MONITORING FACTORS AFFECTING THE SRI LANKAN PEACE PROCESS

CLUSTER REPORT

THIRD QUARTERLY MAY 2008 – JULY 2008

CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CLUSTER Page Number PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS CLUSTER ……………………………………… 2 MILITARY BALANCE CLUSTER ...... 3 HUMAN SECURITY...... 7 POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT CLUSTER ...... 11 INTERNATIONAL CLUSTER ...... 15 LEGAL & CONSTIIUTIONAL CLUSTER ...... 18 ECONOMIC CLUSTER ...... 21 PUBLIC OPINION CLUSTER ...... 26 MEDIA ...... 30 ENDNOTES…..……………………………………………………………………………….34

METHODOLOGY

The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has conducted the project “Monitoring the Factors Affecting the Peace Process” to provide an understanding of the current status of the peace process. The output of this project is a series of Quarterly Reports. This is the eighth of such reports.

It should be noted that this Quarterly Report covers the months of May - July 2008.

Having identified a number of key factors that impact the peace process, they have been monitored observing change or stasis through a range of indicators. These indicators suggest trends for each factor. The factors have been grouped into a series of clusters which reflect critical dimensions of the peace process. The trends will suggest the level of change in each cluster and in sum will indicate how the peace process and its environment have been strengthened or weakened.

1 I. PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS

1.1 Context As noted in the previous chapter, the undeclared war which became official during the past six months continued undiminished. Although the government and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Ealam (LTTE) repeatedly stated their commitment to peace talks, the intensification of military operations made it clear that there was little space for renewing talks.

1.2 Continuing expressions of commitment with no signs of the resumption of talks Both sides continued to make expressions of interest in resuming peace talks. Amidst its involvement in military operations to liberate the rebel controlled Wanni, President M. Rajapakse, during his visit to India, stated that his government is ready to resume talks with the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Ealam (LTTE) if they agree with the conditions laid down by him and his respectable government.1 The conditions that Rajapakse laid down were that the government will hold peace talks in the future with the participation of all Tamil political parties in the country not solely with the LTTE.2 Another condition laid was that the LTTE should lay down its weaponry for future peace talks. This latter condition has been repeated by this Government and the LTTE have constantly rejected it.3 The LTTE military spokesmen Rasiah Ilantharian stated that, “Such a condition laid down by the government is just another tactic to evade peace talks.”4 The LTTE too announced that it was willing to resume talks with the Government. The Political Wing Chief of the LTTE Nadesan in an interview with Times Now television in July stated, “We are not against ceasefire or peace talks.”5 For its part the LTTE stated that a new round of peace talks on ending the country's 25-year-old civil war is impossible as long as the government presses ahead with the military offensive.6

In a significant move the LTTE announced on July 22 that it would observe a unilateral ceasefire coinciding with the forthcoming summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation in from July 26 to August 4.7 It projected the proposed ceasefire as a goodwill gesture to extend its support to the SAARC countries, while signaling its willingness to hit back if attacks continued.8 This gesture could have been a signal from the LTTE of its interest in talks as well as a means for slowing down the military onslaught. It could have also been put forward in order to secure international approval.9 However the government announced that it will not stop its ongoing operations and aerial attacks due to this unilateral cease fire. A number of Government actors rejected the offer including Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, who dismissed the offer stating that: "The ceasefire announcement is a ploy by the LTTE when it is being militarily weakened in the war front, to strengthen its militarily under the guise of holding negotiations."10 Hours after the LTTE’s unilateral ceasefire declaration, the government troops launched aerial strikes and naval attacks into the rebel controlled Wanni.11

While the co-Chairs and the international community remained largely silent regarding the LTTE’s announcement they continued to send mixed signals regarding the need for peace talk’s.12. ’s peace facilitator Norway did not, publicly at least, attempt to take any new initiatives only forwarding the LTTE press releases to the government which served to emphasize the country’s continuing trust of the LTTE.

1.3 Projection While the two sides will continue expressing interest in peace talks and ceasefire, it is unlikely that the government will engage in peace talks in the coming months due to its commitment to a military solution. In a situation where the military balance remains in favor of the government forces, the Government will not want to risk its advantage by announcing a ceasefire or moving into peace talks.

2 II. MILITARY BALANCE

2.1 Context13 Over the first two quarters of 2008, military operations in the North have intensified with the Security Forces attempting to defeat the LTTE. The Government has attempted to continue its strategy of decimating the LTTE’s fighting force and forcing the LTTE to withdraw, particularly on its southern fronts. The Security Forces have been able to advance into LTTE-controlled Mannar and into the Welioya region but there has been no movement along the Jaffna FDL. The LTTE has maintained a stiff resistance and has also tried to keep the security forces stretched by continuing attacks in the South, mainly on civilian targets, thereby expanding the theatre of war. The security forces have maintained the balance of power especially through its aerial advantage and naval attacks which has made it more difficult for movement by the LTTE. Nonetheless, the strong defence that the LTTE has put up has meant that the Government has had to push back its self-imposed deadlines. The last two quarter also saw a number of attacks on civilians in government- and LTTE- controlled areas which are some of the violations of international humanitarian law witnessed over this quarter which in turn have intensified the humanitarian and human rights crisis in the North.

2.2 Military balance remaining in favour of Security Forces During this quarter it is clear that it is the security forces that are on the offensive, while the LTTE is fighting more of a defensive military campaign. At present the government is continuing its multi pronged military strategy to defeat the LTTE. The military is currently engaged in five battle fronts with six Divisions currently under operation in the Wanni region. Those are 53 and 55 in Jaffna, 57 (Vavuniya West), 62 (Vavuniya east), 59 (Welioya) and 58 (Mannar) Divisions.14 The military is using large-scale military operations to carry out an onslaught on LTTE positions in addition to using small-troop formations both on the forward defence line and within LTTE-controlled areas. The focus appears to breach LTTE defenses forcing them to withdraw, cut off supply lines and to kill as many LTTE cadres as possible.

The Government has continued to make significant headway especially in LTTE-controlled Mannar. During the last quarter the forces captured Madhu, while in this quarter they advanced further North Adampan in May followed by key LTTE strongholds including Vedithalthivu on July 16. Vedithalthivu is the main sea Tiger base in the North Western coast, which also functioned as a smuggling hub for arms and ammunition from Tamil Nadu.15 The Vedithalthivu capture was followed by the capture of Illuppukadavai another important tiger base .16 State media erroneously reported that troops completed its moves to clear Mannar of the LTTE and as a result that entire district was under government control on June 30 .17 This claim was later rejected by the military spokesperson stating that there are more areas to be cleared in Mannar.18 Troops of the 59 Division have also been able to push back the LTTE from the Weli Oya FDL capturing One Four Base and Sugandan base and at least two other satellite camps.19 After the recent victory in Vedithalthivu, Minister announced that the Government’s next step is to capture Kilinochchi.20 The military continued with their aerial attacks on a daily basis targeting strategic bases in the rebel controlled Wanni. On July 22 hours SLAF fighter jets carried out an air attack in the Mullaitivu area reportedly targeting an LTTE training centre in the Udayarkattikkulam area East of Iranamadu killing 22 Black Tigers.21 During this quarter the LTTE controlled Wanni witnessed a significant number of claymore attacks which have reportedly claimed the lives of LTTE officials and civilians which the LTTE blamed on the army’s deep penetration unit/long range reconnaissance patrol.

While the military dynamic remains in the favour of the military the LTTE has been able to provide a strong resistance to the military, at least to slow down the advance. After the capture of the Vavunikulam Tank by the military on July 25th, the troops had to repulse a counter attack on the

3 Vavunikulam Tank by the LTTE. Military spokesmen Brig. Nanayakkara claimed that the military managed to kill 55 rebel cardres including eight senior LTTE combatants.22 The LTTE too announced that its fighters in Vavuniyaa thwarted three repeated attempts by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) to break into LTTE controlled territory throughout the day in Paalamoaddai in Vavuniyaa on June 08.23 The LTTE has attempted to launch counter attacks in Kebithigollewa, Muhamalai, Nagarkovil, Vavuniya and Mannar.24 On June 11 a group reportedly comprising of 50 LTTE cadres in six boats launched an attack on the Navy outpost at Erukkilampiddi in the Mannar Island.25 Navy spokesman D.K.P Dassanayake, said that in the sea battle one LTTE boat was destroyed and the MI 24 helicopters launched attacks to the fleeing LTTE boats resulting in at least five Sea Tigers including a leader identified as “Siriman” and three sailors being killed.26 The Tamilnet website claimed that the Sea Tigers had briefly been able to bring the entire installation under their control following the attack, while suffering at least four casualties.27 If at all, the LTTE counter attacks have slowed down the military offensive but they have not been able to strategically re-set the military balance. The LTTE’s resistance has forced the Government to push back its self – imposed deadline of August 2008 to December 2008 and then to mid 2009.28 The LTTE has booby trapped and mined areas with the sole intention of slowing down the military movements were one of the key reasons to slow down the military movements and its self–imposed deadline.

Faced with a steady onslaught the LTTE has been forced to withdraw their men and arms from their areas of control rather than fighting pitched battles.29 Towards the latter part of this operation LTTE strategically withdrew from Vedithalthivu and intelligence sources claim that they had moved to Nachchikuda, where another major Sea Tiger base had functioned for many years..30 The LTTE has however faced a significant losses: the LTTE Heroes department in July claimed that the outfit lost 1,128 carders during the first six months of 2008.31 Army commander LT. Gen claimed that the LTTE had now lost nearly two thirds of its manpower and land area to his valiant forces.32 “They [the LTTE] have lost over 9,000 in the last two years. The number of cadres were killed in the East was over 2,000, then over 1,000 in Jaffna, 3,000 in Wanni, over 2,000 in Mannar, and over 1,000 in Weli Oya. The Air Force has killed about a 1,000 and the Navy has killed 329.”33 The LTTE experienced some heavy losses, including some prominent leaders. A senior ‘commander’ of the LTTE, "Brigadier Balraj", who had led several attacks against the Sri Lankan military died of a heart attack in Kilinochchi.34 Among the other prominent LTTE carders killed in the battlefield were Lt. Col. Vikundan, Gadafi who was a close confidante of the LTTE leader Prabhakaran, Senior Female Tiger Lt. Col. Selvy and the IED expert of Mannar, Dhora who was killed in an air raid carried out by the SLAF MI-24.35 A number of reports, including the UTHR(J) report “Trauma in the Vanni: Human Grist to the Mills of Dual Hypocrisy” revealed that the LTTE is facing a severe shortage of man power and experienced carders. The report also claimed that many of the young dying on the frontlines or being horribly maimed were barely 17 years old, recently conscripted, trained and sent to the frontlines.36 The Government officials too boasted about the LTTE being outnumbered due to their intense military offensives. The Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse told Sunday Island that the LTTE is in disarray. He asserted that they (LTTE) are falling apart like a pack of cards and fleeing for safety leaving behind heavy guns and artillery as never seen before.37

The Government also faced significant losses in terms of manpower. Prime Minister Rathnasiri Wickramanayake announced in parliament that 138 military personnel were killed and 549 injured in May and 112 soldiers were killed and 793 wounded in June.38 In July the Prime Minister announced in parliament that 106 security personnel were killed in July. It is very difficult to obtain information about the casualties suffered by both sides due to the lack of independent verification and the exaggeration by both sides of the losses of the opposing side. The figures quoted by the Government and LTTE regarding the losses of the opposing side tends to be exaggerated. The Sri Lanka Army however continued its recruitment drive including using mobile phone text messages in a drive to recruit 8000 personnel. It was reported that mobile service providers volunteered to send text messages to their customers free of charge in order to support this exercise. The army too managed

4 to recruit a colossal amount of deserters during the month of May to strengthen their man power.39 The responses for these recruitment drives were high.40

The LTTE continued to carry out attacks outside the Northern battlefield. In the South there were a series of bomb attacks in and around Colombo which were suspected to be carried out by the LTTE. On May 16 a bomb exploded in the Fort high security zone a few hours prior to the appointment of S. Chandrakanthan alias Pilliyan as Chief Minister of the Eastern Province. This suicide blast that occurred near Sambuddhaloka Viharaya was closer to the Presidential Secretariat targeting a bus carrying the riot police squad. 8 police personnel were killed and over 95 casualties were reported. 41 When looking at these incidents it was evident that the LTTE managed to trigger attacks in the Colombo and suburbs on successive dates creating panic among the public. Due to this situation the government announced that they will recruit retired officers to ensure security in public transport, in addition to adopting other security measures. Meanwhile the security forces managed to arrest at least two terror suspects responsible for these attacks. Although the LTTE was blamed for these spates of attacks a group allied to the LTTE named Ellan Force took responsibility for these attacks.42

Despite the Liberation of the East, the LTTE has maintained a presence in the region and carried out repeated attacks in particular areas such as Kaluwanchikudi on June 02 and border areas such as Buttala. The LTTE also managed to shoot at a VVIP helicopter of the Sri Lanka air force assigned for presidential duty from Kanchikudichchiaru jungles on the first of July which resulted in the helicopter performing an emergency landing in the Pottuvil school grounds and found that the choppers fuselage was drilled by a few bullets.43 It needs to be noted that the LTTE attacks have not been sustained or resulted in a dramatic shift in control and the Government assisted by the TMVP remain dominant. The Eastern Province saw the threat of violence around the Eastern Provincial Council elections held on May 10. The LTTE showed its capacity to destabilize the province including an attack on the Trincomalee Harbour and sank a navy cargo vessel and launching a mortar attack in polling booths in Pannalagama which injured 5 persons on election day.44 While there were a wide range of incidents related to the election, the elections were able to go ahead with relatively high turnouts and a low number of fatalities. The LTTE was suspected for the killing and also the killing of some 13 policemen in individual incidents in May and June in Ampara and . The East experienced a intense period of violence with individual attacks in Tamil and Muslim areas following the Eastern Elections in the following the assassination of TMVP Arayampathy areas leader Shanthan on May 22 .

An interesting development was the LTTE’s offer on July 22 of an unilateral cease-fire during the period of the SAARC summit from July 26 – August 04. While the Government rejected it outright and instead responded with an aerial attack on July 21 on an LTTE training facility in Uddayarkulam killing 22 Black Tigers and a naval attack destroying an LTTE boat

The violations of international humanitarian law continued into this quarter raising concerns as to how the war is being fought. As the areas controlled by the LTTE shrink and the LTTE continues to allow these IDPs to flee out of the Wanni, the security forces and air force will find themselves accused of attacking civilians while the LTTE will be charged with using the civilians as human shields. The Government has made claims that the LTTE is using nearly 200,000 innocent Tamils as a human shield and the LTTE, which has been severely weakened, was now engaged in recruiting innocent children and Tamil elders to its ranks.45 The UTHR(J) report, “Trauma in the Vanni: Human Grist to the Mills of Dual Hypocrisy” ”The outfit has started on conscripting children, married men and government servants to man the frontlines, bunkers and the battlefield.”46 Thereby, the LTTE is essentially challenging the distinction between combatant and civilian. Civilians within the Wanni have been forced to flee the fighting by heading further into the interior.

5 Compared to previous quarters this quarter witnessed large number of attacks targeting civilians in government and LTTE controlled areas. The LTTE attacks targeting civilians in the south intensified during May and the first weeks of June mounting pressure on the state forces. The LTTE used parcel bombs, claymores mainly to target civilians. These bombs were triggered mainly on passenger busses and passenger trains where the general public mostly travels. On May 26 a parcel bomb exploded in an office train in Dehiwala killing 9 and injuring 73.47 On May 31 two were killed from a grenade explosion Wellawatte.48 Another bomb explosion occurred on June 04 near the same rail way track in Dehiwala where a parcel bomb went off on May 28. Due to this 24 were injured.49 Two days after this the LTTE managed to trigger another bloody attack on June 6th on a passenger bus in Katubedda killing 21 and injuring 55 passengers.50 Hours after this attack another blast occurred in a passenger bus in Polgolla killing 2 and injuring 20 passengers.51 In LTTE-controlled Wanni civilians were victims of the SLAF aerial attacks. On June 15 four civilians were reportedly killed 10 civilians, including a pregnant mother, were wounded when Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) bombed a civilian settlement of IDPs in Puthukkudiyiruppu in Mullaitivu.52 The Government has maintained that ‘collateral damage’ has been low because of the care taken by and the professionalism of the Sri Lankan Air Force According to the LTTE, civilians were the main victims of these attacks. On May 23, 16 civilians including 5 children, three girls and two boys, were killed from a Claymore attack that in Kilinochchi.53 The Deputy Planning Director of Poonakari (Pooneryn) division and a development official at Kilinochchi District Secretariat, Santhalingam Vimalakumar, was killed by a claymore mine on July 25, and Assistant Director of Fisheries in Mannaar, J.G.Jujin was killed from a claymore on May 23.54

Projections The Government has made clear its aim of defeating the LTTE and over the next quarter it is expected that the security forces will continue to make successive advances capturing key LTTE strategic locations including Mallavi and Nachchikuda over the next quarter, before seeking to capture the de facto capital Killinochchi and the LTTE’s military heartland in Mullaitivu. Within the next quarter the Government will be able to move its guns in close proximity to the LTTE’s nerve centre. Given the current military dynamic it would seem that the military will advance, while facing losses and pockets of resistance that will hamper their advance. The encirclement of the Wanni and the attacks inside LTTE-controlled areas using the air force, artillery and long range reconnaissance patrols coupled with the loss of cadres will make it increasingly difficult for the LTTE to resist. In such a scenario the LTTE will find itself hard pressed and will be forced to launch a massive counter- offensive or at least a number of operations by sea and land on government-controlled areas in order to off-set the military advance and the loss of the Wanni. The foreign secretary Palitha Kohana in an interview to Reuters stated that The LTTE could still wage a protracted low-intensity insurgency with hidden resources despite a military victory over the outfit, "Defeating the LTTE might not be the end of the story because an organisation like this might still have some resources hidden away."55 The civilian population in the North in particular will face severe threats including violations of international humanitarian law and other threats to their security including limited access to basic items.

