NATO Secretaries-General The Legacies of and

Ryan C. Hendrickson

With the end of Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’s term as NATO’s Secretary-General, the time is ripe for an initial assessment of his service as NATO’s chief .

NATO’s secretary-general, an office that did not even exist until three years after the Alliance’s creation, has generated little academic scrutiny. In part, this dearth of research is understandable given the few official powers held by the Alliance’s political leader. The secretary-general is charged with promoting consensus among the Allies – a rather broad responsibility that provides few organisational tools to achieve this end. In addition, the secretary-general must oversee and manage Alliance summits and ministerial meetings, and chair meetings of the North Atlantic Council, but has no voting authority. Given this limited institutional authority, coupled with the political influence of the Alliance’s ‘great powers’ and the organisational authority wielded by NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), most histories of NATO provide little assessment of the secretary-general.1

Three individuals from the : , Joseph Luns, and de Hoop Scheffer, have served as NATO’s chief political leader, yet each has left his own, quite different, legacy. De Hoop Scheffer’s record, at least at this first early juncture, is very different from those of his predecessors, and especially from that of his Dutch predecessor, Joseph Luns, who was NATO’s longest serving secretary-general. This essay provides a short comparison of the legacies of Luns and de Hoop Scheffer.

Joseph Luns

Among all secretaries-general at NATO, Joseph Luns is the most understudied leader, which is remarkable given his 13 years at the helm (1971-1984). Luns simply loved being NATO’s chief diplomat, and relished the international and media spotlight that this position could compel. Nonetheless, much remains to be learned regarding how he sought to personally impact the Alliance, and to what extent he shaped NATO’s strategic direction. Despite this lack of research, historians and others have identified a number of his leadership traits and favoured policy directions that shaped his time at NATO.

It is first noteworthy that Luns held a rather conservative political ideology on both domestic and international issues. Luns viewed the Alliance as an organisation that was there to provide collective defence of its members. Luns resisted calls for the Alliance to go beyond its borders, so much so that he opposed the queries of the Carter Administration regarding whether NATO would assist Western-leaning forces in Zaire in 1978. Luns noted: “Any European force in Africa will not be realised. All the Allies agree that NATO as such should not get involved in Africa.”2 In addition, as secretary-general Luns was a fierce opponent of an empowered European Community, which he viewed as a potential threat to NATO’s primacy in security affairs.3

Apart from his occasional opposition to the United States, Luns was generally known for his support of American foreign policy, which included American , Henry Kissinger, who was viewed with considerable scepticism across much of Europe. In the later years of his tenure at NATO, when the United States encouraged the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe, Luns backed the American position to the disappointment of many Europeans.4 Like all NATO secretaries-general, Luns also favoured higher defence spending for the Allies. When defence spending measures dropped to levels that he viewed as

1 dangerously low, he would personally contact a member’s defence to encourage more military investment.5

Beyond his preferred strategic directions for the Alliance, Luns’ legacy at NATO has been shaped in large part by his unique personality, which at times was impressively charming, but could also be over-powering and domineering. As chairman of the North Atlantic Council, Luns tossed aside the diplomatic etiquette employed by his immediate predecessor, , and instead chose to lead NAC sessions far more informally. Luns would refer to the NATO ambassadors by their first names, and sometimes would remove his shoes during NAC meetings, leading sessions in his stocking feet. Luns, who stood six feet seven inches, would also use his physical presence to demand compliance with his views: when an ambassador disagreed with him, Luns would publicly berate the ambassador in an efforts to generate consensus. At the Council’s conclusion, however, he would attempt to immediately undo the public embarrassment that he had just created and to repair the political damage that he had inflicted.6

