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MANAGING ELECTIONS: THE KMT AND LOCAL FACTIONS IN THE 1990’S

Juha Tähkämaa Center for East Asian Studies University of Turku FIN-20014 University of Turku tel. +358-2-333 5367 email: [email protected]

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This paper is based on my ongoing licenciate1 research for the University of Turku Department of Contemporary History. It is basically a short version of one of the chapters of my study and discusses the relationship between the KMT and local factions in the 1990’s. The licenciate study charts the development of the co-operation from 1949, when the ROC government relocated to the island, but for the conference purposes it is perhaps more interesting to limit the discussion to more recent events. This paper discusses the role of the local factions in the KMT’s electoral strategy within two dimensions, candidate selection and election ratio, i.e. the share of factional candidates elected of the total KMT candidates in the 1990’s. The point is to argue that the local factions were perhaps even more important to the KMT in the 1990’s than before and that they were especially important to the Taiwanese contingency in the party in the struggle for the KMT and ROC leadership in Taiwan.2

The KMT performance In the parliamentary elections of the 1990’s was characterised by three tendencies: diminishing vote share at the polls, complicated candidate selection processes and increased dependence on local factions. These are all intertwined and I shall discuss them in the context of the three legislative elections of the 1990’s (1992, 1995 and 1998). The backdrop and explaining factor to all three trajectories is the political infighting of the Taiwanese and mainlanders in the party and the split in the KMT caused by this.

The Taiwanese vs. mainlanders power struggle within the party took place mainly on two dimensions vital to Taiwan’s democratization: intra-party democratization and national elections. Consequently national elections and the structure of electoral systems and candidate nomination procedures became subject to intensive power struggle within KMT. Election results would have an impact on the capability of the KMT sub-ethnic elite factions to advocate and implement their political agenda in the legislature. They could also be used as a tool in the struggle over the KMT leadership; the winning sub-ethnic party elite faction could utilise electoral success in building up a power base in the party by dispensing favours and perks through the incumbents and their electoral network. These

1 A licenciate degree is between an M.A. and Ph.d. in Finland. 2 Local factions have been an integral part of KMT’s electoral success and strategy from the 1950’s. According to one analyst the share of local factional representatives of all the KMT candidates in the parliamentary elections between 1972 and 1992 was 59,8% on the average, and of those elected 60,4%. Huang (1996) 133. This estimate includes only the regional districts. 3 two dimensions were the overriding concern for the Taiwanese and the mainlanders in the party throughout the electoral policies of the 1990’s.

Because of the sub-ethnic cleavage within the party the intensifying power competition through national elections, instead of increasing efficiency, fragmented the KMT party organization. Both camps demanded reform whenever it would increase their chances of success in the elections or increase their influence within the party hierarchy. Respectively they criticized the other camp for authoritarianism and anti-democratic sentiment if their demands were not answered. The conservative, i.e. mainlander3, camp in the party elite in many cases demanded internal party democratization in the form of electoral primaries for candidate selections, because it would favour their better organized voting block.

Basically two kinds of attitudes towards overall political reform in Taiwan and internal party reform existed within the KMT. The Taiwanese supporting President Lee Teng-hui were more open to overall political reform in Taiwan since it would increase the influence of Taiwanese in the society and politics. Within party democratization they supported increased participation of mid- and low-ranking party cadres in party congresses as a form of internal party democracy. It would increase the participation and influence of the Taiwanese in the KMT party congresses, since they constituted the majority of this group.

The Taiwanese contingency also favoured decision making by voting in the party congresses as a form of internal democratization because of their broader representation there. Through this method it was possible to gain control of the KMT’s central decision- making bodies through personnel nominations. At the same time it escalated the rapid taiwanization of the party elite as key decision-makers and party leadership were elected by the party congresses. More over, as the Taiwanese faction controlled the party chairmanship in the 1990’s, they had no intention of weakening this institution by introducing more democratic measures that would limit its power.4