6 III. HUMAN SECURITY

3.1 Context This quarter witnesses similar trends to the previous quarter with a continuation of human rights violations and a deepening humanitarian crisis in the North of Sri Lanka. The inability to conduct independent investigations and inquiries and hold perpetrators accountable continues to exacerbate the culture of impunity. Though nationally measures were taken by the Government to control public knowledge of the deteriorating human security situation, internationally strong messages were witnessed as seen with the reelection in New York to the Human Rights Council (HRC), where Sri Lanka lost its seat in the HRC. This came as a strong message by the international community on the poor human rights situation in the country.

3.2 Continuing human rights crisis and widening humanitarian crisis in the North This quarter witnessed a continuation of hostilities in the North and incidence of violence in the rest of the country including the recently liberated East. This quarter also witnessed several attacks against civilian targets in Colombo and outskirts, a trend witnessed in the later part of the last quarter. The increased attacks resulted in over 20 civilian deaths and many more being injured.56 Such attacks demonstrated that the LTTE had recommenced their tactics of targeting civilians through which creating fear and pandemonium among the communities.

Extra judicial killings continued in this quarter. A high profile killing this quarter was that of Maheswari Velayutham, a human rights activist and lawyer in Jaffna.57 Her killers like in many other cases are yet to be tried and convicted, a sign of the collapse of the rule of law and culture of impunity prevalent in Sri Lanka.

Though the East has officially been ‘liberated’ from terrorism, there remained concern on the continued human rights violations and lack of accountability in the area. Disappearances continued this quarter, with special attention drawn to increased disappearances in Trincomalee district.58 It has also been reported that 147 persons have been missing in June-July, according to R. Sampanthan, MP.59 In a statement issued by the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances in the even of the HRC sessions in June, the Working Group highlighted increased disappearances in the recent months with over 22 people disappearing in two months, with 18 cases being reported in one month alone.60 They stated that the recent wave of disappearances included women and humanitarian aid workers. Many others were too scared to report due to fears of reprisals.

Though UNICEF figures demonstrated a reduction in recruitment by both the LTTE and TMVP, reports from the areas indicate that there is still recruitment ongoing by both the LTTE and TMVP but there are fears in reporting to the authorities. The LTTE and TMVP both continue to have children within their ranks. Concern on child recruitment in Sri Lanka was highlighted at the united nations security council sessions where the USA representative to the UN, Zalmay Khalilzad urged the UNSC to take targeted measures against actors involved in child recruitment.61

Round ups, arrests and detentions continued this quarter. It was reported in May that 61 Tamils were detained in Colombo after a round up.62 There were also reported of 68 Tamil political prisoners who were transferred from Welikada to Boosa prison and assaulted.63 It is reported that 254 detainees have been detained in Boosa for more than nice months.64 These figures demonstrate that regardless of judicial orders, arrests and detentions continued, most times targeting the Tamil population. Due to the limited information and resources available, many of the detainees and their families were unable to challenge the detentions resulting in long periods of detention. There were also the issue of ‘surrendees’, persons who continued to seek protective custody in Jaffna as seen in

7 the previous quarter.65 This trend continued due to the numerous human security threats faced by civilians in areas of Jaffna.

In response to the human rights situation, this quarter witnessed the establishment of a human rights hotline to report on violations with 59 violations reported in only three days.66 It is yet to be seen whether the hotline would lead to speedy investigations of violations and a precursor for halting future violations.

Collapse of the rule of law and a thriving culture of impunity: This quarter witnessed the continued detention of journalist Tissainayagam, who was detained on 7th March. Though in detention for over four months, he was yet to be charged with any crime. Two colleagues of his, Jesiharan and his partner are also detained with no charges. All three have fundamental rights applications challenging their detentions which are presently before the Supreme Court.

The Commission of Inquiry appointed to investigate 17 human rights cases continued with its public session in two cases, the killing of five youth in Trincomalee in January 2006 and the killing of 17 aid workers of ACF in Mutur in August 2006. It was reported that interim reports of the two cases would be available in September though there were no indicators whether these reports would be made public.67 Significant developments with the Commission of Inquiry were the resignations of two Commissioners Dr. Devanesan Nesiah and Mr. Javid Yusuf,68 raising questions on the reasons behind their resignation and the future of the investigations. With the term of the present Commission ending in November, it is to be seen what progress it would have made since being appointed in November 2006.

As highlighted in previous quarters, a reason for the inability to have constructive investigations and prosecutions is that many victims and witnesses fear giving evidence and subsequent reprisals. In June the Government presented the Assistance and Protection to Victims of Crime and Witness Bill to Parliament though delays have hampered the enactment into law.69 Though a law is welcome, there are concerns that legislation may not provide all the answers to successful investigations and prosecutions. The bill has been criticised for allowing the police to play a pivotal role in witness and victim protection, when there are reported cases of violations by the police. It is imperative that the authorities address the systematic and fundamental concerns in relation to witness and victim protection and not merely enact laws and establish institutions.

Continuing violence despite the Liberation of the East: May 10th witnessed the holding of the first ever Eastern Provincial Council elections in the Eastern Province. This significant event unfortunately was marred with violence and voter malpractices, calling to question the elections were free and fair. The accusations of malpractices and irregularities were numerous and from all political parties and included threats, assault and intimidation of candidates, supporters and voters, ballot box stuffing.70 Similar to the previously held local government elections in March in Batticaloa district, the Government contested jointly with the TMVP, the political arm of the breakaway group of the LTTE. The elections witnessed several coalitions being formed among the groups and deals being made including agreements between the TMVP and some Muslim groups indicating a new trend of partnering for political gain. On 16th May Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan alias was appointed the Chief Minister by President Mahinda Rajapakse, amid protests by the Muslim politicians within the Government.71 It is yet to be seen how the new Chief Minister will be able to govern in the newly liberated East and whether he would have the full backing of his coalition members and Provincial Council. With the return of Karuna to Sri Lanka in July 03 and his subsequent reinstatement as leader of the TMVP, it is unclear what the future holds of the new Chief minister. It is also to be seen whether full powers such as land and police powers would be vested with the new Provincial Council as provided in the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, or whether this would be yet a token gesture.

8

Humanitarian Crisis: A trend witnessed in the previous quarter that has continued to the present quarter was the increasing humanitarian crisis in the North, with increased numbers of IDPs and shortages of essential items.72 According to UNOCHA, the numbers of IDPs has increased recently among the populations with more than 22% of the total population being displaced in Mannar and Mullativu districts and 34% being displaced in Killinochchi district.73 It was reported that the situation with the IDPs was dire, with reports of disease and malnutrition due to limitations in getting across humanitarian and essential items to areas in the Vanni.74 The increased hostilities have not only resulted in food shortages but increased prices of staple food by more than 50% creating dire hardships among the civilian communities, leaving no choice among families to limit meals and food intake.75 There were also reports of more IDPs living under trees in the Vanni due to the security situation and lack of proper infrastructure and facilities.76

There also concerns of the IDPs who were now in welfare camps in Mannar such as in Kalimoddai camp. In a statement by Human Rights Watch, it highlighted the plight of over 400 IDPs who were ‘arbitrarily detained’ by the authorities.77 The statement cited a survey conducted on 10th and 11th May by local authorities in the camp which assessed whether IDPs preferred to remain or leave the camp, in which only five families out of 257 persons wanted to remain. With increased hostilities and resulting displacement, there are fears that the restrictions in movement witnessed in the Kalimoddai camp could be imposed in other camps and areas, and similar arbitrary practices used to curtail the rights of civilians.

On May 10 and 11, local authorities conducted a survey in Kalimoddai camp to assess the wishes of displaced persons on their preferred place of residence. Out of the then camp population of 257, only five families indicated a wish to remain in Kalimoddai. The large majority indicated that they wished to leave and had alternative places to stay, including with nearby host families. To date, unconfirmed information indicates only 28 people have been released.78

The exacerbation in hostilities not only increased migration and displacement among communities but also resulted in increased refugee flows with over 270 refugees crossing over to Tamil Nadu within three days,79 a sign of the threats to human security and limited options available in Sri Lanka.

In addition to the increased displacement in the North, there still remained IDPs in the East. Many who were displaced with the hostilities in 2006 and 2007 remained in welfare camps and transit centers in Batticaloa and Trincomalee.80 The High Security Zone, Special Economic Zone and high security areas in Trincomalee district has resulted in large numbers being displaced.81 Though two alternative sites have been identified, IDPs are reluctant to relocate due to security, livelihoods and desire to return to one’s own land.82

There were also concerns of livelihoods in Trincomalee district. Fisherman in Muttur were not allowed to fish following a ban after the elections, resulting in severe hardship among the fishing community and those dependent on their trade.83 As result, it was reported that many families had only one meal a day and a few incidents where children had fainted in school due to malnourishment.84

International attention: This quarter witnessed several initiatives internationally that focused on the human rights situation in Sri Lanka. A key event was the re-election of members to the Human Rights Council (HRC) which took place on May 21 with Sri Lanka being a candidate for the four seats available from the Asia block. In the election held at the United Nations in New York, Sri Lanka lost its seat in the HRC with Japan, South Korea, Bahrain and Pakistan being elected from the Asia block.85 The defeat sent a clear signal of the international community’s concern and criticism of the human rights situation in Sri Lanka, with several actors publicly denouncing the deteriorating

9 situation.86 The strongest critiques came from three Nobel Laureates including Archbishop Desmond Tutu from South Africa, Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center in USA and Adolfo Pérez Esquivel from Argentina. Archbishop Tutu stated that “The systematic abuses by the Sri Lankan government forces are among the most serious imaginable. Government security forces summarily remove their own citizens from their homes and families in the middle of the night, never to be heard from again. Torture and extra-judicial killings are widespread. When the human rights council was established, UN members required that states elected must themselves uphold the highest standards of human rights. On that count, Sri Lanka is clearly disqualified.”

Sri Lanka’s defeat in the HRC re-elections resulted in the Government blaming a I/NGO conspiracy and portraying a possible victory if not for the smear campaign against Sri Lanka.87 Such blaming and name calling is not a new trend in Sri Lanka, as witnessed in 2006 and 2007.

Another significant event witnessed this quarter was the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of Sri Lanka at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva in May.88 In the UPR, Sri Lanka’s human rights situation and the commitments made by the Government were discussed with several members of the HRC being critical of the current situation. The UPR recommendations and commitments were formalised at the June HRC sessions, where the Government agreed to and committed to undertake various measures including the implementation of a National Action Plan on Human Rights. Regardless of the commitments at the UPR, the defeat of its HRC seat has sent a strong message to the Government that much more needs to be done to address the deteriorating situation in Sri Lanka.

3.3 Projection The intensification of hostilities in the North and the prevailing uncertainty and tension in the East will continue to impact the human security of civilians in those areas. All signs indicate to violations witnessed in this quarter spreading to the next quarter, with a possibility of greater numbers and frequencies in the fight against terrorism and in the name of ‘national security’. The humanitarian crisis is likely to witness a crisis point, with increased restrictions imposed on movement of civilians and operations of humanitarian agencies. It is inevitable that there is a repeat of the human rights and humanitarian issues witnessed in the East in 2007 with a greater intensity than previously seen.

10 III. POLITICAL

3.1 Context Despite the lack of a clear Parliamentary majority and its reliance on a loosely held alliance, the Government of President Mahinda Rajapakse has further strengthened its position. The convincing victory in the Eastern Provincial Council Elections with support from its ally the TMVP placed the Government in an advantageous position and emboldened it to contest other elections. The Government called for elections to the North Central and Sabaragamuwa Provincial Council elections which are to be held in August. The split within the JVP and the breakaway faction’s Nidahas Janatha Peramuna (NJP) alliance with the Government has meant that the opposition is further weakened.

3.2 Government continuing to consolidate control Eastern Provincial Council Elections: A key development in this quarter was the Eastern Provincial Council (EPC) Elections which were held on May 10 exactly a month after the Batticaloa local Government elections. The UPFA emerged victorious securing 20 seats out of 37 seats on offer, while polling 52.21% of total votes.89 The UNP which obtained 42.38% of the total valid votes got 15 seats while the JVP and the Tamil Democratic National Alliance secured one slot each.90 The UPFA won two out of the three districts-Batticaloa and Ampara while the Trincomalee District was won by the UNP.91 Out of 10 polling divisions in the East, the UPFA won 792 while the UNP secured 3.93 In addition, the Government was able to claim that the elections were legitimate due to the turn out as a total number of 591, 676 votes (65,78%) voters had exercised their franchise.94

The claim that the EPC elections were free and fair was challenged by all major opposition parties. The UNP refused to accept the election results “citing the intimidation of voters and rigging the poll by the government using armed groups.” 95 Muslim Congress leader alleged that the UPFA “in desperation to win the election, flouted all election laws and robbed the eastern people of their right to be ruled by the party of their choice.”96 The JVP claimed that the “election in the east was a robbery, that elements of communalism, lawlessness and thuggery were declared winners.”97 Election monitoring groups also expressed concern. The People’s Action for a Free and Fair Election (PAFFREL) has noted in its interim report that there were “serious incidents reported” in the Province on the day of polling, including 24 cases of intimidating voters, and 14 incidents of physical assault with most of the complaints lodged against the TMVP.98 The Center for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV) said in a statement that it had recorded 64 incidents of election malpractices as at 6.00p.m on May 10. Of the 48 major offences the majority of the major offences (28) were committed in the Batticaloa District followed by Ampara (12) and Trincomalee (08). Of the major offences, systematic impersonation was the most widespread with a particular concentration in the Batticaloa District where 15 of the 22 such incidents occurred.99 An international election monitoring group, the Association of Asian Election Authorities (AAEA), however dissented with the local groups claiming that “the elections were totally free and fair and that they had not encountered a single untowed incident during their monitoring process.”100 There was no action taken by the Election Commissioner to re-poll areas and while the legitimacy of the election was challenged it was clear that the Government-TMVP-Muslim political alliance had been able secure a significant voter base and thereby give credibility to the election outcome.

The elections were very significant for the Government as it could prove that the Eastern election was not just a military liberation and that it had the popular mandate of the Eastern people. President Mahinda Rajapakse in a statement claimed that “this [the election] is another important milestone in the Government’s policy of restoring democratic rights to the people in areas once dominated by the LTTE and of ensuring democracy throughout the island.”101 The TMVP’s alliance also has meant that the Government is able to demonstrate that it has the support of the Tamil people, which is

11 critical to the Government’s current politico-military strategy. Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse acknowledged that “the comfortable victory gained by the government TMVP alliance would be a tremendous boost to the military campaign in the Vanni.”102 Out of all the provincial councils the Eastern election seems to be the most challenging as the SLMC-TNA-UNP had a strong base in the East. Hence, the Government’s victory gives it a huge confidence boost while the UNP led by Ranil Wickremasinghe has had to face another electoral defeat which in turn. The threat to Wickremasinghe’s leadership of the UNP intensified as a result of the loss.103

Having secured a victory the Government faced a significant challenge in reaching a consensus on the candidate for Chief Minister. The Government had refused to select a candidate as Chief Minister prior to the election and instead promised to grant the position to whoever won the highest number of votes. While TMVP leader Sivanesathurai Chanthirakanthan alias Pillaiyan polled the highest number of preferential votes, the Muslims had secured the largest number of seats for the Government and hence argued for a Muslim, ostensibly A.L.M. Hizbullah.104 While both sides attempted to make their arguments, the President intervened appointing Pillayan as Chief Minister, despite open dissent by some of the Muslim ministers, which threatened the Government’s majority in the council. 105 Hizbullah finally agreed to take up an appointment as the Provincial Health Minister in the EPC and was sworn in on 21 May. 106 While the Government succeeded in bringing about a compromise it made clear the tussle for power between the ethnic communities in the East which the Government and the Provincial Council will have to contend with. May also a serious security situation in Batticalo Town-Kathankudy-Aryampathy and Eravur areas following the killing of TMVP area leader Shanthan. Over a period of a week there were a number of killings, abductions and attacks on Muslims and Tamil civilians and property, which intensified communal tensions and fears, thereby further polarizing ethnic relations.107

Thus, the political actors in East face a number of critical challenges. For the TMVP the election proved that it had the support of the Eastern Tamils, and coming in the wake of its election victories in the local Government elections in Batticaloa it demonstrates the legitimacy of the group. The election was critical for the TMVP as its raison d’etat is the representation of the Eastern Tamils, and hence securing control of the EPC was critical. In power, the TMVP led administration will face significant challenges including ensuring that the Central Government provides critical powers and finances.108 The TMVP also faces a significant security challenge. A few hours prior to Pillayan’s official appointment a bomb exploded in the immediate vicinity of the Presidential Secretariat where the ceremony was supposed to take place. Six people were killed and seventy five were injured in the bomb blast.109 The TMVP will also face pressures in maintaining internal cohesion, particularly if it is unable to provide employment opportunities for its cadres and ensure a patronage system. The deportation of ex-TMVP leader Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan, Karuna from Britain on July 3rd also threatened to destabilize the TMVP but on the surface it appears that an internal crisis was prevented as the TMVP was re-structured, providing Karuna with a position within the group. Yet, it cannot be assumed that the power struggle between Pillayan and Karuna is over. The TMVP also faces the challenge of transformations. The group has been accused of a variety of human rights violations including the forcible recruitment of children and killings and abductions of civilians. There is an expectation that its entry into democratic politics will make it more accountable and result in better behaviour and a commitment to key values including human rights. The TMVP has resisted calls to disarm in the immediate future, a position which the Government supports. Nonetheless, the TMVP will have to prove that it has transformed in order to secure the recognition and legitimacy it craves, especially in order to secure international support and funding. As to how far the TMVP is committed to becoming an adept administrator and moves away from its involvement in human rights violations will be seen in the months to come.

