Anamnesis The Colorado College Journal of Philosophy

Volume V • 2020 _Staff_

Editors-in-Chief Benedict Wright Anne Daley

Editorial Staff Max Chiaramonte Daniel Lawrence Molly Lovett Anton Rieselbach Natalie TeSelle

Artwork Sam Cadigan

Layout Editor Noah Weeks

Advisor Rick Furtak

2 Anamnesis Contents

Vol. V 3 Mission Statement & Acknowledgements

Anamnesis is the student-edited philosophy journal of Colorado College. The journal publishes philosophical under- graduate essays from colleges and universities nationwide. Colo- rado College students founded the journal in order to give their peers a taste of what the discipline can be at its best. In line with this goal, we aim to publish clearly written, elegantly argued es- says. We also strive to publish essays that directly pertain to the most interesting, difficult, and pressing issues in both philosophy and our lives. We would like to thank Cutler Publications and the Col- orado College Philosophy Department for making the journal possible this year. We would also like to thank Rick Furtak for his thoughtful insights and support.

4 Anamnesis Letter from the Editors This year, for the fifth volume of Anamnesis, we released our call for papers without a specific theme in mind. True to the vision of the journal’s founders, we sought to publish rigor- ous and accessible essays that made thoughtful arguments and raised relevant questions. It is our belief that we have done that to the very best of our abilities. Despite the absence of an ex- plicit theme, this year’s essays ended up sharing some notable common elements. Each in their own way, these three essays and one poem all ponder issues of freedom, autonomy, and constraint. In the first essay, Colorado College student Ying Wang raises questions and fears about the existential signifi- cance of death, the ultimate and inevitable constraint on our lives as we know them. Yuezhen Li, attending the University of Chicago, then gives an analysis of Marx’s early critique of capitalism wherein Marx focuses on alienation and the depriva- tion of human freedom. In the third essay, Khalid “Kai” Davis of Macalester College makes a case for physician-assisted dying on the grounds that, in certain cases, the practice maximizes freedom and autonomy. This year, the journal ends with a poem written by Spencer Janney, also a student at Colorado College. His poem, “The Seed,” ponders the organic metaphor of He- gel’s dialectic, the unfolding of Spirit towards freedom. Given the unfamiliar moment that we are experiencing in the Spring of 2020, it is a real joy to still be able to publish Anamnesis this year. We extend our well-wishes to the Colorado College community and beyond.

Vol. V 5 Confronting Death by Ying Wang Colorado College Confronting Death

And then a gloomy rhyming word, like – ‘Death’. It rang hollow, ghostly, subdued, to me. – Goethe

y understanding of life and death Hume in the eighteenth-century and Mwas radically changed this past later adapted by Derek Parfit to explain summer. All of a sudden, my mom for- personal identity. In Parfit’s interpreta- got basic arithmetic and the meaning of tion of bundle theory, no coherent self words. After I found that she could not exists, and humans are nothing more answer any simple questions, I immedi- than bundles of past experiences and ately burst into tears. In the hospital, the memories unified by causal relation. doctor pointed at some tiny, tiny dark Nonetheless, if we take the points on an X-ray film of my mom’s bundle theorists seriously, the question skull and told me that my mom had had of why death is so scary becomes con- a stroke caused by these little blocks in fusing. Indeed, if life is no more than her cerebral artery. But I was unable to a series of different events and mental make any sense of these blocks. They states, then a person only exists at this were nothing more than little heaps of very moment. There is no real con- fat sitting inside my mom’s brain, but tinuous existence based on a unity of they were able to make my mom terri- consciousness, and thus death is merely fyingly different from the smart, lovely an event in the far future that is whol- woman I have known for twenty years. ly independent from this very moment. Their power horrified me. They made However, for many of us death is so me consider how fragile our brains and frightening that believing in bundle selves are—or even if there are “selves” theory would not seem to help at all. at all given that some tiny blocks could There must be some deep repugnance so easily destroy them. for death that made me cry when I Modern neuroscience has sig- learned that my mom had a stroke. My nificantly challenged our understand- problem now becomes, how could I, a ing of the “self ” because substantial mere bundle of my past experiences, be studies of human brains find nothing scared by death? representing it. Therefore, the notion For bundle theorists, this ques- of a coherent self seems more a ro- tion would seem so naïve that they mantic matter rather than a scientific would confidently assert that my -feel fact. Neuroscience has thus offered new ings are only illusions. After all, if there grounds for bundle theory, a long-last- is no persistent self, the future death ing ontology theory developed by David has nothing to do with the present. Vol. V 7 Ying Wang However, in this paper, I will justify the ilarly, the general notion of retirement fear of death and argue that we should allows the elderly to enjoy the last pe- be afraid of it even in the context of riod of their lives in leisure. Of course, bundle theory. I will begin with a con- there are many other reasons for these cept I call the “Naturality of Fearing norms, but a thought experiment helps Death,” which offers an explanation of to indicate that human life is deeply in- why human beings inevitably possess tertwined with death. Imagine an im- attitudes and emotions toward death mortal race such as Tolkien’s Elves— and why these emotions often take the they have no need to rush in life, to get form of fear (although there could be their education done by a certain age, many other forms as well). “Fear,” in or to work as hard as possible in their this context, indicates a strong wish to middle age to save money, and so they avoid an event, usually accompanied by lead calm and elegant lives. By contrast, anxiety about the uncertainty inherent we mortals live lives that necessarily to the event. I will then analyze and re- terminate, and our awareness of the spond to the bundle theorists’ “living in termination leads us to utilize precious the moment” objection to the fear of time by making life plans. If biologists death. After that, based on the work of suddenly eliminate death or significant- Haslanger and Kierkegaard, I will give ly extend lifespan, our plans would go normative reasons why a moderate fear through massive changes as well. Thus, of death is in fact beneficial in practice. consciously or not, death is looming I hope to show why there is nothing whenever we are making and carrying wrong with fearing death and how we out life plans (which is to say, regularly can, in fact, use our fear to work for so- and often). cial justice. Similarly, our attitude to life in- cludes our attitude toward death. This The Naturality of Fearing Death complementary relationship between life and death becomes most apparent First of all, I argue that it is nat- when death becomes an urgent possibil- ural and inevitable for human beings to ity rather than a far-away event. When produce emotions and attitudes regard- busying myself with everyday life, I sel- ing death, although these feelings may dom bring the concept of death to my not necessarily appear as fear. Although mind. Time appears to be an inexhaust- we may be unaware of the presence of ible resource to me, and I do not active- death most of the time, it perpetually ly keep in mind that the amount of time influences our lives. For example, death I could spend with my family was limit- plays an essential role in the formation ed. However, after my mother’s stroke, of basic social norms. We typically go it comes to me now and then that an to school at the most vigorous age when end of our relationship is hiding behind death is furthest away so that we have a our everyday interactions. Realization long time to apply our knowledge. Sim- of the inevitability of such an end has 8 Anamnesis Confronting Death instilled in me new thoughts whenev- many people are afraid of dying alone, er I am with my mother: to argue less which explains why, in Chinese tradi- with her, to understand her better, and tion, the more children one has, the bet- to cherish the moments I could spend ter. These all are practical but legitimate with her. reasons for fearing death. To summarize, the reason for our fear of death is not that death it- Against the Fear of Death self is scary a priori. The word fear could be replaced by hatred, relief, and Over the history of philosoph- many other feelings. The key reason ical debates over death, a strong objec- why these feelings are natural is that in tion to fearing death has been that, given the throes of existence death matters. that we have no control over the future, Death presents itself in our lives con- it is pointless to worry about it. There- sistently and influences our life choices fore, although the fear of death comes heavily. Hence, human beings cannot naturally, we should train ourselves to avoid thinking—consciously or uncon- get rid of this fear. Among the figures sciously—about death. Even those who who support this idea, I want to discuss display defiant rage or admirable cour- two representative arguments given by age in the face of death are showing ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus their feelings about it. I call this deduc- and bundle theorist Galen Strawson. tion the Naturality of Fearing Death. Writing in the third and fourth While the Naturality of Fear- centuries B.C., Epicurus develops an ing Death does not distinguish fear (in early form of Hedonism simply known the specific sense of being afraid) from as Epicureanism. He believes that most other feelings such as hatred and relief, profound good comes from happiness, in practice fear is certainly the most and good cannot exist independently of common one. Look at people’s faces happiness. Also an atomic materialist, outside of Intensive Care Units to see Epicurus thinks that after one’s death this fact. Instead of just being a feeling the soul disperses along with the atoms or instinctual response, being afraid of in the body, and so there is no continu- death can have a complex set of causes. ation of life after death. Based on this For instance, Nichols et al. have sum- understanding of death, he centers marized six common reasons behind his philosophy of death on the notion people’s fear of death, including: “loss of ‘prudence.’ He claims that because of self-fulfillment, loss of social identi- when death comes we are not aware ty, consequences to family and friends, of our feelings at all, the fear of future transcendental consequences, self-anni- death only makes the present painful. hilation, and punishment in the hereaf- Therefore, he advises people to break ter.”1 There are also culturally depen- free from fearing death so that they dent factors that lead a person to fear could live a most prudent and pleasant death. For instance, in Chinese culture, life.2 From this standpoint, being afraid Vol. V 9 Ying Wang of death is not only futile since no feel- Naturality of Fearing Death argument ings or emotions will be present at the can help justify his feelings. Rather than moment of death, but also imprudent, a remote event in the future, death is a as it distresses us in the present when we subjective fact in the present moment. are still alive. Death manifests itself in Strawson’s life Strawson agrees with Epicurus as an emotion evoked by the fact that that we should live in the moment, but after death he could not observe the he goes a step further arguing we can world again, an emotion which Straw- only live in the moment. He claims that son identifies as fear. because we humans are not entities Epicurus makes two other im- with control over our futures, the loss of portant observations relevant to the fear the future (i.e., death) cannot harm us. of death. First, he claims that to lead However, Strawson does admit that he a prudent life we need “sober reason- himself fears death. He does not take ing searching out the grounds of every our lack of ownership of the future to choice and avoidance.”4 Such reasoning mean that the fear of death is invalid. cannot be done without considering I agree with Strawson here because he the future. Second, his philosophy is understands that we do not need to own completely normative; that is, it gives something in order to fear it. Strawson guidance on how to live while avoiding has also taken a step further to explain what the nature of life and death is. Be- why he is afraid of death even though he cause death is a significant—perhaps has no control of it. He interprets death the most significant—part of the future, as a feeling of “not being there.”3 He it follows from Epicurus’s first observa- uses a metaphor to describe the concept tion combined with the Naturality of of death: an empty house with a win- Fearing Death that the Epicurean phi- dow with no one in the house looking losophy of life should necessarily involve out from the window. Everything out- a consideration of death. Therefore, in side of the window keeps its own pace, a normative sense, what we think about but in the house, he is not there any- future death may inform how we act more. It is this feeling of absence that now. For example, if a person is worried worries and scares him. Even though about dying alone, she might prudently Strawson offers a beautiful reason for decide to get married and have children his fear, it is left unexplained why he now. Again, this emotion toward death chooses to keep this fear in his heart. If could legitimately manifest as fear. he has no control over something that is independent of this very moment, why How Ought We Understand Death? accept this fear? In other words, why would someone care for death, if it is, as The normative significance of bundle theorists argue, an event in the death is further important because it di- future that only is only loosely related rects us to important ontological ques- with the present via casualty? But the tions, such as what the word ‘death’ 10 Anamnesis Confronting Death really means, which meanings of death dhists and Tibetan scholars to complete we are referring to when we think about a questionnaire about the fear of death, and react to death respectively, and the former based on how they actual- what are the functions of those mean- ly feel about death and the latter on ings. We notice that, even though we how Tibetan Buddhists ought to feel. can define death in an impersonal or Surprisingly, it turned out that Tibet- objective way (with science or religion), an Buddhists reported fearing death we cannot avoid feeling and respond- much more than they are supposed to ing to the subjective presence of death be. To explain what leads to the gap, in our life. When death really comes to the researchers put forward “the tra- one’s face, someone who has read a lot ditional Buddhist distinction between about death might not be able to find innate self-grasping and philosophical reassurance in literary advice. This gap self-grasping.”6 One may arrive at a between objective theory and subjective deeper philosophical understanding of practice can shake the credibility of ob- death through practicing philosophical jective guidance as to how to react to and religious reflection, but such - re the notion of death. To elucidate this flection cannot immunize one from in- gap and discuss what to do about it, I terpreting life events as they appear in want to introduce Haslanger’s analyses one’s innate self-grasping. In this innate of meaning, including her differenti- self-grasping, the subjective impression ation between manifest and operative that death makes could not be remod- concepts and her normative approach eled through reflection. This Buddhist toward this distinction. distinction fits well into Haslanger’s Haslanger claims that there manifest/operative framework of con- are two layers of concepts behind any cepts. word: the manifest one and the opera- Given the extant differences tive one. She characterizes the former between concepts, Haslanger concludes as “the more explicit, public, and ‘in- that both of them are inadequate and tuitive’ one,” whereas the latter is “the discusses a third possibility: to consider more implicit, hidden, and yet prac- the meaning of concepts on the norma- ticed one.”5 This theory seems to hold tive level. She advises us to think about true in the case of the word death. how we should define words so that the While I will not try to articulate what definition benefits us in practice. Ap- these concepts of the word death are, plying her suggestion in the context of I reference Haslanger’s theory to point thinking about death, we should weigh out that what we think death is and the practical pros and cons of differ- what we actually feel about it could be ent definitions of death. Although Ep- quite different. For example, Nichols et icurus’ normative reason for not fearing al. have carried out a quantitative ex- death is sensible, I claim there are more periment which explicitly reveals such important reasons why we should care differences. They invited Tibetan Bud- about death and fear it. Vol. V 11 Ying Wang The first reason is developed pearl-like, from our souls without real by Kierkegaard, who argues that death pain.”8 This phenomenon is undoubt- is our teacher, and fearing death lets edly problematic because it is sympathy us understand the scarcity of time. He and empathy that drive people to un- writes, “who has not heard how one derstand others’ condition and choose day, sometimes one hour, gained in- to help them. However, feeling and finite worth because death made time expressing emotions toward others’ po- dear, but with the thought of death the tential death is perhaps an effective way earnest person is able to create a scarci- to penetrate the “nacreous layer.” By ty… and the merchant profits by using training ourselves to share others’ fear time.”7 Kierkegaard puts forward the of death, we become more sensitive and notion of “earnestness” toward death, sympathetic toward others’ feelings and according to which he urges us to con- hence value their lives. template death carefully and frequently Finally, feelings about death be- so that we can pursue the right goals at sides fear could also illuminate and even present. The fear of death could guide orient our lives. Hermann Hesse vividly our current life in a way that highlights describes in Steppenwolf how some- what really matters right now. Think- one—whom Hesse calls “the suicide”— ing of death earnestly pushes one to gains power to control one’s life through ask oneself such questions as, “Is there his aspiration to death. Such power someone you want to thank before your comes from his freedom of terminating death? Do you want to say sorry to life and erasing all of his wrongdoings someone if this is the last chance that and pain: “He gained strength through you could do so? What do you want to familiarity with the thought that the accomplish before your death?” emergency exit stood always open, and I believe there is a more im- became curious, too, to taste his suffer- portant moral consideration why we ing to the dregs. If it went too badly should fear death, but this time not only with him he could feel, sometimes with the death of ourselves but also of other a grim malicious pleasure: ‘I am curi- individuals. In a society where we are ous to see all the same just how much a overwhelmingly connected to each oth- man can endure. If the limit of what is er, it is all too easy for us to hear others’ bearable is reached, I have only to open sufferings without feeling any of them. the door to escape.’”9 The Steppenwolf Our failure to share others’ emotions does not live to remedy his wrongdo- isolates us from each other, as Neil ings or to get rid of pain. On the con- Gaiman depicts in his American Gods: trary, his view of life makes it a gamble “We draw our lines around these mo- in which his goal is to see how much ments of pain (of others), and remain pain he could possibly bear. When the upon our islands, and they cannot hurt amount of pain goes beyond his limit, us. They are covered with a smooth, he has the option to turn around and safe, nacreous layer to let them slip, quit the game through choosing death 12 Anamnesis Confronting Death willingly. Therefore, his power to escape about living properly–which we consis- through the emergency exit anytime lib- tently produce–are also thoughts about erates his present behavior. how to die properly. We treat life with emotions, and hence face death with Conclusion perhaps even stronger emotions. She loves her happy life, and so she hates To fear death is not only nat- the ruthless death; he loathes his miser- ural and sensible but also prudent and able existence, and so he welcomes the even normative. After all, in a universe consoling death. Our emotions toward where entities as tiny as atoms fuse and death co-exist with death itself, and if split and those as gigantic as planets so- we do not feel anything about death, lidify and explode, it would be a wonder it is only because we do not yet know if we, evanescent human beings, could there is death. My own feeling toward ignore our own end. In every moment death is fear. That fear is not irrational; of living, we are simultaneously wit- rather, it has an orienting power and nessing and confronting death because sheds light on this very moment. living itself implies death. Any thoughts Bibliography

