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Meno's Paradox of Inquiry and Socrates

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Meno's Paradox of Inquiry and Socrates Rutgers University Undergraduate Philosophy Journal Issue 2, Fall 2008 Acknowledgments As always we would like to acknowledge Mercedes Diaz for her invaluable help in making this Journal a reality. Rutgers University Undergraduate Philosophy Journal Executive Board Editor-in-Chief Kamil Kaczynski Editor-of-Content Max Mintz Publisher Barbara Saramak Secretary Henry Yeh Editorial Staff Brandi Bernoskie Hillel Herzfeld Uriel Carni Stephanie Horowitz Nicole D’Amore Elizabeth Jacobs Pat Dennis Tim Morey Alex Firsichbaum Yuri Roh Chase Freed Said Saillant Steve Gallagher Abe Stanway Erik Grisham Volodymyr Takhistov E.J. Green Table of Contents On Going Above and Beyond the Call of Duty � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1 Michael Licciardi Rutgers University Hegel’s Master-Slave Dialectic and Sexual Oppression � � � � � � � � � 15 Luke Roelofs Oxford University Meno’s Paradox of Inquiry and Socrates’ Theory of Recollection � � � 27 Ross Harman Oxford University Referential Descriptions and Communication � � � � � � � � � � � � � 37 Jim Hutchinson University of Toronto Reverence & Rationality: A Utilitarian Account of Belief � � � � � � � � 49 Sigal Samuel McGill University The Aftermath of Moral Realism � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 63 Jordan Jolly University of Texas at Austin On Going Above and Beyond the Call of Duty Michael Licciardi Rutgers University Abstract: In this paper, I endeavor to discuss and analyze the concept of morally supererogatory acts—of going above and beyond the call of moral duty. There is reason to suggest that the topic needs more clarification, and that a presumed understanding of it is not wholly sufficient. I will present these reasons before pursuing an investigation as to what further reflection yields when we examine the concept more closely. Ultimately, I intend to show that the concept of moral supererogation is not so coherent a concept as we might initially have thought. 2 Michael Licciardi In this paper, I endeavor to discuss and analyze the concept of morally supererogatory acts—of going above and beyond the call of moral duty. There is reason to suggest that the topic needs more clarification, and that a presumed understanding of it is not wholly sufficient. I will present these reasons before pursuing an investigation as to what further reflection yields when we examine the concept more closely. Ultimately, I intend to show that the concept of moral supererogation is not so coherent a concept as we might initially have thought. Stilts Ethics, as a sub-discipline of philosophy, similar to most sub-disciplines thereof, must, in a certain sense, stand upon stilts. That is to say, if one wishes to see far, one’s natural gifts alone will not be enough, and, invariably, the shoulders of a number of artificial giants will be necessary—which is really just to say that one cannot gain ethical insight, propose substantive ethical theories, or even assign oneself to the task in the first place without taking a number of things for granted, assumptions on which one’s theories can rest, stand, or run for that matter. As such, if one wishes to provide the philosophical community, or at least one’s ethics professor, with a theory involving ethics, it would seem most prudent and honest of that individual to provide a brief account of exactly what assumptions he/ she is making. This seems only fair to all parties involved. Believing, or at least wishing, myself to be the prudent and honest type, this will be my first task. Before I approach the problem of supererogation directly, I will lay out those prejudices in my ethical theory, which, for lack of space and time, I cannot defend in this essay. First and foremost, I suppose, I assume that there is some thing1* called “the good,” some thing called the “bad,” possibly even the “evil,” some actions which are “right,” and some which are “wrong”. As such, I assume that there is a moral fact about every morally relevant act or situation, rendering it either good or bad, right or wrong—excluding those cases which we might call morally neutral. The meaning I assume for the word “good” is somewhat abstract, but possibly helpful—by good I mean, that which one should do (or possibly value).2** I assume, then, that bad is 1 * I use the word thing here because I do not wish to commit myself to exactly what the good might be—whether Form, property, or otherwise. 