The Government’s commitment to addressing the ethnic conflict will also be seen over the coming months, particularly in how deals with the devolution of power and the allocation of funds to the

12 EPC. The Government has made a number of statements expressing its commitment to PC system but it is unclear how soon or whether that police and land powers did not have to be devolved to the Eastern Provincial Council. In other developments the President appointed Former IGP Victor Perera as the Governor of the Northern Province, as Rear Admiral Mohan Wijewickrema, Governor of the Eastern Province, who was also acting as the Governor of Northern province since 1st January 2007, after North and Eastern provinces were de-merged.110 This appointment was critiqued by the opposition parties. The Government and the EPDP had mooted the idea of an Interim Council for the North but due to threats that the JVP would legally challenge such a move, the Government appointed a three member Interim Advisory body on April 30. Headed by Minister to oversea resettlement and development work in the North, the other members include Senior Presidential Adviser Basil Rajapakse and Mr. Abdul Rashid Bathiudeen, Wanni District MP.111 The body would play a role in the rehabilitation and development of the North and seems also to be a tool of involving minority political leaders from the North and thereby demonstrate the Government’s commitment to addressing the needs of the North.112

NCP and Sabaragamuwa PC’s dissolved: Taking advantage of the successful conclusion of the Eastern PC elections the Government dissolved the North Central and Sabaragamuwa Provincial Councils with effect from midnight on 10th June through two special gazette notifications issued by the Governors of the two provinces.113 The move was condemned by both the UNP and the JVP. The UNP questioned why elections in all nine PCs were not being held, and also condemned the decision to hold elections before the due date as “unconstitutional and unethical.”114 The dissolution was premature as the elections to these Councils were held in 2004 and their terms were due to expire in August 2009. 115 “The UNP which said the dissolution of these councils was illegal filed two FR petitions before the Supreme Court.” 116 “The JVP also followed a similar way.” 117 However, the Supreme Court dismissed the two fundamental rights petitions filed by the UNP and JVP challenging the dissolution as it stated that the Governors of the Provincial Councils had legally dissolved the both Provincial Councils.118 The Government’s decision to hold elections is reportedly due to the loss of its majority following the JVP moving away from the Government.119 An opposing view is that the choice of Sabaragamuwa and North Central is possibly due to growing sentiment in these provinces being favourable to the Government’s strategy of fighting the war but it would seem that there are other units like the Southern Province which would prove more favourable.

The PC elections are set for 23 August. All major parties and a number of independent groups concluded handing over of nominations for the North Central and the Sabaragamuwa provincial council elections on 4 July. All the main parties are contesting with the JVP and CWC contesting as independents and the SLMC in alliance with the UNP. The UPFA Chief Ministerial candidate for the North-central province is former Chief Minister Berty Premalal Dissanayake, while the Chief Ministerial candidate for Sabaragamuwa is former Chief Minister Mahipala Herath. The UNP has nominated former Major General Janaka Perera as its main candidate for the NCP while actor was nominated as the UNP chief ministerial candidate for Sabaragamuwa.120

Formation of Jathika Nidahas Peramuna(JNP) and the breakup of the JVP: A significant development in the last quarter was the break up of the JVP party. While the splintering of political parties and cross over of M.Ps has become a common phenomenon in Sri Lankan politics, the JVP which prides itself on internal cohesion and discipline has largely been able to withstand these pressures, apart from the departure of JVP front liner Nandana Gunathileke. In the months preceding the break up there were rumours of internal rifts within the JVP but the party dismissed them. During the current quarter a new party was formed Nidahas Janatha Peramuna(JNP) with Weerawansa named as the President of the party and Gunathilake as the General Secretary.121

During this quarter the JNP managed to hold on to its M.Ps despite continuing violence, intimidation and coercion by the JVP. JNP managed to snatch another JVP parliamentarian Anjan Umma to its

13 party during June.122 The JNP was either unable or unwilling to join the Government so finds itself in a challenging position. The JNP and the TMVP formed a political alliance to contest future elections together and cooperate in other matters. 123 Over this quarter the party continued to launch attacks on the JVP during this quarter, including a book by titled “Naththa Venuwata Aththa” the release of which was thwarted by a court injunction.124

The JVP meanwhile attempted to re-structure the party and re-energize its voting base. With the expulsion of the breakaway members the party nominated new members to its Central Committee. At the fifth national convention where was reinstated as party leader, he vowed to topple President Mahinda Rajapakse’s government alleging it would never come back to the “right” track.125 In order to flex its muscles the JVP announced a general strike on July 10. The rational behind the strike was an increase in wages but the strikers also demanded “a reduction of the Ministers of the cabinet (from 109 to 30), the reduction of the Presidential advisers (from 168 to 30), the postponement of the PC elections until due time and the immediate implementation of the 17 amendment to the constitution.” 126 The strike was spearheaded by JVP backed trade unions but the UNP at the last minute lent its support. 127 The government termed the strike “a failure” and a defeat for the combined JVP-UNP affiliated TU’s and even though JVP trade union leader K.D. Lal Kantha claimed that it was a 70% success.128 The strike while having an impact in worker turn out did not have the impact desired by the JVP and was used by the Government to demonstrate its popularity, particularly with regards to the commitment to the military campaign.

APRC struggles on: After a lapse of several months the APRC resumed sittings on 14 July with the TMVP representative - Batticaloa Mayor Sivageetha Prabhakaran participating in the sittings.129 The APRC met in July after a long lay off as the JHU and MEP refused to participate unless the TMVP could participate.130 The future of the APRC however remains in question as some of the political parties, including the UNP, JVP, JHU and MEP have opted out of the process and not rejoined while the TNA has never participated.131 APRC Chairman and Minister claimed that 90% of the issues and the remaining 10% could be thrashed out during the coming sessions. Yet, it remains unclear whether the APRC will actually finalize a proposal in the coming months or may find itself mandated to work out a framework that will ensure the full implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution.132 The APRC will continue to provide a useful defence for the Government that it is attempting to devise a political solution, especially with regards to the international community, and India in particular. The resumption of the APRC two weeks prior to the SAARC Summit could have been coincidental but the re-commencement of sitting did prove convenient for the Government.

SAARC conference and summit: The Government gained significant political mileage through hosting the 15th SAARC conference from 27 July to 1 August and the summit from 2-3 August in Colombo. Through playing host to South Asian leaders and holding the conference under tight situation without agreeing to the LTTE’s ceasefire and instead continuing the military campaign strengthened the popular perception that this is a effective Government both on the military and diplomatic front. The entire operation was both costly and involved massive human resources, particularly of security personnel. The JVP attempted to off-set some of this popularity by criticizing the Government for agreeing to allow such a strong foreign security presence that included warships but SAARC did prove to be a public relations success for the Government domestically at least.

3.3 Projection: Despite possible political set backs including at the elections, it is clear that it is the Government which is setting the political agenda and it is unlikely that the opposition can seriously threaten the Government’s popular standing.

14 IV. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

4.1 Context The Government continues to wage an aggressive foreign policy to strengthen its economic and military safety net. Sri Lanka pulled off a diplomatic coup by holding the SAARC conference and summit in Colombo. It was preceded by a high level Indian delegation to Colombo purportedly to review the security situation but was also reportedly to put pressure on Sri Lanka’s military ties with China and Pakistan, and question the Government on its efforts at forging a political solution to the conflict. During this quarter there were a number of high profile visits to Sri Lanka by delegations from the UK and the EU which highlighted the human rights situation. The discussion of Sri Lanka’s eligibility for the EU’s GSP plus trade deal continued through this quarter with no real indication as to whether Sri Lanka would apply. The Government suffered a significant loss of face when it failed to be re-elected by the members of UN General Assembly to the UN Human Rights Council.

4.2 Despite set backs the Government confidently continuing an assertive foreign policy Sri Lanka loses UN HRC Seat: In a significant setback to the Sri Lanka’s Government diplomatic efforts to defend its human rights credentials, it failed to win a seat on the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva. The HRC is made up of 47 members who are voted in by member states. With six countries competing for four positions, Sri Lanka managed to muster only 101 out of 192 votes, behind Japan with 155 votes, Bahrain 142, South Korea 139 and Pakistan 114 and hence failed to win a seat.133 The loss was humiliating for the Government and reflected a lack of confidence on the part of the international community. Given the voting power of the various regional blocks it was clear that the loss was not purely due to countries of the Western hemisphere refusing to endorse Sri Lanka’s candidacy but was also a result of countries from the South, including South America and even Asia not supporting Sri Lanka. In the weeks preceding the vote, Foreign Minister personally went to New York to speak to politicians and diplomats,134 but the campaign proved unsuccessful. The campaign against Sri Lanka was backed by some key international human rights organizations including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and prominent international personalities including former US President Jimmy Carter and Arcbishop Desmond Tutu. The Government had attempted to off-set international criticism by following an aggressive strategy of dismissing statements and reports highlighting abuses and challenging the accuracy of groups or individuals putting out the statements, which seemed to be highly successful. The loss of the seat demonstrated that even among its Southern allies the Sri Lankan Government lacks allies.

The Sri Lankan Government fared better at the Universal Period Review which took place prior to the GA vote. Every member of the HRC has to submit itself to be reviewed by other member countries. Human Rights Minister was sent to Geneva to make a presentation before the Universal Periodic Review panel of the UNHRC on May 13.135 Attorney-General C. R. de Silva who also spoke at the universal periodic review “responded to criticisms of Sri Lanka’s record by lamely declaring that the systematic abuses were the work of a few “bad apples” in the security forces.”136 He said that the Department had instituted criminal proceedings against 599 members of the security forces for abductions, unlawful detentions and extra-judicial murders over the past decade without stating the number of convictions during the tenure of the current administration.137

SAARC conference and summit: The Sri Lankan Government was able to strengthen its diplomatic credentials by hosting the 15th SAARC conference and summit from 27th July to 3rd August under the theme “partnership for the betterment of the people.” Maldives was initially expected to host the conference and deferred due to cost issues. At the commencement of the summit the SAARC leaders announced their intention “to formulate common positions on climate change, energy crisis, developing together, and on the subject of the elimination of poverty.”138 Food and energy security, fuel and trade issues, critical issue of climate change, water resources, transport, social issues, terrorism, women empowerment and cooperation in science and technology dominated the summit

15 talks.139 While there was a heavy foreign security contingent present in Colombo the Government was able to pull off a success. A particular significant indicator was that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed to attend despite appeals by MDMK chief Vaiko not to participate in the upcoming SAARC summit in Colombo.140 Nonetheless, there were some minor embarrassments involving security for the Indians, including one incident where the Indian National Security Advisor, R.K Narayan was not provided with official transport.141

High profile Indian defense delegation visits Lanka: A high level Indian delegation comprising of National Security Adviser M K Narayanan, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon and Defense Secretary Vijay Singh, visited Colombo on June 20-1 for talks.142 Before the talks began “sources on both sides maintained that the team was here for consultations with their counterparts in the island nation on matters of mutual interest and scheduled visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to participate in the SAARC Summit scheduled here for the first week of August. Both sides refrained from any on the record comment as per an agreement not to go public with the details of the talks.”143 The Indian delegation met some of the key policy makers including President Rajapakse, Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse, Secretary to the President, Lalith Weeratunga, Special Presidential Advisor, Basil Rajapakse, Army Commander Lt. General Sarath Fonseka.144 It soon became clear that the high level delegation was not merely seeking to discuss security arrangements. There was some speculation that India had expressed security concerns on the Government’s tilt towards China and Pakistan on military matters. 145 According to one newspaper report the Indian delegation had presented a list of weapons and armaments that the Government was planning to purchase from China including Jinag-7 attack planes and JY-1 air crafts.146 Reportedly the Indians had reiterated their unwillingness to sell weapons with offensive capability to Sri Lanka.147 It was speculated that the visiting delegation had also discussed economic issues especially concerning the ongoing feud between the Sri Lankan Government and the Lanka Indian Oil Company (LIOC), which also saw the Petroleum Resources Minister A.H.M. Fowzie threatening in Parliament to acquire all LIOC fuel stations.148 This issue could generate concern among other companies with and planning substantive Foreign Direct Investment.149 Following this visit President Mahinda Rajapakse paid a private visit to the shrine of Lord Venkateswara in Tirupati on 11th July.150 There were rumours that he would meet Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for urgent consultations, however this never materialized.151

A number of international actors have expressed concern about the lack of a progress on a political solution. The Indian delegation had reportedly shown impatience on the slow progress made with regard to a political solution and had called for a solution in line with the APRC.152 “Media Minister Lakshman Yapa Abeywardane later clarified that the Indian delegation did not instruct the government on conducting the war as alleged by the opposition Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). 154 153But he added, that India did raise the possibility of peace talks. With upcoming parliamentary elections it was clear that the Indian Government is under pressure to demonstrate its credentials to the Tamil Nadu constituency and political parties. In addition to the meetings with the President and senior government leaders, the Indian delegates met CWC leader , EPDP leader Douglas Devananda who heads the Northern Advisory Council and TNA leader R Sampanthan on 21st June and “expressed their concern” about the current unstable situation.155 This point was raised by a number of other international visitors including from the UK and EU.

GSP plus issue: The polemics on the extension of the GSP plus scheme during the last quarter continued into this quarter as well. The Government is well aware that there is a strong possibility that the EU would not extend the GSP Plus facility to Sri Lanka due to the deteriorating human rights situation and the Government not fulfilling all of the 27 international instruments laid out by the EU. However, it is sticking to its original position that it is not prepared to amend the constitution, since human rights and fundamental freedoms are guaranteed by the Constitution.

16 Therefore, attempts have been made by the regime to convince the EU and member states to extend the GSP facility for a further 3 year period. For this purpose President Mahinda Rajapakse in the recent past had set up a committee of three Ministers G.L. Peiris, Rohitha Bogollagama and Saratha Amunugama to study the problem and lobby for it. Following on this, International Trade Minister G L Peiris during a visit to Washington in May stated that “it is really necessary to have sympathy for an understanding of the problems of a developing country that is grappling with terrorism.”156 The basic argument being presented is that due to the Government’s war on terror against one of the world’s most ruthless terrorist groups, the international community needed to be more sympathetic.

The GSP plus issue continued to create problems in Sri Lanka’s domestic politics. The Government and the state media accused opposition leader Ranil Wickremasinghe and the UNP of striving to have the GSP plus facility scrapped. The UNP has denied this charge and said that it is prepared to support the government in case an amendment to the constitution is deemed necessary to get the GSP facility extended. Opposition leader Ranil Wickremasinghe met the European Commission’s Vice President for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy, Margot Wallstrom along with European Commissions Commissioner Fererro-Waldner and European Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson on 26th May in Brussels. He reportedly “made a plea to the EU leaders to grant Sri Lanka an extension of the GSP plus facility to save the jobs of over 300, 000 workers.”157

However, it seems that the Government’s efforts to convince the EU to extend the GSP plus facility for sympathetic reasons are not getting the desired results. At a meeting that visiting British Minister of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs of the UK, he had with Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama on 15th July in Colombo he expressed “hope that this preferential trading facility will be extended and outlined areas which need to be addressed.” 158 The reference to “areas which need to be addressed” was an indication to the Government that the GSP plus would not be extended unless certain actions were taken by the Government. In his meeting with Eastern Province Chief Minister Pillayan, Lord Brown stated “that there were human rights violations in Sri Lanka and he could not guarantee the extension of the GSP plus facility given to Sri Lankan exports to the EU under these circumstances.”159 EU Ambassador in Sri Lanka Julian Wilson, however “criticized newspaper reports on the continuation of GSP+ being linked to human rights abuses as 'rubbish'.”160 The ‘Daily Mirror newspaper quoted him as saying “I will only say that a lot of melodramatic rubbish has been written about the renewal of GSP+ in the local press. The truth is simple if somewhat banal--the EU wants Sri Lanka to receive GSP+ again for the coming three years.”161 Given the mixed signals from the Government as to whether they will re-apply for GSP or not, over the next quarter it will become clear which way the Government will go and how willing it is to take steps to meet the benchmarks laid out by the EU, especially on human rights, as the renewal comes up in October.