Luns’ domineering personality likely gives some insight into his ability to remain secretary- general for 13 years, despite the decline in his knowledge of current affairs within the Alliance. During his last years in office, his effectiveness had clearly waned, as Luns chose to rely upon his accrued knowledge of strategic affairs; he no longer kept abreast of current political developments in the Alliance and became somewhat absent-minded in his day-to- day responsibilities and ceremonial leadership activities. In the latter stages of his tenure, Luns was increasingly viewed as uncreative, with little interest in policy entrepreneurship. He was no longer a leader who could steer-- or was even interested in steering--the Alliance in new directions, a stance which was markedly different from the approach of Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. Nonetheless, Luns clearly loved being NATO’s secretary-general and certainly maintained his political charm among the Allies.7

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

De Hoop Scheffer became NATO’s political leader after an unusually tense period. NATO had just undergone what many observers viewed as the organisation’s tensest episode in , as some analysts pointed to NATO’s potential demise. The American decision to seek NATO deployments and defence measures for Turkey, prior to the war in Iraq, exacerbated a deep fissure in NATO between much of Europe, especially , Germany and France, and the United States. Although de Hoop Scheffer did not take office until January 2004, these conditions still prevailed when he replaced Lord Robertson, becoming NATO’s 11th secretary-general.8

On his first day in office, perhaps as one indication that de Hoop Scheffer sought to repair the damaged and still-strained transatlantic link, he addressed the press using both English and French – demonstrating the difficult but necessary job of the secretary-general, which demands an ability to build consensus among all Alliance members.9 Lord Robertson struggled to not only find commonalities between the United States and France, but also with his limited French speaking skills, which to some degree constrained his effectiveness as secretary-general.10 Other NATO secretaries-general, including Manlio Brosio and Lord Carrington, have acknowledged the importance of foreign language skills in promoting consensus.11 Thus, within this context, de Hoop Scheffer was arguably initiating his Alliance leadership in a symbolic manner to set the tone for a more meaningful transatlantic dialogue.

While NATO continued to experience internal tension over a variety of issues, and disputes between Germany, France and the United States persisted, it is clear that five years later, de Hoop Scheffer leaves the helm of a fundamentally different NATO, one that would have been almost impossible to predict in January 2004. France’s re-entry in 2009 into NATO’s integrated military command is one indication of an Alliance in repair, rather than a withering

2 organisation. While French President Nicolas Sarkozy was responsible for this decision, de Hoop Scheffer made a number of efforts to assuage French critics of NATO that France’s ‘re- entry’ could be accomplished while simultaneously fostering NATO’s European Security and Defence Identity. De Hoop Scheffer lobbied the French elite and the public, assuring them that France was losing none of its historical ambitions in NATO through advanced military integration with the Allies.12

During his entire tenure, from his first day in office through his leadership at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in April 2009, de Hoop Scheffer consistently highlighted NATO’s operation in . In nearly every public address, he noted the primacy of this mission for NATO. Critical observers of NATO who complain that the Alliance has “lost its way” and is now drifting without a clear direction and mission must have not been listening well; de Hoop Scheffer has been unambiguous, almost on a daily basis, that NATO’s central concern was Afghanistan.

As secretary-general, de Hoop Scheffer oversaw an expansion of NATO’s role in Afghanistan, which initially included a small peacekeeping presence intended to stabilise Kabul and build support for Afghanistan’s national government. The mission later expanded to a wider set of peacekeeping operations through the deployment of its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in northern and western sections of the country. In August 2006, NATO also agreed to take on combat operations in southern and eastern Afghanistan, which are now set to expand considerably with the newly proposed strategy put forward by American President Barack Obama. All evidence indicates that de Hoop Scheffer consistently lobbied the Allies for additional resources and more troops to battle the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Certainly, from the standpoint of public on Afghanistan, de Hoop Scheffer can be credited with consistently making the case that NATO must fight the Taliban and can succeed in promoting stability in Afghanistan.

Apart from his leadership on Afghanistan, de Hoop Scheffer travelled widely as NATO secretary-general, far beyond what Luns or any previous secretary-general would have ever considered. De Hoop Scheffer spoke in Egypt, South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, among other states well beyond NATO’s traditional geographic milieu, all in an effort to produce more support for NATO’s operations to defeat terrorism, and to build wider appeal for NATO’s activities in Afghanistan.

