From to reform A study of social movements’ success Contents

Introduction 4

About this report 7

At a glance: selected features of social movements 8

Setting the context: what triggers 9 protest movements?

Armenia’s Velvet Revolution (2018) 9 Pro-impeachment in Brazil (2015-2016) 10 The October Revolution in Lebanon (2019) 11 End SARS protests in (2020) 12

There’s no success like failure: 13 debunking spontaneity

The risks and pitfalls of leaderlessness 17 and over-reliance on strong leadership

Measuring success and failure 24

Conclusions 30

2

Foreword From the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia to military coup in Myanmar, undermining civil the Taksim protests in Turkey and the Maidan disobedience and nonviolent resistance. protests in Ukraine, social upheavals can gain strength seemingly suddenly, often around Sometimes, the threat to a protest movement’s a single event, and then go on to challenge success comes from within. When movement deeply entrenched power structures. leadership is weak, or overly rigid and centralised, movements have a hard time What makes these protests so powerful is realising their goals. Equally, when movement activists’ and movement members’ willingness structures are not built for the long haul, it to risk life and liberty in their urgent desire to becomes hard to build and sustain momentum work against— against an oppressive regime, for lasting political change. discriminatory legislation, or a systemic lack of justice. But after these early chaotic moments, Importantly, even when protests “succeed”, disruptive movements too often fade away long-term reforms are not a given. Activists can without creating the long-term changes that lack a long-term vision for change which goes they sought. beyond immediate and short-term demands, leaving them ill-prepared for the “day after” the Often, there is significant resistance against the big disruption. It is because of this that many aims of social movements. Governments push seemingly successful protest movements do back, and push back hard, to quash civic not lead to sustainable change. dissent, and oppress protests against systemic challenges and injustices. They do so through Luminate is keen to understand how those policy, legislation, and through the use of their internal challenges hinder social movements security apparatuses. from achieving continuous, lasting, positive

“Most movements fail in the victory phase.” – Srdja Popovic, founding member of Otpor!, Serbian resistance movement

In 2020, for example, the U.S. government used change. This is why we commissioned heavily militarised security forces to violently this report, as an opportunity to learn from respond to overwhelmingly peaceful protests and make a contribution to a vibrant and challenging systemic injustice and violence courageous field. against Black Americans, and especially Black men in the U.S. We asked a number of questions: How can movement leaders take forward the momentum But the success of social movements is not that they created to build sustainable political only threatened by a state’s own government. change? How can they build the bridge from Other adversaries, governmental or non- political disruption to political reform? And governmental, can play a significant role in ultimately, how can they succeed? distorting, shaping, and even undermining the aims and purposes of social movements. This report, authored by FairSquare, provides some first answers to those questions. We A poignant example is the Chinese government are excited to continue exploring protest which, in early 2021, blocked a UN Security movements, and how they can best help Council statement condemning the achieve more just and fair societies.

Amira El-Sayed Principal, Luminate July 2021

3 Introduction

Over the past decade, mass protests have In parallel, progressive social movements, erupted in a notable range of countries. These largely sparked by measures and have often involved tens of thousands or even joblessness caused by the 2007-2008 global hundreds of thousands of people. In December financial crisis but also inspired by the “Arab 2010, the desperate act of defiance of a young Spring”, as it became known, started forming fruit vendor in Tunisia who set himself on fire across the world. “Occupy” activists rushed to protest incessant police harassment, daily to fill squares in major cities first in the United humiliation and economic hardship unleashed States, and then in European and South long-simmering anger and discontent felt by American countries, spreading to Asia and

Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution”, 2019 (Credit: Bert Pot) Over the past decade, mass protests have often involved tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of people.

millions of Tunisians who took to the streets the Pacific region. Of these, the Spanish 15-M to demand jobs, better living conditions, and and the Greek Aganaktismeni (Indignant) ultimately, political change. In the weeks movements stood out as some of the most and months that followed, huge waves of powerful social movements that demanded mobilizations spread across the Middle East not only greater social and economic justice and North to oppose oppressive regimes, but also “real” democracy.1 The decade ended leading to the ousting of its most ruthless rulers. with millions of people joining youth-led global For the first time, millions of people across the climate change marches and mass protests region were able to imagine a different reality against the ruling elites in virtually all parts of only to have their hopes crushed as uprisings the world – Chile, Lebanon, Iraq, Ecuador, , were repressed through unlawful force, armed Hong Kong, Indonesia, Sudan, Georgia and conflict or the return of authoritarian rule. Algeria, amongst other countries – demanding basic services, social justice, civil and political

4 rights, an end to corruption and in some cases, included tear gas, live or rubber bullets and raids a complete change of the political system. on encampments resulting in unlawful killings and injuries. Tens of thousands of protesters Largely enabled by the use of digital and activists over the world have been arrested technologies that allow them to grow rapidly, over the past decade – many of them arbitrarily and in many cases strongly committed – and were often subjected to prosecution on to participation, horizontal structures of trumped-up charges as well as other forms of organizing, and the rejection of formal judicial harassment that continued long after the hierarchies and leaders, these spectacular protests ended, significantly weakening these movements have been successful in attracting movements’ capacity to survive, grow and adopt huge levels of global media attention, with new tactics. the media and analysts characterizing them as “spontaneous”, “new” or “unprecedented.”2 There is no doubt that the authorities’ response Many of these movements have displayed and political context inform protesters’ choices strong disruptive capacities, bringing entire once the initial mobilization comes to an end neighbourhoods or cities to a halt, and but is it enough to understand why some interrupting all forms of economic and social movements achieve their immediate objectives life for prolonged periods. At times, they have while others don’t? Why are certain movements achieved major breakthroughs leading to the more resilient and able not only to survive but Many of these movements have displayed strong disruptive capacities. However, only a few were able to convert their gains into sustained mobilization and political change.

ousting of corrupt leaders and governments, or also to translate their initial mobilization into constitutional and legislative reforms. However, different forms of organizing? What types only a few were able to convert their gains into of tactics are most successful and when do sustained mobilization and political change they start posing a threat to those in power? with many protest movements seemingly dying Can lasting change be achieved through down almost as immediately as they appeared. leaderless, autonomous movements, or do While some have morphed into encampments, movements need strong central bodies and occupying symbolic public or private spaces leaders to be successful? What are the different for weeks or months, they too have often fizzled strategies that activists adopt after protests out when faced with state repression or a are quashed or simply die down? What drives response that required them to take decisions their choices? How important are past historic or adopt new tactics.3 events to protest movements, and how do they inform mobilization tactics and post-protest Indeed, the authorities’ response to these strategies? And crucially, how can we measure movements has been uneven, and has often a ’s success or failure? shaped their trajectories and ability to survive. In some contexts, those in power appeared to be Based on four case studies of recent protests threatened enough by the strength of popular that occurred in different regions across the demands to adopt reforms, with protesters world, this report will seek to examine some of engaging in the process or turning their efforts to the questions outlined above, while recognizing the monitoring of their implementation. In others, that there is no one-size-fits-all answer, and authorities showed an apparent willingness to that protesters’ pathways differ from one negotiate only to appease popular anger, casting context to another. The cases include Armenia’s doubt on prospects for any meaningful political 2018 “Velvet Revolution”, Brazil’s 2015-2016 or structural change. In most cases however, pro-impeachment demonstrations, the 2019 they responded with intense repression that “October Revolution” in Lebanon and Nigeria’s

5 #EndSARS protests of 2020. In all these set the narrative and frame their messages contexts, protests attracted huge numbers to different audiences. Beyond the use of of people, involved considerable mobilization , these four movements adopted efforts, sought significant political, structural mobilization tactics that differed widely and and economic changes and showed a potential ranged from horizontal, leaderless forms of for great disruptive capacity, which they were organizing to a more hierarchical mobilization able to sustain for differing periods of time, and communication style and a political ranging from weeks to months. transition led by a clearly identifiable leader that opted for highly decentralized yet disciplined In all four cases, movements were also able collective actions. They were also associated to capture the world’s attention as protests with different political ideologies with some were unfolding, with some receiving support identifying with left-leaning, egalitarian politics from their own diaspora communities and and others adhering to right-wing, conservative national or international celebrities, highlighting principles. Finally, the level of state violence and their far-reaching impact. Indeed, social repression varied hugely across these contexts, media played an important role not only and although all movements were able to in generating this support – with activists’ achieve a political breakthrough at some point, constantly disseminating videos and photos only in the case of Armenia and Brazil were they from the ground – but also in mobilizing able to achieve their stated goals. The question protesters and coordinating collective actions. of long-term political change and success, In addition, it allowed activists to successfully though, remains open for all.

Lebanese anti-government protesters celebrate the resignation of Prime Minister in Beirut on October 29, 2019 on the 13th day of anti-government protests. (Credit: Patrick Baz/AFP via Getty Images)

6 interviews with activists and protest leaders, About this report civil society workers, journalists and academics Luminate commissioned FairSquare Research from each of the countries analysed as well to identify and scope 3-4 case studies of social as interviews with social movement scholars movements and political disruptions and concerning general mobilization and post- extracting trends and factors that contributed protest dynamics and tactics. Some of these to successes and challenges; provide analysis analytical frameworks have been incorporated of how social and political movements can into this report. In total, 24 interviews were succeed at creating profound and necessary conducted remotely between December 2020 disruption but often fall short of creating lasting, and February 2021. sustainable reform; offer some thoughts on approaches that work, and others that don’t; Social movements, including protest events, and build an argument building on the above, have been the subject of in-depth academic introducing the case for more sustained work and investigative research, and this report’s to find and employ the ingredients needed to format and space constraints mean that it sustain political reform. Magdalena Mughrabi led cannot hope to offer a comprehensive analysis research for FairSquare. of these movements over the past decade, or indeed, those highlighted in the four case studies. It does, however, identify the main Methodology dynamics and trends underpinning these movements. Similarly, although the authors The analysis and findings included in this have incorporated the voices of activists, report are primarily based on a review of including protest leaders, and experts who have publicly available information on each of the researched the examples examined here, it was case studies ranging from NGO and think tank impossible to present all voices and views from reports to academic publications, webinars, across the different movements. It is therefore press articles, media interviews and social very likely that some contextual or internal media content. The report also draws on dynamics will have been omitted, simplified or

explained without the nuance they deserve.

About FairSquare About the author Based in London, FairSquare produces Magdalena Mughrabi is a FairSquare specialist research and advice to help associate specialising in human rights prevent human rights abuse, and promote and international humanitarian law accountability and the rule of law. FairSquare investigations. Magdalena was Deputy Projects, a non-profit organisation, tailors Director for the Middle East and North rigorous research with communication Africa at and and advocacy work to promote systemic previously worked as a Protection change. FairSquare Research helps clients Delegate for the International Committee understand and evaluate human rights of the Red Cross. issues, and plan their next steps.

