SRI LANKA’S EASTERN PROVINCE: LAND, DEVELOPMENT, CONFLICT Asia Report N°159 – 15 October 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. HISTORIES IN CONFLICT......................................................................................... 2 A. PRE-COLONIAL AND COLONIAL HISTORY...................................................................................2 B. MODERN HISTORY.....................................................................................................................4 1. Irrigation, settlement and demographic changes........................................................................4 2. Violence and colonisation...........................................................................................................5 3. The Indo-Lanka accord and the merger of the north and east.....................................................6 C. CHANGING TAMIL-MUSLIM RELATIONS IN RESPONSE TO MILITANCY AND WAR.......................6 D. FROM “PEACE” TO WAR TO ELECTIONS: 2002-2008.................................................................7 III. “DEMOCRACY, DEVOLUTION, DEVELOPMENT”............................................ 9 A. “DEMOCRATIC” ELECTIONS .......................................................................................................9 B. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND DEVOLUTION OF POWER.................................................11 IV. SECURITY, LAND AND THE GRIEVANCES OF TAMILS AND MUSLIMS . 13 A. TAMIL VIEWS, FEARS AND GRIEVANCES..................................................................................13 1. Security concerns......................................................................................................................13 2. Lack of political voice ..............................................................................................................14 3. TMVP: the slow march to democratisation?.............................................................................14 4. Liberating the TMVP? ..............................................................................................................15 B. MUSLIM VIEWS, FEARS AND GRIEVANCES...............................................................................17 1. Lack of land and the underlying sources of land conflict .........................................................17 2. Land conflicts between Tamils and Muslims ...........................................................................19 3. Lack of security ........................................................................................................................19 4. Lack of political power .............................................................................................................20 V. FEARS OF “SINHALISATION” ............................................................................... 21 A. MUSLIM-SINHALA LAND DISPUTES IN AMPARA......................................................................22 B. “DEVELOPING” TRINCOMALEE ................................................................................................23 1. Seeds of war: inter-communal tension and violence in Trincomalee, 2005-2006....................24 2. Mutur East-Sampur high security zone.....................................................................................25 3. Trincomalee development plans and the fear of “Sinhalisation”..............................................26 VI. GRIEVANCES AND FEARS OF EASTERN SINHALESE .................................. 28 VII. FUTURE SCENARIOS................................................................................................ 30 A. POLICY VACUUM .....................................................................................................................30 B. TACTICAL QUESTIONS .............................................................................................................30 C. REALITY CHECK ......................................................................................................................31 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 33 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SRI LANKA .........................................................................................................................34 B. MAP OF THE EASTERN PROVINCE WITH POPULATION STATISTICS ....................................................35 C. POPULATION STATISTICS .................................................................................................................36 D. DIGHAVAPI TEMPLE, BUDDHIST SITES AND LAND DISPUTES ...........................................................37 E. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................................39 F. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................41 G. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA ...........................................................................42 H. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................45 Asia Report N°159 15 October 2008 SRI LANKA’S EASTERN PROVINCE: LAND, DEVELOPMENT, CONFLICT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Sri Lanka’s government must address the security needs lims. The east grew even more tense in March 2004 and land-related grievances of all ethnic communities when the LTTE’s eastern military commander, “Colo- in its Eastern Province or risk losing a unique oppor- nel Karuna”, split from the Tigers and formed the tunity for development and peace. Muslims, Tamils Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP). The next and Sinhalese all feel weak and under threat, and recent few years of guerrilla warfare between the northern ethnic violence could easily worsen. The government Tigers and Karuna’s forces, with government support must devolve real power to the newly elected provin- for the latter, contributed to the collapse of the cease- cial council, end impunity for ongoing human rights fire. The massive death and destruction caused by the violations and work to develop a consensus on issues December 2004 tsunami led to the displacement of of land, security and power sharing with independent hundreds of thousands and increased conflict over representatives of all communities, including those scarce land. from opposition parties. The government relaunched military action against the The province is Sri Lanka’s most ethnically complex LTTE in July 2006. After a year-long campaign that region and has been at the heart of post-independence saw large-scale destruction and the displacement of conflicts. It features a Tamil-speaking majority split almost 200,000, mostly Tamil, civilians, the military equally between ethnic Tamils and Muslims, as well forced the LTTE from their last stronghold in the east as a sizeable Sinhala minority who mostly moved in July 2007. The government immediately promised there from the south under state irrigation and reset- restoration of democracy, devolution of powers to local tlement schemes. Lying at the intersection of compet- and provincial politicians and development for the ing Tamil and Sinhala nationalisms, the east has seen province. some of the worst of Sri Lanka’s inter-ethnic violence and remains at risk for more. The removal of the LTTE has brought benefits to all three communities. Development projects have begun For Tamil nationalists, the province is an integral part and the economic benefits of relative peace have of the Tamil homeland, but has been subject to delib- been felt by all communities. Recent violent clashes erate state attempts to change the ethnic balance and between Tamils and Muslims, however, are a sign of undermine its Tamil character. The October 2006 underlying insecurity aggravated by the flawed and Supreme Court decision to separate the Eastern from ethnically divisive provincial council elections of 10 the Northern Province, temporarily merged under the May 2008. Violence, intimidation and rigging signifi- terms of the 1987 Indo-Lanka accord, and subsequent cantly damaged the credibility of the results, which provincial council elections in May 2008 were a major saw government parties win a narrow majority of seats. blow to Tamil nationalists. For Sinhala nationalists, the Their victory was due in large part to their alliance province should be equally open to all Sri Lankans, and with the TMVP, which remains armed. Far from a its hundreds of ancient Buddhist sites and rich Sinhala champion of Tamil rights, the TMVP is a crucial part cultural heritage should be defended and preserved. of the government’s counter-insurgency campaign in The east is also home to an emergent Muslim nation- the east and is credibly accused of abductions, extor- alism, largely a product of Muslims’ insecurity rela- tion and political killings of Tamils. The province’s new tive to Tamil armed groups and the Sinhala-dominated chief minister and TMVP deputy leader, S. Chandra- government. kanthan, has so far worked well with pro-government Muslim ministers, but many Muslims continue to dis- The east remained tense throughout the 2002-2006 peace trust the TMVP’s intentions and see it as maintaining process, with the