Interpretation A JOURNAL J_OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Winter 1998 Volume 26 Number 2

149 Jules Gleicher Moses Politikos

183 Tucker Landy The Limitations of Political Philosophy: An Interpretation of 's

201 Jason A. Tipton Love of Gain, Philosophy and Tyranny: A Commentary on Plato's

217 Larry Peterman Changing Titles: Some Suggestions about the "Prince" Use of in Machiavelli and Others

239 Catherine H. Zuckert Leadership Natural and Conventional in Melville's "Benito Cereno"

257 Jon Fennell Harry Neumann and the Political Piety of Rorty's Postmodernism

Book Reviews

275 George Anastaplo Aristotle's "Physics": A Guided Study, by Joe Sachs

285 Michael P. Zuckert Shakespeare and the Good Life, by David Lowenthal

295 Joan Stambaugh Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, by Rudiger Safranski

299 Patrick Coby Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau and the Ethics of Politics, by Ruth Grant

305 Susan Orr Leo Strauss and the American Right, by Shadia Drury

309 Will Morrisey Public Morality and Liberal Society: Essays on Decency, Law, and Pornography, by Harry M. Clor Interpretation

Editor-in-Chief Hilail Gildin, Dept. of Philosophy, Queens College Executive Editor Leonard Grey General Editors Seth G. Benardete Charles E. Butterworth Hilail Gildin Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) Howard B. White (d. 1974) Consulting Editors Christopher Bruell Joseph Cropsey Ernest L. Fortin John Hallowell (d. 1992) Harry V. Jaffa David Lowenthal Muhsin Mahdi Harvey C. Mansfield Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) Michael Oakeshott (d. 1990) Ellis Sandoz Leo Strauss (d. 1973) Kenneth W. Thompson International Editors Terence E. Marshall Heinrich Meier Editors Wayne Ambler Maurice Auerbach Fred Baumann Amy Bonnette Patrick Coby Elizabeth C de Baca Eastman Thomas S. Engeman Edward J. Erler Maureen Feder-Marcus Pamela K. Jensen Ken Masugi Will Morrisey Susan Orr Charles T. Rubin Leslie G. Rubin Susan Meld Shell Bradford P. Wilson Michael P. Zuckert Catherine H. Zuckert Manuscript Editor Lucia B. Prochnow

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Inquiries: (Ms.) Joan Walsh, Assistant to the Editor interpretation, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y. 1 1 367- 1 597, U.S.A. (7 1 8)997-5542 Fax (7 1 8) 997-5565 E Mail: [email protected] Limitations of Political Philosophy: An Interpretation of Plato's Charmides

Tucker Landy Kentucky State University

Both the and the Charmides are in the form of a monologue by , and both contain a description of a good or ideal regime, but the differences in the presentation of these regimes are decisive. In the Republic, the description of the good city takes up the bulk of the work, and it is taken quite seriously by the 's participants as a realizable proposal (see 471c-e). In the Charmides, Socrates very briefly describes a city ruled by temperance, in which all tasks are performed by those who know their busi ness, but he characterizes this description as a dream and leaves open the ques tion whether it has come from the gate of hom, which issues true dreams, or of ivory, which issues false ones (173b) (see , Odyssey 19.562). The inter locutors of the Charmides, then, are discouraged from taking this description as a realizable proposal. The Charmides, the dialogue on temperance, appears to Republic.1 offer a sobering counterweight to the intense political idealism of the Part of the reason for this difference has to do with the characters in each dialogue. In the Republic, Socrates speaks mainly to and Adeimantus, who are eager to see justice and the just life defended against the arguments of the Thrasymachus. Glaucon and Adeimantus would appear to need a noble vision of justice worthy of their laudable request. In contrast, in the Charmides, Socrates speaks mainly to Charmides and , both of whom would later be involved in the regime of the in (404-403 B.C.; see Hellenica 2.4.19). During that time, Critias took extremely violent measures to establish and maintain a Spartan-style oligarchy or aristoc racy there. (Critias wrote a poem celebrating Spartan moderation. I have this from Tuckey, p. 15.) Knowing these facts about their careers, we are not sur prised that Plato chose to have Socrates give Critias and Charmides a lesson in temperance and furthermore in the limitations of what can be accomplished with philosophy in the political arena. Knowing also, however, that Critias had spent some time with Socrates be fore becoming one of the Thirty Tyrants, we also wonder to what extent Socra Critias.2 tes and his ideas influenced the character and thinking of Of all the , the Charmides would seem to be the most likely place to look for Plato's thoughts on this matter. The difficulty is that we cannot be sure that the Socrates of Plato's dialogues is intended to represent the historical Socrates, his

