Cluster Report

MONITORING FACTORS AFFECTING THE SRI LANKAN PEACE PROCESS CLUSTER REPORT THIRD QUARTERLY MAY 2008 – JULY 2008 CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES TABLE OF CONTENTS CLUSTER Page Number PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS CLUSTER ……………………………………… 2 MILITARY BALANCE CLUSTER ........................................................................................................3 HUMAN SECURITY....................................................................................................................................7 POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT CLUSTER .....................................................................................11 INTERNATIONAL CLUSTER ............................................................................................................15 LEGAL & CONSTIIUTIONAL CLUSTER .....................................................................................18 ECONOMIC CLUSTER ..........................................................................................................................21 PUBLIC OPINION CLUSTER ............................................................................................................26 MEDIA ...........................................................................................................................................................30 ENDNOTES…..……………………………………………………………………………….34 METHODOLOGY The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has conducted the project “Monitoring the Factors Affecting the Peace Process” to provide an understanding of the current status of the peace process. The output of this project is a series of Quarterly Reports. This is the eighth of such reports. It should be noted that this Quarterly Report covers the months of May - July 2008. Having identified a number of key factors that impact the peace process, they have been monitored observing change or stasis through a range of indicators. These indicators suggest trends for each factor. The factors have been grouped into a series of clusters which reflect critical dimensions of the peace process. The trends will suggest the level of change in each cluster and in sum will indicate how the peace process and its environment have been strengthened or weakened. 1 I. PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS 1.1 Context As noted in the previous chapter, the undeclared war which became official during the past six months continued undiminished. Although the government and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Ealam (LTTE) repeatedly stated their commitment to peace talks, the intensification of military operations made it clear that there was little space for renewing talks. 1.2 Continuing expressions of commitment with no signs of the resumption of talks Both sides continued to make expressions of interest in resuming peace talks. Amidst its involvement in military operations to liberate the rebel controlled Wanni, President M. Rajapakse, during his visit to India, stated that his government is ready to resume talks with the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Ealam (LTTE) if they agree with the conditions laid down by him and his respectable government.1 The conditions that Rajapakse laid down were that the government will hold peace talks in the future with the participation of all Tamil political parties in the country not solely with the LTTE.2 Another condition laid was that the LTTE should lay down its weaponry for future peace talks. This latter condition has been repeated by this Government and the LTTE have constantly rejected it.3 The LTTE military spokesmen Rasiah Ilantharian stated that, “Such a condition laid down by the government is just another tactic to evade peace talks.”4 The LTTE too announced that it was willing to resume talks with the Government. The Political Wing Chief of the LTTE Nadesan in an interview with Times Now television in July stated, “We are not against ceasefire or peace talks.”5 For its part the LTTE stated that a new round of peace talks on ending the country's 25-year-old civil war is impossible as long as the government presses ahead with the military offensive.6 In a significant move the LTTE announced on July 22 that it would observe a unilateral ceasefire coinciding with the forthcoming summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation in Colombo from July 26 to August 4.7 It projected the proposed ceasefire as a goodwill gesture to extend its support to the SAARC countries, while signaling its willingness to hit back if attacks continued.8 This gesture could have been a signal from the LTTE of its interest in talks as well as a means for slowing down the military onslaught. It could have also been put forward in order to secure international approval.9 However the government announced that it will not stop its ongoing operations and aerial attacks due to this unilateral cease fire. A number of Government actors rejected the offer including Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, who dismissed the offer stating that: "The ceasefire announcement is a ploy by the LTTE when it is being militarily weakened in the war front, to strengthen its militarily under the guise of holding negotiations."10 Hours after the LTTE’s unilateral ceasefire declaration, the government troops launched aerial strikes and naval attacks into the rebel controlled Wanni.11 While the co-Chairs and the international community remained largely silent regarding the LTTE’s announcement they continued to send mixed signals regarding the need for peace talk’s.12. Sri Lanka’s peace facilitator Norway did not, publicly at least, attempt to take any new initiatives only forwarding the LTTE press releases to the government which served to emphasize the country’s continuing trust of the LTTE. 1.3 Projection While the two sides will continue expressing interest in peace talks and ceasefire, it is unlikely that the government will engage in peace talks in the coming months due to its commitment to a military solution. In a situation where the military balance remains in favor of the government forces, the Government will not want to risk its advantage by announcing a ceasefire or moving into peace talks. 2 II. MILITARY BALANCE 2.1 Context13 Over the first two quarters of 2008, military operations in the North have intensified with the Security Forces attempting to defeat the LTTE. The Government has attempted to continue its strategy of decimating the LTTE’s fighting force and forcing the LTTE to withdraw, particularly on its southern fronts. The Security Forces have been able to advance into LTTE-controlled Mannar and into the Welioya region but there has been no movement along the Jaffna FDL. The LTTE has maintained a stiff resistance and has also tried to keep the security forces stretched by continuing attacks in the South, mainly on civilian targets, thereby expanding the theatre of war. The security forces have maintained the balance of power especially through its aerial advantage and naval attacks which has made it more difficult for movement by the LTTE. Nonetheless, the strong defence that the LTTE has put up has meant that the Government has had to push back its self-imposed deadlines. The last two quarter also saw a number of attacks on civilians in government- and LTTE- controlled areas which are some of the violations of international humanitarian law witnessed over this quarter which in turn have intensified the humanitarian and human rights crisis in the North. 2.2 Military balance remaining in favour of Security Forces During this quarter it is clear that it is the security forces that are on the offensive, while the LTTE is fighting more of a defensive military campaign. At present the government is continuing its multi pronged military strategy to defeat the LTTE. The military is currently engaged in five battle fronts with six Divisions currently under operation in the Wanni region. Those are 53 and 55 in Jaffna, 57 (Vavuniya West), 62 (Vavuniya east), 59 (Welioya) and 58 (Mannar) Divisions.14 The military is using large-scale military operations to carry out an onslaught on LTTE positions in addition to using small-troop formations both on the forward defence line and within LTTE-controlled areas. The focus appears to breach LTTE defenses forcing them to withdraw, cut off supply lines and to kill as many LTTE cadres as possible. The Government has continued to make significant headway especially in LTTE-controlled Mannar. During the last quarter the forces captured Madhu, while in this quarter they advanced further North Adampan in May followed by key LTTE strongholds including Vedithalthivu on July 16. Vedithalthivu is the main sea Tiger base in the North Western coast, which also functioned as a smuggling hub for arms and ammunition from Tamil Nadu.15 The Vedithalthivu capture was followed by the capture of Illuppukadavai another important tiger base .16 State media erroneously reported that troops completed its moves to clear Mannar of the LTTE and as a result that entire district was under government control on June 30 .17 This claim was later rejected by the military spokesperson stating that there are more areas to be cleared in Mannar.18 Troops of the 59 Division have also been able to push back the LTTE from the Weli Oya FDL capturing One Four Base and Sugandan base and at least two other satellite camps.19 After the recent victory in Vedithalthivu, Minister Keheliya Rambukwella announced that the Government’s next step is to capture Kilinochchi.20 The military continued with their aerial attacks on a daily basis targeting strategic bases in the rebel controlled Wanni. On

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