JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2011 taking note Brazil: Dilma Rousseff’s Victory

By James N. Green

n n e w y e a r ’s d a y , d i l m a r o u s s e f f well as integrity and accountability in govern- became the first woman to assume the ment. Pointing to her humble roots and strong Opresidency of Brazil. An economist and moral beliefs, Silva offered herself as the honest longtime political activist, Rousseff, 63, defeated and principled alternative to Rousseff’s leftist co- her center-right opponent with 56% of the vote alition and Serra’s conservative policies. in a second-round election held October 31, se- Silva’s appeal to integrity was perhaps most curing a third consecutive term for the Work- effective against Rousseff in the last weeks be- ers Party (PT). Her election reflects the massive fore the first election round on October 3, when popularity of outgoing president Luiz Inácio Rousseff’s popularity was hurt by ongoing ac- Lula da Silva, who handpicked Rousseff in 2009 cusations that the PT-led government continued as his successor before leaving office with an to be involved in corruption schemes. To begin unprecedented 80% approval rating. During the with, Rousseff’s predecessor as chief of staff, José electoral campaign, Lula emphasized that Rous- Dirceu, left the position in 2005 when he was seff had stood side by side with him in carrying accused of participating in a congressional vote- out a bold set of government initiatives to move buying operation. Then Rousseff’s own chosen millions of Brazilians out of absolute poverty successor as chief of staff in Lula’s government and into the working classes. became embroiled in an influence-peddling Rousseff’s opponent in the runoff election, scandal, causing Serra to wage a series of hard- José Serra of the Brazilian Social Democratic hitting attacks that attempted to link Rousseff to Party, ran an uneven campaign with the sup- the PT’s corruption scandals. port of the far-right Democratic Party and the In the end, Rousseff fell three points short of former pro-Soviet Communists of the Popular victory, garnering almost 47% of the vote; Serra, Socialist Party. Serra emphasized his experience 33%; and Silva, a surprising 19%. How did Silva as a former governor and mayor, and as a minis- pick up an unexpected six points in the final ter under former president Fernando Henrique week of the campaign, spoiling Rousseff’s first- ­Cardoso. In his first TV ads, Serra embraced round victory? Brazilian analysts adduced sev- Lula’s social reform program and pledged to im- eral reasons. First, erroneous tales about Rouss- James N. Green is prove it. He also rebaptized himself “Joe” Serra eff’s past as a Marxist revolutionary, speculations Professor of Brazilian ­ in an attempt to formulate a more populist im- about her private life, and videos predicting an History and Culture age. At the same time, he distanced himself from apocalyptic future for Brazil if she were elected at Brown Univer- Cardoso, who remains unpopular a decade after crisscrossed the Internet, unchecked by any sity and author of We Cannot his two terms in office. public debate or objective scrutiny. Second, Remain Silent: Before the runoff election, Rousseff faced evangelical churches called on their congrega- Opposition to the not only Serra but also Marina Silva, a former tions to support Silva because of her opposition Brazilian Military trade union leader, environmental activist, sena- to abortion and same-sex marriage, winning Dictatorship in the tor from the rubber-producing state of Acre, unexpected adherents. Third, many left-leaning United States (Duke University Press, longtime PT supporter, and avowed evangelical voters, disappointed with the corruption scan- 2010) and ­Beyond Christian. She served as environmental minister dals associated with the PT, cast a protest vote Carnival: Male during Lula’s second administration but resigned for Silva. And finally, her environmental mes- Homosexuality in in 2008 in protest of an Amazonian develop- sage won over many voters. Twentieth-Century ment project. Her campaign on the Green Party The Rousseff campaign backtracked on her Brazil (University of Chicago Press, 1999). ticket emphasized combating deforestation, as position on abortion, stating ambiguously that 3 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS taking note

