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Transatlantic Relations at Stake: Aspects of NATO

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Transatlantic Relations at Stake: Aspects of NATO ZÜRCHER BEITRÄGE ZUR SICHERHEITSPOLITIK NR. 78 Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher (eds.) TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AT STAKE ASPECTS OF NATO, 1956 – 1972 Series Editors Andreas Wenger and Victor Mauer Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich CSS An ETH Center Contents Preface 5 Introduction Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher Drifting Apart? Restoring the NATO Consensus, 1956–1972 9 Part I Ralph Dietl Towards a European “Th ird Force”? Refl ections on the European Political and Security Cooperation, 1948–1964 23 Ine Megens Interdependence in Principle and in Practice, 1957–1966 51 Bruno Th oss Information, Persuasion, or Consultation? Th e Western Powers and NATO during the Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962 73 Part II David Tal Th e Burden of Alliance: Th e NPT Negotiations and the NATO Factor, 1960–1968 97 Mary Halloran “A Planned and Phased Reduction”:Th e Trudeau Government and the NATO Compromise, 1968–1969 125 Robin S. Gendron Th e Domestic Cost of NATO Membership: Canada’s Commitment to NATO Unity and the Growth of Separatism in Quebec, 1956–1967 145 3 Part III Bruna Bagnato NATO in the mid-1960s: Th e View of Secretary-General Manlio Brosio 165 Vincent Dujardin Belgium, NATO, and Détente, 1960–1973 189 Oliver B. Hemmerle Explaining NATO to the West Germans: Helmut Schmidt as a Military Aff airs Writer in the 1960s 215 Conclusion Lawrence S. Kaplan Refl ections on the US and NATO in the 1960s 237 List of Contributors 251 4 Preface On 26 – 28 August 2004, the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich organized and hosted a conference on NATO in the 1960s. Estab- lished Cold War historians and younger scholars elaborated on the expan- sion of NATO’s political role, which came to complement or even exceed its military and force-planning functions. Th e CSS organized the confer- ence as a partner in the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP, www.isn.ethz.ch/php), a cooperative undertaking dedicated to providing new scholarly perspectives on contemporary international history by collecting, analyzing, and interpreting formerly secret govern- mental documents. Th e volume at hand assembles articles covering the long decade of the 1960s in three sections. It focuses on rifts between Europe and the United States; on central issues including arms control, détente, and de Gaulle; and on the role of individuals in the transatlantic framework. In particular, the book off ers an alliance perspective on issues including the Berlin crisis, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Harmel report. Taking into consid- eration a wealth of newly available primary sources – of governmental, institutional, personal, and public origin – the authors paint a complex and nuanced picture of NATO’s ‘coming of age’. We are delighted to publish these contributions and thank Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher, senior researchers at CSS, for conceptualizing and organizing the 2004 conference and for their solid editorial work. We are also grateful to Christopher Findlay for proofreading the fi nal chapters and to Fabian Furter for the layout of the book. August 2006 Prof. Dr. Andreas Wenger Dr. Victor Mauer Director Deputy Director Center for Security Studies Center for Security Studies 5 INTRODUCTION Drifting Apart? Restoring the NATO Consensus, 1956–1972 Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher Th e Iraq War in 2003 and the related transatlantic strains have brought to the fore the long-standing debate about NATO’s prospects in public, governmental, and academic circles. In 2002–2003, political commen- tators observed that there were “deep diff erences” between the US and Europe, that the “end of atlanticism” had been reached, or that NATO was “dead”.1 Robert Kagan has claimed that, at the beginning of the 21st century, Americans and Europeans no longer agree on major strategic and international questions.2 In contrast, staunch Atlanticists have labeled the transatlantic split over Iraq a “false crisis”. Referring to the vast display of transatlantic solidarity after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the eff orts to reduce transatlantic tensions in 2005 and 2006, they have pointed out that the breakdown of alliance solidarity over Iraq was an accident.3 Optimists thus emphasize the déjà vu character of the 2003 crisis, while pessimists feel that in the 21st century, the United States and Europe are irreconcil- ably drifting apart. To a striking extent, today’s mutual assessments on both sides of the Atlantic – and the language used – parallel the 1960s debates on the state Francis Fukuyama, “Th e West May Be Cracking,” International Herald Tribune ( August ); Ivo Daalder, “Th e End of Atlanticism,” Survival (Summer ), pp. –; Charles Krauthammer, “Reimagining NATO,” Washington Post ( May ). Robert Kagan, “Of Power and Weakness,” Policy Review no. (). See also Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, ). See e.g. Anthony Blinken, “Th e False Crisis Over the Atlantic,” Foreign Aff airs , no. (), pp. –. See also Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq (Washington: McGraw-Hill, ); Vincent Pouliot, “Th e Alive and Well Security Community,” European Journal of International Relations , no. (), pp. –. 