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. Faust. Translated by A. S. Kline, 2003. Hesse, Hermann. Steppenwolf. Translated by Basil Creighton. London: Picador, 2002. Gaiman, Neil. American Gods. Milwaukie: Dark Horse Books, 2018. Strawson, Galen. The Subject of Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Epicurus. “Letter to Menoeceus.” In The Philosophy of Death Reader. Edited by Markar Melkonian. London: Bloomsbury, 2019. Haslanger, Sally. “What Are We Talking About? The Semantics and Politics of Social Kinds.” Hypatia 20, no. 4 (Autumn 2005): 10-26. Nichols, Shaun, Nina Strohminger, Arun Rai, and Jay Garfield. “Death and the Self.” Cognitive Science 42, no 1 (January 2018): 314-332. Kierkegaard, Søren. “At a Graveside.” In Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions. Edited and Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton University Press, 2009. Endnotes

1 Shaun Nichols, Nina Strohminger, Arun Rai, and Jay Garfield, “Death and the Self,” Cognitive Science 42, no. 1 (January 2018): 323. 2 Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus” in The Philosophy of Death Reader, ed. Markar Melkonian (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), 50-53. Vol. V 13 Ying Wang 3 Galen Strawson, The Subject of Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 97. 4 Epicurus, “Menoceus,” 52. 5 Sally Haslanger, “What Are We Talking About? The Semantics and Politics of Social Kinds,” Hypatia 20, no. 4 (Autumn 2005): 14. 6 Nichols et al., “Death and the Self,” 330. 7 Søren Kierkegaard, “At a Graveside” in Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 84.

