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The Atlantic Alliance Through the Historian´S Looking Glass

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The Atlantic Alliance Through the Historian´S Looking Glass Revista UNISCI / UNISCI Journal, Nº 50 (May/Mayo 2019) THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE THROUGH THE HISTORIAN´S LOOKING GLASS Massimo de Leonardis 1 Universitá Cattolica, Milano Abstract: The article gives a long-term evaluation of the Atlantic Alliance in the context of contemporary world history. Actually, the American revolution had much more important impact on international relations than the French one and since their origins the United States envisaged a world role. The period of the Cold War was a parenthesis between two epochs in which the approach of the European countries and of the United States to international politics has been quite different, since their culture and historical experience are different. However, even during the Cold War it was impossible to create a real “Atlantic Community” as advocated in the Preamble and art. 2 of the Atlantic Treaty of 1949. The period after the Cold War saw diverging geopolitical perspectives among the NATO allies and President Trump gives rise to doubts on the importance he attaches to the Alliance. In conclusion, while NATO, the military structure, remains a formidable tool, the political alliance struggles to remain relevant. Key words : Atlantic Alliance. NATO. United States Título en Castellano: La Alianza Atlántica, vista desde la perspectiva del Historiador Resumen: El artículo realiza una evaluación a largo plazo de la Alianza Atlántica en el contexto de la historia mundial contemporánea. En realidad, la revolución estadounidense tuvo un impacto mucho más importante en las relaciones internacionales que la francesa, y desde sus orígenes los Estados Unidos contempló el tener un papel mundial. El período de la guerra fría fue un paréntesis entre dos épocas en las que el enfoque de los países europeos y de los Estados Unidos sobre la política internacional ha sido muy diferente, ya que su cultura y experiencia histórica son diferentes. Sin embargo, incluso durante la guerra fría era imposible crear una verdadera “comunidad atlántica”, como se defendía en el preámbulo y el artículo. 2 del Tratado Atlántico de 1949. El período después de la guerra fría dio lugar a divergentes perspectivas geopolíticas entre los aliados de la OTAN y, en la actualidad, el presidente Trump fomenta las dudas sobre la importancia que concede a la Alianza. En conclusión, mientras que la OTAN, la estructura militar, sigue siendo una herramienta formidable, la alianza política lucha por seguir siendo relevante. Palabras Clave : Alianza Atlántica, OTAN, Estados Unidos. Copyright © UNISCI, 2019. Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores, y no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI. 1 Massimo de Leonardis is Full Professor of History of International Relations at the Catholic University, Milan. Member of the UNISCI Journal Scientific Committee. E-mail: <[email protected]> DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.31439/UNISCI-51 111 Revista UNISCI / UNISCI Journal, Nº 50 (May/Mayo 2019) 1. Introduction On 4 th April 2019, the Atlantic Alliance celebrated its 70 th anniversary. As an historian, I think appropriate to discuss if the Atlantic Alliance and its military arm, NATO, are still historically relevant. I am not questioning the fact that NATO is still useful, certainly the most effective among international organizations and alliances. But, is the Atlantic Alliance a key player in current affairs, an expression of a rather solid community of purpose as it was during the Cold War? 2. The debate among the historians The question of NATO adaptation to a new phase of international politics is not new, since it was widely discussed more than sixty years ago by the Committee of the “three wise man”, the Italian Gaetano Martino, the Canadian Lester Pearson and the Norwegian Halvard Lange. The Committee was formed after years of discussions on the necessity of creating something more than a simple military alliance, of building a real “Atlantic community.” As I will briefly explain later, the project of an “Atlantic community” remained a dead letter, and in 1978 the Italian Manlio Brosio, who had been NATO Secretary General between 1964 and 1971, remarked that “for a long period the perception of the danger and the necessity of common defence were quite sufficient to prop up the Alliance.” 