7 At a glance: selected features of social movements

Armenia Brazil Lebanon Nigeria Overview Shorthand term "Velvet Revolution" n/a "October Revolution" #EndSARS Time period April 2018 2015 - 2016 2019 - 2020 2020 Duration 11 days Series of events over Six months Just under a month 18 months Context to protests Trigger Attempt by President to Deepening economic New round of taxes Video posted on extend grip on power with crisis and corruption (including on WhatsApp alleging the killing of a constitutional reform investigation into state- calls) announced as young man by SARS backed company part of broader officers in austerity measures Broader grievances or Endemic corruption, , State’s failure to deliver Widespread human drivers electoral fraud, limited nationalism, rejection of basic services, pollution, rights violations by political freedoms institutional politics, anger rampant corruption, SARS. Demands to end against corruption regressive tax system, gross inequality, youth unemployment unemployment, lack of basic services, endemic corruption also featured. Goal/s Removal of ex-President Impeachment of Complete overhaul of the Dissolution of SARS, made Prime Minister President Rousseff political system investigations and reforms from power to police Selected movement Background to Activists learnt lessons Political vacuum left by a Lessons learnt during Movement launched in characteristics movement, previous from protests in 1990s and small, leftist movevent in different waves of 2017, previous attempts protests 2000s, as well as major São Paulo in 2013 after it mobilization since 2011. to campaign for reform mobilizations in 2015 retreated from a leading In particular, 2015 had seen only small-scale and 2016 role in free transportation “You Stink” campaign protests, lasting for a protests that led to mass and subsequent day or two mobilization against campaigns in 2016 and corruption and political 2018 laid base for broad- parties, which right-wing based movement activists exploited and refocussed on Workers Party Key groups represented Broad-based movement Mainly white, middle class Protests, led by leftist and Young men and women in protests reaching across political families with no history student groups, excluded from multiple states, as spectrum, including of activism and no ties to main sectarian political well as in the disapora. professional NGOs, CSOs or political parties parties and involved Strong involvement of activist groups, students participants drawn from social justice movements, and ordinary people across classes, religions NGOs, feminist and and geographic regions LGBT+ groups. Leader/s Opposition Loose coalition of new Protesters rejected any Deliberately decentralized parliamentarian right-wing groups – MBL, form of institutionalized movement. Activists Nikol Pashinyan Vem Pra Rua, Revoltados leadership but high in each state had own Online - coordinated level of participation of structures. messaging and activities progressive leftist groups and NGOs with their own structures Main activities Countrywide non-violent Static rallies with 1/4 of population took part Spontaneous protests, roadblocks leaders giving speeches. in street protests, blocking protests across the and other acts of civil Online messaging, roads, coordinated by country, galvanised by disobedience bringing shared via Twitter, social media. Open "digital protests" entire cities to a standstill and WhatsApp strike called with an encampment erected in Beirut. Outcomes Short term Resignation of Prime Dilma Rousseff's PM resigned, elites Agreement to demands, Minister (former government fell after remained in power. but new SWAT formed President), Pashinyan won Senate voted to Technocratic government to replace SARS. Violent subsequent election impeach her formed that was unable to dispersal of protesters. lead change. What became of Some activists ran Some of the movement’s Harrassed by police and Initial energy of the movement for office or joined leaders ran for legislative military, lost momentum. protests lost after executive, others elections, becoming Covid-19 ultimately ended repression, some groups focussed on monitoring successful politicians protests. Leftist groups stopped activities, other govt performance now focussed on took up monitoring political organizing. role, others continued mobilizing Longer term Amid frustration at Far-right populist Jair PM returned, but 24 inquiries into SARS slow pace of reforms Bolsonaro capitalised opposition landscape violations yet to report. and losses in Nagorno- on anti-political and transformed, leftist Groups are organizing Karabakh war, support for anti-lefitst discourse groups stronger ahead of 2023 elections. Pashinyan decreased of protests

parliamentary system and Sargsyan’s second Setting the context: and final presidential term was coming to an what triggers protest end, he announced that he would be seeking his party’s nomination as Prime Minister, having movements? formerly assured the public that he would not be doing so, and that the constitutional reform Although they were triggered by different he had initiated was not aimed at extending events ranging from a video of his rule.4 The following day, small activist-led in Nigeria and a tax increase announcement in protests started in under the banner

People protest during Armenia’s Velvet Revolution in April 2018 (Credit: Sona Manukyan via Flickr)

Lebanon to a planned power grab in Armenia “Reject Serzh”. In parallel, a respected and and a political vacuum in Brazil, all protest charismatic, but largely marginal opposition movements highlighted in this report were an leader and parliamentarian, Nikol Pashinyan, expression of years of suppressed anger and was leading a 120-kilometre march from grievances against those in power. Armenia’s second city . Although it was meant to generate widespread opposition against Sargsyan’s move, by the time Pashinyan Armenia’s Velvet Revolution (2018) entered Yerevan on 13 April, he was met only In April 2018, merely 11 days of peaceful mass by several hundred supporters, and no one protests, roadblocks and sit-ins in Armenia’s expected that the campaign would soon bring capital Yerevan and elsewhere in the country, the entire capital to a standstill.5 His initial rally brought down President ’s was so small and apparently unthreatening to 10-year-long rule marred by nepotism, the authorities that law enforcement officers widespread corruption and electoral fraud. The were not even deployed. It is only when series of events that unfolded during this period Pashinyan merged forces with local activists, took the world completely by surprise, and their and began touring the city, calling for all huge success seemed unbelievable even to Armenians to “Take a step, reject Serzh” through Armenians themselves. non-violent protests and acts of disobedience that the movement started growing with The Velvet Revolution, as it became known, intensity.6 Once the ruling Republican Party of was sparked by a deeply flawed constitutional Armenia (RPA) approved Sargsyan’s nomination transition from a presidential to a parliamentary as Prime Minister, Pashinyan’s supporters took system designed to extend President over the public radio headquarters demanding Serzh Sargsyan’s grip on power. On 11 April airtime, and protests spread to other cities 2018, as the country was moving towards a across the country. A week later, hundreds of

9 thousands of people, angry at years of endemic Pro-impeachment protests in Brazil corruption, electoral fraud and limited political (2015-2016) freedoms, and empowered by a long history of activism, were mobilising every day, bringing Amidst a deepening economic crisis and entire cities to a standstill. Although hundreds against a backdrop of Operation Car Wash, a of protesters were arrested, the authorities corruption investigation into a state-backed refrained from using force.7 company that implicated officials of the ruling leftist Workers’ Party, millions of Brazilians In a televised meeting on 22 April 2018, by then attended protests and marches between sworn in as Prime Minister, Sargsyan appeared 2015-2016 to demand the impeachment 10 to threaten Pashinyan with the use of violence. of then President Dilma Rousseff. Her Pashinyan was arrested shortly after, along with government finally fell down in August 2016 some of his closest supporters, in a move that after the Brazilian Senate voted to impeach generated even greater popular protests that her for breaking budgetary laws, although were joined by members of an army battalion. many analysts saw the move as a “retaliatory All protest movements were an expression of years of suppressed anger and grievances against those in power.

The following day, Serzh Sargsyan resigned, 11 paving the way for a democratic transition political attack by a political rival.” During that and for Pashinyan, who by then enjoyed time, President Rousseff’s supporters, who widespread, uncontested support, to take were largely members of her own party, trade over as his successor. Nonetheless, protests unionists and leftist civil society activists, continued well into May until Pashinyan was staged mass counter demonstrations to prevent elected Prime Minister by an RPA-controlled the impeachment, which they believed was parliament. After appointing a cabinet, he a “coup”. Their message was difficult to put successfully negotiated new parliamentary across, however, as they were defending a elections, which his “My Step” alliance won in government, which they knew was implicated in December 2018 with a 70% majority, allowing corruption – even if the president was not – and him to finally embark on a reform process.8 as a result were unable to convince the wider public, politicians or the media of their cause. By then, the “revolution’s” objectives were widely deemed to have been achieved, and The pro-impeachment movement was atypical popular mobilization dissipated. Some activists for a country accustomed to protests such opted to engage in institutionalised politics as Brazil: it was supported by mainly white, by running for office in the parliamentary middle class families with no history of activism elections, or joining the executive, while others or previous ties to civil society organisations purposefully stayed away from politics and or political parties. In fact, its supporters focussed on monitoring the government’s were united in their anger against corruption, actions as part of their work with civil society conservatism, adherence to the national flag organisations.9 Three years on, weakened by and a total rejection of institutional politics significant losses in the latest round of the and all political parties. Although apparently Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with in leaderless and spontaneous at first, the pro- late 2020, and popular frustration at the slow impeachment campaign and protests were pace of reforms, particularly of the judiciary, organized by a loose coalition of newly formed support for Pashinyan has dramatically right-wing organizations – Movimento Brasil decreased, and the gains of the Velvet Livre (MBL), Vem Pra Rua and Revoltados Revolution are threatened. Online. Ironically, these organizations were born out of mass protests against the increase of

10 bus fares initially organized in June 2013 in São immediately following the announcement: “This Paulo by Movimento Passe Livre (MPL), a small was the spark, but not necessarily the reason”.15 radical, leftist, horizontal movement demanding Indeed, the ground for mass discontent was free transportation.12 fertile: the Lebanese people were increasingly angry at the state’s incompetence to deliver The impeachment of President Rousseff basic services such as electricity, potable water had wide repercussions on Brazilian politics or garbage collection; massive pollution; and and society. Although the movement’s initial rampant corruption which they believed was stated aim was to oust the entirety of Brazil’s the cause behind a deepening economic crisis, corrupt political elite, regardless of where a regressive tax system, unemployment, and they stood on the , protests deteriorating standards of living. In the lead- stopped almost as soon as Dilma Rousseff was up to the protests, unprecedented wildfires, impeached and her political rival Michel Temer which ravaged much of the country, exposed took over the presidency.13 Despite their initial state negligence even further as ordinary

Brazilians stage a demonstration against Dilma Rousseff at Paulista Avenue in São Paulo, Brazil on April 17, 2016. (Credit: Dario Oliveira/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

rejection of institutional politics, which was people rushed to provide assistance to those instrumental in mobilizing protesters for nearly affected, while the government was forced to two years, some of the movement’s leaders rely on volunteer firefighters and foreign help, ran for legislative elections, becoming highly having failed to maintain its own firefighting visible and successful politicians. As they equipment over the past decade.16 embarked on their political journey, they lent support to Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right populist In the evening of 17 October 2020, groups and defender of Brazil’s military rule’s record of youths took to the streets of Beirut who eventually won presidential elections in spontaneously as calls for protests on social 2018, having successful exploited the anti- media grew by then and were increasingly political system discourse, anti-partisanship disseminated by journalists and Lebanon’s and anti-leftist feelings that emerged from the numerous activist networks. The protesters 2015-2016 protests.14 started marching and blocked major crossroads in and around the capital, coming at one point across the Minister of Education’s The October Revolution in Lebanon (2019) convoy whose bodyguards fired shots in the air, In Lebanon, a new round of taxes (including on only angering people further, and generating WhatsApp calls) announced by the government wider support for the protests. After several on 17 October as part of broader austerity hours, the riot police attempted to disperse measures was the straw that broke the camel’s peaceful crowds with tear gas and rubber back. As explained by an activist with Li Haqqi, bullets, prompting some protesters to throw 17 a progressive leftist group, which was one of stones and engage in low-level violence. the first to call for protests on social media Although the government announced a reversal

11 of the tax measure on WhatsApp calls, it was rights violations, including extrajudicial too little too late. By then, an open strike was executions, torture and other ill-treatment, declared to force the Prime Minister to resign, rape and extortion by members of the unit.23 and protests started spreading to other cities However, they would rarely attract more than and towns, with up to a quarter of Lebanon’s several hundred supporters, and would usually four million population coming out into the dissipate after a day or two following the streets at one point.18 A powerful, apparently government’s empty promises to reform SARS. leaderless and decentralized movement that None were able to generate the sustained mass seemed, at least in its initial days, to transcend mobilization and global support seen by the Lebanon’s sectarian, political, ideological latest round of EndSARS protests in late 2020. and class divides was formed to demand a complete overhaul of the political system. On 3 October 2020, an activist posted a video Protesters appeared to be united in their on Twitter alleging the killing of a young man rejection of the entire political elite under the by SARS officers in Delta state. Although it slogan: “kullon ya’ni kullon” (“all means all” in generated widespread condemnation on social the Lebanese dialect of Arabic).19 media, it is unlikely that it would have gone viral had it not been for an innovative online protest Some civil society groups and activists set launched by activists and Nigerian social media up an encampment in Beirut’s exclusive influencers that quickly gained great visibility downtown district, while other protesters both in the country and across the world. The continued blocking roads with burnt tires, outrage on social media galvanised tens of mounds of dirt or garbage containers. thousands of young men and women who Although Prime Minister Saad Hariri resigned started taking to the streets spontaneously, after less than two weeks of protests, other often motivated by their personal experience politicians who had dominated Lebanese of police harassment and brutality or their public life for decades remained in power. relatives and friends’ accounts. First in A new, fairly unknown Prime Minister was and then in other states, protesters demanded eventually appointed in January 2020 to form that SARS be dissolved. Established civil a technocratic government that was unable to society organizations and activist groups as lead change. By then, the economic crisis was well as newly formed, crowdfunded networks deepening even further, while the authorities’ started coordinating actions on the ground repression of the largely peaceful protests and offered legal and medical support to those intensified, with riot police “firing large amounts arrested or injured during protests, which of teargas at protesters, beating some severely,” were often met with excessive force including and conducting violent arrests.20 In parallel, water cannons and tear gas.24 Demonstrations security and military agencies used organised in support of the movement by laws to harass activists and journalists,21 while diaspora took place in major cities attacks against protesters orchestrated by around the world including Berlin, Toronto, pro-government groups continued, often London, Geneva, New York and Paris. turning protests into riots. The movement eventually lost momentum, and many ordinary Grievances started growing almost as quickly people returned home, with only the most as the movement itself, and on 11 October, committed activists staying on the streets.22 protesters issued a 5-point demand statement, Disagreements over strategy set in, dividing which included the release of all detained the movement. Eventually, in March 2020, protesters; justice and adequate compensation Lebanon declared a state of health emergency for victims of police brutality; the setting up of in response to the Covid-19 pandemic and independent bodies to oversee investigations protests fizzled out. into police brutality; the retraining and psychological evaluation of former SARS members; and an increase in police salaries End SARS protests in Nigeria (2020) as a way to reduce extortion. Many protesters, though, expanded their demands beyond Campaigns calling for the dismantling of police reform and called for broader systemic Nigeria’s notorious Special Anti-Robbery change to address gross inequality, youth Squad (SARS) have been periodically taking unemployment and a lack of basic services place across Nigeria for years, with activists due to endemic corruption.25 On 13 October, publicly denouncing widespread human

