This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts, East Asian Studies Stanford University

Democratization in Divided Nations: Comparing the Impact of National Identity on Democratic Development between Taiwan and South Korea

by Kai-wen Tung

August 29, 2019

Advisor: Larry Diamond Department: East Asian Studies

Approval Signature: Jun Uchida, on behalf of Prof. Diamond

Date: August 29, 2019 Democratization in Divided Nations: Comparing the Impact of

National Identity on Democratic Development between Taiwan

and South Korea

Kai-Wen Tung M.A. Candidate, the Center for East Asian Studies Leland Stanford Junior University

Taiwan and South Korea are ideal cases for the most similar comparative design. First, the two countries experienced similar democratic transitional processes, and today are regarded as the most successful third-wave democracies in East Asia. Second, they share common historical experiences, including Japanese colonial rule, national divisions caused by the Cold War, the rule of anti-communist authoritarian regimes, and state-led modernization. Among these commonalities, the divided nationhood and the legacy of authoritarianism have shaped identity political cleavages in Taiwan and South Korea, but the two countries have diverged in regard to their national identities and identity politics. In Taiwan, the contending identity between the Taiwanese and Chinese and the division between Taiwan independence and Chinese unification are salient debates between the KMT and the DPP. In contrast, South Korea lacks sharp cleavages over national identity and unification, yet the political divisions based on South Korea-U.S. and North Korea–South Korea relations still play an important role in South Korea’s identity politics.

Based on this difference in identity politics, my study hypothesizes that national identity cleavages in Taiwan are more irreconcilable than in South Korea and uses two approaches to investigate whether such nonnegotiable cleavages will bring Taiwan’s democratic development more challenges than South Korea. First, a comparative historical approach will explain the divergent development of national identity cleavages, comparing the role of national identity in Taiwan’s and South Korea’s democratic developments. Second, a quantitative approach will analyze if national identity cleavages correlate with political polarization in Taiwan and South Korea by testing their effect on democratic values.

Keywords: Divided Nations, National Identity Cleavages, Identity Politics, Democratic Developments, Political Polarization.

i

Democratization in Divided Nations: Comparing the Impact of National Identity on Democratic Development between Taiwan and South Korea i

I. Introduction 1

II. Relations between National Identity and Democracy 5

III. The comparison between Taiwan and South Korea 9

(1) Comparing historical backgrounds of Taiwan and South Korea 10

(2) Comparing authoritarian regimes in Taiwan and South Korea 16

(3) Comparing democratic transitions in Taiwan and South Korea 25

IV. Comparing the developments of National Identity in Taiwan and South Korea 35

(1) The preparatory phase: the opposition’s challenge to the authoritarian ideology 38

(2) The decision phase: reforms of ex-authoritarian ideologies and the de-radicalization of opposition ideologies 44

(3) The first power rotation: polarization over national identity cleavages 49

(4) The comparative historical institutionalist analysis 54

V. The effect of identity politics on opinions about democracy 58

(1) The research design for Taiwan 58

(2) Data analyses of Taiwan 63

(3) The research design for South Korea 81

(4) Data Analyses of South Korea 84

VI. Conclusion 92

VII. References 97

ii

I. Introduction

Despite commonalities in history, economy, and politics, the most salient difference between Taiwan and South Korea is that they have diverged in their national identity cleavages and identity politics since democratization. Divided nationhood and political confrontations between the previous authoritarian regimes and the oppositions are common historical background for Taiwan and South Korea, providing similar core issues for identity politics and political cleavages in the two countries. Nevertheless, differences in the legacy of authoritarianism, the situation of national division, and opposition ideology against authoritarian regimes create the dichotomy between Taiwan and South Korea in regard to national unification and national identity. First, the KMT authoritarian rule in Taiwan endured the ethnic conflicts between the Taiwanese and the Chinese mainlanders, while South Korea enjoys ethnic homogeneity and a strong ethnic nationalism based on common blood, ethnicity, and historical experience (Shin 2006). Second, the legitimacy of the ROC in Taiwan has been diplomatically derecognized and replaced by the PRC, challenging the legitimacy of the KMT authoritarian rule. In contrast, the authoritarian regime in South Korea had not been challenged by an external legitimacy crisis or a diplomatic derecognition. Finally, the opposition movement in

Taiwan, on the one hand, harnessed Taiwanese identity and Taiwan Independence to

1 challenge the KMT claim on Chinese nationalism and national unification. South

Korea’s opposition movements, on the other hand, adopted the pro-North Korean and anti-American ideology to confront the authoritarian ideology based on anti-communism and its alliance with the U.S.. Today Taiwan and South Korea have developed divergent forms of identity politics and national identity cleavages between their ex-authoritarian incumbent parties and the opposition counterparts. In

Taiwan, on the one hand, the incumbent party during the authoritarian period, the

KMT, supports Chinese nationalism and views the national unification with China as its ultimate goal. On the other hand, the DPP, which was founded by dissidents against the KMT authoritarianism, advocates Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwan independence. In South Korea, the former authoritarian ruling parties, the conservative bloc, inherit the anti-North Korea and pro-U.S. stance from the former authoritarian ideology. In contrast, the progressive parties in South Korea, which had been the oppositions against the authoritarian regime, adopt an anti-American sentiment and sympathy for North Korea.