3 I use the term mainlanders and Taiwanese in a broad sense to indicate the two competing elite factions in the KMT. They could also be called non-mainstream and mainstream factions, or conservative and liberal factions. The majority of the conservatives were mainlanders were while the majority of the Taiwanese in the KMT advocated political reform. Between the two extremes there was a sizeable contingency of both mainlanders and Taiwanese who were more moderate and tried avoid getting crushed in the elite struggle between the two extremes. 4 The internal reform to this direction was initiated by Lee Teng.hui already in the 13th Party Congress in 1988 when against the wishes of party elders he increased the number of congress delegates to include lower-raking party members and introduced the Guidelines for Party Reform. See Domes (1989). When the Taiwanese had secured party control at upper- and elite-levels and in the party congress, they allowed for the the party chairman to be elected through a secret 4

The mainlanders usually favoured voting by the whole party membership as a form of internal democratization within the KMT.5 This applied to the selection of the party leadership and central organ members as well as electoral candidates.6 The rationale behind the demand was that because the mainlander dominated mobilization channels through the army, police, state bureaucracy, state-owned enterprises and government offices was more effective in delivering votes in the primaries than the Taiwanese consisting of local factions, they would be able to dominate the result in any kind of party primary. The demand for party primaries was also in line with the democratic atmosphere of the 1990’s and something that was usually regarded as a necessary step towards internal party democracy even by outsiders.7 For the KMT in general, however, the conservative candidates were problematic since they usually did not appeal to the Taiwanese public-at-large and thus were not conducive to the overall KMT success in the elections.

An important dimension in relation to electoral competition and the sub-ethnic cleavage in the 1990’s was that it was not enough for the KMT members to secure the success of the party per se. More important to the Taiwanese and the mainlanders in the party was to secure the success of their respective contingencies, even if it was detrimental to the overall success of the KMT. For these two camps it was more important to defeat their opponents within the party and the parliament than to work for the party’s success as a whole. This notion became detrimental to the KMT’s electoral success as both camps fielded their own candidates as independents despite of its political consequences for the KMT throughout the 1990’s. It was one of the main reasons why KMT’s share of votes declined steadily during the 1990´s, and interpreting electoral results became very difficult since an increasing number of KMT members began to defy party orders and campaigned as independents, changed parties, or established new ones. One characteristic, however,

ballot happened in the 1993 14th Party Congress. 5 The selection of the presidential candidate for the party was one such instance. The conservatives in the party wanted the nomination to be decided by a membership vote, whereas the Taiwanese wanted only the party congress and Central Committee members to vote. At the time the Taiwanese had a majority in these two institutions. The Taiwanese would have had more problems in mobilizing their supporters in all membership to vote than the mainlanders. 6 This dream was only fulfilled in 2005, when Ma Ying-jiou was elected party chairman by a secret ballot of the whole KMT membership. By that time the party was again in mainlander hands after the putsch caused by the 2000 electoral defeat. 7 See for example Baum & Robinson (1995). In fact those advocating internal democracy in the KMT were not the most liberal with regard to the democratization of Taiwan. 5 is clear; the factional co-operation with the KMT was more or less initiated by President Lee and the Taiwanese in the party while the mainlanders tried to contain the influence of local factions. The local factions were a key aide to the Taiwanese in the party and assisted the President Lee as he solidified his position as the paramount leader of the KMT.

Between military and local factions: The elections of 1992

The mainlander contigency had the upper hand in the candidate nominations and campaign preparations for the 1992 elections. The candidate selection method was based on a party primary system introduced by John Kuan at the end of the 1980’s. The system was especially developed to prevent local factions from dominating the candidate nominations and the final slate. The system favoured the mainlanders in the party, and under pressure from the Taiwanese contingency, it was slightly modified to accommodate the interests of the mainstream faction.

First, the ratio 60%-40% between primary and cadre evaluation was changed into 50%- 50% system, i.e. half the seats were decided by the primary, half by cadre evaluation. Second, the party committees of cities and counties were given right to suspend the primaries if and when deemed unnecessary. This enabled suspending the primaries in constituencies where the conservatives had strong support and/or could interfere with the factional or mainstream supporters campaigning. Consequently the primaries were suspended in more than 50% of the constituencies (18 out of 27).8 Only 29,6% of the KMT members participated in the primaries, which was a way too low number to represent the general will of the party members and serve as a basis for candidate nominations. As in 1991 the ad hoc-committee nominated by the party chairman still reviewed the slate before the final approval of the Central Standing Committee.9

These modifications were heavily criticised by Lee Huan and Premier Hau Pei-tsun, members of the mainlander faction, who argued that it favoured local factions and central

