Introduction
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I Introduction Far from being the tenuous and unmeaningful victory suggested by critical observers, the election of Richard M. Nixon as President of the United States in Novem- ber, 1968, bespoke the end of the New Deal Democratic hegemony and the beginning of a new era in American politics. To begin with, Nixon was elected by a Republi- can Party much changed from that deposed in 1932; and such party metamorphosis has historically brought a fresh political cycle in its wake. Secondly, the vastness of the tide (57 per cent) which overwhelmed Demo- cratic liberalism—George Wallace’s support was clearly an even more vehement protest against the Democrats than was Nixon’s vote—represented an epochal shifting of national gears from the 61 per cent of the country’s ballots garnered in 1964 by Lyndon Johnson. This repu- diation visited upon the Democratic Party for its ambi- tious social programming, and inability to handle the urban and Negro revolutions, was comparable in scope to that given conservative Republicanism in 1932 for its failure to cope with the economic crisis of the Depres- sion. And ironically, the Democratic debacle of 1968 followed the Party’s most smashing victory—that of 1964—just as the 1932 toppling of the Grand Old Party succeeded the great landslide of 1928. A comparison of the two reversals is apt: The changed makeup and outlook of the GOP re- flects its switchover, during the 1932–68 span of the New Deal era, from orientation towards the establish- mentarian Northeast—especially the Yankee and indus- Phillips.indb 1 9/9/2014 11:21:58 AM Chart 1. The Great Upheavals: 1928–32 and 1964–68 share of the total vote for president 1928 1932 Republican 58% 40% Anti- Republican Left (Democrat & 42% 60% Socialist) 1964 1968 Democratic 61% 43% Anti- Democrat Right (Republican and 39% 57% American Independent) trial bailiwicks of New England, upstate New York, Michigan and Pennsylvania—to representation of the rising insurgency of the South, the West, the New York City Irish and middle-class suburbia. At the same time, while the New Deal institutionalized into a nationally- dominant liberal Establishment, the Democratic power base shifted to the Northeast, historically the seat of America’s dominant economic, social, cultural and po- litical elite. By 1964, the transition was reasonably obvi- ous; whatever the strategic ineptitude of the Goldwater candidacy, it was not a geopolitical fluke. As Chart 2 shows, the Republican Party had been moving its reli- ance South and West since the beginning of the New Deal cycle in 1932. The 1968 election confirmed the general Southern and Western impetus of 1964—only the Deep South parochialism had been an aberration— and set a cyclical seal on the partisan re- alignment. Maps 1–4 illustrate the regional tides at work and Chart 3 estimates the group voting currents of 1960– 68. In 1968, only six states and the District of Columbia gave the Democratic presidential nominee a majority of the vote; seven other states produced Humphrey plu- ralities in the face of Nixon- Wallace majorities. In thirty- seven other states, Nixon- Wallace majorities di- 2 Chapter I Phillips.indb 2 9/9/2014 11:21:58 AM Chart 2. The Metamorphosis of the Republican Party’s Regional Support Base, 1932–68 republican share of the two- party presidential vote 1932 1936 Northeast 48% Northeast 42% Heartland and West 43% Heartland and West 40% South 19% South 19% 1948* 1952 Heartland and West 48% Heartland and West 58% Northeast 47% Northeast 56% South 27% South 48% 1960 1964 Heartland and West 52% South 49% South 48% Heartland and West 39% Northeast 47% Northeast 32% 1968** Heartland and West 53% South 53% Northeast 46% * The regional figures represent the GOP share of the Republican- Democratic- Dixiecrat presidential total. **The regional figures represent the GOP share of the Republican- Democratic vote only. (The Wallace vote has been excluded.) vided in such a way as to award victory to either the Republican candidate, who carried thirty- two states, or Wallace, who carried five. Most of the Democratic states were Northeastern—Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Is- land, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland (as well as the District of Columbia)—or (West Virginia excluded) they were states—Michigan, Minnesota, Washington and Hawaii—which had been heavily set- tled or influenced by Yankees or Scandinavians. In light of its concentration in an area which had been the prime sociological core of post- Civil War Republicanism, 1968 Democratic strength