With various similar backgrounds but a critical divergence in national identity cleavages, the most similar design can be applied to the comparative study between

Taiwan and South Korea. Taiwan and South Korea share not only a common historical, economic, and political background, but also a parallel experience of

2 democratization since the late 1980s. However, Taiwan and South Korea are distinct in terms of their national identity cleavages, national unification issues, and identity politics. My research will investigate if the difference in national identity cleavages affects democracy developments in Taiwan and South Korea. More specifically, it will compare the divergent development between Taiwanese and South Korean national identity. In this comparison, I will assume that the identity cleavage in

Taiwan has been intrinsically more conflicted and irreconcilable than in South Korea, since Taiwan has suffered from ethnic conflicts and the division over national unification, which has not occurred in South Korea. Based on this assumption, I will hypothesize that Taiwan’s democratic developments may suffer from more severe conflicts and polarization than South Korea because of an unbridgeable identity confrontation in Taiwan. The effect of national identity cleavages on democratic developments will be operationalized by a historical explanation and quantitative research. First, the comparative historical approach will analyze the role of identity politics during Taiwan’s and South Korea’s democratic transitions, in which both incumbent and opposition parties utilized national identities as weapons to mobilize political supporters and challenge their opponents. In addition, a historical institutionalism offers an analytical framework to compare critical junctures between Taiwan’s and South Korea’s democratic transitions and explain their effect

3 on identity politics and democratic transitions. Second, the quantitative approach will offer a descriptive analysis of national identity cleavages in Taiwan and South

Korea. In Taiwan, the competing identities between Taiwanese or Chinese and debates over unification or independence are core issues of identity cleavages. In

South Korea, the identity issues relate to opinions toward national unification and attitudes to the U.S. and North Korea. To examine the effect of identity cleavages on democratic developments, the correlation between the independent variables—national identity cleavages—and the dependent variables—democratic values and perceptions of government performance—will be quantitatively assessed.

More specifically, my research will investigate whether people’s evaluation of democracy and governance performance will be affected by the incumbent party’s position on national identity issues. For instance, a Taiwanese interviewee who supports Taiwan independence might have lower opinions toward democratic values and governance when the incumbent is the pro-Chinese KMT from 2008 to 2016.

My paper includes the following chapters: first, theories regarding the relation between nationalism and democracy will be reviewed and applied to the comparative analysis. Specifically, I will discuss how various types of national identity contribute to or obstruct democratic transitions. After the theoretical review,

I will compare historical backgrounds, authoritarian regimes, and democratizations

4 between Taiwan and South Korea. Despite differences in pre-modern nation-building and state-building histories, these comparisons show that Taiwan and South Korea share similar authoritarian experience and parallel processes of democratic transitions. Based on the parallel between Taiwan and South Korea’s democratic transitions, I will divide their democratic transitions into three phases and compare the development of identity politics in each phase through a historical institutional approach. Finally, I will quantitatively analyze if the incongruence between one’s position on national identity issues and an incumbent party’s position has negative effect on their viewpoint on democracy.

II. Relations between National Identity and Democracy

Scholars have discussed the relations between national identity and democracy.

First, the existence of national identity is usually regarded as the necessary precondition for a well-developed democracy and a modern state. Gellner (1983) defines nationalism as ―a political principle [in which] political and national unit should be congruent.‖ because political legitimacy is based on this congruence.

Gellner’s definition implies that nationalism is an indispensable condition for legitimacy of modern states. Nodia (1994) suggests that the idea of nationalism is interdependent to the idea of democracy. The boundary of modern democracies is too large to be maintained, so a community sense, which defines ―who are we the

5 people‖, is required for the sustainability of modern democracies, and nationalism will offer a sense of community for developing democracy rule at the national level.

Rustow (1970: 350-351) claims that the national unification should be considered a precondition for democratization, in which ―the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to.‖

Ethnonational cleavage is usually considered fundamentally more conflictive than other issues such as social classes and regional cleavages, since the source of ethnic conflicts is permanent and nonnegotiable. As Diamond and Plattner (1994: xviii) indicate ―Ethnicity is the most difficult type of cleavage for democracy to manage. Because ethnicity taps cultural and symbolic issues…the [ethnic] conflicts it generates are intrinsically less amenable to compromise than those revolving around material issues‖. Therefore, divisions in national identity and ethnic conflicts are always viewed adverse for democratic developments. Almond and Verba (1963) argues that a society with divisions in national identity or a separatist nationalist movement cannot achieve democratic consolidation. In authoritarian regimes with ethnically divided societies, political power is usually monopolized by elites from a single ethnic group, and its legitimacy is challenged by other ethnic groups deprived of power (Wimmer 1997). Horowitz (1994) indicates that ethnic conflicts in a

6 severely divided society usually lead to the failure of democratization. In this situation, ethnically exclusive regimes commonly oppose further democratization to prevent other ethnic oppositions from gaining power.

