Essays on Plato's Epistemology

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Essays on Plato's Epistemology ESSAYS ON PLATO’S EPISTEMOLOGY ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY DE WULF-MANSION CENTRE Series I LIII Series Editors Russell L. Friedman Jan Opsomer Carlos Steel Gerd Van Riel Advisory Board Brad Inwood, University of Toronto, Canada Jill Kraye, The Warburg Institute, London, United Kingdom John Marenbon, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom Lodi Nauta, University of Groningen, The Netherlands Timothy Noone, The Catholic University of America, USA Robert Pasnau, University of Colorado at Boulder, USA Martin Pickavé, University of Toronto, Canada Pasquale Porro, Università degli Studi di Bari, Italy Geert Roskam, KU Leuven, Belgium The “De Wulf-Mansion Centre” is a research centre for Ancient, Medieval, and Renaissance philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of the KU Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein, 2, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium). It hosts the international project “Aristoteles latinus” and publishes the “Opera omnia” of Henry of Ghent and the “Opera Philosophica et Theologica” of Francis of Marchia. ESSAYS ON PLATO’S EPISTEMOLOGY Franco Trabattoni LEUVEN UNIVERSITY PRESS © 2016 by De Wulf-Mansioncentrum – De Wulf-Mansion Centre Leuven University Press / Presses Universitaires de Louvain / Universitaire Pers Leuven Minderbroedersstraat 4, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium) All rights reserved. Except in those cases expressly determined by law, no part of this publication may be multiplied, saved in an automated datafile or made public in any way whatsoever without the express prior written consent of the publishers. ISBN 978 94 6270 059 8 D/2016/1869/2 NUR: 732 To Giuliana, Giovanni and Anna Introduction Thought as Inner Dialogue (Theaet. e–a) Logos and doxa: The Meaning of the Refutation of the Third Definition of Epistêmê in the Theaetetus Theaetetus d–c: Truth without Certainty Foundationalism or Coherentism? On the Third Definition of Epistêmê in the Theaetetus What is the Meaning of Plato’s Theaetetus? Some Remarks on a New Annotated Translation of the Dialogue David Sedley’s Theaetetus The “Virtuous Circle” of Language. On the Meaning of Plato’s Cratylus The Knowledge of the Philosopher What Role Do the Mathematical Sciences Play in the Metaphor of the Line? Socrates’ Error in the Parmenides On the Distinguishing Features of Plato’s “Metaphysics” (Starting from the Parmenides) Is There Such a Thing as a “Platonic Theory of the Ideas” According to Aristotle? The Unity of Virtue, Self-Predication and the “Third Man” in Protagoras e–a Plato: Philosophy, Politics and Knowledge. An Overview Bibliography Index A passage from the Timaeus, one extensively quoted within the Platonic tradition (a), may be seen to effectively encapsulate Plato’s philosophy from an ontologi- cal as much as epistemological perspective: there are two kinds of reality, one eternal, invisible and immobile, the other ever-changing, visible and mobile; and these correspond to two modes of knowledge, “intellection accompanied by logos” and “opinion conjoined with sense-perception devoid of logos”.By examining other Platonic works, however, we soon realise that while this outline may be reliable on the ontological level (the presence of any intermediate mathematical entities in Platonic ontology would not affect its dualistic nature, since these entities would still be situated in the sphere of the intelligible), it is far less reliable on the epistemological level. What engenders some doubts is the nature of logos. In the passage from the Timaeus in question, logos is only fully attributed to noesis, whereas doxa is only the reflection of an alogos perception. Yet elsewhere (Theaetetus, Sophist, Philebus) Plato draws a very close link between logos and doxa: the knowledge founded on logos inherits the intrinsic fallibility of doxa, to which logos is connected, thereby considerably altering the clear-cut epistemo- logical dualism outlined in the passage from the Timaeus. If logos is fallible by nature (as we read in a passage from the Seventh Letter¹), what kind of knowledge can man actually attain? Two possibilities emerge here. If we believe that Plato grants man the possibility to attain certain knowledge of reality (which of course means of intelligible nature according to the philosopher), we can either attempt to demonstrate that man has access to a kind of intuitive knowledge higher than the one ensured by logos, or we can attempt