interpretation, Winter 1999, Vol. 26, No. 2 184 Interpretation thoughts, his speeches, and his actions. In any case, the most important ques tion, probably for Plato and certainly for us, is not whether the historical Socrates actually influenced the historical Critias, but whether political philosophy not just some political philosophies, but political philosophy in general neces sarily inspires or encourages dangerous political ambitions in certain people as it awakens the faculty of philosophical inquiry and teaches them how to think independently, even radically, about political affairs. It is reasonable to assume that this larger question, rather than the historical question, would be Plato's main concern, although the historical question was certainly the stimulus to the main question and is still of some importance because it provides empirical data for answering the larger philosophical question. In this essay we shall assume that the character Socrates represents, not the historical Socrates, but rather the ideal political philosopher to the extent that Plato's philosophical and literary powers allowed: one who is aware of the dangers inherent in political philosophy and of the need to exercise caution in introducing others to its charms. In this respect, he may differ from the histori cal Socrates. We shall then take Critias as representing a dangerous type of student: one who is liable to believe that the knowledge of political philosophy he has acquired is the necessary and sufficient condition of good rulership. Critias, in other words, is something like a prototype of many well-known mod em revolutionaries who were inspired by what they believed to be a complete science of politics that delegitimized all other claims to rulership. The inter pretation of the Charmides that follows, it is hoped, will bear out these assump tions. The Charmides, I shall argue, acknowledges inconspicuously that, because the serious pursuit of political philosophy requires an inclination for (or at least a willingness to engage in) spirited, adventurous inquiries into the most controversial political subjects, that pursuit bears some of the marks of an in temperate or immoderate activity. Political philosophy therefore cannot com pletely avoid inciting and fostering the ambitions of people like Critias. Indeed, both the historical and the Platonic Socrates show a predilection for the politi cally ambitious, perhaps precisely because of the adventurous spirit they pos sess (cf. I 104e-106a). The Charmides also shows, however, that steps can and should be taken to bring some measure of temperance to the souls of such students and to make them aware of the practical limitations to which the application of political theory is subject. We see the Platonic Socrates tak ing such precautions especially in this dialogue. Finally, the Charmides shows that even these steps may not be completely effective, and that the danger of misguided inspiring ambitions is perhaps a necessary companion of political philosophy.

Clearly, if the Charmides has this agenda, it can express these concerns only in an esoteric allusive, manner. It will leave the impression with less attentive readers that there is one only Socrates, the historical Socrates, who was con demned the Athenian unjustly by demos and who was lovingly reproduced here The Limitations of Political Philosophy 185 and in the rest of Plato's dialogues; the inattentive reader will see only a Socra tes innocently concerned with fostering a deeper understanding of virtue in the minds of the young and tender. Because of the difficulty of demonstrating the existence of a hidden agenda, the coherence and plausibility of the interpreta tion offered in this essay will depend on the evidence and the reasoning pre sented as a whole. The relation of the historical Socrates to the Platonic literary character is, as I have suggested, of subordinate but still substantial importance to the philo sophical subject matter of this dialogue. It will not be too far fetched, therefore, to see whether Plato might have addressed this matter in some artful, though allusive, manner in the text. I believe he has. At one point early in the narrative, Socrates explains to Charmides, who had been complaining of headaches, that he had learned of a remedy for headaches and of a certain charm while soldier ing in Potidaea. He learned it from one of the Thracian physicians of , who were said to be able to make a person immortal (156b- 157c). This physi cian agreed with the advice of Greek physicians, according to which one should not treat a part of the body, such as the eyes or the head, apart from the body as a whole. The Thracian added, however, that one should not treat the body apart from the soul. In fact, most illnesses eluded the Greek physicians, according to the Thracian, because the Greek physicians were ignorant with respect to the whole, which ought to be their concern. All good and evil, according to the Thracian doctor, in the body as well as in the whole human being, arose from the soul. Therefore, the soul has to be treated first by certain charms (Socrates

words" now switches to the plural), which are "noble (157a). Such words en gender temperance (now mentioned for the first time) in the soul. As soon as temperance is present in the soul, Socrates maintains, it is easy to secure health to the head and to the rest of the body. Now let us suppose that the Thracian doctor is a parabolic allusion to Plato himself as the author of the dialogue and the literary portrayer of Socrates. (One observation that is not decisive but worth mentioning: the Thracian doctor is said to be able to make men immortal [156d], and Plato did make Socrates and others immortal his dialogues.) Then we could say, perhaps, that Plato is obliquely indicating that he has modified the historical Socrates in his artistic rendition by correcting a fault that the historical Socrates was in fact charged with, namely, that "he did not teach his

politics" companions temperance before (Xenophon, 1.2.17), i.e., he did not engender temperance in their souls before treating their heads. The Platonic Socrates, in contrast to the historical Socrates, has taken an oath to do as the Thracian doctor bid (157c). According to this reading, the Charmides would show, not the effect of the historical Socrates on the historical Charmides and Critias, but the effect of a new and more prudent political philosopher on people like them. This reading would be in accord with Plato's caution in the (although the authenticity of this letter has admittedly been ques beautiful" tioned) that the dialogues are given to a Socrates "become young and 186 Interpretation

(314c). Let us allow, then, that Plato has made some improvements to the his torical character in his writings, and that, in this dialogue especially, he has given Socrates a better sense of how dangerous political philosophy can be and of how important the lessons of restraint are in educating the ambitious young. This essay is divided into four parts that follow roughly the order of the dialogue. The first part will treat the opening pages, which seem to intimate the fundamental problem addressed by the dialogue: the mutual attraction and the conflicting aims of the philosopher and of the politically ambitious. The aims of philosophers are theoretical, while the aims of aspiring statesmen are practical. Socrates' The second part will look at interactions with Charmides, where the potentially dangerous side of Socrates and of philosophical inquiry into ethical Socrates' and political matters is emphasized. We see here indications of pow erful eros and his willingness to teach bold thinking to those who seem suitable. In these passages, it seems to me, we get something of a picture of the histori Socrates' cal Socrates. The third part will look at interaction with Critias, which takes up by far the bulk of the dialogic portion of the Charmides. Here we see the Platonic Socrates teaching restraint, with some at least temporary success, to the student who later showed the most extraordinary intemperance in Athe nian politics. In the fourth part, we shall make use of what has been gained to try to answer the larger question, whether the political philosopher can teach temperance as part of the sometimes dangerous lessons of political philosophy.

