Allen et al. et Allen Schomerus

‘I found the report fascinating and also disturbing in equal measure. …While state building efforts are rightly focused on building up structures from the ground they fail to address the primary need to ensure that such institutions are properly reformed to become independent and impartial institutions…To address these pressing issues and to maximise the positive momentum generated at Sudan odd Southern from the elections and the international focus on Southern Sudan at this time, these issues needs to be discussed publicly with all key states, governments and civil society stakeholders who hold the future of Southern Sudan in their hands. I would urge action sooner rather than later.’ Akbar Khan, Director, Legal & Constitutional Affairs Division, Commonwealth Secretariat

‘The great strength of the report is the accuracy of its voicing of common concerns – it forms an excellent representation of people’s perceptions and experiences, making an important corollary to the current focus on high-level political negotiations and structures. As the report emphasises at the outset, the current focus of Sudanese governments and their international advisors on the technicalities and procedural aspects of planning for the referendum and its outcome needs to be countered by the more holistic approach advocated by this report.’ Cherry Leonardi, Durham University

‘A very important and timely contribution to the current debates…The report offers an invaluable it s with insight in some of the key issues and dilemma’s Southern Sudan and international actors face.’ Jort Hemmer, Clingendael Institute s elf: elf:

Dynamics of conflict and predicaments peace of predicaments and of conflict Dynamics

Southern Sudan

at odds with itself: Dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace Development Studies Institute Research team led by Mareike Schomerus and Tim Allen The research undertaken for this report, Research by Southern Sudan Peace commissioned by Pact Sudan through Commission (SSPC), Centre for Peace CONTENTS DfID, was led by Mareike Schomerus and Development Studies (CPDS), (project director and principal author) and Juba University and the London School Acknowledgements 01 Professor Tim Allen (lead researcher) of of Economics and Political Science the London School of Economics and Development Studies Institute (DESTIN) Acronyms 04 Political Science (LSE) Development Executive summary 05 Studies Institute (DESTIN). The LSE Report by DESTIN team worked in partnership with Juba Introduction: Southern Sudan at Crossroads 14 University’s Centre for Peace and DISCLAIMER: Findings and Local violence and its causes 14 Development Studies (CPDS) and the recommendations do not represent Major findings in brief 15 south Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC). the views of Pact Sudan or the UK Structure of the report 16 Contributing authors to this report Department for International Development Research sites 17 were Rachel Flynn, Aoife McCullough, (DfID). They solely reflect the opinions of Upper Nile 17 Eastern Equatoria 17 Adam O’Brien, Krisana Pieper, Sophie the authors based at the London School Western Bahr el Ghazal 19 Rutenbar and Liana Simmons. of Economics and Political Science. Southern Sudan at odds with itself 20 Research Teams Rethinking ‘Tribalism’ 20 ‘Tribalism’ as a political tool 20 Eastern Equatoria permanent team: Fear of tribal domination and territorial expansion 21 Rachel Flynn, LSE ‘Tribal fighting’ versus ‘tribalism’ 22 Charles Taban, senior SSPC researcher Tribal relations and views of the ‘other’ 22 Ronald Iya, independent Committing ‘tribal’ violence 22 Case study: Nimule: a case of ‘tribalism’ or a land dispute? 23 Ugandan researcher Case Study: Categorising conflicts: Liana Simmons, DESTIN MSc graduate Design: LSE Design Unit Between group identity, resources and civil war 24 (www.lse.ac.uk/design unit) Competing administrative structures 25 Eastern Equatoria temporary team: Chart: When did Southern Sudan have the best leaders? 26 Aisha Ali, Pact Sudan staff Copy editor: Heather Forse Contradictory approaches 27 Livia Ndurua, Pact Sudan staff Chart: Will there be another war with the north? 29 Dr Sirisio Oromo, CPDS Photographs: Aoife McCullough, Chart: Will there be another war within Southern Sudan? 29 Tim Allen, Mareike Schomerus, Reflections on the referendum 30 Greater Bahr el-Ghazal team: Vikki Groves, Adam O’Brien Chart: Will you vote for unity or independence? 30 Mareike Schomerus, LSE Table: Violence potential of referendum outcomes 30 Minihiteng Odihak, Office Manager Referendum as a moment for change 31 of the SSPC Chairperson Case Study: Caught in the middle: Raja County 32 Taban Charles, Sudanese Developing government structures 34 independent researcher Background: The lack of viable historical models for Southern Sudan’s future 34 Krisana Pieper, LSE affiliate Dynamics of conflict 38 Aoife McCullough, DESTIN MSc graduate How decentralisation and administrative division fuels conflict 38 Chaplain Kenyi, CPDS Borders and conflicts 40 Blurring borders between ethnic and administrative boundaries 40 Upper Nile team: Case study: An example of ‘ethnic’ administrative division in EES 42 Adam O’Brien, LSE affiliate Table: Respondent Perceptions of Pros and Cons of Administrative Division 43 Duoth Kwon, SSPC Jonglei state Case Study: Counties cause conflict in Eastern Equatoria 43 Director for Administration and Finance Case study: International borders between Toposa and Turkana 44 Victoria Guli, CPDS Relying on an illusion? The 1956 borders 46 Paul Opio Both, Pact Sudan Case Study: The Atar/Khorflus agreements 48 Sophie Rutenbar, DESTIN MSc graduate Case study: The legacy of the ‘1956 border’ between Acholi and Bari 50 Case Study: Different memories: Dinka, Shilluk and internal borders Frontcover: A dust storm gathers over 52 Land and other resources 53 All teams were visited by Professor Allen. Wau – photograph by Aoife McCullough Case study: Lopit: How a ‘resource conflict’ spreads into politics 53 Cattle-raiding as a resource conflict? 54 3 Examining the causes of cattle-raiding 55 Politics of cattle herders versus farmers 57 Case study: A new experience of cattle-raiding in Mapel 58 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Protection 58 Chart: Institutions providing protection and problem solving in Southern Sudan 59 Case study: The SPLA, security and legacies of unsolved violence in Budi County 61 Case study: Arms and the WFP barge attack 63 Other armed groups and outsiders 64 We would like to thank Pact Sudan, particularly Judy McCallum, Julie Brethfeld, Dina Parmer, Militias 64 Alfred Okech, Paul Opio Both, Mauro Tadiwe, Peter Lominit, Emmanuel Gumbiri, Rachel Youth gangs 64 DuBois, Stephanie Marienau and many others affiliated with Pact Sudan (namely Kenneth The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 65 Akau from INCODE) who helped with information, time, organisation and encouragement. Fellata 66 Thanks to the Southern Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC), particularly Louis Labong Lojore and Predicaments of peace 69 Peter Gwang for their partnership, commitment and insight into the complexities of the conflicts. Chart: Themes in drawings depicting life before the CPA 69 Chart: Themes in drawings depicting life after the CPA 69 Thanks to Simon Lubang and the Centre for Peace and Development Studies (CPDS) at Chart: Perceptions of peace, security and aid from 1972 – 2009 70 Juba University for facilitating the participation of three researchers. Thanks to Graham Peace-building: a palliative cure? 72 Thompson and Freddie Carver from DfID in Sudan for their insights and support. Case study: Strategic peacemaking between Dinka Malual and Rizeigat 73 Thanks to Jeannine McMahon and Anju Begum of LSE Enterprise for their assistance. The meaning of peace-building 75 We much appreciate helpful and insightful comments on drafts from: Table: Peace meetings as a response to conflict 75 ‘Talk about peace’-building 76 • Cherry Leonardi and John W Donaldson, Durham University Chart: What is the best way to get peace? 77 • John Marks, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) Questioning the sustainability of peace meetings 78 • Jort Hemmer, Clingendael Institute Case study: A fragile ‘peace’ at Lauro 79 • Akbar Khan, Director, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Division, Commonwealth Secretariat A look at local peace agreements 80 Alternative approaches 81 We owe a lot to the Juba community of NGOs, donors and government officials who ‘Chiefs’ and peace-building 82 attended two workshops, and they shared ideas and gave their feedback. Particular thanks Case study: Monyomiji 83 go to His Excellency Gier Chuang Aluong, GoSS Minister for Internal Affairs for his astute and Tension between chiefs and government structures 84 challenging speech at the start of our research. Case study: Hybrid structures and the Local Government Act 86 Most importantly, we are grateful to the women and men, youth, community leaders, Political Voice 87 religious leaders, elders, military commanders, NGO staff, donors, commissioners, ministers, Access to news media 88 governors, UN staff and taxi drivers who gave us their time and patience to describe the Chart: When did you listen to the radio for information? 89 problems they are facing and to answer our endless questions. We hope we can reflect their Chart: Which radio stations do you listen to? 89 experiences adequately. The effectiveness of agencies: funding, coordinating and targeting 90 Case study: the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) 92 Ensuring accountability 93 Coordination challenges 93 The politics of the development sector 94 Local partnerships and appropriate entry points 94 The politics of hiring 94 Politics of uneasy partnerships 94 Conclusion 96 Appendix: Methodology and introduction to research sites 97 Research Challenges 97 Fieldwork methodology 98 Qualitative interviews 98 School drawing exercises 98 Ranking 98 University seminars 99 Questionnaire 99 References 100 Endnotes 104 1 CountiesCounties of Southern of Southern Sudan Sudan- representative - representative

" "

Renk Blue Nile Sudan Sudan Renk Blue Nile Southern DarfurSouthern Darfur

Southern Southern Kordofan Kordofan Melut Manyo Melut Manyo

Fashoda Fashoda Abyei Abyei Pariang Pariang Maban Maban Upper Nile Upper Nile Abiemnhom Malakai Malakai Abiemnhom Panyikang Panyikang Awell North Awell North Awell East Rubkona Rubkona Baliet Baliet Awell East Longochuk Twic Mayom Longochuk Twic Mayom Canal (Khor Fulus) Guit GuitCanal (Khor Fulus) Awell West Awell West Unity FangakUnity Fangak Luakpiny/Nasir GogrialAwell EastSouth Gogrial KochEast Koch Luakpiny/NasirNyriol Raga Raga Awell South Nyriol Maiwut Maiwut Gogrial West Gogrial West Ulang Ulang Awell Centre Awell Centre Tonj North Tonj North Leer Leer Warrap Warrap Ayod Ayod Mayendit Mayendit Ethiopia Tonj East Tonj East Ethiopia Uror Uror Western Bahr el GhazalWestern Bahr el Ghazal Duk Duk Akobo Akobo Rumbek North PanyijarRumbek North Panyijar Jur River Jur River Jonglei Jonglei Tonj South Tonj South Wau Wau Twic East Pochalla Pochalla Central Central Rumbek Centre Rumbek CentreTwic East Cueibet Cueibet African African Yirol East Yirol East RepublicRepublic Lakes Lakes Bor South Bor South Yirol West Yirol West Nagero Nagero Pibor Pibor Awerial Awerial Wulu Wulu Tambura Tambura Mvolo Mvolo

T e rekeka T e rekeka Mundri West Mundri West Lapon Kapoeta NorthLapon Kapoeta North Western Equatoria Kapoeta East Kapoeta East Western Equatoria Mundri East Mundri East Ezo Ezo Ibba Maridi Ibba Maridi Yambio Yambio Eastern Equatoria Juba Juba Eastern Equatoria Nzara Nzara DemocraticDemocratic Central Equatoria Central Equatoria Kapoeta South Kapoeta South Republic Republicof Congo of Congo Lainya Lainya Torit BudiTorit Budi Y e i Y e i Ikotos Kilometers Kilometers Ikotos Kajo-Keji MagwiKajo-Keji Magwi 0 50 1000 50 201000300200403000 400 Kenya Kenya Morobo Morobo

Uganda Uganda

2 3 Acronyms Executive summarY

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement With Sudan’s elections over, this is the maintained. Building up a government from CBO Community-based organisation moment to refocus on challenges that lie scratch is an impressive achievement. Yet, ahead for Southern Sudan in the coming few the new government structures do not reach CPDS Centre for Peace and Development Studies/Juba University months. The tremendous task of conducting the majority of people interviewed for this DDR Demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration elections as part of what was agreed in the report and violence is part of everyday life for DESTIN Development Studies Institute of the LSE Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has many Southern Sudanese. Gains are fragile DoT Diocese of Torit placed an emphasis on technical aspects and will be put to the test in the coming EES Eastern Equatoria State and shortcomings of that process. It is likely months as Southern Sudan prepares for the that in the coming months attention will be final CPA milestone and the time beyond. This GoNU Government of National Unity concentrated on similarly technical aspects difficult period also creates an opportunity for GoS Government of Sudan of the referendum on Southern Sudan’s a coordinated and necessary effort to put in GoSS Government of Southern Sudan independence, which is planned to take place structural changes. HDI Human Development Index place in 2011. IDP Internally Displaced Person In contrast, this report focuses on some of Objective and INGO International non-governmental organisation the broader and more conceptual issues. methodology JDO Joint Donor Office Its main undertaking is to deliver information that clarifies the reasons for increased The objective of this report is to provide JIU Joint Integrated Unit intra-south violence. By reflecting on how evidence that will inform key actors in LRA Lord’s Resistance Army people living and working in Southern Sudan Southern Sudan in consulting Southern LSE London School of Economics and Political Science have experienced events since the CPA, the Sudan’s citizens and in designing, MDTF Multi-donor trust fund report looks at ways in which intra-southern implementing and prioritising policies and M&E Monitoring and Evaluation structures and international approaches have activities that support peace and stability. created some of the current predicaments of Three research teams, comprised of NBeG Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State peace, and have contributed to the dynamics researchers from the Southern Sudan NCP National Congress Party of ongoing conflict. It questions established Peace Commission (SSPC), the London NGO Non-Governmental Organisation narratives about the influence of the School of Economics and Political Science NIF National Islamic Front government of Khartoum or ‘tribalism’ being Development Studies Institute (LSE/DESTIN) at the heart of the region’s problems. The OAG Other Armed Group and Juba University’s Centre for Peace and report finds that other issues, some of which Development Studies (CPDS), spent a month SAF Sudan Armed Forces have been ignored or underemphasised gathering data in Eastern Equatoria, Upper SNGO Sudanese NGO – such as the lack of internal border Nile and Greater Bahr el-Ghazal in October SSLA Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly demarcations – have a direct impact on local and November 2009. The teams conducted SSRRC Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commision violence. It also identifies problems with the close to 300 extended qualitative interviews development/reconstruction/peace-building with local government officials, NGO and SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army approach that have exacerbated tensions. UN staff as well as individual or focus group SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement In particular, current attempts to establish discussions with local leaders and residents. SPLM-DC Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-Democratic Change state institutions, notably at the local level, are In addition, several methods were used for SSPC Southern Sudan Peace Commission actually making outbreaks of violence more triangulation, including 354 questionnaire- likely. Above all, the report demonstrates the SSR Security Sector Reform based surveys administered to randomly importance of moving away from simplistic selected individuals, drawing competitions UN United Nations categorisations in order to arrive at a more in schools and participatory exercises with UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees multi-faceted analysis, one that takes into women, youths and elders. In addition further UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan account the complexities on the ground. follow-up research was conducted during the elections in April 2010. UNS Upper Nile State The past five years have seen tremendous UNDP United Nations Development Programme progress in Southern Sudan as peace WBeG Western Bahr el-Ghazal State between north and south has largely been

4 5 Factual findings simply a lazy and misleading interpretation commonly referred to as a ‘peace dividend’, law enforcement was very weak. State of reasons for violence. This does not mean combined with an intense political contest actors are not held to account and thus do Despite great achievements, neither the that many people do not assign tremendous down to the local level, and an absence not administer punishment to those who Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) importance to their tribal belonging, or of institutions with the capacity to control commit violent acts in a transparent way. nor the international agencies working in that ethnicity cannot be manipulated by violence. The process of establishing Violence is perpetrated either by non-state Southern Sudan have achieved what they politicians wanting a local power-base. institutions to stem local violence presents actors or state actors who behave in ways set out to do during the Interim Period. But, for peace-building programming to be opportunities for gaining positions of power that exacerbate further violence. Personal Accountable government structures on successful, clashes between groups need to and authority. political agendas support deliberate all levels, reliable service delivery, civic be more comprehensively investigated and attempts to avoid controlling violence education, security and a coordinated explained, taking into account competition Competing structural approaches and prevent state-building, as credible effort among development agencies remain for resources as well as the underlying Approaches to state-building in Southern and accountable structures may usurp elusive goals. Serious shortcomings have motivations of local leaders and other elites. Sudan stand in direct competition with the authority of those currently in power. emerged that need to be addressed. the need to control violence. Violence can Southern Sudan is an example of how Establishing state structures only be reliably supressedthrough strong difficult it is to introduce democratic models Major themes: that support conflict and reliable state structures yet these in a nascent state, where a monopoly on Major issues that emerged as reasons do not exist or where they do, might be the use of force by that state is far from Scape-goating Khartoum for local violence are either structural or perpetrators of violence themselves. For guaranteed. While on paper, responsibilities A default explanation for violence is the can be found in a troubled, somewhat GoSS this creates a problem of deciding on for imposing order are clearly laid out, lack interference of the Government of Sudan paradoxical relationship between the prioritising approaches to either build the of implementation of structures established (GoS). Theories put forth by respondents state and its citizens. The current state- state or control violence. in the CPA and the Interim Constitution has from local government, army or civilians building approach emphasises the creation New government structures are being created an empty space. range from blaming Khartoum for bringing of strong institutions; an emphasis on created while at the same time there is a • Citizen versus subject Uganda’s outlawed Lord’s Resistance decentralisation addresses Sudan’s legacy reliance on governance systems that are Army (LRA) to Western Bahr el-Ghazal, to of marginalisation. At the same time, this not readily linked to a vision of Southern A democratic state-building framework assumptions that the recent increase in approach works counter-productively, as Sudan’s possible future as an independent suggests a need for politically responsible cattle-raiding is part of a northern strategy the very same institutions lack accountability state, or even as an autonomous region. citizens and this vision of integration into a of destabilisation. Such sentiments ferment particularly at the local level where most While theoretically, Southern Sudan aims to democratic and responsible state resonates anti-north opinions and contribute to unease violence is caused. In combination with be decentralised, it has in reality become an with those interviewed. However, current and tension in the run up to significant the political manipulation of the ‘tribal’ extremely centralised system. The Interim trends suggest that much of the population political decisions. However, testimony given label, what are meant to be accountable, Period has fostered a certain lack of clarity will be treated more as subjects.1 This is by local authorities or civilians to support decentralised government structures have in among CPA actors, including donors and most evident in places where many people Khartoum’s direct involvement in local reality begun to resemble ethnic fiefdoms. NGOs. A focus on CPA milestones has speak neither English nor Arabic. Away conflicts tends to be anecdotal, based on contributed to a murky understanding by It seems that with Khartoum’s influence on from the bigger towns, the population lacks rumours and unsupported by actual events those interviewed of the precise ambition or southern violence overestimated and the label political voice and is largely disconnected on the ground. One poignant example is the vision for Southern Sudan. This is evident in ‘tribal conflict’ too broad to deliver any useful from governmental processes. Those continued rumour and accusation that the the vast range of ways people interviewed insights, it is in the structure of the fledgling state interviewed generally expressed high nomadic Amborroro/Fellata are functioning for this report described their understanding that it becomes apparent that Southern Sudan expectations for what would happen after as an armed militia of the Khartoum of the current situation. is, in a way, at odds with itself. the referendum and indicated hopes of government. However, no actual violent International organisations might be clear becoming engaged citizens in the future. incidents were known even by local civilians about their own organisations’ goals, but It was difficult, however, to discern how or the government which accuses the Drivers of conflict or are restricted by short-term funding cycles they believed these expectations might Amborroro of being Khartoum’s agents. Southern Sudan at odds which prohibit long-term and multi-faceted be met. Views were often contradictory. planning. The result is a lack of depth in Many respondents suggested that the Creating ‘tribal conflicts’ with itself programming which fails to combine GoSS was actually an impediment to The second most common explanation conflict mitigation with peace-building state-building because resources were not The period immediately succeeding the is that ‘tribal hatred’ drives local violence. and development. being distributed in an equitable manner, signing of the CPA was characterised by an The ‘tribal’ label is applied to anything from something that was repeatedly highlighted enthusiasm for changing times in Southern • State-building and controlling violence family disputes, clashes within sub-clans as crucial for the establishment of a Sudan. After five years of the CPA and of the same tribes, to attacks by criminal Patronage politics and a proliferation of lasting peace. unfulfilled expectations, war-like behaviour gangs or marauding former soldiers. As government structures have lessened and opportunism have resurfaced. Factors an explanation for violence, the term is governmental accountability and intensified that contribute to the increase in tensions Unclear authorities meaningless, particularly as violence is the violent struggle over access to resources Unclear authority structures are most often and acts of aggression include the failure as often intra-tribal as it is inter-tribal. It is and political space. At sites researched, cited as the biggest obstacle to preventing of delivering services according to what is

6 7 and controlling violence. The research team the SPLA. As a result, locals have started Defining violence in Southern Sudan as entrench ‘tribal’ lines over competition for found numerous examples of situations taking the law into their own hands and no ‘tribal conflicts’ has led to a pervasive resources, manifesting itself in a proliferation where individuals appeared to act without one, it seems, has the authority or capacity flawed logic. This logic has informed local of new counties. Momentum for increased reference to established conventional to impose order. peace initiatives with their emphasis on administrative fragmentation is developing notions of social restraint, openly taking ‘tribal’ issues and ‘tribal’ reconciliation. while decision-making power is being resources for their own personal gain, acting ‘Tribalism’ Counterproductively, these often involve firmly held at the centre, thus voiding in ways that violated ideas about moral The description of local conflicts as tribal chiefs whose authority may be enhanced the entire idea of devolution of power probity or in ways that were simply criminal in nature is ubiquitous but is in many by emphasising the very ‘tribal’ divisions through decentralisation. Theoretically, or unconstitutional. They did so without any respects superficial and unhelpful. To a large they are supposed to be ameliorating. In decentralisation and localised responsibility expectation of facing repercussions. extent, it conflates symptoms of underlying other words, there is a failure to address are necessary in Southern Sudan; New governance structures of community- problems with their causes. Although underlying political and structural issues. practically, the implications of continued based administrators are implemented there are situations in which cattle-raiding, Some of the solutions on offer just make administrative division can be dangerously half-heartedly and aid agencies exacerbate competition over pastures, or claims over things worse. far-reaching and damaging. the confusion by turning to ‘chiefs’ as land were found to be associated with tribal Locally, there exist two main schools of default community representatives for groupings, that was by no means always the Dynamics of conflict programming. Yet it is not clear how case. Also, what appeared to be a localised thought regarding this fragmentation: one posits that this is a natural process in a ‘chief’s’ position currently relates to dispute was usually on closer examination Tensions over borders, both real and emerging democracies, based on local-level government structures. Part of the reason found to have links with various kinds of imagined, are escalating for this nebulous role is that no distinctions political grudges, governmental failures, or The CPA refers to the 1956 borders between power struggles both at the representative are drawn between different types of resource disputes which had little to do with the north and south. However, the team and at the grassroots level. The alternative ‘chiefs’, of which there are many and whose assumed divisions between ‘tribes’. was told repeatedly that county, payam and view foresees this fragmentation as authority and legitimacy among communities An example for this would be cattle- boma borders also need to be reverted to the undermining unity in the south because it varies widely. raiding in Greater Bahr el-Ghazal, which way they were in 1956 as a way of dealing fosters ethnicisation of authority structures, is commonly intra-tribal and fuelled by with disputes. Contrary to popular opinion and fuels populist patronage politics. While • Governmental reform versus strengthening increased disconnection between citizens in Southern Sudan, detailed maps, showing decentralisation could be an effective way to indigenous structures and the government. demarcated boundaries at such local levels increase accountability and dilute nepotism, as they were at independence, do not actually it currently mimics and reinforces damaging A major contributor to local violence is the It is no coincidence that some of the worst arrangements at the national level, rather lack of accountable and reliable entities exist. Even if they did, using such maps to solve violence has occurred in drought-prone present day problems disregards the fact that than providing an alternative to them. to deal with violence when it occurs. One regions. Competition for resources in these reason why a responsibility gap has opened the social and political landscape has been areas becomes intense; young men, often Motivations for cattle-raiding have is that currently two different approaches drastically changed by decades of war and staying together in camps, end up raiding altered with changed circumstances in attempt to establish such structures. displacement. Expectations that local border each other, sometimes with a shocking lack demarcation will bring peace are tremendously Southern Sudan While consideration of local indigenous of constraint. Among other things, cattle- Cattle-raiding is mostly carried out by young structures is important and necessary in high. Yet internal border demarcation is far raiding provides a potential for immediately from being a problem-solver, but rather triggers men based at cattle camps who appear to establishing a forum for political conflict, it improving their livelihoods. As noted above, have minimal respect for either governmental is problematic if local indigenous structures conflicts as groups on all sides of boundaries such incidents do not always relate to tribal seek the legitimisation of land rights which or traditional authorities. It is said this is are strengthened without questioning their divisions; rather, the adoption of tribal and because they are unschooled, grew up political accountability in connection with accelerates division of Southern Sudan into clan affiliations may provide opportunities ethnic fiefdoms. as orphans, have no employment, are just violent conflict. In addition, linkages between that some individuals exploit. Previously used to fighting, or know that that nothing formal government and putative traditional weak or relatively unimportant distinctions will happen to them even if they are caught authorities have not been clarified and Administrative division between social groups suddenly take on a The CPA and Interim Constitution commit in the act. Compounding the problem of strengthened where appropriate. Currently, new significance, and the process is also lack of authority is extreme poverty, uneven the proliferation of new government to administrative, political, and fiscal exacerbated and facilitated by the availability decentralisation and devolution of power. distribution of wealth, inflation in bride- structures in addition to an emphasis on old of small arms. These problems have, to price, historical intergroup tensions and the governance systems has created a situation However, the goal of breaking power some extent, been rooted in the particular down into small administrative units while proliferation of arms. Cattle-raiders are often in which it is not clear where authority lies history of groups. But matters have been better armed than the police or even the and ultimately who can take charge of simultaneously seeking to portray and exacerbated by the notable absence of build a strong central state combines two army. Modern weapons also make fatalities dealing with violent conflict. Currently, with benefits from the CPA and by the weakness much more likely than in the past and limit these issues undefined, responsibility for approaches at odds with one another, pulling of GoSS. The latter resorts to un-monitored Southern Sudan into opposite directions. the possibilities of using traditional mediation conflict resolution is unclear. Government decentralised administration which and compensatory measures to contain the officials refer to chiefs, but chiefs mostly effectively encourages localised politics that Decentralisation, while theoretically the violence. In addition, there are indications refer back to government officials, or exaggerate the notion of tribalism as the best way to govern Southern Sudan, has that in some locations armed bands of perhaps to the Southern Sudanese army, main source of division. in reality often become an instrument to young men, ostensibly raiding for cattle, are

8 9 linked to political machinations of former to be at the heart of peace-building activities. Nevertheless aid programming remains Although quite substantial funds have been militia commanders and other political affected by short-term funding and funding allocated by donors to Southern Sudan, figures in search of constituencies. Peace conferences and peace mechanisms that better suit humanitarian much of it has not yet been spent, and a very agreements have been ineffective in assistance. There is a reluctance to move high portion has been used by GoSS for resolving local conflicts Predicaments of peace away from the humanitarian approach recurrent expenditure rather than investment. By framing political and resource insecurity completely because the current political A consequence is that in several of the areas as tribal conflict, peace conferences Some conflicts are a result of the CPA climate is unpredictable; there is increased in which research was carried out, the CPA is have focused on working with traditional volatility in the region; it is often easier to viewed as a point at which assistance for the The CPA has exacerbated certain conflicts. authorities that often lack the capacity and Competition involving returnees is often secure funding for humanitarian situations; population declined. The withdrawal of food credibility to resolve complex disputes. and finally there are areas which are in need aid in particular was often mentioned. intense and bitter. A strong sense of Usually facilitated with outside help, the victimisation is felt across all groups in of humanitarian aid. In addition, it is important proliferation of peace conferences has to keep in mind that a transition such as the Southern Sudan, creating a condition in created a paradoxical situation for many which certain people feel justified in using one in Southern Sudan does not follow clear THE WAY FORWARD local leaders in which their power is ‘stages’ and the practical implications of violence to rectify what is considered an A principle finding from the research was the expressed by the ability to fundraise for a the overlap between aspects of emergency unfair distribution of ‘peace dividends’. interconnectedness between conflict triggers. local conference and gather support of an assistance and the promotion of various Disarmament is exemplary of the While the search to identify the most burning aid agency, yet simultaneously undermining forms of longer-term development needs to widespread feeling of victimisation: almost issue that would help mitigate current violence their own authority to solve local problems be dealt with more adequately. every community asked about disarmament without outside help. By defining conflicts is pressing, the complicated and fluid situation claimed that while they had been disarmed, as local and tribal, peace conferences have The uncertainty about what ‘mode’ Southern in Southern Sudan does not allow for a their neighbouring community had not. neglected the broader political context. Sudan is in creates institutional confusion straightforward prioritisation of concerns. The The CPA does not address local conflicts, Indeed, one could argue that local conflict that manifests itself in contradictory great disconnection most citizens feel from but only sets up institutions that, upon their resolution cannot take broader politics into approaches to aid and donors seem their government, competition for resources, maturity, are supposed to address some account, but this in turn requires rethinking unable to provide much needed strategic absence of representation, a lack of credible of the local drivers of conflict. Priority in of local conflict resolution approaches. direction. Due to uncertainty surrounding social reconciliation, a perception that CPA implementation, however, has been the referendum, donors are unable to share international aid is being withheld, all throw Without able actors and clear their political scenario planning, which in light on what is happening. The simultaneous on maintaining a working relationship implementation mechanisms, peace between north and south. This is in part turn means that they are prevented from tasks of establishing accountable government conferences often yield many resolutions publicising their future development plans. structures, delivering services, promoting civic also due to the state-building approach, and few results. Though there may be which has prioritised building government Representatives from the donor community education and providing security may have limited value in the communication channels argue that there is long-term thinking within been unmanageable. Expectations of what capacity to deliver services in the future over that are established between groups at more instant service delivery. As a result, the donor community but due to the current would be possible in a short and politically such meetings, these tend to break down political situation, it is not visible. tense time may have been too high. Ongoing communities and individuals committing soon after if there is no long-term strategy violence feel they have little to lose through violence will not automatically fade away and to follow up. In general, a long-term local Disharmony between donors prevents them there is no panacea to deal with atrocities. violent behaviour – they do not even have peace-building strategy is needed that will from being able to coordinate effectively. to fear punishment. In the scramble for culminate in a broadly inclusive conference While it was reported that donors are active Nonetheless, serious shortcomings in resources and local political space, potential that is a product of peace-building – rather in trying to align their approaches to ensure current programmes and policies urgently for violence is also readily manipulated for than just a dominant peace-building activity mutual accountability, the World Bank, which need to be addressed. There is an obvious wider political interests. which becomes an end in itself. is in control of a large amount of funds, was requirement to clarify the overarching vision perceived as unreceptive, making it difficult for Southern Sudan. There are reasons Perceptions of peace Approaches to aid and development to make joint decisions. Those criticising the why that has been difficult, but with the For Southern Sudanese, living in peace are confusing World Bank from within the donor community referendum approaching it is ever more seems to come with two major expectations: GoSS officially sees the country in the mentioned lack of capacity and political will as important. An aspect of that vision will be personal security and access to resources. stage of development, rather than in a a possible reason for the World Bank’s lack of a more explicit recognition of the acute Witnessing development and experiencing state of humanitarian emergency, and pro-activeness. tensions between democracy and state- a changed quality of life through services there is a general perception among NGOs building. It will inevitably take a long time to is vital, and the absence of tangible that donors are now pushing for more It is recognised that there are downsides to build the necessary accountable institutions development in many areas has made the engagement in capacity building of GoSS deciding on a unified southern-wide approach for the former, but peace requires functional notion of peace insignificant and encouraged and local civil society organisations. NGOs as it might fail to take into account different means of imposing and maintaining order violent behaviour familiar to southerners from have themselves raised concerns about circumstances in different parts of the country. now. That is a basic dilemma, and needs be war times. Tangible development progress, short-term funding as it focuses on visible However, donors need to agree on a clear openly confronted. such as building of hospitals or gaining short-term interventions that might not be general policy. access to education, are seen as vital in most conducive to establishing lasting peace. establishing peace and this realisation needs

10 11 Grappling with pervasive local violence 2. Scrutinising the process of will require a strengthening of constructive decentralisation which has caused – rather than divisive – local mechanisms division and ‘tribalisation’ of and the delivery of tangible peace administrative units through the creation benefits. Amongst other things, this will of ethnic fiefdoms. mean facilitating and holding to account government structures and clarifying the 3. Addressing the lack of clarity of political responsibilities of relevant authorities. Also, structures and development approaches. without indications that life is improving, there will be a growing crisis of expectations. 4. Putting into practice an ongoing and Those expectations must be carefully inclusive commitment to make peace- managed, or they will have seriously adverse building a long-term, accountable and consequences. One strategy for doing so multi-faceted endeavour. is likely to be provision of food and other Violent Conflict After resources, probably in cooperation with international agencies. That may be the CPA: case Studies effective in alleviating tensions, particularly in examined in the report the many areas where livelihoods are very fragile. Eastern Equatoria State (EES): To respond effectively and to monitor • ‘Resource conflicts’ in Lopit appropriately, an overarching vision needs to be related to each specific situation. • Border conflicts between Acholi Southern Sudan is a vast and socially and Bari diverse region. Searching for solutions for • Legacies of violence in Budi its multiple, overlapping and interrelated County violent conflicts requires an understanding of the unique and idiosyncratic nature of • International borders between each situation. General recommendations Toposa and Turkana about broad approaches too easily gloss • Land disputes in Nimule over the very issues that make problems so apparently intractable. GoSS, donors Upper Nile: and agencies have to subscribe in earnest to the view that each location of upheaval • The Atar/Khorflus agreements calls for detailed and nuanced analysis, and • Dinka, Shilluk and internal borders may necessitate particular, even unique, responses. Simplistic approaches to • Lou Nuer and Jikany Nuer pacification will either be oppressive • Arms and the attack on the and/or ineffective. WFP barge In order to develop appropriate solutions Greater Bahr el-Ghazal: that work in each specific local context, a renewed emphasis on working with • Cattle-raiding in Mapel, Warrap the affected populations is needed. This and Lakes States requires continuous long-term programming and funding, committed regardless of CPA A school child’s depiction of life • Strategic peace-making between milestones and their outcomes. before the CPA Dinka Malual and Rizeigat We recommend a focus on four main areas: • The presence of the Lord’s Resistance Army 1. Providing a ‘peace dividend’ which • The tensions between Fellata and emphasises the improvement of the  long-term WBeG residents infrastructure to bring visible and tangible peace benefits. • Marginalisation in Raja County

12 13 the ‘hidden hand’ explanation and the ‘tribal programming and development approaches INTRODUCTION: SOUTHERN clashes’ explanation overlook that there are which are in themselves struggling to very delicate and complicated underlying establish continuous peace-building issues that cause local violence which are not processes. Since the CPA, the GoSS has SUDAN AT CROSSROADS driven by Khartoum or tribal belonging. been unable to regulate or monitor equitable distribution of access to resources or A closer look at evidence and a more to achieve demobilisation or systematic With Sudan’s elections completed, it is Southern Sudan have experienced conflict detailed analysis of incidents of local disarmament. In addition, a ‘peace necessary to refocus on challenges that lie and peace-building since the CPA. Looking violence shows that the ‘hidden hand’ and dividend’ is manifestly lacking in the places ahead for Southern Sudan in the coming few at problematic intra-southern structures ‘tribal’ explanations are too simple. Major where research for this report was carried months. In the lead up to the elections, the and dynamics, we identify predicaments of issues that emerged as reasons for local out. Instead, a very weak administration tremendous task of conducting them as part peace and dynamics of conflict and map violence are either structural or can be has resorted to forms of decentralised of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement how local violent processes link to broader found in a troubled, somewhat paradoxical administration that encourage ‘tribal’ (CPA) placed an emphasis on technical structural causes. relationship between the state and its politics, and dangerously links ‘tribal’ politics issues regarding the conduct and logistics of citizens. On the one hand, the state is not to holding power over specific territories. elections, rather than their political significance. Local violence and its causes strong enough to be able to suppress local Management concerns took centre stage. In What are the reasons for local violence? Two violence. On the other, whenever state the coming months, the focus will inevitably explanations are most commonly given: institutions are too strong and coercive, shift towards similarly technical aspects of the this causes renewed conflict which is at the upcoming referendum on Southern Sudan’s a) Southern Sudanese and their leaders are heart of local violence.4 This is exacerbated willing to blame the ‘hidden hand’ of Khartoum independence in 2011. The fact that this 2 by the development emphasis to build state milestone is now so near and seems reachable for all ills and unexplained local phenomena. institutions. Yet as these new institutions is a tremendous achievement, and looking Indeed southerners credit Khartoum with the lack accountability, particularly at the local back over the last eight years since the CPA ability and desire to exert power over even level where most violence is caused, the process began makes very clear how much the most banal of issues. The more serious development-aid supported structures turn has been accomplished in regards to largely accusations focus on weapons dissemination, into a structural cause for violence. maintaining the peace between north and continuing support for militias (including the south and building a government from scratch. Lord’s Resistance Army), and the buying It seems that with Khartoum’s influence on The emphasis on achieved success and the of political support. Yet evidence about southern violence overestimated and the final CPA milestone, however, is precisely why this ‘hidden hand’ is scarce to non-existent label ‘tribal conflict’ too broad to deliver any Some of the issues discussed in this report there is a danger that complex and long- and this stance has become less important useful insights, it is in the structure of the might at first seem only vaguely connected running issues might again be overlooked. since the elections made clear that southern fledgling state that it becomes apparent to local violence. One such issue is the This report tackles some of these broader and political dynamics and power struggles that Southern Sudan is, in a way, at odds importance of internal border demarcation. more conceptual issues. Its main undertaking carry great potential for conflict. Even before with itself. In the current period of transition, is to deliver information that clarifies reasons elections, local violence in Southern Sudan momentum for the formal demarcation of for a puzzling development: increased seemed to be largely disconnected from Major findings in brief Southern Sudan’s borders at all levels is intra-south violence, particularly since 2009. the power politics in Khartoum. During the This report finds that political and huge, and a key reason for ‘ethnicising’ Everyday security has become one of the first two months of 2010, more people were administrative developments have conflicts. The movement toward final and major challenges for Southern Sudan’s killed in relatively small Warrap State (WS) heightened tensions over territories, legally defined borders, inevitably linked citizens, yet analysis has often been reduced than in any other state, however northern administrative units and border demarcation. with permanently coded access and usage influence is acknowledged to be minimal in To claim administrative units, ‘tribal’ to citing the more obvious reasons for local 3 rights, is creating tension in a region where violence, such as the lack of state reach and WS. During this research, many respondents identities are used and often manipulated as boundaries have tended to be contested and access to rural areas, availability of small arms acknowledged that within the south, there was the primary marker of separation between often ambiguous. While this may seem like and lack of economic opportunities. This great potential for people to incite hate and groups. At the same time, economic and a distinct issue, we argue that connections report urges to refocus from obvious answers violence without encouragement from environmental change and population need to be drawn that are less than obvious. to understanding the web of causes and the north. migrations have increased pressure on land Despite the complexity of each issue, we effects of violence. The objective is to identify and competition over access to resources, aim to identify entry points for possible This leads to the second most common emphasising again group dynamics that what appear to be more holistic solutions. explanation: solutions. It is vital that measures will be put often manifest in seemingly ‘tribal’ conflicts. in place to mitigate local violence in tandem In order to achieve this and to attempt b) Local violence in Southern Sudan is driven On a broader level, these often very with preparations for the referendum. continuous and constructive peace-building, by conflicts between tribes. The tribal label is it is necessary to look beyond established localised tensions remain unaddressed by Establishing a solid evidence base for applied to anything from family disputes, to a central government, creating a vacuum narratives and terminology, and we aim to disputes within tribes, to attacks by criminal general findings is extremely challenging reflect on how those living and working in of responsibility that can only partially be in Southern Sudan. Robust data is still gangs or marauding former soldiers. Both, addressed through current peace-building