to demonstrate that the connections between logos and doxa in Plato are only sporadic and unessential, so that it is indeed possible to find certain and infallible logoi (possibly to be identified with definitions). Alternatively – and this is the hypothesis upheld in the present book – we must admit that according to Plato human beings, precisely by virtue of their being confined within the realm of logos and doxa, have no access to certain and definitive knowledge in this life. The second hypothesis is not tantamount to claiming that according to Plato philosophy cannot attain any degree of truth at all or make any progress towards truth; less still does it imply that Plato was a sceptic philosopher. Rather, it means acknowledging the fact that well-founded doubts and objections are always possible, and hence that truth can only ever be grasped in a partial, approximate and incomplete way. The crucial assumption behind a reading of this sort, which ¹ On the Seventh Letter see ch. , n. aims to identify a guiding thread for Plato’s philosophy as a whole, is a realist interpretation of Plato’s metaphysics (i.e. the Two Worlds Theory) and doctrine of recollection. While this frame of reference may seem cumbersome (especially in the eyes of readers approaching Plato’s writing with a modern sensitivity), in my view it cannot be removed without jeopardising our capacity to understand Plato’s thought. Indeed, on the one hand the metaphysical framework provides a solid grounding in truth, enabling man to confidently pursue the task of discovering and interpreting reality; on the other hand, it explains why this task is a far from straightforward one in practice: why it is actually a rough and winding path laden with obstacles. It explains why, despite having the impression of living in a world marked by a clear-cut distinction between right and wrong, between true and false, between what works and what does not, man is not capable of producing unconditional and irrefutable truths to which everyone must bow. The reason for this apparent ambiguity lies precisely in reminiscence, which is to say the fact that truth is only accessible in a direct, evident and therefore indisputable way to the gods and the disembodied soul. Embodied souls, by contrast, can only draw upon their memories and the endless range of different logoi by which they strive to correctly describe a bygone vision. The pursuit of truth, for Plato, may therefore be seen as an attempt to find the unity or accordance (homologia) between logoi that comes closest to that pre-logical unity (the direct intuition of truth) which originally spawned the multiplicity of logoi. The interpretative framework just outlined sums up the overall view of Plato’s thought I have acquired ever since the first book I devoted to the philosopher.² The collection of studies presented in this volume – previously published essays that have been substantially revised³ – constitutes a further investigation of the ² Trabattoni (). Since I suppose that the image of Plato I draw in the book could appear to many readers somehow unusual and odd, I would like to mention here – in no particular order – various scholars I feel particularly in tune with (and, no doubt, I am forgetting many others): S. Rosen, K. Sayre, F. Gonzalez, D. Hyland, D. Roochnik, Ch. Griswold, E. Heitsch, R. Polansky, P. Stemmer, Ch. Rowe, M. Dixsaut, G. Casertano, W. Watson, R. Barney, A. Capra, G.A. Scott, W. Welton, D. Barton, D. Blank, W. Detel, P. Stern, B. Wachterhauser, M. McCoy, J. Kastely. ³ For each text I will be quoting the title, place of publication and date of the first (usually Italian) edition. Ch. : Il pensiero come dialogo interiore (Theaet. e–a), in Il Teeteto di Platone: strutture e problematiche, a c. di G. Casertano, Loffredo, Naples , pp. –; Ch. : Logos e doxa: o significado da refutação da terceira definição de epistêmê no Teeteto, in J. Trindade Santos (ed.), Do Saber ao Conhecimento. Estudos sobre o Teeteto, Lisboa , pp. – (it. transl. Λόγος e δόξα: il significato della confutazione della terza definizione di ἐπιστήμη nel Teeteto, in “Rivista di cultura classica e medievale” (), pp. –); Ch. : Theaetetus, d–c: Truth without Certainty, in A. Havlíček, F. Karfík, Š. Špinka (eds), Plato’s Theaetetus. Proceedings of the sixth Symposium Platonicum Pragense, above-described topics, with a special emphasis on epistemology. The revision work I just mentioned was chiefly carried out so as to lend unity and consistency to the volume, while reducing repetitions to a minimum. However, as the various chapters have not been conceived as a part