The Russia Portfolio

Georgia Postbellum

Lincoln A. Mitchell

ast summer’s war in brought Re-examining our relations with both Russia into sharp focus several key components and Georgia in light of Europe will be a compli- L of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold cated undertaking, not least because of the di- War period, and raised major questions about verse views toward Russia within the European the future of U.S. relations with Russia, Geor- Union. In general, the East European countries gia and most of the former Soviet region. The are far more concerned about an imperial Rus- war was also a wake-up call (to those who may sia, while the West European countries are more somehow have still been asleep): The post-Cold concerned about maintaining economic and War period—a time marked by a prostrate Rus- other ties with Russia, lest conflict push the Eu- sia and virtually unchecked American power in ropean experiment beyond its breaking point. the region—is over. In this new post-post-Cold These differences are highlighted whenever War period, the challenge for U.S. policymak- the word “Georgia” is spoken within European ers is to craft a strategy that recognizes both the Union council chambers. Many East European potential danger Russia poses to its neighbors elites believe that NATO membership for Geor- and the limits to U.S. influence in the region— gia (as well as Ukraine) should be fast-tracked; limits that have only grown tighter thanks to any other course of action would seem to reward the ongoing global economic crisis. Russian aggression and devalue NATO’s repu- The war has already forced the tation. But most West European elites believe to take a more critical look at its relationships that this is the very last thing we should do, lest with both Georgia and Russia. That task fell to a it catalyze another war over Georgia, something Bush Administration as it was coming to an end. that couldn’t possibly end well. But the war also forces us to situate those chal- If the European Union lacks a coherent Rus- lenges in the context of a triangular relationship sia policy, Washington will be as hard-pressed as between Russia, the United States and Europe, ever to give it one. We cannot “get tough” with because the United States cannot formulate an Russia without a European partner, yet a failure effective policy toward Russia without the sup- to challenge Russia’s imperial appetites could port of the Europeans. This task falls to the lead to disasters down the road. In such a situa- Obama Administration as it is just beginning. tion, wise policy avoids forcing the issue in either of two dangerous directions. That is where U.S. Lincoln A. Mitchell is Arnold A. Saltzman Assis- policy was—precariously nestled in the bosom of tant Professor of International Politics at Columbia useful ambiguity—before the summer war. And University’s School of International and Public Af- that is where the Obama Administration should fairs. He has written extensively on Georgia and is return it to, if it can. Certainly, it should do noth- the author of Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign ing to force equally unpleasant choices upon itself Policy and Georgia’s Rose Revolution (University over Ukraine or other potential flashpoints along of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). the post-Soviet Eurasian shatterbelt.

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Current borders Republic of Georgia 1918-1920 Kingdom of Georgia 1184-1230

Archeographics To avoid such self-inflicted crises, the Obama lize Georgia, Saakashvili’s efforts to move his Administration must learn from the mistakes of country closer to the United States, and the do- its predecessor. The United States got way too mestic Georgian political considerations push- far out on its skis in its support for Georgia, and ing him to war. If we were to start our history for its mercurial and accident-prone leader. The in the early 1990s, we would understand how Bush Administration took risks it seemed un- Georgia became fragmented territorially in the aware of, and, when war came, it was reduced immediate post-Communist period by the na- to mostly feckless posturing. It did manage to tionalist government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, avoid a broader conflict, but the whole affair Georgia’s first post-Soviet leader. And if we go was not a pretty sight. We should not let such a back to the Bolshevik Revolution and its imme- thing happen again. diate aftermath, we would see how the special status given to Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the Soviet leadership in the 1920s destined any Origins of the War future Georgian state to be dogged by issues of territorial integrity. voiding a repeat of past mistakes requires The truth is that all of these points of entry A understanding the origins of the Russo- matter, and have something to teach us. Georgia Georgian war, but, not for first time, what one had been part of the Russian Empire since the sees depends on when one starts looking. If we early 19th century, but from 1918 to 1921, Geor- focus on the events of the spring and summer of gia was, for the first time in centuries, an inde- 2008, we can argue over whether Russia plotted pendent state, and during those few years it did the war and trapped the Georgian leadership, include South Ossetia and Abkhazia (although or whether the Georgian leadership made an Abkhazia was not entirely consolidated into the ill-considered decision to start shooting, hand- state). The tiny republic was no match for the So- ing Russia a pretext for retaliation. If we were viet Union, however, and when the Soviet Union to focus on the 2003 Rose Revolution, which incorporated Georgia, Stalin, first as Commis- brought President to pow- sioner for Nationalities in the USSR and later er, we would stress the importance of Russia’s as the General Secretary of the Soviet Commu- long-standing attempts to weaken and destabi- nist Party, granted South Ossetia and Abkhazia,