2 This issue of the “Atlantic Community” drew also the historians’ attention. In September 1955, in Rome, the X International Congress of Historical Sciences devoted a session to Le probléme de l’Atlantique du XVIII au XX siècle , with the participation of prominent historians. The introductory report was prepared by Jacques Godechot and Richard Palmer, who both studied the age of “Atlantic revolutions”, which shook Europe and the Americas between the 1770s and the 1820s. Discussing that report, the distinguished British historian Sir Charles Webster maintained that “the regionalisation of the world had been a theme for discussion since modern historiography began, but the Atlantic was not suggested as a ‘region’ until the Second World War” and added that “the Atlantic Community might be a temporary phenomenon. It was created by the policy of the USSR and if this changed it might change also.” 3 Indeed, the Soviet Union has not only changed but disappeared. Paraphrasing Dean Acheson’s well-known remark on Britain,4 we might say that the Atlantic Alliance “has lost an enemy and not yet found a role.” The efforts to revive the Russian threat look to me as the lifting of an old lady in search for a new youth. Another British historian, the Marxist Eric Hobsbawn, agreed with Sir Charles “that this idea [of the “Atlantic community”] has been brought into historical analysis as a result of the political situation since 1945, which might be a very temporary situation.” A few years later, this vision was contested by the Italian liberal historian Vittorio De Caprariis, who was a disciple of the famous philosopher Benedetto Croce. De Caprariis wrote about «a new civilization» which, in Modern age, “was born indeed on the Atlantic”, and on “a coherent 2 Brosio, Manlio (1979): “Introduzione”, in AA.VV., Trent’anni di Alleanza Atlantica , Roma, Editrice Europea, p. VII. 3 AA.VV. (1957): Atti del X Congresso Internazionale: Roma 4-11 settembre 1955 , Roma, p. 571. The introductory paper was Godechot, Jacques; Palmer, Robert Roswell: “Le problème de l’Atlantique du XVIII éme au XX éme siècle”, in AA.VV. (1955): Relazioni: riassunti delle comunicazioni. Atti a cura della Giunta Centrale per gli Studi Storici e Comitato internazionale di Scienze Storiche , vol. V, Storia contemporanea , Firenze, Sansoni, pp. 173-239. 4 In a speech at West Point military academy on 5 th December 1962, the former Secretary of State said: “Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role”. (In, Acheson, Dean: Vital Speeches , vol. 29, n° 6 (January 1963), p. 163). 112 Revista UNISCI / UNISCI Journal, Nº 50 (May/Mayo 2019) development of the European and American history.” NATO was “not only the result of a specific contingent situation, it was also the finishing line of an historical process at the same time manifold and univocal.” 5 3. The United States towards Europe: a challenge or a resource? In the perspective of diplomatic history, 6 I tend to agree with Webster’s and Hobsbawn’s opinions. We usually consider the French revolution a much more important event than the American one. Actually, this might be true on the general level, but not for international politics. Certainly the French revolution and Napoleon had a major impact on Europe’s international relations, but in the long term France did not change the traditional system of power politics, while the birth of the independent United States of America marked a major break, which became evident more than one century later, but was immediately perceived at the moment by expert observers. Many founding fathers, from George Washington to James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, envisaged an “imperial” destiny for the young republic. 7 In 1816, Thomas Jefferson, third President of the United States, wrote to his predecessor John Adams that “old Europe will have to lean on our shoulders, and to hobble along to our side, under the monkish trammels of priests and Kings, as she can. What a colossus shall we be.” 8 Actually in 1794 the Spanish minister in Paris had made this comment on the United States: “This federal republic was born as a pygmy, but a day will come that it will be a giant, even a colossus.” 9 In 1817, the American minister in London and future President John Quincy Adams (son of the above- mentioned John) wrote that “the universal feeling of Europe in witnessing the gigantic growth of our population and power is that we shall, if united, become a very dangerous member of the society of nations.” 10 On the issue of the birth of independent States in Latin America, British Foreign minister George Canning tried to call “the New World into existence, to redress the balance of the Old,” 11 but Washington didn’t follow London’s lead and reaffirmed its unilateralism with the Monroe doctrine, the third pillar of which rejected the raison d’état and the European tradition, indicating the republic as the institutional regime most adapted to the American continent. Commenting that doctrine, Prince Metternich rightly observed that the United States “had declared […] their intention not only to oppose power to power, but also, to speak with greater exactitude, altar to altar.” 12 From 1815 to 1914, the United States completed the conquest of the West, survived a civil war, and, at the turn of the century, appeared as a new protagonist in the international arena.
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