8 According to some statistics there are 29 constituencies. This figure includes the aboriginal and female quotas, as well as at-large seats and overseas representation. In 1991 the number of constituencies was 58. 9 Wu (1997) 323-324. 6 party leadership, i.e. President Lee and his supporters.10 The dispute between mainlanders and Taiwanese in the candidate selection was reflected in the final stages of compiling the slate. Especially the incumbent supporters of President Lee in the parliament, who constituted the Wisdom Coalition parliamentary faction, were treated harshly by the mainlander contingency in the final phase of candidate selection.11 The conservatives wiped out all Wisdom Coalition members from the primary elections list, to which the Taiwanese protested strongly.12 The dispute was solved through negotiations in the party leadership, resulting in the inclusion of some of the Wisdom Coalition members in the final slate.13

The mainstreamers respectively wiped out three members of the New KMT Alliance (a mainlander faction in Legislature) from the final slate, who all still decided to run as independents in the election alongside with three former government members who had resigned from the Hau government of 1990 because of pressure from President Lee. All these candidates represented the conservatives of the party, and caused heavy losses for the KMT in the forthcoming elections. 14

According to one estimate the KMT nominated 98 candidates to compete for the 125 seats, and among the candidates approved by the party 58 were factional (59,18%).15 This interpretation takes into account only those in the final party slate, but President Lee endorsed some candidates to run without formal party endorsement or against the will of the party.16 Another interpretation claims that 165 KMT candidates took part in the elections, of which 72 were supported by the factions, while 56 were supported by the military. This estimate also includes candidates not on the party slate.17 According to this estimate the mainstream, i.e. Taiwanese candidates had a majority among all KMT

10 Wu (1997) 334-335 11 The members of the Wisdom Coalition had demanded the resignation of the unpopular and conservative Premier Hau Pei-tsun, which had angered the mainlanders in the party who then wanted to take revenge on the Coalition. Chu & Lin (1996) 86. 12 ibid. 13 Wu (1997) 336. Those Wisdom Coalition members not in the slate or not elected to the parliament were given prestigious government posts by President Lee. 14 Copper (1997) 301. For the complexities of selecting the right candidates, see Julian Baum: Building the Ballot, Far Eastern Economic Review, October 1, 1992. 15 Chen (1996) 189. 16 There were also a number of mainlander candidates running as independents, as Rigger (1999) has noted, 164. Copper (1997) 301. For the complexities of selecting the right candidates, see Julian Baum: Building the Ballot, Far Eastern Economic Review, October 1, 1992. 17 Nathan (1997) 116. 7 candidates taking Part in the elections. It is also interesting to note that of the total amount of the KMT candidates only 37 were without factional or military support, which basically rendered the 1992 elections on KMT’s behalf as an extension of the party’s internal power struggle at the polls. At the same time the KMT, of course, had to fight the opposition, but the DPP had nominated so few candidates, that they had no chance of winning the majority in the parliament, even they would be all elected.18

In the final results the KMT’s vote share dropped to an all time low, 52,7%, which gave it 58,4% of the seats.19 Despite the electoral defeat, the number of local faction candidates elected was higher than ever, and 82% of all the elected KMT candidates were factional.20 However, the mainlanders and conservative candidates also fared well in some of the constituencies, and were in general more active voters than the Taiwanese. More than 20% of the voters in the 1992 elections were mainlanders, though their share of the population was not more than 15%. In the KMT ranks 40% of the voters were mainlanders. Despite of this they only claimed 22% of seats won by the party in the elections. This was because the mainlanders in the northern constituencies, where their showing is strongest, failed to organize their voting satisfactorily, and candidates took votes from each other.21 In the Taipei County Northern constituency, for example, four members of the New KMT Alliance were elected to the parliament with landslide votes. Their number one candidate, Jaw Shau-kong, garnered 253 000 votes in a constituency where 35 000 would have been enough to get elected. The New KMT Alliance votes were basically KMT votes, and all votes given to the Alliance were deducted from the KMT party’s vote share.22 In the Taipei County Northern constituency Jaw prevented many KMT candidates from getting elected with his huge vote share.23

