1 MANAGING ELECTIONS: THE KMT AND LOCAL FACTIONS IN THE 1990’S Juha Tähkämaa Center for East Asian Studies University of Turku FIN-20014 University of Turku tel. +358-2-333 5367 email: [email protected] 2 This paper is based on my ongoing licenciate1 research for the University of Turku Department of Contemporary History. It is basically a short version of one of the chapters of my study and discusses the relationship between the KMT and local factions in the 1990’s. The licenciate study charts the development of the co-operation from 1949, when the ROC government relocated to the island, but for the conference purposes it is perhaps more interesting to limit the discussion to more recent events. This paper discusses the role of the local factions in the KMT’s electoral strategy within two dimensions, candidate selection and election ratio, i.e. the share of factional candidates elected of the total KMT candidates in the 1990’s. The point is to argue that the local factions were perhaps even more important to the KMT in the 1990’s than before and that they were especially important to the Taiwanese contingency in the party in the struggle for the KMT and ROC leadership in Taiwan.2 The KMT performance In the parliamentary elections of the 1990’s was characterised by three tendencies: diminishing vote share at the polls, complicated candidate selection processes and increased dependence on local factions. These are all intertwined and I shall discuss them in the context of the three legislative elections of the 1990’s (1992, 1995 and 1998). The backdrop and explaining factor to all three trajectories is the political infighting of the Taiwanese and mainlanders in the party and the split in the KMT caused by this. The Taiwanese vs. mainlanders power struggle within the party took place mainly on two dimensions vital to Taiwan’s democratization: intra-party democratization and national elections. Consequently national elections and the structure of electoral systems and candidate nomination procedures became subject to intensive power struggle within KMT. Election results would have an impact on the capability of the KMT sub-ethnic elite factions to advocate and implement their political agenda in the legislature. They could also be used as a tool in the struggle over the KMT leadership; the winning sub-ethnic party elite faction could utilise electoral success in building up a power base in the party by dispensing favours and perks through the incumbents and their electoral network. These 1 A licenciate degree is between an M.A. and Ph.d. in Finland. 2 Local factions have been an integral part of KMT’s electoral success and strategy from the 1950’s. According to one analyst the share of local factional representatives of all the KMT candidates in the parliamentary elections between 1972 and 1992 was 59,8% on the average, and of those elected 60,4%. Huang (1996) 133. This estimate includes only the regional districts. 3 two dimensions were the overriding concern for the Taiwanese and the mainlanders in the party throughout the electoral policies of the 1990’s. Because of the sub-ethnic cleavage within the party the intensifying power competition through national elections, instead of increasing efficiency, fragmented the KMT party organization. Both camps demanded reform whenever it would increase their chances of success in the elections or increase their influence within the party hierarchy. Respectively they criticized the other camp for authoritarianism and anti-democratic sentiment if their demands were not answered. The conservative, i.e. mainlander3, camp in the party elite in many cases demanded internal party democratization in the form of electoral primaries for candidate selections, because it would favour their better organized voting block. Basically two kinds of attitudes towards overall political reform in Taiwan and internal party reform existed within the KMT. The Taiwanese supporting President Lee Teng-hui were more open to overall political reform in Taiwan since it would increase the influence of Taiwanese in the society and politics. Within party democratization they supported increased participation of mid- and low-ranking party cadres in party congresses as a form of internal party democracy. It would increase the participation and influence of the Taiwanese in the KMT party congresses, since they constituted the majority of this group. The Taiwanese contingency also favoured decision making by voting in the party congresses as a form of internal democratization because of their broader representation there. Through this method it was possible to gain control of the KMT’s central decision- making bodies through personnel nominations. At the same time it escalated the rapid taiwanization of the party elite as key decision-makers and party leadership were elected by the party congresses. More over, as the Taiwanese faction controlled the party chairmanship in the 1990’s, they had no intention of weakening this institution by introducing more democratic measures that would limit its power.4 3 I use the term mainlanders and Taiwanese in a broad sense to indicate the two competing elite factions in the KMT. They could also be called non-mainstream and mainstream factions, or conservative and liberal factions. The majority of the conservatives were mainlanders were while the majority of the Taiwanese in the KMT advocated political reform. Between the two extremes there was a sizeable contingency of both mainlanders and Taiwanese who were more moderate and tried avoid getting crushed in the elite struggle between the two extremes. 4 The internal reform to this direction was initiated by Lee Teng.hui already in the 13th Party Congress in 1988 when against the wishes of party elders he increased the number of congress delegates to include lower-raking party members and introduced the Guidelines for Party Reform. See Domes (1989). When the Taiwanese had secured party control at upper- and elite-levels and in the party congress, they allowed for the the party chairman to be elected through a secret 4 The mainlanders usually favoured voting by the whole party membership as a form of internal democratization within the KMT.5 This applied to the selection of the party leadership and central organ members as well as electoral candidates.6 The rationale behind the demand was that because the mainlander dominated mobilization channels through the army, police, state bureaucracy, state-owned enterprises and government offices was more effective in delivering votes in the primaries than the Taiwanese consisting of local factions, they would be able to dominate the result in any kind of party primary. The demand for party primaries was also in line with the democratic atmosphere of the 1990’s and something that was usually regarded as a necessary step towards internal party democracy even by outsiders.7 For the KMT in general, however, the conservative candidates were problematic since they usually did not appeal to the Taiwanese public-at-large and thus were not conducive to the overall KMT success in the elections. An important dimension in relation to electoral competition and the sub-ethnic cleavage in the 1990’s was that it was not enough for the KMT members to secure the success of the party per se. More important to the Taiwanese and the mainlanders in the party was to secure the success of their respective contingencies, even if it was detrimental to the overall success of the KMT. For these two camps it was more important to defeat their opponents within the party and the parliament than to work for the party’s success as a whole. This notion became detrimental to the KMT’s electoral success as both camps fielded their own candidates as independents despite of its political consequences for the KMT throughout the 1990’s. It was one of the main reasons why KMT’s share of votes declined steadily during the 1990´s, and interpreting electoral results became very difficult since an increasing number of KMT members began to defy party orders and campaigned as independents, changed parties, or established new ones. One characteristic, however, ballot happened in the 1993 14th Party Congress. 5 The selection of the presidential candidate for the party was one such instance. The conservatives in the party wanted the nomination to be decided by a membership vote, whereas the Taiwanese wanted only the party congress and Central Committee members to vote. At the time the Taiwanese had a majority in these two institutions. The Taiwanese would have had more problems in mobilizing their supporters in all membership to vote than the mainlanders. 6 This dream was only fulfilled in 2005, when Ma Ying-jiou was elected party chairman by a secret ballot of the whole KMT membership. By that time the party was again in mainlander hands after the putsch caused by the 2000 electoral defeat. 7 See for example Baum & Robinson (1995). In fact those advocating internal democracy in the KMT were not the most liberal with regard to the democratization of Taiwan. 5 is clear; the factional co-operation with the KMT was more or less initiated by President Lee and the Taiwanese in the party while the mainlanders tried to contain the influence of local factions. The local factions were a key aide to the Taiwanese in the party and assisted the President Lee as he solidified his position as the paramount leader of the KMT. Between military and local factions: The elections of 1992 The mainlander contigency had the upper hand in the candidate nominations and campaign preparations for the 1992 elections. The candidate selection method was based on a party primary system introduced by John Kuan at the end of the 1980’s.