The indications that Plato gives at the end of the dialogue are not especially encouraging in this regard.

I. THE SETTING

Socrates' In the opening of narrative (a recollection of the events of "the evening of the day before"), he and the young men to whom he will speak are literally and figuratively coming from and heading in opposite directions, thus highlighting the difference between the former's primary interest in philosophy and the latter's primary interest in practical politics. Socrates explains first that he had just come back from the army camps at Potidaea, where a major battle with Peloponnesian forces had taken place. That battle initiated the Peloponne sian War, which would eventually bring down the Athenian democracy and also to help bring Critias and the Thirty Tyrants to power. Socrates explains that he was delighted to get back to his usual pastimes, since he had been away for so long. He to the went, therefore, school of Taureas, where the young are trained. Several people hailed Socrates from a distance, and the mad rushed over to led him the hand to a seat him, by beside Critias, and urged him to give a complete account of the battle at Potidaea (153b-c). Socrates obliged them, answering all their questions. But in his narrative he repeats nothing about what he told them then; he shows no interest in such matters. He says that after they The Limitations of Political Philosophy 187

things," had had enough of "these sorts of he asked them about affairs at home and in particular about philosophy (153d). He also wanted to know whether any both." of the young men had distinguished themselves in "wisdom or beauty or We see that Chaerephon, Critias, and the rest wanted to know what was happening at the edge of the Athenian empire, at the limits of Athenian power; they were looking outward. Socrates wanted to know what was happening in the city of Athens and specifically what philosophical activity was going on Socrates' there; he was looking inward. Figuratively, the inward direction of attention could represent his interest in the objects of philosophy, while the

Critias' outward direction of Chaerephon's and attention could represent their

interest in material and practical objects. The action of the dialogue as a whole seems to stem from the struggle between these two tendencies. In the early part Socrates' of the dialogue (154d-161b), inward, philosophical tendency pre dominates, manifesting itself as a desire to examine the soul of the young Athe nian Charmides. Indeed, as Socrates and Charmides discuss the nature of temperance, Charmides proves quite amenable to the activity of soul-searching and the serious pursuit of self-knowledge. But there is an abrupt change at

Critias' 161b, where presence begins to be felt more strongly. From that point on, the discussion focusses on the question of the practical benefits and even the political power afforded by temperance understood as self-knowledge. It is clear that in the hands of someone like Socrates, who is interested in knowl edge for its own sake and not in political power (see 3 Id), even the most controversial political inquiries can do no harm to himself or to others. In

the hands of the politically ambitious, however, it is another matter. The prob lem is that Socrates is naturally interested in educating the young, especially the most talented and ambitious, toward a life of philosophy. The politically ambi tious, however, may be inspired to use their knowledge of political philosophy to realize grandiose political dreams. There is a mutual attraction, then, between

philosophy and political ambition which can be dangerous, and the historical record, in ancient Athens and in modern times, shows this. Can anything be

done to avoid the danger? The subsequent narration in the dialogue analyzes the

Socrates' problem and provides an illustration, through the examples of action, of how it might be addressed, if not entirely solved.

II. SOCRATES AS TEACHER OF INTEMPERANCE

The Platonic Socrates is an extremely complex character (see 230a). As we learn from Alcibiades in the , Socrates seems to have

given the impression that virtuous behavior was easy for him (217e-221c). No

Alcibiades' doubt flattery contains much that is tme, if only about the Platonic character, but it is a mistake to assume that the Platonic Socrates is utterly sober

and temperate in all respects. In the Charmides, the dialogue on temperance, we 188 Interpretation

Socrates' have own account of a moment when his desires almost got the better of him. We learn that Socrates does not always find it easy, but rather some times extremely difficult to control his powerful erotic appetite. If Socrates is reasonably taken to be the most complete human being in the world of the Platonic dialogues, then to be fully human, it seems, is to have desires, strong desires that are difficult, though not impossible, to control. Critias, looking away toward the door, told Socrates that a young man of the greatest beauty was about to show up, and presently Charmides appeared. Soc rates tells us actually he addresses some companion (o hetaire, 154b) who is Socrates' evidently listening to monologue two days after the conversation with Charmides and Critias took place that he is no measurer: he is the proverbial

line," marble.3 "white useless in marking off the measurements of white Almost all men at that age seem beautiful to him. In this way, Socrates shows his liberal, perhaps immoderate appetite for the beauty of the young (cf. Republic 474d-475a). After Socrates acknowledged the extraordinary beauty of Char

mides' face, Chaerephon told Socrates that if Charmides consented to strip, Charmides' Socrates would believe he had no face, so thoroughly beautiful was Charmides' form (154d). Socrates, however, claimed interest in stripping soul and viewing that rather than his form, since he believed Charmides was old enough for a conversation. Critias had an attendant summon Charmides on the pretense that Socrates was a doctor who could help Charmides with the ailment he had been complaining about yesterday. Then Critias turned to Socrates, ex plaining that Charmides had been complaining about headaches, and asked Soc

head." so.4 rates to pretend he had "some remedy for the Socrates agreed to do Much later in the dialogue, this sort of pretense is associated with intemperate

doctor" behavior (see 17 le and also the references to "pretending to be a at Socrates' 170c and 171c). Evidently, eros or his desire for conversation or both sometimes led him to act intemperately himself. Socrates, addressing his listener again, now reveals the extraordinary turbu lence that arose in his soul as Charmides sat down beside him (155c-d). He explains that his former confidence in looking forward to an easy conversation with the young man was knocked out. Then, addressing his nameless listener for the third and last time, Socrates relates how, as people started pressing all