During this quarter a number of high profile delegations visited Sri Lanka. A delegation of 7 members of the European Parliament traveled to Sri Lanka from 20-26 July for the 5th EP-Sri Lanka Inter-parliamentary Meeting. The Delegation, led by Robert Evans(UK) met a range of actors including Government and opposition leaders, and members of civil society organisations in Colombo. The delegation was expected to travel to Trincomalee to meet Eastern Province Chief Minister in a highly symbolic visit but the flight was cancelled at the last minute. In a statement issued on 25 July the delegation alleged that “a last minute cancellation and a catalogue of chaos and confusion meant that the delegation did not [could not] fly to Trincomalee.”162 The delegation also came down hard on the Government over alleged human rights abuses being committed in the country with the head of the delegation expressing doubts that Sri Lanka will qualify for the GSP plus trade concessions.”163 Evans said the following –“Asked if he was sure Sri Lanka will obtain the concession the Evans said “in my opinion, and this is not of the delegation, I don’t think Sri Lanka will qualify for the concession…but the door is not shut.”164 The delegation was also critical of the APRC and said that it was incomplete without the TNA.

17 The Government was quick to respond.165 Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama accused the EU delegation of having “misrepresented what really occurred.”166 Furthermore, he criticized the “EU delegation’s “hasty decisions” on the human rights situation in Sri Lanka and said that the delegation had confined itself to Colombo and only met people with their own political agendas.167 The EU delegation was also criticized by one of its own members –Niranjan De Silva Deva Aditya of Sri Lankan origin who said “The delegation should have made statements encouraging good governance in a friendly way without employing megaphone politics that promote terrorism.”168

British Foreign & Commonwealth Office Minister for Africa, Asia and the UN, Lord Maloch Brown paid a visit to Sri Lanka from June 14-16. In his meeting with President Rajapakse it is believed that he raised concerns about the human rights situation and the need for institutional safeguards to protect human rights while acknowledging the steps taken by the Government. In a significant step Lord Brown also met with Eastern Province Chief Minister Pillaiyan during his visit. Prior to his visit Lord Brown had issued a statement expressing concern about the targeting of civilians and the need for a sustainable solution. 169 US Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Evan Feigenbaum also visited Sri Lanka on June 30-July 1. He too “raised concerns over the HR situation in Sri Lanka, as well as the pressures being put on the media in the country.” 170 There were a number of visits by Sri Lankan and British delegations. President Mahinda Rajapkse undertook two visits to Britain to address the Oxford Union in May and to attend the Commonwealth heads of state reform on international institutions on 10 June when he met PM Gordon Brown and opposition leader David Cameron.171 A British Defense delegation led by the military adviser to the British High Commissioner in Sri Lanka Lt Col A S Gash toured Jaffna peninsula May 3-4.172

Political Officer attached to British High Commission beaten - A political officer attached to the British High Commission, Mahendra Ratnaweera and a journalist attached to the Sri Lanka Press Institute Namal Perera who were traveling by car together were severely attacked with batons and clubs on 30 June in Colombo. In his immediate response the British High Commissioner Peter Hayes stated "I condemn in the strongest terms this despicable act on innocent civilians and demanded a full investigation.” 173 Following the British condemnation, the United States embassy in Colombo condemned the attack and called upon “the authorities to bring the perpetrators of this crime swiftly to justice.” 174 This attack highlighted the campaign of violence against the journalist, and the human rights situation in general. It also made clear the willingness of the armed group/s involved to even risk involving individuals from a key international actor. Soon after the attack the Government promised to investigate the incident.175 However, no one has been brought to justice so far. This attack is another example of the prevailing culture of impunity in the country and will only further erode the government’s credibility on the issue of human rights.

Strengthening Military Ties: A delegation headed by Army Commander Sarath Fonseka visited Pakistan on 4 May for a week long official visit on the invitation from Pakistan army Chief General Kayani.176 In addition to meeting figures from the Pakistan Army, the army commander met President Pervez Mushraff..177 Allegedly the main purpose of the visit was to discuss the purchasing of certain required weapons and ammunition.178 This quarter also saw a strengthening of defence ties between Sri Lanka and Croatia. Prime Minister visited Croatia in September 2007 and requested the strengthening of naval ties and constructing naval craft.179 The Commander of the Navy, Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda met his Croatian counterpart, Rear Admiral Ante Urilic, in May 2008 and discussed a proposed venture between the two countries to build ships for the Sri Lanka navy involving Colombo Dockyard. 180

4.3 Projection: With the intensification of the war, it is very likely that the Government will maintain an aggressive foreign policy to bolster its position. While Western Countries, the UN and India which is heading towards general elections are likely to raise concerns regarding human rights and a political solution but it is unlikely they are unlikely to put high levels of pressure.

18 V. LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL

5.1 Context

The implementation of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution continues to be bypassed which raises a number of issues. On the pretext of a pending parliamentary select committee report the Government has not moved ahead with resolving the crisis despite a number of problems being raised during this quarter, including with the Elections Commission. While the judiciary has played some role in censuring the Government it has not necessarily altered the Government’s approach towards constitutionalism and its respect for the rule of law.

5.2 Continuing Constitutional Crisis

Eastern Provincial Council Elections: Several elections petitions were filed during this period seeking to nullify the May 10th UPFA-TMVP victory at the Eastern Provincial Council Election. The opposition UNP-SLMC accused the Government coalition of election malpractice and filed an election petition in Appeal Court. This claim was substantiated by independent election monitoring groups including Campaign for Free and Fair Elections (CaFFE) and CMEV report of incidence of violence and malpractice add to the list of complaints heaped on the Eastern PC elections. Despite reports of systemic impersonation, ballot stuffing, chasing away of polling agents by armed groups, the Elections Commissioner Dayananda Dissanayake who is vested with powers to declare the elections free and fair and if not take appropriate action, ratified the results of the election. His failure to use his discretionary powers was used as an indication of the lack of independence on the part of the commission. Inquiry in to this case continues.181 A further election petition has been filed by three voters of the Batticaloa district in the Supreme Court seeking the court to declare the May 10th poll null and void citing that free and fair election was not held due to intimidation and threat, preventing voters from exercising their franchise without fear and of further large scale rigging. This petition too has been fixed for inquiry for 21st August.182

Non implementation of 17th Amendment: The criticism of the Commissioner of Elections once more highlighted the issue of the non-implementation of the 17th amendment and the establishment of independent commissions, including the Elections Commission. However the flagrant non compliance of the constitution and the distinct lack of political will to depoliticize public institutions continues and the 17th amendment to the Constitution remains unimplemented. Despite calls for its effectual implementation by various quarters including opposition parties, civil society and lately the Speaker in Parliament, the President is yet to appoint the Constitutional Council pending proposals by the select committee appointed to study shortcomings in the 17th Amendment and make recommendations to correct them. Select Committee Chairman D.E.W. Gunasekera informed Parliament that there was no final agreement among the political parties on these proposals and that the matters agreed upon by the respective political parties, were not sufficient to compile the final report.183

A positive development regarding the 17th Amendment was the Supreme Court decision on July 29th when it granted leave to proceed with the Fundamental Rights application seeking a direction from the court on President’s powers to make appointments to the Constitutional Council. Senior lecturer in Economics at the Peradeniya University Sumanasiri G. Liyanage and Executive Director of South Asia Peace Institute H.S. Ravi Jayawardana in their petition cited the President, the Speaker W.J.M. Lokubandara, President’s Secretary Lalith Weeratunga and the Attorney General as respondents, stating that the act of not constituting the Constitutional Council and thereby arbitrarily not implementing the 17th Amendment directly and otherwise infringes their fundamental right to

19 equality.184 This application came in the wake of an indication made from the Supreme Court bench to this effect in a previous writ application made to the Appeal Court by the Center for Policy Alternatives on the same issue of calling for the reconstitution of the Constitutional Council. The Appeal Court in this case was reluctant to venture an opinion and proceeded to refer the matter to the Supreme Court. The Appeal Court in this instance clearly appears to be reluctant to decide on the issue at hand and preferred to pass the responsibility to the Supreme Court. The matter is being heard in the Supreme Court and pending and there is a possibility that the Supreme Court would resend the case back to the Appeal Court for a lack of a need for constitutional interpretation.

Dissolution of North Central and Sabaragamuwa PC’s: Hard on the heels of the Eastern Provincial Council election the North Central and Sabaragamuwa Provincial Councils were dissolved on May 9th and elections were called for same. Both Councils were dissolved approximately fourteen months before their respective terms of office would have expired at the end of five years from the date of election in terms of Article 154E of the Constitution. The UNP and JVP filed two fundamental rights petitions in Supreme Court asking for an interim injunction on holding elections for the two Provincial Councils on the basis of their fundamental rights had been violated due to the dissolution of the councils. On 20th June the Supreme Court dismissed the two petitions with the Chief Justice Sarath N. Silva stating that the decision taken by the Governors of the respective province cannot be challenged as it has been done in accordance with the relevant legislation.185 At issue is the constitutionality of the dissolution of a council on the request of a chief minister who does not command the majority support of the council. A dispassionate unpacking of the constitutional and political options available within the framework of the constitutional provisions governing the question of dissolution of PC’s suggests that while the Constitution provides for the dissolution of a PC at any time prior to the expiry of its term, the Governor’s power to do so is neither substantively nor procedurally absolute.186 The Governor is granted discretionary power to dissolve a PC but subject to the mandatory duty to exercise the power only according to the advice of the Chief Minister, who must further command the support of a majority in the Council which in this case he did not.187 The Supreme Court in this instance seems to have delivered within its legal bounds.

Further Cases: On 5 May, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka terminated the rights application filed against the mass evictions of Tamils from Colombo, with Chief Justice Sarath Silva observing that persons could only be evicted according to the established law and acting upon a judicial order. In this instance, the Additional Solicitor General gave an undertaking on behalf of the Attorney General assuring that such evictions would not be repeated. However, this order failed to address the issue of the rights violation which had already occurred in this case, and appears to have deliberately avoided identifying and naming the perpetrators of the offence both any form of redress to the victims.

Jayaprakash Tissanayagam a columnist for the Sunday Times and editor of the Outreachsl.com which focus on issues related to the on going ethnic conflict has been held in TID custody since March 7 along with 4 others under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Thissanayagam writes from a Tamil viewpoint and frequently talks of issues sensitive to the Sri Lankan Government including the humanitarian situation and security issues. This case has serious implications to journalists in general, and that this was the first instance where a journalist had been charged under the Prevention of Terrorism Act for expressing his/her views. At the time of reporting Thissanayagam continues to be held in TID remand custody without being indicted in excess of the 90 days valid under the PTA bringing in to question adherence to due process and access to rule of law and fair trial for suspects. As at this point, Mr. Tissainayagam has been granted leave-to-proceed by the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka in a Fundamental Rights petition.

Freedom to practice Religion: The Supreme Court in late July upheld the fundamental right to freedom of thought, conscience and freedom to practice religion of choice by delivering an order in

20 favour of a petitioner, priest who complained that the police had stopped the celebration of Holy Mass held in church in an abrupt manner and of repeated destruction of the church building by an armed group. Having heard the case, the Supreme Court directed the police and the church to restart construction on the church and continue religious observances as well as Sunday School and ordered the IGP to arrest any body who obstructs this order and produce them before the court. 188

European Court of Human Rights recognizes rights of Tamil Refugee: The European Court of Human Rights on the 17th July ruled that an ethnic Tamil man denied asylum in Britain could not be sent back to his native Sri Lanka because he would be at risk of torture there. The ruling could have implications for hundreds of other Tamils trying to avoid expulsion from Britain to Sri Lanka. This ruling which brings in to focus the current reality of the ethnic conflict and it implications in the international forums centred on a 33-year-old man who sought asylum in Britain in 1999 citing fears of ill-treatment by the Sri Lankan authorities, who had detained him six times in seven years on suspicion of involvement with the rebel Tamil Tigers.189

Draft bill for the Assistance and Protection of Victims of Crime and Witnesses: On 17th June Government introduced a draft bill for the 'Assistance and Protection of Victims of Crime and Witnesses' in the parliament. Presenting the bill which had been pending a long time Human Rights Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe said the basic objective was to conform human rights laws to international norms, standards, and best practices.190 President Rajapakse, referred the Bill to the Supreme Court191 for urgent consideration and the Supreme Court, after review, sent the Bill back to the Speaker stating that the bill was consistent with the Constitution but suggested some minor amendments. However many civil society groups including the Center for Policy Alternatives has strongly recommended that there be substantial revision of the Draft Bill before enactment192. There is serious concern with regard flaws in the law making process which is that of secrecy and exclusivity with little or no public participation, transparency and inclusiveness in the drafting of laws and policy and that in this instance substantive changes recommended by various actors have not been incorporated. Whilst acknowledging certain improvements which have been made to the Bill, critics highlight major problems with the Bill which includes inter alia that even though the Bill deals comprehensively with victim rights and assistance but only cursorily with witness protection issues, excessive domination of institutions under the Bill by the executive, lack of clarity in the division of responsibility regarding protection and mainly lack of independence and impartiality of the Protection division and serious flaws with regard to the provisions on Videoconferencing.193

21 VI. ECONOMIC

6.1 Context Although the second quarter 2008 GDP growth rate has not been computed yet it is expected to be marginally lower than that of the same quarter last year. Accordingly, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expected to have grown by about 6% during the first half of this year. In the agriculture sector, tea production increased by almost 18% and rubber production by almost 7% during the first seven months of this year compared to the corresponding period last year. However, coconut production dropped by 15% during the same period and it was off-season for paddy harvest. Both the private and public sector industrial production indices increased marginally during the first half of this year compared to the same period last year. Interest rate (weighted average prime lending rate, treasury bill rate and repo and reverse repo rates) remained quite stable during the second quarter 2008. However, inflation continued to surge until June 2008 and then has begun to decelerate during July and August.

In the external sector of the economy, the trade deficit increased by over 92% during the first half of this year in comparison to the same period last year. Despite the huge increase in trade deficit, the gross official reserves increased by 12% at end of June 2008 compared to end of December 2007, partly due to 23% rise in net private remittances in the first six months of this year in comparison to the corresponding period last year. Tourist arrivals and earnings dropped marginally (-4%) during the first seven months of this year compared to the same period last year.

6.2 Signs of economic growth slowing down In terms of the Fiscal Management (Responsibility) Act of 2003, the Ministry of Finance released the Mid-Year Fiscal Position Report in July 2008 that revealed the government revenue and expenditure during the first four months of this year. There are several indicators of acute fiscal vulnerability in the economy. Firstly, the budget deficit increased by almost 26% during the first four months of 2008 (LKR 93,420 million) compared to the first four months of last year (LKR 74,264 million). Hence, it is clear that the rise in government expenditure thus far this year has been higher than the rise in government revenue, which is a matter of concern.

Secondly, a more negative indication is the changing composition of deficit financing during this year vis-à-vis last year. During the first four months of 2007, 49.42% of the budget deficit was financed through external borrowings (foreign loans accounting for 34.78% and foreign grants accounting for 14.65%) and 50.58% was financed through domestic borrowings. On the contrary, during the same period this year almost 80% of the budget deficit was financed through domestic borrowings and only 20% was financed through external borrowings (foreign loans accounting for 16.24% and foreign grants accounting for just 3.84%). In spite of strenuous efforts by the Government to mobilise external resources through the sale of foreign currency denominated treasury bonds, syndicated loans and sale of Sri Lanka Development Bonds to Sri Lankans working and living abroad, the amount of external resources (including official development assistance from bilateral and multilateral donors by way of grants and loans) received this year have been significantly lower than last year. This reality check is in contrast to the government propaganda of undiminished aid flows, especially from emerging economies and non-traditional sources such as China and Iran. Lendings by these new sources are on commercial terms and not on concessionary terms as in the case of traditional sources such as the ADB, Japan and the World Bank.

Changed composition of deficit financing this year has far reaching implications towards debt repayments, public debt management and cost of living. For example, interest rates on domestic borrowings (circa 18%) are about ten times higher than the interest rates on lending by bilateral and multilateral donors (less than 2%). Besides, interest rates on commercial borrowings in international capital markets (highest was 8.25% thus far) are also less than half the rates paid for domestic

22 borrowings. Therefore, interest payment on domestic debt is several folds higher than interest payment on external debt, which increases the debt repayment burden to the government. Further, domestic debts are short term whereas concessionary lendings by donors are long term with a grace period for repayment. Moreover, extensive government borrowings in the domestic financial markets crowd out financial resources available for private investments, which are much more productive than public spending. In other words, extensive government borrowings in the domestic financial markets retard economic growth because of lack of financial resources for private investments.