14 15 largely non-existent and the situation is Research sites Nasir, then took a boat to Akobo, stopping so multi-faceted and diverse that for each along the way at Torkech and Wanding. A point made, a counter-example suggesting Upper Nile post-CPA conflict between the Dinka and the exact opposite can easily be found. An oil-producing border area, Upper Nile Shilluk over land has added a new layer of However, the report draws on several was the frontline of Sudan’s civil war from instability which erupted into violence in hundred interviews in addition to existing 1983-2005 as well as the fault line of January 2009 and has continued into the scholarship on Southern Sudan (see Southern Sudan’s split into internal strife elections and beyond. Currently, tensions Appendix for research methodology) and in 1991. Saturated with small arms and between officials of the leading party, Sudan presents as general findings only issues that proxy militias during the war, Upper Nile has People’s Liberation Movement SPLM, its resonated in all three research sites. continued to be a volatile flashpoint during supporters and those who support or hold implementation of the CPA. The current office for Lam Akol’s SPLM-DC (Democratic Structure of the report trends in Upper Nile are troubling, and the Change), continue. To investigate the state’s strategic geography, valuable natural dynamic and likely trends of this conflict, This report is divided into three parts, each resources, volatile ethnic mix, and fractured the research team went to Dolieb Hills, Atar, discussing specific issues and using local political landscape are likely to be catalysts Fangak, Kodok, Melut, and Paloich. case studies to emphasise how these issues for future conflict. The possibility of this came manifest themselves. into sharp focus on April 30 2010, when guns Eastern Equatoria were fired within the SPLA barracks as a Eastern Equatoria State is situated in a ‘Southern Sudan at odds with itself’ result over dissatisfaction with the elections. region that experiences chronic armed examines how ethnicity has become the conflict and frequent cattle-rustling with default explanation for local violence in The state’s capital Malakal reflects and weak institutional structures for imposing Southern Sudan and how this has created reinforces the tensions that run throughout the rule of law.5 The state is bordered by a simplified and misleading understanding the state. Before the second Sudanese civil Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya which adds of violence. The section looks at the war, Malakal was a heavily arabised town difficult cross-border dynamics.6 Sudan’s tension created through current state- with a distinctly northern and Islamic identity. second civil war devastated parts of the building, development and peace-building During the war, it was a garrison stronghold state, setting back development gains made approaches, which have essentially created of the northern Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) during the period of regional autonomy.7 a situation in which Southern Sudan is that served as a central funnel of arms, The limited infrastructure of the state was at odds with itself. The meaning of the ammunition, supplies and soldiers into the destroyed by frequent aerial bombardment, referendum for the Southern Sudanese south via military intelligence. Since the military attacks and fighting which also is examined. This section also gives signing of the CPA, the northern influence created widespread displacement. some background as to how the current has receded – albeit very slowly with Upper experience of Southern Sudan links to its Nile having been governed by governors Administrative fragmentation over the last history and what might be learned from this. of the National Congress Party (NCP) until decade means that the state currently the elections – and created an opening consists of eight counties. The region ‘Dynamics of conflict’ analyses how for competition over control of Malakal’s is experiencing increasingly harsh tension over administrative and territorial resources. Since 2005, Malakal has twice environmental conditions and reduced or boundaries is perpetuating violent behaviour, erupted into heavy fighting between SAF and failing crop yields. Combined with a lack particularly in areas where economic change SPLA elements of the Joint Integrated Units of basic services, weak or absent state is happening across such boundaries, (JIU), the hybrid troops of SAF and SPLA institutions and failing local economies, manifesting itself in violent behaviour that is established as part of the CPA. While control high levels of conflict – often over access often simply labelled as ‘tribal’. of the town is not officially the JIU’s mandate, to scarce resources – are not unexpected. Cattle-rustling has become embedded as a ‘Predicaments of peace’ dissects the in reality control over the tense town is survival strategy; however, recent years have local experience of current peace-building currently divided between the two factions. seen a change in the ferocity and frequency initiatives, including some of the approaches The northern side of Malakal is marked by of raids as a result of the widespread that have developed as a consequence of tension between Shilluk, Dinka, and Nuer, availability and use of small arms as well issues discussed in previous sections, such each of which is trying to stake claim. In as severe drought experienced in the last as administrative decentralisation. other parts of Upper Nile, the legacy of two years. Attempts to resolve conflicts and a ferocious intra-Nuer war continues to improve security in the region have been reverberate in the form of fighting between undermined by political manipulation of the Lou and Jikany. In an attempt to identities and few opportunities for imminent understand the conflict between the two development because of depressed local groups, the research team spent time in economies and lack of aid.

16 17 The border town of Nimule is struggling with presence of arms, the changing role of Greater Bahr el Ghazal from cattle-raiding, the team examined tense relations between a Dinka ‘Internally ‘chiefs’, perceptions of justice systems and Western Bahr el Ghazal stretches from the dynamics of local cattle-raiding and Displace Person’ (IDP) community and Madi unsuccessful peace meetings. One peace Darfur in the north to the borders of Warrap the history of the peace and reconciliation ‘returnees’ despite the ‘Nimule Agreement’ meeting that had repercussions was the State in its south eastern corner. The state process between the Jur, the Dinka and the that supposedly solves issues of land Lauro Conference in Budi County, held is divided into a contentious small number Fertit. Following the trail of cattle-raiding, the ownership at the heart of this tension. The between the Didinga, Toposa and Buya. of counties; Raja County in the north, Wau team travelled to Tonj in Warrap and Cueibet wider political landscape in Torit has a broad In Lafon and Lopa, intra-tribal (particularly County in the middle and Jur River County in Lakes State to speak to cattle-keepers impact on local level conflict dynamics between the Mura and the Tennet) and inter- in the south east. Jur River County and Wau who are accused of raiding the Jur in Mapel. in the state, including a concern with the tribal (between the Lopit and Pari) tensions County are characterised by savannah, governance gap between state government are increasing, while in Magwi County, the planted extensively with sorghum, groundnut Visiting areas around Korgana, Bisselia and Monyomiji—the greater Equatoria research team examined land disputes and sesame. Further north, towards Raja, and Marial Bei, the frictions between governance system based on age-sets. In between the Lotuko in Palotaka and the the climate is cooler, the vegetation denser the residents of Western Bahr el-Ghazal Kapoeta East County, conflict is, for example, Acholi in Obbo; the Panukuara and Agoro in and larger trees, such as mahogany, more state become clear. Grievances and CPA fuelled by the issue of cattle-raiding between Orobo and the Acholi and Bari in Kit/Ayii and widespread. Western Bahr el Ghazal has disappointments were tangible in tensions the Toposa and Buya in Kapoeta, Machi I and how they are embedded in the broader socio- historically benefitted economically from its between the Fertit, Dinka and Jur and are II, Camp 15 and Kapoeta north. Exacerbating political context. strategic location between north Sudan and particularly poignant in the group that has factors include scarce resources, the Equatoria. During the 19th century, Arab been one of the most maligned tribes in slave traders made huge profits from the Southern Sudan in recent years: the Fellata unplundered populations in Equatoria and (or Ambororo). The current state of the ivory from the Central African Republic.8 Fellata provided a multi-faceted insight into Today, mahogany is felled from surrounding Southern Sudan’s aspirations of statehood, forests and sold mostly by Ugandan, Kenyan the use of scapegoats to cover government and Arab businessmen in neighbouring shortcomings and the direct impact of countries. Western Bahr el Ghazal’s second unclear administrative structures. biggest town, Raja, depends almost entirely Raja County occupies a unique place in on trade with Khartoum. Southern Sudan, mainly because it is hardly The population of Western Bahr el Ghazal connected to the rest of Southern Sudan. is divided into three main groups; the Jur, Roads to Raja Town are impassable for the Fertit and a Dinka minority. Fertit is a most of the year and the local community’s term used by the Jur and Dinka to describe experience with both SPLA and SPLM is roughly 15 different groups.9 The Fertit never limited, having been entirely northern-run joined the SPLA in large numbers. Today, during the war. Facing an uncertain future as political affiliations among the Fertit are a border town or the centre of Sudan, Raja divided. The growing political and military Town provided an interesting case study divide between the Fertit, Jur and Dinka to understand the connections between resulted in the segregation of the capital politics of state-building and identity. In Wau into two areas – one for Fertit, one addition, Raja County has recently been for Dinka and Jur – in the early 1990s. The under attack by the Ugandan Lord’s SPLA eventually attacked Wau town in 1998; Resistance Army. however the town remained under GoS One of the most prevalent issues in control until the CPA was signed and it was discussions with respondents was the not until 2007 that the SPLA officially arrived north-south border. In Aweil North in in Raja Town. Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, residents continue Focussing on the political dynamics in a to be threatened by nomadic tribes who state that has divided political affiliations, cross the contested north-south border to the research team examined perceptions graze their cattle in the dry season. Recent of political voice among people who feel interventions have aimed to develop a marginalised in an SPLM-led Southern strategic peacemaking approach to solve Sudan, due to their political history with the the ongoing tension between Dinka Malual north. The team also spent time investigating and Rizeigat. the meaning of youth gangs for security. As the east of the state recently suffered

18 19 Fear of tribal domination and that changed relations… The Dinka now SOUTHERN SUDAN AT territorial expansion disregard the law.’ 14 Differing perceptions of the contributions of each group to the CPA cause deep divisions The ‘main chief’ at Korgana in WBeG ODDS WITH ITSELF and it is easy to see how the politicisation of explained that: ‘The Dinka did not come such feelings occurs. Indeed, in contested here before the war. They have their own areas, many activities typically associated river, fish, and cattle. There is no reason why Rethinking ‘Tribalism’ Southern Sudan, the Interim Period has with Dinka identity become politicised. An they should come here other than a pretext 15 provided those conditions. When particularly example of this can be seen in Wau, where to cause ethnic tensions.’ ‘Tribalism’ has become the default local politicians ‘tribalise’ their struggle for political power remains highly contested. explanation for increased local violence in power – a phenomenon widely visible in Each cattle-raid that occurred in this region Southern Sudan. The description of local the lead-up to the elections – ethnicity can was portrayed by non-Dinka informants conflicts as tribal in nature is ubiquitous, but become a contestable social resource and as an assertion of political supremacy by 10 is in many respects misleading. The term hence a possible catalyst for group strife and Dinka tribes. While this fear appears to be ‘tribal clash’ is applied with a broad brush, violent conflict. The sense that tribal divisions rooted in ‘tribal’ suspicion, closer analysis referring also to antipathies within a tribal were deepening as politicians consolidated and discussion reveals that it is often driven group (such as the ongoing conflict between their positions was expressed in all research 11 by a governance vacuum and tensions over Dinka Gok and Dinka Rek in Warrap and sites. This happens in two ways: some local territory. A female leader who runs a local Lakes States) or to a situation in which politicians aimed to strengthen their power NGO in WBeG commented: supposedly hostile tribes align to raid a base by emphasising their tribal affiliation in common enemy. Even within those intra- opposition to another local tribal group. Or, You know, our Dinka, during the war, there tribal clashes it is usually specific gangs that tribal connections are used to emphasise was nothing. After CPA, they start fighting. commit violence rather than an entire tribe. direct lines to the central government. I went to Mundri, there was a big farm. And When interrogating the tribal label in Dinka of Bor took their cattle there. They ate Of course, a lot of tensions visible in connection to specific incidents of local everything. But the payam administrator said Southern Sudan apparently contradict the violence, it seems clear that the ‘tribal’ we have no choice. Dinka says it belongs idea that most ‘tribal’ tensions are the result affiliation is at best only one component to them and they have a gun. I went to Torit of political manipulation. Even members of of a complex web of political power, and I heard that there is now a payam in small tribes are acutely aware that a key marginalization, competition over Nimule called Bor [Dinka town and Garang’s element of Southern Sudan’s future is the resources and unaccountable government home] payam…For me I am thinking that ongoing tensions between, and within, the structures. Although it is the case that they are thinking this Southern Sudan Nuer and Dinka populations. While this is there are situations in which cattle-raiding, belongs to them. So they want to cover all a long-standing conflict that seems to be 13 competition over pastures, or claims over the small tribes. clearly demarcated along tribal lines, it is land were found to be associated with tribal cattle market near Tonj also the best example of such politisation groupings, that was by no means always Among smaller tribes, fears of a Dinka- of identities in which tribal belonging is the case. Sometimes localised disputes Groups who feel that they have lost dominated national government and Dinka emphasised whenever politically useful. on closer examination were found to have out in the ‘tribal’ favouritism driving the territorial expansion are pervasive. Historical Ideas about Nuer hegemony were, for links with, variously, political grudges, government are experiencing a deepening grievances may explain this perception. In the example, enhanced when the historian governmental failures or resource disputes sense of disconnection from what they lead up to the signing of the CPA, the SPLA of Southern Sudan, Douglas Johnson, having little to do with traditional divisions expected Southern Sudan to become. This was dominated by the Dinka – despite the brought back a ceremonial stick or dang but more with new political realities. To is compounded by an obvious and visible fact that prominent and rank-and-file non- in May 2009.16 The dang had been looted a large extent, an emphasis on tribalism connection between power and wealth, Dinka have always been part of the SPLA by British troops 80-years-ago, and conflates the symptoms of underlying which has resulted in widespread disillusion – while other militia groups were excluded belonged to the prophet Ngundeng Bong, problems with their causes. with some parts of the SPLM at both the from negotiations. This helped consolidate who predicted a Nuer leader would rule an political and population level. People who a sense of entitlement among the Dinka. A independent Southern Sudan.17 The dang ‘Tribalism’ as a political tool joined the movement with the expectation of group of Ndogo elders in Bisselia in WBEG is now described by some as a potent However, the ‘tribal’ label is extremely being appointed to a position of power and described how before the war, Dinka cattle- sign that will reinforce Nuer power. Such powerful, particularly for those who have failing to secure one are now returning to keepers would request permission from the reassertion of authority is precisely the kind an interest in rallying groups against each their original parties, such as NCP and USAP, chief before grazing their cattle. Now they of manipulation evident on many levels and other to strengthen their own support base. or, as evident in the elections, attempted to reportedly come and graze without asking, is cited regularly as a factor in inciting local Political power is an extremely scarce and secure power as independent candidates.12 often damaging crops. The Ndogo attribute violence. Jur Luo interviewed in WBeG, for highly valuable resource, available only the change in behaviour to the SPLA’s example, expressed the belief that following periodically under specific conditions. In dominance: ‘It was the formation of the SPLA the return of the stick, Nuer from Unity State

20 21 would move into Dinka territory in Warrap, WBeG, described their relationship with Such incidents do not always relate to tribal pushing the Warrap Dinka cattle-raiders their neighbours, the Jur Luo, as ‘good’ divisions – as discussed in the section on into WBeG Jur Luo areas. This is a fear that because they had been displaced together cattle-raiding – but the adoption of tribal and is clearly related to territory and resources, and intermarriage was possible. Their clan affiliations may provide opportunities yet is explained with the tribal label. Some neighbours on the other sides – the Zande that some individuals exploit. Previously Nuer respondents expressed a renewed – were also regarded as ‘good’ because the weak or relatively unimportant distinctions sense that they should be the ones leading former Zande Minister of Agriculture often between social groups suddenly take the struggle. When asked, Equatorian came to inform the women about farming.21 on new significance. The process is also respondents said that they do not believe However, discussion with the male elders of exacerbated and facilitated by the availability in the prophecy, but they sometimes Marial Bei revealed different views. At first of small arms.25 Automatic rifles were mentioned it as catalyst in the struggle for they asserted that there were really only observed to be readily available to those who leadership, as both the Nuer and Dinka two tribes: northerners and southerners. wanted them although in some cases they leaders feel entitled to lead Sudan. Any further division into tribal groups was had to raid more cows first in order to pay for understood as something introduced by them. Other areas prone to ‘tribal’ clashes ‘Tribal fighting’ versus ‘tribalism’ government. As one man put it: ‘The people are those in which land rights remain unclear, When fighting was not obviously about in the offices are the right people to talk for example in the town of Nimule. territory, those interviewed had complex and about tribalism.’22 Yet, when asked about often contradictory ideas about the reasons for neighbouring tribes, elders seemed to putative ‘tribal’ fighting. Many seemed to make possess certain preconceived tribally-based a conceptual distinction between conflicts in notions after all. They described the Jur which protagonists divided along traditional Luo and Fertit as good people who allowed Case study: Nimule: Idi Amin’s rule and that these had returned to ‘tribal’ lines and those involving ‘tribalism’. intermarriage but the Zande as: ‘…very bad a case of ‘tribalism’ Uganda, leaving the land unoccupied. Nimule This distinction was not precise or consistent people. They kill us and torture us when we became a garrison town, predominantly and might have at times been based on an go there.’23 Marial Bei was one of several or a land dispute? inhabited by SPLA soldiers and Dinka individual translator’s view. Nevertheless, the places in which we found divergent opinions IDPs. After the CPA, Madi returnees started As a vibrant border town populated by Dinka notion of ‘tribalism’, or of tribal motivations within a group. resettling in Nimule again and tensions IDPs, Madi returnees and SPLA soldiers, being the main factor behind conflicts, increased. A common expression, explained Nimule presents an example of the tensions tended to be viewed as something brought Committing ‘tribal’ violence a Madi elder, that is used to explain land resulting from post-war re-settlement, and from outside the immediate community. In Those who actually perpetrate ‘tribal’ disputes is that of a Madi seeing someone could superficially be described as a tribal other words, many respondents perceived violence are mostly young men.24 In several else: ‘…sitting under the mango tree I conflict. According to the narrative provided 26 tribalism as a negative development that is not locations, young men were quite open planted’ and harvesting its fruits. by a long time resident, Nimule fell to the necessarily intrinsic to tribal relations.18 about their need or demands for a range of Nimule is not only attractive for its cross- SPLA in 1989. Before this, it had been under things, from education to money, cattle and border trade and a growing economy but the control of Madi militias opposed to the The failure to build a functioning, democratic access to water. Occasionally they were also for its proximity to ‘safety’ as a strategic 19 SPLA. The Madi opposition to the SPLA state was often attributed to ‘tribalism’. disconcertingly straightforward about how border town and access to education reached its climax when Joseph Kebulu, an Some of those interviewed went further and they intended to secure such assets. facilities in Uganda. The ‘Nimule Agreement’, explicitly stated that ‘tribalism’ had become a MP campaigning for elections, was killed designed to assist the return of Dinka IDPs political tool used by those in power. This view It is thus no coincidence that some of the at the Opare junction whilst travelling from (facilitated by Catholic Relief Services was expressed during a group discussion worst violence has occurred in drought- Torit to Opare. The SPLA soldiers who CRS and the International Organization for with Dinka residents of Marial Bei in WBeG: prone regions with a scarcity of water points killed Joseph Kebulu were Acholi, creating Migration – IOM), is considered relatively ‘Tribalism is not for the old and illiterates like and grazing lands. Here competition for a division between the Acholi and Madi successful in soothing tensions. However, us in the villages but [the] educated like you resources becomes intense and animals palpable to this day, particularly in Opare. the Madi community feel the land issue who come from towns are the ones bringing are concentrated. In these places, young The fall of Nimule to the SPLA in 1989 led to has not been resolved because they are tribalism.’20 When asked about relations with men, often staying together in camps, a Madi exodus into Uganda. unable to occupy land that was historically neighbouring tribes, the same respondents end up raiding each other, sometimes theirs, as, for example, pointed out in an During the 1990s, Dinka groups started tended to base their evaluations on local group with a shocking lack of constraint. Among anonymous questionnaire response from fleeing Jonglei state and came to settle in rather than tribal relations. other things, cattle-raiding is potentially an Nimule: ‘It has not been resolved; peace for Nimule. According to the chief of the Bor immediate way of improving their livelihoods. Madi will come only when Dinka leave. You Tribal relations and views of the ‘other’ Dinka community, most settled from 1991-3, have no rights if you have not fought. There Opinions about neighbouring groups following the attacks by the Khartoum- is good business at the border, so they stay differed widely and were quite the opposite supported militia group ‘White Army’ under and trade and claim land.’27 Despite official of entrenched ‘tribal’ hostility suggested Riek Machar at Bor. Dinka interviewees statements reporting smooth transitions to by applying the label of ‘tribal conflict’. For stated they were told that Nimule town had peace, tension simmers. example, a group of women in Marial Bei, been inhabited by Ugandan refugees from

22 23 Case Study: Categorising result of the SPLA split made it difficult to Using ‘tribalism’ or ‘tribal hatred’ as a simple CPA came about. As a document, the CPA address the conflict and protect the local explanatory device for local violence has did not establish an identifiable way forward conflicts: Between population. In the past few years, the Jikany a doubly damaging effect: it obscures the and it was signed for the southern side by group identity, have been gradually driven out of Wanding. realities of conflict and shapes attempts to a disunited SPLM with divergent ideas and resources and civil war However, Lou population movements are solve them. Defining violence in Southern under intense international pressure. In fact, not a straightforward land grab. The land Sudan as ‘tribal conflict’ has led to pervasive all actors involved in the CPA, including In southern Upper Nile, tensions continue south of Akobo in Jonglei state has been flawed logic. This logic has informed local donors and implementing agencies or to exist between the Lou Nuer and Jikany undergoing a gradual change in its water peace initiatives, causing an emphasis on NGOs, remain unclear as to what exactly the Nuer. On the surface, the conflict between supply over the past several decades ‘tribal’ issues and ‘tribal’ reconciliation, often overarching ambition is beyond the ticking the Lou and Jikany seems to be centred on with no surface water available during dry with ‘chiefs’ whose authority, in turn, stems off of CPA milestones such as census, 28 control over resources. The towns of Nasser season. As a result, the Murle roam widely from emphasising such tribal divisions. elections and the referendum. in the south-eastern corner of Upper Nile in the area, pushing the Anuak into Ethiopia Underlying political and structural issues that There are two distinct reasons for this: state, and Akobo, in the north-eastern part and putting pressure on the Lou. A lack of have evolved as a result of the space the a) the complexity of Southern Sudan puts of Jonglei, are connected by the Sobat and security also impacts traffic along the rivers CPA has opened up are not fully addressed. an emphasis on CPA milestones as these Pibor Rivers, which mark the border with to ‘landlocked’ Akobo. With their roads in are much easier to assess than more Ethiopia. Before the conflict began, Jikany poor shape or inaccessible and their river Competing multifarious developmental processes and traffic vulnerable to problems upriver, the b) the CPA represents the lowest common territory extended as far south along the administrative Pibor River as the village of Wanding near Lou feel isolated, under siege and excluded denominator of what was acceptable the border with Jonglei state and closer to from the newly-built Southern Sudan. structures not only between north and south but 29 Akobo than to Nasser. Traditionally during The issue of Wanding itself remains also within the SPLM. Despite Marxist the dry season, with the acquiescence of unresolved, even though its administration Southern Sudan’s journey from 2002, when tendencies, a lack of clear ideology has local Jikany, the Lou took their cattle from was officially returned to Nasir County CPA negotiations started, to 2010 has always been characteristic of the SPLM, yet Akobo north to Wanding, where water and of Upper Nile State in a January 2009 been remarkable. It has gone from being a Garang’s leadership infused the party with a 30 grazing land were more plentiful. ceremony. A multitude of issues feed into full-blown war zone to a semi-autonomous semblance of a publicly unified goal. Since Conflict first began between the two tribes this conflict including population pressures, region with achievements in creating a new his death, the lack of ideology has become a in 1993 as several factors coalesced. First, displacement, access to water, changing government, building infrastructure and more significant issue. Critics of the election the fall of Mengistu in Ethiopia in 1991 meant political loyalties and a history of warlordism. generally maintaining a state of no fighting process have pointed out that it brought to the sudden loss of the SPLA safe haven in Compounding these tensions is a lack of between north and south. All of these light that the SPLM’s main plan was forced western Ethiopia. Within days, the refugee local authority resulting from the legacy of developments took place under extremely consolidation of power, with a path towards camps there were emptied as hundreds of conflict, a changing environment, a lack of difficult conditions. It is important to keep democracy remaining distinctly ambiguous. thousands of Southern Sudanese refugees infrastructure and lack of broader political this in mind when addressing the numerous crossed the border. The sudden influx of participation in the state-building endeavour. challenges ahead and analysing the reasons ‘Government in a briefcase’ refugees to Nasser and Akobo counties The complexity and intersection of issues for continued local violence. In fact, one It is widely discussed in academic literature placed significant pressure on local land above demonstrates that classifying reason why local violence has increased that the SPLM’s ideas about governing a and local food stores. Increasing population conflicts as instances of tribal or ethnic lies in the work that is being done in civilian population in peace and democracy pressure was compounded by a severe violence may produce an oversimplified Southern Sudan, some of which has created are not fully formed. ‘The SPLA was not humanitarian crisis caused by drought understanding, and obscure issues that contradictions that have inadvertently planned from day one,’ said one government in 1992 and 1993, leading to some Lou require deeper consideration. created, rather than stemmed, violence. employee in the WBeG State Ministry for Education. ‘It was a spontaneous war with to attempt to settle more permanently at Currently, Southern Sudan is experiencing Wanding. With the Jikany under similar no proper documentations such as how they a combination of development approaches want the government to look like.’31 Another pressures, tensions escalated and eventually and emergency aid, of state and peace- turned violent. respondent, a former SPLA child soldier, building activities, of creating of new stated that Garang’s vision had never been The split of the SPLA in 1991 also government structures while strengthening clear: ‘Dr John moved with his government contributed to rising tensions between the old governance systems. This breadth of in his briefcase. Now that he died nobody two groups. The schism within the SPLA, activity has created competing or unclear knows what he wanted and Salva Kiir has combined with weak management by Riek ideas of what goal is to be achieved with inherited little.’ 32 Machar, Lam Akol, and Gordon Kong, led each activity and ultimately over Southern to insecurity in the area around the new Sudan’s future. The incredibly challenging transformation faction’s Nasser headquarters. Loose of political leadership in Southern Sudan Such lack of clarity over the future is not is made yet more complex by the political control of local commanders helped the rise surprising, considering that a major aspect of local warlords, worsening the security history of Southern Sudan. Conflicting of the CPA is to decide on the future. reconstruction approaches of peace and situation. Once fighting commenced, the However, it also stems from the way the disintegration of authority in the area as a state-building and very difficult elections may

24 25 have added to a certain disconnect between As actual power is played out, administrative Despite the passage of years since the the war, localised random violence was citizens and their government. This creates confusion arises, namely over which level of CPA was signed, the political leadership is less common because the army usually an overwhelming sense of political volatility government is responsible for which kind of still seen as delivering mixed messages on executed perpetrators without trial. While as was expressed during a focus group issue. The dissonance is growing between governance and broader visions. Even a civilians suffered under army violence, the discussion with youth in Bisselia, WBeG: the government’s aspirations as the best respondent from the SSPC, the government SPLA also protected civilians from such representative of its citizens’ interests, as authority mandated to deal with local crimes as cattle-raiding. In addition, local During the war, the government was very expressed in the Interim Constitution, and conflicts, expressed little confidence that the violence tended to be more controlled during strong. Now there’s no respect. The conflict how Southern Sudanese experience their government is pursuing peace and equality war times because people were joining between the north and the south was the government. Most respondents expressed for all its citizens: ‘There is no focus on together locally against bigger enemies. only conflict...now you go to the next village some doubt about government capacity peace at all.’36 Today, the bigger enemy is harder to define and people will hassle you. Is this the way we and citizens were less than confident that and no credible actor exists to administer will lead ourselves? Why aren’t our leaders their government could build peace despite Contradictory approaches punishment in an accountable way. This leading in a good way?33 expressing hope for improvement post- The lack of focus on establishing a peaceful means that violence is controlled or that referendum.35 Such lack of confidence and democratic society does not necessarily conflicts are managed either by non-state This question is crucial to understanding creates space for behaviour that translates reflect an overall reluctance of the SPLM to actors or by state actors who do not follow current violence. A large majority of people into increased local violence, behaviour that allow for a process of democratisation, as the rules of law. in the three research sites believe that the was suppressed during the war by powerful the approaching referendum is without a best future for Southern Sudan lies with military leadership. doubt the major motivation for consolidation Personal local political agendas in some GoSS yet,there was also an overwhelming of power. But it nonetheless adds to reasons cases support deliberate attempts to avoid consensus that GoSS was struggling We asked 319 respondents when they for current incidents of local violence and controlling violence and in turn to prevent to mitigate conflict and, juggling various had the best leaders compared with when several conflicting issues remain that need to state-building as credible democratic inter-party or personal tensions and donor people thought Southern Sudan was at be addressed. structures might usurp the authority of relationships, might even increase volatility.34 peace. The data indicates that respondents those currently in power. So while state- perceived war leadership – namely John Partly, the Interim Period has been and building and controlling violence ought to be While government structures are being Garangs but also on a local level – as is treated as a time for state-building, an two sides of the same coin, they currently established, these do not necessarily reflect distinctly better than peace leadership. endeavour that includes establishing a new often contradict each other. Further tension existing power relationships. political democratic culture, government is created through a current emphasis service delivery and an accountable state on reform, evident in new government CHART: When did SOUTHERN Sudan have that honours the human rights it sets out in structures and democratic elections, while the best leaders? its Interim Constitution.37 Up to the elections, at the same time reinvigorating traditional political appointments were naturally driven indigenous structures with appointed or 250 by personal connections, and a proliferation inherited leaders, commonly referred to as of unclear political structures has challenged ‘chiefs’. 38 This is driven by a belief, grounded the credibility of the nascent state. The in the integration of traditional leaders into 200 elections, touted as the moment when local government and Local Government Southern Sudanese citizens could voice Law and perpetuated by donors and NGOs, When did you have their political preference, have fallen short of that structures seen as ‘indigenous’ need 150 the best leaders? stabilising the path to democracy as state- to be supported unquestionably. While this (n=319) building measures have been largely overrun is partly true, it is problematic if it is done When was Southern by power consolidation. Essential tools of an without challenging the accountability of 100 Sudan at peace? accountable and democratic state remain such structures. Due to unclear governance elusive, namely the monopoly on violence structures both ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ and means of recourse for citizens. representatives can be given the same 50 responsibilities, including the resolution of This makes controlling violence near violent conflict.39 In addition, both ‘traditional’ impossible. As concepts, both state-building and ‘modern’ leaders stand to lose if 0 and controlling violence should be mutually the attempted government reforms are reinforcing. But in Southern Sudan things accomplished, which has created a situation 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 do not work like that. Southern Sudanese in which those who do hold power – from often claim that the very introduction of the very local to the state-level – are very human rights as part of state-building has 1989 – 2004 Note: 25 people reluctant to change the status quo. While made controlling violence impossible, answered that they theoretically, traditional and state authorities Protracted war years as quick capital punishment is no longer During the Addis Abada are joined in government, in reality they often Agreement 1972 – 1982 have never had the ‘effective’ option it once was. During play out as various versions of governance. Early war years 1983 – 1988 good leaders

26 27 The combination of ‘modernisation and note that election violence was a lot less than Chart: Will there be another ‘traditionalisation’, change and status quo, might have been expected locally and some war with the north? has left the population confused about the genuine democratic processes were evident Yes if southern Sudan role and boundaries of power of authorities. in which leading political figures were voted does not become One striking example is the confusion that out of office. independent 9% exists around judicial matters. While in some (n=319) areas modern and traditional authorities While the goals of state-building and are working together constructively to controlling violence or modernisation and improve security, in others the lack of clarity traditionalisation aim to achieve conflicting regarding responsibilities has created a outcomes, they are not a matter of clear DON’T situation in which there is no credible actor opposites. Nuances make each goal KNOW 29% to solve issues of local conflict and violence. both a precursor to and a result of the accomplishment of the other. This highlights Ultimately, a combination of various the difficulty in establishing an appropriate approaches and personal interests has entry point for any activity that controls local created a tension in what the GoSS violence and the circularity is mirrored in YES 43% demands of its citizens. While the future expectations of conflict. democratic state-building framework, and particularly the recent call to the ballot, Expectations of further war and conflict NO 28% creates a theoretical need for politically Khartoum is commonly used as a scapegoat responsible citizens, the leadership’s interest for explaining local conflict, including cattle- in maintaining the status quo degrades raiding or localised violence. However, in the citizens to subjects, using Mahmood contrast with allocating blame to Khartoum, Mamdani’s language.40 The degradation respondents to a survey conducted in to subject results in a lack of political voice the three research sites had almost the and a disconnect with the government. In same level of expectation of future south- many ways, this degradation to subject and south violence as north-south violence. government-citizen disconnect is, however, An example of why attention should turn Chart: Will there be another not an aberration of the governance system, to south-south dynamics was given by war within Southern Sudan? it is in fact the continuation of a governance the Sudanese head of a Sudanese NGO Yes if no justice, no system that is firmly rooted in Sudan’s struggling with cattle-raiding in Greater BeG: freedom and too much recent history. tribalism 2% Is Khartoum interested in taking the cattle? Southern Sudan’s more recent experience [The SPLA] know who is taking the cattle, (n=319) of political administration is one of intense but they are pointing the finger. If the guns marginalisation. With power firmly held in are coming from the north, then you can MAYBE Khartoum, decision-making became a control the borders. How can a person from 15% centralised affair and interest in the periphery Khartoum incite a local chief here?42 was mainly focused on controlling the margins in order to avoid challenges to the We asked 319 people whether they centre’s power. This was mainly done through expected further war with the north and maintaining selected tight connections to further conflicts within the south even after YES 38% local elites. It seems that currently, the model the referendum, regardless of its outcome. NO 47% is being replicated as the southern political We also asked respondents whether they establishment solidifies an elite network in expect fighting to break out among southern order to control the new periphery i.e. any groups after the referendum. Despite place outside the new centre of power, Juba. Khartoum being blamed for much local The systematic disconnection between conflict, the answers indicate southerners citizens and government sentiment is widely are aware of their own potential for violence. echoed in civil society criticism of how the elections were conducted, despite the fact that expectations of the level of accountability the elections could achieve were consistently lowered.41 It is, however, also important to

28 29 Reflections on the diverge with regard to secession, particularly Each scenario holds potential for intra-south debate solely against the north, rather than in areas with strong connections to the violence and fighting among southerners encouraging a credible and diverse political referendum north. In WBeG, concerns about continued seems widely expected. Remarkably, those system to foster political debate and give a northern oppression versus the perceived wanting to vote for unity came from many glimpse of a different political culture. Criticism Expectations of south-south conflict are administrative weaknesses of GoSS make different tribes, including Dinka from WBeG about the way elections were conducted has fuelled by the fact that no unanimous the decision increasingly complex, and who said that they felt better in a unified made this point even more important. consensus exists among southerners one fifth of respondents in Greater Bahr Sudan. Interviewees in EES on the other hand, regarding what is in the best interests of their el-Ghazal stated that they would vote for who are often assumed to be very critical of Just as expectations of violence come with country. The vision of what the referendum unity.43 In both Upper Nile and Eastern an SPLM-led unity,44 seemed convinced that each possible referendum scenario, some ought to deliver features prominently in this Equatoria, the vote for independence the referendum would result in an independent respondents expressed that either way assumption. In reality, while a majority vote was clearer. Southern Sudan, while a negative vote on they would lose out. Such sentiments are in favour of unity is improbable, desires the referendum was locally synonymous with particularly strong in Raja County where the failure of the CPA and a need to take up people are very aware that they will be voting Chart: Will you vote for unity or independence? arms against the north again. This assertion to be either a county in the centre of Sudan was made consistently with a number of or on the frontier of a new sovereign state. respondents stressing that if independence Separation might escalate local conditions, 100 said a UN officer in Raja Town, leading to was not achieved by vote, it would be achieved 48 90 by violence. This view is expressed, for closure of the borders. Respondents in example, in the following answers: Raja made clear that voting for unity or 80 separation meant voting to cut off or keep 70 There must be an independent south, their supply lines. As a local SPLM official violently or not, otherwise we will be put it, ‘If there is no separation, Raja will 60 enslaved again.45 (Response on an suffer. If there is separation, Raja will suffer.’49 50 Independence anonymous questionnaire) Yet for some, the symbolic strength of a