14 Anamnesis Can Early Marx Ground His Critique of Capitalism? by Yuezhen Li The University of Chicago Yuezhen Li

he period between 1843 and 1845 labor”, rendering the good life through Tmarks a formative and distinctive work impossible. stage in Marx’s career. This period, be- I identify the underlying struc- ginning with Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy ture of Early Marx’s argument as simi- of Right of 1843 and ending with The lar to that in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Eth- German Ideology of 1845, signifies his ear- ics. They not only each give a version ly attention to German idealist philoso- of non-utilitarian consequentialism on phy (particularly Hegel and Hegelian- the level of normative ethics, but they ism, such as that of Ludwig Feuerbach) both base their ethical theories on ap- and his increasing interest in the system peals to an account of human nature. of “private property,” i.e. capitalism. In- They share a metaethical structure that deed, it was in Economic and Philosophical can be summarized by the following Manuscripts of 1844 that Marx made his valid syllogism: P1. The good life is to first attempt at a critique of capitalism, do what is human—a basic metaeth- one based on alienation from our true ical claim; P2. To do X is to do what essence, namely, our human species-be- is human—a metaphysical theory of ing.1 human nature; C. The good life is to This essay will examine the do X. However, with his methodologi- structural status of Early Marx’s cal commitment, Marx seems to be in critique. After outlining this alien- no position to justify either the abstract ation-based critique, I will establish— claim of P1 or the substantive claim of against Allen Wood’s commentary— P2 (wherein he thinks of a kind of labor that Early Marx not only has a norma- activities as central to human nature). tive ethical theory but that this theory Given these unresolvable difficulties, I provides an important grounding for argue that Early Marx’s appeal to hu- his critical apparatus. This normative man nature—the lack of exercise of ethical theory also describes the good which he terms “alienation”—fails as life: the good life for human beings is an attempt to ground his normative to conduct activities suited to their na- ethical claim. ture. Given the substantive claim that fulfilling, collaborative labor is essential The Conception of Alienation & to who we are, Early Marx identifies Critique of Capitalism the good life as one in which people can produce freely and meaningfully. The Early Marx’s general critical evil of capitalism, it follows, is that it de- outlook is that capitalism makes it im- generates fulfilling labor into “alienated possible for us to engage in such activ- 16 Anamnesis Can Early Marx Ground His Critique of Capitalism? ities and in such ways that are in har- Early Marx’s fundamental mony with the essential nature of our problem with alienation is neither the human species; thus, capitalism alienates repetitious, mechanical labor process us from who we are. The German term nor the fact that it renders the work- for “alienation”—alternatively translat- er’s subjective life unpleasurable and ed as “estrangement”—is Entfremdung or anguished: “robbed of all actual life Entäusserung. They have the literal sense content…worthless, devoid of dignity.”2 of making something “strange, foreign” While such subjective states are surely or “external, of others”; they carry the terrible, they are at best evidential or image of externalizing something that symptomatic of alienation. Instead, is supposed to be internal, to make alienation is an objective state wherein alien/strange/foreign something that the product of the worker is taken away, is supposed to be familiar, and to make work is only done to earn a wage (rather what is supposed to be of this to be of than as an autonomous activity), work- other. Taken together, Marx’s use of the ers are turned against each other, etc. term “alienation” or “estrangement” What each worker thinks or feels about should refer to the unnatural separation such an objective state is irrelevant. A of things that naturally belong together. well-paid software engineer at Google Much like Hegel and Feuer- is nonetheless an alienated worker; a bach using the notion of alienation to pre-capitalist peasant suffering from his address spirituality and religious con- work may nonetheless be unalienated. sciousness, Early Marx focuses on a Only with this in mind can we historically specific kind of alienation approach the fourth sense of alienated under capitalism: alienated labor. labor, which seems the most interesting Alienated labor should literally mean for our purposes. It refers to the unnat- the unnatural separation of the worker ural separation of the worker from her from her labor. In EPM Marx identifies species-being, or something akin to her four kinds of alienation for workers: “human nature”. Species-being or Gat- 1. Alienation from the product, as it is tungswesen literally points to the folk idea taken away by the capitalists once the of “what makes us human.” For Marx, production commences; 2. Alienation the species-being is not manifested from the working process itself, because statically, but only in practice: a life in the workers’ labor-power is transformed harmony with species-beings is a life in into something for sale (so as to earn a which we act like a human and realize wage for livelihood) and thus belong to our essential powers qua human beings. others, i.e. the capitalists; 3. Alienation In other words, for Marx we are not just from other workers, as workers are put what we are; we are what we (can) do. into competition for employment and Marx maintains that it is our powers for higher wages against each other; 4. to act that make who we are.3 There- Alienation from their “species-beings” fore, alienation from our species-being (Gattungswesen). means an objective inability to realize Vol. V 17 Yuezhen Li our essential powers. Under capitalism, ductive activity and species-being is cut we—qua workers—are thwarted from off. An activity of labor is inhuman if the full exercise of our essential powers. it lacks control where one ought to have; What are our essential powers a human activity, by contrast, is an au- that constitute our species-being? Early tonomous “self-activity”. Marx seems Marx suggests that our ability to engage to suggest that in order for the work to in labor is among them. The point of be unalienated, workers ought to have labor for Marx is objectification. De- freedom in choosing: 1) on whether to spite the word’s negative connotation in labor at all and 2) on how and what to popular usage, objectification is indis- labor, as part of the transformation of pensable for Marx. As EPM explains, the world. Unfortunately, unalienated “the product of labor is labor which has workers have neither freedom; contrary been congealed in an object, which has to capitalism’s claim that it has brought become material; it is [the] objectification about unprecedented emancipation, of labor.”4 For Marx, labor is the con- wage workers are not sufficiently freer scious transformation of the world; we than serfs or slaves. All the four aspects can only act upon the material world by of alienated labor show up at once, as objectifying our productive power, viz. workers lose their products, their work, by turning that power into something their comradery, and their human selves tangible,5 material, and real. By engag- as they work. Central to this picture is ing in labor, one not only objectifies that their work is not truly autonomous one’s labor-power into a concrete prod- self-activity, but they lack control where uct but also affirms one’s by species-be- they ought to have. ing as a human being exercising one’s Workers under alienated labor essential powers. This Marxian theme do appear to voluntarily choose to work seems to echo Aristotle’s idea that pro- as they do, but that is just a mere appear- duction is the objectification of the self, ance. In reality, there is no alternative to as the activation of the essence, such engaging in the capitalist mode of pro- that “his product manifest[s] in reali- duction. Since the means of production ty.”6 We affirm our individuality as well are concentrated at the hands of capi- as our humanity through our conscious talists, the workers cannot support their productive activity and confirm them own lives without constantly selling their by the objectively existing products labor-power as commodities. To refuse of labor, which Marx describes as “so such a transaction is to deny oneself of many mirrors in which we saw reflected the day’s subsistence and thus deny one- our essential nature.”7 Our productive self of life. Compelled by the threat of power thus belongs naturally to our spe- starvation, workers must instead spend cies-being. all their days working for mere sub- Labor under capitalism is sistence (a low level guaranteed by in- alienated precisely because this natural ter-workers alienation, viz. competition linkage (“belonging-together”) of pro- amongst workers). As Engels summariz- 18 Anamnesis Can Early Marx Ground His Critique of Capitalism? es in 1847, “the slave is sold once and inated by him.”11 By this Marx alludes for all; the proletarian must sell himself to Adam Smith, who argues that divi- daily and hourly.”8 The idea that work- sion of labor arises naturally from each ers under capitalism are categorically individual’s “comparative advantages.” freer than slaves is merely formal—in Under such a systematic division of reality just self-congratulation in vain. labor, a worker cannot be said to have Not only do alienated workers control over what and how to work; in- lack the freedom to choose whether to stead, it is dictated and imposed by an work or not, but they have no autonomy external will, which instrumentally uses in deciding what and how they would the workers to achieve some goal (e.g., like to produce. This is particularly general efficiency) outside of the work- damning for Marx, who not only names er. After all, workers lack control over autonomous production as a central as- the social conditions that determine pect of our human species-being, but how labor is divided. They objectify also emphasizes that the degree of pro- their labor-power not out of their own ductive autonomy is closely linked with conscious will, as it naturally should; in- the human (as opposed to animalistic) stead, their labor is so alienated that it form of being. Marx famously asserts in thwarts their self-actualization as indi- the 1860s—although Early Marx would vidual human beings. more than likely concur—that, “what The problem of human alien- distinguishes the worst architect from ation, in summary, is that one’s life is not the best of bees is this, that the archi- lived in a human fashion, insofar as one tect raises his structure in imagination lacks control over one’s life-activities. before he erects it in reality.”9 Namely, Rather than autonomous self-activities, Marx seems to hold that there is a char- the worker experiences his productive acteristically, even “exclusively,” human labor as not “his own activity;”12 rather way of labor.10 All animals produce for than confirming the worker’s individu- their own subsistence, but it is human ality and humanity, alienated labor feels to have a conscious plan in the imag- like a sacrifice of that humanity.13 Thus, ination and willingly realize it into ac- the alienated worker “feels at home tuality. Alienated labor under capitalism when he is not working, and when he is is characteristically un-human because working, he does not feel at home”14— the worker has no say in what or how paradoxically, only able to find his hu- to produce. A primary cause of this manity in animalistic activities: “eating, unfreedom is the ever-present division drinking, procreating, or at most in his of labor under capitalism. Marx writes dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.,”15 in 1845 that “as long … as activity is while feeling a loss of himself when divided not freely but naturally, the engaging in the otherwise humanity-ac- human being’s own deed becomes an tualizing labor. In Early Marx’s view, alien might standing over against him, we are alienated when we cannot fully subjugating him instead of being dom- and freely exercise our essential pow- Vol. V 19 Yuezhen Li ers through autonomous self-activities cile Wood’s insight that Marx’s critique and confirm our human nature.16 This is never based on justice or morality and alienation is historical,17 most promi- the fact that the critique is based on a nent amongst workers under capitalism. certain normative ethical theory. Wood’s point, as G.A. Cohen Does Early Marx Have an Ethical summarizes it, seems to be that for Theory? Marx, “capitalism because it displays, not injustice, or any other moral evil, Early Marx critiques capitalism but what Wood considers to be non- on the grounds that it causes alienation moral evils: it cripples human creativi- for human beings (especially among ty and it fosters inhumane social rela- workers) and prevents them from fully tions.”18 By that, I think Wood has got actualizing their humanity. This train of something very important right about thought appears to be based on two in- Marx: it is meaningless to say that cap- tertwined philosophy projects: a norma- italism is unjust or unethical because, tive-ethical theory of the good life and a according to Marx, the specific formu- metaphysical theory of human nature. lations of justice and ethics are contingent He seems to be claiming that capitalism upon the dominant form of society. is bad because it fails to do what is good, This “meaninglessness” may have two that is, to promote the good life; there- senses: 1. Theories of value – justice fore, he seems to presuppose a theory and ethics included – are by nature of the good life. Meanwhile, he seems “superstructures” that justify the given to claim that the good life is to actualize social order from which and ensure the our essential (humanity-defining/con- survival and stability of the structure of firming) powers and to align ourselves the “economic foundation”. Our sense with who we truly are, thus requiring a of justice and ethics is nothing like tran- theory of human nature. shistorical natural law and instead is Whether this ethical-metaphys- part of the self-perpetuating apparatus ical complex exists for Early Marx has of capitalism that is unlikely to judge it been controversial amongst his com- as unjust or unethical; 2. It is possible mentators. Allen Wood, for example, ar- to avoid this catch by evaluating capi- gues that Marx—young and mature— talism from a different notion of justice never thinks of capitalism as unjust or and ethics; however, to impose certain unethical. Along with that thought, it values from outside of capitalism is jar- would be really weird to state that Ear- ring for Marx.19 To say something is un- ly Marx critiques capitalism based on just seems to presuppose that it violates an ethical theory. Yet I think this re- some juridical rights, given the etymo- sult stems from either a misreading of logical link between “justice,” iustitia in Wood’s position or a misunderstanding Latin, and the law, iuris. As Wood cor- of Marx’s position on Wood’s part. I ar- rectly notes, this kind of right-based ju- gue that it is perfectly possible to recon- ridicism is not found in Marx. In his late 20 Anamnesis Can Early Marx Ground His Critique of Capitalism? career, Marx makes it crystal clear that That which is called a “nonmoral evil” his critique of capitalism has nothing to must fall and not fall into the moral cat- do with the “equal right” to products egory at the same time. While I agree or “fair distribution” of wealth.20 The with Wood that Early Marx’s critique of workers’ alienation from their product capitalism is not moralizing;22 however, is wrong, similarly, not because their Early Marx does make a moral statement “property right” is violated, but because about capitalism: “it cripples human they are cut off from a natural linkage creativity and fosters inhumane social to their products, which, as above, are relations”, alienating them from the hu- “mirrors in which we saw reflected our man species whom they really are. The essential nature” and thus confirm our latter accusation by itself constitutes a human creative ingenuity.21 Taken to- moral charge against capitalism by the gether, Wood gets it right that Marx very claim that something is wrong about makes no criticism of capitalism based it. With that in mind, Marx’s critique of on justice; instead, capitalism is accused capitalism as promoting the bad, alien- as unnatural, dehumanizing, subject to ating life is not only consistent with, but immanent contradictions, etc. indeed presupposing an ethical theory However, it would be going too qua an outlook of the good life. There far to claim that Marx’s critique of cap- is nothing wrong—but everything es- italism is amoral because it is morally sential—for Marx in making claims of irrelevant, in the sense that he needs no normative ethics. ethical theory. To say so confounds two senses in which the word “moral” can Does Early Marx’s Ethical Theory be used: On the one hand, morality can Have a Metaphysical Grounding? refer to the commonly accepted system of values specific to a given society; for As discussed above, Marx’s example, we can say “it is not moral to ethical theory of the good life is based kill” or “it is moral to work for the most on the notion of alienation, that is, the money and then donate it”. On the oth- inability to fully actualize our essential er hand, morality in a “meta” sense can powers; this necessitates a notion of hu- refer to the sphere of values as such. man nature, or what it is that defines us Any “good-bad/evil” claim and any as humans. This section considers Early normative claim is inherently moral, in Marx’s conception of human nature as the sense of morally relevant. If Marx a metaphysical theory undergirding his is truly morally irrelevant, he would not ethical theory. be able to critique capitalism, for he is not Early Marx’s notion of the hu- allowed to say what is wrong—which is man species-beings has at least the fol- by itself a moral term—with it. The fact lowing substance: 1. Human beings are that Wood presents the locus of Marx’s “tool-making animals” (per Benjamin critique of capitalism on “nonmoral Franklin’s “definition” or, in truth,- de evils” involves a contradiction in terms. scription) and productive beings. Unlike Vol. V 21 Yuezhen Li animals, human beings labor beyond that Marx’s characterization of spe- necessities so as to actualize their cre- cies-being, focused on free production, ative ingenuity, which is further evi- is not a biological observation. Even denced by the way in which they work when anthropologists have corroborat- (i.e. conscious transformation of the ed with empirical evidence that labor is world, as discussed above). 