Even for those societies with democratic institutions, ethnic cleavages will result in factionalism and polarization, which usually obstruct further democratic consolidation. Horowitz (1985: ch. 8) argues that a party system sharply divided along ethnic lines will radicalize and polarize ethnic cleavages, because political parties are likely to take a radical stance on ethnic spectrum to gain support within a certain ethnic group. Linz and Stepan (1996) views ethnic conflicts as one of the main obstacles for democratic consolidation in which democratic agreement will be difficult to reach under the plurality of national, linguistic, religious, or cultural societies. A regimes’ attempt to pursue a homogenous ―nation-state‖ is difficult to achieve by democratic means, and regimes may be tempted to use undemocratic approaches such as ethnic cleansing. To promote democratic consolidation in a multiethnic society, Linz and Stepan advocated building a ―state-nation‖ with inclusive political identification. Snyder (2000) suggests that the initial stage of democratization may exacerbate existing nationalist and ethnic conflicts domestically or internationally in which political elites tend to manipulate nationalism to mobilize political supports. Snyder regards two variables—the

7 adaptability of elites’ interests to democracy and the strength of political institutions—to evaluate whether democratic transitions will worsen nationalist conflicts. The more adaptable elites’ interests and stronger political institutions, the lower will be the possibility for nationalist and ethnic conflicts.

These perspectives are insightful when analyzing the relationship between national identity and democratic developments in multiethnic societies such as post-communist Eastern Europe, postcolonial Africa, and postcolonial Southeast

Asia. Nevertheless, when these arguments are applied to the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, the difference between the two cases and other multiethnic cases should be considered. First, South Korea and Taiwan are not multiethnic societies with divisions in cultures, religions, and languages. South Korea has been viewed as one of the most ethnically homogenous societies, and almost no ethnic conflicts have occurred in South Korea. Although the contending identities over national unification, the South-North Korea relations, and the South-Korea-U.S. relations have existed in South Korea’s society, these debates should be viewed as identity cleavages rather than ethnic cleavages. In Taiwan, the majority population of

Taiwanese was ruled by the minority of Chinese mainlander elites during Chiang

Kai-shel’s authoritarian rule, and ethnic conflicts between Taiwanese islanders

(benshengren) and Chinese mainlanders (waishengren) existed after the KMT ruled

8

Taiwan in 1945.However, the cultural, ethnical, and linguistic gaps between

Taiwanese islanders and Chinese mainlanders are small because native Taiwanese, in fact, are ethnic Chinese who emigrated from mainland China before 1945.

Therefore, the ethnic conflicts between Taiwanese islanders and Chinese mainlanders centered on distributions of sociopolitical resources rather than conflicts over cultures and religions. In addition, the political inequality between the

Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders was alleviated by the Taiwanizaiton political reform during Chiang Ching-kuo’s rule. Today, the ethnic gap between Taiwanese islanders and Chinese mainlanders are considerably diminished due to the democratization and the ethnic fusion over several generations.

III. The comparison between Taiwan and South Korea

To apply the most similar comparative design to Taiwan and South Korea, the similarities and differences in factors contributing to their democratizations should be discussed. Therefore, similar factors between two cases can offer groundwork to compare how national identity cleavages affect their democratic developments, while the differences should be controlled and excluded. In this chapter, I will compare their historical backgrounds, authoritarian regimes, and democratic transitions.

9

(1) Comparing historical backgrounds of Taiwan and South Korea

Although Taiwan and South Korea share similar experiences in their modern history, including Japanese colonial rules and national divisions following civil wars, they considerably diverge in their pre-modern era. In Taiwan, a centralized government was not introduced and Chinese immigrants from the mainland did not come to Taiwan until the several foreign regimes ruled in the seventeenth century. In contrast, South Korea experienced the state-building process under the rule of highly centralized dynasties, and it had not been successfully ruled by foreign countries until the annexation of Korea by japan in 1910. In addition, Taiwan and South Korea experience differently forms of rule by Japan, and this difference shaped their divergence in their national identity cleavages. The following paragraphs will compare the pre-modern and the modern histories of Taiwan and South Korea, analyzing the impact of the difference on their national identity and state building.

In Taiwan’s history, the Austronesian-speaking aboriginals have dwelled in

Taiwan since before the arrival of Chinese immigrates. Yet these aboriginal tribes did not build a modern centralized regime. Chinese people in the mainland seldom visited and traded with Taiwanese aboriginals until the seventeenth century when some Chinese mainlanders migrated to Taiwan. Taiwan was colonized by

Netherland in 1624 and Spain in 1626, which could be viewed as the first time when

10 a modern state building was introduced in Taiwan. In 1664, the Ming loyalists led by

Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) expelled the Netherlander force and built the Kingdom of Tungning, which was the first Chinese regime in Taiwan, to confront the Qing dynasty in mainland China. In 1683, the Qing dynasty occupied and annexed Taiwan into its territory. Until the mid-nineteenth century when Taiwan was invaded by

Western and Japanese powers, the Qing government viewed Taiwan as a peripheral province and adopted the ―negative policy‖ that restricted immigration and developments to prevent any possibility of uprisings. Nevertheless, under the rule of the Qing dynasty, Chinese immigrants from Southeast provinces on the mainland became the major inhabitants in Taiwan, and Taiwan was formally incorporated as a territory of the Chinese regime, which offered a historical legitimacy for future claims of mainland China’s regimes on Taiwan.

