. 19 Psychological determinism, Freudianism and Behaviorism Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) Human beings determined by unconscious drives that cultures distort or repress. Psychological determinism significantly argues from observed behavior rather than inner psychical dynamics. B.F. Skinner (1904-1990) argues that human behavior is governed by conditioning and environment, both physical and social. Problems: Conditioning may work for some under certain circumstances but not for all of the time. Skinner’s premise is a totally malleable material that can be shaped with the appropriate techniques. Fatalism and Hard and Soft Determinism Fatalism All events are fixed and beyond our control. This is not the same as saying everything has a cause. Hard determinism (HD) Everything is caused so no free will. Humans can change the future but this will be as a result of their own personal make-up or environment, not a free choice. Soft determinism Everything is caused but some events are caused by humans by means of their own minds or wills. Thus neither completely free or determined. Freedom is strictly limited because humans originate only some causes but are determined by others. Indeterminism There is freedom and chance in the world especially when we look at human deliberation and chose especially moral deliberation. William James (1842-1910) is the most prominent exponent of this view. But if acts are ‘uncaused’ or indeterminate then nobody could be said to be responsible for them. Thus there may be accidents or chance but not true human freedom. Criticism of hard determinism and arguments for freedom For hard determinists morality is an illusion. Hospers argues that we can free ourselves of certain desires (alcoholism, smoking, etc.). Inaccurate use of language Hospers argues that hard determinists have pushed the meaning of ‘freedom’ to mean completely free in an unlimited sense, i.e., free of biological or genetic make-up, etc. this is ultimately self-contradictory. Human complexity HD ignores the complexity of human beings and reduces, for example, consciousness to physical phenomenon. Levels of differences Rocks, plants and animals, and humans Freedom or choice seems to increase the further up the evolutionary scale you go. Existentialism and human consciousness Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980) argued that humans are confronted by freedom in that consciousness ‘intends’ and creates experience. We make ‘choices’ in relation situations that may be determined. For example, how we choose to live in relation to those things that may be determined for us. Conclusion: Soft determinism Soft determinism appears as the best alternative. Freedom is limited by external factors of all sorts. But we are free to choose or not choose how we react to them, to act or not to act in relation to them. Thus it makes sense to assign moral responsibility to human beings, to praise, blame and reward them. 20.
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