9 Transatlantic Relations at Stake of NATO aff airs. For Cold War historians, bitter arguments across the Atlantic Ocean are nothing new – disputes have always been part of the history of the transatlantic alliance. Th e Cold War history of NATO has been described as a history of continuing confl ict and crisis, or as a “trou- bled partnership” (Henry Kissinger, 1966). Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro have noted that in the Cold War, the US and Europe engaged in intra-alliance disputes with little fear of causing permanent damage: “Each successive crisis, battle-hardened diplomats would casually say, was ‘the worst transatlantic crisis since the last one’.”4 Clearly, there are crucial diff erences between the post-9/11 world and the Cold War in the 1960s, and their specifi c eff ects on the Atlantic alliance. As one observer has noted, NATO today is not suff ering from an identity crisis, but it lacks an identity as such.5 Apart from the similarities with regard to perceptions and a comparable use of language, the political and military environment facing NATO today is diff erent from the one in the 1960s in three decisive ways. Institutionally, today’s NATO of 26 member states can hardly be compared to the organization’s previous 15-member incarnation any longer; the role and impact of today’s European Union far exceed the politically embryonic and militarily inexistent European Communities of the 1950s–1960s; and the contemporary global diff usion of power and threat has replaced the system of the East–West confl ict.6 West–West Strains Th is book is about NATO in the “long decade” of the 1960s, when diff er- ences over out-of-area issues clashed with starkly contrasting visions of the future security architecture of Europe. Th at decade lasted from the 1956 “Wise Men” report, which called for expanding the non-military role of NATO in the light of a fi rst East–West “thaw” following Stalin’s death, Gordon/Shapiro, Allies at War, p. See also Timothy Garton Ash, Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West (New York: Random House, ), p. Alan L. Isenberg, “Last Chance: A Roadmap for NATO Revitalization,” Orbis , no. (Fall ), pp. –, . John Peterson, “Is the Wolf at the Door Th is Time? Transatlantic Relations after Iraq,” European Political Science , no. (), pp. –, at f. 10 Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher: Drifting Apart? to the years 1969–1972, when NATO played the most active role in West- ern preparations for a European security conference. A major milestone formally establishing a role for the alliance in European détente was the Harmel report, adopted in December 1967.7 Nevertheless, the route from the Wise Men to Harmel was anything but straight. From 1956 through 1967, the transatlantic alliance was con- stantly at stake. Since the late 1950s, West–West rifts progressively added to the complexity of the East–West dispute. Not unlike today, these rifts resulted to a large degree from transatlantic divergences over out-of-area issues and the politico-military architecture of (Western) Europe. As will be seen in this volume, these divisions were exacerbated because of the diversity of views and policies in Western Europe and North America fea- turing a variety of states, actors, and political traditions. NATO – the institutional core of the transatlantic relationship – was created in 1949 primarily in response to a perceived Soviet threat. However, from the early 1950s on, this uniform outlook fragmented due to divergent assessments among Western governments of out-of-area issues – including Korea and Indochina – and of chances for a relaxation of East–West ten- sions. In the context of the fragile East–West détente after Stalin’s death, policymakers and observers began to question the necessity of NATO. After the Geneva summit of July 1955, political commentator Walter Lippmann feared that the future of NATO was in doubt.8 US journalist Cyrus L. Sulzberger likewise criticized that the Western alliance had failed to adapt to the thaw in East–West relations and suggested that NATO should concentrate its eff orts on diplomatic coordination rather than on military integration and war preparations.9 For recent studies exploring NATO’s political evolution during the Cold War, see Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher (eds.), Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond Deterrence in the s (London: Routledge, ); Christian Nuenlist, “Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Political Cooperation in NATO: Western Reactions to Khrushchev’s Foreign Policy, –” (PhD thesis, University of Zurich, ); Anna Locher, “Crisis? What Crisis? Th e Debate on the Future of NATO, –” (PhD thesis, University of Zurich, ).
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