Percetile 40 clear vote for separation is more important Unity The referendum can bring an eruption of than immediate economic improvement 30 conflict. If they impose Islam, then there and development. ‘Chiefs’ in Northern Don’t know will be war.46 (Director of the Toposa 20 Bahr el-Ghazal, for example, were less Development Association) than enthused about the revival of the 10 The government said they collected enough railway between Khartoum and Aweil. 0 guns; they left the others so we can use Rather than hail it as a big step towards EES (n=139) UN (n=45) WBeG (n=118) [them] for an eventual dispute with the establishing a transport infrastructure, in north.47 (Kapoeta north boma ‘chiefs’) their minds it expresses a threat and tightens In general, respondents saw potential for violence with each possible outcome of the referendum. a connection with the North that they do It is thus too simplistic to assume that tribal not want – and it brings back memories of allegiance or a history of alienation between Rizeigat fighters riding the trains to attack Nilotic and Equatorian tribes dictates political and abduct children.50 beliefs. What seems instead to be needed Table: Violence potential of referendum outcomes is a reinterpretation of the meaning of the However, a Fertit elder in Wau pointed out referendum because it is rather the case that some Fertit felt the strict binary identity of This table is based on responses or scenarios given during fieldwork conducted for this report that the referendum is seen as a hugely north versus south was counterproductive in important symbolic and dynamic event for supporting the idea of a diverse Sudan, and Southern Sudan. indeed was simply not applicable to them Outcome Potential for violence because: ‘…many families…have members Overwhelming vote North will return to war, different groups of southerners Referendum as a moment for change from the north and south’ and thus feel for separation will fight for political representation Indeed, some respondents pointed out neither distinctly southern nor northern.51 that the single-issue debate, centred on the Overwhelming vote SPLA will start fighting the North and some question of whether the outcome would be for unity southerners seen as traitors unity or separation, was misleading. The Separation with North will employ violence, southerners will fight each other referendum is viewed as an opportunity limited support to incite, push and support lasting change within the south. Indeed, some pointed out Unity with SPLA will fight against north and southern tribes that GoSS was muffling its own support limited support will fight each other for separation by pitting the referendum

30 31 Case Study: Caught in Sudan independent and then we take the Closely connected with perceptions of are in a different culture. We are ashamed North. When those of East and West call for separation and unity are issues of identity. of ourselves. We cannot link up with other the middle: Raja County their rights, we will unite Sudan.’54 In Raja, a place of close alliances with women because language is a problem. But Darfur and tenuous connections with Juba, from here to north is far. From here to south In Raja, the most northerly town in Western A local religious leader pointed out that people are very aware that separation could is far. We are in between.’60 Bahr el-Ghazal, people expressed serious independence had less political meaning, possibly mean cultural isolation for them concerns about southern secession. Four but strong practical implications for everyday in a newly independent Southern Sudan Because GoSS has failed to deliver services, issues were highlighted in interviews and living: ‘Independence also means being and indeed leave them exposed without hopes were high that voting for unity in the discussions: 1) Raja’s history as an NCP independent from outside resources,’ he protection. Residents in Raja speak an referendum would mean that the north, stronghold 2) the area’s close cultural and said,55 echoing what had been expressed Arabic dialect closer to the northern dialects which is seen as having stronger government economic connection with the north 3) the by the mainly northern traders in the market: and distinctly different from Juba Arabic. capacity, could no longer continue its politics perception among the population that they ‘I think dividing Sudan will make us suffer of under-serving the south and ultimately, are not benefiting from the CPA and 4) the more, there is no factory in Southern Sudan, ‘We only take small culture from south and the south would benefit from unity. This view remoteness of the SPLM administration.52 The so where will traders get goods from? It big culture from Darfur,’ explained a religious seemed quite separate from any personal SPLA entered Raja Town for a brief period in will make our life difficult. One Sudan will leader in Raja. opinions held about President Bashir. The 2001 and were fought back by SAF. Under excel in business and cross-state taxes will perception was that a streamlined political 56 ‘And Southern Sudan is very big. When the CPA, SPLA troops only arrived in Raja not be there.’ The local NCP chairman system would mean a much stronger national people come from Juba, they think I am an in 2007. During a group discussion, a youth also emphasized the strength of a united voice for the electorate. One youth leader Arab. I wear a Jallabiah and I pray in the leader argued that by staying together with the economy: ‘If we don’t vote for unity, every put it like this: ‘The advantage is the national mosque. Our culture is not really like southern north, the south would fulfil Garang’s vision: single company here comes from the North, election, so Bashir will not rule forever. Bush culture, it is more like northern.’59 ‘When Dr John started the movement, he every business. If we will separate, where will comes, Bush goes, Obama comes, and 57 wanted to rule all of Sudan from Nimule to the we get our goods?’ A woman’s group in Raja lamented the Obama goes.’61 border with Egypt. So what is better now?’ However, others point out that this line of fact that they did not see any connections asked a youth leader in Raja Town. ‘He wanted between them and southern women and to liberate Sudan, not Southern Sudan. It is reasoning just means that the north now uses the systematic underdevelopment having only spoken Arabic until very recently, SPLA, not SSPLA. So Sudan is one, Sudan is saw no way of bridging the divide: unity. When your father has started something of the south as an argument against its and he passes away, you have to finish.’53 independence. ‘My opinion is if Sudan is ‘We can differentiate: we look like Arab SPLM officials echoed that view: ‘Dr John’s divided into two, factories are not created women and even if we are called to Juba, vision is calling for unity and we are working for by God, they can only be created here,’ said we are different. We are like Arabs and we unity. If not unity, we are going on to liberate one man. ‘Now they are not here because of want to be like African women, so we need 58 our people in the North. Let the Arabs agree northerners but it can be created.’ to have someone teach us. When we go to with what we want. Let’s first make Southern Juba, nobody insults us, but we ourselves

32 33 Developing government An Autonomous Region These divisions became ever more against southern unity. People returning from This more recent and perhaps more intense during the late 1970s. They were exile in East Africa fluent in English continue structures obvious model is derived from memories compounded by competition for scarce to secure the majority of well-paid jobs with of what occurred after Southern Sudan funds, as more and more of the budget that aid agencies and civil service, and concerns The CPA gave two tasks to the GoSS: was established as an autonomous state was supposed to be supplied by Khartoum about Dinka domination are commonly establish southern government institutions following the Addis Ababa Agreement of to the regional government in Juba went expressed.71 There are other lessons from and make unity attractive. This was a 1972. A plethora of aid agencies became largely unpaid, year on year. By the turn the challenges of the early 1980’s, especially contradictory endeavor from the start as involved in what was only the second mass of the 1980s, political factions in the north regarding the dangers of ethnic politics and these are essentially two opposing projects. voluntary return of refugees assisted by the were openly manipulating conflicts in the of concentrating economic opportunities This contradiction might have helped United Nations.63 At the time, international south, and president Nimeri himself, who in certain places or among certain groups create the current government’s unclear support for returning refugees was a had pushed through the Addis Ababa – namely among the elites congregating structures which have a direct impact on sensitive matter due to Cold War tensions Agreement despite intense opposition from in Juba.72 If Southern Sudan becomes local violent conflict. Current activities of and the Palestine/Israel issue. So, when it many northern Sudanese politicians, was independent and gains recognition by the state-building, pacification, modernisation became possible to support a mass return forced into alliances with opponents of government in Khartoum, then a common and traditionalisation have created a movement by allowing an ad hoc extension southern regional autonomy and enthusiasts hostility towards the north will no longer transitory situation in which it is not clear to the powers of the High Commissioner of Islamisation.67 Nimeri and his new allies serve to ameliorate the dangers of intra- how conflicts should be handled now or for Refugees, there was a great deal of began supporting demands from a group south divisions by uniting it.73 how they will be handled in the future. One interest in making it work. Despite problems of Southern Sudanese politicians for problem is that actors that were set up with the delivery of assistance, it was division of the south into three regions. This Native Administration to institute peace within Southern Sudan nevertheless deployed quickly and sustained group became known as the ‘Equatoria If the Addis Ababa period is not a viable have unclear roles and responsibilities. An for several years.64 Indeed, in some parts faction’, though members also included model, can a system of administration be obvious example of this is the undefined of Southern Sudan, aid agencies remained representatives of Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper derived from the period of colonial rule, relationship between two of the more very active right through the outbreak of Nile (including some Dinka representatives). as has been done, with varying results, prominent peace actors, the Southern war in 1983. This was especially true in Arguing that a more decentralised in countries such as Kenya, Tanzania or Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) Peace parts of the Equatorias, where similarities government would be more accountable Uganda? To a surprisingly large extent, it is and Reconciliation Committee and the with populations in Uganda and Kenya and and effective at absorbing aid, the Equatoria indeed to this earlier period that reference is SSPC. The lack of clear mandates and job large numbers of English speakers, made faction also expected that re-division would frequently made, or from which ideas about descriptions has resulted in confusion of for more straightforward aid work relative to break the power of a particular group of today’s governance are drawn. To some what the roles are. Many interviewees had areas in Northern Sudan. This situation was Dinka who were seen to be exploiting the extent, this is a consequence of the CPA rather abstract and idealised views of the not, however, without consequences. existing regional administration for their itself, because it mentions borders in place SSPC’s responsibility, for example. When own interests. Re-division was pushed at independence in 1956. But reference is asked in a ranking exercise who the best is The concentration of aid activities in through, even though a majority of southern now made persistently to the 1956 borders at bringing peace to Southern Sudan, many places such as Yei, Torit and Juba during parliamentarians were opposed to it. Almost in ways that relate to much more than the respondents voted for the SSPC but were the l970s and early 1980s was a factor immediately, Dinka traders were expelled demarcated ‘north’ and ‘south’ and greater then unable to describe what the SSPC that fed tensions between Southern from Juba, which in part triggered the Bor Upper Nile, Bahr el-Ghazal and Equatoria really was and how it could bring peace.62 Sudanese groups and contributed to the mutiny that led to the formation of the SPLA. regional borders, i.e., those boundaries By remaining such an abstract entity, it is ultimate failure of regional autonomy. On specifically mentioned in the CPA. The difficult for local authorities and communities the one hand, educated people from the Generally, there is a tendency to blame the boundaries and references to 1956 are to support the actions of the SSPC or to Equatorias enjoyed most of the employment collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement on linked to an idea that the clock has to be hold it accountable. One reason for this lack opportunities afforded by NGOs and UN politicians in Khartoum and to assume that put back and everything begun again. of vision in regards to government structures agencies and thus resented any efforts to in the present context, full independence Old administrative divisions are frequently and responsibilities might be found in a lack 65 redirect resources away from their areas. will lead to better results following the mentioned and are associated with the of lessons from the past. Ambitious Equatorians complained bitterly referendum. The failure of the regional districts once administered by British about ‘Dinka’ domination in the Regional autonomy experiment and the southern officials. There is an assumption that county Background: The lack of viable historical Assembly and there was talk of a ‘Nilotic’ divisions that opened up at that time helps and newly created sub-county boundaries models for Southern Sudan’s future faction allegedly dominating Southern explain why a return to the kind of solution should follow those old boundary lines. Of models from the past that might shape Sudanese politics which was seen to be attempted in the 1970s and 1980s is now Southern Sudan’s future, two dominate an obstacle to progressive change. On the rarely mentioned. Yet there are indications This perspective poses several problems. the discussion: an autonomous region and other hand, groups in the greater Upper Nile that some of the issues that emerged There are no maps available from this period to native administration. Both are frequently region and Bahr el-Ghazal felt that peace during the years of regional autonomy show where demarcations occurred at county mentioned by those interviewed and both benefits (which later would be somewhat are resurfacing, such as the inability or and sub-county level, and conspiracy theories are imbued with a degree of mythical status. mistakenly renamed ‘peace dividends’66) had unwillingness of southern politicians to put circulate about where the maps are and who largely accrued in the Equatorias. regional interests above their own, which has hidden them.74 Research indicates that opened the space for Khartoum to work no such maps existed for most of Southern

34 35 Sudan from the mid 1950s, and those persistently opposed British authority, did recognised as ‘chiefs’ and sultans. Where as compared to the north or other parts available from the Sudan Archive in Durham not have ‘chiefs’ in the way that British possible, such a strategy was replicated in of British Africa. In order to ‘protect’ the from the 1940s were, for the most part, drawn officers imagined all Africans should. Some the south, but in many cases ‘chiefs’ needed southerners, even labour migration was much earlier and lack sufficient detail.75 of the last British African campaigns of to be ‘created’ because no such traditional restricted. Additionally, the use of tribal violent pacification occurred as a result. In figures existed. It was also discovered that categories and the cooption of ‘chiefs’ Of greater concern is the emphasis on what 1917, for example, a punitive expedition was ‘racial or tribal units’ were both more varied tended to reify particular indigenous the situation was like in 1956, which evokes launched against the Lou Nuer. It is reported and difficult to discern than anticipated. customs and promote practices and beliefs both an overly romantic version of British rule that 108 male prisoners were taken in Confusingly, the Shilluk and the Azande had associated with selected male hierarchies. and links these alleged 1956 borders with addition to 4,496 cattle, 3,000 sheep and a large kingdoms. If these were to be called Certain ethnic identities were fostered, tribal categories. It is as if there was a kind of large quantity of millet.78 Attacks of this kind ‘tribes’, could they be compared with the formalised and exaggerated. The approach stable or ‘correct’ ethnic grid that needs to be continued until the late 1920s, when the Lou many different Nuer and Dinka clan clusters? to administration was somewhat altered recovered to resolve current claims on territory Nuer were ordered to settle in two locations, Is each of these clan clusters ‘tribes’? from the late 1940s, by which time it was and resources. Matters are compounded and all those who refused were considered Was the Shilluk reth (king) the equivalent becoming apparent that the Condominium by an emphasis on the role that putative fair game for marauding army patrols. of a chief? And then what about all the arrangement with Egypt might not be ‘traditional chiefs’ should play in everything Several Nuer leaders were killed, including numerous smaller groups, often speaking sustainable. Rumbek received a secondary from resolving conflicts and disarmament to the most important prophet, and the people different languages? Was each of these a school in 1947 and various investments dealing with marriage disputes and monitoring 76 were forced into submission. separate tribe? The result was the invention were made in economic development the delivery of services. of hybrid ‘traditional’ systems, drawing projects. One notable example of this was From the end of the 1920s, British on local customs and responding to the the Zande scheme – a pilot project which Given the current emphasis on how administration became more intensive things are thought to have been before requirements of the government, which had attempted to raise tribal living standards in other parts of Southern Sudan and to be tailored to fit local circumstances. by: ‘…the promotion of a ‘healthy market’ independence, it is worth reflecting briefly Christian missionaries were encouraged on what Southern Sudan was actually like in 79 and the establishment of manufactures to extend their activities. British officials Someone appointed as a Shilluk chief could throughout the Southern Sudan’.83 Yet, it the first half of the twentieth century. What adopted a strategy to minimise Egyptian is commonly referred to as ‘the period of do little without reference to the Shilluk reth proved impossible to reverse the policy influence, which was formalised in 1930 (king) whereas someone appointed as a Dinka of effectively cocooning Southern Sudan British rule’ was technically no such thing. when the British Civil Secretary of the Following the demise of the Mahdist state at chief might have considerably more authority before independence in 1956. Anglo-Egyptian government enacted if he was accepted as a leader by his clan. In the battle of Omdurman in 1898, Sudan did the ‘Southern Policy’.80 Ostensibly, the Thus, unlike some other territories that not become a colony or a protectorate but either case, such a figure was only accessible policy was a response to the discovery of to the British officials in the dry season. He have sought or achieved recognition as rather something unique: the Anglo-Egyptian clandestine slave-raiding taking place in states, Southern Sudan does not have a Condominium. The reason for this was that would migrate with the cattle during the rains Bahr el-Ghazal by northern traders. The aim to places that government officials could not historical template that can be readily evoked Egypt had laid claim to Sudan before the rise was to ‘protect’ the African, non-Muslim to promote a cohesive southern identity. of the Mahdi, and the claim was recognised easily reach. Meanwhile, particularly in what population from their Arabised northern became the Equatorias, neighbouring groups Memories of regional autonomy and the by the British in the Anglo-Egyptian treaty neighbours by building up: ‘…a series of current mythologising of the Condominium era of 1899. Britain was to administer Sudan could be tremendously diverse. For example, self-contained racial or tribal units with among some groups, those appointed as do not provide an ideal starting point for the on behalf of the King of Egypt, who was structure and organisation based upon… formation of a new nation. More readily they himself under British domination.77 The ‘traditional chiefs’ were linked to rain-making indigenous customs, traditional usage and and other ritual capacities, while other groups seem to provide a precedent for a system of British Governor General reported to the beliefs.’81 As in other parts of Africa under localised or decentralised governance, and Foreign Office through its resident agent in organised themselves along age set systems, British control, a system of indirect rule was and a chief’s authority might only by accepted ominously, a system that could shift readily Cairo, rather than to the Colonial Office in set up which was commonly referred to as towards the establishment of ethnic fiefdoms London. However, in practice he directed the by his own age cohort. In places where ‘chiefs’ ‘native administration’ in Sudan. In Southern (and the courts at which they were required by equating ethnicity with government condominium government from Khartoum Sudan this policy was taken to extremes in structures and access to resources.84 as if it were a colonial administration. by the government to raise taxes and impose an attempt to prevent the spread of Islam fines) were accessible all year round, British In what is now thought of as Southern and to allow the ‘primitive’ populations to administrators closely monitored what was Sudan, Anglo-Egyptian administration was adjust to the modern world gradually while happening. Under these conditions, mostly in minimal in the early decades of the twentieth preserving their customary way of life. The Equatoria, increasingly complex bureaucracies century. British officials tried to locate tension between local government and the 82 evolved during the later decades of the ‘chiefs’ who would make tribute payments ‘traditional’ systems has existed ever since. Condominium, including local parliaments of to the government, and there was a good In the north of Sudan, efforts had been elders. However, such arrangements were deal of forced conscription into the army made to re-establish the families of those entirely absent elsewhere. in some areas. Raiding and confiscation of who held positions of authority before the property such as cattle was punishment In general terms, the effects of the ‘southern Mahdist uprising against Turkish/Egyptian policy’ included acute limitations on for those who resisted. One challenge was rule. Individuals from these families were that some groups such as the Nuer, who economic and educational development

36 37 start from the centre, has created a new A major problem is that in payams there DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT periphery within the south. are two village leaders, one who is the local authority and another who has been assigned However, theory and practice are currently by the SPLM. This causes problems as both at odds with each other as the emphasis on people are vying for authority and often decentralisation has in many areas become times neither person has the single legitimate instrumental in entrenching ‘tribal’ lines authority.97 When asked about their personal safety, Respondents also reported the perceived over competition of resources. In many respondents expressed two parallel increase of outside threats, such as the ways, smaller counties can be seen as the Two schools of thought dominate the local experiences. While day-to-day life has Lord’s Resistance Army, the Fellata or the ultimate manifestation that decentralisation narrative on administrative division. One says generally become safer, a sense of Kenyan army on the Eastern Equatoria works to devolve along political lines. Yet that this is a natural process in emerging increased uncertainty and continued threat international border. Yet most violence the current state of decentralising political democracies based on local-level power among interviewees was noticeable in all is not executed by large-scale attack by powers in Southern Sudan exemplifies how struggles both at the level of representation three research sites.85 This threat is not outside threats but is based on simmering theory and reality of politics pulls Southern and at the grassroots. Ultimately, this is constant but it is noticeably less predictable local conflicts, many of which are rooted in Sudan in opposite directions. Momentum seen as a settling process as groups of than during wartime when insecurity was challenging administrative developments. for increased administrative fragmentation people are represented by leaders with common and respondents were prepared is developing at the same time as decision whom they identify. Some respondents for violence. Since the CPA, a continuing How decentralisation power is firmly held at the centre, creating pointed out that the current divisions are a but unpredictable threat of violent attack a situation in which decentralisation seems northern legacy and were not carried out has created a permanent, low-level anxiety, and administrative to primarily signify a localised power grip along lines that make sense to local people. as, for example, expressed by a group of division fuels conflict over resources, rather than localised political This group believes that fragmentation is women in EES: ‘We live in fear. Is it true that decision-making.94 While some county and a realisation of Garang’s vision to take the this peace will exist? There is no day that Both of the Sudanese wars were fought over state governments are more active than town to rural areas, a belief expressed, for you do not hear gunshots.’86 marginalisation of the periphery through others, it was generally seen as a problem example, by a group of elders in Jur River political and economic centres of power; that state and county-level decision-making County in WBeG: ‘It is important to have Fifty-three per cent of 319 survey the CPA and many government documents is not as strong yet as it could be. new counties because we want to take respondents stated that they currently have emphasise the need for decentralisation power to the people. Everyone should have an enemy they consider a threat to their and devolution of power. There are obvious In a group discussion with a collection of a responsibility in the area where they are so personal security. This upsurge in internal and indisputable benefits to decentralising chiefs in Wau, one representative explained they can develop this area by themselves.’98 conflict in Southern Sudan was particularly government in such a vast and diverse the reality of the current situation from disturbing to many respondents because of territory.90 But decentralisation is certainly a local perspective: ‘Now everything The alternative view is that this fragmentation the perception that the violence had taken not undisputed in its ability to stem conflict starts from the top. Every law is handed will undermine unity in the south and make a more intense form and that new trends and in fact, evidence from, for example, from the President to the Governor to the it less feasible to govern Southern Sudan were emerging. Women and children were Uganda, shows that decentralisation rather Commissioner. Nothing is coming from as an independent state. A Sudanese more readily targeted during attacks, such fuels conflict on the local level.91 The same Commissioner; everything is coming from NGO director summed up this sentiment: as in Upper Nile in 2009, or attacks were 95 is currently happening in Southern Sudan the top.’ With the tacit understanding – so ‘everyone wants their own county, each tribe well-planned and carried out in military style, because decentralisation is not pursued prevalent in most of the south – that any wants their own commissioner, Southern such as in EES’s Lauro in 2007.87 Changes in 99 convincingly and is abused for local power real change or decision can only come Sudan is dividing but it is unity we need.’ the style and tactics of attacks must indicate struggles which cause violent conflict. from the President, those at the top as well Some advocates of this position believe that that people are aware when an attack by as the bottom inadvertently boycott the the main driver of fragmentation is patronage their own group is impending. For example, The strong emphasis on decentralisation has idea of a multi-tiered government.96 For politics from Khartoum used to secure it is quite unlikely that hundreds of Lou youth made the challenges in implementing it even citizens, meaningful political decentralisation support or as an extension of the ‘divide in Upper Nile could go missing from the more pronounced, said, for example, an is invisible due to Juba’s role as power and rule’ policy implemented during the war. Akobo area without local government and international employee of an INGO: ‘GoSS centre, while decentralisation has become Others believe that it is the ethnicisation of traditional leaders at the very least being was very clear about devolution…but it has synonymous with dividing up and claiming politics at the local level, where counties are aware, if not actively assisting, their activity.88 not happened in practice.’92 ownership of land of local government being drawn along tribal lines, that is fuelling Indeed, an INGO respondent stated that authorities who act in the interest of their nepotism and patronage in politics. there are no doubts about awareness A donor representative pointed out the own community. The local situation is further among community and government leaders, tremendous challenges in decentralising confused by competing authorities between stating that ‘chiefs’ and/or commissioners: a fledgling government because achieving government and party representatives, as an ‘…know and also communicate with each decentralisation: ‘…is difficult, given they do international officer of an INGO explained: other, and sometimes intervene.’89 Such not even have a central government. They intervention can take the form of supporting are just doing it because it is in the CPA or trying to stop an impending attack. and in the Interim Constitution.’ In many ways, the new government, having had to

38 39 Borders and conflicts Blurring borders between ethnic and has caused competition over resources and younger generation.110 The two approaches administrative boundaries boundaries.107 translate into a militarily-controlled tribal For those groups vying for political space The creation of new counties and drawing local administration. This has created a Despite the fact that many tribes support by having their own defined county, having up of constituencies has fomented confusion situation in which county commissioners and even demand drawing counties along ill-defined and threatened borders means an regarding local administration structures, with a military background may preside over tribal lines, this approach does not take into ill-defined and threatened state of being. This causing a number of problematic socio- ethnic fiefdoms, often criticised for acting account the manner in which local social and is true on the state level, but also applies to political dynamics.103 The issue of internal out of personal rather than public interests demographic aspects have evolved since the borders at the local level and unclear territorial borders is fraught with distrust and struggles in community development. Students at ceasefire in 2002. Towns,payams and bomas demarcation is creating conflict flash points.100 over power and resources. On the one hand, Western Bahr el-Ghazal University also are increasingly home to a mixture of tribal Debates about undefined borderlines, many citizens welcome the idea of dividing added that this has entrenched the military groups, often because returnees and IDPs controversial naming of territory as well as Southern Sudan into more counties in government on the local level and put have decided to settle in areas with better shifting fault lines and narratives of territorial order to gain better political representation. military loyalists with low literacy rates in resources, rather than automatically going besiegement infuse the everyday existence of Interviewees acknowledge that citizens feel positions of leadership.111 In Upper Nile, back to their original homes. The increased many Southern Sudanese.101 they would be better represented at state representatives of youth pointed out that level through tribally demarcated counties. diversity means it is more important that the position of commissioner was often self- Borders have the potential to enable peace Decentralisation is immediately associated border demarcations are done in such a serving: ‘County commissioners just think by providing clarity and stability over with improved access to resources and way that resources are equally distributed about their own safety and disregard the disputed land; but where disputed, borders development, said one Sudanese working in between counties and to its constituents. community. If Southern Sudanese want to can exacerbate conflict and foment tension. a local NGO doing peace work: ‘If you have Where this is not happening, differing ethnic protect what they fought for, they need to go The pivotal role of borders is recognised your own county, you can get development. tribes are vying for their own counties. back to Dr Garang’s manifesto and focus on throughout Southern Sudan. In fact, the 112 For this representation at the state level Political appointments can ignite political and freedom, liberty, and self-determination.’ majority of interviewees in this research is more important than representation at ideological tension. The selection of county expressed the need to address confusion 104 Lastly, the issue of border demarcation, GoSS level.’ On the other hand, GoSS commissioners, who play a significant role about borders and clearly demarcate them. county creation and county administration is seen as carving up the country in order in Southern Sudan’s decentralised system, Varying opinions were found regarding the has caused doubt in GoSS’s leadership, to gain power. Continued fragmentation has also been shaped by tribal calculations value of borders: many spoke about shifting decision-making, and vision. Students at of administrative borders fuels fear that – a post-CPA development which obviously territories that are being claimed by different Western Bahr el-Ghazal University described GoSS is emphasising ‘tribalism’ by creating contradicts what had been promised to groups; others described how they saw the 105 it as an authoritarian policy. Upper Nile’s counties based on tribal territories. Southern Sudan’s citizens. Respondents border as either a valuable resource or a SSRRC director said that this policy needs in a youth focus group discussion in Upper threat. Such problems are particularly acute Dividing people into counties can break to be countered by standardising the rules Nile said: ‘Dr Garang set up an initial system in areas where water points are near the down traditional forms of kinship ties, for every county position in the Constitution: of caretakers. He made that arrangement borders, such as along the border of Warrap which in return breaks down informal ways ‘The problem is that when the government to diffuse tribalism. When he died, the and Lakes States. of peace-building and conflict mitigation takes a position, people don’t see it as techniques. Demarcating land can separate leadership broke Garang’s arrangement… the government position. They see it as a Border disputes are now arising on multiple or unite those within the area. In other They came with an ideology that counties personal decision made along tribal lines levels – between payams, counties, states, words, people can be brought together should be based on tribes. That has led or based on party politics.’113 According and the north and south. Expectations because they have a common sense of the to tribalism and nepotism…We need to to youth in Kodok: ‘When the SPLA went 108 that border demarcation will signal the ‘other’ or rifts can be created as a result of return to Garang’s ideology of caretaking.’ into the bush, the north recognised that end of many local problems are evident labelling a border a division.106 In Atar, an anonymous response on the the south had an agenda to fight for. Our all across Southern Sudan. ‘Demarcation questionnaire read: ‘They should mix relatives sacrificed their own children for These dynamics create a two-pronged of the borders will bring conflict, but once administrators and governors. They should the sake of freedom. Now, south Sudan effect. On the one hand, GoSS has demarcation is done there will be [rule of] make them administer other people – is divided by tribalism, and each group is reinforced tribalism by equating law,’ said NBeG Deputy Governor Josephine Garang had that policy. Now they bring sons divided into its own county.’114 For many, 102 administrative boundaries with ethnic 109 Moses Lado. Yet, contrary to the line of the soil to administer their own areas’. GoSS has both created the problem of often touted by local government officials, identities – a situation which was strongly Creating ethnic fiefdoms tribal counties and lacked the political will internal border demarcation is far from being visible in all research areas. A member of the Another administrative policy, which has to address the issue before the referendum. a problem-solver. Throughout the research Council of Elders in Upper Nile elaborated exacerbated divisions, is GoSS’ unofficial As stated by a local government official sites, internal border demarcation was cited on this issue: preference that county commissioners have in Upper Nile: ‘Some intellectuals and as a primary trigger of conflict as groups on New administrative structures have been a military background or close connections politicians are creating hatred between the all sides of boundaries seek legitimisation of created since the CPA was signed… to the military, ostensibly to give them tribes in the south…I blame the government their territories through defined border lines 115 In drawing the boundaries, there has greater authority. This monopolisation of even though I am part of the government’. and new counties. been confusion and some counties have power through local leaders who gain power expanded. The counties were drawn along through military connections was seen as tribal lines. Tribes were given counties, which extremely problematic, especially by the

40 41 Finally, it can be seen that internal border authorities are usually recruited from their Table: Respondent Perceptions of Pros demarcation is a politically thorny and home communities. The reasons for this ethnically sensitive process. Indeed, internal are obvious; they have local knowledge and Cons of Administrative Division border disputes are a festering problem. and speak the local language. However, The issue will likely get worse as groups the downfalls are clear and reiterate why Perceived advantages Perceived disadvantages seek to secure territorial claims before a John Garang’s vision had been to recruit Division of work capacity; increased em- Capable personnel may be divided or lost likely secession. local government staff from outside the ployment opportunities community to be administered: having local Case study: An example staff contributes to fragmentation along Expands representation within the state The creation of a county without meeting group identities. the proper criteria creates more problems of ‘ethnic’ administrative (forcing the process induces conflict) Theoretically, the argument for division in EES decentralisation remains a strong one, Promotion of trade between counties particularly considering the damaging Until relatively recently, EES comprised of Safeguards cultural heritage (each county Division of people; relationships are cut; history of the heavily centralised government two districts: Torit and Kapoeta. However, speaking own language and maintains people will become selfish with their ideas model which located power exclusively in Greater Kapoeta is now divided into four own traditions) and resources. ‘We are going to lose some Khartoum. Yet certain measures may need counties. Initially, it was split into Kapoeta of our friends’ to be put into place to disconnect local and Budi, separating the Toposa (Kapoeta) government staff from their personal local Increases autonomy and justice Risk of corruption and decreased service and Buya-Didinga (thus the name BU-DI networks in order to improve representation provision capacity was coined). Then Kapoeta itself split into and accountability. Both would be three counties: Kapoeta North, Kapoeta Allows for resource sharing Some counties lose resources improved with democratic decentralisation. south and Kapoeta Eastern. The people (particularly at the border) However, the current reality of a process of of Kapoeta Eastern are Toposa and fragmentation, which models ‘one county, Nyangatom, while the people of Kapoeta one tribe’ in a bid for representation, is south and north are Buya and Didinga. In the unsustainable. For example, within counties Case Study: Counties The then-Governor informed the research former Torit District, first Magwi (Acholi and dominated by a single tribe, there are team that the county is Lopa (from Lopit Madi) broke away, then Ikotos (Dongotona cause conflict in 119 still those who feel marginalised, causing and Pari) and its capital is Imehejek; and Lango), and finally Lafon/Lopa (Lopit divisions along sub-tribe or clan lines to Eastern Equatoria however at a conference several weeks and Pari). This process looks set to continue begin to emerge. In situations of inequality later, he stated that the county is Lafon and as the Acholi and Madi, Lopit and Pari, and The current conflict between the Lopit and or limited access to resources, people the capital is Lafon. Thus, the ambiguity Buya and Didinga have all made applications the Pari highlights access to services as assert whatever aspect of their identity and confusion at the local level is replicated to split their counties.116 a driver of fragmentation. While it initially differentiates them from those competing to among government officials. The Pari argue appears that the conflict is over the name of access resources. As a result, the process that a 2004 resolution signed by Garang the county, ultimately the issue is the location of fragmentation has the potential to be identifies Lafon as the county name and County headquarters tend to be located of the county headquarters. The name is divisive. Nevertheless, respondents were headquarters while the administrative in the main town of the dominant tribe important because the name of the county overwhelmingly in favour of fragmentation buildings of the county are situated of each county, thus the proximity of the would indicate where the headquarters and, in most cases, could not imagine a in Imehejek. At the time of writing, an county capital is seen to be accompanied should be located – if the county is Lafon, viable alternative. Yet what does it mean application had been submitted to the local by improved disbursement of funds for then the administrative centre should be in to have centralisation of power alongside government board to establish two separate basic services. Access to affordable food Lafon, if it is Lopa then it can be argued that fragmentation of administrative units? In counties. This motion is strongly supported and available medical services and schools the headquarters should be in Imehejek. reality, it is unclear what kind of financial by both communities and the Governor as are seen to be a product of having the Some voices from Eastern Equatoria: resources local administrations have the two communities are deemed unable to ‘government’ nearby, exacerbating feelings to implement changes for citizens, and co-exist peacefully within a single county. of marginalisation among other groups. Almost everyone knows about the resources differ vastly depending on how There is a strong perception among people headquarter issue…It is an issue of power The issue has been so divisive that cross- active a county is engaged in trade. Despite 117 that the provision of basic services in villages sharing. (Youth chairman in Lafon) cutting ties encompassing kinship and this, as long as local structures remain marriage, friendship, and trade between is directly correlated to the degree of their People are very angry that the headquarters weak and gain their legitimacy from their the two groups have been completely cut tribal representation within local government. were taken there. The Lopit and Pari cannot relationship with GoSS and line ministries, off. This is to the great disadvantage of As such, people associate a lack of services speak to each other. If Imehejek were to the peripheries will remain upwardly the both populations for their subsistence not with a failure of accountability but become the head quarters, it will bring accountable in order to compete for power. and survival, yet no serious effort for rather a failure of political representation war. People will fight. There is already a reconciliation has been made.120 and access to political power. This is plan. We will not accept Imehejek to be exacerbated by the fact that government headquarters.118 (Pastor in Torit)

42 43 Case study: situation was not remedied within five days, land and water points, as was explained by wait until we’re dead and then for GoSS they would attack the Kenyan Army.126 locally based staff of the SSPC: ‘Civilians to come.’132 On the other hand there is a International borders The community leaders believe that the should know that they cannot attack another sense locally that this historical conflict between Toposa Kenyan Army refused to withdraw and that country’s army but the Kenyans should over access to scarce resources is being and Turkana no response was received from GoSS. come with a civilian administration, the exploited by politicians with a strong belief Thus on 23 October, a number of Toposa Toposa saw it as an occupation.’130 This that the Government in Khartoum had a Over a decade ago, journalist Peter Kamau launched an attack on the Kenyan Army has had implications for Toposa/Turkana hand in escalating the tensions to this level. referred to the border area of Sudan, Kenya barracks in Nadapal. Reports about the relationships as before the escalation of this There are many questions surrounding the and Ethiopia as: ‘the border area that number of casualties and on which side are conflict there was intermarriage, dry-season militarisation of these conflicts with some defies security’.121 Since then, little along the inconsistent, with reports in Narus relayed reciprocal arrangements and high levels of hypothesising that NCP is ‘the invisible force’ Sudan/Kenya border has changed. At the by the Diocese that: ‘…the Toposa killed 16 cross-border trade. At present all of these fomenting tensions between groups. While time of research, the situation was so tense Kenyan soldiers and captured a machine activities have been suspended with Toposa some respondents expressed frustration 127 that the County administrators used the term gun with only two injured’ while news reporting no contact with family across the that GoSS were not engaging more heavily, ‘entry point’, explaining: ‘These days we outlets were reporting that the Kenyan border for a number of months as a result or at least more visibly, others believed that can’t even call it a border, the situation is too Government was claiming no casualties. of this conflict and the ceasing of trade GoSS were strategically avoiding becoming volatile, so we are calling it the entry point.’122 Regardless of the veracity of the numbers between the two tribes. involved in an international border dispute in reported injured and killed, what is clear is the run up to elections and the referendum. Due to the difficulty of reaching the border As opposed to an occupation, one aspect and analysing the understanding of events that there was a conflict between Toposa A group of young men in Naurs market nomadic pastoralists and the army of a of the situation seems to be that GoSS said: ‘The GoSS are refraining from action according to the Turkana, only the version made an arrangement with the Government of events espoused by the Toposa is here sovereign state over what is considered, at because they know it is a strategy to distract least by the Toposa, to be a disputed border. of Kenya that they could move their them from elections’133 below presented. customs post to Nadapal to facilitate the Ultimately, this is an issue that has been administration of customs duties. However Regardless of the impetus for this border The Toposa version of events playing out over a long period of time the Toposa were not consulted about dispute, it is an extremely volatile and Tensions along the border began mounting between the Toposa of Sudan and the this, nor were they informed after the fact. potentially explosive issue for GoSS. in the months leading up to September Turkana of Kenya, two groups bound by Thus, they saw the establishment of official Inhabitants of the region are feeling insecure 2009 for several reasons. For one, the ethno-linguistic ties and practising nomadic Kenyan structures on what has traditionally and it is believed locally that there has Kenyan Government began to ask Toposa pastoralism as their main livelihood activity. been their land as evidence of the Kenyan been an increase in the number of civilians for passports and travel permits to cross the The crux of the issue is that because Government supporting the Turkana in the carrying arms, as expressed by a group of 123 border in July 2009. Heightened tension is nomadic pastoralism is their main livelihood ongoing struggle over access to grazing Madi women: ‘This thing, it is making us feel also based on the belief that in August 2009 and they live in regions increasingly prone land and water points. In addition, there so insecure, the gunshots are reminding us a Kenyan Minister, having been refused entry to drought, these groups need to share was a perception among a number of of Sudan some time ago, when we were to Sudan because no high level official was dry season pasture and water points.128 In respondents that this conflict, and other running, sometimes naked, from the war.’134 at the border to meet him as is deemed times of severe drought, or in order to meet similar ones, have escalated of late because Along with others, this weakly defined customary, returned to Lokichoggio and: bride-price requirements, there has been of a commercialisation of cattle-raiding. A international border represents a serious ‘…ordered the army and police to arrest and habitual raiding of one another’s cattle, number of respondents believe that local challenge for GoSS. beat any Sudanese in the market...many which occasionally resulted in the death politicians and/or businessmen are funding 124 people were badly beaten.’ of the person or persons guarding the raids as a commercial enterprise. herd.129 Local people are frustrated because During the period of research, the border Opinions about the role of GoSS in this between the Toposa and the Turkana historically these conflicts were managed by the Toposa and the Turkana. conflict tended to be polarised and was particularly contentious with fighting somewhat contradictory. In one respect reported between the Toposa and the The movement of people and cattle from the Toposa were disgruntled that they had Kenyan Government on 18, 23 and 24 one affected area to another is a recipe not been involved or notified of changes October, resulting in the closing of the for tension. While conditional agreements in cross border arrangements: ‘There was border-crossing for a number of days. This used to be reached among the groups an a agreement signed that customs post specific period of fighting is believed by for temporary sharing, as the frequency should be moved closer to Nadapal but the community leaders to have been provoked and duration increase the strains become Toposa were not consulted or informed, by the Kenyan Army erecting a Kenyan much greater. According to the Toposa they think the government does not mind flag in Nadapal because: ‘…this was an interviewed, the involvement of the Kenyan about them.’131 Toposa youth at Narus act of war, they came with their army and Government has changed this relationship. expressed the impatience felt by some of 125 their flag to take our land’ The Toposa The gravity of the issue was transformed, the community towards GoSS, explaining say they issued the Kenyan Government from being perceived as a localised struggle that: ‘…people of Nadapal and locals say with an ultimatum to withdraw and sent between two communities over access to ‘it is better for Kenyans to finish us then to word to Juba to alert GoSS that if the