she was personally against the prac- During the last two weeks of the economy remains robust, Rousseff tice but saw it as a public health campaign both sides stepped up criti- has indicated that the new adminis- issue. Similarly, the campaign an- cisms on their opponent, adopting tration will have to cut back on gov- nounced that Rousseff opposed polarizing tactics that many analysts ernment spending to avoid a budget discrimination against gays and les- attributed to excessive influences of deficit. Reducing successful govern- bians, but thought the issue of same- U.S.-style ­attack-ad electioneering. But ment programs designed to address sex marriage ought to be decided by in the end, even a last-minute message chronic social and economic inequal- legislative bodies, not the executive. from Pope Benedict XVI calling on ity might erode her popularity. Focus- Meanwhile, Silva stayed neutral in Brazilian clergy to support candidates ing on domestic problems might draw the second round, endorsing neither aligned with the Catholic Church’s Rousseff away from the Lula admin- candidate. The question of abortion ­beliefs—a clear endorsement of istration’s initiatives to expand Brazil’s soon receded, however, after the ­Serra—failed to turn the tide. Rousseff international prestige and importance press discovered that handily out-polled her as an emerging global player. Rousseff Serra’s wife had had an Brazil’s mainstream opponent, with more also faces the problem of holding her abortion in Ithaca, New press almost than 55 million votes to broad electoral coalition together. York, when her hus- his near 44 million. ­ Vice President Michel Temer of the band was completing unanimously Many conservative Brazilian Democratic Movement Party his doctorate at Cornell opposed Rousseff’s journalists and politi- will likely play a more significant role University. cal analysts interpreted in the new administration than Lula’s candidacy, portraying Rousseff’s political bi- Rousseff’s victory as the vice president, José Alencar, forcing ography also became a her as too connected voice of the uninformed Rousseff to cut more political deals and controversial campaign to her revolution- and uneducated dis- make more accommodations to retain issue. As a young student possessed, ­especially a working mega-majority in Congress in Belo Horizonte in the ary past and former the poor from the and among the different ministries late 1960s, she joined comrades, making north and northeast, that will be divided up among her po- the National Liberation who voted overwhelm- litical allies. The promise to root out Command ­(COLINA), her an unsuitable ingly for Lula’s candi- corruption and influence peddling in an underground revolu- presidential date because of their the new administration, if successful, tionary organization that candidate. dependency on the will clearly strengthen the PT’s moral supported the Cuban government’s poverty authority. Lula may be of help in this strategy of armed strug- alleviation­ programs. regard, although he has pledged to gle to overthrow the Brazilian military Implicit in this discourse is a notion withdraw from day-to-day politics to dictatorship, which came to power in that poor people voted narrowly for allow his successor to govern with- a 1964 coup. Arrested in São Paulo their own interests, while those who out his interference; it remains to be in January 1970 and tortured, Rous- supported Serra voted with the best seen if he will resist the impulse to seff served three years in prison for interests of the whole nation in mind. again involve himself publicly in na- violating the National Security Act. The news media reinforced this vision tional politics. Brazil’s mainstream press, which al- of a country divided, using maps of Throughout the campaign, Rous- most unanimously supported ­­Serra’s Brazil ­showing the north and north- seff’s opponents pointed to the fact candidacy, portrayed Rousseff as too east, plus the states of Rio de Janeiro that she had never been elected to linked to her revolutionary past and and Minas Gerais, in red, and the public office as a sign that she lacked to her former comrades, supposedly states of the south and southeast, in- the political experience to be a com- making her an unsuitable presiden- cluding São Paulo, in blue. This over- petent president. Although she is less tial candidate. Although Serra had simplified, but graphic, description of charismatic and seasoned in day-to- also been a part of the radical left in the electoral results obscured the fact day maneuvering than her predeces- the 1960s, his campaign portrayed that Rousseff picked up significant sor, anyone who is familiar with her him as a moderate who merely op- support throughout the country. long trajectory in left-wing politics posed the undemocratic nature of the The new president faces many knows she is by no means a political military regime. challenges. Although the Brazilian neophyte. 4