Korea, in contrast, was controlled by unified and indigenous regimes for most of the time. The Korean Peninsula was first unified by the Kingdom of Silla in 668

AD, and a highly centralized Chinese bureaucratic model was introduced

(Holcombe 2011: 114). After the division among three kingdoms following the collapse of Silla, the Korean Peninsula was unified again for ten centuries by the

Goryeo dynasty (918-1392) and the Joseon dynasty (1392-1910), resulting in

Korea’s experience of state building and a cultural development. Despite invasions

11 by Mongolia in the thirteenth century, Japan in the 1590s, and Manchu in the early seventeenth century, Korea maintained a stable boundary within the Korean

Peninsula for a long time, and these invaders did not successfully rule the Korean

Peninsula. Rather, these external threats strengthened an ethnic, organic concept of the Korean nation (Shin 2006: 8). Furthermore, Joseon was generally viewed as the most isolated ―hermit kingdom‖ in East Asia, which had adopted isolationism for a long time until the invasions of Japanese and Western powers in the late nineteenth century. Thus, the rules of unified, centralized indigenous regimes, the presence of external threats, and a political isolation shaped a strong ethnic and primordial identity and left a legacy of intensive state building and political centralization.

Taiwan was ceded to Japan from the rule of Qing in the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, which separated Taiwanese historical memories from mainland China. The

Japanese colonization brought experiences of modernization, the state building, and mass mobilizations, shaping the modern form of imagined community in Taiwan. In addition, the Japanese colonial government enforced the assimilation policy in the

1920s and the more radical Japanization policy (the Kōminka movement) in the late

1930s. Therefore, the modern Taiwanese imagined community germinated among political elites in the 1920s, when these Taiwanese elites protested against the

12

Japanese rule by promoting Taiwanese culture and Taiwanese’s self-governance1

(Lan 2015). The Kōminka movement after the late 1930s attempted to convert

Taiwanese people from Chinese identity into Japanese identity by forcible cultural conversions, de-sinicization, and military mobilizations. Although the conversion failed, the Kōminka movement separated Taiwanese identification from Chinese and shaped the cleavage between the Taiwanese and the Chinese (Cho 1996: 68).

The five-decade legacy of the Japanese colonization and the separation caused the division between the Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders when the KMT assumed control of Taiwan in 1945. The post-war political transition and instability mobilized the identification’s competitions among the Taiwanese, the KMT Chinese, and the communist Chinese (Wu 2016). The KMT’s repressive policies and the radical de-Japanization exacerbated Taiwanese’s resentments against the KMT government and ethnic conflicts between the Taiwanese and the Chinese, eventually causing the February 28 Incident in 1947 in which mass conflicts within the

Taiwanese and the Chinese government erupted and were bloodily suppressed by the military. In 1949 when the KMT lost the civil war against the CCP in the mainland, the KMT government and a million Chinese mainlanders retreated to Taiwan,

1 Being encouraged by the idea of Wilson’s self-determination, Taiwanese elites such as Lin Hsien-tang and Chiang Wei-shui launched several political movements against the Japanese rule, including the Petition Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament and the Taiwanese Cultural Association.

13 building an authoritarian rule over the majority population of Taiwanese by a few

Chinese mainlander elites.

Korea was annexed and colonized by Japan in 1910 and experienced modernization, the state building, and mobilizations like Taiwan. The assimilation policy was enforced in Korea in the 1920s. Nevertheless, Japanese colonial policies faced strong resistances by Koreans, especially in the 1919 March 1st Movement, which has been regarded as the first modern nationalist movement (Shin 2006: 44).

To resist Japanese racism and assimilation policies, Korean activists developed both the ethnic nationalism stressing the uniqueness of the Korean nationality and the pan-Asianism advocating Korea’s centrality in East Asian history (Shin 2006). In addition, mass mobilization and migration within the Peninsula shaped the modern community of Korean identity. In the late 1930s, the Japanese colonial government enforced more forcible Japanization policies in Korea than in Taiwan, but in Korea the Japanization movement was less effective and met heavier resistance (Cho,

1996).

After the defeat of Japan in 1945, the Korean Peninsula was occupied and divided by the U.S. in the South and the USSR in the north, and the division caused the ideological confrontation between communism and anti-communism. In South

Korea, however, oppositions against national divisions accused the alliance between

14 the U.S. military government and Rhee’s authoritarian regime of pursuing national divisions. Opposition movements against the U.S. military rule and Rhee’s authoritarianism were bloodily suppressed, including the Jeju Uprising in 1947. The

Korean War (1950-1953) not only resulted in a lasting national division between the

South and the North, but also consolidated the legitimacy of Rhee’s regime and its anti-communist ideology.

To summarize, Taiwan and South Korea considerably diverge in their pre-modern history. Taiwan experienced state building and centralization after the seventeenth century and was incorporated into Chinese territory for only 300 years.

Korea, in contrast, experienced state building and centralization under unified regimes for more than a thousand years. The distinction in pre-modern state building is probably why Taiwan’s attachment to Chinese identity has been weaker than ethnic Korean identity. In comparing their modern histories, the resistance to the cultural assimilation and the Japanization policies shaped modern nationalism in

Taiwan and South Korea, yet they had different national identity developments. In

Taiwan, opposition movements developed a Taiwanese identity, and the division between the Taiwanese and the Chinese was broadened by Japanization policy, leading to the ethnic division after the KMT ruled Taiwan. In contrast, Japanese colonial rule strengthened a unified Korean ethnic nationalism, and this strong

15 ethnic nationalism resulted in the opposition against the national division caused by the ideological confrontation during the Cold War.