44 45 School buildings, Upper Nile

Relying on an illusion? Borders are important for consolidating Applicability and administrative capitals should lie in The 1956 borders135 power and presenting the impression that It is not clear where detailed, useful maps present day Southern Sudan and what area As previously discussed, communities often all entities within this boundary are unified. of the 1956 borders within Southern Sudan each tribe would be allowed to call home.140 disagree on the location of their ethnic and This was particularly evident in Upper could actually be found.139 In addition, all administrative borders. Yet there remains a Nile; for most state officials interviewed in known information seems to point to the fact Using past maps or past boundaries to solve misinformed consensus that the CPA calls Malakal and Juba, the only border issue that before 1956 the vast majority of internal present day problems, however, disregards for internal border demarcation to be based that needs to be addressed before the Sudanese boundaries were never marked that the social and political landscape has on the boundaries created by the British referendum is demarcation of the north/ on the ground or defined by administrative been drastically altered by decades of war that existed at Sudan’s independence on south ‘1956 border’. In July 2008, the county text. The mapping conducted under British and displacement. Many people no longer 1 January 1956. The CPA refers to these commissioners of Melut, Maban, and Renk administration is probably the most coherent live where they used to live in the 1920s borders only with respect to demarcation counties held a conference in Paloich to definition of boundaries, but while parts of when the data was collected, and those in a of the north/south border. Respondents, discuss internal borders. The main resolution Sudan have been mapped in great detail, it better position with respect to the amount of however, refer to 1956 borders as the of the conference was to postpone dealing was not applied consistently all over Sudan. land they occupy and the amount of natural tool that could be used when settling with the issue until after the referendum. Geographical data used was gathered in the resources to which they have access share local territorial disputes or separate two The logic is clear: GoSS’s main goal is to 1920s and 1930s. a vested interested in maintaining the status competing groups today – for example in keep the south united by a common desire quo rather than reconstructing an illusory the case of Agar and Gok in Lakes State. for independence and a collective fear of Nonetheless, the fact that the ‘1956 maps’ past. How difficult it is to adjust to current The response given by a group of ‘chiefs’ the north long enough to make it to the have not been consulted is seen by some realities is evident, for example, in the in Korgana in Western Bahr el-Ghazal referendum and achieve statehood. local officials as proof of a conspiracy, Lou-Jikany conflict in Upper Nile. In addition, was echoed all across the south: ‘People rather than lack of existence. In addition, GoSS has created an array of payams and should stick by the 1956 boundaries. This The widespread perception that a reversion the legal validity of maps as evidence in counties within the south that did not exist shows the boundaries between states, to the 1956 borders is the solution to local boundary disputes is not always clear- in 1956. Therefore, GoSS’ motivations and counties, boma, and payam.’137 Elders in territorial problems is problematic; both in cut. Maps simply reflect administrative method of implementation of these divisions Eastern Equatoria felt that the ongoing terms of applicability and legal validity, as realities, so boundaries need to be defined need to be held to account. It underlines problem of cattle-raiding needs to be: ‘… it is based on a particular interpretation of in more legally-binding sources such as the fuzziness of definition of what Southern solved according to pre-independence tribal the CPA that was not intended to refer to all administrative records and reports. However, Sudan is that the boundary issues remains boundaries’, claiming that tribal boundaries borders. The major problem, however, is that in the absence of other documentation a undefined, despite the fact that it is at the were clearly laid out during colonial times these historical boundaries may not exist. map can be very influential, so much so heart of numerous local conflicts. and that the only way to make peace now is that the ‘1956’ historical map has shaped by returning to previous boundaries.138 people’s opinions on where new boundaries

46 47 Case Study: The Atar/ back, but that will not be a problem.’143 The response goes on to make similar points However, it is important to note the reference The young men claimed that they had no to those heard by the research team from to the ‘1956 administrative territorial maps’. Khorflus agreements conflicts with the Shilluk and that fighting Shilluk people interviewed in Upper Nile. It Also, it is not disputed that Shilluk lived in the that had occurred in Malakal town and explains that the provocation for the Shilluk area of Atar in the early 1980s. The current The conflict between neighbouring Dinka elsewhere had no affect on them. As far attack was the Dinkas’ abuse of power: Dinka population has settled recently, groups now resident in Atar and Khorflus as current enemies were concerned, they ‘Part of what ignited the fight that took place and it would appear that an aspect of the of Upper Nile has been addressed at two explained that: ‘We are enemies among on Wednesday in Canal area (Pigi) was the two peace conferences – at which there conferences. The fighting between Dinka ourselves. Our neighbours are our enemies, brutal abuse of a Shilluk fisherman by some were no Shilluk representatives – was to sub clans has focused on the location of but it is just about cattle…They are Dinka Dinka elements in police uniform stationed provide an official imprimatur for permanent an administrative centre for, and the name like us. It was (also) about the name of the in a post there. They stopped his boat and Dinka occupation. Whatever the value of of, a new county. At a conference held in county.’ They admitted that cattle theft tried to take his fish by force without pay. the meetings in resolving Dinka sub-clan December 2008, the dispute was resolved continues on a small scale. When he protested, they shot him dead on disputes, they were obviously antagonistic when the two communities of Atar and the spot.’146 to nearby Shilluk. It is hard to avoid the Khorflus ‘unanimously agreed after lengthy On 8 November, a few days after the conclusion that local political activists were and consultative discussions’ to relocate the research team’s visit, fighting took place in This is not the place to discuss the veracity seeking to draw UNMIS and later Pact county headquarters away from Khorflus Atar between resident Dinka and a group of these claims, or the counter claims that Sudan into the process. Pact Sudan has to Wunaruop, located between the two of Shilluk, resulting in several deaths. An have been made in subsequent articles. wisely distanced itself. communities.141 They also agreed to call article, published on 14 November made the the new county ‘Canal’. At the end of the following comments: meeting ‘the two communities’ thanked various facilitators of the meeting, including The recent clashes which broke out at the United Nations Mission in Sudan seven o’clock in the morning on Wednesday (UNMIS), for facilitating it. They also formally between Shilluk from Upper Nile and Dinka expressed thanks: ‘…to themselves for their who are at Jonglei State’s territorial borders commitment to peace and willingness to caught both State governments by surprise settle their differences’.142 as there had never been tribal fight between Padang Dinka in Jonglei and Shilluk in Upper Despite these assertions, outbreaks of Nile State. A group of armed men reportedly fighting have reoccurred and cattle-raiding identified as members of Shilluk tribe from persists. A further meeting was therefore Upper Nile State attacked a Dinka village of called and funding sought from various Pigi county in the extreme east of Malakal agencies, including Pact Sudan. Various town on Wednesday on the other side of problems arose over support for this second Jonglei. The attackers killed a teacher with meeting, which took place in April 2009, two policemen and wounded two other and the text of the agreement has not been members of Southern Army forces, said widely circulated. It is omitted from the the SPLA in the area. Eight, from attackers Upper Nile Consolidated Peace Conference reportedly identified by the tribal marks on Resolutions, compiled by Pact Sudan and their heads as members of Shilluk tribe, published in September 2009. The main got killed while two other Dinka gunmen in reported difference from the first meeting the same village were also killed late in the was that the name chosen for the new evening of Wednesday in an ambush.144 county was ‘Pigi’. On November 15, the Sudan Tribune The research team visited Atar on 4 published a response from a Shilluk writer November and a focus group was carried who was convinced that the interpretation out with a group of seven young men, all of of these events was biased by the alleged The remains of Atar Senior Secondary School, Upper Nile them working for the payam administration Dinka loyalties of the author. According to or at the dispensary. All of them were Dinka, the respondent, the report was misleading and had settled in the area since the CPA. because: ‘Pigi is not and will never be a They explained that they will build homes Dinka village of Jonglei state because it has at Atar permanently. When asked what had been and it will always be a Shilluk area happened to the Shilluk who were living in according to 1956 administrative territorial the area in the 1980s, it was explained that: maps.’ The Atar area was: ‘…one of the ‘The Shilluk have moved to the west bank major fishing points for the Shilluk before the of the Nile due to the war. Some may come Dinka started fishing here as well.’145

48 49 Case study: The legacy land, there can be no fight over the border, boma Chief has been moving throughout everyone recognises it’148 The Bari chief, the community and reports that the majority of the ‘1956 border’ however, countered that: are: ‘…living peacefully together, most are between Acholi and Bari knowing this is an issue of the politicians’.150 We can tell you because we’ve been here The land dispute dividing the Acholi and There is a belief throughout much of Eastern longer. A long time ago, there was nothing Bari escalated in May of 2009 when two Equatoria that the ‘1956’ borders must be called Ayii here. It was called Kit. The name households fought over one plot, leading to reverted to solve these border issues despite of the river is Kit. It comes from ‘Kiteru’ the burning of a hut and violence between complex, convincing and entirely contrasting which means something like ‘sweeping all youth. The tension between the Acholi and local opinions of where these borders are. the dirt away from the river’ (when it rains it 149 Bari also came to the fore in an ongoing The disputed border between the Acholi becomes dirty). dispute over the signpost resulting from the and Bari at Kit, or Ayii on the Juba to Nimule The Acholi trace the Bari claim of the land to identification of the name as Kit or Ayii.151 road is an example of this. The contrasting a prominent senior local politician, a Bari and Currently, the land dispute lies at a standstill historical narratives, dating back to the British the speaker of the south Sudan Legislative as the communities wait for the response era, are extremely powerful and expressed Assembly – allegedly making statements of the government since the meeting that passionately by Acholi and Bari locals in a bid about the piece of land and erecting was held to discuss the land dispute in April to legitimise ownership of the land. signposts to state that the land is part of 2008, which involved the commissioner and governor of both Eastern Equatoria (Magwi) According to the Bari chief at Kit, the Labone Payam. It is believed that he wants and Central Equatoria (Juba). Hope for main road (passing through Kit from Juba this piece of land to be included in Juba solving this local land dispute is based on an to Nimule) was dug in 1949 by a British County to boost the number of Bari in his illusion of the clarity of the 1956 border, as engineer named Mujaranga. As the nearest constituency, increasing the likelihood of his the Bari chief reiterated: people to the road were Bari, Mujaranga election success. In addition, it is believed employed Bari headmen. The Acholi came that the ultimate goal is to create a separate They [politicians] say they will bring that old after the road was opened, in the mid 1950s; Bari-dominated county. In this respect, Igga map to show old border lines from British, their population increased with the growth of has supposedly been making speeches but they are saying it belongs to Bari. If services offered by the British (schools and declaring the area part of Juba County they change that map and make different a hospital). The Bari chief stated: ‘The Acholi and fomenting a sense of marginalisation borders, there will be continued conflict in the ran and came to Bari land and stayed here… among the Bari at the hands of the Acholi. community.152 now they are saying it is theirs?’147 This Regardless of the competing histories and unlawful ‘grabbing’ of land by the Acholi – as entrenched views of where the land belongs, It is evident that within the Bari community, seen by the Bari -began with the Acholi chief the area is currently being administered there is a strong assumption that a careful instigating support among the Acholi to send under Magwi County. analysis of history and an objective study of the map will provide clarity to the communities. Bari returnees to settle on different land. The strength of belief in each of these The Acholi history holds that the land up opposing histories with each group stating as far as the border with Central Equatoria that the other is welcome to stay on ‘their’ State has always been Acholi land and in the land as long as they respect the other, is 1930s or 40s the Acholi chief married a Bari potentially explosive and as an issue has woman. She gave birth to two brothers with been exacerbated through the emphasis on one child staying with the Acholi family and ethnically divided administrations. This belief the other moving to stay with the Bari after enables each group to vindicate violence if the mother’s death. Both these sons then necessary to assert their ownership over the laid claim to the Acholiland for their clan. land. Diametrically opposed interpretations This was exacerbated locally by the British of the border, which are supposedly rooted saying that the border was the road, which in historically-legitimate accounts, have is believed by the Acholi to be deep in their caused a number of violent clashes between land, rather than the border. The Acholi call the two communities. This has resulted in a the area ‘Ayii’, saying that this is the Acholi souring of relations among some groups of age-old name for the river running through Acholi and Bari with one Acholi compound the region, a river that the Bari call ‘Kit’ river: reported to have been demolished by ‘This is our [Acholi] place, the landlord is still some Bari last May, the beating of the alive and has been recognised before by the former Acholi boma Chief and another Bari people…everyone knows this is Acholi violent conflict resulting in the continued hospitalisation of a local man. The new

50 51 Case Study: Different among the Shilluk. Socially, the Shilluk Land and other the Land Act, which reiterates community occupy a distinct space in Southern Sudan’s ownership of land, are extremely high. It is memories: Dinka, Shilluk social fabric. With a clear, hierarchical social resources viewed as the panacea for all land disputes, and internal borders structure anchored by a quasi-divine king, with the expectation being that once land Access to land is one of the most common the Shilluk have a firmly rooted sense of officially belongs to the ‘community’, all triggers of local violence. In Southern Sudan The Dinka and Shilluk in Upper Nile have collective identity, social order, and historical problems will be resolved, as an SSPC staff the problematic nature of access to land diametrically opposed recollections of where ancestry. Unlike the Dinka and Nuer, the member said.156 This is problematic as each and its link to the exacerbation of hostilities the border between the two communities Shilluk are not a semi-nomadic, acephalous ‘community’ in the administrative sense manifests itself in issues regarding new was in 1956. According to many Dinka society of cattle-keeping pastoralists. The is rather diverse. In addition, this is likely administrative boundaries, local borders or political and traditional leaders, the middle Shilluk also occupy a physical landscape to magnify conflict as land administration clashes between residents and IDPs. The of the Nile River is the boundary between that is conducive to centralised social demands solid community administration access issue manifests itself in various ways: the Dinka and Shilluk; while the Shilluk and political organisation. Protected by structures in order to prevent conflict. These in creating new administrative boundaries, unwaveringly state that they have historically mountains to the west and rivers to the east, remain entirely unclear and the struggle over as discussed above, in contesting local occupied both banks of the Nile and that the the Shilluk kingdom enjoys high population access to land continues. In Ayii/Kit, EES, borders or in clashes between residents and border is east of the river. As Shilluk began densities in a favourable geography of fertile despite a peace meeting being held in 2008 IDPS. Land is now often in possession of returning from northern cities, mainly Kosti soil and easy access to waterways that where resolutions were drafted, the Acholi those who stayed at home during the war, and Khartoum, after 2005, they found Dinka facilitate communication and trade. and the Bari are still struggling over access and did not join the SPLA, or, as in the case occupying areas east of the Nile. Tensions to land. A group of elders and community of Nimule, where land is occupied by former as a result of land occupation seethed Politically, Fashoda County, the centre of leaders were despondent: ‘…it’s under the SPLA soldiers who feel that their struggle slowly until they were sparked by the clash the Shilluk kingdom, has not been an SPLM GoSS assembly, it’s almost one year now to ‘liberate the land’ gives them the right to on January 9 2009 over competing claims stronghold. Shilluk areas were controlled by but we have no power, we just have to wait occupy and own it. The hopes hinged on of ownership of Malakal town. The Shilluk SAF for most of the war. While the Shilluk did for them.’157 not form proxy militias armed by Khartoum, like the Murle or Toposa, they sat on a geographic and strategic fence for most of the war. Located along the border between oil-producing Upper Nile and the north, the Shilluk area is also the home of Lam Case study: Lopit: How sanctioned by the Commissioner as he was Akol, architect of the SPLM split in 1991, a ‘resource conflict’ present during this period. The prisoners subsequent SAF affiliate and recent founder were kept in this shipping container for a of the political party SPLM-DC. spreads into politics number of weeks resulting in the deaths of five of the detainees over the course of a In contrast, peace has not brought In Lopit villages in Eastern Equatoria, week. The eight surviving prisoners were prosperity or development to Kodok, the conflict erupted when it was reported that then moved to Torit and were reported, headquarters of Fashoda County. As the Logonwati attacked Lehinyang around as the payam administrator said, to have opposed to Melut, a mainly Dinka area that Christmas day of 2008 over a tract of been released without trial at the end of produces oil and has witnessed substantial fertile land that both communities claim. October.158 This issue has been politically claim that the Dinka are using their dominant growth since 2005, Kodok does not even A message was sent to the neighbouring disastrous for the current Commissioner position in the government and military to have a functioning mobile phone network. Mura community by the people of Lehinyang who is believed by the payam administrator consolidate territorial expansions made The disparity in development has bred for help and resulting in a number of Mura to be on: ‘…an island of trouble’159 as the during the war. ‘The problem started in resentment among many Shilluk, creating running to their aid. This culminated in Mura are annoyed about the deaths of the 1991,’ claimed Kodok’s payam administrator. an opening for SPLM-DC. As residents of the shooting dead of one Mura man while five prisoners while the Tennet are also ‘The current Minister for Information and Kodok said: ‘The leadership of GoSS has another was seriously injured. The following annoyed that the remaining eight have Communication used to have a SAF-aligned increased tribalism and is not favouring day, people from Mura village attacked the been released without charge. In addition, militia around Binthieng. Shilluk ‘chiefs’ told the entire community. We the Shilluk are Commissioner’s convoy coming from the it is believed by the acting paramount him to stay there, allowing Shilluk civilians to very marginalised. The community has no village of Tennet, as it was said that injured chief that there is strong anti-SPLM (the fall back to the other side of the river. Now political say. Our political representation is Logonwati were being transported in one commissioner’s party) sentiment in Mura the Dinka are refusing to leave these lands low. We are being intimidated by security of the cars. On inspection, this was found and that the NCP are now targeting Mura: 153 and claiming them as their own.’ apparatuses’.154 Consequently, many Shilluk not to be the case and 10 men were killed ‘…when they (NCP) see this insecurity The impression that a cabal of Dinka interviewed expressed the view that they in this attack resulting in the arrest of twelve they will capture these areas, this is an politicians is instigating violence in an feel territorially besieged, developmentally Mura who were imprisoned in Imehejek. opportunity for them.’160 Thus a conflict orchestrated strategy to drive Shilluk from undermined, and devoid of a political voice. These individuals attempted to escape so seemingly based on resource access has their historical homes is rooted in a deep ‘If we cross the river, we will be killed,’ said a they were moved to a ‘container’ in the implications for regional security as local 155 sense of marginalisation and victimisation Shilluk chief in Kodok. town, an action that is believed to have been issues became increasingly politicised.

52 53 Cattle-raiding as a rape, killing, stealing cattle in thousands.’167 social norms are also contributing to changes much higher, a successful raid can be worth Similarly, respondents in EES felt that the in the type of violence being carried out thousands of dollars to the participants. resource conflict? frequency and ferocity of cattle-raiding was during cattle-raiding. In Upper Nile, residents of Dolieb Hills and increasing. In Greater Bahr el Ghazal, 56 per Fangak respectively explained that those who Cattle represent both a source of livelihood cent of the attacks since the CPA reported Examining the causes of cattle-raiding raid do so for money and food. ‘They want and a symbol of prestige for many Southern by interviewees were cattle-raids. Opinions vary widely on the ‘root causes’ money. They take the cattle they’ve raided Sudanese.161 Dinka Gok cattle-keepers in of cattle-raiding and associated increase in to sell them.’175 Others in Fangak state that: Cueibet described their cattle as: ‘…the It is not surprising that people feel there violence. However, many felt that addressing ‘Cattle-raiders are not enemies… They are same thing as life. We eat from them and has been an increase in cattle-raiding such a complex and multi-layered issue is thieves and they are forced by hunger’.176 we get married from them. They are our since the end of the war, since during the inappropriate during a time when focusing property.’162 In recent years, cattle have also war, movement was restricted, raiding was on a single-issue approach better serves the It is tempting to arrive at the conclusion become one of the major catalysts for intra- punished by the army, and more crucially, interest of the future of Southern Sudan. 171 that economics explain cattle-raiding. south conflict. Cattle-raiding has become many of the youth were in the SPLA and did The idea that Southern Sudanese problems Indeed, a group of interviewees at Machi, synonymous with what are often termed not stay in cattle camps. Nonetheless, it is need to be on hold until the big problem – Eastern Equatoria asserted: ‘When there ‘tribal clashes’, a euphemism which does difficult to establish whether the incidence the relationship with the North – is solved is is food, there is no cattle-raiding’.177 little to explain the reasons for cattle-raiding. of cattle-raiding since the CPA is higher omnipresent and this approach is advocated However, the increase in cattle-raiding To understand cattle-raiding, one needs to than before the war. What is more easily for by the state-building element of current is more than a simple correlation with examine the social and economic context.163 substantiated is that the nature of the developments. As an SPLM official in an increase in poverty. In NBeG, people violence associated with cattle-raiding has Raja Town insisted: ‘People with cattle suffered comparable levels of poverty after Cattle-raiding is not a new phenomenon changed. For one, the proliferation of guns are a second problem, let us solve our big the war, and, despite the preponderance in Southern Sudan; Burton described makes raiding easier and more violent. With problem and then solve this from inside. We of cattle-keepers in the state, there is a cattle-raiding as characterising ‘inter-tribal’ the availability of guns, smaller numbers can sit on that one’.172 A closer look at the notable absence of cattle-raiding. A key relations before the British administration.164 of people can execute a large cattle raid; issues related to cattle-raiding reveals the difference between NBeG and other states Many cattle-keepers talked about how before the arms proliferation, victory was possibility that cattle-raiding may partially is that NBeG is more homogenous. It is cattle-raiding has become more intense and based on male strength. be a product of weaknesses in the building thus possible that the pressure of poverty violent, but many also referred to the conflict of Southern Sudan, possibly also a lack of is played out along existing fault lines; i.e. between groups as long-standing. To Furthermore, there is a noticeable disregard services and a disregard of the role of young divisions between groups. quote youth in Narus: ‘The Turkana/Toposa for certain rules of engagement, namely men in Southern Sudan. conflict over cattle-raiding is historical. that fighting should take place outside the Bride-price Our people have been fighting for a long village and women and children should not Poverty Many interviewees related the increase time. We will have peace today, and be targeted. Cattle-raiders are beginning For nomadic pastoralists, cattle represent in cattle-raiding to the increase in bride- tomorrow you will see they are fighting to use what could be described as guerrilla units of wealth. In the aftermath of war, those price; bride-price has been cited as one again’.165 South of Tonj in Warrap State, the terror to spread fear among rival cattle desperate to survive understandably target of the reasons for raiding for at least the Dinka Thony described the ongoing cattle- camps. According to women from Jonglei these units of wealth in the community. In past century. Before the war, interviewees raids between them and the Dinka Apuk/Yar state: ‘It used to be they wouldn’t kill women Cueibet County in Lakes State, Dinka Gok in Greater Bahr el-Ghazal reported that as historical tensions, which had continued 168 and children, but now they do’. This could youth remember having good relations with bride-price ranged from 10 cattle to 30 throughout the war and until today. Thus, also be due to the fact that cattle-raiding is the Dinka Rek before and during the war: cattle. In 2009, the highest price that it is likely that some groups are more likely carried out by gangs, that sometimes form ‘Before the war, the Rek came and reared interviewees had heard of was 300 cattle, to raid old enemies in an attempt to survive across ‘tribal’ divisions, and which award their cattle here and we had our cattle with the average seemingly closer to 70. drought and poverty. respect and honour on the basis of courage there. We intermarried. During the war, we Young cattle-keepers in Cueibet County, shown during a raid. Dinka Gok youth in intermingled. We went to Aweil and fought However, not all conflicts have such historical Lakes State thought that to get a ‘good’ cattle camps in Cueibet County, Lakes State, together there’.173 Dinka Gok youth attributed roots. In many cases the war caused a bride, one had to pay 150 cattle. They also described the new tactics being employed the outbreak of continuous raiding between change in relations between groups, which estimated that young men on average own by Dinka Rek cattle-raiders: ‘The raiding the groups after the war to the actions is now manifesting itself in the form of cattle- about 50 cattle each. As such, it is easy to nowadays happens at night. They come and of desperate ‘robbers’: ‘It was robbers raiding. It is widely reported that, since the jump to the conclusion that young men must kill people in their sleep.’169 Similar types of that started the raids. Robbers increased signing of the CPA, the incidence of cattle- raid in order to secure a suitable marriage violence were reported in cattle camps in because of a lack of things, lack of food.’174 raiding in certain areas has increased. For partner. However, the dowry system is Eastern Equatoria’s Budi County where in example, in Lakes State, the Cueibet county not simply a form of payment: it is more a October 2009, two boys aged 12 and 13 had In Eastern Equatoria, hunger was most often vet commented that: ‘Between 2005 and system of circulation of cattle through the their throats cut as they slept in their corral. cited as the main cause of cattle-raiding 2009, cattle clashes increased and became camp. Young men wait until their sisters As a Budi County official explained: ‘They and in both Eastern Equatoria and Lakes serious, more intense.’166 ‘Chiefs’, elders get married before using her bride-price slaughtered those two young boys in cold it was reported that raided cattle are often and administrators of Jur River County in to make a proposition for their marriage.178 blood, as if they were chickens’.170 It is likely transported to the large town markets and Western Bahr el Ghazal described 2009 as: Dinka Gok cattle-keepers emphasised that that war experiences and the breakdown of sold as quickly as possible. With prices per ‘…the worst year… We have experienced head of cattle around $300 and sometimes not everyone can participate at the highest

54 55 levels of this system: ‘This kind of marriage Social change, war legacies and lack highest level of government where they feel Our leaders try to knock communities’ is not for everyone. It is done by competitors of future perspectives tensions between Dinka and Nuer cattle- heads together. This raiding does not end, who want to show off their wealth.’179 During Many respondents agreed that most serious keepers are not addressed: because these leaders have cattle in villages this research, when young Dinka Gok men forms of violence occur in cattle camps with and they are willing to give arms to grass The people who work in government, some were asked if they felt pressure to raid to youth who reportedly do not respect either roots to go and retrieve the cattle. I think the were soldiers and are now in government, pay the current high prices, they answered: civilian or traditional authorities. Illiteracy, government has a hand in the violence of the they will collect guns and take their cattle. If ‘We don’t raid cattle for brides’. In another lack of religious teaching and lack of other youth. We suspect the hands of politicians government is working they should collect conversation, the young men explained: ‘In economic opportunities, were seen as are there. We hear people saying, ‘We fight guns, even from Nuer, people are now the process of loving you will collect your exacerbating violent raiding practices. For because our leaders are the ones who are running from Nuer… What happened now relatives to help you. We do not raid for many of these youth, cattle-keeping and fuelling us.’191 in Dinka area, some people do not work in bride-price.’180 Unfortunately, it is likely that increasing their cattle are the only visions government, but they only have cows, but the tradition of shunning raided cattle for they have for their own future and indeed somebody who works in government can Politics of cattle bride-price has come under some strain the only things to do. Going to school or take all the cows, that is why the Dinka now with a general breakdown in structures getting an income elsewhere is a far-fetched herders versus farmers run away.187 and prescripts. It is thus easy to imagine notion for most and no infrastructure exists Although raiding is the most obvious how some youth break the rules and raid that could offer them different perspectives. Youths in Marial Bei in Western Bahr problem in connection with cattle, the most to quickly increase their wealth and enable Raiding, which is also seen as a competition, el-Ghazal pointed out that since there is common problem is the clash of lifestyles them to participate in the higher-end market is also a way to stave off boredom and have an overlap between military and political between cattle-keepers and agriculturalists. for wives. an adventure. power, cattle-raiding is not only closely The challenge of harmonising land usage linked to high level military, but also political In addition to these factors, animosity among so that farmers and cattle-keepers can Weak governance and policing actors. One young man pointed out that the certain groups has been exacerbated by peacefully co-exist is a recurring problem Compounding the problem of poverty, involvement of army generals in the raiding the changing use and function of the local reported each year towards the end of dry uneven distribution of wealth and historical by way of supplying guns and ammunitions environment resulting from the war. For season, when cattle are taken to graze on intergroup tensions, is a weak government to their people intensified the conflicts.188 that has demonstrated little to no capacity example, elders in Mapel talked about a lake planted fields. Clashes are also reported for punishing the perpetrators of cattle-raids that people from Lakes and Jonglei used to After the recent spate of attacks, there at water sources, where people and cattle or the taking of women without bride- share, before fighting in the area. During the has been a growing perception that these share the same access and cattle-keepers 192 price. Though there were some instances war, the presence of the northern militia of may be part of an ‘invisible insurgency’. and fishermen compete for the best spots. 181 the Public Defence Force, forced those who Kenya’s The Nation reported that: ‘…people of county commissioners attempting to The resolution of this problem is intimately had used the lake to search for new sources are beginning to see the attacks as not return cattle, and an example of the Shilluk connected to issues of land and political of water; this is turn caused pressure further merely tribal, but as a result of a sinister king reportedly jailing some of his soldiers influence. Many agriculturalists believe that west in Warrap and Lakes States.184 political motive aimed at, as the leaders for raiding 30 goats before providing the government does not want to take on 182 often say, presenting Southern Sudan as compensation to their Dinka owners, Cattle-raiding has also become entangled cattle-keepers in order not to upset Dinka ungovernable.’189 Many people embraced there is no systematic attempt to address with territorial expansion, as a woman leader leaders, thus allocating less importance to this view. For example, a Dinka man in cattle-raids. Thus, revenge-raiding has from Mapel explained: ‘They came to Mapel farmers. Some respondents assumed that Melut in Upper Nile said in an anonymous become widespread across the region. from Tonj and they say Mapel belongs senior Dinka leaders encourage cattle- questionnaire response: ‘As long as the Dinka youth in Western Bahr el-Ghazal to them… Now they say Luo of Mapel, driving towards the farms because: ‘Warrap south stays with the north, the north will commented that: ‘Other people are also this belongs to us.’185 The Toposa make state is very dry grazing site,’ explained continue instigating conflict. They want settling old grudges by doing bad things similar complaints about the Turkana, while one respondent in Mapel. The problem to show that southerners aren’t capable to the people they had problems with. The numerous other Equatorian tribes complain persists despite, as a Wau SSRRC official of being independent’. Yet some believe raids and counter raids have become a big that the Toposa use raiding to displace explained: ‘...a written agreement between 183 problems originate closer to home, echoing source of conflicts’. Part of the problem, people and occupy the land, as is believed governors.’193 Farmers who have only seen the idea that most violence in Southern of course, is the powerlessness of punitive to have occurred in Lauro. inactivity from the government mentioned Sudan is home-grown. systems in the face of modern weapons. In the possibility of taking up arms as they addition, in some areas such as Lakes and Raiding and politics A number of respondents attribute the cannot see who might protect them. Warrap State, respondents commented that Many respondents implicated high- escalation of conflict in places such as the ‘chiefs’ were implicitly complicit in the level politicians and businessmen in the Lauro to the commercialisation of cattle- raiding because they were instrumental in proliferation of local cattle-raiding. The raiding. These posit that local politicians negotiating high bride-price for their relatives intricate connections between guns, cattle and/or businessmen are funding raids as a in some communities. and politics are at the heart of the challenge commercial enterprise, as a national staff to tackle the problem.186 In WBeG, local member of UNMIS explained: ‘chiefs’ drew a connection that links their own experience of cattle-raiding to the

56 57 Case study: A new Mapel into Lakes, raided 300 head of cattle Chart: Institutions providing protection belonging to Gok and killed seven young experience of cattle- men.196 The Gok followed the Rek back to and problem solving in Southern Sudan raiding in Mapel Mapel where they raided, looted and raped The chart below shows the institutions that Southern Sudanese turn to for protection and women in ‘revenge’ for the actions of the for problem solving. Mapel is a town in the far south east corner Rek. Gok claim that they only attacked the of Western Bahr el-Ghazal inhabited mostly Rek and were not interested in stealing from by Jur-Luo (known as Jur Chol to Dinkas). the Jur-Luo. Despite their claims, Mapel The Jur-Luo are mainly cultivators but some became a secondary battle ground for a also keep small herds of cattle. During the conflict in which the residents were not war, Mapel was a target for aerial bombing originally involved. and horse raids by northern Sudanese. With the signing of the CPA in 2005, the people of Mapel looked forward to peaceful (n=319) times. They describe the good things Protection about the peace: ‘There is no army, no 200 bombing, no mistreatment, we can move In Southern Sudan, the monopoly on 180 now.’194 However in 2005, cattle-keepers violence by the state, deemed by Weber to from the states of Lakes and Warrap be the core characteristic defining state, has 160 started to raid cattle, loot food and rape not been achieved.197 Protection agencies – 140 women. The attacks took the Jur-Luo by such as the police and the army – have not 120 surprise and caused outrage in the town been sufficiently strengthened, an issue now and surrounding villages. The raiding and contributing to the very same violence these 100 looting have continued each dry season agencies ought to prevent. In the case of 80 since then. The Jur-Luo blame the Dinkas, the army, an ill-prepared DDR programme including the Luoch, Muak, Yar, Rek, Apuk and half-hearted military transformation have 60 and most importantly the Gok. The Gok reinforced perceptions and realities that 40 came in March 2009 and carried out what soldiers present the greatest threat. In fact, Mapel elders called the worst raiding. The in most of the research sites, the greatest 20 women at Mapel described a raid as follows: local violence experienced was committed 0 ‘The raiders tie the male members of the by soldiers against the civilian population. household with ropes. After that they drive payam Furthermore, the broader security sector Police SPLA Other away the goats, cows, and rob any food they reform programme has been weak and Nobody No answer can find. There are many that come, maybe somewhat scattered. Chief/EldersGovernment 40 or 60. They come at night.’195 Protection of civilians from violent crime was UN/UNMIS/UNHCR The problem of cattle-raiding in Western somewhat counter-intuitively more effective Local authorities ( Community/Family/Tribe Neighbouring Countries Bahr el-Ghazal’s Mapel where the Jur live is during the war, because of the relatively Administrator, Comissioner) actually linked to a breakdown of relations tight control exerted by army and state between the Dinka Gok and Dinka Rek authorities, as a Sudanese coordinator of a from Lakes and Warrap State after the local NGO explained: ‘During the war, we Who do you go to if you war. The tension between the two groups had a very strong law. You do [something feel unsafe? meant that neither could graze their cattle bad] and you will be penalized. But now after Who do you go to if you on each other’s land. This resulted in a the peace, the army is not in one place and have other problems? shift in their seasonal movements; the Rek everybody has a gun and nobody respects Kongor started bringing their cattle to Mapel anybody.’198 The protracted process to take advantage of the good grass which of establishing judicial structures has grows there during the dry season and the expanded the vacuum of law and order that Gok started moving their cattle towards is ubiquitous in Southern Sudan. This has Western Equatoria. It is likely that the Rek necessitated local power structures taking were responsible for some of the raiding charge according to their own rules, often and looting that started in Mapel in 2005. to the detriment of civilians because: ‘when However, in March 2009, according to there is no law, somebody will apply law by Gok youth, the Rek Kongor crossed from their own hands.’199

58 59 The two most cited institutions offering and retaliation are likely to proliferate. local allegiances bound to fracture under founding of the SPLA. It is also worth noting protection were the ‘police’ (p=35 per cent) pressure. The close relationship between that the SPLA is seen primarily as a ‘Dinka- and the government (p=13 per cent). While Police, wildlife authority and the SPLA the army and the ruling party makes army’. While this perception is somewhat police is clearly defined as uniformed ‘police A striking result of the survey was that the distinctions blurry and creates discomfort. It skewed as the actual numbers do not seem officers’, it is not clear what exactly is seen vast majority of interviewees said that they is problematic that neither SPLM nor SPLA to confirm a Dinka majority in the SPLA, as ‘government’. Community/family and turn to the police when they feel unsafe. tend to refer to the army as a national army the perception might still mean that a policy ‘chiefs’/elders are considered a source of They said this even if they feel the police for Southern Sudan, which reinforces the that shifts soldiers to the police force risks protection by a much smaller percentage are ineffective or unresponsive. While there uneasy relationships between the army alienating non-Dinka populations from both have been efforts to improve the capacity of the population (p=9 per cent). This result 200 and civilians that have prevailed since the security apparatuses. indicates that people perceive the state as of the police force, in most cases police providing more protection than the older lack weapons, communication equipment, community-based structures. However, transportation, and basic training. Outside conclusions drawn from this data should of the larger population centres, police be qualified by the observation that many presence is generally nonexistent. Lack of education and widespread illiteracy among Case study: The SPLA, off for local residents. A group of Didinga people who said they would go to the women drew out the true nature of the police also commented that the police are the police forces are frequently cited as security and legacies major institutional weaknesses. Although military-civilian relationship: ‘We are safe ineffective, despite the fact that they are of unsolved violence in one way, from the Toposa, even though the largest body of public officials. Neither the police are popularly viewed as the foundation of community security, in practice in Budi County they still tried to come with the army. But the SPLA nor the UN feature as major now there is the worry of having the boys in institutions for protection in the responses. they are largely absent or incompetent. For example, a priest in Imehejek stated: ‘There In Budi County in EES, the legacy of the green here.’ In addition to regular beatings of In contrast, 46 per cent of respondents are 70 police in this county, that’s nearly how ‘Lauro Massacre’ and recent responses local men by soldiers, the primary concern reported that they go to their chief/elders for many villages we have and the presence of highlight the challenges of protection and the was the sexual assault of young women, help in solving other problems such as family police alone cannot create security.’201 role of the SPLA. The attack was allegedly which has made the women flee to the and community disputes. This indicates carried out, said a group of community mountains: ‘When there is a dance, the girls that such structures still play a role in the To counter this ineffectiveness, GoSS has leaders, to either: ‘…displace the Didinga will be going back and they [the soldiers] resolution of smaller disputes, but are not increasingly infused the police force with and gain access to local resources (pastures waylay. This was regular. Look now and considered significant in providing protection. generally older SPLA soldiers who simply and gold)’ or as a: ‘…revenge attack due you see no girls here; they have all gone to 203 swap fatigues for uniforms. While this short- to the Didinga’s refusal to join a political the mountains because they are fearing.’ It should be noted that the responses to term strategy provides a much-needed alliance with the Toposa and Buya.’202 An The army commander denies any form of the question on protection are more widely surge in numbers, it comes with costs. army barracks was established in Lauro as tension: ‘Relations between the community distributed than the responses on problem Militarising domestic law enforcement by an inducement for the community to return and the army are good. They live together solving. Furthermore, eight per cent of relying on soldiers obscures the important from living in the hills, yet the involvement of without any problem. If anything happens, 204 respondents responded that nobody offered distinction between police and army, which the SPLA as a protection force in a volatile they raise a complaint and we address it.’ them protection, whereas only three per cent is the cornerstone of any state’s security environment has led to a security trade- of respondents thought that nobody could infrastructure. Its absence highlights the help solve their problems. These results structural tension in Southern Sudan. show that there is more disagreement among In stand-offs between police and army, people as to who provides the best protection, respondents generally reported that indicating an underlying sense of uncertainty the army has the upper hand, making it about who should be providing protection. impossible to pursue legal recourse against members of the army. Furthermore, the The lack of reliable protection structures SPLA’s respect for human rights, training, creates a cycle of violence that is hard command and control have all come under to break. As the state does not establish scrutiny, both during and after the war. security, groups act to ensure their own There is no reason to believe that changing safety, often sparking a cycle of attacks uniforms will cast off questions about the and counterattacks. For example, there is a levels of professionalism. clear logic of proportional justice in what the Lou term ‘collective revenge.’ After a group The role of the SPLA in most citizens’ has committed enough small-scale attacks views remains unclear. There is confusion and cattle-raids, the Lou mobilise into large as to whether they are a government groups and inflict a single attack in retribution. army, a national army, the armed wing of In the absence of the rule of law and justice, a political party, the de facto police or a community justice mechanisms of revenge loosely bound collection of local militias with

60 61 Several dynamics directly challenge the the government’s reluctance to involve the Case study: Arms and The leader of the youth group who had security situation and the SPLA’s capacity SPLA at the local level as it could prove inspected the boat claimed that: ‘I checked to protect the population. Firstly, the SPLA counterproductive for the army by exposing the WFP barge attack the barge…the first boat we checked had SAF must integrate former foes that have SPLA’s inner tension. An international UN military uniforms. We were unable to check An example of the complex effects of the become ambiguous allies and have the security officer explained: ‘Salva Kiir has the rest. People on board were trying to bribe proliferation and use of arms – widely potential to challenge the SPLA’s southern smartly avoided interfering in tribal clashes us not to check the boats… We got seven documented in recent research – was the army monopoly. The integration of powerful because he knows that this will cause the boxes of ammunition from the boat, and we events that occurred in June 2009, when a commanders can only happen if credible SPLA to break along tribal lines. Instead, used these to fight the SPLA. The SPLA sunk convoy of WFP barges was carrying food incentives are offered – such as high ranks, the SPLA is coming in after the fighting to the suspected boats. We also found tents and aid from Malakal to Akobo along the Sobat prestigious positions or good pay – which secure the area and act as a buffer.’207 blankets aboard the boats.’209 River in Upper Nile. The barges needed in turn has alienated long-standing SPLA to pass through the Jikany town of Nasir. members who are not offered incentives. The role of the wildlife authority is equally The barges were released from Nasir after Officials in Nasir say that they were tipped Secondly, the SPLA must create a national problematic. Mandated to preserve wildlife being detained for a week. Nasir County off that some of the boats were carrying army that includes a mosaic of militias and protected areas, in some areas the officials were reportedly ordered by Dr. Riek ammunition sent from Dr Riek Gai, a Lou primarily concerned with the narrow wildlife authority clearly stick to this mandate Machar, the GoSS Vice President, to allow Nuer presidential advisor to Omar Bashir. interests of their home community. ‘If the while in others, there is little distinction all the boats to pass. Many of the SPLA who When the boats arrived, they were guarded SPLA had to fight a war tomorrow we between police and wildlife authorities. were on the barges in Nasir disembarked by a large contingent of SPLA from Dolieb estimate that only 30 per cent of their forces During the elections, wildlife authorities were and followed on foot along the river, fearing Hills, which was apparently not standard would answer the call to mobilise,’ said an dispatched as police. Furthermore in some that the boats would be ambushed as soon operating procedure for humanitarian relief international UNMIS official.205 areas the wildlife authority seems to have as they departed. The boats were attacked convoys. When officials in Nasir checked the Weakened by its own ‘ethnic divisions’, developed into a praetorian guard for county and sunk soon after leaving Nasir, and at waybill for the convoy, they found that three the SPLA must tread carefully into local commissioners. The county commissioner in least 50 SPLA were killed. boats were not officially listed but did bear violence. ‘The SPLA is caught in the middle Fangak, for example, was observed to have WFP flags. Whether the boats were actually carrying and they’re afraid of being associated his compound protected by heavily armed wildlife authority personnel. ammunition has not been confirmed, with certain tribes,’ said an employee of a A group led by the local SSRRC official and although UNMIS did send divers to search local NGO in WBeG.206 This may explain including some local youth attempted to the wrecks. According to UN officials, the search the boats: ‘We started checking the water was too cloudy to determine whether boats, but the SPLA commanders stopped there were any crates of ammunition us. …I think the WFP logistics people were or other military supplies on the barge. given money to allow the boats to carry WFP In May, Lou had attacked Torkech and flags, and some SPLA commanders were killed 75 Jikany women and children, and given money to ensure that the boats went many in Nasir were not predisposed to through uninspected. This was the first time sit by passively while they perceived the that the SPLA guarded a WFP barge.’208 international community to be assisting and strengthening a group they see as hijacking their land and massacring their people.