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among other things, the nominal right to secede and former Georgian Ambassador to the from Georgia. (Of course, everybody knows that United Nations Irakli Alasania have called for Stalin was Georgian; but a lot of Georgians in- investigations into the origins of the war. If it sist he was really Ossetian.) This right, which can be shown that Saakashvili bears substan- was highly theoretical at the time, turned out to tial responsibility for starting it, his already be a geopolitical time bomb, for it was exercised embattled regime will be further weakened— shortly after Georgia became independent once precisely what Saakashvili’s detractors hope for. again in 1991. When it was exercised, the first The perception that Georgia was responsible post-independence Georgian government reacted for the initial escalation hurts Georgia in the in a way that exacerbated the division, employ- international context as well. While European ing an all-sticks, no-carrots rhetoric that it could and American governments agree that Russia’s not back up with effective action. Thereafter, actions were reprehensible and showed signs the Russian government endeavored to keep the of ambitions that go far beyond Abkhazia and breach open in order to use the Ossetians and South Ossetia, the question of whether Geor- Abkhazians to gain leverage against Georgia. gia fired the first shot speaks to both the judg- It’s a fair guess that the senior members of ment of its leadership and its reliability as an the Bush Administration knew little about ally. Even those willing to contemplate Georgia these historical threads, even the post-Cold in NATO might be daunted by evidence that War ones, when they committed American the Georgian leadership is impulsive and im- prestige and reputation to the Saakashvili gov- prudent. ernment and the restoration of Georgia’s terri- There is a difference, however, between torial integrity. (They knew little of the history Saakashvili’s methods, which may have been ill- of Afghanistan or , either; knowledge-free considered, and his strategy, which arose from zones are part and parcel of an ideologically the logic of circumstances. The frozen con- driven foreign policy.) This and other mistakes flicts provided context and, perhaps, pretext for yet to be mentioned left them unprepared for Russian actions, but clearly the real stake was what happened last August 7–8. Georgia’s orientation toward the world. Since The initial, still widely accepted view of the Saakashvili came to power in January 2004, war’s proximate origin is that Saakashvili was after helping to lead a protest movement that provoked one too many times by Russia and so swept former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard decided that something had to be done about it. Shevardnadze from power, his main aim has He then sent the Georgian military into South been to build an independent and democratic Ossetia, which gave Russia the excuse it had been country aligned with the West. That is what ir- looking for to attack the entire country, devastate ritated the Kremlin, which has preferred that its military and visibly re-assert Russian power in Georgia remain a failing state that depends on the region. The Georgians, not surprisingly, take Russia economically and politically—the Ar- a different view. The official position, which is menian model, one might call it. shared by most Georgian citizens (due in no Moscow made itself crystal clear. Before last small part to government dominance of the summer’s war, Russia had flown planes over media), is essentially that Russia began attack- Georgian airspace and even dropped explosives ing Georgia early in the day on August 7 and onto Georgian territory. The Georgian econo- that Georgia retaliated in self-defense. Alas, the my suffered from a Russian boycott of Georgian Georgians have been unable to persuade many wine and mineral water, justified by the bizarre outsiders that this was in fact the case. Lately, assertion that these products were tainted and more Georgians are also raising questions about dangerous. Russia has also become involved in the decisions their leaders made. Georgian domestic politics (although not to the This growing chorus of questions amounts extent occasionally suggested by the Georgian to a serious problem for the Saakashvili govern- government) in a way that has generally been ment. Major political and civil society figures destructive for Georgia. The war was never outside of the government, most notably for- simply about Abkhazia and South Ossetia; nor, mer Speaker of Parliament Nino Burjanadze therefore, is the aftermath.