2. They are found universally in all human societies, social beings, living and understanding it at best shows that labor is a necessary themselves vis-a-vis each other, thus condition for a properly human life— having a consciousness of their species hardly a surprising observation. How- as humans. 3. They, unlike other an- ever, Marx emphasizes that only free, imals, are conscious of these two facts fulfilling work—not necessary work— and therefore of their own species-be- is part of our species-being. Thus, he ing. Afforded by our natural propensity claims, “the shortening of the work- to work and our species-consciousness, ing-day is [the] basic prerequisite … human beings by nature cooperate and [of] the realm of freedom.”25 Further- engage in social labor: even “simple more, Marx seems to place fulfilling, co-operation” has had such “colossal collaborative work in a singularly cen- effects” in history, as evidenced by “the tral place in the definition of the human palaces and temples, the pyramids.”23 species. Neither claim appears to fall in This account of the human the scope of investigation for biology or species-beings may be problematic in anthropology. its metaphysical status. Is “species-con- The most defensible response scious, socially productive animal” an appears to be that Marx focuses on pro- exhaustive theory of human nature? Is duction as the central aspect of human it just part of the definition of our spe- nature because of his materialism. The cies? Is it just a description—if so, it is chief methodological movement for timeless and universal, or does it just de- the early Marx is to reject “speculative scribe human beings in a given time and philosophy”, that is, thinking about the place? Some commentators have found human sciences in the abstract, with- Early Marx’s theory of human nature out reference to historical practice; in to be of a dubious character. Brian 1843, Marx laments that this has been Leiter, for example, comments that “it the standard practice in Western phi- is certainly no part of serious biology, losophy since almost ever.26 With this either then or since, and it is not clear in mind, Marx develops his theory it does any explanatory work in making of human nature with a very special sense of historical transformation.”24 I metaphysical status. His notion of spe- will argue against the second half of his cies-being does sketch the essence of comment later by highlighting the ex- human beings, but it is not an essential- planatory function—grounding the eth- ist account of some unchanging human ical theory of the good life—of Marx’s nature. Marx rejects the idea that every theory of human nature. Yet I concur human individual inherently has an ab- 22 Anamnesis Can Early Marx Ground His Critique of Capitalism? stract, universal, or a priori human na- rise to a materialist approach to concep- ture. He states this famously in his The- tualizing human nature, such that the sis VI on Feuerbach: there is no human way in which we produce is central to essence as “abstraction inherent in each any formulation of who we are. Thus, single individual” but “the ensemble of for Marx, the concept of human nature the social relations.”27 To think that the can only make sense in empirical-histor- same human essence exists before each ical practice, rather than in speculative human individual, for Early Marx, is consciousness, and only in the collective akin to thinking that God exists before “genus” (human species as productive humans—a “religious alienation” that beings), rather than in each individu- Feuerbach has gone a long way to re- al. Marx attributes a central place of fute. Instead, both the conception of production to human nature not from human nature and religious deity are logico-metaphysical deductions but projections of our self-consciousness precisely in an anti-philosophical, an- and self-understanding. By that Marx ti-reification movement. It is a discov- overturns the tradition of speculative ery from empirical history rather than “armchair philosophy” postulating cer- a postulation of armchair speculation; tain things as human nature in a meta- Early Marx thus displays an inchoate physical and a priori way, and maintains formulation of the materialist concep- that human nature is only to be discov- tion of history. ered—epistemologically and metaphys- However, this natural-historical ically28—from historical human prac- or anthropological account of human tice in an empirical, a posteriori, and even nature does not suffice in itself for Marx inductive fashion. but instead points to an ongoing tension Marx’s materialist theory of in Marx’s corpus: Marx seems to view human nature therefore does not pre- only free, creative labor as truly fulfilling scribe but describes who we are. His and truly human. However, it is unfree, substantive claim of the human spe- subsistence work that fundamentally cies-being is thus a claim of natural histo- supports humans as an animal; it is also ry, that is, scrutinizing the life conditions the prevailing majority kind of labor and habits of human beings as a natural found in the history of human labor. kind, as an animal. Following the tradi- For Early Marx, the incipient histori- tion set forth by Aristotle’s research in cal materialism appears to explain why zoology,29 Marx seems to imply that the he holds that only the uniquely human single most important activity for any kind of labor—rather than animalistic animal is the subsistence of itself; every subsistence labor (done only when there animal works in some way to sustain its is an imminent need; carried out with- own life. Therefore, the basic nature of out a plan in mind, as conscious trans- human beings—qua animals—must formation of the world)—is essential to have to do with how we feed ourselves and human labor: after all, if each animal meet our other basic needs. This gives has a unique way in which it produc- Vol. V 23 Yuezhen Li es, such a way would be essential to its ed to the development and exercise of species-being. However, it would be the our essentially human capacities, which utmost puzzling that the human kind in turn make up our nature. They surely of labor is the exclusion of the primary disagree greatly on what a fulfilling hu- and original kind of labor, that is, that man life exactly looks like and what our which meets basic animalistic needs. For essential capacities encompass—Marx Marx, only the secondary and in fact is likely to find Aristotle’s sanctification rarer kind of labor confirm human be- of the contemplative life misguided. Yet ings’ nature as productive beings. Thus, they both see fulfilled human life as the the majority kind of work—subsistence highest ethical goal; if we take happi- labor—is for Marx not only unable to ness in Aristotle’s sense of εὐδαιμονία confirm our species-being but indeed (eudaimonia) as flourishing, we can claim undermines it. Whereas Marx consid- that Early Marx wants us to be “hap- ers production as the essential “human py”, without a subjectivist reading of function,”30 he seems to think that only him. Marx’s concept of alienation, as a after producing what we need is produc- state of objective unfulfillment wherein tion free and truly human, rendering such capacities are frustrated, is direct- subsistence labor—“the realm of neces- ly comparable to Aristotle’s concept of sity and mundane considerations”31—in bad life, which is set up in terms of the truth animal and dehumanizing. Marx, good life. Aristotle’s good life, therefore, throughout his entire career, seems nev- resembles Marx’s unalienated life. er able to resolve this obvious paradox. Aristotle and Early Marx are also alike in their way of justifying such Non-Utilitarian Consequentialism: a life as the good life. To put it blunt- Marx & Aristotle ly, they both understand the good life as one in which we act and actualize The rest of this essay considers ourselves as human beings, because we the structure of the normative ethical should want to distinguish ourselves claim made by Early Marx, now that from animals. For Aristotle, we should it is shown that he can—and does— act in accord with our exclusive essence make such a claim. I argued that Marx – that is, our rational soul guided by grounds his ethical theory of the good life virtue.32 Marx’s concept of species-be- on his theory of human nature. I shall ing also concerns what makes us unique explain it in reference to a parallel proj- among animals—not by reason but by ect from Aristotle. Aristotle and Marx unalienated, fulfilling labor. Marx’s are unalike on a level of specific moral vision fits nicely into Aristotelian - tele content, yet quite alike on the level of a ology: the labor process clearly has a normative framework. dual telos: a transformed world and an Both Aristotle’s Nicomachean Eth- actualized self. For Marx, the end of the ics and Early Marx portray a fulfilling activity (e.g., the product) is harmonized human life as consisting in activities suit- with the act of the activity (e.g., a work- 24 Anamnesis Can Early Marx Ground His Critique of Capitalism? er engaging in production). ground their ethical theory in a theory Following this train of thought, of human nature. Namely, they both Richard Miller proposes that Marx and tacitly employ a valid syllogism: P1. Aristotle are alike not only in rejecting The good life is to do what is human; Kantian juridicism—based on discours- P2. To do X is to do what is human; C. es of rights—and utilitarianism of Ben- The good life is to do X. Whereas this tham and Mill but also in giving two rare model appears quite unproblematic for examples of non-utilitarian consequen- Aristotle, for Marx it appears so serious- tialism.33 Namely, they both envision the ly wanting in certain respects that his good life as consisting in the exercise of metaethical theory cannot be justified. capacities suited to human nature. They Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics disagree with Kant on normative ethics: works toward the conclusion that the they insist value judgments over social best human life is the contemplative life arrangements and actions be made on from the general argument that con- the consequences they engender rath- templation is the kind of activity most er than their “right” or “lawfulness” in line with what is human, which fur- by themselves. At the same time, Marx ther presupposes that it is good to do and Aristotle disagree with Bentham on the kind of activity in line with what the ultimate human good. Rather than is human. Aristotle states this explicit- aiming at promoting subjective happi- ly in what some commentators call the ness (pleasure, a sense of meaningfulness, “function argument”: Aristotle asks for etc.), they strive for what may be called the function [ergon] of the human be- objective happiness, that is, flourishing ing in order to find out what kind of in an essentially human way.34 Subse- life they should lead. By identifying that quently, both Marx and Aristotle “eval- function as “a life of action of [the part uate social institutions based on the con- of] the soul that has reason” in accor- sequences they have for promoting the dance with virtue,36 Aristotle bridges the good life.”35 The central problem that is-ought gap and is able to ground con- Early Marx has with capitalism, after templative life as the good life, insofar as all, is that it causes alienation, thereby it is the most human kind of life. rendering people unable to exercise es- Contrasted with Aristotle, Ear- sential powers, actualize species-being, ly Marx’s similar project is of a dubious and lead good lives. character. Going back to the syllogism, for Marx it should be specified as P1. Can Early Marx Justify His The good life is to do what is human; Metaethical Theory? P2. To engage in fulfilling social labor is to do what is human; C. The good As I have shown, Early Marx life is to engage in fulfilling social labor. has a metaethical theory that is struc- Taking together bits of thoughts de- turally similar to the logical structure of veloped earlier in the essay, neither P1 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: they each nor P2 seems possible to be sufficiently Vol. V 25 Yuezhen Li grounded for Early Marx, rendering the ly activities consist in fulfilling, conscious conclusion—Early Marx’s metaethical (planned) social labor is no less curious theory—impossible to justify. than the first premise. As we have hint- Firstly, that the good life is to ed in previous sections, it is unclear how do what is human roughly resolves to Marx could justify the idea that only the claim that it is good to do what is free and creative labor corresponds to human. Marx has implicitly invoked the truly human way of life, while an- this idea throughout his career, but no- thropological observations indicate that where other than for Early Marx has subsistence labor—of which Marx not this idea occupied an essential locus. only thinks lowly but uses a reference Unfortunately, Marx leaves the follow- point in describing unalienated labor— ing questions unanswered: Why is it is the primary and predominant kind. better to be like a human than just an Aside from that, it is also unclear how animal? More generally, why is it good Early Marx justifies—or can possibly to act according to what we really are justify—the claim that a certain kind of and strive to realize ourselves in the first productive work is the complete essence place? Aristotle can dodge this difficulty of human nature—not just an aspect in bridging “is” and “ought” by postu- or prerequisite. Marx does not seek to lating it as a metaphysical fact that each vindicate that claim philosophically thing—human beings included—has a because he thinks of it as a natural-his- function toward which it should strive. torical claim on the empirical basis of Aristotle is able to resort to the claim (A) historical human practice rather than that our function—what sets us apart armchair speculation into certain un- from animals—is good for humans be- changing essence of our species. How- cause of the claim (B), that the function ever, the claim does not seem to with- of anything—what sets that thing part stand philosophical scrutiny: if “engag- from everything else—is good for that ing in fulfilling, conscious social labor” thing. However, this is not an option for captures the essence of human nature, Early Marx; he is not in a position to use it can be said to define (rather than sim- the claim (B) to justify the claim (A), be- ply describe) the human species. Name- cause the claim (B) is way too metaphys- ly, any animal that engages in fulfilling, ical for his methodological commitment conscious social labor would be identifi- against speculative abstract thinking able as human beings. Such a thought is about humans. Furthermore, it is not weird, because it is not difficult to imag- clear to me if there is any permissible ine a non-human animal engaging not alternative that could justify the claim only labor, but also that specific kind of (A). Since Early Marx’s entire critique labor. Even though Marx claims that implicitly hangs upon the idea that it the human way of production, in the is good to do what is human, his entire architect-bee example, is “stamp[ed] as metaethical project becomes dubitable. exclusively human,”37 that way of labor Secondly, the idea that human- has no built-in marks of humanity when 26 Anamnesis Can Early Marx Ground His Critique of Capitalism? examined alone. Defenders of Marx is about acting in accordance with the are certainly inclined to dismiss this en- human functions. However, given his tire thinking as exemplary of the kind important methodological attitude that of speculative metaphysics of human rejects abstract thinking about human nature with which Marx avows to do nature in an a priori fashion, Marx is away. However, a query lingers on: To unable to justify that same claim. While what degree does Marx’s theory based Aristotle identifies contemplation as on creative labor grasp the very essence the most human activity, Marx iden- of human nature, rather than just giv- tifies fulfilling, cooperative productive ing a description of an important aspect activities. However, Marx seems to be thereof ? With what can he justify this in no position to sufficiently justify that essential status? Without consulting cer- choice either. These difficulties com- tain metaphysical surmises as Aristotle bined, Early Marx’s entire metaethical does, Early Marx seems to be left with theory is exposed as barely grounded. no resource to sufficiently address these The weakly-based status suggests why questions, which are nonetheless foun- Early Marx’s alienation-based critique dational to the grounding of his entire of capitalism would fade out of fash- metaethical theory. ion: it is not so much refuted as never In summary, Early Marx’s cri- having been fully vindicated. As Marx’s tique of capitalism is inherently an eth- thought develops, alienation retreats ical critique, on grounds that it engen- from a central explanatory role of the ders alienation of people (particularly evils under capitalism to a diagnostic workers) from their true human nature. one and from the hallmark evil of cap- This critique is inversely based on a italism to just one of its immanent con- normative ethical theory, best described tradictions. Instead of some cleavage in as non-utilitarian consequentialism the style of Althusser’s “epistemic gap”, (which finds a parallel in Aristotle’sNico - the insufficiency in early Marx’s moral machean Ethics), by which Marx assesses philosophy gives an indication that ex- social conditions by the effects they have plains the mature Marx’s turn to politi- on promoting the good life. Capitalism cal economy and scientific socialism. is bad by that standard, because the alienation it causes is detrimental to the good life. Early Marx further resembles Aristotle in that they both hold that, metaethically, the good life of human beings is to conduct humanly activities. However, unlike Aristotle, Early Marx has insufficient resources to justify the metaethical structure underlying his normative claim. Aristotle proposes as a metaphysical claim that the good life Vol. V 27 Yuezhen Li Bibliography