62 63 Other armed groups force had given up its weapons and fully They wear baggy trousers, loose t-shirts abroad as refugees and do not wish to demobilised.214 Only the governor himself and sunglasses and are said to be drunk return to an old way of life. Members of the and outsiders was adamant that with a presidential and lascivious at parties they organise in the Niggaz in Korgana explained: ‘We just want declaration ordering Quart Salam to align, bush.221 A large proportion of the members to lead our lives, not be forced to marry Militias the bulk joined the SPLA after a public rally are reportedly women who wear short who your parents says… we just want As with weapons inflows, it is hard to verify in Wau’s Freedom Square.215 The UN tells to be modern.’228 At the same time, they claims of renewed militia activity as the the story of the Quart Salam’s disarmament expressed concern regarding the manner reason for local violence. Nonetheless, the quite differently because demobilisation in which they were treated by the chief who perceived threat that stems from militias happened under SAF auspices without UN is: ‘…very hard on us. We do not get to do – current or former – is palpable. When involvement or verification. Several other anything or else the chief will lock us up in investigated, most reports are based on sources, including a government official, an abandoned house.’229 loose conjecture and weak evidence. Even confirmed that Quart Salam: ‘…went home if there aren’t large mobilised militias active, with their guns.’216 While only few former At another level, the Niggaz and Outlaws there are suggestions that the legacy of Quart Salam fighters are known to be in the could be interpreted as a result of the vacuum militia activity continues to make individuals SPLA or SAF, the general story is that, as produced by a breakdown in social structures and communities feel threatened. Niggaz and Outlaws posing for the camera told by Sudanese staff in a local NGO: ‘Tom combined with a weak state that fails to monopolise force. According to a prison In Upper Nile, a host of former militia leaders Anour was able to be convinced to send half skirts, tight jeans and have been accused officer in Wau, 32 Niggaz were arrested in – Gordon Kong, Tanginya, Lam Akol, Simon his forces to SPLA and half to SAF, but they of killing.222 The older generation decries the October 2009 for: ‘…collecting young ladies, Gatwich, Ismael Konye, and others – create are still branded as NCP or Jellabahs.’217 activities of the groups (likened by a Wau pitching tents by the riverside and using the a general apprehension that old northern The fate of militia members who went to SSRRC official to ‘Sodom and Gomorrha’)223 ladies there.’230 All members were able to proxy militias who are now part of the JIU neither SPLA nor SAF is entirely unclear; and criticise the dress style. The reverend of arrange the required SDP1,000 (£270) to post in Malakal could be rapidly reactivated to they were described by international UN staff the Diocese of Torit laments: ‘The trousers bail.231 Similar arrests and posting of bail have destabilise the region. Gordon Kong, the as being merely: ‘…a fatigued non-Dinka, down the buttocks, is it a good dress? occurred in Torit and Juba. Such groups of former SSDF commander who joined SAF non-Luo force.’218 Most Wau residents asked They are copying the black Americans who alienated and unoccupied youths are easily after the Juba declaration and is currently did not seem comfortable talking about move half naked around the streets killing manipulated and mobilised and thus could based in Khartoum, told sources that he was them, emphasising the conclusion of UN people.’224 Seen as major threat, the Niggaz pose a serious threat to urban and rural responsible for ordering the attack on the staff that the Quart Salam ought not to be and Outlaws are accused of owning guns stability in Southern Sudan. WFP barge.210 In remote areas, local SPLA is written off too quickly.219 and committing crimes.225 There are also often comprised of former militia groups who allegations linking the Niggaz to the SPLA – Militias operating under the guise of ‘youth The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) are still loyal to their old commanders. This or rather criminal activities carried out under groups’ seem to be present in Upper The LRA has been present in Sudan for is the case for example in Boro Medina near SPLA guises, as voiced by a large group of Nile, where SPLM-DC, state government close to 20 years now; EES has particularly the Darfur border where residents are very chiefs in Wau. The ‘chiefs’ from Wau County officials, and several county commissioners suffered from a legacy of distrust, violence aware that the SPLA sent for their protection believed that: ‘Some soldiers are supporting are all reported to have their own armed and LRA movement. From 2006 onwards, is only loosely connected to any central the Niggaz and guns are not collected from groups. When a group of youth in Akobo the location of the LRA shifted to Western SPLA command.211 there.’226 Others echo the use of ‘youth were asked whether they used to be part of groups’ by militia leaders and suspect that Equatoria. The year 2009 marked another The state of other personal militias is unclear. the white army, one replied: ‘…no, we are the Niggaz and Outlaws also answer to a significant development. The LRA is now The forces of the former leader of the SPLA white army…but we don’t have weapons scattered across Sudan, DRC and Central 220 military or political leader, as expressed by Bahr el-Ghazal faction, Karabino Kuany Bol, anymore’. Interestingly, the same youth a Wau correction officer: ‘One reason why African Republic (CAR) by the ill-fated are said to be: ‘…basically spent in Abyei’ explained that a group of 26 Lou youth [the judges] don’t prosecute [Niggaz for their ‘Operation Lightning Thunder’, a joint military although concrete evidence is missing. The purchased weapons from an unknown crimes] is there might be something political operation launched, after peace talks failed, Al Fursan militia along the Darfur border is source in Malakal to collectively conduct behind it.’227 by the Ugandan, Congolese and US armies supposedly integrated into the SPLA, but revenge attacks on other groups. and, to some extent, the SPLA.232 The LRA at times reports suggest otherwise.212 The The formation of the Niggaz and Outlaws has since continued to attack civilians in the proximity to the border causes concerns Youth gangs in the years following the end of the civil DRC, the CAR and Sudan. among residents there, as was expressed Several youth gangs are emerging in war can be interpreted in several ways. On The current strength of the LRA and the during a group discussion with local leaders: Southern Sudan; the ‘Niggaz’ and ‘Outlaws’ one level, they are a symptom of the drastic exact whereabouts of LRA leader Joseph ‘We fear those people because they might are two of the best-known youth gangs in social change within Southern Sudanese Kony remain unknown. Some reports be friends of those with horses.’213 Southern Sudan, with the term ‘Niggaz’ society as it struggles to return to a state describing both members of a specific of peace modelled on Sudan before the suggest that troops have moved into Chad Almost everyone questioned in WBeG gang as well as generally bad behaviour by war whilst embracing and incorporating and Darfur, others point out that there are no about the state of ‘Quart Salam’, the militia groups of young people. Members of the its citizens who do not remember the old troops left to speak of. In the lead-up to the formerly commanded by Major General gangs model themselves on US-rap stars Sudan. Many youths have experienced Sudanese elections, the SPLA announced El Tom Anour, expressed doubt that the such as Jay-Z, 50 Cent, Lil Wayne and 2Pac. another type of life, either in the army or that it was expecting large-scale attacks in

64 65 Greater Bahr el-Ghazal, but there seemed suspicions have been circulating for years.235 For the Fellata, life in Southern Sudan is that the Fellata that look after cattle in to be no hard evidence for this. Based on Numerous respondents cited the Ambororo challenging, as explained by a Fellata elder the bush carry guns as the Fellata elders eyewitness accounts of civilians who have and Fellata as the biggest threat to peace in Wau: openly talked about it – although the group suffered through attacks, the number of and this sentiment is certainly echoed in in Korgana claimed to have no guns – Sudanese commanders in the LRA seems the Sudanese press. Currently, accusations There is peace, but not for everyone. We and even those suspicious of the Fellata to have increased tremendously. UN staff about the Ambororo and Fellata are do not benefit from it. We have no school, confirm that: ‘In the bush you cannot walk commented that the perception is that high- creating a backlash, with the groups being no water. We cannot move out from here without a gun.’247 The allegation that they ranking Sudanese are in the LRA by choice, blamed for uncounted conflicts and violent or we will be killed…We need to be home are carrying out subversive activities on rather than by force.233 incidents,to the extent that communities by 7pm, otherwise it is dangerous, even behalf of the Khartoum government is hard in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr walking to the cattle camp is now dangerous to corroborate. Information on the Fellata The lack of reliable information and el-Ghazal use violence to prevent the in a group, we cannot even take motorbikes is so sketchy that all understanding is comprehensive military strategies have Ambororo and Fellata from passing through because the motorbike owners will tell rather limited, leading to accusations and brought a few things to light that are or settling in the area. In the Nile region of somebody we are taking the motorbike misinterpretations. The broader implications important for understanding some of the Sudan, ‘Fellata’ is used by Arab groups as a and they will betray us and attack us… of this are important as there are several security and conflict perceptions shaping derogatory term associated with ignorance, The government wanted to open schools groups in Southern Sudan who are already Southern Sudan today. WBeG recently disease and shiftiness. 236 but were told by other people ‘if you extremely vulnerable because little is known regularly reported LRA movement. The allow Fellata to go to school, there will be about them. As a result, they are less likely validity of the information is impossible Over the last few years, numerous public problems…We are not bad people, we have to benefit from government in the future, to verify, but the content of the reported allegations have been made specifically not killed a single Fertit. If they say we are regardless of whether they will live in a united movement is in itself telling. After the attack against the Ambororo, following a campaign unapproachable that is a lie. But so many of or divided Sudan. on Boro Medina on October 21 2009, the by the GoSS to remove the Ambororo our people are killed.242 state government initiated a visit to the area from Western Equatoria State. The thinly on October 30 to investigate. Even though veiled suspicion of external support in the At the community level in WBeG, perceptions three policemen were killed in the attack, media was often openly aired in interviews of the Fellata were more positive. It was the police commissioner declined to join conducted by the research team. An SSRRC noted that they were no longer bringing their animals to town, thus causing less the investigation. During the visit, facilitated official at Wau reported that the Ambororo 243 by the UN, the government delegation are being used by the North to terrorize the destruction. One chief from the Wau area was controlled by the SPLA which did not people in Southern Sudan.237 A coordinator pointed out that dealing with the Fellata allow the delegation to talk to people who of a local peace-building NGO commented regarding cattle on the fields was much less had witnessed what happened. The army that people think that the Fellata are complicated than dealing with the Dinka: only supplied its own information to the janjaweed.238 Again and again, interviewees The Ambororo, the Fellatas, they are also delegation, including the SPLA’s success in reported that the Fellata were armed and cattle-keepers, but they have a good Fellata women freeing those abducted, although the army that they carried satellite phones, signifying understanding if you talk to them, they was not clear whether it had killed or rather the need for communication with outsiders. understand. The most destruction comes captured three LRA.234 International UNMIS staff confirmed that from those people of Warrap State.242 the Ambororo are: ‘…considered a high None of the people involved in the attack security risk on the higher political level, The Fellata interviewed for this report were interviewed for this report had provided yet local reports seem to suggest that clear about their aspirations. In Korgana, information about the attackers to anyone there are actually very few problems. So their message for GoSS was ‘the Fellata else or had been interviewed by government the question is: why is this such a political in Korgana are Southern Sudanese. We’re officials or the army. The lack of interest issue?’239 Indeed when asking those who blacks. In the north, that’s how we are displayed by authorities to pursue detailed blamed the lack of peace on the Ambororo looked at.’245 The Fellata settled in Wau information about LRA attacks is striking. to name a specific violent incident involving reported more problems than those at Overall, the SPLA kept a very tight lid on the accused groups, only one UN official Korgana and expressed more uncertainty information, presumably because details could refer to two incidents.240 One answer about their position. As participants in one about attacks might expose SPLA behaviour why the issue is so politicised could be focus group put it: ‘We are afraid of the and whereabouts as well as expose failures in that the Fellata are a welcome scapegoat government because they discriminate us. Southern Sudan’s protection mechanisms. for local authorities who accuse the Fellata We don’t think there is a government.’246 of violence in order to cover up their own Fellata It is difficult to conclude whether there is administrative shortcomings or failure to any truth in the allegations made against Similarly shrouded in mystery are the prevent LRA attacks.241 nomadic Ambororo, or the Fellata, a name the Fellata or indeed to understand the often used interchangeably for a group connection between the settled Fellata about which little is known, yet many and the nomadic Ambororo. It is clear

66 67 Chart: Themes in drawings PREDICAMENTS OF PEACE depicting life before the CPA

Attacks by northerners Destruction of 8% property 6% The functionality of peace based on peace unsteady. Often respondents pointed out that Arial bombardment agreements is a contentious issue. This their personal security was ‘better’ during 9% Refuges/IDPs/ is particularly important in Sudan, where wartimes, or rather more ‘predictable’. flight 6% peace agreements form the basis of many To gain an understanding of what defines life Limited/no levels of government from the national to the Attacks on education very local. Despite the prevalence of positive during peace as opposed to war, drawing competitions were held in several schools Civilians achievements since the CPA, it is clear that Forced by throughout the three states, asking children 9% for many interviewees ‘living peacefully’ is soldiers/police a remote concept. Because violence can to draw their impressions of life before and after the CPA. In portrayals of life before the happen at any point, people do not perceive Other Cattle their environment as peaceful. Women CPA, a common image is recruitment to fight with the SPLA, dilapidated, destroyed Death 16% representatives in Wau noted that: ‘Social 10% attitudes around violence have not changed. houses and aerial bombing. The exact Limited mobility People do not have a positive attitude.’248 breakdown of themes and depictions in the drawings can be seen on the next page: Mines The unpredictability of supplies and security Fighting Guns/ post-CPA has made experiences of peace 11% weapons Famine, lack of water 23% Abduction

Chart: Themes in drawings depicting life after the CPA

Worship 5% Guns/weapons 4% Improved food/ Communication 4% agri/H20 6% Unity/reconciliation Hospitals/health Leisure 7% Fighting/conflict Leaders

Other Trade/increased wealth Improved School 30% buildings/homes Power sharing 14% Security Cattle Education 14% Attacks on civilians Transport/free Aid/UN movement 15% Electricity

68 69 The recurring themes in children’s views of aid are important aspects of peace. By The data in the chart on the previous ‘us versus them’ attitude. A sense of life under the CPA serve as an illustration correlating perceptions of personal security, page depicts the numbers of people who marginalisation – highlighted by the of what seems to be the most important memories of receiving aid and perceptions reported perceiving peace, feeling safe, and overwhelming sense of victimisation elements of peace, or more precisely what of peace, we gain an insight into how receiving food and other assistance along expressed in many interviews – was widely people most expect as ‘peace dividends’ so-called peace times are experienced. a timeline from 1972 to 2009. It depicts a experienced and seen as connected to – for example, free movement, education, The data indicate that Southern Sudanese high correlation between perceptions of government policies that deliberately and better access to food and water. A experienced war as a time of increased food peace and perceptions of personal security excluded some from benefiting from peace. dominant trend in images portraying life after aid and assistance from the international (r= .95). The number of respondents For instance, the Lopit at Iboni in EES feel the CPA concerned the increase in school community, and peace as a time of reduced who perceived peace in Southern Sudan the government has ‘forgotten’ them or is attendance, probably unsurprising for a assistance and food aid. The perception that increased from 17 (p=17%) during the intentionally performing politics of exclusion. competition held among school children. food aid and assistance under the CPA fell protracted wars years to 81 (p=83%) when Members of the peace committee argued below levels of the early war years – coupled the CPA was signed in 2005. The number of that there is a clear bias towards other tribes Services and peace with the lack of a peace dividend – does respondents who perceived an increase in within the government, and that NGOs and Along the same lines, survey results indicate promote a sense that instability creates their personal security also increased from funds are being directed elsewhere: that aspects of life associated with peace better aid delivery. 14 (p=14%) during the protracted war years concern personal security, and receiving to 56 (p=57%) when the CPA was signed. Even the government says that to the Lopit After 2005, perceptions of both peace and they are blind. If the government knew we personal security decreased, reflecting the were his people, he would have divided the rise in conflict in some areas. The correlation food and employment equally between all the tribes. We are forgotten from the government. Chart: Perceptions of peace, between perceptions of peace and perceptions of personal security is especially There are some communities who are security and aid from 1972 – 2009 strong during the years since the CPA. saying that aid should not come to the The difference in the numbers of people Lopit. Do not listen to them. The nearest who perceived peace in 2005 compared (n=98) Age ≥ 40) counties, the politicians and people working to personal security suggests that while in government are telling NGOs not to be people associate peace with the signing of bringing development to the Lopit.251 90 the CPA (i.e. formal contracts at a national level), security is more intimately linked to The direct relationship between perceptions 80 the reality on the ground. This suggests that of peace, services and lack of government credibility points to a larger problem 70 as a measure of lack of conflict, assessing personal security may be more accurate. It within the building of Southern Sudan. 60 should be noted however that perceptions of The state-building framework dictates the 50 peace may have influenced the increase in strengthening of government institutions perceptions of personal security in 2005. to deliver better services in the future; 40 yet peace-building requires these better 30 It is clear from almost all interviews that services now so that people can experience better access to services is seen as a vital peace as a benefit and adjust violent 20 ingredient of peace. Lack of development behaviour. While people are hopeful for the 10 in infrastructure impacts quality of life future, at present the sentiment that GoSS is as it hinders trade and movement, but not meeting the expectations of the people 0 respondents pointed out that being of Southern Sudan is overwhelming. connected by road symbolised more than a Never 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 simple infrastructure requirement. In parts of GoSS faces a serious challenge in addressing this credibility gap, particularly Don’t know EES, being able to travel along the road safely was the most remarkable aspect of being in because currently the main strategy peace,249 while in Raja County, one religious seems to be to pressure INGOs to fill the leader pointed out that the road was also service vacuum; these are often reluctant When was Southern Sudan at peace? the gateway for information and knowledge, to take it on due to the aim of building Early war years 1983 – 1988 When did you feel safe? both desperately needed by the Southern government capacity and avoiding a shift Protracted war years 1989 – 2004 Sudanese to become informed citizens.250 of accountability away from the domestic When did you receive food aid? government to international actors. The Furthermore, groups tended to judge their situation warrants a close analysis of When did you receive other assistance? During Addis Abada Agreement 1972 – 1982 own peace benefits in direct comparison priorities, asking whether the priority to that of other groups, reinforcing an should lie in building government capacity

70 71 or in delivering services through NGOs actors is a quasi-insurmountable task. For Case study: Strategic conflict resolution. Several peace conferences to establish peace benefits. Allowing the many people who have experienced violence have been held since an outbreak of violence government to rely on other actors may since the CPA, there is confusion over who peacemaking between involving Misseriya in spring 2008 to re- currently be the price that needs to be paid the appropriate authorities should be. This Dinka Malual and Rizeigat establish peaceful co-existence and sharing for life saving services. was aptly summed up by the leader of a of resources. In addition to the very prominent youth peace-building association in NBeG Clashes between lifestyles are readily peace meetings, local residents, NGO staff International NGO staff pointed out that: ‘We who stated that: ‘One root cause of conflict is apparent on the north-south border where and government employees point out that as NGOs are basically state-building which that it is unclear who solves conflicts.’254 nomadic people venture south during dry there is something uniquely different in their is outside our normal mandate… and this season in search of pastures. The two attempts to prevent future clashes: each means we are essentially providing what Several respondents attribute the nomadic groups who have been caught conference has been followed up through the GoSS should be providing in terms of inadequacy of conflict resolution to the up in conflict are the Misseriya of southern further initiatives to keep communication service delivery in many locations, including lack of analysis of the causes of violence. Kordofan and the Rizeigat of south Darfur. 252 open. While communication is tentative and very remote ones.’ This perception ‘Conflict analysis is a tool’, said a Sudanese The history between nomadic people and unreliable, local government officials also point ultimately situates NGOs as an alternative or NGO leader – one that many felt was the residents of the border areas in Northern out that in 2009 violence has been confined to additional government branch. Numerous underutilized in an effort to provide conflict Bahr el-Ghazal and Unity State is long and isolated small incidents. respondents indicated a tendency to hold resolution. Yet with the confined CPA time diverse.258 Throughout long periods, nomadic Local officials, while admitting that the international or the NGO-community frame of six years, there is pressure to show cattle-keepers and settled residents co- fundamental issues have not yet been more accountable for their welfare, which results rather than analysis and an extremely existed with agreed sharing of resources.259 256 resolved, credit the ongoing process deflects accountability away from GoSS. slow process. During the war, Misseriya and Rizeigat were for relatively confined violence. An NGO This is particularly acute in Eastern Equatoria There is a vague expectation that the named in the same breath, both as northern employee involved in the Rizeigat-Dinka where for much of the war and the late allies, yet recent years have seemingly process explained how each side had 1970s and early 1980s, INGOs, especially government is in charge of providing both analysis and solutions, but this is made seen increased political division between formed a committee of 75 people to assure those of Norwegian origin, were the de the two. During war years, the nomadic continuity in the dialogue, and a meeting of the facto governing body of that region. This more complicated by the equally vague understanding of what government is. tribes abducted thousands of people from committees took place in January 2010.262 The could provide a stabilisation model for the NBeG, Unity or from the Nuba. Many people commissioner of Gok Machar explained how region today, albeit a model that would Five years after the signing of the CPA, lack of clarity, misinterpretation of conflict remember massacres. Memories of the since he first opened dialogue with Rizeigat require radical shifts in donor strategy. As infamous ‘Wau Train’ are still strong:260 When leaders unofficially in 2008, he has gradually such, frustration about the lack of services as mainly ‘tribal’ and the vague notion of what Southern Sudan might become, Khartoum wanted to move the train along built up communication, culminating in a first was directed towards NGOs – and even the tracks to Wau, they gave the Misseriya meeting in Darfur’s Nyala in autumn 2009. His donors – and not the government. Donors seem to have disempowered the conflict- solving potential at every government licence to kill or take anything they could find approach is to underline that for people who acknowledged that there is a perception that 261 level. ‘We have to teach people the use of along the train lines. rely on resources on both sides of the border, GoSS is not providing for the community changed geopolitics could have a devastating government,’ one youth leader in WBeG Current conflict between the nomadic and stated that GoSS is keen to change effect unless local cross-border contacts are emphasised: ‘When people know their role people and residents of the border – with this, but they also feel that GoSS’ priority strong: ‘We are sharing water and grain…we and duties, people cannot be confused a closer look here at Rizeigat and Dinka is with streamlining payroll and accounting want to assure we are not [the] enemy.’263 systems,253 implicitly underscoring the belief easily.’ In addition, citizens have observed Malual – is about pastures and water, but of many Southern Sudanese that GoSS is time and again that conflict resolution seems just as much about the history of child Local NGO staff says that the combination of more self-serving than citizen-serving. to be equated with ‘forgive and forget’, rather abduction by nomadic people and a cycle pushing for involvement of communities by than bringing justice, or even more crucially of revenge. Currently, there is increased using the two committees has been equally in the Sudanese context, compensation Peace-building: a anxiety in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal because important as official strategies.264 Traditional for stolen property or lost lives, rather than limited rains have decreased pastures leaders were involved, but not asked to be palliative cure? a much more encompassing approach and water supply. The ongoing problems the main brokers of a peace deal, but given involving restitution, punishment, deterrence, draw on issues such as unclear border 257 a very specific task of solving property When dealing with complex and multi- tolerance and compensation. Ideally, it demarcation, failure to compensate and lack issues resulting from cattle-raiding, so: ‘… layered conflicts, it is often not obvious how involves a strategy that gives each party to of reconciliation for families who have had a we do traditional courts with… ‘chiefs’ from ‘peace-building’ works. At the moment, the conflict an incentive to solve the conflict. relative abducted or killed. Uncertainty about Rizeigat and Dinka. Five ‘chiefs’ from Rizeigat anything from family disputes to massacres the origins of heavy weapons carried by came, five from Dinka.’ This was also seen as is lumped together under one ‘conflict’ the nomads and continued militarisation of necessary in order to not alienate community headline. In turn, various approaches groups adds to the confusion. members who felt that closing the border to to ‘peace-building’ also merge. This nomadic movement would be the only way to Continuous peacemaking causes widely differing expectations of prevent violence. the outcomes of peace-building activities. With the long history of conflict between Identifying an entry point for conflict nomadic tribes and settled Dinka along the resolutions, in terms of prioritising issues and north-south border comes a long history of

72 73 Shared strategic interests strategy used by the commissioner. The The meaning of peace-building that although the conflict with the Logir had Several respondents underlined the commissioner is allowing Rizeigat, who Though there exists a general perception reached a dangerous level, there: ‘…is no approach to peacemaking between Dinka sometimes take their cattle across the among local communities and NGOs budget for a peace meeting; we are waiting and Rizeigat based on the concept that the border to evade taxation in northern Sudan, that Southern Sudan has witnessed a for funds for peace,’ while simultaneously two had more in common than divided them. to graze cattle without paying taxes. proliferation of peace-building activities, exhibiting nostalgia for times when external Both sides need the water and open trade Queried by the Ministry of Finance on this few NGOs interviewed implemented actors did not ‘interfere’ in local conflicts.271 routes between north and south because, independent taxation policy, he explained programmes specifically targeting conflict as a local peace-building officer state:, that if he was: mitigation and peace-building. ‘Conflict- Such contradictory statements about ‘Khartoum is closer than Kampala.’266 While sensitive’ programming is interpreted by usefulness and uselessness of peace- Taking taxes from cows, Rizeigat can cause residents in Gok Machar were less than most NGOs interviewed as attempting building activities underline the importance problems for people in Gok Machar, not in enthusiastic to facilitate more contact with to distribute their services equally so as of abandoning standardised peace-building Juba. So why bring trouble to Gok Machar to the Rizeigat, on the government level the not to cause tensions. None of the NGOs activities. This realisation is widely shared give money to Juba? I said give us good policy strategy for peace is to use the relationship interviewed, however, had done formal among interviewees, yet implementation is and peace and then [explain these policies at between the groups and neutralise triggers research into the potential effects of their difficult when pressure to disperse funds a] conference about good taxing.268 for violence. The commissioner in Gok interventions on conflict dynamics or into and to be seen to ‘do something’ makes organising a public peace meeting the Machar explained that: While it would be premature to evaluate ways in which to mitigate them. These results resonate with what has been obvious choice. We want to divide Misseriya and Rizeigat. We lasting success of peacemaking between Dinka Malual and Rizeigat, both local officials found in the Rift Valley baseline study of are in dialogue with them and then we will local peace processes in Sudan from divide them. How? We have tactics. Every and residents generally seemed more hopeful than in other areas that solutions 1980-2006.269 The study addresses the Table: Peace meetings as human being has an interest. …the Rizeigat lack of a shared understanding between are poor people, like the people of NBeG. In could be found to prevent future violence. a response to conflict Furthermore, given the lack of standardised donors and intended audiences over what our vision of SPLM, there are marginalized peace-building projects are intending to people in southern Darfur like Southern efficient mechanisms for dealing with The following schematic table presents local level conflicts, these issues become achieve. This confusion remains. The lack findings on the perceived importance of Sudan…they don’t have development in their of clarity within and between organisations area. So we should build our relationship as a matter of personality politics – when a peace meetings for resolving conflict. strong popular leader challenges the status about what ‘peace-building’ entails as marginalized people…because the needs well as the lack of common objectives of Rizeigat are not the needs of Khartoum. quo and implements sound policies real advances, meaningful outcomes for local among organisations supporting peace Out of 319 respondents, They need water and grazing. This need can processes has damaging effects on be used so I say I give you your need and people can be achieved. 184 people report being attacked at governance infrastructure. This ultimately least once (58%) security, so don’t come with gun…we are pulls Southern Sudan in different directions now challenging the mentality of people, this by simultaneously strengthening different is our duty…And we train these to understand authorities to perform identical tasks. the benefits of peace.267 Of those who report being attacked, NGO-sponsored peace-building activities 121 (66%) report being attacked In finding a shared ground – marginalisation could potentially usurp state roles and since the signing of the CPA through Khartoum and need for the same local efforts by exerting donor-driven resources – local peacemaking attempts agendas and controlling disbursement of to shift political alliances by providing a funds according to formulaic and inorganic seemingly more fruitful alliance. The political activities. Contrary to service-delivery NGOs, ambitions of this redefined relationship go whose roles are rather different in bringing even further: by finding common ground tangible benefits, these conditions have with Rizeigat, the SPLM of Gok Machar also the potential to construct a ‘peace’ that is Of those who reported being aims to shift dynamics in the war in Darfur. divorced from the realities and complexities attacked since the CPA, 52 conflicts Some Rizeigat clans have been deeply on the ground.270 were followed by peace meetings involved in the Darfur war, while others refused to fight on the government side, The proliferation of peace activities has citing marginalisation as a reason. According the potential to stifle creative alternatives in to the SPLM, the alliance would strengthen a peace-building. According to a number of front against Khartoum by uniting groups in respondents, programming is undermining Southern Sudan and Darfur. community-based conflict resolution by Only 17 respondents who had creating dependency on external actors to A further incentive to stop violence and attended a peace meeting to create ‘peace’. For example, the Buya in resolve a conflict thought that the underlines official involvement for peaceful Budi County of Eastern Equatoria stated co-existence has been the recent taxation conflict would not come back

74 75 ‘Talk about peace’-building process between local actors, government Chart: What is the best way Peace activities, including peace and facilitating NGOs. It is clear from conferences which focus on mediation, interviews that a key factor facilitating the to get peace? negotiation and dialogue, have gained successful implementation and follow-up wide currency within the vocabulary of of the resolutions would have been access even the most remote villages. For many to resources for longer-term engagement, respondents, ‘peace’, ‘conflict resolution’, resources that are often not available to the Peace talks ‘peace conference’ and ‘peace-building’ NGO itself. Unity/reconciliation are almost interchangeable terms. When Local conflict resolution appears to provide Disarmament agencies are under pressure to act – or Talking indeed to spend money – the quickest and positive results in communities where the Government/leadership most visible way to do so is by organising chief remains a respected authority with a clear mandate and in cases of disputes Independence visible peace meetings or ‘capacity 273 Eastern Equatoria (n=139) building’ workshops. that involve small groups of people. This Security/stop cattle raiding was echoed in the survey response that Eliminate tribalism Upper Nile (n=44) A number of NGO respondents exhibited showed that a majority of people turn to a high level of self-awareness about the the chief to solve family disputes. A group Development/jobs Greater Bahr el Ghazal (n=136) pitfalls of this approach. For example, one of elders in Bisselia were adamant that Democracy employee of an INGO that supported a peace local peace initiatives in their experience Negotiation conference in Western Bahr el-Ghazal said: had worked best when not taken to Tolerance/understanding government level. Giving the example of It felt like we were almost funding conflict. Education a conflict resolution between the Jur and Chiefs The peace-building exercise was like a Ndogo in November 2006, they argued that Accountability/justice precursor to the conflict breaking out. There issues must be solved at the grassroots is too much rush to have a peace-building level and involve respected ‘chiefs’.274 Seperation of tribes exercise without really understanding and Others are not so sure that the elders can God/churches doing appropriate analysis of why the conflict do much if a dispute crosses tribal lines. Elections existed. In the end all the community got out A group of Ndogo women was adamant Don’t know of it were bikes and blankets. It is a bit of a that elders are powerless outside their own fad because everyone else is doing it so we 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 272 tribe and indeed they had seen the Jur – need to be seen doing it as well. their perceived enemy – attacking their Descriptions of peace meetings emphasise chief. Their expectation remains that the No of people (n=319) centrality of dialogue, compromise, government needs to be in charge of solving forgiveness and negotiation – an approach all conflicts because: ‘ ‘Chiefs’ are powerless that creates disjointed peace efforts by as they cannot give strong warnings and The above chart depicts the mechanism did anything. The answer to this question excluding issues of governance, such orders so people will always disobey.’275 respondents named as the best way to was at times similar: ‘talking peace’ was as accountability, justice, restitution, law get peace. There is a wide distribution of the most readily available answer, but it was enforcement and broader national peace responses reflecting a range of opinions on often qualified by saying that problems must processes despite better knowledge the best way to get peace. Despite the wide be resolved for peace, such as access to that these are vital for a comprehensive range, several results are of note. Although water. The differences between the states process. In fact, a number of respondents not forming a large portion, it is interesting regarding the best method to achieve peace felt that peace meetings undermine the to note that respondents were most likely reflect the different types of conflict that are establishment of a strong rule of law, to mention peace meetings as the best way being played out at the local level. In Eastern especially conferences that assumed that to get peace (p=16%). A large number of Equatoria, increased security (p=12%) was people could reconcile without a justice respondents also thought that talking is the a priority for securing peace. In Greater Bahr or reparation component. In contrast, best way to get peace (p= 9%). The results el Ghazal, respondents perceived tribalism programmes that address the structural indicate that people value face-to-face (p= 10%) as a major block to peace. In Upper causes of conflict and include addressing contact as a way to resolve conflict. However, Nile disarmament (p= 18%), unity (p=18%) shortages in resources or infrastructure are this result is also very reminiscient of the and reconciliation were considered important more positively received by communities outcome of the question of protection. When factors in the peace-building process. and are deemed to have long-term asked who do they go to for protection, most meaningful outcomes in conflict mitigation answered ‘police’, qualifying their answer programming. Yet finding resolutions to by saying that the police, however, never local problems is a complex give-and-take

76 77 Questioning the sustainability Ultimately this can worsen relations between Case study: A fragile of a law enforcement institution in the village, of peace meetings groups, a negative outcome that could have bringing into sharp focus the need to look Those who criticised the idea of peace been avoided with adequate planning to ‘peace’ at Lauro at peace-building and law enforcement as meetings or conferences felt that they only either ensure that all parties attended or to complementary activities, emphasised by The conference held in Lauro in July 2009, provided a snapshot of a conflict situation postpone a meeting until it was clear that all local responses: in response to ‘the Lauro massacre’, is and often lacked strategic aims or indeed key actors in the conflict would attend. One continually highlighted as an example of a rarely sought to address structural causes donor representative, after having funded If the soldiers were not here, the peace successful peace conference which is meant of local conflict. The short-term nature of and facilitated the drafting of numerous would not be here. The peace is just to have brought the cessation of hostilities resolutions is noted by numerous observers peace agreements, pointed out that in maintained because of the army. If the army between the Buya, Didinga and Toposa. The and participants in peace conferences, such her experience, local peace agreements is pulled out, and police and wild life come, conference lasted seven days and concluded as the head of the Toposa Development were: ‘…intangible and there are intangible then we might have peace. with the resolution to re-establish the border Association: ‘The peace will be there for six benefits’ and that lack of follow-up was: between the Didinga and Toposa. According If the army isn’t here, we wouldn’t come months to a year. Without anyone monitoring ‘…devastating to the whole project.’ 280 to the Didinga, Toposa from Kapoeta East down from the mountain...If soldiers leave, it, conflict will return.’276 Illustrating the Furthermore, many of the resolutions had encouraged Toposa of Budi County to we will run away. We know definitely the connection of issues outlined in this 287 recognise the border and reach a compromise Toposa will come back and attack report, just months after the January 2009 that communities agree on are related with the Didinga over access to grazing (Didinga community leaders) ceremony handing the village of Wanding to the security situation and need to be land during the dry season. The mediation from the Lou Nuer back to the Jikany Nuer, implemented by government actors. Even so, the army barracks are no guarantee and facilitation was provided by numerous Lou ‘chiefs’ at Akobo said: ‘We are not In EES, the reluctance by some top- of dissuasion; as a number of attacks have peace actors, including members of Pact aware of any peace agreement between the level government officials to implement been carried out on the soldiers, the presence Sudan, officials from GoSS and administrative Lou and Jikany that gives them Wanding. resolutions is believed by some to be a of the army maintaining peace highlights the representatives. The conference culminated in There was a reconciliation conference, but function of high-level involvement in the importance of the government establishing the burial of ammunition as a symbolic act of there was no demarcation of the borders.’277 funding and instigating of cattle-raiding. a monopoly of force in the south. The all members’ commitment to peace. Notably, ‘Our leaders try to knock communities’ implementation of bye-laws, established by Others were even harsher in their criticisms: the task of monitoring implementation was the two communities, codifies this peace as ‘Nobody followed the resolutions of heads together. This raiding does not end, handed to a committee with a wide base because these leaders have cattle in villages enforced by the presence of the army. In effect, the conference. When you finish the in the community: ‘chiefs’, police, the army, the conference was a hat-tip to traditional conference, you go home…Sometimes you and they are willing to give arms to grass commissioner, women and youth. 281 adjudication of conflict and peace-building. take a conference and the same day, you roots to go and retrieve the cattle.’ The positive reporting and official portrayal have conflict again. So you need to find (UNMIS staff) The Lauro conference also highlights the of the Lauro conference give credence to another strategy,’ said the commissioner neglected ‘politics of peace’. In a context where ‘I suspect that this raiding has become peace meetings and the power of dialogue, of Aweil North in NBeG, pointing out that peace meetings are so embedded within the commercial, the cows from far away end up negotiation and compromise between it was often unclear who is responsible for 282 governance discourse it is not surprising that in the market here, how?’ (EES politician) communities pursuing harmonious relations. implementation and follow-up.278 political wrangling occurs. The Speaker of Though there is widespread recognition Although shortly after the conference there the EES Interim Legislative Assembly spoke 284 Speaking about the ‘Bentiu conference for that the outcomes of peace meetings was an incident of Buya raiding Toposa, passionately about having been excluded from Kings, Chiefs and Traditional Leaders’ held in have a history of becoming unsustainable, the incidents of cattle-raiding are described the Lauro Conference. As the highest ranking May 2009 with 1,400 leaders in attendance, agencies were quite open that in most cases as having drastically decreased after the representative of the Didinga community in one chief from Wau pointed out that results they have made few revisions to how the peace meeting. Didinga explain that relations EES, she felt that the meeting was held at short of the conference were still unclear to them conferences are organised. ‘People talk all with their neighbours have vastly improved: notice in her absence. She believes this was a despite the fact that a final communiqué had the time, but there is no implementation,’ ‘Up until now, the Toposa are living strategic action by the Chairman of the Peace 285 been passed. ‘What is the challenge for me is said a local NGO worker, summing up a fairly peacefully; some of them even stay here.’ Commission – a Toposa – to ensure that the the result of the Bentiu conference. Because typical reply.283 PACT programme manager states that since peace meeting was not too demanding on people meet, but they don’t establish the conference, there has been no reported members of his tribe in terms of concessions 286 mechanisms. When you come up with a violence. The achievements of the peace and potential reparations for the attack. The resolution, you create a mechanism. If the conference must however be re-examined Speaker was scathing about the political CPA did not establish many mechanisms, we in light of the fact that raiding tends to be manipulation of this issue and extended cannot achieve peace’.279 seasonal, with fewer raids occurring during her criticism of the Peace Commission to a rainy season and that there is now a strong number of other peace initiatives that failed In certain cases, peace meetings are army presence in the town. Upon closer believed to have resulted in renewed conflict to involve Members of Parliament and the analysis, it is clear that the peace conference Parliamentary Committee on Peace, including as the meetings refresh memories about was largely symbolic and took place during old grudges. Numerous meetings that one the lack of representation of the legislative a period of seasonally low-raiding and after body in Toposa-Turkana conference scheduled or more of the antagonists did not attend ‘peace’ had been enforced by the presence were highlighted during the research. for late 2009 and ultimately postponed.