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That is why, regardless of what happens in the toward U.S. foreign policy as a whole. From the frozen conflicts, the United States cannot throw start of the Kosovo War onward, the United Georgia to the Russian wolves. That would not States pursued a policy that Russia opposed on only wreak havoc on Georgia; it would also set a specific political grounds and on more general dangerous precedent for many other states in the grounds as well. Here was the West yet again roiling post-Soviet space. Besides, even if it were attacking Serbia, Russia’s oldest Slavic ally. And possible to abandon the Georgian mess through, here was the West saying that ethnic criteria say, a cold-blooded realpolitik exchange for Rus- provided sufficient justification to dismember sian cooperation over Iran or Afghanistan one a state in the name of self-determination, even simply cannot secure reliable guarantees from without the explicit consent of the United Na- a Russia increasingly racked by economic cri- tions Security Council. The Russian govern- sis and instability. The Obama Administration ment said plainly that if the West proceeded should not trade on the Georgian portfolio even with this breach of traditional restraint on be- if it can suppress its conscience long enough to half of its own interests, Russia would feel free do the deal. to do the same, specifically pointing to Abkha- zia and South Ossetia as examples. There are good reasons why Kosovo is not The U.S. Role comparable to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but Moscow genuinely saw them as parallel or what it’s worth, giving up on Georgia situations. Russia began acting accordingly af- Fwould be morally objectionable for yet an- ter February 2008 by strengthening its ties with other reason: U.S. policymakers helped cause the Abkhazian and Ossestian leaderships in the war by mishandling U.S. relationships with Sukhumi and Tsinkhvali. That American diplo- both Russia and Georgia. mats expressed surprise at Russian opposition to Russia’s aggression against Georgia clarifies U.S. Kosovo policy, treating it as merely a tacti- the fact that Russia is a would-be regional hege- cal feint that could be propitiated with the right mon whose goals frequently conflict with those phraseology, outraged the Russians. They saw in of the United States. It is hard to believe that any- that response proof that the Americans had not body who thought much about Russia could have even been listening to what they were saying. been unaware of this by the summer of 2008; Unfortunately, they had a point. U.S. policy yet U.S. policy proceeded as though its embrace in recent years has overstated both the weak- of the Georgian and Ukrainian “Color Revolu- ness and the good intentions of Russia, but tions” had no significant effect on Russian as- above all, perhaps, it has overlooked its rel- sessments and potential behavior. U.S. efforts to evance. The Bush Administration was reason- expand democracy and NATO into the former ably subtle when it came to understanding the Soviet space were not necessarily wrongheaded, price it would have to pay for publicly criticizing but they were almost guaranteed to create prob- Russia’s increasingly anti-liberal inclinations; it lems in U.S.-Russia relations. To have been blind resisted domestic pressure to push Moscow on to this fact was to invite a nasty surprise. this issue, knowing that it would not help to This is not solely a matter of balancing inter- secure Russian cooperation with regard to Iran, ests; there’s a psychological dynamic at work as for example. But it never seemed to understand well. The way the United States treats Russia’s how its boastful embrace of the Color Revolu- interests is almost as important to Russia as the tions or its vigor to expand NATO and support interests themselves. Russian frustration with democracy assistance in the region would exact the United States has been driven by U.S. style a similar cost. That’s apparently not an insight as well as substance. A case in point is the U.S. George W. Bush got from looking into Vladi- decision to support and later to recognize Ko- mir Putin’s soul. sovo’s independence in February 2008, and it is a point very likely related to the Georgian war. he U.S. role in the war must also be un- U.S. policy on Kosovo, whatever its merits, Tderstood in the context of policy toward was bound to exacerbate Russian resentment Georgia. The United States did not start the