cloak," around the two of them, he saw "the things inside [Charmides'] caught and lost fire, possession of himself. He says he was reminded of a verse by the wise who in of a Kydias, speaking beautiful boy warns someone "to take care

meats." lest, going as a fawn before the lion, you be seized as his share of the In this passage, Socrates reveals that his temperance in erotic matters is far from perfect. he First, shows that he had too much confidence in thinking he would have an conversation easy with the beautiful Charmides, arguably a kind of hubris. he shows Charmides' Second, that his erotic attraction to form made it almost impossible for him to do what he had said he wanted to do instead of Charmides' Charmides' contemplating form, namely, to examine soul. But at The Limitations of Political Philosophy 189 the same time, in giving an account of these things to his nameless listener, Socrates shows what could be considered an essential ingredient of temperance: knowledge of himself, his appetites and weaknesses, and he eventually recovers Socrates' his composure. Still, if this passage is meant to illustrate temperance, it is also extraordinary in illustrating the enormous difficulty Socrates has in keeping his erotic appetite under control. With respect to eros, Socrates seems to display a shaky form of continence to use Aristotle's language rather

temperance.5 than an exemplary, virtuous form of

Temperance now emerges as the theme of the conversation. Socrates some

Charmides' how maintained the pretense that he had a remedy for ailment, explaining that the remedy was a certain leaf and that a charm (epode) went with the remedy (155e). Socrates then explained that he had learned of the remedy as well as of the charm while he was in Potidaea from one of the Thracian physicians of Zalmoxis. In any case, Socrates or the Thracian doctor suggested that temperance is analogous to health: temperance is the welfare of the soul and, thereby, of the whole human being as health is the welfare of the body. Critias, remarking on what a stroke of luck this headache would turn out to be if it compelled Charmides to improve his understanding, apparently sus Socrates' "charm" pected right away that was nothing other than the Socratic manner of questioning (157c-d). Eventually, Charmides also apparently caught on (see 176a-b). There can be little doubt that Socrates was only pretending to Charmides' Socrates' know the remedy for head, but we wonder whether dia lectic can indeed engender temperance in the souls of his interlocutors. As the history of Athens bears out, Critias and perhaps Charmides were certainly in need of such treatment. Does Socrates (I mean the Platonic Socrates, not the historical Socrates) really have a treatment for the whole human being, or was this all just a hoax? Critias told Socrates that Charmides excelled his comrades in the very thing Socrates' which charm produced, namely, temperance. Perhaps to encourage Charmides to speak out boldly, Socrates flattered him with a lengthy account of his fine pedigree as a way of explaining why it was only right that he should excel others in this virtue (157d-158c). He asked Charmides to say whether he already possessed this virtue, as Critias maintained, and was therefore not in any need of the charm. Charmides proved to be the very embodiment of tem perance. He blushed and explained that he was reluctant either to boast about his virtue by affirming that he had it, or to make a liar out of his guardian, Critias, by denying that he had it (158c-d). Socrates replied that the answer was fitting and asked Charmides to join him in inquiring whether or not he (Charmides) in fact had this virtue. Socrates asked him to say what he thought temperance was, since, if he had it, he should be able to formulate an opinion about it (159a). Socrates was evidently going to assist Charmides in knowing himself better. In addition, him- since Socrates had just experienced a momentary lapse of temperance in 190 Interpretation self, he might have been interested in pursuing an investigation of temperance also for his own benefit, so that he might better understand himself and his own temperance or lack of it. Charmides hesitated but finally answered that temperance was orderliness or quietness (159b). Socrates then proceeded to convince him that this answer was not adequate. Charmides agreed, first, that temperance was a noble thing and, then, that doing things quickly and force fully or even excessively (sphodrd) was more noble than doing them quietly and slowly (159e). As examples, Socrates mentioned the activities of reading, writing, lyre playing, boxing, athletic activity in general, and learning. Finally, Socrates added, "In the searchings of the soul, and in deliberation, it is not the quietest person, I imagine, or he who deliberates and discovers with difficulty,

quickly" that is held worthy of praise, but he who does this most easily and (160a). In this way Socrates encouraged Charmides to acquire, or at least to show, qualities that contrast sharply with the qualities Charmides had identified with temperance. For Socrates, temperance understood as a form of quietness or slowness is of questionable value in the pursuit of knowledge or skill. Both in body and in soul, Socrates and Charmides agreed, speed and sharpness were more honorable than slowness and quietness. Hence, if temperance was noble, it could not be quietness; neither could the quiet, orderly life be more "tempe

rate" than the unquiet life (160b-d).

"bravely" Socrates asked Charmides to look inside himself and say what kind of person this temperance makes him into (160d). Charmides replied that tem perance was respect or modesty. In response, Socrates got Charmides to agree, first, that temperance was a good thing, as well as a noble thing, and second that

need" Homer was right when he said, "Modesty is not good for a man in (from Odyssey 17.347). Thus, temperance could not be modesty if, on the one hand, temperance was good, while, on the other, modesty was no more good than it was Socrates' evil. Charmides agreed. At this point, questioning could appear to be Charmides' temperance.6 aimed at deliberately undermining vaunted To speak Charmides' precisely, Socrates was undermining understanding of temperance as quietness, orderliness, or modesty. In any case, the direction of the conversation seems to be moving toward a notion of temperance that is far from the ordinary. Socrates' prodding of Charmides to examine himself boldly suggests one reason for the direction the conversation is taking: perhaps a kind of boldness that may look to some like a intemperance is vital part of philosophical inquiry, since such inquiry requires overcoming the natural or habitual reluctance to question con ventional and dearly held beliefs. It is not impossible that the historical Socrates in Plato's was, view, somewhat careless in encouraging boldness of this sort in the men he with young associated and so could reasonably be held responsible in part for the intemperate character of some of them (cf. Alcibiades I 119c-124b). The Platonic is Socrates, however, willing to switch directions in conversing with an interlocutor who shows any bad character. We shall see that his treatment of Critias was quite different from his treatment of Charmides. The Limitations of Political Philosophy '191