(2) Comparing authoritarian regimes in Taiwan and South Korea

After World War II, Taiwan and South Korea had been ruled by authoritarian regimes until their democratic transitions in the late 1980s. Despite slight differences in their regimes’ characteristics, the experience of civil wars against communism and the following national divisions led Taiwan’s and South Korea’s authoritarian regimes to build their legitimacy on anti-communist and nationalist ideologies. Furthermore, the authoritarian regimes in Taiwan and South Korea can be viewed as an electoral authoritarianism with limited competition. The greatest difference between these two authoritarian regimes is legitimacy crises they encountered. The KMT authoritarian regime encountered international de-recognition of the ROC status, while the authoritarian regimes of Park

Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan were challenged domestically. The following paragraphs will compare several characteristics between authoritarian regimes in

Taiwan and South Korea, including political ideologies, state building and nation building, party systems, political responsiveness and competiveness, and their responses to legitimacy crises.

A similar ideology based on anti-communism and nationalism is the most

16 noticeable commonality between Taiwan’s and South Korea’s authoritarian regimes, since they were challenged by their communist rivals and viewed unification of divided nations as their ultimate goal. The anti-communist and nationalist ideologies not only justified the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, but also considerably narrowed the ideological spectrum in each system. In Taiwan, the KMT authoritarian regime enforced the ―Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of

Communist Rebellion‖ (動員戡亂時期) in 1947 and martial law in 1949, which authorized government to suspend democratic elections, restrict human rights, and extend presidential terms. Under the KMT authoritarian ideology, rival ideologies such as communism and Taiwanese nationalism were forbidden and suppressed.

South Korea’s authoritarian regimes enacted the National Security Act in 1948 and the Anti-Communist Law in 1961, which banned communist ideology and authorized the government to arrest political dissidents in the excuse of national security. The anti-communist ideology led to an ideologically narrow party politics in which both incumbent parties and opposition parties were based on conservative ideologies, and ideological debate was limited because non official ideologies such as leftism were forbidden (Choi, 2012: 23-53). The Korean War and the military threat from North Korea consolidated the legitimacy of Rhee’s authoritarian rule and created a strong state apparatus. In terms of nationalism, the KMT authoritarian

17 regime viewed ―recapture mainland China‖ as its ultimate goal, so it regarded

Taiwan as a provisional base to unified China and thoroughly mobilized the

Taiwanese societies to accomplish its goal. The KMT claimed its legitimacy as the sole Chinese government by promoting Chinese nationalism, competing with the

PRC communism and Taiwanese nationalism. The authoritarian regime in South

Korea also adopted ―Ilminism‖ as its official ideology, which combined anti-communism, ethnic Korean nationalism, and anti-colonialism. South Korean nationalist ideology viewed North Korea as an illegitimate government that broke the national unity, competing with North Korea’s nationalist ideology that combined

Korean nationalism with communism and claimed South Korea’s regime as the imperialist puppet (Shin, 2006).

Confrontations with the communist rivals brought an intensive experience of state building in Taiwan and South Korea during their authoritarian periods. Both

Taiwan and South Korea inherited the legacy of a strong state apparatus from

Japanese colonial rule, and their authoritarian regimes massively mobilized societies for military and economic development. When the KMT retreated to Taiwan, it brought tens of thousands of bureaucrats, technocrats, and soldiers from mainland

China. The KMT enforced a series of land reforms in Taiwan immediately when retreating to Taiwan. The land reforms consolidated KMT rule and prevented

18 communist infiltration in rural areas. The KMT also adopted corporatism by developing state-led labor, student, and professional organizations. In terms of nation building, the KMT adopted a top-down approach, such as Chinese patriotism education and media promotions of Chinese nationalism. Nevertheless, the ethnic division between Taiwanese and Chinese limited the effect of the KMT nation building (Lin 1998). The Korean War transformed Rhee’s regime from an unstable state to a strong bureaucratic state, and offered ideological legitimacy for the strong state (Choi 1993). The military and the police greatly expanded after the Korean War, and the society experienced massive military mobilization during wartime. Park

Chung-hee’s rule combined nation building with state building. Park utilized ethnic nationalism to develop a collective identity that pursued modernizations and economic developments (Shin 2006). In contrast with Taiwan, a strong ethnic identity in South Korea made nation building easier and legitimized the nationalist ideology of the authoritarian regime.

Taiwan’s and South Korea’s authoritarian regimes were distinct in their party system. The KMT built a highly institutionalized party-state system in Taiwan, while the authoritarian regime in South Korea was based on personal leadership and military supports rather than a strong one-party rule. The KMT party system in

Taiwan had inherited a Leninist legacy since its establishment as a revolutionary

19 party in the 1920s. Therefore, the KMT rule in Taiwan developed Leninist party organizations to penetrate and control society, the military, and the state (Lin 1998:

19-23), and it established a highly institutionalized and a stable one-party system which had continually ruled Taiwan for five decades. In addition, the KMT inherited a revolutionary ideology of the ―Three People's Principles‖ (三民主義) developed by its founding father, Sun Yat-sen, and the Three People's Principles had been esteemed as the official ideology during the authoritarian period. Despite the existence of local elections, the KMT enjoyed strong supports and seldom encountered pressures from oppositions, since the martial law enforced from 1949 to

1987 banned any opposition party, preventing the oppositions from being institutionalized and organized. Conversely, the authoritarian regime in South Korea had not developed a highly institutionalized party system as the KMT did in Taiwan, because its authoritarian parties did not inherit a long-term institutional legacy as the

KMT (Hicken and Kuhonta, 2011). Compared to the KMT, the authoritarian party system in South Korea was much more volatile because the ruling parties reorganized as personal leaderships from Syngman Rhee to Chun Doo-hwan. In contrast with the KMT’s severe ban on opposition parties, South Korea’s authoritarian regimes allowed opposition parties to run in elections, and these opposition parties were occasionally able to challenge the authoritarian incumbent

20 parties. Nevertheless, opposition parties in South Korea were usually too fragmented to compete with the authoritarian ruling parties.