12 in a meeting with the National , civil society organisations, There’s no success activists and celebrities, the police’s Inspector like failure: debunking General accepted all five demands made by the movement.26 However, almost immediately spontaneity after, the authorities announced the formation of a new unit, the Special Weapons and The spectacular nature of mass protests Tactics Team (SWAT), to replace SARS, in a attracts global attention whilst they are move that generated wide condemnation and ongoing, with commentators pointing to raised serious doubts about the authorities’ the power of social media and other digital willingness to engage in meaningful reforms.27 technologies to replace organizing structures and overcome weak ties,31 but interest often Protests continued and concentrated mainly fades away almost as soon as people leave the at the Lekki toll gate and Alausa in Lagos, streets. Success and failure are usually seen where on 20 October, soldiers opened live fire through a lens of short-term political gains, at protesters, killing at least 12 people.28 With even though protests often occur in cycles, violence breaking out following the killings, and with periods of mobilizing and organizing after some people, who activists say were not in between. Indeed, although collective mobilization follows “a recurrent dynamic

Success and failure are usually seen through a lens of short-term political gains, even though protests often occur in cycles, with periods of mobilizing and organizing in between.

associated with the EndSARS movement, set of ebb and flow”,32 contemporary social police stations on fire and engaged in acts of movements have often been characterized looting and vandalizing,29 authorities imposed as social media “revolutions”, “a spontaneous curfews, while activist groups largely called for coming together, a natural collective expression an end to protests. Since then, many have been of indignation, or a magical connection of subjected to arrests, had their bank accounts people on Facebook or Twitter.”33 The focus on frozen or had travel bans imposed against the power of social media often hides the huge them. Others decided to flee the country “behind the scenes organization” involved in to avoid violations. Independent television mobilizing people, which is rarely reported on stations were subjected to arbitrary fines for in the news, and activists often benefit “from using social media footage in their reporting ‘spontaneity narratives’ such as presenting on the security forces’ violent response to their demands as the will of the people, or the protests.30 Whilst judicial panels of inquiry proving autonomy from the existing power have been set up across 24 states in Nigeria structure they want to challenge”.34 Whilst to investigate SARS violations, and have there is no denying that activists nowadays rely at times included activists, lawyers or civil heavily on social media to call for protests and society workers associated with the EndSARS organize, more often than not, online networks movement, they have yet to conclude their do not provide a sufficient explanation for work and present recommendations. The the emergence and mobilization of major initial movement’s momentum has largely died movements. Most such movements include down, though some groups say that they keep both experienced activists with a long history organizing in preparation for Nigeria’s 2023 of dissent and mobilization, and newcomers, general elections. who often become accidentally involved by merely showing up at a protest, driven by curiosity or specific grievances. Any powerful

13 movement therefore includes elements of first time, and as a result, had yet to establish continuity and change, with activists learning the networks and trust that are so essential in from past struggles and earlier movements.35 any social movement building, but even more A social movement scholar explained this so in a polarized environment.38 Even though dynamic in relation to recent autonomous the campaign did not manage to spread social movements: beyond Beirut, or attract mass participation, it was largely seen as the beginning of organizing, “The key difference between the and the formation of new ties.39 These informal movements of the squares that survived networks consolidated during the 2015 “You and the ones that didn’t was actually Stink” campaign and wave of protests launched the presence of pre-existing networks in response to Beirut’s garbage crisis that in the locations in which they erupted… exposed state corruption and mismanagement. However, yet again, the protests did not grow Social media can be mobilised and used beyond downtown Beirut. Seen primarily as a as a way to channel unrest, indignation, cause pioneered by “the liberal middle class”, outrage, demands, which can also they did not manage to galvanise grassroots escalate very quickly into a mass support.40 Further lessons were learnt from presence on the streets [...] But what organizing attempts during the 2016 municipal distinguishes [movements] that evaporate and 2018 general elections, as well as smaller afterwards into not much […] versus really campaigns “led by feminists, migrant workers, building and re-fertilizing and revitalizing public sector employees, [and] the families of social movement communities is actually the disappeared” in addition to periodic waves pre-existing networks of experienced of mobilization around refugee and housing rights, corruption, and environmental, social activists and some kind of infrastructure. and economic justice.41 According to research By that I don’t mean institutions and by Lebanon Support, a local NGO, the October organizations, but I mean a community 2019 protests were preceded by some 472 that has an organizational infrastructure collective actions, including protests, strikes, and a reciprocal alliance and identity with roadblocks and solidarity events, organized in each other.”36 support of these causes since 2017.42

Indeed, in all the cases examined in this report, The effects of this gradual accumulation of activists’ narratives focussed on learning knowledge, which people were able to draw processes, and an accumulation of experiences upon during the October Revolution, is perhaps from previous waves of mobilization that in best expressed by a Lebanese activist with some cases went back decades. In Lebanon over 20 years’ experience: “If there’s something for example, activists and researchers point out that I’ve learnt during these past 10 years, it that the origins of the 2019 October Revolution is that every act we make, every meeting we date back to the mobilization of 2011 when attend, every demonstration, every protest we up to several thousand protesters went out go to, every blog we write, every article we into the streets of Beirut to demand the end of publish – this is all part of a long movement, a political sectarianism, echoing the same call 10-year-long movement after which you start repeated in demonstrations across the region seeing real change.”43 at the time: “the people want the fall of the regime”. It was then that the slogan “all means Although Lebanon’s October Revolution did all”, which became so successful in creating not immediately produce the change that a collective identity in the first weeks of the people wanted to see, and merely within October Revolution, first appeared. However, a year of resigning, Saad Hariri was again the ground for making such radical demands appointed as prime minister in a bid to gain was not ready, and the call was largely seen international support and avoid a complete as imported from protests.37 economic collapse, the opposition landscape Indeed, the protests were dominated by a was dramatically transformed during that time, strong presence of political parties, dividing with some leftist groups emerging stronger participants along sectarian and ideological following the wave of mobilization and currently lines. This was particularly problematic since expanding efforts towards community-building the majority of protesters were meeting for the and political organizing.44

14 Graffiti and street art, Beirut, October 2019 (Credit: Freimut Bahlo)

Armenia is another case where continuity Revolution activists stem from protests against between movements that had formed over election fraud, which started in 1996, and smaller decades played a major role, and largely civic initiatives of the 2000s. With the exception contributed to the peaceful political transition of protests which took place following the 2008 of the Velvet Revolution. As explained by presidential elections – lasted 10 days, were an Armenian political analyst, “[To] those violently suppressed and resulted in the killing unacquainted with the realities of Armenian of 10 protesters as well as mass arrests and politics, it seemed that the huge protests prosecutions – these demonstrations usually came out of nowhere to attract hundreds of failed to sustain large-scale mobilization for any thousands of people and engulf the whole length of time, enabling the authorities to ignore country. To those familiar with Armenian them until they would dissipate by themselves. realities, the fact of the protests themselves was However, even if they did not threaten the not surprising, but what seemed unlikely was authorities sufficiently to disperse them with that the protests could ever succeed, since the force or enter into negotiations, they “prevented numerous political and civic protest movements Armenia from becoming a full-fledged that had taken place in Armenia in preceding autocracy”, and “created networks of activism years had mostly ended in vain… [But] it was that enabled mass mobilization in 2018.”48 precisely the legacy of those ‘failed’ protests that had prepared the success of 2018.”45 In addition, many small-scale civic initiatives emerged out of the 2008 protests, which Indeed, civic activism and protests have been were attended by large numbers of youths, a feature of Armenia’s political culture since including students, who purposefully distanced 1988 when a movement had mobilized on themselves from political parties, claiming and off for about three years to demand a to be non-partisan and non-political. In the transfer of the Nagorno-Karabakh region from years that followed, they mainly focussed Soviet Azerbaijan to Armenia46 and to provide on social and environmental causes such assistance to Armenian refugees fleeing as preventing the demolition of an open-air Azerbaijan as well as victims of a devastating theatre in Yerevan or a harmful education or earthquake. The activism and volunteerism pension reform. They adopted “horizontal of that period was not only instrumental in structures, spontaneity, flexibility [and a] shaping Armenia’s post-Soviet identity but also narrow focus” while also aiming for “relatively made people realise that better support and rapid outcomes”.49 Because of their apolitical organisation structures were needed in light nature, and the protesters’ strategy to enter of the state’s failure to lead an effective relief into negotiations with the government, rather effort.47 However, most lessons learnt by Velvet than calling for its overthrow, they were largely

15 seen as unthreatening and tolerated by the While there is no doubt that social media allow authorities. In 2018, these groups brought their movements to mobilize and grow dramatically accumulated knowledge, forms of organizing within hours, without the involvement of and tested tactics to the protests successfully formal organizations, collective decisions or revolutionising their character from the onset. established leaders, the sole reliance on the internet can in many cases lead to failure. As A protest leader explained how this learning explained by a sociologist whose academic process was put to use during the Velvet research focuses on movements, privacy Revolution: “Yes, there are new people. For and data, “[O]lder movements had to build example, a couple of people [in organising their organizing capacity first, working over roles] were very new, but there are also people long periods and expending much effort. from previous movements. I think that all the The infrastructure for logistics they created, previous movements […] have led up and using the less developed technology that contributed to this movement. They have was available to them at the time, also helped formed the foundation of this movement. We develop their capacity for the inevitable have learned a lot. For example, the positivity of next steps that movements face after their this movement was taken from the No Pasaran initial events (be it a march, a protest, or mobilisation, where we saw that it worked and an occupation) is over. Modern networked brought results.”50 movements can scale up quickly and take care of all sorts of logistical tasks without building Of all these movements, two waves of any substantial organizational capacity before mobilization had probably the biggest impact the first protest or march.”54 on the Velvet Revolution: the 2015 Electric Yerevan protests against a rise in electricity The EndSARS protests in Nigeria appear to be prices, when between 10,000 to 20,000 people a case where the internal capacity, cohesion took to the streets, and huge demonstrations and identity of the movement had not been in 2016 in favour of a peaceful resolution of an sufficiently developed before the protests armed takeover of a police station by former started growing and gained mass national and fighters of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict international visibility. Indeed, although the and some opposition activists. In the first, initial EndSARS campaign, which called for a activists demonstrated their great disruptive dissolution of SARS and a police reform, was capacity by blocking the capital’s major roads, first launched in late 2017 by a group of human and even though they lost momentum after rights defenders and organizations that had the government managed to convince some been raising awareness on the unit’s violations of them to move the protests to Yerevan’s through advocacy, “rallies and marches”, Freedom Square, where they no longer public talks and social media actions,55 the threatened daily life, and eventually dissipated October 2020 digital protests were started after some limited concessions, the movement by a separate group of tech-savvy activists, showed “the potential for a youth-based media strategists and entrepreneurs. The innovative peaceful protest”.51 However, it power of social media allowed anyone to lend also demonstrated the limits of a relatively their support and eventually the movement inexperienced, leaderless movement when was made up of different NGO and activist faced with a government’s response that communities with different agendas and no required it to adapt its tactics. As explained by established networks between each other. New an Armenian political analyst: this experience groups such as the LGBTQ network Safe Hquse “helped Armenian activists of various stripes or the Feminist Coalition, founded only three to put aside their ideological differences and months before the protests, emerged as some concerns about ‘politicization’ and ‘partisanship’ of the protest leaders online by successfully and consolidate around Pashinyan and his using their huge following on social media to party during the April 2018 raise funds for the movement.56 Although they events”.52 The second movement exposed the were able to use their social media following ineffectiveness of violent actions, and gave the to greatly amplify the movement’s cause authorities an excuse to use repression against internationally, and even though they organized activists and conduct scores of arrests citing assistance to protesters on the ground by security concerns.53 By doing so, it helped coordinating legal or medical aid, food, water reinforce the insistence on non-violence by and other supplies, they were relatively protest leaders in 2018. unknown amongst Nigeria’s civil society

