791 IX . IN THE SHADOW OF RENATIONALIZATION 2000–09 1 . GENERAL INTRODUCTION: THE BIGGEST ENLARGEMENT IN EU HISTORY IN SIGHT, IMPOTENT SECURITY POLICY, AND THE NICE SUMMIT OF 2000 ON THE BRINK OF FAILURE The EU’s agony over security policy continued to exist, however, as became clear in the “Kosovo War” of 1999, in the wake of September 11, 2001 and the invasion of Afghanistan, and in the Iraq Crisis of 2002–03. EU Europe was at the point of setting up a defense agency which, however, was still very far removed from the burden sharing that was demanded by the USA. The EU was prepared for defense but not willing for attack, for which it was also not structurally capable. This underscores its value as a peace project and its significance as a factor of balance and stability as well as an exporter of justice and values.1 Characterized by the French President of the Council of the European Un- ion Jacques Chirac as “an historic summit”, a conference of governments that was important for EU “Eastern Enlargement” took place in Nice from December 6–11, 2000 after months of uncertainty about the will of member states for the reform of EU institutions. Differences and rivalries in the crisis-plagued relations between Germany and France as well as those between the larger and smaller states played a role. They made up a part of the summit that was supposed to provide the apparatus for the restructuring of the EU. Even though not all of this was resolved, a new treaty did come into existence that laid the cornerstone for new admissions. A crisis through the political drifting apart of the states was prevented by the possibility of finding compromises, particularly as there was no alternative to continued integration.2 After two Irish referenda (2001, 2002) the EU Treaty of Nice entered into force on February 1, 2003. It continues to regulate the distribution of power, above all else the all-decisive vote weighting of the EU states and the competences of the EU, with which the future members were already taken into consideration. A conver- sion to majority decisions was provided, and the seats in the European Parliament 1 Michael GEHLER, Europa. Ideen – Institutionen – Vereinigung – Zusammenhalt, Reinbek/ Hamburg 2018, 399–404, 432–436, 495–497; for this chapter see documents 94–100 in the appendix “Documents”. 2 Ibid., 410–414. 792 IX. In the Shadow of Renationalization 2000–09 were also redistributed. With Nice, however, the sweeping institutional reforms that were necessary for the inclusion of ten new members did not take place. The old structure with the Court of Justice, Commission, Council, Parliament, Court of Auditors, and Economic and Social Committee remained untouched. Merely on the sidelines, a Charter of Fundamental Rights that emerged from the “Her- zog Convention”, named by its Chairman the former German Federal President Roman Herzog (1994–1999), was solemnly adopted which, however, still has not achieved legal validity. Through the setting up of a convention for the drawing up of a Constitutional Treaty, these deficits in reform were supposed to be alleviated. This was at the same time an indirect admission of the failure of the methodol- ogy of the conference of governments. The era of Kohl, Delors, and Mitterrand was no longer followed by any strong European leadership personalities in the subsequent decade. A lack of support in their own populations, thin majorities, cases of corruption, tendencies towards renationalization, economic and growth crises, an absence of successes in job security and employment policy, and com- petition against the background of the increasing pressure of globalization that was expressed in a reaction of neo-liberal policy dominated the domestic political picture in the European states. The Constitutional Convention met in 2002–03, tellingly enough under a pre- sidium that was composed of elder statesmen (Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Giuliano Amato, and Jean-Luc Dehaene), did indeed achieve a respectable compromise. The inclusion of the aforementioned Charter of Fundamental Rights into the Con- stitutional Treaty, a simplification and combination of the existing treaties, the EU as its own legal entity, more participation for the European Parliament, and the possibility of a Europe-wide referendum were balanced by the principle of unanimity in foreign policy, a two and a half year presidency of the Council, and no substantial progress in integration in social and economic policy. Adherents to a European social charter found this to be disappointing. In the end, the EU Heads of State and Government finally decided on June 18–19, 2004 to establish the Constitutional Treaty within the context of the acceptance of ten new EU members (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lith- uania, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia) that had taken place on May 1 of the same year. The treaty required the assent of all twenty-five member states to enter into force. The debate over the Constitutional Treaty was overshadowed, however, by the question of the high unemployment numbers in EU countries (25 million), the discussion of the immigration of cheaper work forces from Eastern Europe, and the highly controversial candidate for accession Turkey, with which negotiations officially began on October 1, 2005.3 The process of ratification of the Constitutional Treaty was delayed in the face of negative referenda in France on May 29, 2005 (54.87% voting against) and the 3 Ibid., 428–446, 452–459, 460–473. 