2 ** While this definition is certainly only provisional, and by no means perfect, it seems, in its current formulation, to bridge the epic gulf between meta and normative ethics—generally phrased in the assertion, “no theory or definition of what the word ‘good’ means will ever give us a directive to, or show us why we should, be good.” If we assume that the good is that which we should do, then it follows analytically that we should be good. On Going Above and Beyond the Call of Duty 3 that which we should not do, that right is any action which is, or leads to, good, and that wrong is any action which is, or causes things to become, bad. Next, I assume that moral situations are of such vast uniqueness and complexity that, on the whole, general normative theories will not be able to encompass them. Thus, normative theories will be able to provide no more than guidance to individual moral agents, rather than definitive accounts of the absolute moral fact regarding a given situation. In this way, I assume a special brand of moral particularism, which, as noted, cannot be defended here. Given that this sort of particularism requires certain epistemic conditions/ qualifications, those conditions/qualifications will comprise my next assumption. I assume a sort of ethical intuitionism, whereby individuals, upon reflection, are presented with the moral fact of their individual situation. These moral facts are disclosed privately, and are, ultimately, unimpeachable by any moral theory or the judgment of other individuals3*. Lastly, I must assume a certain definition of “supererogation,” or at least an approximation of its meaning. I assume “supererogation” to mean: doing more than one is obligated to do, or going above and beyond the call of duty. It is my hope that this definition/approximation will conform to most everyone’s judgment about how the word is typically used, in order that it not have been constructed solely to serve my own theory—as such a construction would make my theory vacuous and unimportant. I hope also that the simplicity of my definition will not count against it, but rather, will leave room open to fit our general understanding of the term. With these assumptions out in the open, I will now proceed to outline my theory of moral supererogation, detailing, first, why I believe the concept to need further 3 * (A somewhat lengthy point)—It might be objected that this allows one to do what one wants, provided one can tell a convincing story about one’s ethical intuitions. This is not necessarily true, though. For one, one’s ability to cheat a system does not make the ideal of that system inherently false. Second, ultimately, we may only be punished, deemed worthy of censure, or officially blamed for some act via the imperfect laws of the legal system. In that we must all live together, we must all be governed by the same laws, even if these cannot, or could not, mirror moral fact. In so far as morality is concerned, we stand alone as individuals, and, for better or for worse, ultimately, we cannot fully know that our moral judgments of others are correct, in virtue of the fact that we are not them (although it is not uncommon that individuals are presented with similar, if not the same, moral intuitions, making moral judgment, if not infallible, not always unreasonable). In summation, law is rigid, and, while it can be cheated as well, it provides more objective standards for judgment. As far as ethics is concerned, one cannot fully cheat oneself. Thus, this theory does not prevent one from being judged by the law; it only prevents one from being conclusively judged by others. The inability to be judged conclusively by others, however, does not make one’s actions right when one wants them to be. 4 Michael Licciardi clarification, moving on to a theory of moral worth and character, before explaining why the concept’s presumed coherence does not hold up to scrutiny. Pre-Reflection on Supererogation It is often assumed that morally supererogatory actions are, in some sense, morally superior to morally obligatory actions. This assumption seems to come from the generally accepted view that morally neutral supererogatory acts are, in some sense, superior to obligatory actions. For instance, James, Greg’s boss, will think more highly of Greg, if Greg stays late once a week—not out of any contractual obligation, but out of a desire to increase productivity at the office—than he will of Steve, who only works the hours that he is required to. This is not a terribly uncommon phenomenon: students are admired by their teachers for reading ahead; our friends greatly appreciate it when we pick them up from the train-station at short notice; and restaurant-goers are generally very grateful—their gratitude often expressed in the form of a higher tip—for exceptional service provided by waiters and waitresses. The pertinent question is whether this principle extends to the moral realm. In other words, would it be correct to assert that actions which go above and beyond the call of moral duty are morally superior to actions which are simply in accord with moral duty? By way of a sort of analogy, we might think that the answer to this question is simple: of course morally supererogatory acts are superior to morally obligatory acts.
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