Thirdly, the relative shares of sources of domestic financing have also changed during the first four months of this year in comparison to the corresponding period last year. Whereas non-bank financing accounted for 87% of domestic financing last year it dropped to 60% this year. On the other hand, bank financing accounted for (-) 37% last year, which had increased to 20% this year. Foregoing figures indicate that the state banks (particularly the National Savings Bank) are being used as captive sources of financing the budget deficit by the government this year.

Heightened domestic borrowings by the government increase the cost of living as a result of demand-pull inflation and money printing. Declining external finances (particularly concessionary lendings by donors) amidst galloping trade deficit has serious implications for the external balance- of-payments. The external trade deficit increased by a whopping 90% during the first half (January- June) of this year compared to the same period last year primarily due to rising oil and food prices in the international markets.

In spite of the dual jeopardy of galloping trade deficit and dramatic drop in external financial resources, the gross official reserve of foreign currencies has increased by 12% during the first half of this year in comparison to end of last year. That is, gross official reserves increased from USD.3,063 million at the end of last year to USD.3,433 million at the end of June 2008 (provisional estimate). The rise in gross official reserves (provided the data is accurate and reliable) is partly due to 23% rise in net private remittances during the first half of this year compared to last year, i.e. from USD.1,075 million to USD.1,326 million. However, the rise in net private remittances was insufficient to compensate for loss in external finances, galloping trade deficit and drop in tourism earnings.

Hence, the question puzzles many keen watchers of the Sri Lankan economy is how has the gross official reserve increased amidst dramatic drop in external finances and galloping trade deficit? There are two plausible explanations though hard to find credible evidence to confirm. Few months ago there was a rumour in the media that the Central Bank has sold part of its gold reserves in order to bolster the external balance-of-payments. This rumour has been officially denial by the Central Bank. Secondly, it appears that the Central Bank is artificially bolstering the Lankan Rupee (LKR), because in spite of almost doubling of the trade deficit during the first six months of this year the rupee has been steady vis-à-vis major international currencies such as the United States Dollar (USD), Great British Pound (GBP) and the Euro (EUR). That is, LKR has not depreciated despite the galloping trade deficit. On the contrary, LKR has appreciated recently against major trading partners’ currencies, viz. USD, GBP and EUR. This is partly due to depreciation of these currencies in the international market. Due to recession in these economies their respective currencies have been allowed to depreciate in order to provide fillip to boost their economies.

Despite deceleration of economic growth in Sri Lanka during this year, the Central Bank seems to be propping up the rupee in order to minimise the external debt burden to the government. In the past couple of years, the present government has resorted to short-term (less than five years) borrowings from international capital markets at high interest rates (up to 8.25% per annum). Repayments of these short-term external debts have become a drain on the foreign exchange reserves. One of the ways in which this burden is mitigated is through Central Bank’s intervention in the foreign currency market to prevent depreciation of the rupee and thereby reduce the cost of external debt repayments

23 (both interest and capital). This tactic was revealed by the Central Bank Governor at the annual Economic Summit organized by the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce couple of months ago, which he trumpeted as a “balancing act” performed by the apex bank of the country.

The reality of this “balancing act” is somewhat different. By artificially propping up the rupee through interventions in the foreign exchange market the Central Bank is making Sri Lanka’s exports less competitive in international markets notwithstanding the fact that total export value in real terms (i.e. in terms of USD value) has increased by almost 10% during the first half of this year vis-à-vis the first half of last year. Logically, because of the stability of the rupee against USD and appreciation against GBP and EUR, import values should have decreased. On the contrary, total import value in real terms (i.e. in terms of USD value) has increased by almost 36% during the first six months of this year in comparison to the same period last year, which was primarily due to higher import cost of petroleum products. Staggering increase in the total import value at least partly offsets the benefit accruing from lower external debt repayment burden to the government. Furthermore, stable or higher value of the rupee should have contributed to decreased cost of living by reducing the cost of imports, which does not seems to take place.

Myopic fiscal policies of the present government appear to be caught up in a vicious cycle of debt trap and exchange rate manipulation. Crisis management appears to be the order of the day. There is no vision of a sustainable fiscal strategy that would promote sustained growth of the economy.

Deficit Financing January – April 2007 & 2008 Financing the Overall Deficit Jan - Apr 2007 Jan – Apr 2008 (Govt Revenue – Govt Expenditure) LKR Million LKR Million Foreign Grants 10,878 3,585 (14.65%) (3.84%) Foreign Loans 25,826 15,170 (34.78%) (16.24%) Domestic Financing 37,560 74,665 (50.58%) (79.92%) Non Bank 64,873 56,276 (87.35%) (60.24%) Bank (-) 27,313 18,389 (-36.78%) (19.68%) Total Deficit Financing (-) 74,264 (-) 93,420 (100%) (100%) Source: Ministry of Finance, Mid-Year Fiscal Position Report 2008, pp3, Colombo. http://www.treasury.gov.lk/docs/midyearfsr2008-eng.pdf accessed on 14 July 2008

24 VI. PUBLIC PERCETPIONS AND ATTITUDES

7.1 Context A majority within the Sinhalese community continues to support the Government in its bid to defeat the LTTE militarily and place less importance on a political solution. On the other hand majorities within all three minority communities believe that the war should be stopped and voiced a desire for a political solution to be used as a means to end the war. This polarization between communities is also seen with security issues but both the Sinhalese and Muslim commuinites believe that the security conditions in the country has improved while both the Tamil and Up-Country Tamil communities stated that conditions have deteriorated in comparison to last year and some had even stated that it had deteriorated greatly. It is also interesting that a majority in all ethnic communities believed that the cost of living had risen due to the ongoing war rather than the increase in oil prices worldwide, but it is within the Sinhalese community that there is an unwillingness to protest against the cost of living due to the Government fighting a war.

This section examines the trends in public opinion regarding issues related to the war and peace situation in Sri Lanka. The analyses herein are primarily based on the Peace Confidence Index (PCI), an island-wide household survey conducted amongst approximately 1600 individuals using a semi- structured questionnaire during the period from July 31st to August 7th. It is important to note that this particular wave of the PCI only covers the Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim and Up Country Tamils in the areas outside the Northern province. The Tamil sample, drawn from the cities of Ampara, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Colombo were surveyed using a non-random sampling technique. Therefore, all findings that reference the Tamils cannot be generalized to the entire community.

7.2 Continuing Support for War over Peace When asked to rate five national issues depending on the importance they place on each issue, all the communities prioritised the economy and a peace process in Sri Lanka. The Sinhala community gave the highest importance to the country’s economy (27.8%) Ref 1: Important Issues marginally over the conflict (27%). It is noteworthy that 0.1 10.8 19.1 only 19.9% of the Sinhala Mus lim 24.2 12.1 community stressed on the 33.7 Others (specify) importance of a future peace 0.2 Corruption 12.5 20.3 The conflict in the North and East process in Sri Lanka. In Up-Country Tamil 25.9 17.6 A peace process in Sri Lanka comparison both the Tamil 23.4 Law and Order and Up-Country Tamila gave 1.6 8.4 18.1 The Economy marginally more importance Tamil 26.5 20.0 to the peace process over the 25.5 0.7 economy. The Muslim 13.6 27.0 community gave importance Sinhala 19.9 11.0 to the economy (33.7%) and 27.8 a peace process in Sri Lanka 02040 (24.2%). (Ref 1) %

A majority of the Sinhala community (50.9%) thought that the Government defeating the LTTE was the way to end the war and arrive at peace in Sri Lanka. However, just under a quarter of the Sinhala community believed that political negotiations after the Government defeats the LTTE was the way to find peace. In contrast a majority of the Tamil community (78.7%), the Up-Country Tamil (76.4%) and the Muslim (77.5%) communities thought that the war should be stopped and political negotiations should be conducted. Interestingly, 13.1% of the Tamil community also thought conducting peace talks while having military operations could be a way to peace. (Ref 2) It is notable

25 Ref 2: How do you think we can end the war and arrive at peace in the . percentage amongst the Sri Lanka? Sinhala community of those who think that there should be Don't know /Not sure 4.4 1.2 political negotiations after 77.5 8.8 Mus lim 2 Other Government defeats the LTTE 0.8 5.2 18.8 Stop the w ar and conduct political has increased when compared to 0.5 76.4 negotiations Up-Country 3.1 the PCI findings of March 2008 Tamil 0.5 Conducting peace talks w hile having (March ’08: 14.6%, August ’08: 0.5 military operations 78.7 Political negotiations after Government 23.6%). Interestingly, amongst 13.1 Tamil 0.8 defeats LTTE 1.6 5.7 the Tamil (March ’08:6.4%, Political negotiations after LTTE defeats 6 Government August ’08: 13.1%) and the 1.2 9.3 8.2 Sinhala 23.8 LTTE defeating the Government Muslim (March ’08:4.6%, August 0.5 0.1 50.9 ’08: 8.8%) communities, those Government defeating the LTTE who think that peace talks should 0 20 40 60 80 100 be conducted while having % military operations has also witnessed an increase.

When asked about the necessity of a political solution to resolve the present ethnic conflict, a majority of the minority communities (Tamil: 72.4%, Up-Country Tamil: 40.9%, Muslim: 59.3%) thought that irrespective of how the war ends, a political solution is essential. However, the Sinhala community have a mixed opinion. While 31.4% thought a political solution is essential, 35.7% thought that it is useful.194

In terms of timing a political solution majorities within the minority communities believed that a political solution should be designed while the war continues (Tamil: 56.6%, Up-Country Tamil: 68.2%, Muslim: 48.4%). However, amongst the Sinhala community, 39.5% believed that a political solution should be designed after the war a 5 percentage point increase from March 2008.195 Nevertheless, another 23% of the Sinhala community thought that a political solution should be designed while the war continues. When compared to the PCI findings of March ’08, those who thought that a political solution should be designed while the war continued has increased amongst the Tamil community (March ’08:49.5 %, August ’08: 56.6%) while it has significantly increased amongst the Up-Country Tamil community (March ’08: 24.7%, August ’08: 68.2%).

Therewas a significant divergence in opinion between the Sinhalese and minority communities with regards to how close Sri Lanka is to approaching a permanent settlement to the ethnic conflict. While a majority of the Sinhala community (69.6%) thought that compared to a year ago, the country is close to approaching a permanent settlement to the ethnic conflict, a majority of the Tamil (64.8%) and the Up-Country Tamil (62.6%) communities thought that the country is not close at all. The Muslim community was split, 38.8% thought that the country was not close while 32% thought it was close. When compared to the PCI findings of March 2008, amongst the Sinhala community, those who thought that the country is close to a permanent settlement has slightly increased (March ’08: 60.7%, August ’08: 69.6%).196

Current security Condition: Compared to the situation a year ago, 44.2% of the Sinhala community thought the national security had somewhat improved while 17.9% thought it had greatly improved. The Tamil community tended to disagree: 34.1% of the Tamil community thought it had got worse while another 34.1% thought it had got much worse. While the Up-Country Tamil community seemed to agree more with the Tamil Community (38.5% thought that the national security had got worse compared to the situation a year ago while 35.4% thought it had got much worse) the Muslim community tended to agree with the Sinhala Community (32.8% thought the national security had somewhat improved while 17.8% thought it had greatly improved).

26

When asked about their personal security a higher percentage among the minority community believed it has worsened over the past one year. An overwhelming majority of the Tamil community thought their personal security had either got much worse (44.4%) or that it had got worse (42.1%). Amongst the Up-Country Tamil community, 42.3% thought their personal security had got worse 34.5% thought it had got much worse. Amongst the Muslim community, 27.4% thought their personal security had got much worse while 24.6% thought it had got worse. However, 23.4% thought it had somewhat improved. Compared to the situation a year ago, 28.5% of the Sinhala community thought that their level of personal security remains the same. However, another 27.8% thought their personal security had greatly improved while 24.4% thought it had got worse.

A majority of all the communities thought their personal security was being threatened now as a result of the terrorist attacks such as bomb blasts and shooting (Sinhala: 73.9%, Tamil: 68.2%, Up- Country Tamil: 54.2%, Muslim: 81.7%). Interestingly amongst the Sinhala community, 14.7% said their personal security was being threatened as a result of theft. However, amongst the minority community (Tamil:20%, Up-Country Tamil: 14.8%, Muslim: 15.3%) thought their personal security was being threatened as a result of abductions.

Cost of Living: When asked to Ref 5: Affect of Cost of Living on People's Lives describe the affect of the present cost of living on their lives, an 66.8 Present COL has affected badly on 27.7 overwhelming majority within all Muslim my financial situation and I live w ith 5 great difficulties communities stated they have 0.4 either been badly affected or are 83.6 Present COL has affected my 15.2 Up-Country financial situation and I live w ith some living with great difficulty. (Ref 1.2 difficulties 5). A greater majority in all ethnic 0 52.2 Present COL does not have any communities believed that the 41.9 affect on my financial situation and I Tamil war rather than the increase in oil 5.9 live as same as before 0 prices had resulted in increasing Present COL does not have any 45.8 affect on my financial situation and I 47.8 the cost of living. Majorities Sinhala live more comfortably than before 5.9 within the Sinhala (53.6%) and 0.5

Tamil (46.9%) communities 020406080100 thought that the increase in oil % prices in the world market had contributed to a great extent in increasing the cost of living. A majority of the Up-Country Tamil community (49.8%) and the Muslim community (50.6%) thought the increased oil prices in the world market had contributed to some extent in increasing the cost of living. Overwhelming majority of the Tamil (85.1%) and the Up-Country Tamil (61.8%) communities and a majority of the Sinhala (59.7%) and the Muslim (48.6%) communities thought that the on going war had contributed to the increase cost of living. However, another 31.6% of the Sinhala community and 40.1% of the Muslim communities believed that the on going war had contributed to the increase cost of living only to some extent.197

Coping mechanisms: A majority of the Sinhala (50.8%) and the Up-Country Tamil (54.9%) communities claimed that they had limited their extra activities such as parties and trips to a great extent in order to cope with the present high cost of living. Amongst the Tamil community, 46.8% said that they had limited their extra activities to a great extent while 45.7% that they had limited it to some extent. A majority of the Muslim community (70.1%) said they had limited their extra activities to some extent.

A majority of the Sinhala community (45.8%) and the Up-Country Tamil community (57.6%) said that they had cut down on their spending on non essentials items such as jewellery and furniture to a

27 great extent in order to cope with the present cost of living. However, 38.8% of the Sinhala and 37.4% of the Up-Country Tamil communities said that they had cut down on these non essential items to some extent. The Tamil community had a divided opinion. While 42.8% said they had cut down on non essential items to some extent, 42.7% said they had cut down on non essential items to a great extent. Amongst the Muslim community (67.3%), a majority said they had cut down on non essential items to some extent.

A majority of the Sinhala community said that they had neither limited their spending on education and health nor had they cut down their spending on food in order to cope with the present cost of living. Strikingly amongst the Up-Country Tamil community, 49.5% said they had limited their spending on education and health and had cut down their spending on food to a great extent and 41.9% also said they had done this to some extent. However, the Tamil community had a mixed opinion in this regard. While 36% said they had cut down in these areas to some extent, 31.3% said they had done neither and 25.8% said they had cut down in these areas to a great extent. A majority of the Muslim community (70.9%) said they had limited their spending on education and health and had cut down their spending on food to some extent.

A majority of the Sinhala community (43.5%) claimed that they had started taking loans or begun selling or pawning some of their belongings, while 35.5% said they had not done this at all. The Tamil community had a mixed opinion in this regard: while 33% said they had done neither, 30.5% said they had done this to a great extent and 30% said they had done this to some extent. A majority of the Up-Country Tamil community (54.9%) said they had started selling or pawning some of their belongings or had started taking loans from others to a great extent while a majority of the Muslim community (54.7%) said they had done this to some extent.

A majority of the minority communities (Tamil: 72.2%, Up-Country Tamil: 60%, Muslim: 64.4%, Sinhala 52.9%) completely disagreed with the statement that the ministers and the government MPs are doing their best to reduce the cost of living in the country.

Protesting about the Cost of living: A majority of the Sinhala community agreed (61.6%) with the statement that people should not complain about the rising cost of living as the government is in a war with the LTTE. Amongst the Tamil (84.3%), Up-Country Tamil (65.4%) and Muslim (53.3%) communities, a majority disagreed with the statement. 43.5% of the Sinhala community agreed with the statement that people should not complain about the rising cost of living as the oil prices in the world market are increasing.198

It is striking that a majority within the Sinhalese community are not supportive of protesting against the cost of living. A majority of the Sinhala community agreed (51.3%) with the statement that the Trade Unions should not demand increase of salaries as the government is in a war with the LTTE. About half of the Sinhala community (57.8%) expressed their disagreement with the statement that as individuals they would vote against the government in the next election due to the present cost of living. When people were asked whether they would join with anyone to protest against the present Government as it was unable to control the present cost of living, 65.4% of the Sinhalese said ‘No’ by disagreeing with the statement. By contrast, the minority communities

Eastern province elections: The general response to the results of the Eastern Provincial Council elections significantly varied between the ethnic communities: the Sinhalese tended to be positive while the Tamils tended to be divided in their opinion. A majority of the Sinhala community (44%) agreed with the statement that the eastern provincial council election was free & fair. Nevertheless, 19.1% of the Sinhala community expressed their disagreement. Amongst the Tamil community, 31.6% agreed while 33.3% disagreed with the statement. A majority of the Up-Country Tamil community (73.9%) did not know or were not sure whether to agree or disagree with the statement.

