THE RUSSIA POrtFOLIO Georgia Postbellum Lincoln A. Mitchell ast summer’s war in Georgia brought Re-examining our relations with both Russia into sharp focus several key components and Georgia in light of Europe will be a compli- L of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold cated undertaking, not least because of the di- War period, and raised major questions about verse views toward Russia within the European the future of U.S. relations with Russia, Geor- Union. In general, the East European countries gia and most of the former Soviet region. The are far more concerned about an imperial Rus- war was also a wake-up call (to those who may sia, while the West European countries are more somehow have still been asleep): The post-Cold concerned about maintaining economic and War period—a time marked by a prostrate Rus- other ties with Russia, lest conflict push the Eu- sia and virtually unchecked American power in ropean experiment beyond its breaking point. the region—is over. In this new post-post-Cold These differences are highlighted whenever War period, the challenge for U.S. policymak- the word “Georgia” is spoken within European ers is to craft a strategy that recognizes both the Union council chambers. Many East European potential danger Russia poses to its neighbors elites believe that NATO membership for Geor- and the limits to U.S. influence in the region— gia (as well as Ukraine) should be fast-tracked; limits that have only grown tighter thanks to any other course of action would seem to reward the ongoing global economic crisis. Russian aggression and devalue NATO’s repu- The war has already forced the United States tation. But most West European elites believe to take a more critical look at its relationships that this is the very last thing we should do, lest with both Georgia and Russia. That task fell to a it catalyze another war over Georgia, something Bush Administration as it was coming to an end. that couldn’t possibly end well. But the war also forces us to situate those chal- If the European Union lacks a coherent Rus- lenges in the context of a triangular relationship sia policy, Washington will be as hard-pressed as between Russia, the United States and Europe, ever to give it one. We cannot “get tough” with because the United States cannot formulate an Russia without a European partner, yet a failure effective policy toward Russia without the sup- to challenge Russia’s imperial appetites could port of the Europeans. This task falls to the lead to disasters down the road. In such a situa- Obama Administration as it is just beginning. tion, wise policy avoids forcing the issue in either of two dangerous directions. That is where U.S. Lincoln A. Mitchell is Arnold A. Saltzman Assis- policy was—precariously nestled in the bosom of tant Professor of International Politics at Columbia useful ambiguity—before the summer war. And University’s School of International and Public Af- that is where the Obama Administration should fairs. He has written extensively on Georgia and is return it to, if it can. Certainly, it should do noth- the author of Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign ing to force equally unpleasant choices upon itself Policy and Georgia’s Rose Revolution (University over Ukraine or other potential flashpoints along of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). the post-Soviet Eurasian shatterbelt. SUMMER (MAY /JUNE ) 2009 65 THE RUSSIA POrtFOLIO Current borders Republic of Georgia 1918-1920 Kingdom of Georgia 1184-1230 Abkhazia South Ossetia Archeographics To avoid such self-inflicted crises, the Obama lize Georgia, Saakashvili’s efforts to move his Administration must learn from the mistakes of country closer to the United States, and the do- its predecessor. The United States got way too mestic Georgian political considerations push- far out on its skis in its support for Georgia, and ing him to war. If we were to start our history for its mercurial and accident-prone leader. The in the early 1990s, we would understand how Bush Administration took risks it seemed un- Georgia became fragmented territorially in the aware of, and, when war came, it was reduced immediate post-Communist period by the na- to mostly feckless posturing. It did manage to tionalist government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, avoid a broader conflict, but the whole affair Georgia’s first post-Soviet leader. And if we go was not a pretty sight. We should not let such a back to the Bolshevik Revolution and its imme- thing happen again. diate aftermath, we would see how the special status given to Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the Soviet leadership in the 1920s destined any Origins of the War future Georgian state to be dogged by issues of territorial integrity. voiding a repeat of past mistakes requires The truth is that all of these points of entry A understanding the origins of the Russo- matter, and have