of a single volume, this aim has only partly been achieved: some degree of repetition was unavoidable. This is particularly the case with the chapters on the Theaetetus, which – as might be expected in a work on Platonic epistemology – make up the bulk of the book. In the Theaetetus Plato addresses a crucial problem, the solution of which directly bears upon the nature and very existence of philosophy (if by this term we understand that activity through which one seeks to know the truth). This being the case, it is certainly striking that the question raised in the dialogue, namely “What is knowledge?”,is given no answer which withstands elenchos. This is all the more surprising given the fact that when he composed the Theaetetus Plato had already long ceased writing dialogues with aporetic outcomes. The Theaetetus is therefore widely regarded as a remarkable dialogue, one difficult to bring in line with what are regarded as the key texts of Platonic epistemology (starting from the central books of the Republic).
Recommended publications
  • Clitophon's Challenge and the Aporia of Socratic Protreptic* Teruo Mishima
    Clitophon’s Challenge and the Aporia of Socratic Protreptic* Teruo Mishima Before I discuss the text in detail, I would like to briefly sketch the main line of arguments in the Clitophon which I am going to take up, just for the sake of anamnēsis of the readers : In the opening scene Socrates speaks to Clitophon in the third person and tells him that he heard from somebody else that Clitophon, in his conversation with Lysias, has criticised Socratic diatribai (pursuits), whereas he has lavishly praised his synousia (association) with Thrasymachus. Taking Socrates’ words as a sort of disguised criticism or complaint, Clitophon answers that the story was only half true, because although he did on the one hand criticise Socrates, he also on the other hand highly praised him. Then, he explains to Socrates why he must take such an ambiguous attitude towards him. In the first half of his speech he focuses on the aspect of Socratic teaching which he admires unreservedly, namely Socrates’ protreptic speech towards virtues. Here he refers to a lot of Socratic dicta which remind us of well known passages in the early dialogues of Plato. By contrast, in the latter half Clitophon explains where his deep frustration with Socrates lies. He says that, being already converted by Socratic protreptic and resolved to pursue virtues, what he expects now from Socrates is “what comes next”, that is a detailed account of the essence of virtues to be acquired and a piece of concrete advice on how to acquire them. But to these - Clitophon complains - neither Socrates’ company nor Socrates himself gives any convincing answer.
    [Show full text]
  • CRATYLUS by Plato Translated by Benjamin Jowett the Project Gutenberg Ebook of Cratylus, by Plato
    CRATYLUS By Plato Translated by Benjamin Jowett The Project Gutenberg EBook of Cratylus, by Plato INTRODUCTION. The Cratylus has always been a source of perplexity to the student of Plato. While in fancy and humour, and perfection of style and metaphysical originality, this dialogue may be ranked with the best of the Platonic writings, there has been an uncertainty about the motive of the piece, which interpreters have hitherto not succeeded in dispelling. We need not suppose that Plato used words in order to conceal his thoughts, or that he would have been unintelligible to an educated contemporary. In the Phaedrus and Euthydemus we also find a difficulty in determining the precise aim of the author. Plato wrote satires in the form of dialogues, and his meaning, like that of other satirical writers, has often slept in the ear of posterity. Two causes may be assigned for this obscurity: 1st, the subtlety and allusiveness of this species of composition; 2nd, the difficulty of reproducing a state of life and literature which has passed away. A satire is unmeaning unless we can place ourselves back among the persons and thoughts of the age in which it was written. Had the treatise of Antisthenes upon words, or the speculations of Cratylus, or some other Heracleitean of the fourth century B.C., on the nature of language been preserved to us; or if we had lived at the time, and been 'rich enough to attend the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus,' we should have understood Plato better, and many points which are now attributed to the extravagance of Socrates' humour would have been found, like the allusions of Aristophanes in the Clouds, to have gone home to the sophists and grammarians of the day.