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war, nor did it encourage Georgia to start it— November 2007, it was not uncommon to hear notwithstanding the ludicrous and somewhat people in Washington say, referring to Saakash- frightening claim by Putin himself that the vili by his nickname, “Misha had a bad week, Bush White House sought to whip up anti- but he’s okay now.” This sentiment only grew Russian hysteria to help elect John McCain to stronger after a snap election in January 2008, the presidency. Nonetheless, during the years in which Saakashvili narrowly avoided a runoff preceding August 2008, the United States acted in part through the liberal use of “administra- in ways that emboldened the Georgian leader- tive resources” by the government. ship and led it to behave impulsively. Indeed, it Over time, Saakashvili developed an unusu- acted in ways that led the Georgian government ally strong relationship with President Bush, as to feel confident that the United States would well as with many people close to Vice Presi- support it in the event of war. dent . This relationship allowed U.S. policy toward Georgia from the Rose Saakashvili to have direct access to the President Revolution to the end of the Bush Adminis- and Vice President, making it even more diffi- tration suffered from an inability, or perhaps cult for the few members of the Administration unwillingness, to accurately understand Geor- who were critical or concerned about develop- gian politics. It was dominated by an increas- ments in Georgia to be heard. The development ingly personalized relationship between the of direct channels skirting the conventional two sides. Saakashvili and other leaders of the structures between the leaders of the two gov- Rose Revolution, most notably Saakashvili’s ernments was particularly important during the first Prime Minister, Zurab Zhvania, had spent spring and summer of 2008. The personaliza- years building relationships throughout the tion of relationships meant that perceptions of U.S. foreign policy leadership. When Saakash- Saakashvili—rather than, say, the U.S. national vili finally came to power, he had well-wishers interest—played a major role in how Georgia throughout Washington at all levels of govern- was viewed in the United States and elsewhere. ment who helped the new government secure It’s not hard to see how this situation devel- both financial backing and the confidence of oped. Saakashvili is an extraordinary personal- the U.S. government. ity who makes an extraordinary impression. He These personal relationships led to an exces- is relatively young, only 41 years old, extremely sively rosy U.S. view of Georgian reality. The energetic, smart and witty—the kind of person American side tended to treat Georgia as an un- who brightens a room when he walks in. He equivocal success story and a thriving democra- spent time in Washington and New York as a cy, and tended to see the Rose Revolution, which law student, is married to a Dutch woman and was obviously only a part of a process, as the en- is famous for being able to speak many Euro- tire process of democratization itself. The U.S. pean languages. It is not unusual to see him Ambassador during most of this time, a Foreign switch effortlessly from Georgian to French to Service Officer named John Tefft, had a clearer English to Ukrainian in the course of a single understanding of Georgian realities and of the press conference. Although Georgia sees itself sometimes perilous course its leadership chose, as European, Saakashvili himself seems more but his impact on decision-makers in Washing- American than anything else, and more a New ton was limited. Despite his warnings, the U.S. Yorker than an American. government became incapable of any public Ironically, the Bush Administration’s will- disagreement with the Georgian government. ingness to accept Saakashvili as a Georgian The frozen conflicts were dominated by Geor- George Washington wound up harming Geor- gia’s focus on its own territorial integrity rather gian democracy. Shortly after the Rose Revolu- than on U.S. efforts to solve existing problems. tion, U.S. support in Georgia shifted away from And as the Georgian government moved more democratic development in areas such as media, clearly away from its democratic promise, offi- political parties and civil society and toward cial Washington either explained away or simply strengthening the state. The reason? Against ignored the problems. Thus, after Saakashvili nearly all available evidence on the history of violently dispersed peaceful demonstrators in democratization, the United States increasingly