something to teach us. Georgia Georgian war, but, not for first time, what one had been part of the Russian Empire since the sees depends on when one starts looking. If we early 19th century, but from 1918 to 1921, Geor- focus on the events of the spring and summer of gia was, for the first time in centuries, an inde- 2008, we can argue over whether Russia plotted pendent state, and during those few years it did the war and trapped the Georgian leadership, include South Ossetia and Abkhazia (although or whether the Georgian leadership made an Abkhazia was not entirely consolidated into the ill-considered decision to start shooting, hand- state). The tiny republic was no match for the So- ing Russia a pretext for retaliation. If we were viet Union, however, and when the Soviet Union to focus on the 2003 Rose Revolution, which incorporated Georgia, Stalin, first as Commis- brought President Mikheil Saakashvili to pow- sioner for Nationalities in the USSR and later er, we would stress the importance of Russia’s as the General Secretary of the Soviet Commu- long-standing attempts to weaken and destabi- nist Party, granted South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 66 THE AMERICAN IN T ERE st GEOrgIA POSTBELLUM among other things, the nominal right to secede and former Georgian Ambassador to the from Georgia. (Of course, everybody knows that United Nations Irakli Alasania have called for Stalin was Georgian; but a lot of Georgians in- investigations into the origins of the war. If it sist he was really Ossetian.) This right, which can be shown that Saakashvili bears substan- was highly theoretical at the time, turned out to tial responsibility for starting it, his already be a geopolitical time bomb, for it was exercised embattled regime will be further weakened— shortly after Georgia became independent once precisely what Saakashvili’s detractors hope for. again in 1991. When it was exercised, the first The perception that Georgia was responsible post-independence Georgian government reacted for the initial escalation hurts Georgia in the in a way that exacerbated the division, employ- international context as well. While European ing an all-sticks, no-carrots rhetoric that it could and American governments agree that Russia’s not back up with effective action. Thereafter, actions were reprehensible and showed signs the Russian government endeavored to keep the of ambitions that go far beyond Abkhazia and breach open in order to use the Ossetians and South Ossetia, the question of whether Geor- Abkhazians to gain leverage against Georgia. gia fired the first shot speaks to both the judg- It’s a fair guess that the senior members of ment of its leadership and its reliability as an the Bush Administration knew little about ally. Even those willing to contemplate Georgia these historical threads, even the post-Cold in NATO might be daunted by evidence that War ones, when they committed American the Georgian leadership is impulsive and im- prestige and reputation to the Saakashvili gov- prudent. ernment and the restoration of Georgia’s terri- There is a difference, however, between torial integrity. (They knew little of the history Saakashvili’s methods, which may have been ill- of Afghanistan or Iraq, either; knowledge-free considered, and his strategy, which arose from zones are part and parcel of an ideologically the logic of circumstances. The frozen con- driven foreign policy.) This and other mistakes flicts provided context and, perhaps, pretext for yet to be mentioned left them unprepared for Russian actions, but clearly the real stake was what happened last August 7–8. Georgia’s orientation toward the world. Since The initial, still widely accepted view of the Saakashvili came to power in January 2004, war’s proximate origin is that Saakashvili was after helping to lead a protest movement that provoked one too many times by Russia and so swept former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard decided that something had to be done about it. Shevardnadze from power, his main aim has He then sent the Georgian military into South been to build an independent and democratic Ossetia, which gave Russia the excuse it had been country aligned with the West. That is what ir- looking for to attack the entire country, devastate ritated the Kremlin, which has preferred that its military and visibly re-assert Russian power in Georgia remain a failing state that depends on the region. The Georgians, not surprisingly, take Russia economically and politically—the Ar- a different view. The official position, which is menian model, one might call it. shared by most Georgian citizens (due in no Moscow made itself crystal clear. Before last small part to government dominance of the summer’s war, Russia had flown planes over media), is essentially that Russia began attack- Georgian airspace and even dropped explosives ing Georgia early in the day on August 7 and onto Georgian territory.