was peculiarly ironic. Introduction 3 Phillips.indb 3 9/9/2014 11:21:58 AM WASH VT ME MONT N.D. ORE MINN N.H. MASS IDAHO S.D. WISC NY R.I. WYO MICH CONN IOWA PA NEV NEB OHIO N.J. UTAH ILL IND W. DEL CALIF COLO VA MD KAN VA MO KY N.C. TENN ARIZ OKLA N.M. ARK S.C. ALA GA MISS Nixon TEXAS LA Humphrey Wallace FLA Alaska – Nixon Hawaii – Humphrey Map 1. The Election by States, 1968 Wallace vote share 0 – 5% 5 – 10% 10 – 20% 20 – 40% Alaska – 12% Over 40% Hawaii – 1% Map 2. The Extent of Wallace Support, 1968 (Generalized Con- tours) 4 Chapter I Phillips.indb 4 9/9/2014 11:22:06 AM HAWAII Democratic gain Democratic loss of 8% or more Map 3. The 1960–68 Shift in Democratic Party Presidential Support (Generalized Contours) HAWAII Top ten Next ten Map 4. The Top Twenty Democratic States. Ranked by Humphrey share of the total vote for President Introduction 5 Phillips.indb 5 9/9/2014 11:22:07 AM Phillips.indb 6 Chart 3. Gallup Poll Presidential Voting Analysis, 1952–68 vote by groups in presidential elections (1952–1968) 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Wallace % % % % % % % % % % % national . 44.6 55.4 42.2 57.8 50.1 49.9 61.3 38.7 43.0 43.4 13.6 Men . 47 53 45 55 52 48 60 40 41 43 16 Women . 42 38 39 61 49 51 62 38 45 43 12 White . 43 57 41 59 49 51 59 41 38 47 15 Non- White . 79 21 61 39 68 32 94 6 85 12 3 College . 34 66 31 69 39 61 52 48 42 54 9 High School . 45 55 42 58 52 48 62 38 42 43 15 Grade School . 52 48 50 50 55 45 66 34 52 33 15 Prof. & Bus . 36 64 32 68 42 58 54 46 34 56 10 White Collar . 40 60 37 63 48 52 57 43 41 47 12 Manual . 55 45 50 50 60 40 71 29 50 35 15 Farmers . 33 67 46 54 48 52 53 47 29 51 20 Under 30 . 51 49 43 57 54 46 64 36 47 38 15 30–49 years . 47 53 45 55 54 46 63 37 44 41 15 50 years & Older . 39 61 39 61 46 54 59 41 41 47 12 Protestant . 37 63 37 63 38 62 55 45 35 49 16 9/9/2014 11:22:07AM Catholic . 56 44 51 49 78 22 76 24 59 33 8 1960–68 Trends (Chart 3) Men showed a strong anti- Democrat trend between 1960 and 1968; women showed considerably less change. Historically, men have spearheaded political upheaval while women have given greater backing to status quo politics (since 1964, the Democratic Party). In the eight years, the Democrats lost heavily among white voters, but fashioned much increased support among non-whites. The new popular majority is white and conservative. Vocationally, the Demo- crats lost ground with almost every group, but their loss was greatest among farmers. On the plane of education, the Democrats scored a gain among the college- educated elite, but slipped badly among the country’s huge high- school- educated middle spectrum. The relative age profiles of the twoparties did not change much, although Wallace scored his greatest inroads among young people. Between 1960 and 1968, Nixon lost a large bloc of Protestants— mostly Southerners, Borderers and other conservatives temporarily switching to Wallace. Nixon gained sharply among Catholics, many of whom are leaving the Democratic Party. These statistics indicate Nixon’s 1972 opportunity—acceleration of the Catholic GOP trend and recapture of the conservative Protestants who backed the Re- publicans in 1960 but bolted to Wallace in 1968. The forces shaping this parochialism are clear enough; they explain why, even as 1968 saw the nation turning against the Democrats, a handful of the New England and above- mentioned states swam against the current and gave the Democrats a higher vote share than in 1960. First of all, no other part of the United States shares the historical penchant of the Northeast for sup- porting the politics and ideology of a hitherto nationally dominant, but fading, group of interests. The Jefferso- nian, Jacksonian and New Deal upheavals all captured the White House against ballot opposition centered in the Northeast. And on top of growing national Demo- cratic Party identification with Northeastern interests, another major fulcrum of 1968 upheaval was the ero- sion of Civil War political traditions which had been the Introduction 7 Phillips.indb 7 9/9/2014 11:22:07 AM source of American sectional politics and partisanship for a century. Because of loyalties formed in the cruci- ble of slavery and civil war, Yankees and Scandinavians in New England, upstate New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin and the Pacific Northwest were the driving force and numerical bulwark of a Republican Party they had principally created. But as a result of the social upheaval of the Nineteen- Sixties, these were the groups and states among whom and which the Democrats gained (or suf- fered only minimal losses) in 1968.