In addition to his extensive travels, de Hoop Scheffer also oversaw the Alliance as it initiated new operations in Sudan, Iraq and Pakistan. In this respect, NATO clearly entered new territory, both strategically and geographically. In 2008, NATO also agreed to protect against and deter piracy off the coast of Somalia. In all these cases, however, some evidence suggests that de Hoop Scheffer preferred to downplay NATO’s ability to address these different crises and to limit NATO’s role in these new missions.

On Sudan, for example, immediately after NATO agreed to provide air transport assistance to African Union troops to be deployed in Darfur, de Hoop Scheffer made it clear that NATO would not place its forces on the ground to assist in resolving this humanitarian tragedy. De Hoop Scheffer also made few efforts, at least publicly, to offer NATO’s assistance to address the crisis in Darfur prior to the assistance provided, and later in 2006, noted that this sort of mission would be best carried out by the United Nations.

On Iraq, de Hoop Scheffer moved cautiously in seeking consensus for an Alliance military training mission outside of Baghdad. Once a relatively small mission was established, which consisted of only approximately 100 military trainers (most of whom were Dutch or American), with very clear rules of engagement for NATO’s ground presence, de Hoop Scheffer shifted to other issues and did not press for additional NATO presence in Iraq.13 Most recently, soon after NATO agreed to contribute to a naval policing role against pirates

3 in the Indian Ocean in 2008, de Hoop Scheffer noted about Africa: “This continent still has many problems, but it is my strong conviction that Africans should be in the lead to find solutions for those problems, and not others.”14 In its initial months in the Indian Ocean, NATO provided only five ships, and has primarily been engaged in supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance from the World Food Programme. In short, while scholars are sure to provide additional analyses of de Hoop Scheffer’s leadership in the years to come and new findings may suggest otherwise, the publicly available evidence suggests that he sought small operations with limited mandates in each of these new missions. His focus remained on Afghanistan.

Like Luns, and all other previous secretaries-general, de Hoop Scheffer consistently called upon the European Allies to devote more financial resources to defence. Much like his immediate predecessor, Lord Robertson, de Hoop Scheffer lamented the low spending on defence across Europe, arguing at times that the future of the Alliance was at stake without higher military expenditures. De Hoop Scheffer, however, went beyond these traditional calls for defence spending reform to call for new funding approaches for NATO operations, so that NATO would have funds readily available to pay for ongoing operations and immediate needs, rather than having to rely upon only those states who contribute to these missions. To date, NATO has not changed its funding practices, but the Declaration on Alliance Security, which was agreed to at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit and was steered in large part by de Hoop Scheffer, called upon the Allies to create “a leaner and more cost-effective organization”.15 At the least, de Hoop Scheffer kept his message alive in the Declaration. Whether or not the Allies address this issue again remains to be seen.

Conclusion

The recent intra-Alliance debate over de Hoop Scheffer’s successor demonstrates that the member states continue to see great significance in the person who leads the Allies. In the months prior to the summit, a number of Allies floated the names of potential candidates to lead NATO, which eventually resulted in the selection of Danish Prime Minister, .16 While all secretaries-general are limited by the preferred foreign policy directions of NATO’s member states, as well as the military capabilities of its members, Rasmussen clearly inherits an Alliance that is in much better political condition than in 2004. While the challenges in Afghanistan, as well as in Kosovo, remain profound, for most members of the Alliance, NATO’s position in their individual foreign policies has risen substantially. This condition contrasts sharply with the time when de Hoop Scheffer first entered office, when many thought the Alliance could collapse. This political context increases NATO’s significance in global security, and thus implicitly, heightens the potential leadership role of its secretary-general.

Moreover, the position of the secretary-general has also evolved, in part due to de Hoop Scheffer’s leadership. NATO’s borders, which Joseph Luns so aggressively protected, have in many ways been erased. This means that NATO’s options, diplomatically and militarily, have increased. A similar argument can be made with an expanded set of potential strategic partners for the Alliance, as is witnessed in the wide participation of NATO members and non-members in Afghanistan. While de Hoop Scheffer was careful to note that NATO was not a ‘global cop’, the Alliance has undoubtedly ventured into new political, diplomatic and military realms under his leadership, all of which makes Rasmussen’s job more challenging, but also more significant in addressing modern security challenges faced by the Alliance.