Despite dictatorships, authoritarian regimes in Taiwan and South Korea were able to respond to social changes and reform themselves during democratic transitions. In addition, political competition was limited but still existed during their authoritarian periods. Despite the ban on political parties, the KMT authoritarian regime opened up local elections in the early 1950s. Although the local elections were not competitive since the KMT was able to control local elections through the patron-clientelism and the co-optation of Taiwanese local elites, local elections improved the KMT’s adaptability and responsiveness to Taiwan’s society and de-radicalized the oppositions by encouraging these dissidents to join the KMT

(Dickson 1996). Furthermore, the KMT during Chiang Ching-kuo leadership undertook Taiwanization reform in response to ethnic conflicts between Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders and the Taiwanese appeal for political participation opportunities. When the KMT was challenged by the oppositions in elections in the

1970s, it reformed party organizations and campaign strategies to adapt itself to political competition from the oppositions.

In contrast with the strict party ban in Taiwan, political pressure from the oppositions in South Korea was much higher than in Taiwan, because opposition

21 parties were able to challenge the rule of authoritarian parties or even win the majority of parliamentary seats, such as in the 1971 presidential election and the

1985 parliamentary election. In response to pressures, Park Chung-hee, on the one hand, sought support from capitalists by forming a state-Chaebol alliance. On the other hand, Park took a hard-line response to the oppositions by initiating the repressive Yushin constitution, which severely suppressed the oppositions and suspended presidential elections. Nevertheless, during the Chun Doo-hwan period,

Chun responded to the opposition’s demands by promising constitutional reform, because Chun lacked strong political support and legitimacy as Park Chung-hee. The debate over the constitution amendment finally resulted in the collapse of Chun’s regime in 1987.

The legitimacy of Taiwan’s and South Korea’s authoritarian regimes was challenged in the late 1980s, forcing them to initiate democratic reforms, but legitimacy crises were different between the two countries. The legitimacy of the

KMT one-party rule, which was based on Chinese nationalism and national unification, was challenged domestically and internationally. Domestically,

Taiwanese people considered KMT rule as an immigrant regime in which a few

Chinese elites ruled the majority population of Taiwanese. The KMT’s Chinese nationalist ideology and claim on retaking mainland China were unrealistic and

22 unappealing for most Taiwanese. The ethnic conflicts and the KMT’s repression of

Taiwanese identity further exacerbated Taiwanese’s resentment against the KMT.

However, the KMT was able to suppress Taiwanese resistance until it encountered international challenges in the 1970s. Throughout the 1970s, the legitimacy of the

ROC as the sole Chinese government was challenged by the rise of the PRC. Two major external challenges occurred when the UN membership of the ROC was replaced by the PRC in 1971 and when the U.S. severed its diplomatic relation with the ROC in 1978. These diplomatic crises seriously undermined the KMT legitimacy on Chinese nationalism, encouraging the oppositions to challenge the

KMT rule by Taiwanese identity. The KMT responded to the opposition challenge by opening more political opportunities to Taiwanese elites and Taiwanizing the

KMT.

South Korea has not faced international de-recognition as Taiwan suffered; however, domestic pressure in South Korea may be stronger than Taiwan. Unlike the

KMT institutionalized one-party rule, South Korea’s dictatorship was based on military supports and personal leadership. Until the Korean War, the legitimacy of

Syngman Rhee’s first republic was vulnerable and unstable because the Rhee’s power was perceived as a puppet government supported by the American military occupation, but the Korean War considerably strengthened Rhee’s regime by

23 legitimizing its claim on anti-communism and national security (Choi, 1993: 21-24).

Both Park Chung-hee’s and Chun Doo-hwan’s regimes suffered from legitimacy crises because they seized power through military coups and suppression of democratic movements. Park Chung-hee consolidated his legitimacy by economic development and his strong personal leadership. Chun Doo-hwan, however, lacked strong leadership and suffered from low political support, finally leading to the collapse of Chun’s regime and the negotiation between the opposition and Chun’s successor, Roh Tae-woo

In short, authoritarian regimes in Taiwan and South Korea were the result of ideological confrontations and national divisions caused by their civil wars. Under this circumstance, the two authoritarian regimes claimed their legitimacy on anti-communism, national security, and nationalist goals to unify divided nations.