18 The electoral campaign was markedly different from the 1991 National Assembly elections, when only 2,4% of the KMT candidates campaigned without the party´s endorsement. These candidates received only 1% of the total vote of the KMT, and thus did not have a significant impact on the KMT electoral performance. In the 1991 elections the KMT received 71% of the votes, but 78% of the seats, which implies that the party´s vote mobilization had been extremely effective and well co-ordinated. Rigger (1994) 229. 19 Huang & Yu 91. 20 Huang (1996) 133. On the other hand Chen claims that only 65% of the elected were factional. Chen (1996) 189. 21 Nathan & Ho (1993) 31-61. Also Jaw and other New KMT Alliance running as independents took away votes from the KMT, though their voter were hard-core KMT members. More detailed analysis of the 1989 mainlanders electoral performance in Rigger (1999) 138-140. 22 Julian Baum: The Hollow Centre, Far Eastern Economic Review, January 7, 1993. Rigger (1999) 166. 23 The seven founding members of the New Party accounted for 5.5% of total vote in the 1992 election. Lin, Chu, Huang & Zhang, 17. 8

According to one estimate the independent KMT candidates received 12% of the total vote of the elections and 26% of the KMT members in the elections campaigned without party’s endorsement. Thus a quarter of the KMT candidates were nominally campaigning only for themselves and not for the party.24 If one would combine the amount of seats and votes received by the independent KMT candidates, the party’s share would amount to 61% of the votes and 63% of the seats. The election results indicate that the KMT party organization was deeply divided in the elections and that the Taiwanese contingency in the KMT became ever more dependent upon the local factions. The elite power struggle and the 1992 elections effectively split the KMT electoral mobilization channels into two; local factions utilised by the mainlanders and military and state-apparatus channels utilised by the mainlanders.

Asserting factional influence 1995-1998

The 1992 election result deepened the sub-ethnic cleavage within the KMT. The continued infighting and President Lee’s strengthening position in the party as well as the good showing of the mainlander candidates in the 1992 elections lead to the first major split in the KMT as the New KMT Alliance broke away from the party and established the New Party in 1993. President Lee’s grip on the KMT strengthened as some of his adversaries left, but nevertheless a sizeable number of them still remained within the party.

The weakening of the mainlander contingency in the KMT also clarified electoral strategies. If the Taiwanese in the party had not been strong enough to change the candidate selection system before the 1992 elections, they were able to do it now. Encouraged by their better control of the party, President Lee and Secretary-General Hsu Li-teh25 implemented a less democratic method of candidate selection for the next parliamentary elections in 1995.26

24 Rigger (1994) 241-242. 25 Hsu had been nominated KMT Secretary-General after the 1992 elections. He was a close supporter of Lee Teng-hui and later became Presidential Advisor to Chen Shui-bian in 2002. 26 Although cadre evaluations were a part of the system, the relative weight or importance of the different methods was not specified, and apparently it was up to the local party head to decide whichever method should be applied. Wu (1997) 62. 9

In the new candidate selection method more authority was assigned to local party headquarters, the leaders of which were given responsibility to decide the slate on the basis of opinion inquiries and discussions with the party members. They were given choice whether to organize a primary, personal discussions, cadre evaluation, or a broader opinion inquiry to fill the slate. Even though the primary still was included in the roster of methods, they were not organized anymore. The results of the opinion inquiries conducted by the local party leaders were classified, and on the basis of the provisional list a final slate was drawn. After this the slate followed the normal route through the KMT bureaucracy, and before the final word of the Central Standing Committee and party chairman, the slate passed though the ad-hoc committee nominated by the party chairman.27 In connection with the reform, the KMT for the first time included the candidate selection rules in the party charter, which implied a need to institutionalize the system.28

The system was bureaucratic and cumbersome, and clearly emphasized the role of the local party leaders and the party central, which favoured President Lee and his supporters in the party. It gave the party central leadership more authority over candidate nominations and indicated that Lee Teng-hui and his supporters had solidified their position in the KMT to the extent that they were strong enough to impose their policy on candidate selection. The policy goal behind of the new method appeared to be minimizing mainlander influence and maximising the Taiwanese influence in the candidate nomination. For the first time the candidate selection methods were also included in the KMT party charter, which basically made them more difficult to modify and tamper with.29

The streamlined candidate nomination policy enhanced preparations for the 1995 elections, and more importantly to the March 1996 presidential elections, to which the legislative elections were considered a warm-up. Connections to local factions were strengthened and the KMT was able to achieve greater unity between the centre and local districts than in 1992. Campaign work was conducted to shore up support for the spring elections and