Dr Ryan C. Hendrickson is Professor of Political Science at Eastern Illinois University in the U.S., and author of Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary-General and Military Action After the Cold War.

4 Notes

1. On the influence of the SACEUR, see Robert S. Jordan, Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander, New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2000; Robert S. Jordan (ed.), Generals in International Politics: NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1987. More recent research has suggested, however, that the secretary- general provided more influence than has been commonly accepted. On Dirk Stikker, see Anna Locher, ‘A Crisis Foretold: NATO, 1963-66’, in: Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher (eds.), Transforming NATO in the Cold War, London, Routledge, 2007. 2. Quoted in: Douglas Stuart and William Tow, The Limits of the Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems since 1949, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990: p. 233. 3. Author interview with former U.S. State Department official, Stanton Burnett, 31 May 2005. 4. ‘Consummate Diplomat Who Believed in Europe’, at www.rnw.nl/hotspots/html/lunsobit.html. 5. Stuart and Tow, The Limits of the Alliance, p. 120. 6. Ryan C. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary-General and Military Action after the Cold War, Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2006: pp. 30-34. 7. Author interviews with former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, David Abshire, 26 November 2008; former U.S. Ambassador to NATO and Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Taft IV, 1 December 2008; and former Assistant Secretary to NATO, Robin Beard, 4 August 2003. 8. David M. Andrews (ed.), The Atlantic Alliance under Stress: US-European Relations after Iraq, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 9. NATO Press Release, ‘Press Statement by NATO Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’, 5 January 2004, at www..int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_21341.htm. 10. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NATO, p. 131. 11. Lord Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, London: Collins, 1988, p. 381. On Brosio, see Robert S. Jordan with Michael E. Bloome, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational Diplomacy, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979. 12. Author interview with senior NATO official, 8 April 2009. 13. See Ryan C. Hendrickson, ‘NATO’s Secretary-General: Organizational Leadership in Shaping Alliance Strategy, in’: Gülnur Aybet and Rebecca R. Moore (eds.), NATO in Search of a Vision, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, forthcoming. 14. Quoted in: ‘NATO Wants Africa to Lead; Allied Forces Train Merchant Seamen to Counter Piracy’, International Herald Tribune, 21 November 2008, p. 3. 15. Author interview with senior NATO official, April 2009. See also NATO Press Release, ‘Declaration on Alliance Security’, 4 April 2009, at www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52838.htm?mode=pressrelease. 16. Judy Dempsey, ‘NATO Ruled by Fear as it Picks a Chief’, International Herald Tribune, 2 April 2009, p. 2.

5 The secretary general of NATO is the chief civil servant of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The officeholder is an international diplomat responsible for coordinating the workings of the alliance, leading NATO's international staff, chairing the meetings of the North Atlantic Council and most major committees of the alliance, with the notable exception of the NATO Military Committee, as well as acting as NATO's spokesperson. Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Flag of NATO. Incumbent since 1 October 2014. The Secretary General of NATO is an international North Atlantic Council, and leads NATO's staff. The current Secretary General is Jens Stoltenberg , the former Prime Minister of Norway , who took office on 1 October 2014. [1]. The Secretary General of NATO is an international diplomat who serves as the chief official of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Secretary General is responsible for coordinating the workings of the alliance, serves as the head of the North Atlantic Council, is the primary spokesperson of the alliance, and leads NATO's staff. The current Secretary General is Anders Fogh Rasmussen,[1] former prime minister of Denmark. Contents. 1 Establishment of position. The secretary general of NATO is the chief civil servant of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization . For faster navigation, this Iframe is preloading the Wikiwand page for Secretary General of NATO. Home. News. Random Article. Install Wikiwand. Send a suggestion. Uninstall Wikiwand.