Aristotle. History of Animals. In The Basic Works of Aristotle. Edited by Richard McKeon. New York: Modern Library, 2001. ———Nicomachean Ethics. In The Basic Works of Aristotle. Edited by Richard McKeon. New York: Modern Library, 2001. Brudney, Daniel. Marx’s Attempt to Leave Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998. Cohen, G.A. “Review of Wood’s Karl Marx.” In G. A. Cohen and Jonathan Wolff. Lectures on the History of Moral and Political Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. Leiter, Brian. “Why Marxism Still Does Not Need Normative Theory,” Analyse und Kritik 23, no. 1 (2015): 23-50. Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1. Translated by Ben Fowkes, New York: Penguin Books, 1993. ———Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 3. Translated by David Fernbach New York: Penguin Books, 2013. Miller, Richard. “Marx and Aristotle: A Kind of Consequentialism”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 11, 1981, Pages 323-352. Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations. Edited by Andrew Skinner. New York: Penguin Books, 1982. Tucker, Robert C. ed. The Marx-Engels Reader. New York: Norton, 1978. Wood, Allen. Karl Marx. London: Routledge, 2004. Endnotes

1 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, in The Marx- Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978). The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 are hereafter referred to as EPM and the Marx- Engels Reader as MER. 2 Marx, Marx Engels Werke, 3:67, quoted in Allen Wood, Karl Marx (London: Routledge, 2004), 9. 3 This idea somewhat anticipates what has become known as the Capabilities Approach. 4 Marx, EPM, 61. 5 It is noteworthy that although the idea of objectification evokes material objects as its products, it has no real difficulty in encompassing mental/ intellectual fruits of labor as real products. 6 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 2001), XI, 7 (hereafter cited as NE with book and chapter numbers).

28 Anamnesis Can Early Marx Ground His Critique of Capitalism? 7 Marx, “Comments on James Mill,” in MER, 228. 8 Friedrich Engels, “The Principles of Communism,” in MER, section 7. 9 Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, trans. David Fernbach (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), Ch. 7. 10 Marx, Capital, vol. 1, Ch. 7. 11 Marx, The German Ideology, quoted in Allen Wood, Karl Marx, 50. 12 Marx, “Estranged Labor,” in EPM. 13 Adam Smith, in his Wealth of Nations, maintains work must be a sacrifice for those who do it. 14 Marx, The German Ideology, quoted in Allen Wood, Karl Marx, 50. 15 Marx, “Estranged Labor,” in EPM. 16 Marx means freely beyond just voluntarily, as in a merely formal sense of freedom. 17 Alienation is a historical problem, largely specific to capitalism. For alienation points to the gap between human essential powers and their actual (lack of) exercise; since our productive powers vary greatly throughout history and across societies, alienation rarely occurs in pre-capitalist societies. It is by the greatly expanded productivity under capitalism that alienation comes to rise and it is, in Marx’s vision for communism, through the greatly expanded productivity that drives out the realm of necessities that alienation is abolished and thus enter a realm of freedom (c.f. Marx, Capital, vol.3, trans. David Fernbach (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), Chapter 48). 18 G.A. Cohen, “Review of Wood’s Karl Marx,” in Lectures on the History of Moral and Political Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013). 19 Some may suggest we evaluate capitalism by the ethical standards of communism. However, doing so gets Marx wrong in an upside-down fashion: for Marx, communism is not a state of affairs, but a reversal movement (or the synthetical resolution for the contradictions) of capitalism. Therefore, it is not just epistemologically but ontologically impossible to critique capitalism by communism. 20 Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Program,” in MER. 21 Marx, “Comments on James Mill,” in MER, 228. 22 For example, by condemning private property as effectively theft (c.f. Proudhon), or the fact that workers trapped in hideous working conditions, or the lack of distributive justice, etc. 23 Marx, Capital, vol. 1, Ch. 13. 24 Brian Leiter, “Why Marxism Still Does Not Need Normative Theory,” Analyse und Kritik 23, no. 1 (2015): 24, footnote. 25 Marx, Capital, vol. 3, Ch. 48. 26 For example, in “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Vol. V 29 Yuezhen Li Right”, Marx comments that whereas Hegelians think of Hegelianism as the highest form of Western Philosophy, it is in truth the worst symptom of abstract, a priori thinking of the same tradition. 27 Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in MER, thesis IV. 28 This, I should add, is uniquely consistent with Early Marx’s central rejection of the idea that philosophers have certain privileged standpoints by which they “know better”. They are unlikely to know human nature from practice better than, say, historians or anthropologists. 29 Aristotle, History of Animals, in The Basic Works of Aristotle. 30 Marx, “Estranged Labor,” in EPM. 31 Marx, Capital, vol. 3, Ch. 48. 32 Aristotle, NE, I, 2.1094a. 33 Richard Miller, “Marx and Aristotle: A Kind of Consequentialism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11, issue sup. 1 (1981), 323-352. 34 They also differ from typical consequentialists in that they do not look at the end of an action alone; rather, they both foreground the action in process, alongside the ending results: Aristotle stresses that a good action must showcase virtuous character, while Marx pushes for the harmonization of ends and means – product-alienation and species-alienation are equal features of alienated labor. 35 Miller, “Marx and Aristotle.” 36 Aristotle, NE, I, 1094a; Aristotle, NE, I, 1097b22–1098a20. 37 Marx, Capital, vol. I, Ch. 7.