78 79 A look at local peace agreements the disconnection between resolutions and Alternative approaches programmes to acquaint communities with More than 10 years ago, a journalist wrote: reality is not surprising. Many resolutions How to achieve peace and peaceful each other is organised by the Don Bosco ‘One problem that has bedevilled the peace from peace conferences and meetings co-existence of communities is the community in Tonj. The radio station of the process in the region is lack of follow up. are: ‘…on the shelves’, said an INGO great challenge of Southern Sudan and mission broadcasts in five languages with Whenever peace pacts are concluded, staff member in Kapoeta.289 They lack approaches to peace need to be rethought. simultaneous translation and the community there are no funds to facilitate follow-up practical, implementable, and ‘grounded’ What became clear during this research is facilitiate visits of Jur of Mapel in WBeG to meetings to ensure resolutions agreed on activities to ensure that resolutions are that peace is not a prize in itself; it needs to ‘Dinka country’ Tonj for football games. The are implemented.’288 This points to two met and, importantly, this is believed to be connected with tangible benefits. Hence, Twic Olympics in Warrap State are seen as issues: firstly, a lack of clarity on whether it be particularly acute with resolutions that peace-building activities need to move far a great and continuous attempt to connect is the government that needs to follow-up, involve government intervention or threaten beyond common approaches of talking communities. Such kind of activities also the parties to the agreement or the NGO the activities of elites. about issues in an open forum and need to make programming a lot more manageable that initiated the peace meeting. Secondly, be tightly connected to bringing solutions and hand over positions of responsibility to for an NGO, follow-up might be hard to In the resolutions of a conference held in to the problems that, without fail, each individuals, which in turn creates a sense of realise due to lack of resources and funding Western Bahr el-Ghazal’s Mapel in 2005 a community underlined during the course of opportunity and takes away the burden of procedures that often do not allow for longer plan was laid out to form a joint committee, this research: ‘peace’ holds a meaning far peace-building from the ‘chiefs’. term presence and multi-sectorial funding which would meet annually to monitor and beyond ‘peacefulness’ or simply ‘absence of required for this kind of programming. settle border disputes. It was not specified conflict’ and for most respondents included In addition, coupling each peace-building who would make up the committee, how better infrastructure, better resources, activity with a tangible attempt at solving a Compounding the problem of follow-up is it would be connected to government better opportunities, demarcated borders problem is necessary. If thorough conflict the fact that the resolution ofen does not institutions, whether it would use customary and reliable government structures. It also analysis shows that competition over water make clear what is agreed on and hence, or judicial law and finally, who would fund means tolerance and peaceful co-existence is at the heart of local violence, a peace- what needs to be followed up. Resolutions such an endeavour. More critically, the of different groups through an ongoing building activity has to address this with all tend to be broad-brushed. An example is committee was never mentioned as playing process, rather than an event. its complications, even if it involves tackling Eastern Equatoria’s Kamuto Declaration a role in resolving the border dispute at such politically contentious issues as internal (July 2004), which is very rich in rhetoric. Mapel or Fongu River. Ultimately, the core For peace-building activities, this could border demarcation. If revenge cattle- Resolutions include: ‘Create and strengthen weaknesses of the Mapel Peace Conference mean changing the approach. Rather raiding is at the heart of ongoing violence, all institutions or activities that shall deepen were the lack of an outline of how the than making it a priority to bring together compensation must be worked out. If a local the sentiments of unity and harmony resolutions would be achieved and the lack groups of people, priorities might need peace agreement involves an element of amongst our respective communities.’ of a designated body responsible for the to shift towards tangible improvement of problem solving, such as negotiating access However there is no elaboration on whose follow up. In fact most of the resolutions the living situation and anchoring long- to water points, it needs to be binding and responsibility this is or what institutions or were about infrastructure, much of which term processes on individual community reinforced. Without such a comprehensive activities might promote unity and harmony. depends on GoSS. As one elder at Mapel members who can act as conduits. The approach, however, localised snapshot A similar vagueness was apparent at the commented: ‘There is no peace without concept of peace committees, which has activities are doomed to fail. November 2009 conference in Torit where food and water, road, school and health been used intermittently in Sudan, has resolutions were added in an ad hoc manner service but we are only concentrating on reflected this approach, assigning individual Peace can only be built through improved with a familiar impetus toward containing peace and reconciliation.’290 As GoSS community members the task of peace living situations, so pairing peace with common development jargon such as is unable or unwilling to provide these making. Yet often the approach was not infrastructure programming or enforceable ‘participation’, ‘ownership’ and ‘gender- resources, peace conferences act as a pursued with enough building of capacity local contracts over resources, creates the balance’. Indeed, towards the end of the superficial salve for deep wounds – or, of the individual appointed to the peace credible incentive structure that is needed resolution-writing session one attendee strategically, can only be one component committee. Such individualised attempts to create a peaceful environment. This may brought it to the attention of the room that of a larger approach that absolutely has to at peace could, for example, include mean that high-level political decisions are nowhere in the resolutions had ‘human involve development, justice and security. building individual connections between necessary, both on donor and GoSS level, on rights’ been mentioned. The resolutions Currently, however, with many of the groups through long-term exchange how services can best be delivered quickly were duly revised and a notion about other components not in place, peace programmes between members of different in order to facilitate conditions for peace. adhering to ‘human rights’ slotted into an conferences seem to be counterproductive communities. This will not bring results Waiting with service delivery until security has existing resolution. and taken out of context. quickly but build a sustainable base with arrived takes the wrong starting point. capable individuals who can be drivers of Nowhere in the document is there an long-term local processes. It is important elaboration of how these resolutions to turn individualised peace-building into a might be implemented. Calls by a female different kind of ‘talking about peace’ and participant to explicitly outline who should be include such elements as learning common responsible for follow-up went unanswered. languages to make sure that communities Without elaboration of mechanisms with the are able to talk to each other without a potential to make these ‘wish-lists’ a reality, problem. An example of such local exchange

80 81 ‘Chiefs’ and that, currently, the position of ‘chiefs’ as Proliferation of chiefs of the condominium administration. mediators and enforcers of law and order The term ‘chief’ is less clear in its meaning These structures are now seen by some peace-building is tenuous. For many, the war weakened than it seems. While we use the term for to have legitimacy, especially by those the authority of ‘chiefs’ as too often their ease of reading, it is important to keep in who benefit.301 Many organisations working in peace- communities had to witness how the army mind that it can describe very different building assign tremendous importance to abused or disobeyed the chief without kinds of power in different communities. ‘chiefs’, utilising them as the primary entry fear of retribution.292 A youth in Bisselia One reason for that is that administrative point into the community, pointing out that described how the war weakened the ability divisions also create leadership divisions with working with ‘chiefs’ means having relatively Case study: Monyomiji of a chief to retain his status: ‘Before the a corresponding proliferation of ‘chiefs’.296 transparent and respected partners. At the peace, the chief would collect taxes in the The war confused roles by creating, in some same time, many acknowledge that in reality, The age-set systems of greater Equatoria form of food. During the war, the chief also areas, up to three sets of ‘chiefs’ for the it is not clear whether using the ‘chiefs’ are deemed by some to be a traditional suffered, people shared food with him and same people: ‘chiefs’ who stayed at home for peace-building has been a successful governance mechanism that could help his family…now he is also a beneficiary of in SPLA areas, ‘chiefs’ in IDP camps who bridge the divide between the government strategy. The impulse to rely on ‘chiefs’ 293 NGO programmes.’ represented the same community during 302 as the primary peacemakers in a conflict and the community. Engaging the displacement and ‘chiefs’ who were instated partly stems from the inherited notion that monyomiji is an important endeavour A key area of authority, which was eroded by the Khartoum government to control ‘chiefs’ are the most legitimate leaders in the as these young males, traditionally the during the war years, was the authority of politics.297 In some payams, SPLM and NCP community and can adequately represent community ‘warriors’, are alienated from the community leader to protect. During established parallel chieftainships, which the community’s needs. It also adds to the government and indeed are usually the the war, previously respected ‘chiefs’ were creates tension. Given the already flexible confusion of approaches. individuals carrying out the increasingly often unable to protect their community understandings of their powers in many and had to hand over protection-duty to violent cattle-raiding discussed elsewhere. One issue is, for example, that the push communities, this proliferation of ‘chiefs’ the youth. Today, just over 20 per cent of However, reinvigorating the monyomiji to increase women’s representation in further obscures the distinction of roles and survey respondents said they would turn system and attempting to engage the entire politics clashes with support to reinstate undermines authority. ‘These differences to ‘chiefs’ if they felt unsafe. There was a community through them faces similar customary law held by ‘chiefs’, which often haven’t been resolved. Until that is sorted general acknowledgement that, whatever problems, as does relying on ‘chiefs’ to excludes women. Focusing on ‘chiefs’ out, [the ‘chiefs’] will not have authority and the deficiencies of the police and local be community gatekeepers. Like ‘chiefs’, also overlooks the realities and nuances of they need to be given authority,’ said one government, ‘chiefs’ were unable to monyomiji systems vary in terms of scope governing citizens, rather than administering UNMIS officer, emphasising that it is unsound offer protection. of authority and legitimacy but most subjects. The use of a network of ‘chiefs’, for peace-building strategies to be the remit importantly they are systems based on the which is, with few exceptions, a highly However, ‘chiefs’ still clearly have a role to play of ‘chiefs’, given that there is no systematic exclusion of large sections of communities, patriarchal system, highlights that the focus in their communities. Survey answers show approach to deciding who of the many which further limits their representativeness on empowering women is in most respects that 46 per cent of respondents turn to their ‘chiefs’ will be responsible.‘Often the three and potentially entrenches undesirable mere rhetoric.291 In reality, government and ‘chiefs’ to solve disputes, particularly family ‘chiefs’ are cousins so all are legitimate. But power structures, such as patriarchy. NGOs need a representative or gate-keeper disputes over dowries or neighbourhood just because one is SPLA doesn’t mean that Therefore, while engaging the monyomiji as a point of entry to communities, but the arguments. Youth representatives in Mapel he is the best guy. People somehow will have youth is important, engaging with them as reinvigoration of a potentially outdated and noted that the chief can: ‘unite the people’. to decide who the best is but that will be monyomiji is simultaneously problematic 298 patriarchal system, or indeed in some cases ‘The chief is there with his people’, said one a nightmare to sort out.’ Representation as it revitalises an undemocratic and the creation of ‘tradition’, is not productive youth leader,294 ‘the ‘chiefs’ cooperate with the of community interests is thus a major unrepresentative system. Instead of or progressive. This sentiment was echoed people’, said another.295 community challenge, but also one of the romanticising tradition, government bodies throughout all research sites with numerous great challenges for those looking for an entry and organisations that want to engage with Thus, while the chief still commands authority respondents indicating that ‘chiefs’ point into a community to build peace. the youth who have traditionally comprised should be elected, particularly as ideas of in the area of local dispute resolution, an over- ‘There have been reports of traditional the monyomiji might engage with them as democratic representation are becoming reliance on ‘chiefs’ as peace-builders may payam boundaries being changed,’ part of a broader hybrid structure that is more widely accepted. Undoubtedly, be problematic. In fact, a reverse mechanism explained an international NGO employee, representative of all community members. changing supposed ‘traditional’ structures of establishing and using authority has set ‘confusing the traditional leaders and will meet with resistance from those with in: ‘chiefs’, rather than using their authority ultimately weakening their legitimacy based vested interest in maintaining the status to disseminate a peace-building message, on inheritance’.299 In some areas, ‘chiefs’ quo but it is a necessary development use the peace-building message – which is have been demoted in consultation with the if Southern Sudan’s subjects are to be usually linked to an international agency – to community300 to solve the problem of the engaged meaningfully and democratically legitimise the fragile authority that has been confusing multiplicity of ‘chiefs’. Khartoum’s as citizens. bestowed on them by the government and international actors. policy of establishing civilian authority in In theory, ‘chiefs’ are held in high esteem controlled areas from 1994 onwards clashed and respected; however, interviews with the existing traditional structures – and focus group discussions indicate which were themselves often an introduction

82 83 Tension between chiefs and GoSS subsequently failed to disseminate a strong sense in all research sites that Yet, this also means that the power assigned government structures the document to ‘chiefs’. The lack of follow political leaders use conflict as a means to ‘chiefs’ creates a space for capable While it is believed that ‘chiefs’ also have up and of respect for the ‘chiefs’ efforts of rallying their constituency behind them, individuals to maintain order. In some a judiciary role to play, it is unclear what undermined them in their respective often conflating political identities with ethnic research areas where government-provided role that might be, and where powers of communities. This issue was for many ones. Nonetheless political leaders are rarely order was absent, it was acknowledged that ‘chiefs’ and the judiciary intersect. There is representative of the government’s true invited to local peace talks. For example, in the local conflict resolution done by the chief consensus that customary law is important position on ‘chiefs’. One chief from Wau Upper Nile, one expat respondent explained was one of few stabilizing factors for the and needs to be refined or improved, but described his emasculating lack of power: ‘If how: ‘Local peace conferences have been community, as for example, pointed out by how exactly that should be done is less someone comes to me, I am like a lady, I have somewhat helpful, but the problem is that an SSRRC official in Wau: ‘ ‘Chiefs’ used to clear.303 It is also important to note, however, no power. When a man comes with power, I these issues are political. If you just involve call all the parties to come and sit together that in some areas the legal structures in am weak.’305 A sense of disillusionment and ‘chiefs’ and not the politicians, you will have to resolve the problem that arises. They are which the ‘chiefs’ operate are not ‘traditions’ helplessness was palpable among many of limited results.’308 still doing it.’310 that have emerged organically over long the ‘chiefs’ interviewed. For example, when a periods of time but instead are rather group of ‘chiefs’ in Wau were asked what they The parallel structures of local leadership new and perhaps a remnant of war-time can do about the problems they are facing, – chiefs and government administrators leadership; in many places customary law they responded: ‘This is your work; you came – pull in two different directions. There was hardly practised in non-war times. The to let us know what the ‘chiefs’ can do... You exist, however, models for hybrid systems lack of clarity over the remit of ‘chiefs’ and the researcher, you talk to the government,’ that combine using local structures and the judiciary was often cited as an issue adding that there was ‘nothing at all’ that the government structures. An obvious place by respondents, particularly because it ‘chiefs’ could do to bring about peace.306 to look for inspiration for this approach is was felt that this lack of structure creates Such ambiguity is also problematic with in neighbouring countries. The Ugandan ambiguity, resulting in violence and mob regard to the political hierarchy of Southern local councils, for example, have been justice when communities take justice into Sudan, as both ‘chiefs’ and local politicians very effective and the Ugandan model was their own hands. A youth leader working on compete for the same political space. Many already used as inspiration for Southern peace-building in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal respondents acknowledged that the unclear Sudan following the SPLM civil society explained how: dual structure creates additional conflict as conference in the mid 90’s, but never ‘chiefs’ try to maintain their grip on power implemented. Initially called ‘resistance Before the war [‘chiefs’] could make by undermining local political positions or councils’, these were introduced throughout decisions at the level of the judge. Now vice-versa. This collision of two loosely Uganda in 1986. Each village elected its people focus on modern judicial system defined governance structures threatens own council, which had to include women and [‘chiefs’] get no salary. If they fine both political and chief cohorts as well as representatives. The village councils people before, they get a percentage of the credible decentralisation. For example, boma would then elect from among themselves fine as incentive, their families depend on and payam administrators, installed by GoSS representatives to articulate their views at them. But they lose socially and financially, since the CPA, decrease the responsibilities county level. Subsequently, the councils with dialogue between the government and authority of the ‘chiefs’ who expressed were incorporated into the Ugandan civil and judiciary [about] what cases should during this research that they saw themselves Aside from the focus on ‘chiefs’ detracting service, but initially they were a parallel be handled by ‘chiefs’. Citizens now lose as the last link in a centralised government from the involvement of key government arrangement, and to some extent monitored confidence in ‘chiefs’, although through chain needed to implement policies and actors, the fetishisation of ‘chiefs’ has and regulated local government officials – dialogue the judiciary system and ‘chiefs’ directives specifically on community security, another more insidious side-effects with including ‘sub-chiefs’. Perhaps a system of can decide which cases or serious offences as a chief from Wau explained: numerous respondents indicating that local councils, with women’s representatives, should be judged by a judge. Domestic certain ‘chiefs’ can foment tensions to could be created in Southern Sudan. Their cases can be judged by chief, maybe small The president should bring the order to the advance their own interests. Even a simple chairmen and chairwomen could then sit criminal cases like beating, but this needs to governor and give security to the governor refusal to get involved can retard conflict with ‘chiefs’ as equals. This would certainly be identified through dialogue.304 and also head of JIU and everyone. resolution. This was reported by a group of be a more representative and participatory No governor should work without the youth in Raja County who felt that they had way of accessing a community’s views Several government-facilitated initiatives president’s order, from his own law. Let no way to solve problems of intermarriage than the current system of engagement have sought to establish ‘chiefs’ as the word come from Salva. This case [of between tribes because: ‘Their ‘chiefs’ through ‘chiefs’. guardians of customary law and mediators community violence] needs to be brought to also refuse to cooperate with our ‘chiefs’ of peace. One such initiative was the the president so he can give us [the ‘chiefs’] in marriage related issues.’309 Numerous conference for all the traditional leaders order. We ‘chiefs’ see what is going wrong in respondents felt that ‘chiefs’ were a problem of Southern Sudan held in Bentiu in May our community.307 as opposed to a solution and it is clear 2009. The ‘chiefs’ collaborated extensively that with ill-defined roles, whether a ‘chief’ to produce a document detailing customary This ambiguity of remits has implications is a positive or negative force within the laws for which they should be responsible. for attempts to establish peace. There was community is largely based on personality.

84 85 Case study: Hybrid male-dominated ‘chieftainships’, further Political Voice Civil society’s political voice is weakened institutionalises women’s marginalised at the exact moment it should be structures and the position. While there are references to a So far, Southern Sudan is failing to elevate strengthened. The connection between this Local Government Act 25 per cent quota for women, the lowest most of its subjects to the status of lack of political voice and increasing violence level of traditional leader is described as citizens.312 The majority of the people are was an obvious one for some interviewees, The precise role of ‘chiefs’ needs scrutiny the ‘headman’ upon whom the other levels at best ‘vote casters’ without valid political as, for example, explained by the Sudanese to find ways of supporting positive aspects are built. This is an intrinsically male system voice or meaningful representation. The leader of a local NGO in Wau: ‘The nature of their role without overburdening them, into which females will most likely be slotted widespread criticism voiced against the of conflict is now becoming worse. Before, exaggerating gendered hierarchies, to meet the quota. An inherently male- conduct of the elections has made this point culturally, when people fight among the or promoting the polarisation of ethnic dominated system accommodating women very clear. communities, the elderly people, the women, identities. There is, in essence, a need for image reasons does little to empower The state’s failure to engage the population the children were not to be killed. The for a hybrid structure. In theory, the Local these women and those they represent. In was perceived by a number of respondents houses were not to be burnt,’ he explained. Government Act (2009) outlines how this regard, it might have been beneficial to be in stark contrast to NGO activities ‘But now they are even killing elders and this hybrid structure can be created by to refer to ‘community representatives’ (or and, when talking about taking on a role as burning houses. That is the result of one incorporating a Customary Law Council into likewise) in a bid to move away from the a citizen – which includes making informed community feeling that they have nobody Local Government. Leaving aside challenges language of ‘chiefs’ and ‘chieftainships’. political choices, using political structures representing them in government. Because of implementation, there are a number of to voice grievances and having access to a of the bitterness they have in their heart, issues that undermine the value of the Act. The Act does little to address the mainly young people, they do this.’315 weaknesses of relying on traditional reliable voting system – many respondents On paper, it seems that traditional or authorities to govern certain aspects of life made it clear that NGOs were more helpful The almost ubiquitous failure of customary authority will continue to operate and resolve conflicts. The fact that members than the government because, as a group of representation was highlighted with regard as a parallel system to ‘modern’ governance of the Customary Law Council are not able women in Mapel explained: ‘They have been to local conflict resolution and reinforces the mechanisms. The Act states that traditional to hold positions on either of the other involved in capacity building’ and have thus idea that the south is essentially creating authorities will administer customary law, councils precluded ‘traditional’ leaders taught people the tools of citizenship.313 This its own enemies within. Respondents yet it is still unclear what does and does from engaging in legislative and executive exposes the striking dissonance between in all research sites expressed concern not fall under the category of ‘customary affairs.311 This highlights the ambiguity of the the role of the state and the role of NGOs: that they were not clear who represents law’. Ultimately this is not a truly ‘hybrid’ Act. In fact, it becomes difficult to assert that the current situation is one in which the state them, so problems and grievances remain system, but rather a new way of organizing the Act is a genuine and meaningful attempt is seen as a hindrance to citizenship, with unaddressed. This lack of faith in the and conceptualizing existing governance to engage with traditional authorities in a NGOs seen by some to be facilitating this political system was re-emphasised by a mechanisms. The Act, which could have ‘hybrid’ governance system. process. Being a citizen with rights vis-à-vis group of ‘chiefs’ and elders in the same been used as an opportunity to break with the state is inextricably linked in people’s state who pointed out that in the current the patriarchal status quo with regard to minds with ‘peace’, thus the government’s system whole groups of people have no reluctance to grant the population the status meaningful political representation.316 The of citizen and the concomitant rights, means majority of respondents felt they were that some respondents saw the state as an entitled to contribute to state-building impediment to a lasting peace. beyond being a passive recipient of For some, the promise of peace had government programmes, based on their involved the promise of being elevated from own contribution during the war. Women the ‘poor’ to the level of citizen. However, often point out that without their support, the the current situation is closer to a ‘military soldiers would not have been able to fight. peace’ determined by military personnel and One man recalled his times as a student behaviour. Many members of civil society in Khartoum, when he was one of the first uphold a belief that: ‘The war was a war for people to raise the SPLA flag in the capital. participation in government’ as described His experience is indicative of what those by a Fertit elder. Yet the multi-layered power who see themselves as part of the non- structures make it much harder for citizens to military educated elite experience: feel represented as both official and unofficial When we came back, we were not power is concentrated in the hands of few. accommodated in this new government. One international NGO employee summed So now you are dividing people into up a general sense that it is misleading to talk classes – the people who were military are about civil society and grassroots: ‘…as if supported and the people who contributed their views actually matter.’314 in other ways are sidelined. But you need to give also other people positions; you

86 87 have a generation who understands the resigned themselves to being subjects, or Chart: When did you listen to the radio north better. But the SPLM decided to only has contributed to an escalation of violence give political positions to the military. This as people take law, order and violence into for information? means you are creating your enemy within their own hands. Some point out that this is yourself.317 a temporary state until the government has 50 the capacity to assume its duties, for others Five years of limited peace and development, such a state seems wishful thinking. 45 coupled with a controversial election has 40 for many respondents voided the idea of Access to news media ‘government’. During the elections, widely The geography of the south contributes to 35 reported intimidation through government a deepening chasm between government 30 security agents emphasised the current and citizens. Rural isolation and a weak 25 skewed interpretation of what ‘political voice’ infrastructure often make it impossible for means. Vast amounts of voters experienced citizens to gain access to their leaders or Percetile 20 the first expression of their political voice vice versa. The government is physically 15 as a confusing, often coercive process. disconnected from many of its citizens.318 Those running for political office reported When asked about accessing information, a 10 on campaigns of intimidation and abuse, large number of those interviewed stated that 5 rather than political discussion. The amount they relied on the radio. An important rising of complaints by independent or opposition trend in the use of radio is reflected in the 0 party candidates underscores this and in graph on the next page.319 In the over 40 and some of the areas researched for this report, under 25 age groups, the numbers of people Never 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 the elections and the immediate aftermath listening to radio increased year on year were extremely volatile, with position-holders following the signing of the CPA. In the 25 to 40 and above (n=56) threatening opponents with violence if their 39 age group, there is a substantial increase During Addis Abada Between 25 and 39 (n=91) seat becomes contested. in radio listenership during 2005, the year This real-life manifestation of the concept of the CPA was signed. Given the absence of Agreement 1972 – 1982 24 and under (n=30) ‘political voice’ has created a limbo situation newspapers, and what are thought to be very Early war years 1983 – 1988 in which people have lost trust in the ability low levels of literacy in some areas, the radio Protracted war years 1989 – 2004 of their government – and with that in what is the most effective means of communicating Southern Sudan might become – while with the population of Southern Sudan. It is continuing to keep up the hope that change from the radio that people will hear about will come. Hope, however, has turned into matters such as immunisation campaigns either a paralysing factor, as people have and political events. Chart: Which radio stations do you listen to?

Miraya FM 18% BBC World Service 23% Omdurman 4% Sudan Radio Service 5% FM Radio Stations 6% 20% Torit FM 11% 13% Juba Stations Other Stations

88 89 In terms of reported radio access, the data propaganda. Experience has shown the quantify and show results, because baseline of these further funds by the EC and the are promising. In some locations, there dangers of radio being used for propaganda, data needed for monitoring does not exist unforeseeable future affecting other donors’ is quite a wide choice of stations. The and a free press may not be acceptable to a and carrying out necessary surveys is too aid strategies has therefore resulted in following pie chart depicts a breakdown of ruling party.320 However, concerns about news expensive and too difficult.323 During the a decline in funds promised to Sudan the stations interviewees reported listening media should not focus on press freedoms course of this research, it is evident that until the referendum and beyond, which to. Choice of programme relates in part alone. Southern Sudan is politically fragile and respondents display a certain assessment makes planning difficult. This uncertainty is to another factor that limits access to the drive towards ethnic polarities is troubling. fatigue: the sentiment that NGOs only ever exacerbated by the physical disconnection broadcasted news media. Many of those Unrestrained radio development, particularly in come to ask questions which do not lead to with donors, who are mainly based in who spent the war in Southern Sudan do local languages, may be having destabilising improvement was expressed in almost every Khartoum or visit only Juba when travelling not speak either English or Arabic. They may effects. What is actually said on air will need interview. Indeed, difficulties in obtaining to the south. therefore listen to the radio for music and, to be monitored closely, and restrictions on data and need for visible results are two where available, programmes in their own certain kinds of inflammatory statements are reasons for the prioritisation of visible peace Furthermore, several complaints about mother-tongue, such as Dinka. essential. At present, no such monitoring is conferences over long-term engagement current funding conditions were expressed attempted and it is unclear who should do it. that might take years to produce tangible by NGOs because they exacerbate levels It is likely that radio use will continue to rise results. These can be conducted at the of uncertainty and undermine long-term programming: ‘It’s really discordant,’ said in the coming years and be a key resource The effectiveness expense of joint planning and prioritisation in mobilising the population to participate of interventions, along with a more thorough an international NGO representative. ‘When of agencies: funding, a bunch of instruments all play out of tune, in political decisions. At present, access to analysis of a situation, including an analysis 328 key information via this medium is good for of risks and threats that come with short- that’s what it’s like.’ The short-term coordinating and nature of most funding is a source of great some people in some areas, but is far from targeting term approaches. universal. It is important to note that more frustration for NGOs. Many respondents Funding in an unforeseeable future stated that longer-term funding would lend than 25 per cent in all age groups stated that The effectiveness of agencies – both they never listened to radio. This is something High levels of funding uncertainty make it itself to more conflict-sensitive programming UN and NGOs – in Southern Sudan is extremely difficult to undertake long-term because staff spend prolonged time in the that came up in focus group discussions, subject to divisive debate. In regards to UN especially with women. To sit and listen to planning, as outlined in the GoSS aid strategy: field, make better assessments and commit agencies, this debate is primarily focussed the time needed to do extremely time- the radio is a sign of status in itself. Women on effectiveness as well as the strength On current estimates, donor funding is would sometimes laugh when asked why consuming conflict mitigation work which of the mandate. NGOs have come under projected to decline by 62 per cent between will only show results after considerable they did not do so, even when there was a scrutiny for seemingly limited engagement 2008 and 2011. This sharp decline in radio in the compound. They explained that engagement. One INGO operations with evidence-driven programming while estimated funding up to 2011 reflects the manager pointed out that: they were too busy to listen or that they could showing limited progress. The debate continuing short-term nature of many donor not sit where men were sitting. Most stated is made even more complex by lack of commitments to Southern Sudan.324 INGOs are struggling to do this job [of that information came from their men-folk, the structured information that in addition is service delivery] by patching together chief or public meetings. Agencies are drawing on future scenario many small and large grants… and are often complex and contradictory, reflecting 325 mapping done by organisations like USIP handicapped by the short-term nature of Not surprisingly, the issues facing women the contradictory realities. A donor but ultimately – with ambiguity about the in accessing news via radio are similar with representative stated that: these and the fact we are constantly looking outcome of the referendum – planning is for the next grant…until donors really decide regard to television. Southern Sudan television The cost benefit analysis for projects is based on hypothetical predictions. Many news media is of a good standard, but sets are to invest genuine large amount of money very low. Even taking into consideration key players in development aid cannot in Sudan long-term then these essential usually located in bars or places where men how expensive goods and services are in be factored into planning without making socialise, and are mainly used to show football services and the corresponding peace the country, money isn’t being spent well. assumptions about the future. For example, dividends will be scanty.329 or music videos. However, several examples of With all the funds being spent the human a southern secession would alter the television being used for news were observed development index remains very low; mode of engagement of the European In response to questioning on why funding in the research sites. In Fangak, Upper NGOs still tout their achievements but are Commission and the World Bank, which cycles are so short, NGOs thought that donors Nile, news programmes were shown in the unable to show these results as there is little would vastly modify the ‘aid landscape’ of did not want to invest large amounts over a evening on a television at the commissioner’s monitoring and evaluation.321 Southern Sudan’s development trajectory. long-term because the situation was volatile residence. It was, however, behind a fence, The European Commission is unable to and in addition donors wanted the flexibility and could only be watched by invited people – Donors are equally responsible for the low contribute further to Sudan as a whole, to change their position. In agreement with almost all of whom were senior men from the levels or wrong kinds of monitoring and through its main bilateral funding instrument, Wakabi, a main problem is the lack of, and neighbourhood. They would then impart the evaluation (M&E). Before 2007, standard as Sudan had not ratified the Revised unpredictable nature of, funding.330 information to others. M&E procedures were not required and Cotonou Agreement by the legal deadline of credible M&E is currently impaired by short- 326 Key issues that need to be considered in 30 June 2009. This means the European term funding for processes that do need Commission will not disburse the pledged relation to the development of media in long-term approaches.322 On the other hand, Southern Sudan include censorship and 300 million which was promised to Sudan some NGOs say it is simply too difficult to between 2008 and 2013.327 The suspension