    [Show full text]
  • Curriculum Vitae
    Timothy Williamson: Publications in reverse chronological order In preparation [a] ‘Knowledge, credence, and strength of belief’, invited for Amy Flowerree and Baron Reed (eds.), The Epistemic. [b] ‘Blackburn against moral realism’, for Paul Bloomfield and David Copp (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism, Oxford University Press. [c] ‘Non-modal normativity and norms of belief’, for Ilkka Niiniluoto and Sami Pihlstrom (eds.), volume on normativity, Acta Philosophica Fennica (2020). [d] ‘The KK principle and rotational symmetry’, invited for Analytic Philosophy. [e] ‘Chakrabarti and the Nyāya on knowability’. To appear [a] Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. [b] (with Paul Boghossian) Debating the A Priori. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. [c] ‘Edgington on possible knowledge of unknown truth’, in J. Hawthorne and L. Walters (eds.), Conditionals, Probability, and Paradox: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [d] ‘Justifications, excuses, and skeptical scenarios’, in J. Dutant and F. Dorsch (eds.), The New Evil Demon, Oxford University Press. [e] ‘The counterfactual-based approach to modal epistemology’, in Otávio Bueno and Scott Shalkowski (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Modality, London: Routledge. [f] ‘More Oxonian scepticism about the a priori’, in Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (eds.), The A Priori: Its Significance, Grounds, and Extent, Oxford University Press. [g] ‘Reply to Casullo’s defence of the significance of the a priori – a posteriori distinction’, in Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (eds.), The A Priori: Its Significance, Grounds, and Extent, Oxford University Press. [h] ‘Introduction’ to Khaled Qutb, Summary of The Philosophy of Philosophy (in Arabic), Cairo: Academic Bookshop.
    [Show full text]
  • Kant's Theoretical Conception Of
    KANT’S THEORETICAL CONCEPTION OF GOD Yaron Noam Hoffer Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, September 2017 Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Doctoral Committee _________________________________________ Allen W. Wood, Ph.D. (Chair) _________________________________________ Sandra L. Shapshay, Ph.D. _________________________________________ Timothy O'Connor, Ph.D. _________________________________________ Michel Chaouli, Ph.D 15 September, 2017 ii Copyright © 2017 Yaron Noam Hoffer iii To Mor, who let me make her ends mine and made my ends hers iv Acknowledgments God has never been an important part of my life, growing up in a secular environment. Ironically, only through Kant, the ‘all-destroyer’ of rational theology and champion of enlightenment, I developed an interest in God. I was drawn to Kant’s philosophy since the beginning of my undergraduate studies, thinking that he got something right in many topics, or at least introduced fruitful ways of dealing with them. Early in my Graduate studies I was struck by Kant’s moral argument justifying belief in God’s existence. While I can’t say I was convinced, it somehow resonated with my cautious but inextricable optimism. My appreciation for this argument led me to have a closer look at Kant’s discussion of rational theology and especially his pre-critical writings. From there it was a short step to rediscover early modern metaphysics in general and embark upon the current project. This journey could not have been completed without the intellectual, emotional, and material support I was very fortunate to receive from my teachers, colleagues, friends, and family.