30 Anamnesis The Moral Right to Die by Khalid “Kai” Davis Macalester College Khalid “Kai” Davis

he third article of the United Na- practice should be illegal entirely. John Ttions Universal Declaration of Hu- Keown, a Christian ethicist and noted man Rights states that “everyone has opponent of PAD, outlines a common the right to life, liberty and the security argument against it: the principle of of person.”1 This same conception of vitalism and the sanctity of life. This individual rights is echoed throughout principle, Keown says, affirms that modern political and philosophical lit- because human life is sacred, it “is an erature. If we accept this framework of absolute moral value. Because of its ab- human rights, the question then arises: solute worth it is wrong either to short- what are the extents of this right to life? en the life of a patient or fail to strive If one can be said to have a legitimate to lengthen it… the vitalist school of legal and moral right to life grounded thought requires human life to be pre- in human dignity and the pursuit of lib- served at all costs.”4 erty and equality for all people, then a Challenging absolutist con- person’s ability to govern their own life ceptions of the value of life, advocates must be respected. This decision-mak- for physician-assisted dying posit that ing touches all aspects of life, potential- if a person possesses the right to live, ly including the time and manner of its this necessarily entails the right to die. termination. Today, this matter sparks This freedom, so the argument goes, contentious debate amongst philoso- shall not be infringed, for the way a phers, bioethicists, and medical profes- person chooses to live—or die—solely sionals alike regarding the legality of concerns that individual so long as the physician-assisted suicide and euthana- rights of others are not violated. In this sia. Although there are those who take essay, I will defend the view that PAD issue with the term “physician-assisted ought to be legalized on the basis that dying” (PAD), objecting to its “vague- the right to life always includes the right ness,”2 for the purposes of this essay it to die. I shall argue that the legal pro- will be taken to include the practices of tection of this right should encompass both physician-assisted suicide (PAS) all adult persons capable of acting as and voluntary euthanasia (VE).3 autonomous moral agents and thus able Although many agree that in to make free and rational decisions for a limited scope of cases—most often their own lives and medical care. With those concerning the terminally ill and that, they should be ethically and le- hospice care patients—physician-assist- gally empowered to demand physician ed dying may be morally permissible, assistance in ending their own life on there remain those who argue that the any basis whatsoever and without qual- 32 Anamnesis The Moral Right to Die ification. This articulation of the right By an Aristotelian account, “every art, to die sanctions both physician-assisted every science, every action or purpose, suicide and voluntary euthanasia, gen- aims at some good. The good is that erating a duty on the state universally at which all things aim.”6 For Aristot- and physicians individually to codify le, human flourishing, eudaimonia, is the and provide access to these services. highest good. The same can be said of Furthermore, the state is also bound a consequentialist account of morality. by the negative duty not to interfere Both Jeremy Bentham and John Stew- with the free exercise of PAD yet at the art Mill, the founders of utilitarianism, same time conserves the responsibility hold that happiness is not a good, but and authority to strictly regulate physi- the good—that which is to be pursued cian-assisted dying in conjunction with above all else. In contrast, Immanuel bodies governing medical ethics to en- Kant tells us that human beings possess, sure that it is carried out competently as ends in themselves, a worth beyond and ethically. Action should be taken price, an inherent dignity. According out of concern for public safety in order to the most influential of normative to avoid falling down the much dread- ethical accounts, human life has some ed “slippery slope.” To make my case, I intrinsic value. However, without the will first briefly outline the philosophical possibility of happiness or flourishing, it value of life and deconstruct the argu- is questionable, particularly for the con- ments against PAD. I will then establish sequentialists, whether that life would bases for what constitutes rational deci- be worthwhile. To ponder this thought, sion-making. And finally, I will explain we can ask ourselves: despite its intrin- how the slippery slope can be avoided. sic value, if life loses most or all of its instrumental value, does it still retain The Value of Life enough value to be worth living, and who is to make that choice? The principal debate around the legalization of physician-assisted Views Against Physician-Assisted dying centers around particular notions Dying of the value of human life. What pre- cisely is the value of human life and The primary argument against how can we attempt to determine it? permitting euthanasia and physician-as- In justifying the philosophical founda- sisted dying concerns what Keown calls tions of human rights, many contem- the principle of the sanctity of life. This porary philosophers, such as bioeth- argument is favored amongst many reli- icist S. Matthew Liao, have taken to gious opponents of PAD. Catholic doc- defending the view that the good life trine, for example, prohibits intentional forms the very basis for human rights.5 killing as well as suicide. In short, “the This idea proves to be the chief aim simplest moral outlook on suicide holds of several systems of normative ethics. that it is necessarily wrong because hu- Vol. V 33 Khalid “Kai” Davis man life is sacred.”7 Vitalist organiza- and chemists such as Francis Glisson tions such as the Christian fundamen- and Jöns Jakob Berzelius theorized a talist group the American Family Asso- sort of non-physical animating force ciation and the Catholic American Life that fundamentally distinguishes living League utterly oppose abortion and eu- beings from inanimate objects.11 Later, thanasia. The latter espouses strict vital- the French philosopher Henri Bergson ism in categorically opposing abortion, proposed an élan vital or vital impetus even in cases of rape and incest, as well or “force” linked to the idea of a soul as all forms of contraception, embry- or consciousness to explain the essential onic stem cell research and euthanasia: difference between life and non-life as “ALL… is an organization committed well as the especial status of the for- to the protection of all innocent human mer.12 Scientific vitalism has fallen out beings from the moment of creation to of favor due to advances in understand- natural death… That ranges from the ing of vital phenomena. single cell human embryo to the elderly, In practice, moral vitalism dis- the infirm and others at risk of having counts all material conditions, social, the life terminated by acts of euthana- economic or personal, in the pursuit sia.”8 Keown and other opponents of of sustaining human life no matter the PAD insist that the “immoral” choice consequences. The vitalist believes life to undergo PAD be dismissed outright: to be “an intrinsic good, irrespective of “The capacity to choose brings with it whether it is of value to its possessor.”13 the responsibility of making not just Whereas less extreme advocates for the any old choice, but choices which do intrinsic value of human life may con- in fact promote, rather than under- cede in certain situations that a person mine, human flourishing... it is difficult should be allowed to die, a vitalist out- to see why patently immoral choices, look requires a person to remain alive, choices clearly inconsistent with human whether they wish to or not, whether it well-being, merit any respect.”9 For Ke- is in their best interest or not, whether own, intentional killing is never consis- their advocates believe it is the best path tent with human flourishing irrespective forward or not. of circumstance. In the same vein, vi- To elucidate the vitalist po- talists maintain that human life must be sition, it is useful to examine actual preserved at all costs regardless of suf- cases. Through policy decisions, gov- fering or quality of life.10 ernments can also commit themselves Notably, vitalism has had its to vitalism. In the U.S., there are eight secular proponents as well. Although states that most clearly exhibit vitalist elements of modern vitalism have ex- tendencies: New York, Arizona, Mich- isted since ancient times, there is a sci- igan, Missouri, Ohio, Mississippi, Wis- entific aspect to this school of thought consin and Hawaii. As Alicia Ouellette, that originated in the seventeenth and legal scholar and bioethicist, describes, eighteenth centuries. Early biologists “these states take a vitalist position for 34 Anamnesis The Moral Right to Die certain classes of patients: life must be individual whose life it is, is valuable.”16 maintained whatever the cost to the In other words, life is valuable in and patient, the families, and the caregiv- of itself by virtue of mere existence ers. Consistently, the states that main- alone. Moreover, the Missouri decision tain a vitalist position for some of their demonstrates a refusal to acknowl- citizens claim an unqualified interest edge the competence of executors and in preserving life.”14 Not only is it con- proxies in deciding what is best for the cerning that these states, all to varying person whose interests they represent. degrees, restrict the ability of surrogates Even the best available medical advice to terminate life sustaining treatment, can be trumped by inflexible state law. but doubly so that the courts seem to By committing to vitalist policies, there uphold states’ claim of ownership over is an implicit conflation all forms of in- their citizens’ lives. In the case of Cruzan tentional killing, making no distinction v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, between homicide, physician-assisted Nancy Beth Cruzan, due to severe inju- suicide, voluntary euthanasia, non-vol- ries sustained in a car accident, was ren- untary euthanasia (NVE), involuntary dered permanently incompetent. Yet euthanasia (IVE), and any other forms when her parents sought a court order of intentional killing.17 To do so over- to passively euthanize their daughter by looks the crucial elements of choice and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, autonomy—and in many cases good the Supreme Court of Missouri refused sense—which, I argue, are critical in the request, ruling that, in light of her ethical decision-making. To understand incompetence and the absence of any the incredible harm that can be inflict- explicit directive from Cruzan before ed by adopting vitalist viewpoints, one her accident to make a life-terminat- need look no further than the needlessly ing decision, she had no constitution- tragic case of Sheila Pouliot. al right to refuse lifesaving treatment, In December 1999, Pouliot, a nor did her parents possess ample au- terminally-ill, severely physically de- thority to execute such a decision. And bilitated, partially blind, muscularly even if such a right did exist, the Court degenerate, acutely mentally disabled expounded that it would have to be forty-two-year-old woman, was admit- weighed against the state’s default, un- ted into a hospital in New York state qualified interest in preserving human for internal bleeding in her gastrointes- life (ironic considering the legality of tinal tract and pneumonia.18 She could capital punishment in Missouri).15 This neither eat, speak, read, nor walk; she point of view disregards the impact that communicated pain through grunts and intractable pain and severely dimin- groans. On the advice of doctors, the ished physical and mental capacities can family decided that it would be best to have on the quality of a person’s life. It withhold all treatment, effectively pas- enforces the belief that “life itself, whol- sively euthanizing her so as not to pro- ly independent of the happiness of the long her unbearable suffering. However, Vol. V 35 Khalid “Kai” Davis New York state intervened and forced and guardian’s wishes, her life expec- the hospital to continue treatment, in- tancy would have spanned only three cluding nutritional care and hydration, to fourteen days.22 Instead, she suffered which, due to Pouliot’s terminal illness, for months on end. The vitalist policies caused only projectile vomiting and of New York state and the reprehensi- intractable hiccups. At this time, the ble handling of this case forced Sheila court battle began in earnest, yet even Pouliot to endure torturous treatment as injunctions and enjoinments were is- that can only be described as inhumane. sued and trials held, the restrictions in New York law prevented “a third par- Rationality, Competence, and ty, even a court appointed guardian or Mental Illness loving family member, from making the decision to terminate life-sustaining Counter to the vitalist principle treatment for another person.”19 The that living is the sole and ultimate good, developments in Pouliot’s case were I argue that a robust vision of human such that her physicians eventually de- rights and human dignity must include scribed her as a “living corpse” and considerations for quality of life and a testified that the order to proceed with right to die. I maintain that a euthanasia artificial hydration was “inhumane and policy based on personal autonomy— is causing suffering... From a medical one that emphasizes individual rights standpoint, it is outside the bounds of... and moral agency—is more reasonable medically indicated care”; in fact, they and humane than one that categorically were inducing “grotesque harm.”20 By disregards circumstance in favor of an all accounts, she was in abject agony. absolute principle. In this context, an Pouliot’s pain continued unabated for important question emerges: what con- months. After visiting her bedside, New stitutes a rational decision, and would York’s Supreme Court justice took the such a choice be morally compelling drastic action of issuing an illegal order when requesting life-terminating care? to terminate all treatment, explaining, This paper sets forth that a voluntary “There’s the law, and there’s what’s request of sound, reasoned judgment right.”21 Nevertheless, the state would commands sufficient moral force to not relent. Beseeched by the Attorney make permissible physician-assisted dy- General’s office to resolve the impasse, ing. Proxies, too, can be recognized as an appellate court on March 3, 2000 rational agents. An autonomous request terminated nutrition and hydration un- from a competent individual is thereby til a full panel could be held on March 7. compelling enough to legalize PAD and Pouliot passed a day before the hearing. to widen the scope of existing laws on The description here cannot accurately the subject. I additionally claim that the capture the extent of her suffering. Had right to make this request is not sub- treatment been ceased in accordance ject to imminence-of-death or terminal with medical advice and the family qualifications, nor does it even require 36 Anamnesis The Moral Right to Die that a patient be actively suffering or ex- son thereafter commits or attempts periencing intractable pain to bear legal to commit suicide, liable to a cus- and moral weight. Current laws govern- todial sentence not exceeding five ing PAD, even the most nonrestrictive, years or to a monetary penalty.25 stipulate some terminal illness or active Swiss law therefore permits assisted suffering in order that the patient- re suicide but prohibits VE because, even ceive physician assistance in dying. For for “commendable motives” and at the example, the Dutch government allows person’s “own genuine and insistent for physician-assisted suicide in nonter- request,” one’s actions cannot direct- minal cases of “lasting and unbearable” ly cause someone else’s death. 26 Based suffering. Similarly, Belgium authorizes on this, both physicians and non-profit physician-assisted suicide for patients organizations (since the 1980s) are able when suffering can be categorized as to at least provide the means to make “constant,” unable to be alleviated.23 life-terminating decisions by dispensing Why must this be the case? This logic life-ending medication. This extends to sustains life well past the point of pur- non-citizens. The Dutch, too, have lib- suing happiness or conceptions of the eral laws on the subject. Conforming good life. Furthermore, stipulations of to de facto guidelines set since 1973 and terminal illness and physical agony po- following the landmark Schoonheim case tentially exclude those suffering from in 1984 wherein a doctor facilitated the psychological conditions (who are often suicide of his elderly patient at her re- indiscriminately construed as being in- quest, the “Termination of Life on Re- capable of making authentically ratio- quest and Assisted Suicide (Review Pro- nal decisions) as well as the non-able- cedures) Act” went into effect in 2002, bodied considering that many laws only legalizing PAD under certain circum- permit physician-assisted suicide pro- stances that meet specified conditions: vided that the patient themself issues (i) The request for euthanasia [i.e., the coup de grâce. VE] must come only from the pa- Recent action by the Swiss tient and must be entirely free and Federal Supreme Court has challenged voluntary; (ii) The patient’s request some of these notions, upholding “the must be well considered, durable right of those suffering from ‘incurable, and persistent; (iii) The patient permanent, severe psychological dis- must be experiencing intolerable orders’ to terminate their own lives.”24 (not necessarily physical) suffering, Under Article 115 of the Swiss Crimi- with no prospect of improvement; nal Code regarding “Homicide / Incit- (iv) Euthanasia must be a last resort. ing and Assisting Suicide”: Other alternatives to alleviate the Any person who for selfish motives patient’s situation must have been [emphasis added] incites or assists considered and found wanting; (v) another to commit or attempt to Euthanasia must be performed by commit suicide is, if that other per- a physician; (vi) The physician must Vol. V 37 Khalid “Kai” Davis consult with an independent physi- trary, there are those who resist the idea cian colleague who has experience that a person can make a genuine re- in this field.27 quest PAD because “we can never have These conditions also stipulate that sufficient evidence to be justified in- be children as young as 12 (with parental lieving that a dying person’s request to consent) may undergo PAD. Patients be helped to die is competent, enduring must furnish their informed consent and genuinely voluntary.”31 Again, this and be unencumbered by the influence claim relies on the presumption that of other people, psychological illness, life is valuable in itself regardless of or drugs. In spite of this, psychiatric its quality or a person’s suffering. This patients are not entirely excluded from objection exemplifies an undue mis- this law, for “a voluntary and well-con- trust of any who would make such a sidered request for assisted suicide may request, precipitating the paradoxical be prompted by a persistent wish to die train of thought of refusing access to resulting from unbearable suffering with physician-assisted dying on the grounds no prospect of improvement caused that it was requested in the first place. by a psychiatric condition.”28 While In my view, this position devalues the bioethicist Jacob Appel agrees that a right to life, reducing it to no more than “higher threshold of competence” must a protection against intentional killing, be required due to the finality of the sustaining life merely because it is not decision to receive PAD, he disputes the death. Further, Keown raises another common notion that mentally ill people salient counterpoint in regards to the cannot be rational actors.29 He observes judgment exonerating the doctor in the that “one can be both deeply depressed Schoonheim case, proffering, “the judg- and capable of making rational deci- ment failed to explain why the doctor’s sions.”30 Hence, it is arguably unjust to duty to alleviate suffering overrode his deny to psychologically suffering pa- or her duty not to kill.”32 I would re- tients the opportunity to exercise the spond in the same vein as any doctor right to make life-terminating decisions. who has provided or would provide Irrespective of the type of suffering, the PAD: the overriding factor is patient au- affected agent may conceivably desire tonomy. nothing less than a permanent solution. The Dutch act is groundbreaking in The Slippery Slope that it breaks past the bounds of termi- nal illness as well as helps to alleviate the A valid concern regarding phy- cumbersome burden of old age and de- sician-assisted dying stems from worry bilitating psychiatric ailments. This has for vulnerable classes of people—the been the rule of thumb for decades but disabled, the mentally ill, the elderly, and only recently codified, a step forward in the like. Opponents of assisted suicide protecting compassionate doctors. generally articulate their objection as Despite evidence to the con- follows: “Any loosening of the absolute 38 Anamnesis The Moral Right to Die and unqualified prohibition of assisted tentional killing, namely non-voluntary suicide risks weakening the effectiveness euthanasia.34 Keown details the slippery of the protection afforded under the slope at length in Euthanasia, Ethics and current law to vulnerable persons.”33 Public Policy and injects the worry that There is a fear that the vulnerable will physician-assisted dying will come to be face imminent danger or that people accepted as a “premature alternative whose situations are deemed hopeless to palliative care.”35 While this worry or their care futile will be coerced to is understandable, I argue that it is ulti- request death prematurely. Additional- mately unfounded. In a chapter entitled ly, proponents of a continued prohibi- “Dutch in Denial?”, Keown discusses tion on PAD also point out the possible a Dutch documentary, Death on Request, hazard that a wish to die may only be which recounts the story of Cees van fleeting due to temporary circumstanc- Wendel de Joode, a man diagnosed with es or treatable bouts of mental illness. ALS, a motor neuron disease, who ob- Admittedly, there is some real danger tained VE in 1993.36 He raises concerns in regards to transitory desires eliciting about this film and its positive portrayal permanent consequences; however, that of the state of euthanasia in the Nether- is not to say that this concern cannot be lands, opining that the production was reasonably mitigated by implementing misleading. Keown argues that de Joode certain regulatory measures in order to was not given a real choice but instead ensure that the patient’s wish truly con- a “deceptively bleak prognosis” which stitutes an enduring, sincerely voluntary urged him to decide between either ter- and autonomously enacted decision. rible pain or euthanasia.37 Contrasting This essay does not itemize specific reg- British medical professionals to Dutch ulations and procedures. Nonetheless, ones, Keown cites palliative care in the it is certainly plausible that informed, English healthcare system, arguing that sensible guidelines can be put in place it is more developed and has seen some through collaboration between govern- success in improving the pain of pa- ment officials, medical professionals, tients with similar motor neuron diseas- mental health professionals and bioeth- es. Reading this section of the book, one icists to allay disquiet surrounding the might get the impression that Keown potential abuses of physician-assisted thinks Dutch physicians and officials dying. want patients to die. This seems patent- Fundamentally, opponents to ly absurd. Doctors have no incentive PAD fear falling down the so-called “slip- to kill their patients. More importantly, pery slope.” There exists a misplaced ap- de Joode did in fact voluntarily request prehension that if society allows for the euthanasia; there is no indication that legalization of voluntary euthanasia, we he experienced any pressure or was will somehow cascade down a “slippery presented with VE as his only option. slope” that will ultimately and inevita- His own doctor noted, “I can give him bly lead us to accept other forms of in- wonderful equipment so he can make Vol. V 39 Khalid “Kai” Davis himself understood. I can give him the mination [VE] has actually decreased finest wheelchair there is, but in the end, since the introduction of the law.’”40 Dr it is only a stopgap. He’s going to die Onwuteaka-Philipsen led an extensive and he knows it.”38 On the one hand, study on the trends of life-terminating I acknowledge that involuntary eutha- practices in the country before and after nasia is morally impermissible under all the introduction of the law. Analyzing circumstances and is essentially murder; the number of reported cases (legally, on the other hand, non-voluntary eu- all instances must be reported to the thanasia may be permissible. Alone, the Public Prosecutor’s office and the cause fear of this specific occurrence is not of death to the municipal coroner) 41 the enough to strip every person of their study found that occurrences of PAD right to PAD, especially considering remained low and any increases were that NVE may be morally permissible due to explicit requests: on a case-by-case basis. For example, The frequency of euthanasia in- it would be acceptable if a person in a creased between 2005 and 2010… persistent vegetative state, previous to The frequency of physician-assist- succumbing to their condition, issued ed suicide remained low over the an explicit directive indicating their years… the increase in the number wishes and a competent proxy deemed of instances of euthanasia is related it appropriate to go through with the to both an increase in the number course of action on the patient’s behalf. of explicit requests for euthanasia Many laws already account for this sce- (from 4.8% [95% CI 4.4-5.2; 503 nario. Ultimately, de Joode made a free, of 9,965] of all deaths surveyed informed choice. Yet in a letter to The in 2005 to 6.7% [6.1-7.3; 766 of Times, various members of the British 6,861] in 2010) and the proportion House of Lords wrote a scathing crit- of requests that were granted (from icism of the film: “Having embraced 37% [252 of 503] to 45% [496 of the practice of euthanasia, the Dutch 766] of requests). The frequency of now find themselves on a slippery slope ending of life without an explicit which not only involves euthanasia for patient request decreased over the those who are not dying but also eutha- years (from 0.8% [95% CI 0.6-1.1; nasia without request.”39 45 of 5,197] of all deaths in 1990 Despite their outrage, actu- to 0.2% [0.1–0.3%; 13 of 6,861] in al statistics can corroborate the suc- 2010).42 cess of the legalization of PAD in the Based on 2010 statistics, “The number Netherlands occasioned by the 2002 of cases was therefore comparable to law. According to Dr. Bregje Onwu- that just before the introduction of the teaka-Philipsen, professor of life-termi- Euthanasia Act in 2002.”43 The study nation research at the Vrije University also found that in “7% (20 of 270) of Medical Center in Amsterdam, “‘... the deaths in which the patient had made number of cases of this type of life ter- a ungranted euthanasia request, the 40 Anamnesis The Moral Right to Die patient hastened death him or herself ” palliative care, these measures should through an act of voluntary starvation.44 only account for an option, not the only When governments are unresponsive to option. Those who choose to terminate citizens’ needs, people will take their their own lives should be free to do so, fate into their own hands. Although it for end-of-life palliative care drugs the is troubling that there are any patient mind and keeps the body in a state of deaths without their explicit request as listlessness, wasting away for no other indicated by the survey, the numbers end than to linger in anticipation of an are minimal: less than one percent and inevitable and certain death—not even falling every year. Notably, the study is to forestall death, but merely to make somewhat unclear, labelling incidents the pain of dying somewhat more bear- under these circumstances as “ending able. Palliative care at this stage is not life without explicit request” without an end in itself, and it is certainly not specifying whether it was done involun- a good end, only a means of eventually tarily or non-voluntarily. The only clar- dying more comfortably. ification offered in the analysis was: “in half of these cases the decision [had] Conclusion been discussed with the patient and in a quarter of cases the physician did not Reasonable skepticism to le- discuss the decision with either patient, galizing physician-assisted suicide and relative, or other physicians.”45 Again, voluntary euthanasia is understandable. to which results and precisely which Nonetheless, if we acknowledge that a country this explanation referred, con- person has a right to die, society has no sidering that the Netherlands, Belgium reason to fear an evolution in the way and the United Kingdom were all dis- we discuss death; on the contrary, we cussed in that same paragraph, was should embrace it. The right to PAD unclear. In any event, this fraction of respects the dignity of human beings as a fraction of a percent is likely the re- rational agents and stresses the moral sult of a transitional lapse and not, as weight of an individual’s autonomy. As some critics wish to frame the issue, a Christine Korsgaard, a scholar of Kant, rampant problem. If there is a genuine writes: issue, then it lies with a diminutive num- But the distinctive feature of hu- ber of rogue doctors who fail to comply manity, as such, is simply the ca- with the letter of the law and not with pacity to take a rational interest the exercise of the right itself. in something: to decide, under the Moreover, I reject the defense influence of reason, that something that palliative care is always the moral, is desirable, that it is worthy of pur- desirable alternative to physician-as- suit or realization, that it is to be sisted dying. Contrary to Keown’s deemed important or valuable, not thoughts, there is nothing “premature” because it contributes to survival about PAD. Despite improvements in or instinctual satisfaction, but as an Vol. V 41 Khalid “Kai” Davis end for its own sake.46 of human rights, equality and justice This idea directly conflicts with the line evolves, we must not allow reactionary of thinking of many opponents of PAD, politics and overzealous fears to cloud who suggest that life-terminating choic- our judgment about the articulation and es are “patently immoral” and merit no defense of individual rights. Just as atti- respect.47 However, I maintain that the tudes towards gay marriage, women’s decision to undergo PAD can be wholly suffrage and reproductive rights have voluntary, freely chosen, of one’s own shifted in the past, so too can our atti- autonomous volition. The British ac- tudes towards death and dying. I urge ademic Nicola Padfield offers valuable that our cultural values ought to shift insight by detailing the case of Pretty v. on the subject of PAD. In reality, physi- United Kingdom wherein the European cian-assisted death is a humanism. The Court of Human Rights upheld Pret- practice respects human dignity, lessens ty’s right to make choices regarding the suffering in the world, and empowers manner and time of her death as be- individuals by concretely establishing a ing “protected by Article 8 para. 1 [of right to death. Courts in Europe have the European Convention on Human already defended the right as an essen- Rights] as one of the integral aspects tial component of health and private of respect for private life.”48 She con- life. Furthermore, Belgium, the Neth- tinues, “The reason why we ought to erlands, Switzerland and Luxembourg respect [Pretty’s] choice is the same rea- have demonstrated the very real possi- son that makes us respect the choice of bility of enacting effective measures to able-bodied persons to commit suicide: police the safety, reliability and ethical not that it is the right choice, but that it administration of PAD. is her choice.”49 I believe a prohibition of PAD Indeed, jurisdictions which serves to disenfranchise humanity of a have already legalized the practice of vital human right. And while concern PAD have yet to stumble down the slip- for the vulnerable is noble, the answer pery slope into involuntary euthanasia is not to constrain the freedoms of the or legalized murder. As apprehensively rest of the population, but rather to remarked by a member of the House strive to ameliorate the circumstances of Lords Select Committee on Medical that would drive a person to seriously Ethics, “‘legislation to permit euthana- contemplate suicide in the first place. sia would in the long run bring about This essay should not be construed as profound changes in social attitudes to- promoting suicide or disregarding the wards death, illness, old age and the role seriousness of mental illness or the real of the medical profession.’”50 But that hazards of the slippery slope. Rather, is precisely the point. As human soci- this essay calls for an expanded under- ety progresses in medicine, science and standing of the right to life. PAD proves technology, our cultural attitudes must a valuable tool to promote compassion change as well. As our understanding and respect for the sincere choices of 42 Anamnesis The Moral Right to Die others, the most important consider- ation for ethical decision-making. The right to die is an essential component in protecting human dignity, and the legalization of PAD is the only morally conscionable path forward.