16 A Nigerian youth holds a protests card during a march against police brutality on October 16, 2020, in Lagos, Nigeria. (Credit: Ajibola Fasola via Shutterstock)

organizations and leftist social justice groups such as Revolution Now that were coordinating The risks and pitfalls protests on the ground, and had a long history of leaderlessness and of activism. They had no shared history of collective action or pre-existing networks over-reliance on strong from previous protest cycles to rely on when disagreements over the aims of the movement leadership erupted, including with the original coordinator Born out of protesters’ frustration with of the 2017 EndSARS campaign, who distanced delegating power to others, a desire to have himself from the protests claiming that they their voices heard, and “a belief that all leaders had been “hijacked” by others.57 will inevitably be corrupted or co-opted”, leaderless movements have been a real The lack of established ties and networks feature of the past decade.59 Although on the between the different groups that started the surface activists often categorically reject protests online was also a major weakness any formal leadership, in practice, however, after the violent dispersal of protesters at Lekki movements are rarely completely leaderless. in Lagos, as there did not appear to be a unified They are often made up of different networks strategy on how to sustain the mobilization, and groups with their own internal structures and with many participants fearing further and hierarchies, and the question of leadership repression, the initial energy of the protests usually arises when the “need for leadership was lost. Some groups stopped their activities functions, such as coordination and public and called on protesters to go back home; representation”, appears.60 others, such as Citizens’ Gavel, who had been providing legal aid to protesters, building on On the one hand, participatory methods their experience and networks prior to the are hugely empowering for individuals, and protests, started engaging with the monitoring contribute to a sense of collective belonging of the work of the judicial panels set up to and shared identity, which is essential in investigate violations by SARS. Others still, such any collective action or community-building as the social justice movement Revolution Now, process. Leaderlessness is also a deliberate who were active in coordinating protests on strategy for some movements to avoid state the ground, opted to continue the mobilization repression, or as mentioned above, corruption through community and political organizing.58 and co-optation. On the other hand, the

17 absence of an institutionalized leadership or end of June.63 However, after the mayor of mechanism to elect or appoint one can create São Paulo accepted MPL’s original demands a political vacuum and constitute a significant and reversed the proposed bus fare increase, weakness for many movements, reducing their the group was keen to end the protests and own negotiating power or capacity to adopt retreated from a leading role. Demonstrators, new tactics, particularly when authorities are though, wanted more: they stayed in the changing their own response strategies.61 streets to demand better public services, The October Revolution in Lebanon and the healthcare, education, and above all an end to EndSARS movement in Nigeria both fall into rampant state corruption. By then the protests this latter category, while the pro-impeachment were truly leaderless. protests in Brazil are an example of how a movement can successfully take advantage of A public policy expert who researched the leaderlessness to advance its goals. By contrast, 2013 protests explained this process: “It was Armenia’s experience shows the advantages of an upheaval, people were very angry and strong leadership in a decentralized movement there was no legitimate political party to lead but is also a warning of the risks of co-optation it them and the only organization that people may present, if left unchecked. trusted – MPL – did not want to lead.”64 Despite its enormous success, MPL was strongly Researchers and activists have yet to committed to its horizontal structure and fully understand how a small, progressive, avoided institutionalized politics, particularly horizontal and non-political left-leaning after its aims were co-opted by a larger group movement gave rise to right-wing, affiliated with the Communist party during a previous wave of mobilization in Salvador in conservative politics in a country 2005: “They did not want to become a political like Brazil and eventually paved the party, and were founded precisely to avoid way for Jair Bolsonaro’s election. politics; this is why they retreated in 2013,” he added.65 Soon after, the protests, which But one thing is bitterly clear: the success of lasted several months and spread across the the pro-impeachment movement goes back country, became a conglomeration of different to a wave of hopeful leftist protests, organized groups with different agendas, including in São Paulo in 2013 by MPL, a group calling progressive, autonomous groups, trade unions, for free public transport, and the political and members of the ruling Workers’ Party but vacuum they created by MPL’s reluctance to also white, middle class families espousing lead protesters in continuing their fight for traditional and conservative beliefs (in a country real political and socio-economic change, where the majority of people identify as black once the campaign’s short-term goals were or of mixed ethnicity). Although some leftist achieved. Indeed, within a few days in June groups tried to form coalitions in cities such 2013, MPL’s protests against a hike in bus fare as Recife or Belo Horizonte, there was no prices were able to mobilize two million people coordination with other networks across the into the streets, having been able to galvanise country and no obvious leaders. In addition, as 62 only several thousands a week earlier. This mentioned above, the Workers’ Party was going unexpected success for a radical group that through an internal legitimacy crisis, prompted up until then attracted only leftist activists and by a corruption investigation, which also anarchists, was mainly triggered by images affected the ability of trade unions to transform of police violence against protesters, which the protests’ momentum into a progressive were widely reported in mainstream media. movement for change. Crucially, though, these Ordinary people, including many families, leftist groups failed to take up corruption, which with no history of activism or established was one of the protesters’ key demands, and as political identities started joining the protests, a result created a political void. In the absence attracted by their non-political, leaderless and of on-the-ground leaders, people went online to non-partisan nature. The lack of any hierarchy find answers or express their anger, where the and the insistence on collective action and space was being filled by emerging right-wing participation meant that people were able conservative groups such as MBL, Vem Pra Rua to express their long-standing grievances and Revoltados Online (see section 6) – much and anger against the establishment freely, to the horror of the original activists who started with opinion polls suggesting that 89% of the protests in 2013. Brazilians were supporting their cause by the

18 The fact that millions of people were Two years later, the angry, apolitical protesters effectively led by these three tiny organizations, who took to the streets to denounce corruption each started by less than a handful of in June 2013 were the backbone of the mass unexperienced, young activists in their late pro-impeachment demonstrations against teens or early twenties, is still difficult to President Dilma Rousseff. By then, they had comprehend. A political scientist explained adopted a clearly right-wing agenda, seeing the this shift: “There were huge waves of anger Workers’ Party as their main enemy. The protest and when you have this many people on the culture had also changed. The movement streets with such anger, you have the perfect abandoned participative methods and protests moment for manipulation. What was left [of lost their fluidity; they started looking like static the 2013 protests] was these traditional white rallies with only a pre-selected, limited number families dressed in [Brazil’s national colours] of people making speeches on top of trucks. yellow and green, screaming against the state The communication style also became much and corruption […] it was quite easy for MBL more hierarchical as MBL and the other right- to transform the anger of these groups into wing groups started producing content for

An anti-Dilma protest in Guarulhos on April 11, 2015. (Credit: Renato Gizzi/Brazil Photo Press via Flickr)

an anger against the system, politicians as online sharing. As explained by a public policy a category, and ultimately an anger against expert: “The movement was led by these three the Workers’ Party.”66 Whilst MPL’s retreat organizations who have their own leadership allowed right-wing groups to advance their and are very visible. At first, they tried to hide own political agenda, the media who needed their right-wing agenda because people were spokespersons to represent the protesters also apolitical and rejected political identities but strengthened their position, by giving them one of the efforts of this campaign was to a voice. A Brazilian journalist describes what make right-wing politics acceptable through happened: “There’s no such thing as a political online messaging. Communication was very vacuum. Someone always steps in to take hierarchical, developed to be shared via over, and that’s what happened after the MPL Facebook and then WhatsApp. They wanted declined to direct the protests in any way. The people to applaud them and share their media wanted leaders, someone who could content but not engage.”68 Because they were ‘speak for the protesters,’ and the MBL youth targeting an older demographic, which was provided them with just that.”67 comfortable with a hierarchical structure, the strategy was effective. 19 By contrast, in Nigeria, the absence of an strength: “It was difficult for the government established leadership was an intentional to single out leaders and arrest them because strategy adopted by EndSARS protesters to everyone was a leader.”72 At the same time, avoid government repression on the one hand, it represented a weakness when the federal and co-optation, on the other. This insistence on government stated its willingness to negotiate decentralized actions and the leaderless nature with the protesters. The authorities attempted of the protests is based on the experience of to use the fact that there was no established Nigeria’s past social movements, whereby leadership, or mechanism to appoint one, to the authorities would invite protest leaders divide the protesters: “The government was apparently for negotiations, but in reality, to saying ‘if the movement is unable to agree buy them off or intimidate them69 – a practice on who represents them, then it suggests a which has been used by governments around level of disunity.’ The demands were out in the the world. This is why protesters insisted on public, on social media so no one wanted to communicating their demands via social or meet with the government. This was only a traditional media and avoided, at first, in-person semi-successful strategy. In the short-term, meetings with the authorities.70 it was a good thing but if they had met, we could have maybe ended up with a better However, this does not mean that the protests outcome, a more detailed implementation were entirely leaderless. While there was no plan. But the fundamental question is centralized form of leadership at a federal level, whether [the government] was acting in good activists in each state had their own structure faith.”73 Eventually, the Nigerian government and strategy on how and where to organize, agreed to the protesters’ demands in a retaining some control over how events meeting co-organized by the Office of the would unfold. There was also some level of Inspector General of Police and the National coordination between different groups leading Human Rights Commission, which was and providing assistance to protesters on the attended by representatives of Nigerian and ground. An activist involved in the protests in international development and human rights

An insistence on leaderlessness does not stop a de facto leadership from appearing.

Lagos explains: “This was a community effort, NGOs, academics, singers, the convenor of with many people involved. Lawyers provided the original EndSARS campaign and other legal services, others were bringing drinks or civil society representatives involved in were sweeping the streets after the protests. police reform.74 Other actors who had been People were using their own cars to transport coordinating protests on the ground, however, protesters. Everything was done by volunteers. were absent, and as a result their voices were This is why the government couldn’t target a unheard. More importantly, the talks failed specific leader. There were no visible leaders to establish public trust in the government’s but each of the organisations that took part in commitment to reforms and avoid a violent the protests had their coordinators.”71 repression against protesters.75

Those coordinating activities on the ground Indeed, social movement scholars point out had also the freedom to adopt strategies that that an insistence on leaderlessness does not would push EndSARS demands and gain stop a de facto leadership from appearing, most visibility in their own state, as opposed which “is often composed of those with the to focussing on the federal government. The most time, tenacity, energy, extroversion, director of a Nigerian NGO that is monitoring preexisting social status, and even plain the work of judicial panels of inquiry into police aggressiveness.”76 The reliance on social media brutality explained that the decentralized by movements to increase their reach and nature of the protests, without any central visibility but also by journalists and analysts to control at the federal level, was its great find representative voices online as they cover

20 protests adds another layer of complication. depending on the involvement of specific While de facto leaders attract much needed groups and their own internal structures and attention by successfully disseminating their strategies. It did nonetheless reduce the movements’ goals and messaging online, they movement’s disruptive capacity to adopt new often lack internal legitimacy in the absence of tactics when the initial energy faded. a “formal recognition of their role as de facto spokespersons”, leading to tensions among A journalist and researcher who observed the activists.77 Crucially, though, in the long-term, the protests explained: “At first, people were very absence of an established leadership weakens emotional. It was touching to see how people movements’ capacity to effect change as no were expressing themselves and overcoming one has the power, or the legitimacy, to adopt differences but then the question of ‘what new tactics when the initial momentum of the next?’ appeared, and protest fatigue set in. And protests fizzles out. The October Revolution in then you can’t protest without a very specific Lebanon is one such example. goal or ability to elaborate specific demands. People were from different class backgrounds “I am the leader of the revolution”, “I am and [had] different interests and priorities. They the founder of the revolution” and “I am the needed a clear vision.”83 negotiator of the revolution” were some of the slogans that emerged during the 2019 wave Although researchers suggest that there were of protests in Lebanon pointing to activists’ a number of external factors that contributed insistence on the movement’s leaderless to the demobilization of protesters even before character.78 In a similar fashion to Nigeria’s the Covid-19 pandemic made large gatherings EndSARS protests, this was a deliberate impossible – including the prolonged economic strategy based on Lebanese activists’ bitter crisis, the use of excessive and unlawful force experience of the 2015 “You Stink” campaign against protesters, co-optation of the discourse designed to expose the state’s neglect in on change by political parties or cold and rainy dealing with Beirut’s garbage crisis. At the weather – ultimately, the lack of sufficient time, state-affiliated media and political parties political organization was the main reason successfully delegitimized the movement by why collective actions faded. This manifested targeting activists with smear campaigns. itself through an absence of a shared political While they portrayed protesters in general as vision amongst the different organizations “delinquents, foreign agents, potential terrorists and people active in the protests, an absence or any combination thereof”, they also carried of a mobilization strategy, and the prolonged out vicious personal attacks against the leaderlessness of the movement.84 movement’s leaders.79 In one such example, OTV, a station affiliated with the Free Patriotic As explained by a Lebanese historian, the Movement,80 accused one of the campaign’s absence of an established leadership “is a leaders As‘ad Thibyan of being “an atheist double-edged sword, being advantageous who missed no chance to insult religion”.81 By at first as an oppositional tactic but focussing on the leadership, politicians also disadvantageous in the longer run when there managed to split the movement when protests is a desire and expectation to take power.”85 As descended into violence, and the campaign’s time went on, disagreements over strategy and spokespersons started distancing themselves political lines became more apparent. With the from those involved in clashes with the police, economic crisis deepening further, activists calling them “infiltrators” and “thugs”. 82 Having were split over the continuation of roadblocks, learnt from these experiences, in October 2019, with some seeing this tactic as too costly for protesters rejected any form of institutionalized ordinary people, who needed to get to work. leadership, even when President Michel Aoun Others opted for more targeted activism by and the Secretary General of Hezbollah both attempting to occupy or disrupt the activities called for the movement to create a body able of symbolic places of political and economic to negotiate with the government. The move power such as the parliament building, the was largely seen with suspicion, as yet another state-owned electricity company or the central attempt to discredit protesters. However, as bank. However, these tactics also became mentioned above, and just like in the other contentious and tensions erupted between contexts examined in this report, the lack of activists once political parties took sides and an established leadership did not mean a praised some of their actions and condemned lack of organizing, which took different forms others, depending on what fitted their political