28 A majority of the Muslim community (43.3%) disagreed that the eastern provincial council election was free & fair.

A majority of the Sinhala community (47%) agreed that the new political leadership in the eastern province would be able to develop the region. Amongst the Tamil community, 31.7% agreed while 25.5% of them disagreed. A majority of the Up-Country Tamil community (78%) did not know or were not sure whether to agree or disagree. Amongst the Muslim community, 20.4% agreed while 21.9% disagreed. A majority of the Sinhala community (51.8%) agreed that the people in the east are now much safer than before the provincial council elections. Amongst the Tamil community, 33.6% agreed while 21.9% disagreed. Amongst the Up-Country Tamil community, 13.7% agreed with the statement while the majority (77.1%) did not know or were not sure. Amongst the Muslim community, 22.2% agreed while 17.8% disagreed.

There is a similarity in the response of ethnic communities to questions on the provincial council system and the TMVP in that a majority either do not have an opinion or do not know. On whether the provincial council system was the best solution for the country’s ethnic conflict 51.8% of Sinhalese, 53.2% of Tamils, 74.1% of Up-Country Tamils and 64.2% of Muslims either did not know or were not sure. However, 27.2% of the Sinhala community, 26.1% of the Tamil community, 16.3% of the Up-Country Tamil community, and 20.2% of the Muslim community did agree. A majority of all the communities (Sinhala: 52.7%, Tamil: 56%, Up-Country Tamil: 80.4%, Muslim: 65.4%) did not know or were not sure whether the new leadership in the eastern provincial council would be able to get full provincial council powers to the province.199 A majority of all the communities (Sinhala: 61.6%, Tamil: 60%, Up-Country Tamil: 77.2%, Muslim: 66.8%) do not know or were not sure whether the present political situation was helpful to persuade the people in the north for a solution under the provincial council system.200 Analyst and officials have pointed out the weaknesses within the provincial councils. A majority of all the communities do not know or were not sure what was the reason for these weaknesses. However, a considerable section of the Tamil (25.1%) and the Up- Country Tamil (27.3%) thought that these weaknesses were due to the central governments unwillingness to devolve power. A majority of all the communities (Sinhala: 53.6%, Tamil: 56.4%, Up-Country Tamil: 80.3%, Muslim: 67.8%) did not know or were not sure whether the TMVP was genuinely committed to democratic politics. However, amongst the Sinhala community 20.7% agreed while 25.8% disagreed. Amongst the Muslim community, 22.1% disagreed with the statement.

APRC: Lack of public awareness of the APRC is widespread. Irrespective of their ethnic group a majority said that they were not aware about the APRC process (Sinhala:52.7%, Tamil: 54.7%, Up- Country Tamil: 74.3%, Muslim: 61.7%). Almost one quarter of Sinhalease, one fifth or less of the Tamil, Up-Country Tamil and Muslim community stated that they did not know enough to form an opinion on the APRC. Amongst those who expressed an opinion more Sinhalese and Muslims believed it had failed either to build a consensus in the south or to deliver a political package. The Tamil tended to state that it was a useful tool for consensus building though it would not be able to deliver a political package. The interim report of the APRC calls for, amongst the other things, the full implementation of the 13th Amendment. While a majority in all communities claimed they did not know or were not sure, 22% of the Sinhala community, 19.8% of the Up-Country Tamil community, and 28.7% of the Muslim community approved of the full implementation.

Projection: It seems that likely that support for the war and a general unwillingness to criticise the Government among the Sinhala Community will continue into the next quarter. The polarization on key issues including security is also likely to continue.

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VIII. Media

8.1 Context As the steady deterioration of media rights in Sri Lanka continues, there seems to be little respite for journalists. A culture of impunity against the media seems to continue unabated and is actively encouraged by the State, who view the media with increasing hostility. Violent attacks, verbal abuse and restrictive measures have become increasingly common for those in media organizations. Amongst countries that are considered to be the most dangerous for journalists to work, Sri Lanka has been placed third by International watchdogs.201

8.2 Continuing threats to the media Defense Correspondents Attacked: The months of May, June and July witnessed a high level of insecurity against media workers. Journalist P. Devakumar, working as the Jaffna district correspondent of MTV Television Network, was hacked to death by an unidentified gang on 28th May. With Devakumar's death, the number of journalists killed in Jaffna since 2006 mounted to 9.202 An emerging trend along with the escalation of the conflict has been the intimidation of defense correspondents, which has led to individual correspondents discontinuing their columns. Over the last few months the targeting has proved violent. The deputy editor and defense analyst of the English Weekly, ‘The Nation’, Keith Noyar was abducted near his home at Dehiwala on the night of May 22nd. After having been mercilessly beaten, he was returned home after a few hours. According to the information revealed, he was hand cuffed and blind-folded by the abductors and had been asked to reveal his military sources. On June 30th,the officer in charge of the advocacy section of the Sri Lanka Press Institute (SLPI), Namal Perera, was brutally assaulted during rush hour on a busy highway. He was traveling with his friend, Mahendra Rathnaweera, the political analyst of British High Commission. The attackers had tried to abduct Namal Perera, but failed. Another defense correspondent, Sirimevan Kasturiarachchi, a senior defense reporter attached to Divaina, was subjected to threats and attacks. An unknown group stormed into his house on May 29th and sternly warned him to desist from reporting matters related to defense and the Sri Lanka army.203

The Defense Ministry website has been used continuously by the government and army officers to voice hostile statements and threats against journalists. During the past three months, journalists and media organizations have been severely criticized on at least three separate occasions as being traitors in articles published in this website. Defense analyst of the ‘Sunday Times’, Iqbal Athas, was targeted in an article which appeared in/on the website on May 3rd, which accused him of concocting facts regarding the recent debacle faced by the Sri Lankan Army in Muhamaali, thereby setting him up as a stooge of the LTTE.204 On May 31st, the editorial of the website warned the Government of certain media organisations : To any discernible person who sees Sirasa, or reads The Sunday Leader, The Morning Leader, Iru Dina, Daily Mirror, Sunday Times, Lanka Dissent, Lanka Enews etc can understand the way that the soldiers are being humiliated, scorned and blamed…However we urge the government to be mindful excessive falsification of facts committed by some of the agencies as such action may be detrimental to the national interest in the international forums…Secondly we have responsible concerns over the behavior of the FMM itself. We have never seen Mr. Sunanda Deshapriya, convener of the FMM wailing in Sirasa over the media freedom in the LTTE held areas. 205

Additionally, the Defence Ministry (also) took other measures to keep the media in line. On the 18th June, the editorial posted on the site mentioned that the Ministry of Defense has set forth its views and suggested guidelines with regard to the reporting of military matters. According to these censorship guidelines, the media should not: 1. Be critical and analyze military strategies 2. Scrutinize promotions and transfers within the military

30 3. Question military procurements and tenders 4. Espouse/discuss anti war positions.206 There have been a number of incidents where the high ranking defense and government officials have interfered to intimidate media personnel and organizations. On the 26th May, the Defense Secretary (had) summoned and reprimanded the President and the General Secretary of the Sri Lanka Working Journalists Association, warning the members of the association that the government is not responsible for their safety if they continue to criticize the armed forces. On the 16th May, a high ranking military officer has visited the office of Tamil Daily "Yal Thinakura". published in Jaffna, and threatened the editorial team to get them to change the caption of a certain news item. 207

The Sri Lanka Press institute has been a target of such attacks and intimidation in several instances throughout the last three months. On the 26th June, a lead story of a Sinhala language newspaper, published by the government owned Lake House, accused the SLPI of sending a group connected to the LTTE to Norway under the label of being journalists. The SLPI claimed that this story was completely incorrect and had been fabricated to discredit and incite violence against their institution.208 On the 16th July, an anonymous caller threatened SLPI staff saying that all of them will be killed.209 Mr. Ranga Kalansooriya, Director General of SLPI has been repeatedly threatened, and he has made several complaints to the police saying that he is constantly being followed by unknown gangs whenever he is traveling.

It is important to note that several times within the past three months, the government imposed bans on the use of telephone lines. The CDMA phones used in Mannar district were cut off by the military on the 27th June. Journalists, along with the rest of the civilian population in the area, have faced a difficult situation due to this disruption of phone lines, as they were unable to send their reports and photos to Colombo newspaper offices on time. As a second move, the government banned the use of mobile phones with a Global Positioning System facility. In the middle of July 2008, Sri Lanka Telecommunication in Jaffna suspended all CDMA wireless phone services to nearly 7000 customers following instructions from the by Sri Lanka Army, who justified this action on grounds of security.

Eastern province Election and the media: The Government was criticized for misusing the government owned printing and electronic media institutions for political propaganda for the Provincial Council Elections in the Eastern Province, which were held on the 10th May 2008. It was alleged that, in addition to misusing the national TV, radio and newspapers, the government had established a temporary TV station and two radio stations in the Eastern province.210

In another incident related to the election, two journalists of AP, who were on their way to the Eastern Province to report the election, had been turned back by the military authorities, saying that foreign press agents need special permission to cover the election in the East. After the journalists’ organizations and rights groups launched a protest against this arbitrary decision, the Ministry of Defense reversed its position. On the 9th May, one day before the election, editor of the weekend newspaper ‘Vaara Ureikal’, M.I. Rahmahetulla, was reported to have been assaulted and his digital camera robbed by an unknown gang. This incident is also believed to be related to the election.211

Ministerial Subcommittee on Journalist's Grievances: A Ministerial SubCommittee set up to look into the grievances of journalists was set up by president Mahinda Rajapakse, as a response to the endless campaigns launched by the media personnel against the media suppression prevalent in the country. This committee consisting of a number of ministers and deputy ministers commenced its duties at the BMICH on the 24th June.212 Journalists are supposed to submit their grievances, complaints, and inquiries related to attacks and killings made on media professionals to this 7 ministerial committee.213 It is noteworthy that journalist, Namal Perera, was beaten in broad day light

31 on a highway in Colombo by an unidentified gang, just 5 days after the inaugural ceremony of this ministerial subcommittee was held.

World Press Freedom Day: Amidst endless suppression against media, Sri Lankan Media organizations and journalists commemorated the World Press Freedom Day on the 6th May by holding a mass vigil. 20,000 leaflets were distributed, banners were displayed around the capital and a vigil in the memory of journalists who had lost their lives was held.

Case Study: Media Coverage on the Torture of Boossa Tamil Detainees

The issue of torture is not frequently reported on in the media, hence it is assumed that the lack of coverage must reflect a low frequency of torture. In the middle of May 2008, a few newspapers reported that a number of Tamils suspected to be working with the LTTE were tortured at the detention center in Boossa, Galle. It was alleged that on May 10, 2008, 68 Tamil Detainees had been transferred suddenly from the Colombo Magazine Prison to the Boossa Detention Camp. It has been reported that the prisoners had been both verbally and physically abused. The main Sinhalese, English and Tamil newspapers were monitored, from May 10th to the 20th of 2008, to examine how the issue was reported on. Online news websites, including TamilNet, were monitored as well.

Highly polarized Media Coverage: The story was first reported by TamilNet on May 12th which reported that 68 Tamil detainees who had been held in the Colombo Magazine Prison, had been suddenly transferred to Boosa 1 and on their arrival there, had been stripped and subjected to many forms of torture. The article stated that the prisoners had been subject to brutal sexual harassment by the TID interrogators. Further, the news item said that TNA parliamentarian, Chandrakanth Chandraneru, informed the media in Colombo about this incident and that the Commissioner General of Prisons, Major General (ret) Vajira Wijegunawardhana had denied the allegations. ‘Lanka Dissent’, a news website, reported the incident on May 13th in a very similar way to TamilNet.

All the main Tamil papers gave prominence to the story. Sudar Oli, Thinakkural and Virakesari published this news on May 13th on the front page. No news item appeared in the State owned Thinakaran with regard to this incident.

Thinakkural added a statement made by Mano Ganeshan to their story. Mano Ganeshan had told the newspaper that this incident of transferring Tamil prisoners forcibly to Boossa, had been made known to the international human rights organizations. There was a separate news article on page 6, under the headline, "TNA condemns the transferring of Tamil prisoners to Boossa". The article was based on information given to the newspaper by TNA MP, Sri Kantha. According to Sri Kantha, the Deputy Minister of Justice, V.Puttirasigamani personally talked to the Prison's chief regarding this matter. He had been told that these prisoners were transferred after a secret plan made by them to detonate a bomb in front of the Magazine Prison on the 19th , was revealed. The article further stated that the TNA strongly condemned this .

Virakesari also published the news that the Prison's Chief had told DP, Puttirasigamani, that the prisoners were transferred after the authorities received information about a plan to explode a bomb near the Magazine Prison on the 10th of May. Virakesari news said that most of the transferred prisoners had been tortured severely by the TID officers upon their arrival at Boossa.

On the whole, all three Tamil newspapers ran a similar story. The fact that the prisoners were subjected to severe torture was stressed in these stories. ‘Sudar Oli’ reported that all the 68 prisoners were forced to be naked and were tortured inhumanly.”1 It has been further reported that there were both old and sick people among the tortured prisoners.1 From these three newspapers, one can see that ‘Sudar Oli’ did not give any reason for the transfer of these prisoners to Boossa and the Prison Chief was not quoted either.

It is very significant that no Sinhala newspaper reported this incident of torture against the transferred prisoners. On May14th, Lakbima ran a very small news item on page 7 with the headline, "6 mobile phones have been found in the bags of the Tiger prisoners who were transferred to Boossa from Colombo", 1 quoting the Commissioner of Prisons, Vajira Wijegunawardhana. Mr. Wijegunawardhana said that 6 mobile phones have been found in the bags of these prisoners. The news referred to these detainees as "LTTE, terrorists prisoners" and further said that on the32 10th of

May 60 LTTE terrorist prisoners were suddenly transferred to Boossa upon the revelation of a secret plan to escape from the prison. Twenty of them have been brought back to the Colombo Magazine prison on the 13th of May. This particular item did not mention anything concerning the alleged torture against the prisoners.

On May 13th, the ‘Daily Mirror’ ran a small article on this incident on page 3; the headline was "Prisoners were not assaulted: Prison chief"1. In fact, this news item gave more information than the Lakbima article. The main focus was the statement made by the Prisons Chief, refuting the allegations that the prisoners were assaulted. The Prison Chief is quoted as saying, We came to know about a plot to explode a bomb in a bus in front of the Prison and there were links with prison inmates and an outside group. According to the Daily Mirror, 68 prisoners had been temporarily transferred to Boossa and 40 prisoners to Mahara, reportedly as a precautionary measure. The newspaper quoted TNA parliamentarian, N Srikantha, who claimed that a group of Tamil political prisoners had been transferred to Boossa, and six of them were assaulted severely. It is noteworthy that the ‘Daily Mirror’ used the word "Tamil political prisoners" to refer to the detainees concerned.

Follow-Up: The story re-surfaced following a case relating to three of the detainees who were brought before the Colombo High Court on May 14th . On May 15th, the story was covered by two Tamil newspapers, ‘Virakesari’ and

‘Sudar Oli’. The story in ‘Virakesari’ reported that three of the four Tamil suspects were involved in the attempted murder case against the former Sri Lankan President, Chandrika Bandaranaike, and had been severely tortured in the Boosa Detention Camp, Galle. The three individuals were Sellathurai Varatharajan, Sakthivel Illankeswaran and Chandra Ayer Ragupathy Sarma.1 The headline read, “Suspects involved in the attempted murder case against the former president Chandrika, have been stripped and tortured: Lawyers inform the court”1. ‘Virakesari’ also ran a separate news item on the 15th under the heading, “Out of the prisoners transferred to Boosa 17 were returned to the Colombo Magazine Prison to be brought before the court”1. This appeared on the same page on which the news about the three murder case suspects appeared. On the day of the trial (14th of May) Virakesari ran an editorial based on this incident. It stressed the fact that Tamil prisoners in the south have been subject to inhuman torture for more than three decades. It gave examples, recalling the prisoners who were tortured and killed in the Welikada prison. The stories of Kuttumani and Thangathurai were depicted. Some more examples were cited, recalling the harassments against Tamil prisoners who were in the Kalutara prison before the 2002 LTTE-UNP truce.

On the same day, ‘Sudar Oli’, another Tamil newspaper, ran a news item on the front page, regarding the aforesaid 1 incident, under the headline, “Tamil suspects have been tortured in Boosa- Court has been informed yesterday”. This article, published on the 15th of May, also mentioned the 68 prisoners who had been transferred and severely tortured by the police officers.