Bibliography

Appel, Jacob M. “A Suicide Right for the Mentally Ill? A Swiss Case Opens a New Debate.” Hastings Center Report 37, no. 3 (2007): 21-23. https://doi. org/10.1353/hcr.2007.0035. Aristotle. “Nicomachean Ethics.” Translated by J.E.C. Welldon. United Kingdom: Macmillan and Company, 1902. Bechtel, William and Robert C. Richardson. “Vitalism.” Edited by E. Craig. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998). http://mechanism.ucsd.edu/ teaching/philbio/vitalism.htm. Cholbi, Michael. “Suicide.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition). Edited by Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/fall2017/entries/suicide/. Ede, Andrew. The Rise and Decline of Colloid Science in North America, 1900-1935: The Neglected Dimension. United Kingdom: Ashgate, 2007. “Euthanasia Law Did Not Lead to More Euthanasia.” Nu.nl, July 10, 2012. https://www.nu.nl/gezondheid/2856077/euthanasiewet-leidde-niet- meer-euthanasie.html?redirect=1. “Home: About.” American Life League. https://www.bibme.org/chicago/website- citation. Liao, S. Matthew. “Human Rights as Fundamental Conditions for a Good Life.” In Principles of Moral Philosophy: Classic and Contemporary Approaches, edited by Steven M. Cahn and Andrew T. Forcehimes, 79-100. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Lillehammer, Hallvard. “Voluntary Euthanasia and the Logical Slippery Slope Argument.” Cambridge Law Journal 61, no. 3 (2002): 545-550. https:// heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/camblj61&i=561. Keown, John. Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument Against Legalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Korsgaard, Christine M. “Kant’s Formula of Humanity.” In Principles of Moral Philosophy: Classic and Contemporary Approaches, edited by Steven M. Cahn and Andrew T. Forcehimes, 161-176. New York: Oxford University Press,