Taiwan and South Korea accomplished intensive state building, mass mobilizations, and economic modernization during their authoritarian rule, and they were able to respond to social demands for political reforms. In regards to their differences, the

KMT rule in Taiwan established a more institutionalized Leninist one-party rule, severe restrictions on opposition parties, and a semi-revolutionary ideology of the

Three People Principles, so the KMT rule is considered as a powerful authoritarian regime with some totalitarian characteristics (Lin 1998: 19-43). Nevertheless, the

24 legitimacy of the KMT rule was undermined by its nature as an immigrant regime ruled by a few Chinese elites and the international de-recognition under the pressure from the PRC. South Korea did not suffer from internal ethnic conflicts and international de-recognition. However, its authoritarian rule was less institutionalized than the KMT’s one party rule, since it was based on military supports and personal leadership instead of an institutionalized one-party system. In addition, South Korea’s authoritarian regime had to face more intense competition than Taiwan, since it allowed the opposition to organize parties and run elections.

(3) Comparing democratic transitions in Taiwan and South Korea

Scholars generally deem that democratic transitions in Taiwan and South Korea were initiated in 1987, when the martial law was lifted in Taiwan and Chun

Doo-hwan’s rule was ended in South Korea. Taiwan’s and South Korea’s democratization share numerous similarities and parallel transitional process. First, modernization theory can be applied to Taiwan’s and South Korea’s democratizations, because they experienced rapid economic expansion, urbanization, and the growth of educated middle classes before their democratizations. Second,

Taiwan and South Korea experienced similar transitional phases during their democratization, including the rise of oppositions in the late 1970s, transitions led by ex-authoritarian reformers after 1987, and three power rotations following their

25 democratic transitions. Finally, although democratic transitional models in Taiwan and South Korea are different in the balance of power between regime and opposition, the two countries’ former authoritarian incumbent parties continued ruling but compromised with the oppositions during their democratic transitions.

One of the major differences between Taiwan’s and South Korea’s democratic transitions is the development of social cleavages. The unification-independence and

Chinese-Taiwanese identities divisions are still the major social cleavages in

Taiwan’s party politics today. In South Korea, diverse issues such as regional divisions, the left-right cleavage, and national identity cleavage regarding North

-South relations and South Korea- United States relations play important roles in party politics. In the following paragraphs, I will compare the application of modernization theory, democratic transitional phases, models and actors during democratization, and the development of social cleavages between Taiwan and

South Korea.

Rustow’s claim that national unification should be regarded as the precondition for democratic transition may not apply to Taiwan and South Korea. Nevertheless,

Taiwan and South Korea’s democratization can still be analyzed by Rustow’s dynamic model in which he divides a democratic transition into three phases

(Rustow, 1970). The first phase is the preparatory phase in which political struggles

26 shape cleavages between the authoritarian elites and the opposition, and such a confrontation will trigger a future democratic transition. In Taiwan and South Korea, the rise of the opposition movements after the late 1970s can be categorized as a preparatory phase. In Taiwan, the Tangwai movement (meaning ―movement outside the KMT‖) arose in 1970s local elections and organized into an anti-authoritarian coalition. The Tangwai movement were suppressed in the 1979 Formosa Incident, but they were reorganized and even strengthened in the 1980s, and in 1986 they finally developed into the first opposition party in Taiwan, the DPP. The confrontation between Tangwai and the KMT aroused social appeals to democratic reforms and Taiwanese identities. In South Korea, the Minjung movement (meaning

―people movements‖) rose against Park’s repressive Yusin Constitution in the 1970s.

In 1980, Chun Doo-hwan’s bloody suppression of Gwangju Uprising radicalized the opposition movements. The opposition movements cooperated with the existing opposition parties, finally leading to the collapse of Chun’s regime in 1987. The conflicts between the opposition movements and authoritarian regime not only aroused existing social cleavages such as debates over democratic reforms and the left-right division, but also shaped new cleavages regarding national unification

(Choi, 1993).

The decision phase is the second stage when political elites choose democratic

27 reforms and institutions. In this phase, interactions and negotiations between the conservatives and the reformers will determine the outcome of democratic transitions. In Taiwan and South Korea, the decision phase began in 1987 when the interplay between the oppositions and the authoritarian regimes initiated political liberalization and democratic reforms. The KMT under Chiang Ching-kuo leadership gradually undertook political liberalization from the late 1970s in response to its legitimacy crisis. However, the pressure from the Tangwai movement accelerated Chiang’s political reforms, including toleration of the DPP’s establishment in 1986 and the lifting of the martial law in 1987. Chiang’s successor,

Lee Teng-hui, further advanced democratization by subtly balancing the KMT conservatives and the oppositional DPP. In South Korea, Chun Doo-hwan carried out political liberalization in face of his legitimacy crisis and political pressures from the oppositions. However, the debate over Chun’s promise on the constitutional reform resulted in the June Democratic Struggle, in which Chun stepped down due to strong opposition forces and Chun’s unpopularity. Chun’s successor, Roh

Tae-woo, implemented democratic reforms by cooperating with opposition parties, and Chun’s ruling party even merged with Kim Young-sam’s and Kim Jong-pil’s opposition parties in 1990.

Habituation is the final stage when political conflicts are habitually resolved

28 through democratic competition rather than by undemocratic means. Habituation can be viewed as equivalent to democratic consolidation. According to Linz and Stepan

(1996), the democratic consolidation is reached when democracy become ―the only game in town‖ in behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions. Taiwan’s and South Korea’s democratization were advancing toward the habituation through the 1990s. In Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui was able to consolidate democratic reforms by marginalizing the opposition from the KMT conservatives led by Hau Pei-tsun.