III. SOCRATES AS TEACHER OF TEMPERANCE

Critias' In fact, presence begins to be felt at this point in the dialogue, and the thrust of the discussion changes toward reinforcing rather than undermining Socrates' temperance. Charmides wanted opinion on something he had heard, business" that temperance was "doing one's own (to ta heautou prattein)

(161b). Socrates expressed shock: "You rascal. . . . You have heard this from

men." Critias or another of the wise Critias denied that Charmides heard this from him (161c), but Socrates tells his nameless companion at 162c that he was

Critias." convinced Charmides "had heard this answer about temperance from

Charmides' Consequently, after refuting understanding of this doctrine, Socra tes took on Critias and debated with him for almost the entire remainder of the dialogue. Why, though, does Socrates act so surprised to hear this answer? I believe Plato has left indications in the dialogue suggesting that this doc trine had arisen in a previous conversation between Critias and Socrates, per haps from Socrates himself, and that Critias passed it off to Charmides as his own. I present four reasons for reading the dialogue this way, aside from the Socrates' fact that it best explains, to my mind, initial reaction upon hearing the doctrine from the mouth of Charmides. First, in the Republic (433a-c), Socra tes is shown supporting the principle that everyone in a well-governed city should do his own business, although he interprets this principle differently and

temperance.7 offers it as a definition of justice rather than But we know from the and the that one of the Socratic teachings is that all the virtues are one. It is not unreasonable, then, to take the definition of temperance offered by Critias to be of Socratic origin. Second, we are told that Critias had already spent a good deal of time with Socrates prior to this occasion (156a), and in one passage Socrates suggests that Critias had a tendency to mimic Socrates in a habitual and unreflective manner: "Now when Critias heard these things and saw me in a difficulty, he seemed to me just as the sight of some one yawning causes people to be affected in the same way to be compelled by the sense of my difficulty to be caught in a difficulty himself (169c). It would not be out of character, then, for Critias to be spreading a Socratic doc trine about as his own while Socrates was serving in Potidaea. Third, as we shall see, Critias expressed surprise at hearing Socrates argue against this and other proposals Critias made. This behavior is at least consistent with his think

Socrates' ing that Socrates was arguing against his own doctrines. Furthermore, replies sometimes seem to signal an awareness that Critias was using or mis using Socratic doctrines, and he occasionally expressed irritation, as though he wanted to remove himself from whatever peculiar interpretation might have

"signal" accrued to his doctrines from Critias. I say that the replies only an awareness they do not demonstrate it. But this indirectness could be said to be demanded by the dramatic situation: Socrates perhaps did not want to em- 192 Interpretation barrass Critias in front of Charmides and the rest of the crowd by openly con fronting him with an accusation. The following passages are consistent with this interpretation and, taken to gether, make it quite plausible. In each of them, we find Critias expressing

Critias' surprise that Socrates did not himself agree with position, and we find Socrates rebuking him in some way for making such a hasty assumption. In other words, in addition to the explicit conversation between Socrates and Cri tias, there also seems to be a subtext or subconversation having to do with Critias' misappropriation of this Socratic doctrine. At 163e Critias asked Socra

Socrates' beltiste" Socrates' tes, addressing him in manner, "o (cf. use of this phrase at 162d) whether he did not agree with the claim that the one doing good, not the one doing evil, was temperate. Socrates replied sternly: "Leave

now" that aside, for we have not to consider yet what I think, but what you say Socrates' (my emphasis). Later, following suggestion (Socrates speaks of one who "knows himself at 164b-c), Critias proposed another definition of tem perance, namely that temperance was self-knowledge or knowledge of knowl Socrates' edge (164c- 165b). This proposal appears to be a modified version of own temperate claim, made in the Apology (23b), that the god considers Socra tes alone to be wise because Socrates alone knows that he is worth nothing with respect to wisdom, a kind of self-knowledge. Critias expressed his desire to give Socrates an argument supporting this definition, if Socrates did not agree with it. Socrates protested: "Why Critias, you treat me as though I professed to know the things on which I ask questions and needed only the will to agree

you" with (165b). When Socrates challenged him, Critias expressed surprise that Socrates did not allow a distinction between the knowledge of knowledge and the other kinds of knowledge: "And of this [difference] you are far from being un aware, since, in fact, as I believe, you are doing the very thing you denied you were doing just now, for you are attempting to refute me, having left aside that is" Critias' about which the argument (166c). Again, the language could suggest annoyance that Socrates is now denying what he had previously taught and that Socrates is arguing merely for the sake of retribution. Socrates replied: "How can you if main think, my effort is to refute you, that I do it with any other motive than that which would impel me to investigate myself, that is, what I say .. (my emphasis). It is hard not to hear a sarcastic double entendre in this rebuke.

Shortly thereafter, Socrates urged Critias not to care at all "whether Critias or

refuted" Socrates is the one being (166d-e), which again could contain a double entendre.