27 Wu (1997) 63-65. 28 Wu (1997) 34. 29 ibid. The rationale behind the institutionalisation perhaps was that as the party congresses that were responsible of drafting the party charter were dominated by Taiwanese, it would be very difficult for the mainlander contingency to modify the rules to their own advantage again. 10

President Lee and the KMT made greater efforts to focus on legislative candidates that would campaign for him in the 1996 presidential elections.30

Despite of the improved electoral work, the vote share of the KMT dropped. The party received its lowest ever regional vote percentage in the parliamentary elections with only 46,06% of the popular vote, which meant a decrease of over 7% from 1992. Vote coordination, however, was successful and the party was able gain a slight majority in the legislature (85 seats of the total of 164 seats).31 The tightened co-operation between the party centre and local factions produced excellent results and the success rate of its district candidates was 64%, compared to that of 59% for the DPP and 46% for the New Party. 32 Of the KMT incumbents 63 (65,1% of total) were factional and 22 non-factional (34,9% of total), giving factional candidates overwhelming majority in the KMT caucus.33

The NP had succeeded exceptionally well and garnered almost 12% of all votes and seats in the election.34 The NP success reflected negatively in the KMT vote share, since the majority of all the NP votes came from voters who had previously voted for the KMT. If we add together the KMT and NP vote shares, the total vote garnered by the KMT-NP axis was ca. 56%, well over half of the votes. A closer look at the seat distribution in constituencies reveals the impact of the NP performance to the KMT result. The KMT suffered its biggest defeats in the areas where the New Party did best, ie. Taipei City, Taipei County, and Kaohsiung City. In Taipei City the KMT lost half of its seats and got only four, while the NP won six seats.35 In the Taipei County the KMT seat amount decreased from 10 to eight, while the NP got three seats. In Kaohsiung City the KMT lost three seats and took five seats, while the NP won 2. In each of the constituencies above the party lost 7-10% of its vote share.36 The size of the New Party caucus in the legislature surged to 21, and the party was the outright winner of the elections. Ideologically the

30 Hood (1997) 137. 31 Hood (1997) 138. 32 Rigger (1999) 172. The rate for the 1980 -1986 elections had been on the average 93%, in 1989 79% and in 1992 63% ofo the officially nominated candidates. Rigger (1999) 82. The turnout of the 1995 elections was 67,5, 4,38% lower than in 1992. Copper (1996) 33. 33 Chen (2001) 75. 34 Huang & Yu 91. 35 Copper (1996) 26. Taipei has a strong mainlander population, ca. 50%, and no local factions. Mainlanders in these elections voted for the NP. ibid 28-31. 36 The Journalist, No. 456A, 1995, p.21. 11

Taiwanese political landscape did not change substantially since the New Party was a sub-ethnic splinter group from the KMT and emphasised “traditional” KMT policies.

However, the KMT-NP axis was not something that materialised as co-operation in the legislature, and in this regard it is somewhat misleading to view the KMT-NP vote as one block. The NP would not co-operate with a Taiwanese dominated KMT in the legislature unless they found a common interest, which – based on the sub-ethnic cleavage and the distrust the mainlanders and NP caucus felt towards Lee Teng-hui - was difficult for both. The NP initially was perhaps more eager to co-operate with the DPP in opposing the KMT, but even this unorthodox alliance fell apart quickly because the ideological differences in China-policy between the two parties were impossible to overcome. The three-party gridlock in the legislature remained unsolved for the tenure of the Third Legislative Yuan.37

The aftermath of the 1995 legislative elections saw President Lee win the first free and popular elections for the ROC president in March 1996.38 This solidified his position as the undisputed political leader in Taiwan and in the KMT. He controlled both the party and state, and the Taiwanese contingency on the whole advanced substantially in the ROC political framework to take control of the last important political institutions on the island. The constitution of the ROC was revised a number of times and as a token of the increasing political confidence of the Taiwanese, the Taiwanese-lead KMT and DPP co- operated in abolishing the Taiwan Provincial Government in 1996. The mainlander dominated NP was left relegated to the sidelines in the process.