90 91 Case study: the Multi directly and the majority of national NGOs Ensuring accountability one another while not overlooking vulnerable have little hope of doing so.335 The disappearance of millions of Sudanese populations, NGOs feel that with ever- Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) pounds of donor funding, which came increasing programming, demand on the When the MDTF failed to deliver, many to light in 2008, placed the issue of SSRRC is simply unmanageable. As a result, One example of how agency work has NGOs were forced to continue to use accountability at centre stage.339 This was coordination and communication is frustrating been hindered by mechanisms established short-term humanitarian funding, which is ill- addressed in the Juba Compact (June 2009) for the SSRRC, NGOs and GoSS. The in the donor community is the MDTF. The suited to support service delivery and other whereby GoSS made a verbal commitment notable lack of coordination between actors MDTF is the largest of the pooled funding 336 multi-year recovery activities. To these to tackle corruption GoSS committed to planning and implementing projects might mechanisms in Southern Sudan.331 MDTF criticisms the World Bank has commented appointing an auditor general and to carry be typical for the aid industry, yet in a fragile was set up to provide longer-term funds to that: ‘The design of the Trust Fund does not out investigations of any allegations. There environment operating under a certain time facilitate effective donor co-ordination and take sufficient account of poor counterpart was a sense among donors that for now pressure, this can be even more damaging.343 harmonisation in providing support to the implementation in a fragile environment like they must give GoSS the benefit of the doubt GoSS to develop and implement recovery that of Southern Sudan but in defence of but it remains to be seen if any changes will At the local government level, lack programmes aimed at rebuilding and the Bank, the main implementer, GoSS, can take place. Regardless of all the concerns of cooperation in planning and NGO consolidating peace and development in do more to keep funds moving. In addition, there is a feeling that some progress is advocacy were also identified as a problem. Southern Sudan.332 The World Bank is the due to the decrease in matched funding being made, as explained by a donor Water projects, for example, tend to managing agent of the Multi-Donor Trust contributed from GoSS due to decreased oil representative: ‘The glass is absolutely half be donor driven rather than based on Fund (MDTF) while UN, government and revenues, less donor funds were also spent full, rather than half empty. Southern Sudan needs assessments. This has dotted the non-governmental actors implement MDTF- which resulted in an overall decrease in has come a long way’340 countryside with ‘monuments’. ‘No one funded projects.333 MDTF expenditure.’337 knows how many bore holes there are, Another major concern of NGOs was the whether they are working,’ explained one The UK Associate Parliamentary Group for Importantly, there has been a concerted ever-increasing donor bureaucracy. While it international NGO worker. ‘There is no Sudan reported that by the end of 2009: effort from the World Bank to take was understood that process is important inventory; no knowledge of what each other ‘Only $181m of the $524m had been spent… these criticisms on board and improve for accountability, burdensome red-tape is doing and lots of chaos.’344 With water More than four years into the fund’s six-year its performance. However, the general is impeding the delivery of services. The being most commonly mentioned as a lifespan, $343m has yet to be used. Last year consensus among contributing donor and tendering to distribution process for the reason for conflict, the implications of this donors diverted $181m that would have gone NGO respondents continues to be ‘too present drug-allocation through the MDTF are far-reaching. into the MDTF to three other funds under little, too late’. How MDTF will improve its took two years.341 A staff member from a their control.’334 At the current trajectory of operations and disperse much-needed medical INGO said that to ensure that the Both the international community and spending, all the funds pledged to the MDTF funds is to be seen. If the situation supply of drugs are uninterrupted past GoSS recognize that more can be done to are unlikely to be used before the planned arises where Southern Sudan became the referendum, it is vitally important that streamline development efforts. There will referendum, which has repercussions for independent, there is a question mark over decisions are made immediately on who, be an increased effort to approve donor NGO planning. This failure to disperse funds whether GoSS should allow the World Bank how and where drugs will be procured projects through the GoSS Interministerial is believed to be partly a result of the MDTF to establish a large fund, e.g. the Afghanistan and who is managing and paying for Appraisal Committee to ensure that all parties not having any senior staff based in Juba. model post-succession, as donors, NGOs, the next distributions. At the moment, are more informed and involved in proposed Staff had little experience of post-conflict and GoSS are all disillusioned with how it indecision – as donors wait to see what projects. These projects will also be compiled countries, which meant that projects were 338 managed the MDTF. the future aid architecture will look like in in the compilation of a yearly ‘Donor Book’ simply not approved quickly enough. light of the referendum result – coupled managed by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning with the help of donors In addition, procurement and compliance with technocratic donors’ overemphasis and NGOs to enable better reporting on donor obligations are deemed to be too stringent on getting the funding process and projects in operation.345 Donors and NGO with little support to GoSS to meet these mechanisms right – could disrupt the representatives are also involved in Budget obligations. Donors are beginning to realise supply.342 This bureaucracy, aimed at Sector Working Groups and Quarterly Donor that putting a majority of their funds in one safeguarding against fraud, only adds to Forums to ensure that all are involved in GoSS’ mechanism is not optimal and therefore in the perception that widespread corruption planning and prioritisation. The Southern some cases are not providing their planned in the region cannot be fought with Sudanese NGO Forum346 aims to represent funds to the MDTF from 2010. On the paperwork alone. over 200 indigenous and international NGOs other hand, NGOs have found that MDTF to increase information flows and coordinate procedures were designed to accommodate Coordination challenges efforts among the NGO community while private sector contractors. As such, they Theoretically, NGO activity is coordinated by prioritising improved engagement with GoSS. are not compatible with NGO mandates the SSRRC. From the NGO’s point of view, However, with the realisation that local violence and ways of working, posing a barrier to this can add to the already great challenges is caused by an intricate combination of accessing timely funds for basic service in implementing programmes. Rather than processes, targeting programming that will delivery. As a result, few international NGOs ensuring that activities are pursuing an directly mitigate local conflict is extremely have succeeded in accessing MDTF funding overarching objective and complementing

92 93 challenging for all actors involved as they the war, often fought in the SPLA, or have a actors need to be realistic and conscious of director of an INGO, that UNDP’s state- decide on appropriate entry points. very close affiliation with the SPLA. In many how the external and internal political, social, building efforts – even after five years of the cases, education – both in English or Arabic economic, and historical strains can pull and CPA – have been: ‘…mainly providing assets The politics of the – was sacrificed for fighting. In general, this push CBOs’ or SNGOs’ growth process.352 and capital rather than building skills.’354 makes government staff more likely to be They find that it is of paramount importance Few donors believe that the state has been development sector Dinka or Nuer. that the international community does not adequately built. simply take the easy route and broadly brush Local partnerships and appropriate NGOs tend to employ Sudanese with good off CBOs and SNGOs as being marred by The main criticism levelled at NGOs by GoSS, entry points English and a solid education and these political tensions. donors, and the UN is that some NGOs are The choice of partners for development are more likely to be Equatorians because not doing enough to build capacity of either projects is wrought with political tension more Equatorians than Dinka or Nuer went In both instances political tensions are government staff or local organisations. that often passes unnoticed. Tensions to school in Kenya or Uganda. The division not understood in-depth and groups are This is reflected in the funding approach between groups over access to resources is well known and was outlined by a donor generalised under the same terms. INGOs of donors where some NGOs are being are described by the administration in representative: ‘[Dinka] government staff and GoSS often reduce the risks of working actively pushed to integrate capacity building Magwi in Eastern Equatoria, for example, and communities call [those who did not with SNGOs by carrying out capacity components into their programming. On the as being exacerbated by pre-planned stay in Sudan during the war] ‘kawajas’, they assessments of local organisations or by other hand, NGOs feel that the short-term NGO interventions that do not consult local are said to be foreigners not having stayed assessing the local context However, the nature of their project funding, usually 12 governments, are not sensitive to local during the war and therefore are not part of political will and funds needed for these time- to 18 months, is not conducive to credible issues or engage with ‘chiefs’ that act as Southern Sudan. For some Equatorians this consuming activities are often lacking. capacity building. In reality it leads to local gatekeepers, rather than entry points. makes it difficult to work.’348 partnerships that fulfil the capacity building The pitfalls of capacity building component on paper only. NGOs feel that A similar misunderstanding might be at play Politics of uneasy partnerships The activities of NGOs within a post-conflict there is a trade-off between provision of with regard to the position of the payam Although there is a clear recognition of the situation inevitably involve capacity building. quality services and building capacity of administrator. In NGO head offices, often Sudanese Non-governmental Organisations’ It is widely believed that capacity building GoSS and local organisations and that donors the importance of the payam administrators (SNGOs) role in development, tension is necessary and interviewees had strong are undecided how much trade-off they was stressed, which in reality underlines a in the partnership between SNGOs and opinions of which institutions should be will accept, as outlined by an INGO country common disconnection between agency INGOs exists. One can argue that the responsible for this. However, they did not director: ‘If they want us to build capacity then policy and the realities of implementation. international community and GoSS make always agree and many feel that not enough they need to be prepared for us to deliver Locally, payam administrators seemed to assumptions about the political motivations progress has been made, as was stressed less and deliver it more slowly.’355 Whether play no significant part in the community’s and capabilities of local development actors. in a recent report: ‘There is still no strategy that is acceptable is entirely dependent perception of agencies. Paradoxically, An international employee of an INGO for increasing involvement and no common on how donors ultimately define their own despite such emphasis on the payam discussed how they often avoid working understanding of the role NGOs can and strategies. Some NGOs are reluctant to work administrator and ‘chiefs’ as agents of with local organisations because: ‘SNGOs should play in the recovery and development with government institutions, particularly on change, NGO respondents also named have often been misappropriating money of Southern Sudan.’353 lower level, as they are perceived to be an ‘chiefs’ and payam/boma administrators as for their own gains.’349 This was repeated impediment to programming. High turnover of the biggest impediment to change, based in a UN Habitat assessment: ‘SNGOs face Many interviewees from international NGOs staff in state and local government results in on a lack of capacity, pursuit of personal considerable credibility challenges, one of believed that the responsibility of building the weak institutional memory, thus necessitating agendas and bias, as explained for example which is the perception held by INGOs that capacity of GoSS at national and state level continued and costly ‘capacity building’ with by an international field coordinator in NBeG: SNGOs have politically motivated links that should largely lie with the UN. In congruence few tangible programming results, as an INGO ‘ “Chiefs” only want things to be done their may compromise their operating principles of with this perception, UNDP viewed their role staff member explains: ‘Government have way and if it’s done another way they will neutrality and partiality.’350 The combination as building state institutional capacity to a high staff turnover so when you build their complain that their authority is eroding or of mistrust of SNGOs with their perceived prepare the field for NGOs to deliver services capacity they leave or immediately become 347 being challenged.’ lack of organisational capacity means that and monitor programmes. Other NGOs managers leaving no lower and middle rung felt that although NGOs might not have the The politics of hiring donors often fund INGOs directly, or in the administrators.’356 However, the risk that the attempt to ‘build local civil society’s capacity’ resources, they have the responsibility to newly capacity-built government staff will The tension within the government/NGO build the capacity of county level government relationship is further exacerbated by while limiting potential ‘risks’, provide SNGOs take on better paid positions in an INGO is an with funding through INGOs. As a result, staff simply because the UN does not inherent problem in a country where skilled the composition of personnel. Broadly operate at that level. speaking, the parallel structures of NGO and many SNGOs feel that they are unequal workers are desperately needed. government are divided along educational, partners in the development of their own While there is a sense amongst NGO and ethnic and geographical lines with each side country. Moore (2009) discusses how donor-respondents that with international having had a very different experience of the SNGOs are eager for INGOs to engage with state-building support GoSS has advanced war and a different sense of entitlement of them as equal partners albeit in the form impressively within four years, the progress the peace. Government officials tend to be of capacity building.351 Hilhorst and van is still too slow. There has been criticism individuals who remained in the south during Leeuwen (2005) argue that international from NGOs, expressed here by the country

94 95 CONCLUSION APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY AND INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH SITES

At first sight, increased local violence in This report has shown that a wide range of Research Challenges we then go beyond and use force, and still Southern Sudan might appear to be a factors have an impact on local conflicts and it is not stopping...your recommendations problem caused by centrally managed can turn them violent. This realisation is vital This report outlines the weaknesses of will have to be magic...and who then will manipulation by Khartoum, or that local in the coming months as Southern Sudan engaging communities through certain implement these magic ‘recommendations’? clashes are based on entrenched ‘tribal’ moves towards the moment of referendum. structures but often these were the same One of the major difficulties faced by hatred and are thus impossible to avoid. A clear realisation and expression of the structures used by the researchers to the research teams was trying to speak However, a closer look and in-depth intricacy of issues and the need to address access communities, highlighting both the to people about often unfamiliar and interviews with a vast range of actors and even seemingly less urgent matters, such as lack of alternatives and the self-perpetuating intangible concepts such as elections civilians, reveals a different, yet no less local borders, needs to be pursued instead of nature of such structures. While criticising and referendum during a period of what is challenging reality. Local violence is in many a misplaced emphasis on the referendum as NGOs for working through ‘chiefs’, this being described locally as famine. Many ways intricately connected to broader issues ‘decision day’ after which all other points can research is also guilty of accessing respondents became frustrated with the line that are being played out at the local, state, be addressed. Expectations for improvement community members through ‘chiefs’. All of questioning when it became apparent GoSS or indeed the donor level. of local conflicts immediately after the attempts were made to reduce bias in that the research was not focusing on their referendum and the change it will bring run the questionnaires, however the sample The ambition to build institutions of a state primary concern – hunger. high. They are bound to be disappointed. is not representative and all results are – as put forward by GoSS and donors – presented with the caveat that rather than and the acknowledgement of time needed There is still time to avoid such As with much primary research of this representing the outcome of a statistically to embed these institutions, is in stark disappointment, but action is required. nature it was not possible to establish robust quantitative study, they are instead contrast with the immediate need to put There is an urgent need for clarification the veracity of many of the statements an additional method used to support the strong measures into place that control local of development and government goals. herein or to establish how well-founded qualitative findings of this research. That violence. More importantly, perhaps, is a That will require a more robust and better the opinions of respondents were, but to a said, the researchers are satisfied with the stark contrast that exists between the theory informed engagement with local realities, certain extent that is not relevant as what veracity of these results and feel they are of some of the development programming including a rethink of current peace-building is most important is that these statements a fair representation of common views, as and the reality. Decentralisation is a initiatives. An honest stock-taking and and opinions reflect local perceptions much as they exist, in the research sites. poignant example: while acknowledged assessment of capacity is needed – by of situations. For these people, these perceptions are reality and much hearsay is to be the only viable path to accountable the GoSS, by donors and by implementing Working through translators presents repeated as fact, particularly in the absence and representative government, it currently agencies. Crucially, there is a requirement to challenges in terms of obtaining verbatim of formal channels of communication. supports division along ethnic lines because plan beyond the referendum. The moment to translations and not translators’ interpretations. Word of mouth is one of the most powerful access to resources is limited and various do that is now. This can be particularly challenging in areas forms of communication, however under unaccountable power structures are where translators are known to respondents circumstances where formal channels of being entrenched. and try to ‘help’ them. A certain amount communication are weak or non-existent a of reluctance was encountered among nefarious form of word of mouth – rumour government officials about the research. -can supplant fact with concomitant To some extent this was to be expected, negative outcomes, thus unsubstantiated given that elections were due to be held and information should not be neglected. elected officials did not want conflicts – ipso facto, governance failures -highlighted in Often respondents referred to ‘other areas’ their constituencies. In addition, one official as being most marginalised, neglected or, alluded to the hubris of a research team for example, not counted in the census. spending just four weeks in the State, being While all three teams travelled extensively able to understand conflict dynamics and throughout their research sites, the research make recommendations to ameliorate existing teams faced the same problems as other conflicts or prevent future ones: actors – NGOs, government, etc – in reaching the most marginal communities. We have tried our best, we use peace agreements, the hostility does not stop, we use voluntary disarmament, it doesn’t stop, Women participating in a ranking excercise

96 97 Fieldwork methodology School drawing exercises Results from the ranking exercises are What would you like the government In all three sites, the research teams ran displayed as graphs with text-based tables to look like? Research was conducted over the course drawing competitions, visiting 18 schools in for more detailed illustration of the answers. Were you counted in the census? of seven weeks in October and November total. Children were asked to draw a picture 2009. During the first two weeks the team representing life before and after the CPA, University seminars Will there be another war with the north? worked in Juba conducting preliminary key before and after the referendum, or of their At the University of Western Bahr el-Ghazal, informant interviews. During two workshops, immediate surroundings. the researchers conducted a workshop Will there be wars within the south? one before and one after the field work, with undergraduate students of different Do you have enemies? the research team presented preliminary Ranking disciplines on border issues. Students and research findings to members of the NGO In various group settings, the research faculty at Upper Nile University discussed When were you attacked? community and government staff. teams carried out ranking exercises. These issues of peace and international justice with By whom? were usually conducted on the ground with the lead researcher. Three teams then spent a total of four weeks When did it start? in Eastern Equatoria; Upper Nile and Jonglei; Questionnaire and Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Northern Bahr A total of 354 questionnaire-based surveys How was it resolved? el-Ghazal, Lakes State and Warrap State. were conducted across the three research Did you have a peace meeting? Additional research was carried out by the sites, often by locally-recruited researchers. project director during the elections. Attempts were made to randomly sample What happened afterwards? in the research sites. Questions, which Will the conflict come back? Qualitative interviews had been developed during a workshop In total, the three research teams conducted in Juba, intended to solicit answers about What is the best way to get peace? 272 qualitative interviews with key informants perceptions of safety over time and whether across the three sites. Interactions with key or not people felt as if their views were When did you go hungry? informants were usually in English or Arabic represented at a variety of government When did you receive food aid? with translation from Sudanese researchers. levels. The best way of soliciting information Some interviews were conducted in local pieces of paper with the choices placed on pertinent to the assessment, it seemed, From whom? languages and translated by locally hired the soil. Each participant was given a pebble was to ask a series of questions under a When have you received assistance from an research assistants and translators. Key to cast their vote by placing it on the paper. ‘time-line’ of Sudanese events, broken down aid agency? informants included inter alia governors, into six-month periods for the time since the Questions asked during ranking commissioners, NGO-workers, religious signing of the CPA. The answers from the What kind of assistance? leaders, community leaders, youth and exercises were: questionnaires were coded into a database women’s representatives. Interviews When did your children go to school? 1) Who protects you the best? Suggested and analysed using quantitative graphs. were typically open-ended and lasted categories: SPLA, Police, UNMIS, When did you listen to a radio between 20-200 minutes. The rationale and Questionnaire questions Community Police, Chief, Relatives, nobody. for information? background of the research was explained When was Southern Sudan in peace? at the beginning of the interview, with the 2) Who is the best at bringing peace? Which station do you listen to? opportunity for respondent questions at the Suggested categories: GoSS, GoS, When were you safe? end. Focus group discussions were also GoNU, Governor, Commissioner, Payam When did you have the best leaders? Who do you turn to if you feel unsafe? conducted in all research sites, primarily Administrator, Chief, Peace Commission, Who were they? with community leaders (‘chiefs’), women’s Parliamentary Committee on Peace, UN, Who do you go to when you have groups and youth groups. NGOs, Relatives. other problems? NGOs A total of 11 NGOs were interviewed in Juba 3) What would be the best future for Who is your member of parliament? Southern Sudan? Suggested categories: and 13 outside of Juba. 80 per cent of these Living under GoSS, Living under GoNU, When did he/she come to speak? NGOs were international while 20 per cent were SNGOs or CBOs. Six donors were Divide Sudan into many parts, UN About what? Administration/Peace-keeping, War interviewed, all located in Juba. Will Southern Sudan become an 4) Who has been of most help to you? independent country? Suggested categories: GoSS, GoS, GoNU, Governor, Commissioner, Payam Will you vote for unity or independence? Administrator, Chief, Peace Commission, What will the government look like? Parliamentary Committee on Peace, UN, NGOs, Relatives.

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102 103 Iyire payam registered as part of Torit County by ‘warlord politics’ that aim to divide the ENDNOTES as they feel they ‘have been marginalised country rather than ancient tribal hatreds. by the Acholi’, the dominant tribe in Magwi Benjamin Maitre, ‘What Sustains Internal County. The Acholi are adamant that the land Wars; the Dynamics of Violent Conflict and inhabited by the Lutuho is Acholi-land. Given State weakness in Sudan.’ Third World how strongly each group believes in their Quarterly 30, 1 (2009).

1 9 entitlement to the land, it is difficult to fathom 19 This distinction and its definition is derived Fertit – an umbrella term given to a group a peaceful resolution to this issue. Irrespective Women in Raja attributed their continued from Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and of tribes – originally meant ‘fruit eaters’. of these entrenched positions, both groups marginalisation to the problem of ethnicity: Subject: Contemporary Africa and the While it is commonly used in WBeG, some acknowledged that in the past relations were ‘We feel the government in Wau is behind Legacy of late Colonialism, (Princeton NJ: respondents also mentioned that they found positive between them, only changing after the the delay in building the road because Princeton University Press, 1996.) the term derogatory. The tribes, some of CPA. It was commonly stated at both county the Fertit are not ruling.’ Focus group which are very small, grouped under the term discussion with women’s group. Raja Town, 2 and state level that this particular issue has Maitre discusses, for example, how the are proud of their harmonious co-existence, Raja County, Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 29 regime uses ‘warlord politics’ to divide the arisen as a result of political manipulation of yet these days, respondents most commonly tribal affiliations in the run up to elections. More October 2009. country and weaken institutions to demolish identify themselves using their tribe, rather precisely, the issue can often be traced back 20 any competing power base. See Benjamin than the group term. Generally, the following Focus group discussion with focus group Maitre, ‘What Sustains Internal Wars; the to the visit of an ‘intellectual’, a politician or an 4: Marial Bei residents. Marial Bei/Western tribes are grouped under the term Fertit: aspiring politician. Dynamics of Violent Conflict and State Golo, Ndogo, Sere, Tagbu, Bai, Belanda Bahr el-Ghazal: 27 October 2009. weakness in Sudan.’ Third World Quarterly (Bviri and Boor), Bongo, Feroge (Ya-ndiri-ka, 12 For a more detailed discussion on challenges 21 30, 1 (2009). Focus group discussion with women’s Togoyo, Kaliki, Nyoolne, Bugwa, Ngbandala, in transforming the SPLA/M into a political group. Marial Bei, Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 3 OCHA, ‘Cumulative figure of persons Dongo), Kresh (Ngbongbo, Naka and party, see Jack V Kalpakian, ‘The narrow 26 October 2009. killed during conflict incidents in 2010 by Gbaya), Woro, Gbaya, Binga, Yama, Yulu, prospects of the SPLA/M’s transition into a 22 county.’ (2010). Banda. Originally, Zande in the state were political party in the short term.’ South African Focus group discussion with focus group also grouped under the term Fertit. Journal of International Affairs 15, 2 (2008). 4: Marial Bei residents. Marial Bei/Western 4 Matt Bryden and Jeremy Brickhill have Bahr el-Ghazal: 27 October 2009. identified a very similar set of problems 10 The academic literature relating to identity 13 Interview with respondent 6: Woman 23 in Somalia and called it Somalia’s ‘state- politics and tribal conflicts in Sudan is leader (name withheld). Wau: 21 Focus group discussion with focus group building paradox’: it describes the situation substantial (recent contributions are Deng, October 2009. 4: Marial Bei residents. Marial Bei/Western 2005, 2006; Idris, 2005, and Sharkey, 2007). Bahr el-Ghazal: 27 October 2009. in which the restoration of state institutions 14 Focus group discussion with focus group creates further conflict, as restored For some analysts the term ‘tribe’ is itself 24 Elders and ‘chiefs’ in some locations unhelpful. We have kept it here because it is 6: elders. Bisselia, Western Bahr el-Ghazal: institutions become repressive. Matt Bryden 29 October 2009. complained that their youth no longer and Jeremy Brickhill, ‘Disarming Somalia: the term universally used by respondents. listened to them, and although that is lessons in stabilisation from a collapsed As is explained later in the report, there 15 The term ‘ethnic tension’ was the term doubtless a complaint of elders everywhere state – Analysis.’ Conflict, Security & are many inconsistencies in the ways in offered by the translator. Focus group in the world, it is probably the case that Development 10, 2 (2010): 239 – 62. which tribal labels are used in practice, with discussion with focus group 7: main chief, some of the former social controls on the relatively small groups in the Equatorias Bai chief, Shat chief and head of parent- 5 Claire McEvoy and Ryan Murray. Small behaviour of youths have been eroded by being referred to as separate tribes, while teacher council. Korgana, Wau County, the years of war and population migration. Arms Survey. ‘Gauging Fear and Insecurity: the Dinka, despite numbering in the millions, Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 31 October 2009. Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern are called just one tribe (although sometimes 25 Both the Small Arms Survey and Safer Equatoria and Turkana North’. Geneva: 2008. there are also references to separate Dinka 16 Skye Wheeler ‘Hundreds welcome World have published extensive research

6 tribes). Essentially, tribal identities are those prophet’s rod in South Sudan’ Reuters, Juba, about the availability and origins of small Mareike Schomerus. Conciliation 16 May 2009 Resources. ‘Perilous border: Sudanese associated with traditional groupings that arms in southern Sudan. were recognised as such under the Anglo- communities affected by conflict on the 17 For more details on Nuer prophecies, see 26 Interview with respondent 5: Madi Elder. Egyptian Condominium administration. Sudan/Uganda border’. Douglas Johnson, Nuer Prophets: A History Nimule, Eastern Equatoria: 20 October 2009. London: November 2008a. 11 The fall-out of political manipulation is of Prophecy from the Upper Nile in the 27 Questionnaire response from Madi evident in the current tension between the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. (New 7 Mareike Schomerus, Violent Legacies: returnee. Nimule, Eastern Equatoria: 19 Acholi of Obbo bomo and the Lutuho of York: Oxford University Press, 1997). Insecurity in Sudan’s Central and Eastern October 2009. Equatoria (Working Paper 13). Human Iyire payam. The two communities’ versions 18 Maitre explains that how wars start is Security Baseline Assessment (Geneva: The of the conflict are diametrically opposed not what sustains them and the common 28 Such confusion arises because the CPA Small Arms Survey, 2008b). with each group claiming contested land perception of ‘ethnicity’ as the single is in many ways a relic, a reflection of its as historically theirs and laying blame on own time. It has initiated changes, but 8 cause of conflict and its sustenance is too Stefano Santandrea, A tribal history of the the other community for the escalation of simplistic. He says conflict is sustained then has proven unable to accommodate Western Bahr el Ghazal. (Bologna: 1964). conflict. The Lutuho have sought to have

104 105 them. The basic idea of an interim period to 32 Interview with respondent 18, former Group. ‘Sudan’s rigged elections: the post that currently the SPLM’s support was initiate changes creates the opposite of the SPLA soldier. Juba: 15 November 2009. election implications on Sudan’s stability’. 4 diminishing and that this made a clear vote stability and transparency many southern May 2010. for secession less likely. 33 Focus group discussion with focus group Sudanese crave. While this emphasises 42 53 the tension discussed between state- 12: youth leaders in Bisselia. October 2009. Interview with Respondent 1: Coordinator Focus group discussion with youth leaders of local NGO (name withheld). Wau, Western (four men and two women). Raga Town, building and conflict management, between 34 A recent report covering similar issues is modernisation and traditionalisation, it is Bahr el-Ghazal: 17 October 2009. Raga County, Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 29 Emile LeBrun and Claire McEvoy. ‘Uncertain October 2009. crucial to remember that the document was Future: Armed Violence in Southern Sudan’. 43 In Greater Bahr el-Ghazal, the majority of based on a vision for Sudan that has since (Geneva: The Small Arms Survey: 2010.) fieldwork was conducted in Western Bahr 54 Interview with SPLM officials (names become largely irrelevant. Developments 35 el-Ghazal, with some work in Northern Bahr withheld), Raja Town, 2009, 256. within Sudan, such as the continuation The Southern Sudan Peace Commission el-Ghazal and Warrap. of the war in Darfur since the CPA or the (SSPC) has been met with much goodwill, 55 Interview with local priest (name and death of Garang have pushed things in but it is universally acknowledged that its 44 Adam Branch and Zachariah Cherian church withheld). Raja: October 2009. contribution to peace-building and conflict Mampilly, ‘Winning the war, but losing different directions. The dichotomy between 56 Interview with Correction services independence and unity was established resolution to this point has been minimal. the peace? The dilemma of SPLM/A civil This is not aided by the fact that the administration and the tasks ahead.’ The official (name and title withheld). Wau: without clarification what each of these 23 October 2009. would mean. It may not be realistic to expect mandate of the SSPC remains unclear. Journal of Modern African Studies 43, 1 (2005): 1-20. 57 a peace agreement to spell out each vision 36 Interview with respondent 19: SSPC Interview with Joseph Lino, NCP chairman in detail – and hence the CPA only states Official. Name, location and date withheld. 45 Questionnaire response. EES. Raja County. Raja Town: 30 October 2009. that the GNU has to make unity attractive 16 October 2009. 58 Interview with Correction services while the GoSS needs to demonstrate its 37 Thomas argues that such processes official (name and title withheld). Wau: capacity as a regional government. The lack have neglected to engage with the reality 46 Interview with Respondent 2: Director 23 October 2009. of clarity has been pointed out in several of everyday life in Sudan and have thus of the Toposa Development Association. articles published as part of the vast range contributed to further violence as the Narus: 23 October 2009. 59 Interview with Imam (name and mosque of literature on the CPA over the last state and the experience of the ordinary 47 Focus group boma ‘chiefs’. Kapoeta north: withheld). Raja Town: 1 November 2009. few years. citizen drift further apart. Edward Thomas. Chatham House. ‘Decisions and Deadlines: 27 October 2009 60 Focus group discussion with women’s 29 The CPA has been broadly criticised for A Critical Year for Sudan’. London: 2010. 48 Interview with Respondent 4: UN officer group. Raja Town, Raja County, Western its lack of inclusiveness and its failure to (name, title and location withheld). 31 Bahr el-Ghazal: 2009 186. emphasise a democratic transformation over 38 This reversion to ‘tradition’ is often simply October 2009. 61 reaching the milestone elections as a symbol a throwback to reforms of another era rather Focus group discussion with youth leaders of democracy, rather than a realization. See, than restoration of a somehow organic 49 Focus group discussion with Focus Group (four men and two women). Raga Town, for example, Young John, ‘Sudan: a flawed structure of society –see further discussion 2: SPLM officials (names withheld). Raja Raga County, Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 29 peace process leading to a flawed peace.’ on chiefs in this report. Town: 2 November 2009. October 2009. Review of African Political Economy 103 62 39 Taxation provides a good illustration: In 50 Four of these ranking exercises were (2005): 99-113. O Antwi-Boateng and G. M Focus group discussion with focus group some areas, collecting taxes has long been conducted: with women and youth in Mapel, O’Mahony, ‘A framework for the analysis of 3: chiefs in Gok Machar. Gok Machar/ the chief’s role. As such, it was a localised with women in Bisselia and with women in peace agreements and lessons learned: The Northern Bahr el-Ghazal: 6 November 2009. process, often disconnected from a national Raja Town. Each time, the SSPC featured case of the Sudanese comprehensive peace 51 authority or social contract with government. Interview with respondent 3: Fertit elder prominently as ‘peace-bringer’ when asked agreement.’ Politics & Policy 36, 1 (2008). (name withheld). Wau: 23 October 2009. who would be the best to bring peace on 40 30 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: the local level, yet in no instance could Young credits Garang with keeping the 52 Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of The delicate balance between those SPLA/M alive and giving it a vision, while at respondents explain why they felt this way. late Colonialism, Princeton NJ: Princeton supporting unity and those favouring the same time establishing a tight hegemony Indeed, the women in Mapel pointed out that University Press, 1996. separation was expressed in an interview within the part. J John Young, ‘Garang’s it was chiefly due to the word ‘peace’ in the with a local NGO worker who pointed out name of the commission. Legacy to the Peace Process, the SPLM/A 41 See, for example, TAMAM, Sudan that ‘previously it was said that more than & the South.’ Review of African Political Domestic Election Monitoring and 52 per cent were for the North, now seems 63 The first was the return of refugees to Economy 106 (2005): 535-48. Observation Programme (SuDEMOP), to be 50/50. It could be more if we were not Algeria in the mid 1960s. 31 and African Centre for Justice and Peace cut off from the south but strong tribal links Interview with Mathew Mawien Akon, 64 Studies, ‘Open Letter: Sudanese Civil For a further discussion, see Barbara Director for Linguistics (Ministry of to the North and Darfur remain.’ Interview Society Leaders Urge African Union and Harrell-Bond, Imposing Aid: Emergency Education, Western Bahr el-Ghazal State). with Field Officer/INGO (name and title Special Envoys to Confront the Failure and Assistance to Refugees. (Oxford, New Wau Town, Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 27 withheld). Raja Town: 31 October 2009. Implications of Recent Elections in Sudan’ York, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, October 2009. Others mentioned that during the August (Khartoum: 2010) , Sudan Democracy First 2009 Governor’s Forum, it was reported 1986). and Mark Leopold, ‘Trying to Hold

106 107 Things Together,’ in The Charitable Impulse, and to John W Donaldson of the University 86 Focus group discussion with focus 95 Focus group discussion with focus group ed. Ondine Barrow and Michael Jennings of Durham. group 14: women’s group. Narus, Eastern 12: 17 chiefs from Wau and surrounding

(Oxford: James Currey, 2001). 76 Equatoria: 25 November 2009. areas. Wau, Wau County, Western Bahr el- Please see section ‘Chiefs’ and peace- Ghazal: 23 October 2009. 65 Tim Allen, ‘Ethnicity and Tribalism on the building for a more detailed discussion on 87 See for example Mareike Schomerus, Sudan-Uganda Border,’ in Ethnicity and the current role of ‘chiefs’. Violent Legacies: Insecurity in Sudan’s 96 One reason for this is that funds are

Conflict in the Horn of Africa, ed. Katsuyoshi 77 Central and Eastern Equatoria (Working distributed from the centre through line Fukui and John Markakis (London: James For a more detailed history, see MW Paper 13). Human Security Baseline ministries rather than through to the State Currey, 1994). Daly, Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian Assessment (Geneva: The Small Arms leaving GoSS fully in charge of 70 per cent Condominium, 1934-1956. (Cambridge: Survey, 2008b). of the revenues and states only upwardly 66 The term ‘peace dividend’ has come to Cambridge University Press, 1991). 88 accountable to the president. mean any benefits associated with no longer 78 Focus group discussion with focus being at war. Originally, however, the term For discussion of these early years of the group 15: ‘chiefs’. Akobo, Jonglei: 97 Interview with Respondent 14: Programme referred to the re-allocation of funds from a Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, see Douglas 10 November 2009. Manager of INGO (name withheld). Wau: 19 no longer needed defense budget. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s October 2009. Civil Wars, James Currey, Oxford, 2004, 89 Respondent 20, INGO employee in report 67 Tim Allen, ‘Full circle? An Overview especially chapter 2. feedback session. Details and date withheld. 98 Focus group discussion with Focus

of Sudan’s southern problems since 79 90 group 11: Chiefs, Elders, Administrators and independence.’ Northeast African Studies Lillian Sanderson and Neville Sanderson, See for example, Daniel Awet Akot, ‘The Court Personnel. Mapel/ Jur River County/ 11, 2 (1989): 41-66. Education, Religion and Politics in Southern imperative of decentralization,’ in Accord: Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 20 October 2009. Sudan, 1899-1964. (London/ Khartoum: Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s 68 Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes of Ithaca Press/ Khartoum University Press, Conflicts, ed. Mark Simmons and Peter 99 Interview with Respondent 1: Coordinator Sudan’s Civil Wars. ed. International African 1981). Dixon (London: Conciliation Resources, of local NGO (name withheld). Wau, Western

Institute, African issues (Oxford: James 80 2006) as one of numerous articles outlining Bahr el-Ghazal: 17 October 2009. Currey, 2003) 62. See Robert O. Collins, Shadows in the the need for decentralising the south. Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918- 100 A key issue of the CPA is the lack of 69 Robert O. Collins, Eastern African History. 1956. (New Haven/ London: Yale University 91 Green has shown how decentralisation clarity on the borders along the three areas (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1990). Press, 1983). in Uganda – while reducing conflict on (cf. O Antwi-Boateng and G. M O’Mahony,

70 81 the national level – created conflict at the ‘A framework for the analysis of peace PM Holt and MW Daly, A History of the ‘1930 Memorandum on Southern Policy’, local level, as leaders struggled over local agreements and lessons learned: The Sudan: From the coming of Islam to the Civil Secretary’s Office, Khartoum, January leadership positions and newly-created case of the Sudanese comprehensive present day. (Harlo: Longman, 2000 (5th 25 1930. administrative units alter established peace agreement.’ Politics & Policy 36, edition)) 171. 82 See, for example, Ahmad Ibrahim relationships between groups. Elliott Green, 1 (2008)., Young John, ‘Sudan: a flawed 71 Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes of AbouShouk and Anders Bjorkelo, The ‘Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda.’ peace process leading to a flawed peace.’ Sudan’s Civil Wars. ed. International African Principles of Native Administration in Conflict, Security and Development 8, 4 Review of African Political Economy 103 Institute, African issues (Oxford: James the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1956. (2008): 427-50. What is currently witnessed (2005): 99-113., J Matus, ‘The future of Currey, 2003) 51-52. (Omdurman/ Bergen: Abdel Karim Mirghani in Southern Sudan echoes his findings. food security in the Three Areas of Sudan.’ Cultural Center/Center for Middle Eastern Disasters 31, 1 (2007): 91-103.) Although 72 92 Interview with respondent 12, coordinator of PA Nyaba, The Politics of Liberation and Islamic Studies, 2004). the protocol provides a strong framework, in South Sudan. (Kampala: Fountain INGO (name and title withheld). Juba: 2009. the details of critical issues such as land 83 Publishers, 1997) 21. PTW Baxter & Audrey Butt. 1953. 93 Interview with respondent 13, donor reform, decentralisation and the devolution The Azande, and related peoples of the 73 Democracy and Governance Officer (name of authority, managing imbalances in See, for example, Emile LeBrun and Claire Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Belgian Congo. McEvoy. Small Arms Survey. ‘Uncertain and title withheld). Juba: 14 November 2009. development and underdevelopment, London: International African Institute: 24. and the participation of the people in Future: Armed Violence in Southern Sudan’. 94 84 For example, at a conference in Malpel, government, are still in the process of Geneva: 2010. Please refer to the section on How WBeG, in 2005, participants agreed on decentralisation and administrative division being worked out. J Matus, ‘The future of 74 six counties and a municipality of Wau for James Gatdek Dak, ‘Sudan’s 1956 fuels conflict, for a further discussion. food security in the Three Areas of Sudan.’ North-South border map is non-existent – WBeG: The idea was agreed on but never Disasters 31, 1 (2007): 91-103. However, committee ‘ Sudan Tribune, 29 June 2008. 85 Thirty-three per cent of survey reached the leadership for approval, but now Johnson (2008) provides valuable insight respondents reported that they had been they have made an assessment of resources into the difficulties of reaching agreement 75 The implications of this are discussed in attacked at least once since the signing of each county. Focus group discussion on such politically and economically more detail in the section on Borders and of the CPA. Of those who reported having with Focus group 11: Chiefs, Elders, important areas. Johnson was part of a conflicts For details about maps of southern been attacked, 80 per cent said that the Administrators and Court Personnel. Mapel/ team of experts nominated by the NCP Sudan we are grateful to the historian most recent attack had happened in 2009. Jur River County/ Western Bahr el-Ghazal: and SPLA to provide an objective account Douglas Johnson who has provided 20 October, 2009. of where borders should be drawn. Bashir information in personal communications

108 109 rejected the report, known as the Abyei ‘Uyuku’ back. At the same time, some 119 Interview with respondent 17, 132 Focus group discussion with focus group Boundaries Commission report, outright. residents wanted to join Aroyo County Governor of EES. Torit, Eastern Equatoria: 17: Toposa youth. Narus, Eastern Equatoria: Douglas Johnson, ‘Why Abyei Matters: the near Aweil in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal 19 October 2009. 24 October 2009.