Su m m e r (Ma y /Ju n e ) 2009 69 The Russia Portfolio viewed the government as the chief engine of ment in an independent state as the destructive democratization in Georgia. But as so often and unpatriotic act it is. happened during George W. Bush’s tenure, re- Moreover, the first 14 years of Georgia’s ality pulled trump. Before he was even sworn in post-Soviet independence did not move Geor- as President, Saakashvili pushed through a se- gia toward becoming a functioning state or ries of constitutional reforms giving more pow- democracy. Two very different governments er to the presidency at the expense of the legisla- oversaw periods of widespread corruption, col- ture. During the next three years, democracy in lapsing economies and the loss of almost a third Georgia could have charitably been described of Georgia’s territory. By the time Saakashvili as simply not a priority to the new Georgian became President, Georgia was an increasingly government, which was intent on rooting out weak and divided state, wracked by poverty and corruption, reforming the education system, a left with a civil society that consisted essen- retraining police, reducing bureaucracy and tially of a tiny handful of well-known NGOs. strengthening the state. In concrete terms, this This was clear to anybody who spent time in meant less media freedom, no independent ju- Georgia during the Shevardnadze period. Sub- diciary, and weakening opposition parties in stantial areas of the country, such as Svaneti and order to produce Georgia’s fourth one-party Samagrelo, were largely controlled by gangsters. system in less than twenty years. Collective action was nearly impossible. Individ- It was still possible during this time to see uals sought personal or family solutions to every the positives as outweighing the negatives: problem. Regular electric service was unheard Rampant corruption, for example, truly was of, so every family and business that could af- weakening Georgians’ faith in democracy, so it ford one bought a generator, making the air on made sense to go after it even if it did strength- the main streets extremely difficult to breathe. en the state at the expense of civil society. These As roads fell into disrepair, the only hope for fix- things are not simple. The United States, how- ing them was to have a millionaire move in next ever, simply didn’t see any negatives or recognize door and take on the job as a private project. (A any tradeoffs. In contrast, European views of representative of the local government of Tbilisi Georgian democracy were grounded in a more offered to fix the road to my house once after realistic understanding and grew considerably dropping me off at home, but I declined. I knew, more negative after November 2007. These dif- in the end, that it would not be worth it.) ferences emerged during the war, when U.S. Apartment buildings in Tbilisi generally did and European statements often diverged in not have front doors. They had been stolen and tone, if not always in substance. either sold as scrap metal or burned for fuel. But despite the obvious drawbacks of not having a front door, the enduring Soviet legacy of mis- The Historical Context trust between citizens meant that it was almost unheard of for the tenants to join together and n fairness, Georgia’s democracy record must split the cost of a replacement. Instead, people Ibe seen in a broader political and social con- just invested, if they could, in good locks and text. Although Georgia is an ancient nation, its thick doors for their own apartments and hoped history as an independent state is brief. Before for the best. 1991, Georgia had been independent for only The Bush Administration never appeared to three years of the preceding two centuries. appreciate the scale of the challenge Saakash- Georgia’s development in this context created vili faced in attempting to build both state and major obstacles to becoming a functioning democracy. Anybody surveying the civil and democratic state. For example, stealing from political climate in Georgia during the late She- the central government when you are unhap- vardnadze period could not have realistically pily under somebody else’s rule can be rational- expected Georgia to become a democracy in a ized as an act of rebellion and patriotism. But matter of a few years. But the Bush Administra- after two centuries of institutional corruption, tion seemed to expect precisely that. it’s hard to see stealing from the central govern- The gist of all this is that U.S. policy was