By this time the most intensive struggle between the mainlanders and the Taiwanese in the KMT was to a large extent over, and the Taiwanese formed the majority of the KMT and the ROC political institutions. However, within the party the role local factions came under review again in the aftermath of 1997 County Executives elections, when the KMT failed in co-ordinating the local factions and suffered a defeat to the DPP. Hsu Li-teh was forced to resign from the Secretary-General post, and John Chang, an esteemed member

37 Outside the legislature the KMT and DPP again found each other in the National Development Conference summoned by President Lee. In this conference the two parties decided to abolish the Taiwan Provincial Government. The NP protested strongly, but to no avail. It was another example of DPP-Taiwanese KMT collusion. This tendency ahd already started in the 1980’s. 38 The candidae selection of the party was made in the 14th party congress of the KMT, again with an expanded participation from the lower-ranking cadres and grassroots level. They outnumbered ex officio candidates by 1400 to 700 (2 to1). Lee was elected candidate with 1637 votes out of the 2100. The number of grassroots candidates and those who voted for Lee is strikingly similar. 12 of the mainlander contingency, took over the post. Chang was a more liberal member of the mainlanders but nevertheless enjoyed support from the conservatives and the military. Because of his liberal stance he was also acceptable to the Taiwanese in the party, and his nomination indicated an attempt to bridge the gap between the mainlanders and Taiwanese in the KMT.

Despite of the temporary waning power struggle between the mainlanders and Taiwanese in the KMT, the role of local factions in the KMT electoral strategy reached its height in the 1998 elections. This was a consequence of the National Development Conference resolution to abolish the National Assembly. As compensation the members of the Provincial Assembly were promised a chance to take part in the legislative elections of 1998. The Provincial Assembly had been rife with faction members, and their participation in the legislative elections meant escalating factional influence in the legislature. With the aid of the Provincial Assembly members the KMT delivered its strongest performance in the legislative elections of the 1990’s. The candidate selection methods remained essentially the same as in the 1995 elections and party member opinion inquiry was used to compile the slate.39 In the 1998 legislative elections 225 representatives were elected, when in 1995 the number had been 164. Thus, 61 seats were added to the parliament, of which 49 were regional and 12 at-large. 40

Because of the increased number of seats in the legislature it was possible to gain more seats with the same amount of votes, supposing the vote mobilization and allocation was successful. Again the KMT delivered an exceptional performance: the party received 46,43% of the votes and 90 of the 168 regional seats. It received 29 more seats than in 1995 with a vote increase of 0,37%. It is obvious that the campaign work and vote allocation had been extremely successful.41 Seats had been added to 19 constituencies to accommodate the members of the Provincial Assembly, and in nine constituencies the KMT won 100% of the new seats42, and in all constituencies the party won more than 50%

39 Wu (2001) 112. 40 Chu & Diamond (1999) 813. This number also includes at large and overseas seats as well as aboriginal constituencies. 41 The election rate for the DPP candidates was 66% (52 out of 77), whereas the KMT’s success rate was markedly better at 83%. Chu & Diamond (1999) 814-816. 42 These constituencies were Kaohsiung County, Keelung City, Taoyuan County,Hsinchu County,Hsinchu City,Yunlin County, Chiayi County,andTaipei City 13 of the additional seats.43 In the nine aforementioned constituencies the KMT won the exact number of additional seats without other parties or independents gaining a seat. Altogether the KMT gained 16 seats in these nine constituencies. As expected a substantial role in the KMT’s success was played by the former members of the Provincial Assembly, of which there were some 57 were candidates. Of those 46 were elected (80% of those taking part).44 The vast majority of them (36) were KMT members, and were affiliated with local factions.45 According to Chen 56 legislators in the KMT caucus were faction affiliated while only 34 were non-factional.46 Thus ca. 25% of the total incumbents in the fifth ROC legislature were affiliated with local factions.47

The two other major parties did not succeed as well as the KMT. The DPP’s share of votes increased with 3,61% to 33,2 % of the total vote, but the party received less than third of the seats, only 52.48 One reason for the dismal showing of the DPP was in its internal disunity, which resulted in an over nomination of candidates by competing elite and local factions within the party. The worst fate was suffered by the New Party, who just managed to creep above the 5% limit, giving the party the right for at-large representatives in the legislature. The party’s vote share dropped from 12,95% in 1995 to 7,06% in 1998, a loss of almost 50% of the vote in just three years. Generally the election result was regarded to signal the end of the New Party, and it was credited to the factional infighting plaguing the party and its inability to develop sufficient grassroots organization.49 It is most likely that some NP members defected to the KMT, even though the KMT’s vote share did not increase respectively. Many of the candidates might have campaigned as independents, and indeed, the number of independent candidates in this election was record high.