21 agenda.86 Once again, the movement was By contrast, Armenia’s Velvet Revolution being faced with attempts to co-opt it. stands out as somewhat an exception not only among the cases studied in this report, The question of a potential shift off street but also among recent social movements. Its politics into institutionalized politics was successful transition from a semi-authoritarian another source of major tensions as was the system towards democracy was led by a debate on how best to coordinate between charismatic leader, Nikol Pashinyan, who the various groups involved – informally or enjoyed uncontested support from the entire through an umbrella structure. However, in protest movement including professional those discussions, there was no agreement NGOs, activist groups, students and ordinary as to whether a formalized leadership should people. Importantly though, he was not only even be put forward. A scholar who attended an opposition activist, but a parliamentarian as the protests as an observer explained: “The well, and therefore was able to lead Armenia’s informal won and so people went back to transition by working within the bounds of the coordinating around small issues such as state and the constitution.88 He had gained banking, the environment […] The hesitancy popular legitimacy following his arrest in 2009 or the inability to create an overall structure of for his role in organizing protests against coordination had an impact in addition to the electoral fraud a year earlier, and was sentenced fact that state violence had repelled a number to seven years in prison, although he was of people who had previously been joining released after serving 23 months. His credibility […] People were calling for [the government’s] was further reinforced through his calls for resignation and for the fall of the regime but justice for victims of the 2008 repression, and very few people were actually saying what his advocacy on behalf of people detained for should replace it. It was clear that you needed their activism. Importantly, he was the first to a crisis government, but people couldn’t rally openly criticise President Serzh Sargsyan ahead behind the idea, and if they did, they needed of the planned power grab and had no history of to also rally behind some mechanism to come collusion with the oligarchs.89 up with a set of names. But there was a big fear also that these names could then be A researcher focussed on social movements subject immediately to smear campaigns or and digital media explained how Pashinyan’s would be co-opted […] The absence of a near- grassroots activism and direct communication consensus that names should be put forward, style contributed to his emergence as a natural and the absence of an understanding of how leader: “There was never any question as to this should happen made people reluctant who the leader would be. Pashinyan had a to put names forward. Because there was no good reputation: he was the only MP who agreement, no one wanted to be seen as the was visiting activists in detention. He was person trying to take advantage of the situation communicating through Facebook […] and to advance themselves or to advance their there was a radical transparency in the ways friends or colleagues.”87 in which he came to power. By contrast, Serzh [Sargsyan]’s communication was through Even though a de facto leadership emerged public TV but as the protests were happening during the protests, the lack of a democratic people turned to Facebook because the public appointment or election mechanism meant TV did not cover them. There was no other such that these people were wary of accepting the figure, Pashinyan was uniquely placed to take responsibility to lead, largely “constrained by up that role.”90 In addition, the weakness of an expectation of shared governance” with the political opposition, including Pashinyan’s the political elite. According to an activist who own Civic Contract party – which had obtained took part in the protest, “A big problem was the only 7.8% of votes in the 2017 parliamentary talk of us being a leaderless movement […] If elections – meant that there was no other there’s a rhetoric of no leaders, no one assumes viable democratic alternative.91 responsibility for their actions”, and ultimately no one was empowered enough to take tactical Although there were some disagreements over decisions on the movement’s behalf. Equally, no strategy and tactics during the April-May 2018 one could be held accountable for any mistakes mobilization wave, the overall political vision or inaction. As a result, the status quo remained, and objectives were clear: Serzh Sargsyan and eventually the movement failed to influence was to resign, while Nikol Pashinyan was to any political changes in the short-term. become Prime Minister and lead the country

22 Armenian opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan waves to supporters after being elected as prime minister in Yerevan's Republic Square on May 8, 2018. (Credit: Sergei Gapon/AFP via Getty Images)

towards free general elections with a view then increasingly, to protect the gains of the to eventually change the “corrupt system”. “revolution” which felt very fragile as members Although the movement was decentralized, a of the RPA were still dominating parliament. central “ committee” that included As mobilization subsided however, activists Pashinyan and a group of 15-20 activists from chose different pathways with some joining the “Reject Serzh” initiative and broader civil the executive branch in advisory or other roles society, were meeting every evening to discuss appointed by Pashinyan. Others successfully and decide on the specific stood for parliamentary elections, while a actions for the following day. These would range considerable number of activists returned from roadblocks and disrupting the banking back to their professional activities in NGOs system to storming the public radio building or or civic activism.93 Even after the elections, calling for protests outside Armenian embassies people associated with the former regime around the world. Pashinyan and other activists controlled the media, and for the first year of would then communicate these broad lines the “revolution” there was very much a fear of action to the protesters via social media that the “old guard” could come back. As a (including Facebook Live streams) or speeches, result, support for Pashinyan continued even asking everyone to practice civil disobedience. after it became apparent that people were There was no central coordination of these dissatisfied with the slow pace of the reform actions at a local level, leaving each group to of the judiciary. A social movements researcher implement them as they wished. Even though explained: “It always felt that the revolution there was no democratic process through was fragile and vulnerable during the first year. which members of the revolutionary committee A lot of NGO people were self-censoring […] were appointed, its legitimacy and credibility because they were scared of the old guard were widely accepted. who were still there, and they did not want to undermine the government but as a result, the A former foreign policy advisor to Nikol culture of critique subsided.”94 During that time, Pashinyan and member of the committee only small progressive groups of feminist or explained: “I’m not sure who gave this mandate environment rights activists remained openly to the committee. It was all very organic […] The critical of the government mainly due to their committee included people who had a history dissatisfaction with the narrowly focussed of civic activism. It was a home grown, natural transition, which did not challenge established group that was accepted. You would come to societal norms or the political system itself. those meetings because you had legitimacy”.92 Once Pashinyan became Prime Minister, the Today, many believe that the gains of support continued, initially because people felt the revolution are threatened, with some euphoric, having achieved the impossible, and attributing it to the uncontested support

23 placed behind Pashinyan from the early days like their voices are being heard.97 This is why of the mass mobilization. A former advisor such movements see particularly high levels of to Nikol Pashinyan, who was one of the volunteerism, with people providing supplies main protest leaders in 2018, explained the for protesters, organizing logistics and cleaning challenges that this is causing today: “Since protest sites, or setting up libraries and kitchens the regime change, there have been a lot of in the middle of encampments.98 In addition, disagreements; the incoming government got the vast majority of movements nowadays used to the one man show. The reform agenda integrate offline actions with online tactics was very small, and it still is a one man show such as digital campaigns or the targeted use […] We had to manage his [Nikol Pashinyan’s] of social media to disseminate a movement’s fame and popularity, which was very difficult to messages and demands. Each of these can control […] There was too much power given serve a separate objective at different times. to one person during the revolution and he inherited a constitution that gives too much Experts agree that movements are most power to one person.”95 successful when they are able to constantly innovate and adapt their tactics to the evolving context, and respond effectively to competing demands from political authorities, potential Measuring success supporters, their own activist base and the media, which often has its own agenda.99 They and failure must therefore be sufficiently threatening While the recent movements for change or disruptive not to be dismissed by the seen in Lebanon, Nigeria, Brazil and Armenia authorities, but equally not pose too much of a included mass protest events, protests are in threat to be heavily repressed. In addition, they fact only one of the many tactics available in must remain credible and true to their original a social movement’s toolkit. Others include ideals in the eyes of their own supporters and marches, rallies and petitions mainly used members but also flexible and open to new to show the power of numbers as well as tactics to attract newcomers. Above all, they strikes, boycotts and roadblocks, which are must adopt radical or innovative tactics to often chosen for their disruptive capacity. 96 remain newsworthy.

While the recent movements for change seen in Lebanon, Nigeria, Brazil and Armenia included mass protest events, protests are in fact only one of the many tactics available in a social movement’s toolkit.

By contrast, encampments where protesters While there is no doubt that mass mobilization pitch tents and occupy symbolic public spaces generates greater visibility and media coverage, or assemblies – which consist of discussions numbers do not always achieve a movement’s in small groups using horizontal techniques intended objectives. Indeed, analysts often – are often used to create a shared identity point to the 2002-2003 anti-war movement, and collective sense of belonging. At times, which drew the participation of millions protests also play that role, and are an end of people across hundreds of cities in the in themselves, not just the means to achieve world but was unable to stop the invasion of impact – their main concern being in such Iraq. Similarly, millions of people marched in cases building support for the movement. This the 2017 Women’s March, the day following is particularly true of horizontal, autonomous President Trump’s inauguration, to support movements, where people often participate gender equality and human rights at a time only as a way to express themselves and feel when significant gains were at risk. Although

24 this was widely considered the largest protest Thinking of social movements in terms of in the United States’ history,100 people went their narrative, disruptive and institutional home without immediately achieving anything. or electoral capacities brings another set of Following this logic, does it matter that one questions. Were the movements in Nigeria, quarter of Lebanon’s population showed up on Brazil, Lebanon and Armenia able to frame the streets in October 2019 to demand an end their stories and spread their worldview to sectarianism? And does this mean that a successfully? Did they manage to convince regression in protesters’ numbers over time and both the public and their own activist base that a return of Saad Hariri’s government a year later their demands and tactics are legitimate? Did was a sign of failure? Similarly, did the violent the security forces stand by their side? How repression and sudden end to the anti-SARS did they reinforce their narratives? Were they protests in Nigeria signify that the movement successful in disrupting daily life, and made had failed? In any social movement, mass it impossible for the authorities to continue mobilization “has a specific momentum that can like “it’s business as usual”? When faced with

Defining success and failure is nuanced. While movements demand long-term changes, activists want to see immediate results.

hardly be sustained over long periods of time” backlash and repression, were they resilient regardless of the specific context, strategies enough to survive? And finally, were they able or authorities’ response.101 Numbers alone are to force changes through elections or internal therefore rarely a reliable indicator of success, institutional strategies? even though the media and commentators often rush to offer an appraisal of a movement A close look at these movements offers a mixed as soon as protests fade, before losing interest picture. Overall, all showed a great narrative and moving on to the next big story. capacity, even though they used different tactics to achieve their aims. Their ability to In reality, defining success and failure is much disrupt the status quo varied depending on the more nuanced as social movements are level of state repression in each of the contexts. made up of different groups with competing In the short-term, only the pro-impeachment objectives. Additionally, while movements movement in Brazil and Armenia’s Velvet demand long-term changes, activists want Revolution were able to effect electoral or to see immediate results. The protest cycle institutional change. usually generates only gradual reforms, and only a partial acceptance of a movement’s Armenia’s Velvet Revolution’s widely messaging by the public, which needs to hailed success is perhaps best explained be distilled before it can become part of the by the fact that it was a “deeply mainstream discourse.102 Processes of change ‘institutional’ revolution', one which are slow, taking decades if not longer, and “worked within the existing institutional require deep societal and cultural shifts in parameters of the state”.104 addition to political change. Therefore, experts suggest that focussing on activists’ capacities By doing so, it had a great capacity to effect demonstrated before, during and after waves of both institutional and electoral change. mobilization, rather than immediate outcomes, The movement had a very narrowly and is a more useful approach to measuring clearly defined goal from the outset: to success: “Strength of social movements lie in remove the incumbent president who was their capacities: to set the narrative, to effect trying to extend his hold on power through electoral or institutional changes, and to disrupt constitutional changes. As explained by an 103 the status quo.” Armenian political scientist, “It was very much