The following day (May 16th), ‘Thinnakural’ published a three column news item on page 3, about this particular incident . On May 16th, TamilNet (www.tamilnet.com) ran an item titled, “Torture of Boosa Tamil Detainees alleged," as their main news for the day. The TamilNet article included the fact that the counsel for the suspects had not only requested a transfer for their clients, but also asked for an inquiry into the conduct of the TID, as well as the police officials in Boossa.

It is striking that none of the Sinhalese and English newspapers reported this incident, even after it was covered by the Tamil papers. No other online media network, other than TamilNet, published anything on this issue.

Torture and Sexual harassment: All the Tamil newspapers said that the transferred prisoners had been stripped and tortured, yet none of them mentioned sexual abuse. Contrastingly, the TamilNet news item on 12th May, stressed that the 68 prisoners had been subjected to inhuman sexual abuse. At the end of this report, they have added a chapter based on research done by the London based Medical Foundation of Victims of Torture, on the sexual abuse of Tamil Detainees in the Sri Lankan prisons. There has been a definite lack of clarity among the media networks that reported this important issue. They have failed to define whether all the prisoners who were detained at Boossa were victims of torture or whether only some were.

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ENDNOTES

PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS 1 Daily News, “Ready for talks with LTTE – President”, July 14 2008 2 Daily News, “Ready for talks with LTTE – President”, July 14 2008 3 Daily Mirror, “Prospects of peace talks go to pieces”, July 08 2008 4 Daily Mirror, “Prospects of peace talks go to pieces”, July 08 2008 5 Daily Mirror, “LTTE ready for ceasefire and talks – Nadesan”, July 11 2008 6 Interview with Associated Press quoted in Daily Mirror, “LTTE declares unilateral ceasefire”, July 22 2008 7 Daily Mirror, by B.Raman, “LTTE’s Ceasefire move: Public relations or more?” July 26 2008 8 The LTTE stated that "At the same time, if the occupying Sinhala forces, disrespecting our goodwill gesture of our people and our nation, carry out any offensive, our movement will be forced to take defensive actions." (Daily Mirror, by B.Raman, “LTTE’s Ceasefire move: Public relations or more?” July 26 2008, LTTE Peace Secretariat, “LTTE declares unilateral ceasefire for SAARC”, July 22 2008) 9 According to analyst B.Raman, The LTTE has sought to project its announcement in the context of the forthcoming SAARC summit in order to allay any fears in the minds of the leaders of the member-countries regarding possible security threats before and during the summit. (Daily Mirror, by B.Raman, “LTTE’s Ceasefire move: Public relations or more?” July 26 2008) 10 Daily Mirror, by B.Raman, “LTTE’s Ceasefire move: Public relations or more?” July 26 2008 11 The Leader of the House Minister said “the government would not accept any ceasefires that would provide ‘oxygen’ to the LTTE and they will not do anything to demoralize our valiant forces.” The head of the government peace secretariat (SCOPP) Prof responding to this development reiterated “the need for the LTTE to make a pledge to ‘abandon terrorism’ if the government is to deviate from its current stance.” (Daily Mirror, “Govt. snubs LTTE ceasefire declaration,” July 23 2008) 12 US Department of State briefing and press conference, “U.S. and Japan: A Joint Approach to South and Central Asia” August 08 2008 13 This chapter is based solely on information available in the public realm including newspapers, news websites and the Official websites of the Sri Lankan Military, the Government Peace Secretariat and the LTTE Peace Secretariat 14 Daily Mirror, by Sunil Jayasiri, “Troops bent on capturing the last strategic areas under LTTE control” July 11 2008 15 The Sunday Times, by Iqbal Athas, “The significance of the Vidattaltivu victory”, July 20 2008 16 Daily Mirror, “Army liberates Illupaikkadavai” July 21 2008 17 Daily Mirror online, “Military clears Mannar – State Media” June 30 2008, 18 Daily Mirror online, “Military spokesmen says more to be cleared in Mannar” June 30 2008 19 Daily Mirror, by Sunil Jayasiri, “Troops bent on capturing the last strategic areas under LTTE control” July 11 2008 20 The Sunday Times, by Iqbal Athas, “The significance of the Vidattaltivu victory”, July 20 2008 21Official website of the Ministry of Defence, Air intelligence confirms 22 LTTE suicide bombers killed in air raid – Mullaittiuvu, July 23 2008 22 They were identified as ‘Lieutenant Colonel’ Pallavan, ‘Major’ Ambumani, Selvakannan, Sellappu, Muhi, Illambu, Sudar and Jenathan, who were at the commanding level of the 'Charles Anthony' brigade in Mannar sector. (Official website of the Ministry of Defence, Air intelligence confirms 22 LTTE suicide bombers killed in air raid – Mullaittiuvu, July 23 2008) 23 TamilNet, 3 SLA attempts thwarted in Vavuniyaa, Tigers attack DPU team - LTTE 24The LTTE during May launched counter offensives in Muhamalai, Vavuniya, and Nagarkovil. On June it launched offensives in Mannar. These counter attacks were continued in Mannar, Jaffna FDL, Vavuniya and Kebiththigollewa. (Source:TamilNet, Media Center for National Security) 25 The Daily Mirror, by Sunil Jayasiri, “The lethal recovery” June 13 2008 26 According to Navy spokesman D.K.P Dassanayake 27 The Daily Mirror, by Sunil Jayasiri, “The lethal recovery” June 13 2008 28 TamilNet, “Sri Lanka Army chief says victory date now mid-2009” July 02 2008

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29 Daily Mirror, by Sunil Jayasiri, “Troops bent on capturing the last strategic areas under LTTE control” July 11 2008, The Sunday Times, by Iqbal Athas, “The significance of the Vidattaltivu victory”, July 20 2008 30 The Sunday Times, by Iqbal Athas, “The significance of the Vidattaltivu victory”, July 20 2008 31 LankaWin, “LTTE Heroes s Department Lists 21,261 as Fallen Heroes” July 20 2008 32 The Sunday Observer, Interview with Maj. Gen Sarath Fonseka, “Victory day not far off” July 20 2008 33 The Sunday Observer, Interview with Maj. Gen Sarath Fonseka, “Victory day not far off” July 20 2008 34 He was also reputed to be the first commander of the Charles Antony Brigade.(TamilNet, Brigadier Balraj passes away – LTTE, May 20 2008) 35 Daily Mirror, “LTTE’s Lt. Col. Selvy killed in action” June 02 2008, The Official Website of the Sri Lanka Army, “Tiger Mannar IED Expert Killed in Air Force Attack” May 26 2008, The Nation, Military Matters by Senapathi, “LTTE strikes city nerve centre” May 18 2008, 36 UTHR(J), Information Bulletin no:46, “Trauma in the Vanni: Human Grist to the Mills of Dual Hypocrisy”July 08 2008 37 The Sunday Island, by Franklin R. Sathyapalan, LTTE is falling apart like a pack of cards, says Secretary Defence, July 26 2008 38 TamilNet, “138 military personnel killed, 549 injured in May – Wikremanayaka” June 05 2008, TamilNet, “112 troops killed, 793 wounded in June - Sri Lankan PM” July 08 2008 39 Daily Mirror, “More than 15,000 army deserters at large?” June 03 2008 40 Daily Mirror, “More than 15,000 army deserters at large?” June 03 2008 41 The Nation, Military Matters by Senapathi, “LTTE strikes city nerve centre” May 18 2008 42 Lanka Dissent, “'Ellalan Force' claims bomb responsibility – Reuters” June 11 2008 43 Daily Mirror, by Sunil Jayasiri, “Troops bent on capturing the last strategic areas under LTTE control” July 11 2008 44 TamilNet, “Mortar attack on polling booths in Pannalagama in Ampaa’rai” May 10 2008 45 The Sunday Observer, Interview with Maj. Gen Sarath Fonseka, “Victory day not far off” July 20 2008 46 UTHR(J), Information Bulletin no:46, “Trauma in the Vanni: Human Grist to the Mills of Dual Hypocrisy”July 08 2008 47 TamilNet, “Bomb blast inside train, 9 killed, 70 wounded” May 26 2008 48 TamilNet, “31.05.08 2 killed, 8 injured in Wellawatte blast” May 31 2008 49 TamilNet, “Bomb explodes along railway track in Dehiwala” June 04 2008 50 Daily Mirror, “Double disaster” June 07 2008 51 Daily Mirror, “Double disaster” June 07 2008 52 TamilNet, “SLAF airstrike kills 4 Tamil civilians, 10 wounded” June 15 2008 53 On June 2, a claymore exploded in Puttur, LTTE-controlled Wanni targeting civilians travelling in a van reportedly travelling to Naakathampiraan Temple,leading to the death of 6 civilians, including 2 women and 2 children and theinjury of 6 other civilians. (TamilNet, “16 civilians killed in DPU attack in Vanni, 5 children, 7 females among victims” May 23 2008; TamilNet, “6 civilians killed in SLA claymore attack – LTTE” June 02 2008) 54 TamilNet, “Development official killed in DPU Claymore attack”, July 25 2008, TamilNet, “Fisheries director killed, DPU attack targets ambulance” May 23 2008 55 Reuters, INTERVIEW-“Sri Lanka says military win may not wipe out rebels”, July 31 2008 56 Montage Magazine, by Savan Wijewardane,“Why attack innocent civilians?”, July 2008 57 Transcurrents, by D.B.S Jeyaraj, “The murder of “Small Parrot” Maheswari at “Mongoose-Geko” Lane” May 17 2008 58 It was reported that there were 78 reported cases of disappearances between January-May 2008. (Daily Mirror, “Disappearances “high” in East says Trincomalee HRC” May 22 2008), 59 Daily Mirror ,“147 Missing since June 1- Sampanthan”, July 23 2008 60 United Nations, Press Statement, 11th June 2008 61Daily Mirror ,“UN urged to act against child recruitment in SL”, July 19 2008 62Tamil Net, “61 Tamils still held in Colombo, 254 remain in Boosa”, May 11 2008 63Daily Mirror, “68 Tamil prisoners transferred to Boose and assaulted-TNA”, May 12 2008 64TamilNet , “61 Tamils still held in Colombo, 254 remain in Boosa”, May 11 2008 65TamilNet “Tamil farmer seeks protection with Jaffna HRC”, May 14 2008 66“Daily Mirror “HR hotline”,May 07 2008; Daily Mirror, “59 HR violations in three days reported: Navaratne”, May 10 2008

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67Daily Mirror, “CoI reassures justice in HR cases”, July 29 2008 68 Ibid. 69 “Assistatnce to Victims Bill will fulfill HR obgligations- Govt”, Daily Mirror, 19th June 2008 70 CMEV, “Media Communiqué on Election-related Violence Eastern Provincial Council Election – 2008” May 10 2008 71 Daily News, “Unity key to EPC’s success – President” May 17 2008 72 Daily Mirror, “23,000 IDPs await assistance”, May 09 2008 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Daily Mirror, “More Wanni displaced living under Trees” July 26 2008 77Human Rights Watch, Press Release, by Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch, “UK: Abusive Ex-Commander Allowed to Return to Sri Lanka”, July 02 2008 78 Ibid. 79Daily Mirror, “270 refugees cross into TN in 3 days following clashes”, May 19 2008 80 UNHCR statistics state 5426 IDPs in Trincomalee district and 16,965 in Batticaloa district. (UNHCR, IDPs by Place of Displacement and Place of Origin as at 31 July 2008 ) 81 CPA, by Mirak Raheem and Bhavani Fonseka, “A brief profile of the Trincomalee High Security Zone and other land issues in Trincomalee District”, May 2008 82 CPA, by Mirak Raheem and Bhavani Fonseka, “A brief profile of the Trincomalee High Security Zone and other land issues in Trincomalee District” ,May 2008 83 CPA field visit to Trincomalee, May 2008 84 CPA field visit to Trincomalee, May 2008 85 Daily Mirror, “Sri Lanka loses UNHRC seat”, May 21 2008 86 Daily Mirror, “Rights Group say Lanka not qualified for HRC seat”, May 07 2008 87Daily Mirror, “NGOs and INGOs deprived UNHRC seat for SL- Govt”, May 22 2008 88 Daily Mirror, “Security forces briefed on importance of HR”, July 23 2008

POLITICAL 89 Daily News, Rasika Somarathna, “UPFA victorious in East”, 12 May 2008, page 1 90 Daily News, Rasika Somarathna, “UPFA victorious in East”, 12 May 2008, page 1 91 Daily News, Rasika Somarathna, “UPFA victorious in East”, 12 May 2008, page 1 92 Batticaloa, Kalkudah, Padirippu, Ampara, Sammanthurai, Pottuvil and Seruwila, 93 Muttur, Trincomalee and Kalmunai 94 982,741 were the total number of voters. However, in comparison to other elections the number of rejected votes was quite high with 54,780 (8.47%) getting annulled. Analysts cited the resident’s unfamiliarity with the complex PR system for this trend. (Daily News, Rasika Somarathna, “UPFA victorious in East”, 12 May 2008, page 1) 95 Daily Mirror, Kelum Bandara, “UNP rejects results: plans to file petition”, 12 May 2008, page 1 96 Daily Mirror, Kelum Bandara, “UNP rejects results: plans to file petition”, 12 May 2008, page 1 97 Daily Mirror, Sandun A Jayasekera, “Robbery and fraud: JVP”, 12 May 2008, page 1 98 According to PAFFREL observers, polling agents of the opposition parties had not been allowed to enter 21 polling stations. At another 5 stations polling agents present had been chased away. PAFFREL interim report for the Eastern Provincial Council Election, Sunday 11 May 2008 99 “Areas of serious concern in respect of violence and malpractices are Valaichchenai and Kattankudi in Batticaloa district, the Pottuvil polling division in the and Thiriyaya in the Trincomalee District” CMEV Media Communiqué on Election-related Violence Eastern Provincial Council Election – 10 May 2008 100 The AAEA comprised of 17 members from 10 Asian countries. (Daily News, Rasika Somarathna, “Poll free and fair, say Foreign Monitors”, 13 may 2008, page 1) 101 Daily News, “ A mandate for ending terror, restoring peace-President”, 12 May 2008, page 1 102 The Island, Shamindra Ferdinando,” Govt. bags crucial EP, vows to finish off Vanni Tigers”, 12 May 2008, page 1 103 Daily Mirror, by Kesara Abeywardana, “Rumblings in UNP” June 18 2008

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104 Daily Mirror, Kelum Bandara, “Pillayan sworn-in as CM:Hizbullah threatens rebellion”, 17 May 2008, page 1 105 The UPFA eastern provincial councilor MLAM Hizbullah together with councilors Mohamed Subair and Jawahir expressed dissent over the appointment of Pillayan as Chief Minister and threatened to function independently in the council, setting off a crisis where both, the ruling UPFA and the opposition will have 17 members each. (The Sunday Times, “Threat of revolt by Muslim Ministers”, 18 May 2008, page 1) 106 Hizbullah was reportedly assured “that he (the President) would not allow any injustice to the Muslims in the East.” (Daily Mirror, Ajantha Kumara Agalakada, Kelum Bandara and Sandun A Jayasekera, “Hizbullah see-saws”, 19 May 2008, page 1) 107 The Nation, by D.B.S Jeyaraj , “The Killing of T.M.V.P Leader Shanthan in Kaathaankudi” June 01 2008 108 Daily Mirror, “CMs’ forum wants police powers for provincial councils” May 19 2008 109 Daily Mirror, “High noon horror” May 17 2008 110 www.asiantribune.com, “ Victor Perera the new Governor of the Northern Province”, 3.7.2008 111 The Sunday Times, “Interim Council for North”, 4 May 2008, page 1 112 Daily Mirror, “Developing the north” May 05 2008 113 Provincial Councils Minister Janaka Bandara Tennekoon said that the Councils were dissolved on the advice of the NCP Chief Minister Berty Premalal Dissanayake and Sabaragamuwa Chief Minister Dixon Dela Bandara. (Daily News, Uditha Kumarasinghe and Irangika Range, “North Central, Sabaragamuwa PC’s dissolved”, 10 June 2008, page 1) 114 The Bottom Line, Jayashika Padmasiri and Kushali Atukorale, “UNP JVP fire fresh salvo at Govt.”, 11 June 2008, page 1 115 Daily Mirror, Kelum Bandara and Yohan Perera, “North-Central and Sabaragamuwa PC’s dissolved”, 10 June 2008, page 1 116 www.asiantribune.com, Asian tribune SL bureau, “Supreme Court rejects fundamental rights petitions”, 21.6.2008 117 www.asiantribune.com, Asian tribune SL bureau, “Supreme Court rejects fundamental rights petitions”, 21.6.2008 118 www.asiantribune.com, Asian tribune SL bureau, “Supreme Court rejects fundamental rights petitions”, 21.6.2008 119 The Morning Leader, “Govt. ponders staggered PC polls” May 14 2008 120 Former JVP parliamentarian is the JVP Chief Minister candidate for the North- central province and the JVP Chief Minister candidate for Sabaragamuwa is Chameera Koswatta. 121 The breakaway faction of the JVP led by Wimal Weerawansa faction on 12th May applied for registration of a new political party, with the Election Commissioners Department. The symbol of the NJP was the crown and its colour golden yellow, dissident JVP MP Nandana Gunatilake told the Island. The new party was launched at the BMICH in Colombo on May 14th. “The date was chosen to coincide with the date when the JVP itself was formally established by its late leader .” (Daily News, Quick Look, JVP dissidents form new party”, 13 May 2008, page 3; The Island, Saman Indrajith, “Wimal spurns Bell embraces crown”, 13 May 2008, page 1; www.lankanews.lk, “Wimal forms new party Nandana Gunathilake becomes Secretary” 13 May 2008) 122 Daily Mirror, “Anjan Unna joins NFF” June 26 2008 123 The two parties agreed on the formation of the alliance after talks at the NFF office in Battaramulla on 29 June. (Sunday Times, JVP dissidents form alliance with TMVP, 29 June 2008, page 1) 124 The book reportedly reveals and exposes the true facts behind the JVP, highlighting the downfall of the JVP and shows where the current party changed track from the previous party that Rohana Wijeweera created. (The Bottomline, Jayashika Padmasiri, “ Wimal hits back”, 25 June 2008, page 1) 125 At the convention the party leadership “decided to expel” the JVP dissidents led by Wimal Weerawansa “from their previous responsibilities and to elect new persons to those posts.” The JVP “decided to re- appoint Mr Amarasinghe as party leader and also appointed 24 members to the party’s Central Committee including Lakshman Nipunaarachchi, Ramalingam Chandrasekar, Dimuthu Abeykoon, Chameera Koswatte, Duminda Nawagamuwa, S K Subasinghe, Jinadasa Kitulegoda, Nihal Galapatthi, Pubudu Jagoda, Mahinda Jayasinghe, and Nalinda Jayasinghe.” “The newly appointed central committee then appointed the party’s politbureau and other office-bearers. The former 12 member