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multi-dimensionally distorted as the summer of government not to take such a step. These warn- 2008 approached. It saw democracy where there ings, however, were never going to be enough. was none. It saw a heroic leader where there was The Saakashvili government’s direct relations only a fallible mortal in a tough spot. It became with Vice President Cheney’s office, in particu- generically uncritical of Georgian policies and lar, meant that if they did not like what they perspectives. It did not listen to its own experts, heard from the State Department, they could instead substituting the false confidence borne go somewhere else for a more pleasing opinion. of personal relationships. Taken together, this To some extent, too, Saakashvili’s decision meant that the U.S. government, while warning to ignore official warnings from the U.S. gov- against military solutions, never raised concerns ernment and seek approval from other channels about the wisdom and realism of the Georgian can be seen as part of a decision to transfer his cause itself in the context of overheating rheto- primary relationship from Bush to Senator John ric. Thus it is not surprising that Georgia did McCain. Saakashvili’s relationship with McCa- not take U.S. warnings about using its military in was close. McCain had visited Georgia, where in South Ossetia or Abkhazia very seriously. the President took him sightseeing and fishing The personalized nature of the U.S.-Geor- in Georgia’s beautiful mountainous country- gia relationship, in particular, made it too easy side. Moreover, they had an important common for Georgia to ignore official U.S. warnings. Al- friend in Randy Scheunemann, who served as though the State Department had never issued the top foreign policy advisor to the Republican a meaningful public criticism of Saakashvili’s nominee and previously as a key Washington government, State officials were wise enough to lobbyist for Saakashvili’s government. understand that a Georgian offensive in either This turned out to be wishful thinking on South Ossetia or Abkhazia would not end well two counts. Not only did McCain lose the elec- for Georgia or the United States. So Secretary tion, but once the war began Bush did not act , Assistant Secretary Dan as aggressively as Saakashvili had hoped. The Fried and others privately urged the Georgian postwar assistance package to Georgia, while extraordinary generous, was not the same as an offer of concrete support to Georgia while Rus- sian tanks plunged deep into Georgian territory. The young President, after all, had been compar- ing the conflict to Soviet-era acts of international aggression against Finland, Hungary and other countries. (If Saakashvili had been a better histo- rian, he would have known that the West did not intervene militarily against the Russians in these cases, either.) It is true, of course, that the United States was overextended militarily at the time, mainly in Iraq. Saakashvili knew that, which explains the relatively large Georgian military deployment to Iraq: It was meant to bind U.S. protection to Georgia. But this, too, was wishful think- ing. The implication that U.S. forces, had they not been tied down in Iraq, would have been deployed to fight Russia in Georgia was mistaken. There was simply no way to get enough of the militarily appropriate forces to Georgia fast enough to Mikheil Saakashvili make a difference, especially

Su m m e r (Ma y /Ju n e ) 2009 71 The Russia Portfolio in a situation where the Georgians refused to from talk of pushing the “reset button.” That reveal their intentions beforehand. fact does not comfort senior decision-makers in The Iraq war probably also played a role in Warsaw or Riga. Russian calculations, as did Washington’s Ko- Meanwhile, it remains unclear how the sovo policy. Protestations by the United States Obama Administration’s pro-Georgian policy, that Russia’s invasion of Georgia was “unaccept- which is so far essentially unaltered from that of able”, while accurate in some abstract sense, rang the Bush Administration, squares with improv- hollow in the ears of many for whom the U.S. ing U.S.-Russia relations or solving the problems invasion of Iraq was similarly unacceptable and of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia’s recogni- “illegal.” John McCain’s assertion that “in the tion of their independence has little legal signifi- 21st century, nations do not invade other nations” cance: Only one other state, Nicaragua (as well sounded like the height of absurdity. Whatever as Hamas and Hizballah), has followed Russia’s the influence on Russian thinking, the fallout lead in recognizing them. However, it provides from Iraq undermined U.S. attempts to commu- a pretext for Russia to increase its military pres- nicate a fundamental reality of the war: Russia’s ence in those regions, further integrate them into invasion of Georgia was unacceptable according Russia, and make the division between those re- to any notion of international sovereignty or law. gions and Georgia even sharper. Any attempt to resolve the status of Abkhazia and South Os- setia thus must now begin at a more difficult What the War Changed starting point. Even advocating a temporary international administration of these regions owever the war happened, it happened, requires challenging Russia and asking them to Hand things are no longer as they were. The give something up. There was a time when the war changed political realities for Georgia and prospect of a more democratic and federally or- the former Soviet Union generally, and it raised ganized Georgia held out hope for a solution— additional challenges for the United States. the kind of non-chauvinistic Georgian state in Understanding how the political environment which those not of Georgian ethnicity could feel has changed will be essential for crafting sound at home. That hope, too, has receded with the policy in the Obama Administration. It won’t growing bitterness caused by the war. be easy even with the best of intentions, for the The war, however, did not change every- new political environment is complex and will thing, and it certainly did not touch off a “new likely push the United States in several different Cold War.” It was strange that fears of a new directions. Cold War became one of the dominant media Russia’s actions in Georgia reverberated narratives in the United States during the first throughout the region and far beyond. It is no few weeks after the war began. Those who talk- coincidence that the leaders of Estonia, , ed about a new Cold War apparently had very Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine joined Geor- dim memories of the old one. What ideological gia’s President at a rally in Tbilisi last August. threat did Russia pose to the West, as Soviet For these countries, a resurgent, confident and Communism once did? What economic dyna- bellicose Russia is frightening. While it is un- mism were they afraid of? After 1991, what vital likely that Russia will try to provoke a similar American interest did Russia threaten in a man- war with them, it is all but certain that Russia ner akin to Khrushchev’s promise to “bury” us? will seek a larger role in their politics and try to The Soviet use of force in Central Europe dur- push their leaders closer to Russia. ing the Cold War—in East Germany, Poland, For the United States, the war means that Hungary and Czechoslovakia—was fraught be- our fearful allies in Eastern Europe may look to cause of the global stakes to which it was linked us for more help than we deem it wise to pro- in a tight bipolar world. To see the Russian use vide. We clearly must balance support to East of force against Georgia, as thuggish as it was, European countries against the prospects of through a Cold War lens is absurd. repairing the U.S.-Russia relationship. So far, Nonetheless, Russian aggression in Geor- the latter has garnered more attention, judging gia remains a serious issue, one that should not