25 a constitutional uprising. People came to the As roadblocks were one of the main tactics of streets and specifically called out this attempt the movement, people used whatever means of constitutional engineering on the side of the they had to create disruption, constantly government […] Even though everyone uses innovating, and organizing themselves through the word ‘revolution’, the key strategy as to why social media. Teenagers would play football it succeeded is precisely because it was not in the streets, while office workers would a revolution in terms of that it did not attack block roads by working on their laptops in the state. It worked within a flawed but formal the middle of major crossroads.108 Roads constitutional order of the state, meaning that were being blocked by classical musicians Nikol Pashinyan was a movement leader by day playing concerts, puppeteers holding puppet and a politician, parliamentarian by night. He shows and women standing with their would go to parliament to negotiate with the prams at intersections. As explained by a incumbent leaders who controlled parliament political scientist, “Overall, the energy was [….] This was a dual track transition and that overwhelming and the empowerment that really helped to seal the gains and do it also comes from this level of organizing was peacefully.”105 However, despite the fact that great.”109 In addition to creating an internal he was a parliamentarian, as a member of sense of belonging and legitimacy amongst the the opposition in a semi-authoritarian regime, movement’s supporters, these actions were Pashinyan’s position was weak, and he would very fluid, emerging in one place, disappearing not have achieved this negotiation power before the arrival of the police to re-emerge had it not been for the movement’s great elsewhere, bringing entire cities to a halt and disruptive and narrative capacity, which posed completely overwhelming law enforcement a significant threat to the authorities. forces. At the same time, the leadership, aided by NGO workers who participated in the Indeed, the positive framing adopted by the protests in large numbers and had experience movement in the initial days of the protests dealing with security forces, kept insisting on played a huge role in encouraging people to non-violence, referring to the police as “friends” join spontaneously. Following a first speech at a even in situations of arrests. rally he held immediately after entering Yerevan on 13 April 2018, which failed to attract crowds While the Velvet Revolution was hugely beyond several hundred middle aged men, successful in achieving its short-term goals and Pashinyan drastically changed his narrative. He demonstrated great narrative, disruptive and abandoned the old discourse of “oppressed electoral capacity, it is yet unclear whether it will Armenian people” and a “fascist regime”, succeed in translating its gains into a formalized which until then had been routinely used at process of institutional and political change. demonstrations, and instead spoke of “proud This can only be assessed in the long-term.110 Armenian citizens” and a “revolution of love and harmony.”106 In parallel, he adopted tactics The pro-impeachment protests in Brazil used by young activists of Armenia’s many civic are another example of a movement that initiatives, and instead of pitching tents in the achieved its stated goals, square, as was usual practice for opposition movements until then, he started touring and although it developed a strong narrative, the capital’s schools and universities, calling disruptive and electoral capacity, the specific on everyone to practice civil disobedience political and economic context at the time in their own cities, villages and towns. The played perhaps a more significant role in novelty of the discourse and tactics was shaping its success than in the other cases hugely successful in attracting huge numbers studied in this report. It created a clear of youths, including students. Once other opportunity for a successful adoption of a parts of the population, including the elderly, right-wing agenda by a previously apolitical saw this initial mobilization, they overcame public, and the rise of right-wing politicians into their fears and started joining the protests institutionalized politics. A political scientist spontaneously.107 For the first time, women explained: “There was a political crisis within constituted a large proportion of protesters, the Workers’ Party, an economic crisis with the and were able to express themselves in a middle class losing its income and purchasing patriarchal society and space traditionally power and then a social crisis. So this was the reserved for men. perfect storm […] For an impeachment you

26 need to have three components: people who successful it was, with images, with videos. want to go to the streets, a political crisis [which And afterwards, they continued to add that manifested itself with] parties abandoning spin, using it to mobilize for the next wave Dilma Rousseff, and low popularity rates of the of protests.”114 As a result, within a space of president. Dilma Rousseff did not know how to several months, the movement grew from a answer the protests in 2013. She had no strategy small, apparently irrelevant demonstration in […] and all of this was happening against the São Paulo in November 2014 to a mass protest backdrop of Operation Car Wash – the symbol of event in March 2015 that attracted a million a fight against corruption. This is what made the people. Whilst the strategy clearly worked, impeachment process possible”.111 some researchers also point to the role that Brazilian mass media played in supporting MBL and the other right-wing activist groups the pro-impeachment movement by giving its took advantage of this unique context to activities and positions far more coverage.115 mobilise huge numbers of protesters by creating a compelling, relatable narrative, and Following Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment, communicating it effectively via social media. the movement continued organizing, and Their messaging was based on the idea of some of the most recognizable campaign and a clear antagonist, which they identified as protest leaders, such as Kim Kataguiri, joined the Workers’ Party, an antipolitical system political parties, founded new ones or ran for discourse and a focus on corruption as the office, even though they built their support cause of all of Brazil’s crises. However, as base on an antipolitical system and antiparty explained by another political scientist who discourse. There too, they demonstrated a great studied these organizations’ online strategies, capacity to set the narrative by using protesters’ “The anti-system discourse was very much “mistrust, anger, and frustration in their favor, directed against the [political] left, which channeling these feelings into successful was very new in Brazil […] and although they electoral campaigns that emphasized their talked about all politicians being corrupt, personal agendas and actually downplayed the the discourse was more about the left being role of political parties.”116 corrupt”.112 She explained further that even though the organizations behind these With no changes to the sectarian system, online campaigns were very heterogeneous, the return of Saad Hariri as Prime Minister, a they were unified in their messaging, which deepening economic crisis and the devastating was simplified for the purpose of social destruction of a mass explosion in Beirut media. This created a semblance of internal caused by state negligence, cohesion within the movement. In addition, they had a clear strategy of engagement and on the surface, it is hard to see how dissemination online, attracting a wide range of Lebanon’s October 2019 Revolution has followers and both online and offline networks achieved anything positive. Yet, even if there that allowed them to gain greater visibility were no obvious, immediate outcomes, the beyond their initial activist base – something, movement was very successful in shifting which the Workers’ Party and left-leaning the political narrative and planting the organizations failed to achieve, and as a result seeds for future political organizing. continued preaching to the converted.113 In the two years leading up to Dilma Rousseff’s Indeed, in the space of just a year since the impeachment, pro-impeachment messages protests, anti-sectarianism has become part of on Twitter had far more retweets, likes and the mainstream discourse. As explained by an engagements through comments. activist: “In 2011, when we used to say ‘kullon ya’ni kullon’ [‘all means all’], we were alienated, In addition, the movement was able to but now this is mainstream. This is a major successfully integrate its online campaign success.”117 By successfully using the slogan both with offline activities: “They would call for during the protests and on social media as well protests and at the same time diffuse a very as organizing countless debates and open public clear message online. During the protests, forums in protest tents set up in a private parking they were filming and [streaming them live] lot in downtown Beirut, each run by a different as well showing how large the protests were. progressive activist group or leftist party, the They had a very clear strategy to add their own October 2019 Revolution managed to create a spin of what the protest represented, and how

27 new sense of belonging and a hunger for political radicalization of the majority of the population activism, especially among the youths, attracted against the political elites. Perhaps most by the energy and horizontalism of the protests importantly, they also raised greater awareness and a festival-like atmosphere. amongst protesters of the need for political and social organizing.122 In that sense, the October Expensive, luxury shops were shut down, traffic 2019 Revolution was a major achievement. was disrupted and the space was reclaimed While it might have failed to fully capitalise on by intellectually stimulating discussions. It its initial disruptive capacity, particularly when was not just the occupation of a symbolic faced with state repression, it strengthened space that was hugely empowering but the progressive leftist groups and parties such as Li openness of the debates, in which everyone’s Haqqi, Citizens in a State, Beirut Madinati or the voice seemed to be valued and heard. National Bloc, as well as student movements, Discussions focussed on tactics – such as which embarked on a process of grassroots, the recurrent debates around roadblocks or community organizing and movement-building. school boycotts that would allow children to The protests also saw the emergence of labour join protests – as well as long-term economic organisations through the formation of new, and political outlooks, “media ownership, water independent syndicates of lawyers, engineers, shortages, failed government projects [and] artists, academics and others. Lebanon’s environmental destruction,” amongst other “revolution” is very much an unfinished affair, issues of concern to ordinary people.118 What a process that is yet to fully unfold, but that is was unprecedented was not only the fact that likely to continue suffering internally from a such discussions were happening, but that they lack of vision “without the advancement of a were unmediated by political parties and were theoretical and political project.”123 taking place outside the established system and its entrenched divisions. According to a Nigeria’s EndSARS protests are another journalist covering the protests, “It felt like a example of a movement with great true agora of democracy, people finally taking narrative capacity, which was unable power into their own hands after so many years to bear the costs of the successful of oppression and dysfunction.”119 The novelty of disruption it created, when faced with the tactics and people’s excitement prompted some TV stations to host “unprecedented, harsh repression. hours-long open mic shows where individuals Just like in Lebanon, some activist groups, can speak freely and put forward demands, which emerged re-energized from the protests reveal problems and propose ideas for and were able to attract a new support base, reform,”120 giving the movement great visibility are now turning their efforts towards internal and allowing it to spread its views and positions political organizing. For some, this means successfully to broader public. preparing for the 2023 general elections. Another new feature of the protests was the As explained above, the innovative use of social widespread cursing of politicians, often caught media gave the movement huge visibility on camera and disseminated via social media. and outside support. By doing so, it gave it As explained by a journalist who covered the legitimacy and strengthened its bargaining protests, “Ordinary Lebanese […] have always and persuasion power vis-a-vis the authorities. cursed the elite classes privately, but never The protests were initially launched online by to their faces. There is a new boldness in a group of tech-savvy activists, who started Lebanon. It has built up not just over the last tagging local journalists on Twitter and few days, but over the last several years of shaming them for failing to cover people’s protests and worsening economic conditions outrage at SARS brutality. They then went […] For outsiders, this may appear crude and on to successfully target both Nigerian and inappropriate. But for anyone who has endured international celebrities, including musicians, the everyday suffering most of Lebanon’s football players and actors, at times equating population face, it also feels empowering.”121 the EndSARS movement to All of these tactics have contributed to protests, and asking them to express their generating “new conversations across social support on Twitter. By responding positively, groups”, “a recognition of corruption”, the these figures greatly amplified the movement’s “de-sanctification of political figures” and voices and attracted global attention to SARS

28 EndSARS protestors in Lagos in October 2020 (Credit: Jerry Jallo via Flickr)

brutality. By 9 October 2020, the although they also faced harassment and #EndSars was trending worldwide, prompting rejection by some protesters and activists, Twitter’s CEO to express his solidarity with including the initial founder of the 2017 protesters and retweet a crowdfunding EndSARS campaign. In general though, the initiative by the Feminist Coalition that became first days of the protests were characterized by hugely successful. A week later, it was being solidarity, kinship and new friendships. Cooks used in some 3.3 million tweets.124 offered food to the protesters on the ground, and businesses offered new opportunities to Importantly, the online buzz empowered some Nigerians when they stated on social ordinary Nigerians to recount their experiences media that they had lost their jobs.128 of harassment and police brutality on Twitter and other platforms, prompting thousands to Following the killings of protesters at Lekki, join a mass digital campaign to ban Nigerian which the authorities continue to deny, government officials from international despite widespread video evidence of travel. People signed petitions and created army involvement and an in-depth CNN online email templates for supporters to sign investigation,129 the movement’s disruptive and send to international organizations.125 capacity was effectively destroyed. Many Ultimately, the movement was successful in protesters went into hiding or fled the country integrating online tactics with offline collective out of fear of arrest, or as mentioned above actions, as explained by an activist who were subjected to travel bans and other attended protests in Lagos: “The drive on social forms of harassment. Since then, civil society media especially on Twitter helped galvanise organizations and activist groups have been people on the streets.”126 placing their efforts in using the political awakening created by the protests, particularly The sense of belonging created by the retelling amongst young people, to raise awareness of a shared experience empowered also about the power of active political participation marginalized groups, such as LGBTQ people, and organizing. In a country where more than who are subjected to pervasive discrimination 60% of the population is under 25, the protests as well as homophobic crimes by both the have sparked conversations about the need police and non-state actors, to join online and for youths to get involved in politics, register to offline protests under the slogan “Queer lives vote, join political movements or parties and matter”. This led to the emergence of new ultimately, run for office.130 Some NGOs have groups such as Safe Hquse, who successfully been providing training on political institution- raised money on social media to support building, mobilizing and campaigning in LGBTQ EndSARS protesters through legal and preparation for the 2023 general elections.131 medical and by providing transportation,127