    [Show full text]
  • The Poverty of Socratic Questioning: Asking and Answering in the Meno
    University of Cincinnati University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications Faculty Articles and Other Publications College of Law Faculty Scholarship 1994 The oP verty of Socratic Questioning: Asking and Answering In The eM no Thomas D. Eisele University of Cincinnati College of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs Part of the Legal Education Commons Recommended Citation Eisele, Thomas D., "The oP verty of Socratic Questioning: Asking and Answering In The eM no" (1994). Faculty Articles and Other Publications. Paper 36. http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs/36 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law Faculty Scholarship at University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles and Other Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE POVERTY OF SOCRATIC QUESTIONING: ASKING AND ANSWERING IN THE MEND Thomas D. Eisele* I understand [philosophy 1 as a willingness to think not about some­ thing other than what ordinary human beings think about, but rather to learn to think undistractedly about things that ordinary human beings cannot help thinking about, or anyway cannot help having occur to them, sometimes in fantasy, sometimes asa flash across a landscape; such things, for example, as whether we can know the world as it is in itself, or whether others really know the nature of one's own experiences, or whether good and bad are relative, or whether we might not now be dreaming that we are awake, or whether modern tyrannies and weapons and spaces and speeds and art are continuous with the past of the human race or discontinuous, and hence whether the learning of the human race is not irrelevant to the problems it has brought before itself.
    [Show full text]
  • Online Library of Liberty: the Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 1
    The Online Library of Liberty A Project Of Liberty Fund, Inc. Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, vol. 1 [387 AD] The Online Library Of Liberty This E-Book (PDF format) is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a private, non-profit, educational foundation established in 1960 to encourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals. 2010 was the 50th anniversary year of the founding of Liberty Fund. It is part of the Online Library of Liberty web site http://oll.libertyfund.org, which was established in 2004 in order to further the educational goals of Liberty Fund, Inc. To find out more about the author or title, to use the site's powerful search engine, to see other titles in other formats (HTML, facsimile PDF), or to make use of the hundreds of essays, educational aids, and study guides, please visit the OLL web site. This title is also part of the Portable Library of Liberty DVD which contains over 1,000 books and quotes about liberty and power, and is available free of charge upon request. The cuneiform inscription that appears in the logo and serves as a design element in all Liberty Fund books and web sites is the earliest-known written appearance of the word “freedom” (amagi), or “liberty.” It is taken from a clay document written about 2300 B.C. in the Sumerian city-state of Lagash, in present day Iraq. To find out more about Liberty Fund, Inc., or the Online Library of Liberty Project, please contact the Director at [email protected].
    [Show full text]
  • The Concept of the Sun As Ἡγεμονικόν in the Stoa and in Manilius’ Astronomica Nº 21, Sep.-Dec
    Eduardo Boechat - Universidade de Brasilia (Brazil) [email protected] The concept of the Sun as ἡγεμονικόν in the Stoa and in Manilius’ Astronomica nº 21, sep.-dec. 2017 BOECHAT, E. (2017). The concept of the Sun as ἡγεμονικόν in the Stoa and in Manilius’ Astronomica. Archai nº21, sep.-dec., p. 79-125 DOI: https://doi.org/10.14195/1984 -249X_21_3 Abstract: Hegemonikon in Stoic vocabulary is the technical term for the chief part or ‘command-centre’ of the soul. As we know, the Stoics considered the cosmos a living organism, and they theorised both about the human soul’s Hegemonikon and about its counterpart in the World-soul. My ultimate purpose in this paper is to show that the Stoic concept of the cosmic hegemonikon can be observed in Manilius’ Astro- nomica. The paper is divided into two parts. To begin with, I will examine and discuss the evidence concerning this concept in the relevant texts of the Early and Middle Stoa. The analysis will indicate that the concept of hegemonikon could involve a background of astronomical theory which some scholars attribute to the Stoic Posidonius. In the second section, I will go on to relate the concept of hegemonikon to the doctrines conveyed by Manilius. Additionally, we shall 79 see that Manilius’ polemic allusions to Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura suggest that the concept was intensely debated in the Post-Hellenistic philosophical circles. Keywords: Ancient Cosmology; Stoics; Manilius; Greek Astrology. nº 21, sep.-dec. 2017 Eduardo Boechat, ‘The concept of the Sun as ἡγεμονικόν in the Stoa and in Manilius’ Astro- nomica.’, p.