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Getty Images

Gone but not forgotten: A final column of Russian soldiers departs Georgia, August 22, 2008. be ignored. But it is not worth starting a new, of building consensus with its European allies. long-term, global conflict with Russia to resolve American policymakers have sometimes given or rectify it, particularly if the first casualty of in to the temptation to belittle European views such a conflict is the coherence of NATO. The as feckless or intellectually fallow. But as satis- Obama Administration needs to sort out what fying as that may have felt, it has only helped it wants and come to some sober understanding Russia by making it more difficult for the Unit- of what it will have to trade to get it. It cannot ed States and Europe to act together. have a policy marked by full-throated democra- Clearly, the Obama Administration has in- tization rhetoric, NATO expansion and unre- herited a problem: U.S. goals are undercut by constructed pro-Georgian, pro-Ukrainian poli- the scant availability of U.S. power (defined as cies and still expect to keep NATO politically the ability to translate U.S. assets into influence coherent, much less secure Russian cooperation over outcomes). That is what the war in Georgia on a range of non-trivial issues. On the other really showed. Since it is most unlikely that the hand, it cannot create a kinder, gentler Russia United States will return to a position of com- simply by throwing old friends and old virtues parative dominance in Eurasia anytime soon, overboard. Russia’s anti-liberal, imperial and we must either curtail our goals, which could frankly nefarious intentions in its near abroad be dangerous and counterproductive, or devise are real, as are its ongoing efforts to destabi- other ways to achieve them. That will mean lize Georgia. Its behavior flows from historical learning all over again how to think strategi- predicates and political proclivities that cannot cally, how to plan, how to genuinely coordinate change quickly or easily. with allies, and how to implement and monitor What we need, then, is a more sober assess- a set of policies that privilege nuance and pa- ment of the ability of and cost for the United tience over supposed moral clarity and instant States to influence political outcomes in the re- gratification. We need a higher tolerance for gion, as well as a clear understanding that Rus- mixed outcomes and a lot less zeal. And with- sian interests cannot be ignored without peril. out addressing the core issues in the triangular The United States cannot determine its strat- relationship between the United States, Europe egy toward Russia in isolation from the task and Russia, we will never get there.

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