Vol. V 43 Khalid “Kai” Davis 2017. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “The Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act in Practice” (2010). https://cdn.factcheck.org/UploadedFiles/faqeuthanasia.pdf. Onwuteaka-Philipsen, Bregje D., Arianne Brinkman-Stoppelenburg, et al. “Trends in End-of-life Practices Before and After the Enactment of the Euthanasia Law in the Netherlands from 1990 to 2010: A Repeated Cross-sectional Survey.” The Lancet 380, no. 9845 (2012): 908-915. https://www.sciencedirect. com/science/article/pii/S0140673612610344?casa_ token=cKnbNo3LPdIAAAAA:rSJHav4IvW8WoLgiITkecOt5Z_ RHLIUuRfbJ8IzheKWy87w11dD_VqgR_x9G7AxdXDTDZCXYX_o. Ouellette, Alicia R. “When Vitalism is Dead Wrong: The Discrimination Against and Torture of Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life- Sustaining Treatment.” Indiana Law Journal 79, no. 1 (2004): 1-55. http:// www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol79/iss1/1?utm_source=www. repository.law.indiana.edu%2Filj%2Fvol79%2Fiss1%2F1&utm_ medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages. Padfield, Nicola. “Assisted Suicide and Personal Autonomy.” Cambridge Law Journal 61, no. 3 (2002): 511-514. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein. journals/camblj61&i=527. Swiss Criminal Code. SR 311, Article 114 § 1, Article 115 § 1 (1937). https:// www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19370083/index.html. United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 217 A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration- human-rights/. Young, Robert. “Voluntary Euthanasia.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition). Edited by Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford. edu/archives/fall2019/entries/euthanasia-voluntary/.

Endnotes

1 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 217 A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (December 10, 1948), https://www.un.org/en/universal- declaration-human-rights/. 2 John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument Against Legalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 20. 3 In this paper, physician-assisted death or dying (PAD) is taken to mean any procedure wherein a patient voluntarily requests a physician’s aid in terminating the patient’s life. Whether that request be the traditional method of a physician prescribing a fatal dose of medication meant to be taken by the patient (PAS) 44 Anamnesis The Moral Right to Die or by lethal injection (active VE) or suspension of life support (passive VE), the two are essentially equivalent and directly comparable. The difference lies in the administering agent—the patient (PAS) or the doctor (VE). 4 John Keown, Euthanasia, 37. 5 Matthew S. Liao, “Human Rights as Fundamental Conditions for a Good Life,” in Principles of Moral Philosophy: Classic and Contemporary Approaches, ed. Steven M. Cahn and Andrew T. Forcehimes (New York: Oxford UP, 2017): 79-100. 6 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J.E.C. Welldon (United Kingdom: Macmillan and Company, 1902), 1094a1-2. 7 Michael Cholbi, “Suicide,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/ entries/suicide/. 8 “Home: About,” American Life League, https://www.bibme.org/chicago/ website-citation. 9 Hallvard Lillehammer, “Voluntary Euthanasia and the Logical Slippery Slope Argument,” Cambridge Law Journal 61, no. 3 (2002): 548-549. 10 Keown, Euthanasia, 37. 11 Andrew Ede, The Rise and Decline of Colloid Science in North America, 1900-1935: The Neglected Dimension (United Kingdom: Ashgate, 2007), 23. 12 William Bechtel and Robert C. Richardson, “Vitalism,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998), ed. E. Craig. 13 Alicia R. Ouellette, “When Vitalism is Dead Wrong: The Discrimination Against and Torture of Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life- Sustaining Treatment,” Indiana Law Journal 79, no. 1 (2004): 21. 14 Ouellette, “When Vitalism,” 10. 15 Ouellette, “When Vitalism,” 11. 16 Cholbi, “Suicide.” 17 Non-voluntary euthanasia (NVE), which can be either active or passive but normally the latter, is the terminating of lifesaving treatment or the administering of life-terminating medication(s) to a patient who is incapable of consenting, most often due to infancy or a persistent vegetative state. Involuntary euthanasia (IVE) concerns the euthanizing of a competent person against their wishes, either because they do not wish to die or were not consulted, viz. murder. IVE is a crime in all legal jurisdictions. 18 Ouellette, “When Vitalism,”14-15. 19 Ouellette, “When Vitalism,” 17. 20 Ouellette, “When Vitalism,” 17-18. 21 Ouellette, “When Vitalism,” 18. 22 Ouellette, “When Vitalism,” 17. 23 Jacob M. Appel, “A Suicide Right for the Mental Ill? A Swiss Case Opens a New Debate,” Hastings Center Report 37, no. 3 (2007): 21. Vol. V 45 Khalid “Kai” Davis 24 Appel, “Suicide Right,” 21. 25 Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311, Article 114 § 1, Article 115 § 1 (1937), https:// www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19370083/index.html. 26 Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311, Article 114 § 1, Article 115 § 1 (1937). 27 Keown, Euthanasia, 95. 28 Netherlands MAinistry of Foreign Affairs, “The Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act in Practice” (2010): 14. 29 Appel, “Suicide Right,” 22. 30 Appel, “Suicide Right,” 22. 31 Robert Young, “Voluntary Euthanasia,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/fall2019/entries/euthanasia-voluntary/. 32 Keown, Euthanasia, 94-95. 33 Nicola Padfield, “Assisted Suicide and Personal Autonomy,” Cambridge Law Journal 61, no. 3 (2002): 512. 34 Young, “Voluntary Euthanasia.” 35 Keown, Euthanasia, 67. 36 Keown, Euthanasia, 145. 37 Keown, Euthanasia, 146. 38 Keown, Euthanasia,145. 39 Keown, Euthanasia, 146. 40 “Euthanasia Law Did Not Lead to More Euthanasia,” Nu.nl, July 10, 2012. 41 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., 9. 42 Bregie D. Onwuteaka-Philipsen, Arianne Brinkman-Stoppelenburg, et al., “Trends in End-of-life Practices Before and After the Enactment of the Euthanasia Law in the Netherlands from 1990 to 2010: A Repeated Cross-sectional Survey,” The Lancet 380, no. 9845 (2012): 908-915. 43 “Euthanasia Law Did Not Lead to More Euthanasia,” op. cit. 44 Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al., “Trends.” 45 Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al., “Trends.” 46 Christine M. Korsgaard, “Kant’s Formula of Humanity,” in Principles of Moral Philosophy: Classic and Contemporary Approaches, eds. Steven M. Cahn and Andrew T. Forcehimes (New York: Oxford University Press), 166-167. 47 Keown, Euthanasia, 53. 48 Padfield, “Assisted Suicide,” 511-512. 49 Padfield, “Assisted Suicide,” 514. 50 Keown, Euthanasia, 68.

46 Anamnesis The Seed by Spencer Janney Colorado College Spencer Janney

The truth is the whole. The whole, however, is merely the essential nature reaching its completeness through the process of its own development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what it is in very truth; and just in that consists its nature, which is to be actual, subject, or self-becoming, self-development.

– Hegel

First there was the seed. The seed of the world which was the seed of everything. The seed was all, but the seed was closed, dark. Then, everything and nothing were the same. There was nothing that the seed was not… and thus the seed was nothing.

The seed, in its desire to know itself split. From its primordial totality came two incomplete energies… feminine and masculine which, in the embryonic darkness, met and merged, fertilizing the seed and through their love creating light.

The seed drank from its light and grew… becoming a bud. The bud was Unity; basking in the light of the encompassing love of its feminine and masculine energies. The bud, Unity, was complete but still sealed… Now a turning circle. So to know itself it drank more and more of its light and it bloomed… It unfolded. Unity bloomed into the flower of the World and its inexorable blossoming was Time. To know its eternity, the petal of finitude unfurled, for to live is to face death. Simultaneously, to explore its own unity, the bud differentiated… the One became Many, and the world in all of its objects emerged.

48 Anamnesis The Seed

To plumb the depths of the boundless waters, the dry lands rose above them… To feel the sensual vitality of heat, out grew the petals of frost and cold. Thus came night and day, the ground and sky, the sun and moon, the mountain and the valley, the desert and the oasis… each mutually creating the other through their originary opposition.

After some time… this ding-an-sich of countless petals flowered in a singular way. To truly discover itself it needed subjects to know its objects… and in the cold morning, as darkness and night receded and the warm light of the young sun slid across the petals of the world flower… the dew of consciousness, trickled down the flower’s stalk, and across its leaves, and once more, One became Many… the petals of the Knower and the Known the signposts of the dew’s fluid track. Thus came conscious subjects, harboring their own internal contradiction, judging everything through the terror and ecstasy of self-awareness. Subject and object… cloven from the same bloom, the world endowed finally with innumerable eyes to open and experience the marvel of itself.

These in-looking subjects were the flower’s great self-explorers. They differentiated with voracity, each a unique self-originating point of the world’s particularity. Endlessly complexifying… endlessly dividing and creating new, deeper unities. Each discovering reality through its discovery of itself. These subjects were both in and of the world, both caused and causing. Determined objects suffused with the flower’s own ichor – subjectivity. Biological and transcendent, rational and intuitive, analytical and creative, Creatures lashing the raw clamor of being into veins of intersecting experience. Each isolated in their perception yet unified through life’s own creationary force, love: The quest for self-completion which vitalizes the eternal Movement. The self-world actualization which only manifests through self-negation.

Vol. V 49 Spencer Janney

Affirmation, negation and creation… not a world of static essence but a world of robust insubstantiality. Self and other mutually revealed through the ignorance and self-discovery obscuring their elemental sameness.

Like a man who stumbles across a cold spring in the desert, these vibrant, contradictory animals gulp experience with rapacity for they revel in their embodied unification of subject and object, mind and body, self and world, and they know that they must inevitably face their ultimate negation: Non-being. The final other through which to realize self. Beings immortalized through their very transience, the eternal and finite are sundered, consciousness bleeding from its object-vessel, nourishment for new growth. The petal shed, only for its substance to be cultivated, its legacy the worlds it united through its unique particularity. Its essence reclaimed, imbibed by the flower’s roots, carried up the stalk into the true wholeness of the world-body; eternal, infinite in the void once more.

50 Anamnesis