Critias' The and fourth final indication of plagiarism, although it is ad not a is that mittedly strong one, toward the end of the dialogue, Critias accused things" Socrates of saying "unusual (atopa) (172e). Now Critias had known Socrates' Socrates for a long time. line of reasoning must have indeed been strange, at least to in order to Critias, provoke this remark. It makes more sense, - The Limitations of Political Philosophy 193 however, if we allow that Critias believed he was defending doctrines that he thought Socrates himself had taught.

Critias' lack of self-restraint extended further than his willingness to use Socratic doctrines to advance his own reputation. He believed, as we shall see shortly, that his acquisition of the Socratic teaching gave him a singular ability to rule. He believed he had obtained the supreme science, the science of all "self-knowledge." sciences, referring to it as This reading, if correct, is both historically and philosophically significant. It is historically significant because it suggests how the regime of the Thirty Tyrants might have been related to Socratic political philosophy. It is philosophically significant because it relates to the general problem of the potential abuse of political philosophy by its devotees. In the Charmides, therefore, we see what is perhaps Plato's improve Socrates' ment on dialectical art, an improvement necessitated by Plato's expe rience of the historical Critias. For those like Charmides, on the one hand, who seem to need encouragement or incitement to excellence and the pursuit of wisdom, we see the Platonic Socrates following the example of the historical Socrates insofar as he is willing to undermine conventional notions of tem perance. It is this willingness that is perhaps partly responsible for the failure of the historical Socrates to teach Alcibiades or Critias the lessons of restraint. For those who need such lessons, on the other hand, the Platonic Socrates, if not the historical Socrates, is alert to the dangers, in Bacon's words, of "a little or

philosophy," superficial knowledge of and can apply remedies accordingly. Socrates' interrogation of Critias, as we shall see presently, accomplished

Critias' two main objectives. First, it elicited understanding of what philosophy Critias' is and of what it can accomplish practically. estimation of the power of

Socrates' philosophy, as we shall see, was unreasonably high in view. The Socrates' second objective that interrogation accomplished, therefore, was to lower this estimation. We shall highlight a few passages that support this under standing of the principal thrust of the interrogation. Critias' At 164a, Socrates secured agreement that temperance is doing good things. Then he asked Critias whether a doctor must know when it was benefi cial to heal someone and when it was not, and whether every craftsman had to know when he himself was likely to benefit from his work and when not. Critias was forced to admit that a craftsman might not know such a thing.

Socrates drew an even stronger conclusion (164b-c): sometimes the doctor might have done what is helpful or harmful without knowing what he did. It may be that what are ordinarily called temperate actions always entail a certain amount of ignorance. But Critias apparently wanted the virtue of temperance to be much more than this. Thus, at this point in the discussion, he preferred to withdraw some of his earlier claims rather than concede that a man who was ignorant of himself in this sense was temperate. He claimed instead that tem

thyself!" perance was self-knowledge, referring to the inscription "Know at 194 Interpretation

Delphi (164d-165b). He even distinguished this inscription from others (two

much" are mentioned: "Nothing too and "A pledge and thereupon thy perdi tion") he considered spurious. Both Critias and the god declared that "!" temperate!" and "Be were the same. The other inscriptions at , he explained, were written afterwards by men who misunderstood the god's words as mere advice and decided to add their own. Critias then decided to defend this new definition: temperance was knowing oneself. In the ensuing conversation, Socrates pressed Critias to express himself more clearly on what he meant by self-knowledge. Critias began by explain ing that temperance was a special kind of knowledge in that it did not produce any immediate, tangible benefit as medicine produced health or as carpentry produced houses (165c-e). Temperance, according to Critias, was more like geometry or calculation in this respect. Critias was evidently thinking of tem perance as a theoretical rather than a practical science. Socrates, however, wondered what the subject matter of temperance was. Critias said that tem perance was unique in that it was the knowledge of the other knowledges and of itself. Trying to find out exactly what Critias meant, Socrates did not object to the switch Critias made in his definition of temperance, from knowledge of self (heautou) to knowledge of itself (heautes), i.e., to knowledge of knowl

edge.8 He got Critias to agree, however, that temperance had to include the knowledge of the lack of knowledge (166e). Socrates now draws a conclusion

"Therefore," which should certainly arrest the careful reader's attention: Soc rates said, "the temperate man alone will know himself and be able to exam ine what he happens to know and not know, and he will likewise have the power to check out what other people know and think they know, in cases where they do know, and what they think they know without knowing it;

unable" other people will be (167a). Critias agreed. Socrates appears to be

Critias' describing temperance, with assent, as the very skill of dialectical examination Socrates himself employed on others throughout his life, a skill he describes in more concrete detail in the Apology (21b-22e). If this surmise Critias' is correct, if there is a subtext beneath this conversation pertaining to Socrates' appropriation of ideas and methods, Socrates would appear to have elicited from Critias the implicit admission that he considered temperance to

Socrates' be the scientific essence of dialectic a science like geometry which could be acquired and which would distinguish the possessor from all other human beings. Socrates proceeded next to investigate how Critias un derstood knowledge of this sort and exactly what power Critias thought it conferred on those who acquired it. In the Republic, Socrates presents dialectic as the highest form of knowl edge, leading to the secure comprehension of ideas that other arts and sciences merely hypothesize (531d-535a). The presentation of dialectic in the Republic is consistent with his in attempt, that dialogue, to move his young interlocutors to an appreciation for theoretical philosophy. In the Charmides, however, Soc- The Limitations of Political Philosophy 195

Critias' rates seeks to puncture inflated opinion of the practical power of philos ophy.