    [Show full text]
  • HEIDEGGER's TRANSCENDENTALISM Author(S): DANIEL DAHLSTROM Source: Research in Phenomenology, Vol
    HEIDEGGER'S TRANSCENDENTALISM Author(s): DANIEL DAHLSTROM Source: Research in Phenomenology, Vol. 35 (2005), pp. 29-54 Published by: Brill Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/24721815 Accessed: 23-01-2018 19:34 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms Brill is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Research in Phenomenology This content downloaded from 142.58.129.109 on Tue, 23 Jan 2018 19:34:17 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms HEIDEGGER S TRANSCENDENTALISM by DANIEL DAHLSTROM Boston University Abstract This paper attempts to marshall some of the evidence of the transcendental character of Heidegger's later thinking, despite his repudiation of any form of transcendental think ing, including that of his own earlier project of fundamental ontology. The transcen dental significance of that early project is first outlined through comparison and contrast with the diverse transcendental turns in the philosophies of Kant and Husserl. The paper then turns to Heidegger's account of the historical source of the notion of tran scendence in Plato's thinking, its legacy in various forms of transcendental philosophy, and his reasons for attempting to think in a post-transcendental way.
    [Show full text]
  • Gillian K. Russell
    Gillian K. Russell Dianoia Institute of Philosophy (cell) +1 (858) 205{2834 Locked Bag 4115 MDC [email protected] Fitzroy, Victoria 3065 https://www.gillianrussell.net Australia Current Employment Professor of Philosophy Dianoia Institute at ACU in Melbourne 2020| 1 Arch´eProfessorial Fellow ( 5 th time) University of St Andrews, Scotland 2019{2023 Employment and Education History Alumni Distinguished Professor University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 2019{2020 Professor of Philosophy University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 2015{19 Associate Professor in Philosophy Washington University in St Louis 2011{2015 Assistant Professor in Philosophy Washington University in St Louis 2004{2011 Killam Postdoctoral Fellow University of Alberta 2005 Ph.D. in Philosophy Princeton University 2004 M.A. in Philosophy Princeton University 2002 M.A. in German and Philosophy University of St Andrews, Scotland 1999 Areas of Specialisation Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Logic, Epistemology Areas of Competence Logic, History of Analytic Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science and Mathematics Books { Truth in Virtue of Meaning: a defence of the analytic/synthetic distinction (Oxford, 2008) { The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language, with Delia Graff Fara (eds.) (Routledge, 2011) { New Waves in Philosophical Logic, with Greg Restall (eds.) (Palgrave MacMillan, 2012) Accepted and Published Papers { \Social Spheres" forthcoming in Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic Audrey Yap and Roy Cook (eds) { \Logic: A Feminist Approach" forthcoming in Philosophy for Girls: An invitation to the life of thought, M. Shew and K. Garchar (eds) (Oxford University Press, 2020) { \Waismann's Papers on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction" in Friedrich Waismann: The Open Texture of Analytic Philosophy, D.
    [Show full text]
  • Anselm's Cur Deus Homo
    Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo: A Meditation from the Point of View of the Sinner Gene Fendt Elements in Anselm's Cur Deus Homo point quite differently from the usual view of it as the locus classicus for a theory of Incarnation and Atonement which exhibits Christ as providing the substitutive revenging satisfaction for the infinite dishonor God suffers at the sin of Adam. This meditation will attempt to bring out how the rhetorical ergon of the work upon faith and conscience drives the sinner to see the necessity of the marriage of human with divine natures offered in Christ and how that marriage raises both man and creation out of sin and its defects. This explanation should exhibit both to believers, who seek to understand, and to unbelievers (primarily Jews and Muslims), from a common root, a solution "intelligible to all, and appealing because of its utility and the beauty of its reasoning" (1.1). Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo is the locus classicus for a theory of Incarnation and Atonement which exhibits Christ as providing the substitutive revenging satisfaction for the infinite dishonor God suffers at the sin of Adam (and company).1 There are elements in it, however, which seem to point quite differently from such a view. This meditation will attempt to bring further into the open how the rhetorical ergon of the work upon “faith and conscience”2 shows something new in this Paschal event, which cannot be well accommodated to the view which makes Christ a scapegoat killed for our sin.3 This ergon upon the conscience I take—in what I trust is a most suitably monastic fashion—to be more important than the theoretical theological shell which Anselm’s discussion with Boso more famously leaves behind.