43 Taipei City was granted two additional seats and the KMT won 3 seats. The opposition (DPP/NP/Ind) lost one seat, so the KMT took one seat from the opposition and the two additional sets. In Taoyuan County the KMT won all additional seats, garnering all together 7seats, the DPP got 4 and independents one. Chiayi City got one additional seat, and thus had two all together, which allowed both the KMT and DPP have their candidates elected. Previously the DPP held the seat in Chiayi City. In Kaohsiung County there was a shift in the seats among the opposition, but the KMT still got the additional seats. In Keelung County, Hsinchu County and City, Yunlin County and Chiayi County the KMT took the additional seats without there being a change in the seat number of the opposition parties. 44 China Post 24.6.1999. page 8. 45 Free China Review 2/1999 38. 46 Chen (2001) 75. This also includes at-large seats. 47 According to Goebel (2001) 13, 92 legislators (around 41%) of the fourth Legislative Yuan have a big business background, of which 72 legislators are from the construction, banking, and media sectors. Especially legislators with construction and banking backgrounds cooperate fruitfully, mustering 48 legislators alone. 48 See for example Lianhebao 6.12.1998, Election special, p.8. 49 Fell (2005) 229-230, 235. Already in 1995 a leading NP member warned that if the party would not be able to develop its grassroots organization and an image of service, it would not be able to sustain its electoral performance. ibid. 14

Conclusion

It is commonly claimed that the KMT lost control of the local polity partially because of the increased power of local factions. This is only part of the picture. As Kuo has shown, the KMT never really had a proper control of the local polity, and that’s why the party could not lose something that it did not have in the first place. 50 The local factions were fostered to gain access and control of the local populace, but they were never easy to work with and always difficult to control, despite continued efforts towards that direction. With the increased liberalization of the political system, the factions leverage towards the KMT increased and the party needed them more than they perhaps needed the party – at least in the sphere of electoral politics. The factions were out of control in regard to the mainlander dominated KMT, but not so in regard to the Taiwanese dominated KMT. As the electoral results and the number of factional candidates in the KMT incumbent roster in the 1990’s legislative elections indicate, the local factions co-operated with the Taiwanese KMT effectively and were in fact better connected to the party centre than ever.

The local factions were not out of control in the 1990’s which is also proven by their support shown to Lee Teng-hui and the Taiwanese KMT in the party congresses. Perhaps the local factions were better under control than ever during the 1990’s, but not in the sense that the mainlanders in the KMT would have wanted, if they had been able to control the party. The local factions were out of control prior to the 1990’s, when the mainlanders still dominated the KMT and the polity was at the same time liberalised. The sub-ethnic cleavage gave ample motivation to the factions to rebel against the mainlander dominated party, but as soon as Taiwanese were able to gain control of the KMT, resistance towards it diminished.

In fact the local factions did not contribute to the downfall of the KMT by being out of control of the party, but by being in control – or perhaps in co-operation – of the Taiwanese in the KMT. By aiding the Taiwanese in the KMT elite to gain control of the party they contributed to the deepening of the sub-ethnic cleavage and the marginalisation of the mainlanders in the KMT, which caused them to exit the party, and this was the ultimate

50 Kuo (1995), passim. 15 reason behind the KMT’s diminishing support in the elections. Or, to be more precise, the support did not so much diminish, but was spread thin among splinter groups from the party.

At the turn of the 1990’s the mainlanders still retained enough power in the KMT to control the local factions, but starting from that the Taiwanese contingency in the party actively sought co-operation with the local factions. For the mainlander dominated KMT the local factions represented a threat to the party elite, but for the Taiwanese-dominated KMT they were a resource and a chance to build up support. It was not until James Soong established his People First Party that the factions drifted out of the KMT contol proprely. His success in the 2001 elections and the simultaneous demise of the KMT demonstrate how much support the PFP chipped away from the KMT. At the time the KMT was drifting back again to the mainlander hands, which perhaps further escalated their flight from the party.

SOURCES

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