29 Regardless of the nature of demands, meaningful political change always involves long-term processes and institution-building.

themselves and the rest of society.”132 Conclusions Meaningful political change cannot take place The movements in Lebanon, Nigeria, Brazil without deep cultural and societal shifts, which and Armenia examined in this report show all take time, and cannot happen without ideas that regardless of the nature of demands, that at first may seem radical gaining wide meaningful political change always involves public acceptance. In some cases, the mere long-term processes and institution-building. participation in a protest or another form of Whilst a movement’s choice of certain tactics collective action can be enough to empower can be hugely effective in gaining legitimacy, a new generation of activists and plant the disrupting the status quo or affecting seeds for movements to come, regardless of institutionalized politics in one context, these immediate outcome. Indeed, many see failures same tactics may not lead to any tangible as important learning processes, and an change in another. The fact that roadblocks as opportunity for activists to invest in organizing a civil disobedience strategy worked during and movement-building. the Velvet Revolution in Armenia does not necessarily mean that they would work in all Ten years since the Arab Spring, which started a protest movements for change, and indeed, decade where mass protests became a feature Lebanon’s 2019 experience proves that. of global politics, there is still no consensus as Similarly, while a persistent digital campaign to whether it was a success or failure. With the in Brazil contributed to pro-impeachment return to repression even more extreme than protesters achieving their stated goals, in under Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, armed conflicts Nigeria, EndSARS demonstrations were in , Libya and Yemen, and peaceful violently repressed despite activists’ very activists behind bars in Bahrain, Tunisia is effective and innovative use of social media generally hailed as the only “success story”. But and online protest. there too, many human rights organisations warn that successive governments failed to Social movements can of course learn a prioritize accountability and human rights great deal from each other, but their success over security concerns, engaging in repressive is largely informed by their own trajectories tactics often reminiscent of the past.133 The and history. Placing too much importance on exhilaration that people felt in 2011 as rulers “revolutionary” or protest events and short- were toppled one by one is long gone, but the term gains at the expense of processes, which uprisings’ profound effects on politics, the level by definition are slow and yield results only in of political and social debate, and people’s the long-term, often leads to thinking about awareness of their own rights are still visible movements only in binary terms – either as today. It would be an error to conclude that a success or as a failure. Importantly, this because the aspirations of those protesters does not allow for a more nuanced analysis. were in many cases not realized in the short As one expert commentator puts it, “Protests term, that they have not left a powerful legacy sometimes look like failures in the short term, that others can build on. In some contexts they but much of the power of protests is in their already are. The hope for change remains. long-term effects, on both the protesters

30 Endnotes 35 Ibidem: 70 36 Cristina Flesher Fominaya, Editor in Chief of Social Movement Studies Journal and Excellence 1 Cristina Flesher Fominaya, “Democracy Reloaded: Inside Spain’s Political Laboratory from 100 Reader in Social Politics and Media at Loughborough University, 8 January 2021, interview 15-M to Podemos”, (2020): 4; Zeynep Tufekci, “Twitter and Tear Gas, the Power and Fragility of 37 Adham Hassaniyeh, activist with Li Haqqi, 22 January 2021, interview Networked Protest”, (Yale University Press, 2017): 81 38 At the time of the protests, Lebanon was politically divided between the pro-Syrian “8 March” 2 Cristina Flesher Fominaya, “Democracy Reloaded: Inside Spain’s Political Laboratory from 15-M and the US and Saudi-backed “14 March” coalitions. The presence of some parties aligned with to Podemos”, (2020): 4 the “8 March” alliance alienated some protesters who were otherwise supportive of the call to 3 Zeynep Tufekci, “Twitter and Tear Gas, the Power and Fragility of Networked Protest”, (Yale “overthrow the regime”. University Press, 2017): XVIII 39 Fares Halabi, “From “Overthrowing the regime” to “All Means All”: An Analysis of the 4 Laurence Broers, “In Armenia, a Constitutional Power Grab Backfires”, , (24 April Lebanonisation of Arab Spring Rhetoric”, Arab Reform Initiative, (18 December 2019), available 2018), available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2018/04/armenia-constitutional-power- at: https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/from-overthrowing-the-regime-to-all-means-all- grab-backfires an-analysis-of-the-lebanonisation-of-arab-spring-rhetoric/ 5 Olesya Vartanyan, ““Velvet Revolution” Takes Armenia into the Unknown”, International Crisis 40 Lara Bitar, Miriam Younes, “New Ways of Relating to Each Other”, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, Group, (26 April 2018), available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/ (12 November 2019), available at: https://www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/41305/new-ways-of- armenia/velvet-revolution-takes-armenia-unknown relating-to-each-other 6 Yevgenya Jenny Paturyan, Associate Professor of the Political Science and International Affairs 41 Ibidem Program leading a research project on Armenian civil society, American University of Armenia, 42 Lebanon Support, “What mobilizes Lebanon? A look into collective actions from 2017 leading 11 January 2021, interview up to October 2019”, available at: https://civilsociety-centre.org/content/what-mobilises- نانبل-كّرحي-يذلا-امLaurence Broers, “Introduction” in Armenia’s Velvet Revolution, Authoritarian Decline and Civil lebanon-look-collective-actions-2017-leading-october-2019- 7 Resistance in a Multipolar World, ed. L. Broers and A.Ohanyan, (I.B. Tauris, 2020): 4 43 Nadine Moawad, Lebanese activist. See video interview published in Fares Halabi, “From 8 Ibidem: 6 “Overthrowing the regime” to “All Means All”: An Analysis of the Lebanonisation of Arab Spring Rhetoric”, Arab Reform Initiative, (18 December 2019), available at: https://www.arab- 9 Armine Ishkanian and Sona Manusyan, “The Postprotest Context in Armenia: Divergent reform.net/publication/from-overthrowing-the-regime-to-all-means-all-an-analysis-of-the- Pathways for Civic Actors” in After Protests: Pathways Beyond Mass Mobilization, ed. R. lebanonisation-of-arab-spring-rhetoric/ Youngs, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019): 19 44 Ziad Abu-Rish, Visiting Associate Professor of Human Rights, Bard College, 19 January 10 Marisa von Bülow, “Pathways after Protests: The Case of Brazil” in After Protests: Pathways 2021, interview Beyond Mass Mobilization, ed. R. Youngs, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019): 69 45 Mikayel Zolyan, “Thirty years of protest, How Armenia’s legacy of political and civic protests prepared the Velvet Revolution” in Armenia’s Velvet Revolution, Authoritarian Decline and Civil 11 Vincent Bevins, “The Brazilian Spring That Never Arrived”, , (20 June 2018), available Resistance in a Multipolar World, ed. L. Broers and A.Ohanyan, (I.B. Tauris, 2020): 51 at: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/brazil-protest-june-2013- rousseff-lula-bolsonaro-election-workers-party-temer/563165/ 46 Recognized as part of Azerbaijan, the Nagarno-Karabakh region is inhabited by ethnic Armenians and is controlled by separatist Armenians, who receive backing from the Armenian 12 Esther Solano, Adjunct Professor at the Federal University of São Paulo in International authorities. Relations, 20 January 2021, interview 47 Yevgenya Jenny Paturyan, “Armenian civil society, Growing pains, honing skills and possible 13 Marisa von Bülow, “What Happened to Brazil’s Civic Activism?”, Carnegie Endowment pitfalls” in Armenia’s Velvet Revolution, Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a for International Peace, (19 December 2017), available at: https://carnegieendowment. Multipolar World, ed. L. Broers and A.Ohanyan, (I.B. Tauris, 2020): 104 org/2017/12/19/what-happened-to-brazil-s-civic-activism-pub-75068 48 Mikayel Zolyan, “Thirty years of protest, How Armenia’s legacy of political and civic protests 14 Esther Solano, ““It’s All Corrupt”, The Roots of Bolsonarism in Brazil” in The Emergence prepared the Velvet Revolution” in Armenia’s Velvet Revolution, Authoritarian Decline and Civil of Illiberalism Understanding a Global Phenomenon, ed. B. Vormann and M. D. Weinman, Resistance in a Multipolar World, ed. L. Broers and A.Ohanyan, (I.B. Tauris, 2020): 59 (Routledge, 2020) v. 1, p. 210-223 49 Yevgenya Jenny Paturyan, “Armenian civil society, Growing pains, honing skills and possible 15 Adham Hassaniyeh, activist with Li Haqqi, 22 January 2021, interview pitfalls” in Armenia’s Velvet Revolution, Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a 16 Kareem Chehayeb, “Opinion: Lebanon’s protests and wildfires tell the same grim story”, Multipolar World, ed. L. Broers and A.Ohanyan, (I.B. Tauris, 2020): 107 Washington Post, (18 October 2019), available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 50 Armen Grigoryan, protest leader in Karena Avedissian, “A real revolution? Protest leader Armen opinions/2019/10/18/lebanons-protests-wildfires-tell-same-grim-story/ Grigoryan on what’s happening in Armenia”, Open Democracy, (30 April 2018), available at: 17 Timour Azhari, “Protests over taxes threaten Lebanon’s political establishment, , (18 https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/real-revolution-protest-leader-armen-grigoryan-on- October 2019), available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/10/18/protests-over- what-s-happening-in-ar/ taxes-threaten-lebanons-political-establishment 51 Mikayel Zolyan, “Thirty years of protest, How Armenia’s legacy of political and civic protests 18 Vivian Yee, “Lebanon Protests Unite Sects in Demanding New Government”, The New York prepared the Velvet Revolution” in Armenia’s Velvet Revolution, Authoritarian Decline and Civil Times, (23 October 2020), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/world/ Resistance in a Multipolar World, ed. L. Broers and A.Ohanyan, (I.B. Tauris, 2020): 65 middleeast/lebanon-protests.html 52 Ibidem 19 International Crisis Group, “Pulling Lebanon out of the Pit”, Middle East Report N°214, 53 Following the attack on the police station, during which a police officer was killed, and (June 2020) several others were taken hostage, the Sasna Tsrer group demanded the resignation of 20 , “Lebanon: Police Violence against Protesters”, (17 January 2020), then President Serzh Sargsyan and called on Armenians to take to the streets and start an available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/17/lebanon-police-violence-against- uprising. Immediately after, the Armenian authorities started arresting activists to prevent protesters demonstrations from taking place. Despite the repression, protests grew, and the police 21 Amnesty International, Lebanon: Punishing the October Protest Movement, (6 July 2020), used excessive and disproportionate force against peaceful crowds in addition to physically available at: https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1826282020ENGLISH.PDF assaulting journalists. See Human Rights Watch, “Armenia: Excessive Police Force at Protest”, (1 August 2016), available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/01/armenia-excessive- 22 Ziad Abu-Rish, Visiting Associate Professor of Human Rights, Bard College, 19 January 2021, police-force-protest interview 54 Zeynep Tufekci, “Twitter and Tear Gas, the Power and Fragility of Networked Protest”, (Yale 23 Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Time to end impunity: Torture and other violations by Special University Press, 2017): 70 Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS)”, (2019): 3 55 Njideka Agbo, “Nigerian Presidency has Received The #EndSars Petition- Segun Awosanya”, 24 OHCHR, “UN human rights experts demand Nigeria investigate shooting of peaceful protestors (11 August 2018), available at: https://guardian.ng/life/nigerian-presidency-has-received-the- by soldiers”, (3 November 2020), available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ endsars-petition-segun-awosanya/ DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26468&LangID=E 56 Akindare Okunola, “Young, Bold, Feminist: How Is Nigeria’s Damilola Odufuwa Creating Space 25 Al Jazeera, “SARS: Why are tens of thousands of Nigerians protesting?”, (21 October 2020), for Africa’s Women?”, Global Citizen, (22 January 2021), available at: https://www.globalcitizen. available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/21/endsars-protests-why-are- org/en/content/feminist-coalition-damilola-odufuwa-nigeria-women/ nigerians-protesting; Interviews with four Nigerian activists who took part in EndSARS protests in and Lagos, January 2021 57 National Daily Newspaper, “Politicians, others have hijacked #EndSARS protest – Segalink”, (17 October 2020), available at: https://nationaldailyng.com/politicians-others-have-hijacked- 26 BBC News, “SARS: Presidential panel on police reforms okay 5-point demand of End Sars endsars-protest-segalink/; See also: Punch, “#EndSARS protest has been hijacked, says Nigerian protesters”, (13 October 2020), available at: https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori- Segalink”, (14 October 2020), available at: https://punchng.com/endsars-protest-has-been- 54528118 hijacked-says-segalink/ 27 BBC News, “End Swat, Nigerians reject police unit replacing hated Sars”, (14 October 2020), 58 Damian Ugwu, researcher, Amnesty International Nigeria, 11 January 2021, interview available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-54531449 59 Zeynep Tufekci, “Twitter and Tear Gas, the Power and Fragility of Networked Protest”, (Yale 28 Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Denials and cover up mark 100 days since Lekki shooting”, University Press, 2017): 99 (28 January 2020), available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/01/nigeria- denials-and-cover-up-mark-100-days-since-lekki-shooting/ 60 Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, “Social Movements, an Introduction”, Second Edition (Blackwell, 1999, 2006): 142 29 Alexis Akwagyiram, “‘Perfect storm’: How Nigeria’s peaceful police protests turned violent”, , (27 October 2020), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-protests- 61 Zeynep Tufekci, “Twitter and Tear Gas, the Power and Fragility of Networked Protest”, (Yale activists-idUSKBN27C13D University Press, 2017): 71 30 Human Rights Watch, “Nigeria: Punitive Financial Moves Against Protesters”, (13 November 62 Vincent Bevins, “The Brazilian Spring That Never Arrived”, The Atlantic, (20 June 2018), available 2020), available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/13/nigeria-punitive-financial-moves- at: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/brazil-protest-june-2013- against-protesters rousseff-lula-bolsonaro-election-workers-party-temer/563165/ 31 Cristina Flesher Fominaya, “Democracy Reloaded: Inside Spain’s Political Laboratory from 15-M 63 Termômetro paulistano - Manifestações PO813712, 25/10/2013, available at: http://media.folha. to Podemos”, (2020): 43 uol.com.br/datafolha/2013/10/28/manifestacoes-2013-10-27.pdf 32 Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, “Social Movements, an Introduction”, Second Edition 64 Pablo Ortellado, Public Policy Management professor at the University of São Paulo and (Blackwell, 1999, 2006): 189 columnist for the newspaper O Globo, 27 January 2021, interview 33 Cristina Flesher Fominaya, “Democracy Reloaded: Inside Spain’s Political Laboratory from 15-M 65 Ibidem to Podemos”, (2020): 70 66 Esther Solano, Adjunct Professor at the Federal University of São Paulo in International 34 Ibidem: 52 Relations, 20 January 2021, interview

