Public Finance and Democratic Ideology in Fourth-Century BC Athens by Christopher Scott Welser BA, Sw

Dēmos and Dioikēsis: Public Finance and Democratic Ideology in Fourth-Century B.C. Athens By Christopher Scott Welser B.A., Swarthmore College, 1994 M.A., University of Maryland, 1999 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Classics at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island. May, 2011 © Copyright 2011 by Christopher Scott Welser This dissertation by Christopher Scott Welser is accepted in its present form by the Department of Classics as satisfying the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Date________________ _______________________________________ Adele C. Scafuro, Advisor Recommended to the Graduate Council Date________________ _______________________________________ Alan L. Boegehold, Reader Date________________ _______________________________________ David Konstan, Reader Approved by the Graduate Council Date________________ _______________________________________ Peter M. Weber, Dean of the Graduate School iii CURRICULUM VITAE Christopher Scott Welser was born in Romeo, Michigan in 1971. He attended Roeper City and Country School in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, and in 1994 he graduated from Swarthmore College, earning an Honors B.A. in Economics (his major) and Biology (his minor). After working for several years at public policy research firms in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, he decided to pursue the study of Classics, an interest of his since childhood. Upon earning an M.A. with Distinction in Latin and Greek from the University of Maryland at College Park in 1999, he enrolled in the Ph.D. program in Classics at Brown University. While working on his Ph.D., he spent two years as Seymour Fellow (2002-2003) and Capps Fellow (2004-2005) at the American School of Classical Studies at Athens and participated in the summer program of the American Academy in Rome (2000). Apart from his teaching fellowships at Brown, he has taught at Haverford College, Bryn Mawr College, Skidmore College, and Trinity University in San Antonio. He has presented papers on various topics and has published two articles on the Histories of Herodotus. iv PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Perhaps even more than most dissertations, this one represents a work in progress, one step in an ongoing process of intellectual inquiry. If it does not do full justice to the wide range of issues with which it deals (or to the vast and growing body of scholarship that relates to each of them) that is partly because it is meant to lay the foundations for a more extensive consideration of the nature of governance in general, and of public finance in particular, in ancient Athens. The reader is encouraged to bear this mind. In writing this dissertation, I received financial support from the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, who granted me a Capps Fellowship for the year 2004- 2005. Much of this year was spent in availing myself of the matchless resources of the Blegen Library. In the following year, 2005-2006, I benefited from a dissertation fellowship provided by the Graduate School of Brown University. I owe a very great debt to the members of the committee who oversaw this dissertation, Adele Scafuro, David Konstan, and Alan Boegehold. They were willing to read and re-read my chapters out of order under conditions that were often less than ideal, and their acuity and wisdom have made this a better dissertation than it would otherwise be. All of went far beyond what their roles required. Adele Scafuro in particular has given generously of her time and energy, tolerating my stubbornness and hesitations and with exceptional good grace. v It is impossible to catalogue the many other friendships and personal kindnesses that have facilitated the completion of this project over many years. Special mention should, however, be made of Chris Kenedi and Larry Myer, who helped me to preserve my sanity during the most critical phases of the writing process. Above all, I wish to thank Sarah Bolmarcich, ἀριπρεπὴς ἐν γυναιξὶ πάσῃσι, whose love and support have far surpassed any expressions of gratitude I could offer. If not for her, I cannot imagine how this work could have been done. * * * Ut peragas mandata, liber, culpabere forsan ingeniique minor laude ferere mei. Iudicis officium est ut res, ita tempora rerum quaerere. Quaesito tempore tutus eris. -Ovid, Tristia 1.1.35-38 vi TABLE OF CONTENTS CURRICULUM VITAE ................................................................................................... iv PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................... v INTRODUCTION: Public Finance and the Limits of Democracy ................................... 1 CHAPTER ONE: Criticisms of Athenian Democracy in the Context of Public Finance ........................................................................................................ 9 CHAPTER TWO: The Legal Framework of Athenian Public Finance .......................... 43 CHAPTER THREE: The Operation of Athenian Financial Institutions ....................... 104 Figure 3.1: Model of Athenian Public Finance ................................................. 153 CHAPTER FOUR: Popular Leaders and the Historical Evolution of Athenian Public Finance .................................................................................................... 154 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 211 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................ 214 SUMMARY OF CITED INSCRIPTIONS .................................................................... 216 BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................... 220 vii INTRODUCTION: PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE LIMITS OF DEMOCRACY Throughout history, the Athenian democracy of the fourth century B.C. has been criticized for its conduct of public finance. Indeed, the democracy’s handling – or mishandling – of its finances has often been blamed for Athens’ defeat by Philip in 338, and thus for the ultimate suppression of democratic government by Macedon in 322. August Boeckh, in his classic work on the public economy of Athens, saw much in the Athenians’ financial arrangements that he found worthy of praise, yet he also felt that it was the Athenians’ “simple and inartificial” financial system, coupled with “appetite, the lowest of human desires” that was largely responsible for their inability to mount an effective resistance against Macedonian expansionism.1 Andreas Andreades, who produced the last comprehensive study of Athenian public finance in his History of Greek Public Finance (1918, second edition 1928) attributed Athens’ fate to the democracy’s failure to budget prudently and its consequent alienation of the wealthier citizens though extortionate taxes: the Athenian financial system, he wrote, was “in all probability the 2 real cause of the destruction of the noblest of all states known to history.” Such views 1 Boeckh refers to “extravagance at home, the expenditures occasioned by foreign military expenditures, [and] maladministration in various places.” These, according to his view, forced Athens to mistreat her allies for the sake of tribute revenues and thus prevented the democracy from building any viable coalition with other Greek city-states: “Athens, and with it Greece must have been ruined, even if Philip of Macedon had never existed, because some other individual would have become to them a Philip” (1857 [1851], 786). (Note the echo of Demosthenes 4.11: ταχέως ὑμεῖς ἕτερον Φίλιππον ποιήσετε.) 2 Andreades 1933 [1928], 363. 1 have not been held by scholars alone: William Gladstone is said to have observed to Jules Ferry that it was bad public finance that was responsible for Athens’ fall.3 Such grim assessments of Athens’ fiscal management are typically not limited to narrow criticisms of particular institutions. Something much bigger is at stake – namely, the question of a democracy’s capacity to balance revenues and expenditures in an intelligent way. For Boeckh, Andreades, and other critics, Athens’ financial organization might not have proved inadequate if only the Athenian people had not insisted, even when faced by pressing problems of national survival, on receiving costly subsidies from their city’s treasury and celebrating, with needless magnificence, the festivals of their gods. According to this point of view, it was because they prioritized misthoi and heortai above all else that the Athenians found it necessary to oppress their allies, antagonize their upper classes, and sacrifice their military readiness – all of which undermined the viability of their polis in the face of external threats. Why, then, did the Athenians make the choices they did? One possible answer, perhaps, is that there was something amiss in the Athenian character. A far more common diagnosis, however, sees the Athenians’ folly and/or greed as something endemic (so to speak) to rule by the many. In this analysis, the weaknesses of Athenian public finance were rooted in the basic limitations of democracy itself. A recent version of this critique has been presented by Loren J. Samons II, who agrees with Boeckh and Andreades that poor fiscal decision-making prevented Athens from making an effective stand against the Macedonian threat: The Athenian example suggests…that once people are allowed to vote themselves an income – whether

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