Breaking Point of Sudan’s Comprehensive while others wanted to stay with Western 120 133 Peace Agreement?.’ African Affairs. 107, 426 Bahr el Gezal because they speak a similar Email communication with Professor Focus group discussion with focus group (2008): 1-19. language (Luer). In the end, the chief of Eisei Kurimoto, Osaka University: 29 18: Toposa males. Narus, Eastern Equatoria: Deim Zubeir went to Aroyo county, some September 2009. 23 October 2009. 101 Borders have always played a crucial people stayed behind and chose a new 121 Peter Kamau, ‘Border area that defies 134 Focus group discussion with focus group role in the north-south conflict. While this chief. Interview with Respondent 7: Deputy applies to state and county borders as well, security,’ The Nation 1999. 19: Madi Woman’s Group. Narus, Eastern Coordinator local peace-building NGO Equatoria: 25 October 2009. the north-south border provides the most [name withheld]. Wau: 17 October 2009. 122 Interview with Commissioner East prominent cases of border issues, such as Kapoeta. Narus, Eastern Equatoria: 22 135 We are indebted to Douglas Johnson Abyei. Since independence, several areas 107 Interview with respondent 9, Member of October 2009. and John W Donaldson for their input into that used to be considered Southern have Council of Elders (name withheld), Malakal: this section. been annexed to the north, mainly as a result 19 October 2009. 123 The Toposa also reported that the Kenyan government was ‘fiddling’ with the Thuraya 136 ‘In respect of the Southern Sudan, there of oil or mineral deposits, such as in Hufrat 108 Al Nihas and Kafir Kanji in Raja, Heglig north Focus group discussion with focus satellite to change where satellite phones shall be a Government of Southern Sudan of Bentiu and Wad Kona in Upper Nile. group 8: youth in Malakal. Malakal : 27 read ‘Thuraya Sudan’ and ‘Thuraya Kenya’. (GoSS), as per the borders of 1/1/56’ (CPA, October 2009. It is said that up until 2008 a satellite phone Section 3.1 of the power sharing protocol). 102 Interview with Deputy Governor 109 would read ‘Thuraya Sudan’ as far as Josephine Moses Lado. Aweil Town, Questionnaire response. 137 Focus group discussion with focus Atar: 4 November 2009. Lokichoggio whereas now it reads ‘Thuraya Northern Bahr el Ghazal State: Kenya’ as far as Nadapal and sometimes to group 7: main chief, Bai chief, Shat chief, 5 November 2009. 110 Focus group discussion with Focus group Narus. While Thuraya is in fact owned by a and head of parent-teacher council. 9: Students at the University of Western Middle Eastern company, this underscores Korgana, Wau County, Western Bahr 103 For a history of the changing authority el-Ghazal: 31 October 2009. and importance of local government, Bahr el-Ghazal. Wau: 4 November 2009. the perception that the Kenyan government is trying to intervene in Toposa territory. 138 see M.W. Norris, ‘Local Government and 111 Focus group discussion with Focus group In Bisselia, the bitterness about having decentralization in the Sudan.’ Public 9: Students at the University of Western 124 Focus group discussion with focus group lost old boundaries was particularly strong. Administration and Development 3, 3 (1983): Bahr el-Ghazal. Wau: 4 November 2009. 16: community leaders. Narus, Eastern Residents pinned their hope for peace on 209-22. Equatoria: 23 October 2009. having their own local peace agreement 112 Focus group discussion with focus group implemented – an agreement that in reality 104 Interview with Respondent 7: Deputy 10: youth in Kodok. Kodok, 27 October 2009. 125 Focus group discussion with focus group is full of unrealistic demands – and on all Coordinator local peace-building NGO 113 16: community leaders. Narus, Eastern other tribes accepting the 1956 Ndogo [name withheld]. Wau: 17 October 2009. Interview with Respondent 10, SSRRC Equatoria: 23 October 2009. boundaries. Interview with respondent director, Malakal, 21 October 2009. 24: local elder (name withheld). Bisselia, 105 Border issues are intimately 126 Focus group discussion with focus group 114 Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 29 October 2009. connected with conflict dynamics and Focus group discussion with focus group 16: community leaders. Narus, Eastern other issues discussed in this report 10: youth in Kodok. Kodok, 27 October 2009. Equatoria: 23 October 2009. 139 The corresponding map present in the -such as government structures. This 115 British Library archives has no boundaries Interview with respondent 11: local 127 Interview with respondent 21: Diocese became clear in Greater Bahr el-Ghazal government official, Kodok, 26 October 2009. located lower than provincial level but rather where weaker groups i.e. those that felt of Torit staff. Narus, Eastern Equatoria: 23 only shows the demarcation between north politically underrepresented saw territorial 116 Email communication with Professor October 2009 and south. Furthermore, the Interim National demarcation as a way to assert control and Eisei Kurimoto, Osaka University: 29 128 This conflict set-up is mirrored in many Constitution of the Republic of Sudan (2005) thus avoid conflict. Groups that felt stronger September 2009. places, such as in the conflict between reiterates this language and refers twice to politically seemed to put less emphasis 117 Interview with respondent 15: chairman Dinka Malual and Rizeigat. the ‘inviolable’ ‘January 1, 1956 line between on demarcation and more on using justice of youth. Lafon, Eastern Equatoria: 02 north and south Sudan.’ Nothing in the CPA mechanisms to resolve conflict. 129 See section on cattle for more on or the Constitution suggests that old maps November 2009. proliferation of cattle-raiding. 106 It is important to note that in most cases, might hold the key to solving local territorial 118 Interview with respondent 16: people are not unified in their local approach 130 Interview with respondent 22: EES SSPC disputes. A known problem with using the Assistant Pastor Inland Church and to a new county, which creates further staff. Torit, Eastern Equatoria: 19 October, 2009. ‘1956 maps’ as a guide is that they were in Civic Educator. Torit, Eastern Equatoria: confusion. In Deim Zubeir, a village on the fact originally produced in the late 1930s. In 01 November 2009. 131 Interview with respondent 23: SPLM staff. border between Western Bahr el Ghazal terms of geographic features such as towns, Torit, Eastern Equatoria: 19 October 2009. and Northern Bahr el Ghazal, for example, roads and infrastructure, they are based on some residents were mostly concerned surveys that date back to the 1920s, 1930s with wanting the town’s original tribal name and sometimes even earlier.

110 111 140 Community members in Bisselia in WBeG kill anyone who would try to stop them. The has degenerated into free-for-all vicious 174 Focus group discussion with focus are waiting for the decision on whether the Acholi version of these events is almost attacks and revenge attacks, often involving group 25: Dinka Gok youth at cattle camp. governor in Wau will grant them the honour identical, however the roles of perpetrator large numbers of cattle and significant loss of Cueibet, Cueibet County, Lakes State: 11 of becoming the county headquarters if a and victim are reversed with the Bari playing life.’ Claire McEvoy and Ryan Murray. Small November 2009. new county is created. When asked how the lead role in antagonising the conflict. Arms Survey. ‘Gauging Fear and Insecurity: 175 Focus group discussion with focus likely this will be, interviewees responded 152 Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern that this was extremely likely given that Interview with respondent 25: Bari chief. Equatoria and Turkana North’. Geneva: 2008. group 27, Dolieb Hills, Upper Nile state, 22 during British colonial rule Bisselia was the Kit, Eastern Equatoria: 12 November 2009. November 2009. 164 JW Burton ‘Ghost Marriage and the county headquarters (Interview with Chief of 153 Interview with respondent 27: payam 176 Focus group discussion with focus group 27, Bisselia, 29 October 2009). Cattle Trade among the Atuot of the administrator. Kodok, Upper Nile: 27 Southern Sudan.’ Journal of the International Fangak, Upper Nile state, 5 November 2009. October 2009. 141 ‘The Resolutions’ (paper presented at the African Institute 48, 4 (1978): 398-405. 177 Focus group discussion with focus group Khorfulus and Atar Peace and Reconciliation 154 Focus group discussion with focus group 165 Focus group discussion with focus group 28. Machi 15: 27 October, 2009. Conference, Khorfulus, Jonglei State, 19-21 20. Kodok, Upper Nile: October 2009. December 2009). 17: youth. Narus: 24 October 2009. 178 Hutchinson (1992) found that raided cattle 155 Focus group discussion. Kodok, Upper 166 were not considered suitable for dowries 142 ‘The Resolutions’ (paper presented at the Interview with respondent 35: veterinary Nile: 27 October 2009. officer (name withheld). Cueibet, Cuebeit among the Nuer during research in the Khorfulus and Atar Peace and Reconciliation 1980s, so at least during that time, bride- 156 County, Lakes State: 10 November 2009. Conference, Khorfulus, Jonglei State, 19-21 Interview with Local Peace Commission price was not the main motivation for raiding. December 2009). Official. Wau: 18 October 2009. 167 Focus group discussion with Focus group 179 Focus group discussion with focus 143 Focus group with youth. Atar, Upper Nile: 157 Focus group discussion with focus group 11: Chiefs, Elders, Administrators and Court Personnel. Mapel/ Jur River County/Western group 25: Dinka Gok youth at cattle camp. 4 November 2009. 21: elders, community leaders and teachers, Cueibet, Cueibet County, Lakes State: 11 Ayii/Kit: 12 November 2009. Bahr el-Ghazal: 20 October 2009. 144 ‘South Sudan asks to restore security November, 2009. 158 168 Focus group discussion with focus group to allow smooth voter registration,’ Sudan Interview with respondent 29: Payam 180 26: women, Malakal, 20 October 2010. Focus group discussion with focus Tribune 2009. Administrator. Imehejek: 1 November 2009. group 25: Dinka Gok youth at cattle camp. 169 145 James Okuk, ‘Pigi belongs to Shilluk in 159 Interview with respondent 29: Payam Focus group discussion with focus Cueibet, Cueibet County, Lakes State: 11 Upper Nile not Dinka of Jonglei,’ Sudan Administrator. Imehejek: 1 November 2009. group 25: Dinka Gok youth at cattle camp. November, 2009. Cueibet, Cueibet County, Lakes State: 11 Tribune, 16 November 2009. 181 160 Interview with respondent 30: Acting November 2009. E.g. the Commissioner of Cueibet county, 146 James Okuk, ‘Pigi belongs to Shilluk in Paramount Chief. Imehejek. 1 November 2009. Lakes State. 170 Interview with respondent 36: county Upper Nile not Dinka of Jonglei,’ Sudan 182 161 The cattle-keeping areas visited for officials, Budi County: 26 October 2009. Interview with respondent 37: government Tribune, 16 November 2009. this research were Kapoeta East in Eastern official, Melut, Upper Nile, 30 October 2009. 171 In a few cattle-keeping areas, cattle- 147 Interview with respondent 25: Bari chief. Equatoria state, Tonj in Warrap, Cueibet 183 raiding seems to be less of a problem. When Focus group discussion with focus group Kit, Eastern Equatoria: 12 November 2009. in Lakes, Nasir in Upper Nile and Akobo 29: youth Marial Bei, Wau County, Western in Jonglei. asked why this was the case, local cattle- 148 Interview with respondent 26: Acholi keepers in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal offered Bahr el-Ghazal State: 28 October 2009. 162 chief. Ayii/Kit, Eastern Equatoria: 12 Focus group discussion with focus two explanations. They felt that the distance 184 Focus group discussion with Focus November 2009. group 25: Dinka Gok youth at cattle camp. from Warrap or Lakes State was too far for group 11: Chiefs, Elders, Administrators and Cueibet, Cueibet County, Lakes State: outsiders to come into their state. Secondly, 149 Interview with respondent 25: Bari chief. Court Personnel. Mapel/ Jur River County/ 11 November 2009. These sentiments they themselves did not want to cause Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 20 October 2009. Kit, Eastern Equatoria echo the findings of Evans Pritchard and insecurity as they are keenly aware of the 185 150 Interview with respondent 26: Acholi Sharon Hutchinson in their analyses of the proximity of their major enemy – the North Interview with respondent 6: Woman leader chief. Ayii/Kit (EES):12 November,2009. relationship between the Nuer and their – and in-fighting would only weaken them (name withheld). Wau: 21 October 2009. cattle. Pritchard, in particular, described the vis-à-vis the border and northern militias. 186 151 According to the Bari chief since before bonds of ‘identification’ uniting a young man Anne Walraet also makes this point, the 1980s there has been a sign post with the ox of initiation and the ‘substitution’ 172 Focus group discussion with Focus elaborating how raiding has become part identifying the area as: ‘Kit boma, Lobonok of ‘the life of an ox’ for that of a ‘man’ in Nuer Group 2: SPLM officials (names withheld). of the local economy, including ‘raiding to Payam’. This was recently pulled down sacrificial acts. Raja Town: 2 November 2009. order’ (p62), which implicates ‘big men’ by the Acholi at night; after two months, as being the driving and commanding 163 In their 2008 report, McEvoy and Murray 173 Focus group discussion with focus force behind cattle-raiding. She identifies the Acholi, supported by police forces and group 25: Dinka Gok youth at cattle camp. wildlife authorities replaced the sign with write that ‘traditional livestock raiding, them as ‘profiteering and well connected’ aided by firearms and influenced by Cueibet, Cueibet County, Lakes State: 11 military-commercial elite that in a context their own signpost reading: ‘Ayii boma, November 2009. Magwi Payam, 56 km’ and threatening to commercial, political and military interests, of war managed to link local assets with

112 113 international markets.’ Anne Walraet, 199 Interview with UN officer (name and title who are more than enemies to us.’ Interview 224 Interview with respondent 50: Reverend ‘Governance, violence and the struggle for withheld). Raja Town: 2009, 236 with various government officials and local of Diocese of Torit. Torit: 19 October 2009. economic regulation in South Sudan: the 200 sources (names withheld). Wau: 23 October 225 case of Budi County (Eastern Equatoria).’ For an analysis of police reform in 2009. The militia worked in conjunction with Interview with respondent 39: SSRRC Afrika Focus 21, 2 (2008): 53-70. Southern Sudan see: Alfred Sebit Lokuji, SAF, including for intelligence gathering. official (name and title withheld). Wau: 23 Abraham Sewonet Abatneh, and Chaplain When the SPLA entered Raja Town in 2001, October 2009. 187 Focus group discussion with focus group Kenyi. Wani. North-South Institute. ‘Police Quart Salam fought with SAF to regain the 226 Focus group discussion with focus group 12: 17 chiefs from Wau and surrounding Reform in Southern Sudan – Measuring the town. areas. Wau, Wau County, Western Bahr el- public’s sense of security’. 2009. 12: 17 chiefs from Wau and surrounding Ghazal: 23 October 2009. 215 Interview with Governor of Western Bahr areas. Wau, Wau County, Western Bahr el- 201 Interview with respondent 40: priest. Ghazal: 23 October 2009. 188 el-Ghazal State. Wau: 2009. Focus group discussion with focus group Imehejek: 1 November 2009. 227 216 Interview with Respondent 49: Correction 29: youth Marial Bei, Wau County, Western 202 Interview with government officials and Bahr el-Ghazal State: 28 October 2009. Focus group discussion with focus local sources , Wau, 2009, 173). services official (name and title withheld). group 32: community leaders. Lauro: 28 Wau: 23 October 2009. 189 Badru Mulumba, ‘Clashes in South Sudan October 2009. 217 Interview with Respondent 1: Coordinator 228 Rather than being a nationally organised no longer inter-ethnic conflict,’ The Nation, 203 of local NGO (name withheld). Wau, Western 28 September 2009. Focus group discussion with focus group Bahr el-Ghazal: 17 October 2009. group, the criminal gangs operating in Juba, 33: women. Lauro: 28 October 2009. Wau and Torit are very different from the 190 218 Questionnaire response, Melut, Melut 204 In Raja, reportedly 3000 guns were small group of young people in Korgana, County, Upper Nile state, 29 October 2009. Interview with respondent 41: SPLA collected from members of Quart Salam, who in fact asked the interviewer if they had commander. Lauro: 27 October 2009 although it is not clear where these are any tips on how to become better Niggaz 191 Interview with respondent 38: of civil 205 stored. Interview with respondent 3: Fertit and Outlaws. affairs representative in UNMIS (name and Interview with respondent 42: UN Officer. Juba: 8 October 2009. elder (name withheld). Wau: 23 October 229 title withheld). Torit: 04 November 2009. 2009. At the same time, respondents in Focus group discussion with focus group 206 36: three male members of Niggaz youth 192 Focus group discussion with focus Interview with respondent 43: NGO worker Raja also stated that Tom Anour was still (name withheld). Wau; 10 November 2009. recruiting in 2008, including organising gang. Korgana, Wau County, Western Bahr group 7: main chief, Bai chief, Shat chief, el-Ghazal: 1 November 2009. and head of parent-teacher council. 207 Interview with respondent 44: UN field weapons drops in Mangayat. Interview with Korgana, Wau County, Western Bahr security Officer. Juba: 8 October 2009. Peace-building Officer/INGO (name and 230 Interview with Respondent 49: Correction el-Ghazal: 31 October 2009. title withheld). Aweil Town: 5 November services official (name and title withheld). 208 Interview with respondent 46: SSRRC 2009. The rumours that guns are still being Wau: 23 October 2009. 193 Interview with respondent 39: SSRRC Field Officer. Upper Nile: 6 November 2009. dropped for Quart Salam members were official (name and title withheld). Wau: 23 persistently mentioned between Mapel and 231 Interview with Respondent 49: Correction 209 Focus group discussion with focus group October 2009. Raja, along with rumours that Quart Salam services official (name and title withheld). 34: youth. Nasir: 7 November 2009. Wau: 23 October 2009. 194 Focus group discussion with focus group was teaming up with the LRA. 210 Interview. Juba with who? 232 30: youth leaders. Mapel, Jur River County, 219 Interview with respondent 48: UN staff. Mareike Schomerus and Kennedy 15 November 2009. Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 23 October 2009. Wau: 18 October 2009. Tumutegyereize. Conciliation Resources. ‘After Operation Lightning Thunder: 195 211 Interview with respondent 47: local priest Focus group discussion with Focus 220 Focus group discussion with focus group (name and church withheld). Raja Town: 30 Protecting communities and building peace’. group 31: women from Mapel. Mapel, Jur 35: youth. Akobo: 10 November 2009. London: 2009. River County, Western Bahr el-Ghazal: October 2009. 221 They also model themselves on 233 24 October 2009. 212 Interview with respondent 48: UN staff. Interview with respondent 42: UN Officer. Sudanese gangs prevalent in the refugee Juba: 8 October 2009. 196 Wau: 18 October 2009. Focus group discussion with focus community in Cairo. Heather Sharp, 234 group 25: Dinka Gok youth at cattle camp. 213 Focus group discussion with sub-’chiefs’ ‘Sudanese gangs afflict Cairo streets ‘ BBC Interview with Respondent 4: UN officer Cueibet, Cueibet County, Lakes State: 11 and youth Tharkueng, Jur River County, News, 25 July 2007. (name, title and location withheld). 31 November 2009. Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 26 October 2009. October 2009. 222 Interview with respondent 39: SSRRC 197 235 Weber, M. (1964) The Fundamental 214 Tom Anour’s Quart Salam (‘Peace official (name and title withheld). Wau: 23 In Southern Sudan, the word ‘Fellata’ and Concepts of Sociology in Talcott Parsons, Forces’) was a Fertit-based militia aligned October 2009., Interview with Respondent ‘Ambororo’ are used interchangeably to refer ed., The Theory of Social and Economic with the north operating in the area between 49: Correction services official (name and to the Fellata, however, Ambororo is more Organisation. New York, Free Press. Wau and Raja. Many residents describe the title withheld). Wau: 23 October 2009. commonly used for the less accessible groups who remain nomadic. Fellata is in fact the 198 Quart Salam as the only force that has ever Interview with Respondent 1: Coordinator 223 Interview with respondent 39: SSRRC offered them reliable protection from SPLA group name and Ambororo is a sub-group of of local NGO (name withheld). Wau, Western official (name and title withheld). Wau: 23 and Dinka neighbours: ‘His men were helpful the Fellata. In Northern Sudan, it is less likely Bahr el-Ghazal: 17 October 2009. October 2009. to the community unlike the SPLA soldiers that these terms are used interchangeably,

114 115 since Northern Fellata are considered distinctly 245 Focus group discussion with focus group ‘chiefs’. Interview with respondent 52: Crisis and location withheld). 31 October 2009. different from the Ambororo. 40: youth. Korgana, Wau County, Western Recovery Mapping Analyst (CRMA), UNDP. 262 Bahr el-Ghazal: 31 October 2009. Wau: 26 October 2009. Interview with respondent 53: Peace- 236 Duffield, M (2002). ‘Aid and complicity: building Officer/ INGO (name and title the case of war-displaced Southerners in the 246 Focus group discussion with focus group 257 There is an overwhelming sense among withheld). Aweil Town: 5 November 2009.

Northern Sudan’, Journal of Modern African 38: Fellata elders. Wau: 26 October 2009. respondents that those who have committed 263 Studies, 40: 1, 83-104. crimes need to pay compensation. In many Interview with respondent 54: 247 Interview with respondent 39: SSRRC Commissioner Aweil North. Gok Machar: 237 communities, the rates of compensation Interview with respondent 39: SSRRC official (name and title withheld). Wau: 23 are fixed and widely known – a group of 7 November 2009. official (name and title withheld). Wau: 23 October 2009. youth leaders pointed out that: ‘if you kill 264 October 2009. Interview with respondent 53: Peace- 248 Focus group discussion with focus group someone, you should pay wither 16 cows building Officer/ INGO (name and title 238 Interview with Respondent 7: Deputy 40: Women’s Development Group. Wau: 21 or 39,000 SP. Among the Dinka, you should withheld). Aweil Town: 5 November 2009. pay 31 cows, money is not acceptable.’ Coordinator local peace-building NGO October 2009. 265 [name withheld]. Wau: 17 October 2009. While local reconciliation ceremonies exist, Interview with respondent 54: 249 This point was made by groups people are acutely aware that these are Commissioner Aweil North. Gok Machar: 239 Interview with respondent 42: UN Officer. interviewed along the road north of Nimule meant for disputes among individuals, 7 November 2009.

Juba: 8 October 2009. in October 2009. By no means everyone such as the ceremony called ‘kac bol’ used 266 thought movement was now possible. Interview with respondent 53: Peace- 240 One reportedly happened near the among the Dinka and Jur communities, building Officer/ INGO (name and title Many said that peace had not yet come which respondents made very clear: ‘cannot Ambororo camp in Lokol Okoni. Allegedly to the area, because roads were still not withheld). Aweil Town: 5 November 2009. an argument between SPLA and Ambororo work outside the community and can only completely safe. Amongst other dangers, work for individual cases.’ If it was a case of 267 Interview with respondent 54: cattle traders ended in the Ambororo man landmines had not all been cleared. stabbing the SPLA soldier to death. In 2007, conflict between groups: ‘how can we go Commissioner Aweil North. Gok Machar: another incident was reported from Northern 250 Interview with respondent 50: Imam and make reconciliation with them? It needs 7 November 2009. to be the government of Southern Sudan.’ Bahr el-Ghazal where a Dinka man was (name and mosque withheld). Raja Town: 1 268 Interview with respondent 54: Focus group discussion with focus group allegedly killed by Ambororo and relatives November 2009. Commissioner Aweil North. Gok Machar: 30: youth leaders. Mapel, Jur River County, of the Dinka killed a few Ambororo in 251 7 November 2009. revenge. Interview with UNMIS official (name Focus group with focus group 41: Peace Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 23 October 2009. Committee. Iboni: 31 October 2009 269 Mark Bradbury et al. Rift Valley Institute. withheld). Wau: 18 October 2009. 258 See for example Andrew Mawson, ‘Local Peace Processes in Sudan: A 252 Personal email with feedback on Juba ‘Murahaleen raids on the Dinka, 1985-1989.’ 241 Duffield’s argument is important here. He Baseline Study’. 2006. describes the process of the undermining research workshop from respondent 20 Disasters 15, 2 (1991): 137-49. (name withheld). 4 December 2009. 270 Interview with respondent 55: INGO of Southerner’s positions in the north by 259 Douglas Johnson, ‘Why Abyei Country Director (name and title withheld). successive post-colonial regimes as parallel 253 Interview with respondent 51: donor Matters: the Breaking Point of Sudan’s Juba: 20 November 2009. with the erosion of the Fellata’s political Democracy and Governance Officer (name Comprehensive Peace Agreement?.’ African status. (Duffield, 2002) The continued and title withheld). Juba: 14 November 2009. Affairs. 107, 426 (2008): 1 – 19. 271 Interview with respondent 56: local man. narrative that the Ambororo are not Budi: 26 October 2009. approachable erodes their political status 254 Interview with respondent 51: 260 Human Rights Watch, Famine and – yet Western Equatoria officials who had Chairperson of a Youth Peace-building human rights: HRW background paper on 272 Interview with Respondent 12: maintained that the Ambororo had refused Association. Aweil Town, Northern Bahr el- the 1998 famine in Bahr el Ghazal, Sudan. Programme Officer/INGO (name and title to communicate only recently admitted that Ghazal: 5 November 2009. (Washington DC: 1998). withheld). Juba: 12 November 2009. the authorities had actually never pursued 255 Interview with Respondent 1: Coordinator 261 The ‘Wau Train’ was usually accompanied 273 A group of youths in Wau County the proper communication channels. of local NGO (name withheld). Wau, Western by several thousands of Misseriya on explained that disputes between the Fertit 242 Focus group discussion with focus group Bahr el-Ghazal: 17 October 2009. horseback. The movement of the train and the Fellata regarding destroyed crops and the destruction caused by Misserya 38: Fellata elders. Wau: 26 October 2009. 256 The most prominent examples of successful had been solved by the ‘chiefs’ of the Bai was largely stopped in 1998 through the and the Fellata. They described their ‘chiefs’ 243 local conflict resolution that CRMA found was Focus group discussion with focus ‘War-Awar Peace Accord’ 1998 signed by with extremely confined and very clearly defined as instrumental in their use of traditional group 39: youth leaders (four men and two current governor Malong. With the Misseriya problems, such as access to a water source. courts. However, the youth pointed out that women). Raja Town, Raja County, Western no longer a readily-available fighting force If it involved two relatively small communities, with support from the police, the traditional Bahr el-Ghazal: 29 October 2009. for the Government in Khartoum, mobilising local mechanisms like water committees who courts of the ‘chiefs’ could be even more sufficient troops became more challenging. 244 Focus group discussion with focus group decided who would gain access, whether the efficient. They cited the arrival of the SPLA Some see this as having been a major 12: 17 chiefs from Wau and surrounding borehole needed to be fenced or allocating in the area as a point when solving disputes motivator for GoS to sign the CPA. Interview areas. Wau, Wau County, Western Bahr el- human and animal access seemed to work. through the court became more efficient with Respondent 4: UN officer (name, title Ghazal: 23 October 2009. These tend to be run by women, rather than because: ‘the soldiers enforce the arrest

116 117 of armed criminals who would otherwise 46: Didinga community leaders in Lauro 27 295 Focus group discussion with focus areas. Wau, Wau County, Western Bahr el- resist the ‘chiefs’.’ Focus group discussion October 2009. group 48: youth leaders. Wau, Wau County, Ghazal: 23 October 2009. with focus group 29: youth Marial Bei, Wau Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 21 October 2009. 288 Peter Kamau, ‘Border area that defies 307 Focus group discussion with focus group County, Western Bahr el-Ghazal State: 28 296 October 2009. security,’ The Nation 1999. Interview with respondent 53: Peace- 12: 17 chiefs from Wau and surrounding 289 building Officer/ INGO (name and title areas. Wau, Wau County, Western Bahr el- 274 Focus group discussion with focus group Interview with rspondent 64: INGO staff. withheld). Aweil Town: 5 November 2009. Ghazal: 23 October 2009. 6: elders. Bisselia, Western Bahr el-Ghazal: Kapoeta South. 22 October 2009. 297 For a detailed and insightful discussion 308 Interview with resondent 67: UN staff. 29 October 2009. 290 Interview with respondent 65: Local SPLM of the types of issues this can create see Malakal: 24 November 2009. 275 Focus group discussion with focus group representative. Mapel: 24 October, 2009. Cherry Leonardi, ‘Violence, Sacrifice and 309 Focus group discussion with youth 43: Ndogo women. Bisselia: 29 October 2009. 291 Many NGOs put great faith in women Chiefship in Central Equatoria, Southern Sudan.’ Africa 77, 4 (2007b). (four men and two women). Raja Town, 276 Interview with respondent 57: Toposa as peace-builders, but those women Raja County, Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 29 Development Association Financial Advisor. interviewed who found themselves being 298 Interview with UNMIS official (name October 2009. Torit. 23 October 2009. asked to perform such a role stated that withheld). Wau: 18 October 2009. they felt out of their depth. When a group 310 Interview with respondent 39: SSRRC 277 Focus group discussion with focus group of women were asked whether they could 299 Interview with Respondent 14: official (name and title withheld). Wau: 23 44: Luo ‘chiefs’. Akobo:November 2009 tell men to stop fighting, they responded: Programme Manager of INGO (name October 2009. ‘Yes, we can stand up and tell them stop withheld). Wau: 19 October 2009. 278 Interview with respondent 54: 311 Indeed, in particular ‘chiefs’ and ‘Kings’ fighting, we don’t want to fight. But we do 300 Commissioner Aweil North. Gok Machar: not have the freedom to do that. We tell our Interview with Respondents 58: Secretary with the most legitimate power and influence 7 November 2009. husbands, don’t fight, we have children. Our General and Chairperson of local peace- would not be in a position to abdicate their building association. Aweil Town, Northern roles thus excluding the most influential 279 Interview with Respondents 58: Secretary children will be orphaned. But the husbands see what is happening and the need to Bahr el-Ghazal: 5 November 2009. traditional leaders from the executive and General and Chairperson of local peace- legislative governing of Southern Sudan. building association. Aweil Town, Northern defend.’ In Hai Gebelker, in Western Bahr 301 Interview with respondent 53: Peace- Bahr el-Ghazal: 5 November 2009. el-Ghazal, a women was chosen as a chief, building Officer/ INGO (name and title 312 See: Citizen and Subject: Contemporary bringing into focus the tension between old withheld). Aweil Town: 5 November 2009. Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. 280 Interview with respondent 59: and new rules, as the payam administrator 302 Mahmood Mamdani. (Princeton NJ: international donor representative (name asked the Women’s Development Group, Conference ‘Bridging the governance gap Princeton University Press, 1996). withheld). Juba: 15 October 2009. which had supported the woman in her between Monyomiji and Government’. Torit, 2009. 313 Focus group discussion with Focus 281 Interview with respondent 60: campaign, to pay for her salary. 303 group 31: women from Mapel. Mapel, Jur advisor to Civil Affairs UNIMIS,.Torit: 292 Interview with respondent 66: local elder A vast body of literature and coverage exists River County, Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 4 Novermber 2009. (name withheld). Bisselia: 29 October 2009 on this issue, some examples are Francis 24 October 2009. 282 M. Deng. United States Institute of Peace. Interview with respondent 61: Speaker of 293 Focus group discussion with focus group ‘Customary Law in the Cross Fire of Sudan’s 314 Personal email with feedback on Juba the EES Interim Legislative Assembly. Torit: 47: youth. Bisselia, Wau County, Western War of Identities’ 2006. ;Robert A Leitch, Aleu research workshop from respondent 3 November 2009. Bahr el-Ghazal: 30 October 2009. However, Akechak Jok, and Carrie Vandewint. World 20: Operations Manager of INGO (name 283 Interview with Respondent 7: Deputy it is worth keeping in mind that just as much Vision International. ‘A Study of Customary Law withheld). 4 December 2009. as the understanding of the chiefs’ role in Contemporary Southern Sudan’. Nairobi: Coordinator local peace-building NGO 315 Interview with Respondent 1: Coordinator [name withheld]. Wau: 17 October 2009. might be skewed, so is the understanding of 2004. ;Apollonia Matia, ‘South Laws Contradict the position of the ‘youth’ towards their own Laws of Constitutions,’ The Juba Post 12 of local NGO (name withheld). Wau, Western 284 Buya from Machi 15 explain that this responsibilities in families and communities. October 2006. Bahr el-Ghazal: 17 October 2009. was an isolated incident; the Buya who For a more detailed discussion, see Cherry 316 Focus group discussion with Focus raided was a revenge for his wife being Leonardi, ‘ ‘Liberation’ or ‘capture’: Youth in 304 Interview with Respondents 58: Secretary General and Chairperson of local peace- group 11: Chiefs, Elders, Administrators and raped by a Toposa. between ‘Hakuma’ and ‘home’ during civil Court Personnel. Mapel/ Jur River County/ war and its aftermath in Southen Sudan.’ building association. Aweil Town, Northern 285 Focus group discussion with focus group Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 20 October 2009. 106, 424 (2007a): 391-412. Bahr el-Ghazal: 5 November 2009. 45: Didinga community leaders in Lauro 27 317 Interview with Respondent 1: Coordinator 294 305 Focus group discussion with focus group October 2009. Focus group discussion with focus of local NGO (name withheld). Wau, Western group 48: youth leaders. Wau, Wau County, 12: 17 chiefs from Wau and surrounding 286 Interview with respondent 63: INGO Bahr el-Ghazal: 17 October 2009. Western Bahr el-Ghazal: 21 October 2009. areas. Wau, Wau County, Western Bahr el- Program Coordinator Eastern Equatoria 26 Ghazal: 23 October 2009. October 2009. 306 Focus group discussion with focus group 287 Focus group discussion with focus gropu 12: 17 chiefs from Wau and surrounding

118 119 318 The consequences of this are expressed 324 Presentation given by Aggrey Tisa Sabuni, 336 Wendy Fenton and Melissa Phillips, 349 Interview with Respondent 14: clearly in isolated areas, such as Raja Under Secretary, Planning, MoFEP, GoSS ‘Funding mechanisms in Southern Sudan: Programme Manager of INGO (name County in Western Bahr el-Ghazal and Lauro GoSS Aid Strategy: Current implementation NGO perspectives.’ Humanitarian Exchange withheld). Wau: 19 October 2009. in Budi County EES. & future challenges March 2009. Magazine 42 (2009). 350 Karen Moore (UN-Habitat supported by 319 These are results from individual 325 United States Institute for Peace. ‘Building 337 Personal email with feedback on MTDT UNDP) Mapping/ Capacity Assessment of interviews. A similar pattern emerged in blocks for citizenship and a peaceful with respondent 69: World Bank staff (name Local Organizations involved in Community focus group discussions. transition in Sudan’. Washington, D.C: 2009. withheld). 20 December 2009. Driven Development/Recovery (CDD/CDR) Mapping in Southern Sudan, May 25 2009. 320 Media’s power to spread hate speech 326 The revised Cotonou Agreement is the 338 Interview with respondent 59: is obvious. In Sudan, the impact of new only binding legal instrument including an international donor representative (name 351 D Hilhorst and M van Leeuwen, media on dissemination of hate speech is ICC-related clause. withheld). Juba 15 October 2009. ‘Grounding local peace organisations: a visible every day in the user forum of the 327 339 case study of southern Sudan.’ Journal of online publication Sudan Tribune, where http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/ At the time of writing it is still unclear Modern African Studies 43, 4 (2005). repository/sudan-final-non-ratification- exactly how much has been misappropriated. hate speech is taken to almost a new level. 352 The most prominent example of a radio faq-200908.pdf GoSS reported that it contracted SDG 6.26 D Hilhorst and M van Leeuwen, bn for 50 mn bags of grain. They have thus ‘Grounding local peace organisations: a station broadcasting propaganda and 328 Interview with respondent 68: NGO far paid SDG 504mn. The government has case study of southern Sudan.’ Journal of inciting violence remain Rwanada’s RTLM. representative. Juba: 9 October 2009. For a most comprehensive examination of done an internal investigation but this still has Modern African Studies 43, 4 (2005). 329 to be presented to the SSLA. It has been the role of media in inciting hatred during Personal email with feedback on Juba 353 Wendy Fenton and Melissa Phillips, the genocide in Rwanda, see The media research workshop from respondent suggested, but not confirmed, that the liability is around SDG 2bn. ‘Funding mechanisms in Southern Sudan: and the Rwanda genocide. ed. Allan 20: Operations Manager of INGO (name NGO perspectives.’ Humanitarian Exchange Thompson (Toronto: Pluto Press/ Fountain withheld). 4 December 2009. 340 Interview with respondent 59: Magazine 42 (2009). Publisher, 2007). The Don Bosco radio 330 Wairagala Wakabi, ‘Peace has come to international donor representative (name 354 station in Tonj, for example, never reports withheld). Juba 15 October 2009. Interview with respondent 55: INGO Southern Sudan, but challenges remain.’ Country Director (name and title withheld). news of local attacks in order not to incite World Report The Lancet 368 (2006). revenge attacks. On the current situation 341 Interview with Respondent 70: Country Juba: 20 November 2009. 331 of journalists working in Sudan, including Currently, pooled funding mechanisms make Director/ Medical INGO (name and title 355 withheld). Juba: 12 November 2009. Interview with respondent 55: INGO a section on harassment of journalists in up 34 per cent of all donors funds whereas bi- Country Director (name and title withheld). Southern Sudan, see for example Human lateral funding makes up 66 per cent. 342 Interview with Respondent 70: Country Juba: 20 November 2009. Rights Watch. HRW. ‘It’s an Everyday Battle’: 332 Fenton, Wendy Funding Mechanisms Director/ Medical INGO (name and title Censorship and Harassment of Journalists 356 Interview with respondent 12: RRP in Southern Sudan: NGO perspectives withheld). Juba: 12 Novembe, 2009. and Human Rights Defenders in Sudan’. coordinator of INGO (name and title 20 February 2008. New York 2009. . On the costs and benefits 343 NGO respondents felt that with limited withheld). Wau: 3 November 2009. of a free media in post-conflict states, see 333 In fact, one reason given for the MDTF’s funding to Southern Sudan, NGOs needed to Tim Allen and Nicole Stremlau, ‘Media slow disbursement is the rivalry between compete for funding which meant that they policy, peace and state reconstruction,’ UNDP and the World Bank. See Axel often worked in silos and lacked coordination. in Media & Glocal Change: Rethinking Borchgrevink and Anita Haslie. Norwegian 344 Interview with respondent 71: INGO. Torit: Communication for Development, ed. Oscar Institute of International Affairs. ‘International 5 November, 2009 Hemer and Thomas Tufte (Nordicom, 2005). Engagement in Sudan after the CPA, Working Paper 714’. Oslo: 2007. 345 As a UN/NGO initiative, this was not 321 Interview with respondent 59: initially welcomed by GoSS. international donor representative (name 334 Associate Parliamentary Group for Sudan. withheld). Juba: 15 October 2009. UK Parliament. ‘On the brink: Towards 346 http://www.ngoforum.info/ lasting peace in Sudan/A report on the role 322 Interview with respondent 59: 347 of the international community in supporting Interview with Respondent 72: Field international donor representative (name Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement Coordination/ INGO (name and title withheld). Juba: 15 October 2009. and beyond’. London: March 2010. withheld). Gok Machar, Northern Bahr el- Ghazal State: 7 November 2009. 323 Interview with respondent 68: NGO 335 Wendy Fenton and Melissa Phillips, representative. Juba: 9 October 2009. 348 ‘Funding mechanisms in Southern Sudan: Interview with respondent 73: Donor NGO perspectives.’ Humanitarian Exchange Coordinator/ Programme Manager (name Magazine 42 (2009). and title withheld). Juba: 11 November, 2009.

120 121 A better future: a selection of school children’s drawings

122 123