31 67 Piero Locatelli, a journalist who was arrested at one of the June 2013 protests in Vincent 105 Anna Ohanyan, Richard B. Finnegan distinguished professor of political science and Bevins, “The Brazilian Spring That Never Arrived”, The Atlantic, (20 June 2018), available at: international relations at Stonehill College, 19 January 2021, interview https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/brazil-protest-june-2013-rousseff- 106 Yevgenya Jenny Paturyan, “Armenian civil society, Growing pains, honing skills and possible lula-bolsonaro-election-workers-party-temer/563165/ pitfalls” in Armenia’s Velvet Revolution, Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a 68 Pablo Ortellado, Public Policy Management professor at the University of São Paulo and Multipolar World, ed. L. Broers and A.Ohanyan, (I.B. Tauris, 2020): 109 & 110 columnist for the newspaper O Globo, 27 January 2021, interview 107 Ibidem 69 Abiodun Sanusi, activist with Revolution Now, 14 January 2021, interview 108 Ibidem 70 Zeynep Tufekci, “Twitter and Tear Gas, the Power and Fragility of Networked Protest”, (Yale 109 Anna Ohanyan, Richard B. Finnegan distinguished professor of political science and University Press, 2017): 78 international relations at Stonehill College, 19 January 2021, interview 71 Uzor Ngdadi, participant in EndSars protests and Revolution Now! activist, 13 January 2021, 110 Ibidem interview 111 Esther Solano, Adjunct Professor at the Federal University of São Paulo in International 72 Samson Itodo, Executive Director, Yiaga Africa, 27 January 2021, interview Relations, 20 January 2021, interview 73 Ibidem 112 Marisa von Bülow, 15 January 2021, interview 74 BBC News, “SARS: Presidential panel on police reforms okay 5-point demand of End Sars 113 Marisa von Bülow, Tayrine Dias, “O ativismo de contra e a favor do impeachment de Nigerian protesters”, (13 October 2020), available at: https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori- Dilma Rousseff”, Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais, 120, (December 2019): 5-32 54528118 114 Marisa von Bülow, 15 January 2021, interview 75 Samson Itodo, Executive Director, Yiaga Africa, 27 January 2021, interview 115 Esther Solano, Adjunct Professor at the Federal University of São Paulo in International 76 Zeynep Tufekci, “Twitter and Tear Gas, the Power and Fragility of Networked Protest”, (Yale Relations, 20 January 2021, interview University Press, 2017): 78 116 Marisa von Bülow, “Pathways after Protests: The Case of Brazil” in After Protests: Pathways 77 Ibidem: 79 Beyond Mass Mobilization, ed. R. Youngs, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019): 78 Lara Bitar, Miriam Younes, “New Ways of Relating to Each Other”, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, 72 (12 November 2019), available at: https://www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/41305/new-ways-of- 117 Adham Hassaniyeh, activist with Li Haqqi, 22 January 2021, interview relating-to-each-other 118 Habib Battah, “A new politics is rising in Lebanon”, Al Jazeera, (15 November 2019), available at: 79 Ziad Abu-Rish, “Garbage Politics”, Jadaliyya, (1 July 2016), available at: https://www.jadaliyya. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2019/11/15/a-new-politics-is-rising-in-lebanon com/Details/33377 119 Habib Battah, “What happened to the protests in Lebanon”, Beirut Report, (27 May 2020), 80 The Free Patriotic Movement is a political party founded by Michel Aoun, a Maronite former available at: http://www.beirutreport.com/2020/05/what-happened-to-the-protests-in- general, who became Lebanon’s president in 2016. lebanon.html 81 Ziad Abu-Rish, “Garbage Politics”, Jadaliyya, (1 July 2016), available at: https://www.jadaliyya. 120 Ibidem com/Details/33377 121 Habib Battah, “An open mic revolution in Lebanon”, Al Jazeera, (25 October 2019), available at: 82 Lara Bitar, Miriam Younes, “New Ways of Relating to Each Other”, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/10/25/an-open-mic-revolution-in-lebanon (12 November 2019), available at: https://www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/41305/new-ways-of- relating-to-each-other; See also Richard Hall, “Lebanon’s got 99 problems and trash is just one”, 122 The Lebanese Studies Center, “Setting the Agenda - Has the October 17 Revolution Achieved Global Post, 24 August 2015, available at: https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-08-24/lebanons- Anything at All?”, (17 October 2020), available at: https://lcps-lebanon.org/agendaArticle. got-99-problems-and-trash-just-one php?id=197 83 Lebanese journalist and researcher, 4 February 2021, interview 123 Rima Majed, “Lebanon’s unfinished revolution: Where next?”, The Middle East Eye, (19 October 2020), available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/one-year-lebanon-marks- 84 Sana Tannoury-Karam, “Setting the agenda: Why Did the October 17 Revolution Witness a unfinished-revolution Regression in Numbers”, The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, (31 October 2020), available at: https://www.lcps-lebanon.org/agendaArticle.php?id=199 124 BBC News, “End Sars: How Nigeria’s anti-police brutality protests went global”, (16 October 2020), available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-54575219. , Greta 85 Ibidem Thunberg, , Naomi Klein and Angela Davis were amongst some of the figures who 86 Ziad Abu-Rish, Visiting Associate Professor of Human Rights, Bard College, 19 January 2021, expressed their support for the EndSARS protesters’ demands. interview 125 Mariam Sule, “Different agendas, one goal: How Nigerians united to #EndSARS”, Al Jazeera, 87 Ibidem (18 November 2020), available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/11/18/different- 88 Anna Ohanyan, Richard B. Finnegan distinguished professor of political science and agendas-one-goal-how-activists-united-to international relations at Stonehill College, 19 January 2021, interview 126 Abiodun Sanusi, journalist and activist with Revolution Now, 14 January 2021, interview 89 Laure Delcour, Associate Professor in International Relations and EU Studies, 19 January 2021, 127 Bernard Dayo, “How safe hquse uplifted queer Nigerian youth”, i-D, (24 November 2020), interview available at: https://i-d.vice.com/en_us/article/z3v43j/safe-hquse-for-nigerian-lgbt-youth 90 Karena Avedissian, researcher focussed on social movements, civil society and new media/ 128 Mariam Sule, “Different agendas, one goal: How Nigerians united to #EndSARS”, Al Jazeera, communications in the former , 28 January 2021, interview (18 November 2020), available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/11/18/different- 91 Laurence Broers, “In Armenia, a Constitutional Power Grab Backfires”, Chatham House, (24 April agendas-one-goal-how-activists-united-to 2018), available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2018/04/armenia-constitutional-power- 129 CNN, “CNN Investigation sheds new light on anti-brutality protests”, (17 November 2020), grab-backfires available at: https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2020/11/17/lekki-toll-gate-shooting-army- 92 Arsen Kharatyan, former foreign policy advisor to Nikol Pashinyan after he became Prime police-lon-orig-mkd.cnn/video/playlists/mobile-digital-features/ Minister, 27 January 2021, interview 130 James Ladi Williams, “#EndSARS: A new youth party isn’t next step. Here’s what is”, 93 Yevgenya Jenny Paturyan, Associate Professor of the Political Science and International Affairs African Arguments, (15 December 2020), available at: https://africanarguments.org/2020/12/ Program leading a research project on Armenian civil society, American University of Armenia, endsars-a-new-youth-party-isnt-the-right-next-step-heres-what-is/ 11 January 2021, interview 131 Samson Itodo, Executive Director, Yiaga Africa, 27 January 2021, interview 94 Karena Avedissian, researcher focussed on social movements, civil society and new media/ 132 Zeynep Tufekci, “Do Protests Even Work? It sometimes takes decades to find out”, The Atlantic, communications in the former Soviet Union, 28 January 2021, interview (24 June 2020), available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/06/why- 95 Arsen Kharatyan, former foreign policy advisor to Nikol Pashinyan after he became Prime protests-work/613420/ Minister, 27 January 2021, interview 133 Amnesty International, “Tunisia: Struggle for justice and reparation continues for victims 10 96 Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, “Social Movements, an Introduction”, Second Edition years after the revolution”, (14 January 2021), available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/ (Blackwell, 1999, 2006): 168 & 169 news/2021/01/tunisia-struggle-for-justice-and-reparation-continues-for-victims-10-years-after- the-revolution/ 97 Zeynep Tufekci, “Twitter and Tear Gas, the Power and Fragility of Networked Protest”, (Yale University Press, 2017): 95 98 Ibidem: 85 99 Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, “Social Movements, an Introduction”, Second Edition (Blackwell, 1999, 2006): 179 & 181 100 Kaveh Waddell, “The Exhausting Work of Tallying America’s Largest Protests”, The Atlantic, (23 January 2021), available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/ womens-march-protest-count/514166/ 101 Lyna Comaty, development studies specialist, and active member of the National Bloc in Lebanon, “Setting the agenda: Why did the October 17 Revolution Witness a Regression in numbers”, The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, (31 October 2020), available at: https:// www.lcps-lebanon.org/agendaArticle.php?id=199 102 Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, “Social Movements, an Introduction”, Second Edition (Blackwell, 1999, 2006): 229 103 Zeynep Tufekci, “Twitter and Tear Gas, the Power and Fragility of Networked Protest”, (Yale University Press, 2017): 191 104 Anna Ohanyan, “Velvet is Not a Colour, Armenia’s Democratic Transition in a Global Context”, in Armenia’s Velvet Revolution, Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a Multipolar World, ed. L. Broers an A.Ohanyan, (I.B. Tauris, 2020): 29

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