    [Show full text]
  • The Roles of Solon in Plato's Dialogues
    The Roles of Solon in Plato’s Dialogues Dissertation Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Samuel Ortencio Flores, M.A. Graduate Program in Greek and Latin The Ohio State University 2013 Dissertation Committee: Bruce Heiden, Advisor Anthony Kaldellis Richard Fletcher Greg Anderson Copyrighy by Samuel Ortencio Flores 2013 Abstract This dissertation is a study of Plato’s use and adaptation of an earlier model and tradition of wisdom based on the thought and legacy of the sixth-century archon, legislator, and poet Solon. Solon is cited and/or quoted thirty-four times in Plato’s dialogues, and alluded to many more times. My study shows that these references and allusions have deeper meaning when contextualized within the reception of Solon in the classical period. For Plato, Solon is a rhetorically powerful figure in advancing the relatively new practice of philosophy in Athens. While Solon himself did not adequately establish justice in the city, his legacy provided a model upon which Platonic philosophy could improve. Chapter One surveys the passing references to Solon in the dialogues as an introduction to my chapters on the dialogues in which Solon is a very prominent figure, Timaeus- Critias, Republic, and Laws. Chapter Two examines Critias’ use of his ancestor Solon to establish his own philosophic credentials. Chapter Three suggests that Socrates re- appropriates the aims and themes of Solon’s political poetry for Socratic philosophy. Chapter Four suggests that Solon provides a legislative model which Plato reconstructs in the Laws for the philosopher to supplant the role of legislator in Greek thought.
    [Show full text]
  • Interpretation: a Journal of Political Philosophy
    Interpretation A JOURNAL J_OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY Winter 1998 Volume 26 Number 2 149 Jules Gleicher Moses Politikos 183 Tucker Landy The Limitations of Political Philosophy: An Interpretation of Plato's Charmides 201 Jason A. Tipton Love of Gain, Philosophy and Tyranny: A Commentary on Plato's Hipparchus 217 Larry Peterman Changing Titles: Some Suggestions about the "Prince" Use of in Machiavelli and Others 239 Catherine H. Zuckert Leadership Natural and Conventional in Melville's "Benito Cereno" 257 Jon Fennell Harry Neumann and the Political Piety of Rorty's Postmodernism Book Reviews 275 George Anastaplo Aristotle's "Physics": A Guided Study, by Joe Sachs 285 Michael P. Zuckert Shakespeare and the Good Life, by David Lowenthal 295 Joan Stambaugh Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, by Rudiger Safranski 299 Patrick Coby Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau and the Ethics of Politics, by Ruth Grant 305 Susan Orr Leo Strauss and the American Right, by Shadia Drury 309 Will Morrisey Public Morality and Liberal Society: Essays on Decency, Law, and Pornography, by Harry M. Clor Interpretation Editor-in-Chief Hilail Gildin, Dept. of Philosophy, Queens College Executive Editor Leonard Grey General Editors Seth G. Benardete Charles E. Butterworth Hilail Gildin Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) Howard B. White (d. 1974) Consulting Editors Christopher Bruell Joseph Cropsey Ernest L. Fortin John Hallowell (d. 1992) Harry V. Jaffa David Lowenthal Muhsin Mahdi Harvey C. Mansfield Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) Michael Oakeshott (d. 1990) Ellis Sandoz Leo Strauss (d. 1973) Kenneth W. Thompson International Editors Terence E. Marshall Heinrich Meier Editors Wayne Ambler Maurice Auerbach Fred Baumann Amy Bonnette Patrick Coby Elizabeth C de Baca Eastman Thomas S.
    [Show full text]