Critias' Socrates raised two questions, therefore, about understanding of temperance and pursued these questions throughout the rest of the dialogue (167b). First, is it possible to know both that one knows or does not know, and what one knows or does not know? Second, if this is possible, what benefit is there in knowing these things? With respect to the first question, Socrates over whelmed Critias with a series of examples showing how unlikely or strange it would be that anything should have the power of being applicable to itself

man" (167b-168e). Socrates said that "some great was needed who could deter mine whether this was possible (169a-b) and that he distrusted his own com petence to do it. Critias was humbled. Seeing Socrates in difficulty, he was compelled to feel the same difficulty, just as one might be compelled to yawn Critias' after seeing someone else yawn (169c). urge to distinguish himself on

Socrates' every occasion prevented him from admitting his inability to answer questions, so he concealed his difficulty, Socrates explains, with an indistinct reply. By failing to acknowledge his difficulty, Critias showed himself to be, in fact, a very poor imitator of Socrates, owing mostly to his love of honor. Socrates' Critias' first question, then, revealed theoretical difficulties with

Socrates' understanding of self-knowledge; second question aimed at revealing its practical limitations. He wanted to know whether one would be helped by knowl edge of what one knew and did not know (169d). Critias and Socrates agreed that

the one who had knowledge that was of itself would know himself and would be

helped thereby. But Socrates raised a new question: how is knowledge that is of itself the same as knowing what one knows and does not know (169e-170a)? Critias needed more explanation. Socrates mentioned medical knowledge, which is of health, and political knowledge, which is of justice, and wondered how someone who knew only knowledge, without any additional knowledge ofjustice or health, could know what he knew about these things or about any other sub ject. Critias admitted this was not possible, and that the temperate man, with no knowledge of health or disease, would not be able to distinguish a true doctor from one who was merely pretending (170a-e). Critias' The deflation of notion of self-knowledge continued as the discus

sion moved into the realm of politics. Socrates wondered what benefit tem perance was if it was only knowledge of knowledge (17 Id). He granted that if temperance enabled us to know what we knew and did not know and to recog nize this condition in others, we would be greatly benefitted by being temper

us" ate. For in that case "we who had temperance and everyone governed by would live without error, never doing or allowing others to do anything without knowledge. Thus, a house or a city ruled by temperance would be well ordered. Critias admitted that this was how they had been speaking of temperance (172a). It is therefore evident that Critias had been considering temperance the knowl edge of knowledge to be of tremendous power and use. As a ruling science, a 196 Interpretation science of sciences, it could, in his view, govern cities without error. Socrates attempted to disabuse Critias of this notion. He forced Critias to admit that no where has any such knowledge as they had imagined been found (172a). Socrates then explained one possible benefit of temperance or self-knowl edge, such as Critias had been supposing it to be: temperance would make one learn more easily whatever one learned since the temperate man would not only learn the subject matter more easily, but would also behold the knowledge itself of those subjects (172b). And the temperate man would also be able to examine others more beautifully about the state of their knowledge. According to Socra tes, then, temperance would help one in the unfinishable theoretical pursuit of knowledge, not in the application of knowledge to practical affairs. Socrates expressed concern, though, that he and Critias had been requiring this temperance to be greater than it really was (172b-c), and he asserted that the inquiry into temperance may have been worthless. Even granting that tem perance could do everything that was originally supposed, Socrates said he was still unsure what benefit it provided. Critias was baffled and accused him of

"dream." saying strange things. Socrates now explained his If temperance had control of human beings, then everything piloting, medicine, warfare, even prophecy would be conducted knowledgeably. This principle resembles the principle of the Republic, according to which everyone performs the task to which he is fit by nature (see 433a-c). It is necessarily aristocratic or oligar chic, in any case certainly not democratic. It is therefore likely to appeal to someone with the oligarchic ambitions of Critias, which we know from history. In the Republic, however, the emphasis of the Socratic principle is not on the perfection of knowledge in such a city but on the natural suitability of each person for the task he performs. In the Charmides Socrates did not, or would not, discuss this interpretation of the doctrine (though it may be said to have le- arisen indirectly at 17 172a), perhaps because his purpose here was not to expound his own views, but to elicit the views of Critias. Socrates wanted to Critias' understand version of Socratic political philosophy. He asked Critias, therefore, if one could determine that human beings under such conditions would be happy. replied Critias that Socrates would not find any other "fulfill ment" "perfection" or (telos) of welfare if he rejected this knowledge. Critias thus revealed that he considered temperance, the knowledge of knowledge, ca pable of bringing about a kind of political perfection. Socrates compelled Cri tias to see that temperance was not sufficient for such ends, that a city governed temperance such as had by they imagined could exist only as a dream, and that the knowledge of good and bad was in any case necessary to determine whether anything done knowledgeably was also done beneficially (173e-174e). Tem without such perance, knowledge, could produce no benefit. Socrates added that he had good for reason, then, fearing that the inquiry had been worthless (175a). The Limitations of Political Philosophy 197