2. Neither Strategic nor Regional Partnership with the CEEC – FPÖ “Veto”-Policy 793 Netherlands on June 1, 2005 (61.6% against in this case), and thus this treaty, which has been set up purely under international law and which does not repre- sent a real and classical state constitution whatsoever in the sense of national law, has been put on ice. The Austrian and Finnish presidencies of the Council of the European Union in 2006 were indeed able to ease the depressed mood somewhat and prevent the Constitutional Treaty from being dropped altogether. Later on, the German EU Presidency of the Council 2007 was no longer been able to draft a precise schedule and could only hope to keep the treaty content alive and put it up for discussion once again in 2008–09. The resistance against it was incessantly strong in Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Poland. In France and the Nether- lands, the treaty would have to be brought up for discussion once again.4 In spite of this setback and an absence of political leaders, the EU policy of enlargement has itself demonstrated leadership. On January 1, 2007, Bulgaria and Romania were accepted as new members into the EU that now numbers twenty-seven – completely passing by the prevailing mood of euroskeptics and naysayers on the part of populations who were against any further members. This was the expression of the revival of the rationalist methods (top down) of Monnet from the 1950s: a consensus of the elite, behind-the-scene negotiations, and deci- sions from above – without involving the people. But how long would these meth- ods still be possible? The period from the middle of the 1990s to 2007 was a time of harvest and bounty for the policies that were introduced in the previous decade (the introduction of the euro, the “Eastern Enlargement”, and a Constitutional Treaty that had at least been passed at the first stages with the attempt at a reform of EU institutions), but because of the negative results of the referenda in France and the Netherlands, the optimism concerning integration policy was severely dampened. With it being, of all countries, two of the founding states, the EU met with fundamental rejection, a rejection which – in light of August 30, 1954 and de Gaulle’s policy of 1965–66 – is, however, nothing new. There have always been setbacks. And EU integration has even thrived upon them. 2 . NEITHER STRATEGIC NOR REGIONAL PARTNERSHIP WITH THE CEEC – “VETO”-POLICY AGAINST THE EU “EASTERN ENLARGEMENT” BY THE FPÖ Austria’s negative experience with its political isolation during the EU-14 boycott measures from January to September 2000 reinforced the recognition that the young EU Member did not belong to either a “friendship group” ( Benelux, Northern or Southern Europeans) or it have any real partners. That is how the project of a “strategic partnership” with the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) came up, which the new Foreign Minister (2000–04) Benita 4 Ibid., 515–564. 794 IX. In the Shadow of Renationalization 2000–09 Ferrero-Waldner (ÖVP) championed. However, this concept would only have real- istic chances of being accepted and approved by the states addressed if the project were successfully kept free from the burdening legacy of the past and the current conflicts of interest. This requirement referred primarily to domestic Austrian concerns or requirements of party policy faced by Ferrero-Waldner who, with her heyday during the “sanctions”, was confronted with her coalition partner, the FPÖ. The “strategic partnership” she vehemently pursued, the goal of which was to form a group with the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) accession candidates and future EU members, was – in addition to the handicap of domestic policy and interparty disputes – fraught with two additional, for- eign-policy conflicts: All of these – as Austria called them – “strategic partners” counted among this partnership of convenience were already members of NATO (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary since as early as 1999), or wanted to soon join this alliance (which had, however, meanwhile become questionable); among them primarily Slovakia (with the Mečiar government), but also Slovenia. This represented and still represents a non-negligible element of incompatibil- ity.