37 politbureau were reduced to seven members that includes leader Somawansa Amarasinghe, Tilvin Silva, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, , K D Lalkantha, Chandrasena Wijesinghe and G Kularatne.Former General Secretary Tilvin Silva was re-elected to the same post, while parliamnetrain Anura Kumara Dissanyakae was appointed as the parliamentary group leader and finance secretary.” “The new propaganda secretary is Vijitha Herath while K D Lal Kantha was appointed as the Administrative Secretary. Organising Secretary (national organizer) is G Kularatne while Chandrasena Wijesinghe was appointed as the Education Secretary. Party leader Somawansa Amarasinghe has been appointed as the party’s International Affairs Secretary which was earlier held by MP Vijitha Herath.” (Daily Mirror, Gagani Weerakoon, “JVP vows to topple govt.”, 28 May 2008, page 3) 126 The Nation, Lakna Paranamanna and Kushali Atukorale, “ Unprecedented TU strike and boycott on July 10”, 6 July 2008, page 10 127 www.island.lk. “ Conspiracy against SB”, online politics, 13.7.2009 128 The Nation, Lakhna Paranamanna, “ Govt.scoffs at trade union conditions”, 7 July 2008, page 1, The Island, www.island.lk, “Conspiracy against SB”, 13.7.2008 129 She submitted a set of proposals on behalf of the TMVP. (Daily Mirror, “TMVP member joins APRC meet”, 16 July 2008, page 1) 130 news.xinhuanet.com, “Sri Lanka’s ex-militant party to propose devolution plan”, 15.7.2008 131 The JHU and the MEP suspended their participation in Committee proceedings insisting that a TMVP representative should be accommodated in the committee. However, now that their request has been granted the path is open for them to enter the process. In the meantime, the JVP had opted out of the APRC process in December 2006 followed by the UNP in September 2007. Therefore, they did not participate in the 14 July proceedings. There is speculation that the newly formed JNP led by Wimal Weerawansa which is now pursuing a policy different from the JVP would also enter the process. (Morning Leader, “The use and abuse of the APRC,” Editorial, 16 July 2008) 132 Morning Leader, “The use and abuse of the APRC, Editorial, 16 July 2008”

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 133 in.reuters.com, United Nations,“SL, Spain lose UN rights council election”, 21 May 2008 134 www.wsws.org, Saman Gunadasa, “Sri Lanka loses vote to retain seat on UN Human Rights Council” 16 June 2008 135 www.wsws.org, Saman Gunadasa, “Sri Lanka loses vote to retain seat on UN Human Rights Council” 16 June 2008 136 www.wsws.org, Saman Gunadasa, “Sri Lanka loses vote to retain seat on UN Human Rights Council” 16 June 2008 137 Sri Lanka’s permanent UN representative in Geneva, Dayan Jayatilleke, along with Peace Secretariat Chief Rajiva Wijesinha, Foreign Secretary Palitha Kohona, Sri Lanka’s UN Ambassador Prasad Kariyawasam all addressed international forums on Sri Lanka’s human rights record. (www.wsws.org, Saman Gunadasa, “Sri Lanka loses vote to retain seat on UN Human Rights Council” 16 June 2008) 138 www.asian tribune.com, “SAARC leaders to take a common position on the scourge of terrorism, developing together- Dr. Palitha Kohona”, 21 July 2008 139 drdivas.wordpress.com, Abdul Ruff Colachal, “15 SAARC Summit” leave terrorism plank”, 13 August 2008 140 In his appeal he accused the SL government of having launched an "all out military offensive to liquidate the Tamil race” (news.indiainfo.com, Vaik against PM attending Colombo SAARC summit”, 24 June 2008) 141 Daily Mirror, “Narayanan’s taxi ride proved security excellence : Keheliya” August 06 2008, 142 Daily Mirror, Jamila Najmuddin, “Top Indian delegation in talks with Government”, 21 June 2008, page 1 143 www.hindu.com, B. Muralidhar Reddy “High-profile Indian team in Sri Lanka” 21. 6. 2008 144 The Sunday Times, Political Editor, ‘ Indian heavyweights here for what ?”, 22 June 2008, page 4 145 Vijay Singh had reportedly told the President that “the purchase of three units of the Chinese made 3-D radars by the security forces has caused a threat to Indian security, especially because of the fact that Chinese help has been sought to establish the radars and operate them in the Jaffna peninsula, causing a

38 security threat to India.( The Sunday Leader, “ Basil talks tough and MR’ damage control”, 29.06.2008; The Sunday Leader, “India calls for political solution fast”, 22 June 2008, page 1) 146 www.sundayleader.lk, Pot Shot, “ Basil talks tough and MR’ damage control”, 29.06.2008 147 www.sundayleader.lk, Pot Shot, “ Basil talks tough and MR’ damage control”, 29.06.2008 148 Sundaytimes.lk, Political Editor, “Indian heavyweights here for what ?”, 22.06.2008 149 “In New Delhi, where the news of the warning to LIOC was received, there was a different view. Officials explained that LIOC was one of those who had invested millions of US dollars to provide encouragement to Sri Lanka Government's policy of promoting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) governed the LIOC role in Sri Lanka and allowed the Indian company to function as a commercial entity empowered to make price revisions. Hence, it was argued that directing unilateral threats to take over ran counter to encouraging the FDI policy and would act as a deterrent even for others who had made a direct investment. Moreover, it was claimed that it contravened provisions of the MoU.” (Sundaytimes.lk, Political Column, “Indian heavyweights here for what”, 26 June 2008) 150 www. Asiantribune.com, M Rama Rao, India Editor, Asian Tribune “President Rajapakse in Tirupati, offers special prayers” 12.7. 2008 151 www. Asiantribune.com, M Rama Rao, India Editor, Asian Tribune “President Rajapakse in Tirupati, offers special prayers” 12.7. 2008 152 The Sunday Leader, “India calls for political solution fast”, 22 June 2008, page 1 153 www.southasiaanalysis.org, Col. R hariharan (retd) “Sri Lanka: putting Indian delegations visit in perspective”, 26 June 2008 154 www.southasiaanalysis.org, Col. R hariharan (retd) “Sri Lanka: putting Indian delegations visit in perspective”, 26 June 2008 155 The Nation, Aisha Edris, “India agonized over Tamils’ plight”, 22 June 2008, page 1 156 Daily mirror, “Govt. warns US and EU against sanctions”, 31 May 2008, page 2 157 The Morning Leader, “Ranil makes a plea for GSP plus facility”, 28 May 2008, page 3 158 www.asiantribune.com, “Lord malloch Brown meets Foreign Minister Bogollagama”, 17.7. 2008 159 Daily Mirror, Kelum Bandara, “British Minister brings gloomy news”, 17 July 2008, page 1 160 ipsnews.net, Feizal Samath, “Economy Sri Lanka-business as usual despite rights record”, 26 May 2008 161 ipsnews.net, Feizal Samath, “Economy Sri Lanka-business as usual despite rights record”, 26 May 2008 162 Press statement issued by EU Parliament’s delegation for relations with South Asia, Colombo 25 July 2008 163 Daily Mirror, “EU says APRC incomplete without TNA”, 26 July 2008, page 1 164 Daily Mirror, Easwaran Rutnam, “EU says APRC incomplete without TNA”, 26 July 2008, page 1 165 Daily Mirror, “EU says APRC incomplete without TNA”, 26 July 2008, page 1 166 The Nation, Rathindra Kuruwita, “ Government censures EU delegation”, 27 July 2008, page 1 167 The Nation, Rathnindra Kuruwita, “ Government censures EU delegation”, 27 July 2008, page 1 168 Lankanewspapers.com, “Sinhala EU MP hits out at the delegation”, 30 July 2008 169 www.britishhighcommission.guv.uk, “Lord malloch Brown’s statement on Sri Lanka” 9 June 2008 170 Daily Mirror, US reiterates HR concerns”, 4 July 2008, page 1 171 Daily News, “British PM warmly welcomes President Rajapakse”, 11 June 2008, page 1 172 The delegation comprising Lt Col Dan Rex and wing commander Andy Lee held talks with Jaffna security forces commander Major General G A Chandrasiri on the current security situation and then visited the Northern Naval Command in Kankasenthurai and Palaly air base. (Daily Mirror, “British defense delegation visit Lanka”, 7 May 2008, page 2) 173 www.lankabusinessonline.com, “British High Commission staffer, journalist attacked in Colombo”, 30 June 2008 174 srilanka.usembassy.gov, Colombo “U.S. Condemns Attack on British High Commission and Sri Lanka Press Institute Staff Members”, 1 July 2008 175 Media Minister Anura Priyadarshana Yapa promised to “take all steps to get at the perpetrators.” (www.lankabusinessonline.com, “British High Commission staffer, journalist attacked in Colombo”, 30 June 2008) 176 Daily Mirror, Sunil Jaysiri, “Army commander on official tour to Pakistan”, 6 May 2008, page 2 177 Daily Mirror, “Army chief visits Pakistan Ordnance factories”, 8 May 2008, page 2 178 Daily Mirror, Sunil Jaysiri, “Army commander on official tour to Pakistan”, 6 May 2008, page 2

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179 The Prime Ministerial delegation visited the Shipyard in Kraljevica and the Shipbuilding Institute in Zagreb (www.grad-rijeka.hr, “Prime Minister of Sri Lanka visits Rijeka”, 11 September 2007) 180 www.navy.lk, “Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy meets Croatian Navy Chief” May 2008

LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL 181 www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=26047 182 www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=26356, www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=26330. 183 Daily Mirror 6/8/2008 p 1.

184 S.S. Selvanayagam, Daily Mirror 30/07/2008.

185 http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/11875, http://www.dailymirror.lk/DM_BLOG/Sections/frmNewsDetailView.aspx?ARTID=18417. 186 The relevant provision of the Constitution Article 154B (8) (c ) and (d). 187 There is strong appallete judicial authority for the proposition that the Governor’s power to dissolve is only exercisable on the advice of the Chief Minister enjoying the support of a majority187 In the present circumstances, the Chief ministers of the North Central and Sabaragamuwa Provinces did not command the support of a majority within the respective Provincial Councils. They were not , therefore, entitled to tender advice recommending dissolution to the Governors. However, a key weakness in this argument is that it represents a highly rigid approach to constitutional interpretation, and in this instance to rigidly insist that a chief Minister must command a majority in order for the procedure for dissolution to be at all possible may risk the possibility of a deadlock and debilitate administration in these provinces. In a second possible interpretation, looking at the Article 154 B (8) as a whole should the Chief Minister in the opinion of the Governor heading a minority administration and therefore does not command the support of a majority of members of council allowing the Governor to act on his own discretion. 188 Susitha R. Fernando, ‘S.C. Orders the construction to continue’ Mirror 28/07/2008. Dailyhttp://www.dailymirror.lk/DM_BLOG/Sections/frmNewsDetailView.aspx?ARTID=21664. 189 ‘Court stops UK from returning Tamils to Sri Lanka’ http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINIndia-34563020080717?sp=true

190 http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca200806/20080619 witness_protection_bill_presented_in_parliament.htm

191 (S.C.S.D.01/08) 192 http://www.cpalanka.org/research_papers/Witness_Protection_Summary.pdf. 193 http://www.cpalanka.org/research_papers/Witness_Protection_Summary.pdf.

PUBLIC OPINION 194 When compared to the PCI findings in March 2008, those who think that a political solution is essential have slightly increased amongst the Tamil community (March ’08: 69.8%, August ’08: 72.4%) while amongst the Up-Country Tamil community those who think that a political solution is essential (March ’08: 30.1%, August ’08: 40.9%) and useful (March ’08: 11.5%, August ’08: 25.3%) have significantly increased. Amongst the Muslim community, those who think that a political solution is essential have considerably decreased (March ’08: 71.2%, August ’08: 59.3%) while those who think it is useful have increased (March ’08: 11.1%, August ’08: 21.7%). 195 Amongst the Sinhala community, those who think a political solution should be designed after the war has slightly increased (March ’08: 33.2%, August ’08: 39.5%). 196 Amongst the Tamil community those who think that it remains the same has increased (March ’08: 16.5%, August ’08: 23.8%) while those who think that it is not close at all have decreased (March ’08: 74.2%, August ’08: 64.8%). Amongst the Muslim community, those who think it is close (March

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’08: 19.7%, August ’08: 32%) have increased while those who think it is not close at all (March ’08: 62.7%, August ’08: 38.8%) have decreased. 197 Amongst the Sinhala community, 42.3% thought the cost of maintaining a large cabinet have contributed to some extent in increasing the cost of living while 41.6% thought it had contributed a great extent. Amongst the Tamil community, 43.3% thought a large cabinet had contributed to cost of living to a great extent while another 37.1% said it had contributed to some extent. A majority of the Up-Country Tamil (41%) and the Muslim (44.3%) communities thought a large cabinet had contributed to some extent in increasing the cost of living while another 36.1% of the Up-Country Tamil and 36.7% of the Muslim communities thought it had contributed to a great extent. A majority of the Sinhala community (46.7%) and the Muslim (41.1%) communities thought the bad economic policies of the previous regime had contributed to some extent in increasing the cost of living. Amongst the Tamil community 29% thought it had contributed to some extent while 28.1% thought it had contributed to a great extent. Amongst the Up-Country Tamil community, 33.4% thought it had contributed to some extent while 25.6% thought it had contributed to a great extent. 198 However, 39.3% of the Sinhala community disagreed with the statement. Amongst the Tamil (54.1%) and the Up-Country Tamil (61.8%) communities, a majority disagreed with the statement although majority completely disagreed. Amongst the Muslim community, 51.6% disagreed with the statement. 199 However, 24% of the Sinhala, 25.8% of the Tamil, 10.8% of the Up-Country Tamil, and 16% of the Muslim communities agreed. 200 However, 26.5% of the Sinhala community and 17.8% of the Muslim community agreed that the present political situation was helpful in persuading the people in the north for a solution under the provincial council.

MEDIA 201 (http://www.freemediasrilanka.org/English/news.php?id=985§ion=news 202 FMM e bulletin, May 2008. 203 FMM e bulletin, May 2008 204 FMM e bulletin, May 2008 205 FMM e bulletin, May 2008 206 FMM e bulletin, June 2008 207 FMM e bulletin, May 2008 208 FMM e bulletin, May 2008 209 FMM e bulletin, Jyly 2008 210 FMM e bulletin, May 2008 211 FMM e bulletin, May 2008 212 The Cabinet Sub- Committee includes Enterprise Development and Investment Promotion Minister Dr. Sarath Amunugama, Mass Media and Information Minister Anura Priyadarshana Yapa, Construction and Engineering Services Minister Rajitha Senaratna, Media Minister Lakshman Yapa Abeywardene, Transport Minister , Nation Building and Estate Infrastructure Development Minister Rohitha Abeygunewardene and Deputy Tourism Minister Faizer Mustapha. (http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca200806/20080625ministerial_committee_to_look_ into_journalists.htm) 213 It introduced a set of objectives to achieve in order to establish a better environment for the working journalists in the country. These objectives are • Ensure the independence of the media personnel and media institutes • To inquire into complaints of harassments and death threats to media personnel and intervene if such allegations are correct. • Develop better understanding between the state officials and the media. • To provide social recognition to media. To follow up on projects proposed to promote welfare of media personnel and to ensure speedy implementation of them. (Online Daily Mirror, 25th June 2008)

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