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Temario para el Curso Propedéutico de Epistemología del Posgrado en Filosofía de la Ciencia

Objetivo general: Ofrecer una visión amplia y un entendimiento detallado de algunos distintos debates que han dado forma a la teoría del conocimiento a través de su historia, y de los argumentos centrales en esos debates. Se busca que el curso proporcione una visión amplia e incluyente de esta disciplina, de manera que los alumnos entiendan a profundidad distintos temas centrales en la teoría del conocimiento. Esto dará a los estudiantes una visión panorámica de los distintos temas y metodologías disponibles para estudiar la epistemología.

Objetivos particulares: El curso expondrá a los alumnos a una variedad de temas centrales selectos en la epistemología desde la antigüedad hasta nuestros días. Se estudiarán con detalle los textos asignados y se desarrollarán en clase los principales argumentos. También se fomentará la discusión crítica de esos argumentos en clase. En todo este proceso se buscará que los alumnos participen activamente en el análisis y escrutinio de las posturas a discutir. Se cubrirán los siguientes temas: preocupaciones sobre el conocimiento en la Filosofía Griega antigua, el problema del escepticismo en la Filosofía Moderna, el problema de Gettier y su recepción en la Epistemología del siglo XX, y nuevas tendencias en Epistemología.

Evaluación: Los alumnos tendrán que elaborar respuestas cortas (no más de 500 palabras) a una pregunta concisa algunos de los temas discutidos en clase. Cada una tendrá un valor de 20%, para un total del 40%. La primera respuesta se entregará el 13 de marzo; la segunda, el 8 de mayo. El restante 60% será evaluado con un trabajo final (con una extensión de 3500 palabras) sobre un tema a elegir por el alumno. El trabajo final debe entregarse el 29 de mayo. Los criterios de evaluación para el trabajo final serán distribuidos en la primera semana de clase.

Temas, Calendario de Sesiones y Lecturas • 28 de Febrero. Introducción • 6 de Marzo. Epistemología Antigua. o Menón, Platón. • 13 de Marzo. No hay clase. Entrega de trabajo Menón. • 20 de Marzo. Escepticismo Cartesiano I. o Meditaciones Metafísicas, Descartes. (Meditaciones 1-4) o Descartes: the project of pure Inquiry, Williams. (Anexo 1) • 27 de Marzo. Escepticismo Cartesiano II. o “Other Minds”, J.L. Austin. • 3 de Abril. El Problema de Gettier y la Respuesta Externista. o “Is Justified true ?”, Gettier. o “What is justified belief?”, Goldman. • 17 de Abril. Reacción Internista al Externismo. o “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge”, BonJour. • 24 de Abril. Epistemología del Testimonio. o “Getting Told and being Believed”, Moran. • 8 de Mayo. La Vigilia Consciente y el Conocimiento. Entrega de segundo trabajo. o “Waking up and being conscious”, Soteriou o “Waking, knowing and being conscious”, Stazicker. • 22 de Mayo. Injusticia Epistémica. o Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker. (Capítulos 1, 2 y 7)

Bibliografía Obligatoria. Austin, J.L. 1946. “Other Minds,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XX. Reprinted in Austin 1979. BonJour, Laurence. 1980. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):53-73. Descartes, René. Meditaciones Metafísicas. Traducción de Vidal Peña. Fricker, Miranda. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press. Goldman, Alvin. 1979. “What is Justified Belief?” Justification and Knowledge. George Pappas (ed.). Boston, D Reidel. Gettier, Edmund. 1963. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge,” Analysis 23(6): 121-123. Moran, Richard. 2005. “Getting Told and Being Believed,” Philosophers’ Imprint 5(5):1- 29. Platón, 1987. Menón, traducción por J.L. Calvo, en Diálogos II, Gredos. Soteriou, Matthew. 2019. “Aking up and Being Concsious,” Aristotelians Society Supplementary Volume 93 (1):111-136. Stazicker, James. “Waking, Knowing, and Being Conscious,” Aristotelians Society Supplementary Volume 93 (1):137-160. Williams, Bernard. 1978. Descartes. The Project of Pure Enquiry. Pelican Books. Reprinted by Penguin Books, 1990.

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