IV. PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS

We turn back now to the question raised at the beginning of this essay: whether precautions can be taken against politically ambitious students or de votees of political philosophy who acquire an exaggerated notion of what it can Socrates' do. In this dialogue, Plato shows two aspects of the relation of teach ing to temperance. First, we see Socrates to some extent undermining Char

mides' temperance, presumably for the purpose of encouraging a more spirited effort at philosophical inquiry. Then we see him applying something like a charm to the soul of Critias, who had shown himself to be in much greater need of temperance than Charmides. Through the art of dialectic, Socrates compelled Critias to see that temperance, even if it be understood as knowledge of knowl edge, was not a comprehensive knowledge or a knowledge governing somehow the whole body of knowledge. Critias could no longer be certain even that such knowledge can alert its possessor to what he knows or does not know, never mind that it can govern whole cities or bring them to a fulfillment of welfare. Socrates' The effect of speeches in the Charmides, then, is to dampen some Socrates' what the zeal of one inspired by dialectic to think it can be used for implementing intemperate Utopian dreams. In another respect, however, we learn that temperance as Socrates, not Critias, understands it can operate effectively between individuals in a philo sophical conversation in a way that it cannot operate between a temperate ruler and the city he rules. The essence of temperance seems to be expressed in Socrates' recognition that the possessor of self-knowledge knowing what he knows and does not know will learn more easily and will examine others more beautifully on the subjects they have learned (172b). Its benefit is philo sophical, rather than political. Socratic education, if it is successful, will en gender new dialecticians and will, in so far as it is possible, avoid stirring the ambitions of those who lean more toward a life of political glory rather than of

Socrates' art" philosophy (cf. discussion of the "kingly in 292c-e). In time, the skillful dialectician might be able to transmit the essence of this philosophical temperance to his interlocutor. In Plato's dialogue, Critias was taught to be more temperate in his estimation of the power of philosophy. But the conclusion of the Charmides gives an ominous foreshadowing of the regime of the Thirty Tyrants. Critias urged Charmides not to abandon Socrates in great or small matters (176b). Socrates

"plotting" wanted to know what they were (bouleuesthon) and whether they were going to use force. Charmides replied: "You must expect me to use force,

command." Athens' since he [Critias] gives the These allusions to one of most intemperate regimes do not allow us the comforting conclusion that the charm ing words of the Platonic Socrates could have sufficiently tempered the soul of 198 Interpretation

that a Critias. I take it, in other words, that Plato is leaving open the possibility the history of Athens could have proceeded as it did even if the historical Socrates (maintaining the distinction we have assumed in this interpretation) had obeyed the precepts of the Thracian physician to induce temperance in the soul before treating the head. Indeed, Socrates later even admitted that the Thracian charm he employed was ineffective (175e).

The Platonic Socrates treats the souls of the young, not because he can cure them, but because he is moved to do so partly by eros, partly by his indefati gable desire for conversation and mutual self-examination with them. These impulses evidently cause him to act, like the doctor discussed at 164b, without knowledge of the benefit to himself or the person he is treating. Unlike Critias, however, Socrates seems well aware of the practical limitations of his knowl Socrates' edge. This is one of the strengths of self-knowledge. Critias actually believed he had or might obtain a comprehensive science that could bring order to whole cities; Socrates, we recall, only pretended to have a remedy for the head and a charm that could treat the soul and the whole human being.

NOTES

1. The Greek word is notoriously difficult to translate, since its meaning is more

"temperance" "'moderation," narrowly mental than the meanings of the Latin-based words and which are perhaps more behavioral. The Greek word seems to mean something like an ability to head." "keep one's See T. G. Tuckey, Plato's Charmides (Amsterdam, 1968), pp. 5-9. In this essay "temperance" I shall always translate sophrosyne as and ask the reader to keep the mental connota tion in mind. 2. See Charmides 156a and Xenophon Memorabilia 1.2.12-37. Socrates, like Critias, had a high regard for the Spartan regime (cf. 52e), which may help to account for the Spartan character of the regime described in the Republic. It is not unlikely that Critias thought he was implementing a Socratic regime in Athens during the time of the Thirty Tyrants. 3. I have this explanation from W. R. M. Lamb's note in the edition of the Charmides in Plato in Twelve Volumes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979) vol. 12, pp. 12-13. 1 have relied on Lamb's translation, emending where I thought I could render a word or phrase more literally.

Critias' 4. Socrates did not agree to original proposal of pretending to be a doctor, which would apparently have been excessive, but only of pretending to have a cure. 19a 5. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1 1 b, where it is explained that the temperate man desires the right thing in the right way at the right time. The continent man, by contrast, has bad appetites, but knows they are bad and refuses to follow them on account of his rational principle (1145a).

Socrates' 6. With regard to use of Homer here, consider Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.2.56: "Again, his accuser alleged that [Socrates] selected from the most famous poets the most immoral

malefactors." passages, and used them as evidence in teaching his companions to be tyrants and The assumption 7. that Critias had passed this doctrine off to Charmides as his own would explain Critias did not admit to Charmides in this Socrates' why conversation that it is actually and does not want idea, Socrates, presumably, to embarrass Critias so crudely by revealing this in front of Charmides. In the the Republic, principle of assigning every citizen to the business for which he is fit by nature is shown to be necessarily oligarchic or aristocratic. Plato would have reason, then, for The Limitations of Political Philosophy 199 distancing Socrates from this principle in a dialogue that features Critias and Charmides. It is Critias' hinted, nonetheless, that this doctrine might have guided thinking when he led the regime of the Thirty Tyrants. 8. Scholars have debated the significance of this conversion for a long time (see Tuckey, pp. 33-37). Tuckey maintains (pp. 37-38) that Socrates induced Critias to make this switch by imply ing that temperance as knowledge might not have a subject matter distinguishable from itself. This Socrates' is probably true, but line of questioning seems perfectly natural: self-knowledge seems to be unique in having the knower as its subject. And Critias might have answered that the subject matter of temperance is the entire soul, not just that part of the soul which knows. What is decisive

Critias' in answer is the suggestion that self-knowledge is somehow comprehensive; it is "the

itself." knowledge of the other knowledges and of It seems to me that Socrates lets the switch go

Critias' because his primary purpose is to examine the full implications of understanding of self- knowledge.