Taiwan is commonly deemed to have consolidated its democracy in the first presidential elections in 1996 and the first party rotation in 2000. In South Korea, the presidency of Kim Young-sam from 1992 to 1997 was the first civilian president since Park’s military coup in 1961. Kim undertook demilitarization to eliminate the military influence on politics, avoiding any possibility of military opposition against democratic reforms. The following first power rotation in 1997 symbolized the democratic consolidation of South Korea.

Despite the difference in the balance of power between the opposition and the former authoritarian regime, democratic transitions in Taiwan and South Korea were achieved by negotiations and cooperation between reformers within the former authoritarian government and the moderate oppositions. According to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), a pacted transition to democracy is achieved by an agreement

29 between the ruling elites and the opposition elites, and in this settlement political elites on both sides will calculate and attempt to maximize their political interests. In the pacted transition, incumbent authoritarian elites are more likely to concede reforms only when they are confident of remaining in power and political stability after democratization. In Taiwan and South Korea’s cases, authoritarian elites had to consider not only domestically political competition from the opposition, but also external threats from their communist rivals. The four-players game model (Linz &

Stepan 1996) can be also applied to Taiwan and South Korea. In this model, political actors during democratic transitions are the authoritarian reformers, the authoritarian hardliners, the moderate opposition, and the radical opposition. The pacted transition will be easily accomplished when authoritarian reformers and the moderate opposition are able to make a consensus on democratic transition. In Taiwan and

South Korea, the ex-authoritarian incumbent parties survived and adapted to democratic elections during democratic transition by making agreements and compromises with the moderate oppositions. However, in Taiwan the balance of power leaned toward the former authoritarian party, while in South Korea the balance of power was not in favor of the ex-authoritarian parties.

According to Huntington (1991), Taiwan followed the transformation model in which the ex-authoritarian incumbent party dominates the top-down democratic

30 transition. The reformer in the former authoritarian regime, the KMT mainstream led by Lee Teng-hui, played the predominant role in the democratic reforms. However,

Taiwan’s state-led transitional model is characterized by informal negotiations between the regime and the opposition. Hence, the four-players game model is applicable to Taiwan’s case during Lee Teng-hui’s presidency (Lin 1998: Part IV).

During the transition, Lee had to marginalize the KMT hard-liners, the KMT nonmainstream led by Hau Pei-tsun, and to moderate the radical opposition. Most importantly, Lee mobilized the moderate opposition to struggle against the anti-reformist hard liners. For example, in 1990 when the constitutional amendment was opposed by the KMT hard-liners, Lee Teng-hui negotiated with the Wild Lily student movement, successfully promoting the reform of the non-elected national congress and the abolishment of the Temporary Provisions against the Communist

Rebellion.

South Korea’s democratic transition followed the transplacement model in which the opposition is sufficiently strong so that the ex-authoritarian rulers cannot dominate the reforms; instead, the process of democratic transition is determined by the cooperation between the incumbent and the opposition. After the collapse of

Chun’s dictatorship in the 1987 June Democratic Struggle, Chun’s successor, Roh

Tae-woo, negotiated with the three opposition party leaders, Kim Young-sam, Kim

31

Dae-jung, and Kim Jong-pil. The negotiation resulted in a democratic constitutional amendment and the open of the direct presidential election. Roh Tae-woo won the following presidential election, but Roh’s ruling party could not gain the majority of seats in the National Congress election. In 1990, Roh’s ruling party merged with

Kim Young-sam’s and Kim Jong-pil’s opposition parties, forming the new ruling party, the DLP. In 1992 presidential election, the ruling DLP nominated Kim

Young-sam, who was the main opposition leader during the authoritarian period, as the presidential candidate, to compete with the opposition leader, Kim Dae-jung.

Kim Young-sam won the presidency in the 1992 election, and then he implemented a de-militarized reform to eliminate the influence of military hard-liners. The dynamics of political actors during South Korea’s democratic transition is more complex and volatile due to the incorporation of oppositions into the former authoritarian ruling parties. Roh Tae-woo could be considered as an authoritarian reformer, and the anti-reformist military was the authoritarian hard-liner. In the opposition camp, Kim Young-sam was a moderate opposition leader and later became a reformer within the former authoritarian party when his party merged with the ruling party, and Kim Dae-jung could be viewed as a relatively radical opposition leader.

Taiwan and South Korea have diverged in their developments of political

32 cleavages since democratizations. In Taiwan, the debates over unification or independence and the contending identities between Taiwanese and Chinese are the most salient cleavages between the KMT and the DPP. Other issues such as social welfares, the left-right cleavage, and the regional divisions do not significantly divide the KMT and the DPP. In fact, economic inequality in Taiwan has been lower than other Asian developmental states, because Taiwan’s economic development has been mainly driven by the rise of small and medium-sized enterprises. Therefore, the left-right cleavage has not been a salient issue in Taiwan’s party politics, and both the KMT and the DPP are considered pro-economic development and right-wing.

Conversely, diverse issues play significant roles in South Korea’s political cleavages between conservatives and progressives. According to Choi (1993), the development of political cleavages can be divided into three phases, and cleavages shaped during these three phases are salient divisions between the conservative and the progressive in South Korea. First, Park Chung hee’s state-led industrialization led to increasing inequality, social stratification, and the rise of Chaebols, so these drastic social changes shaped the left-right cleavage between the conservative right wing and the progressive left wing. Second, the regional cleavage is sharply divided between the southeastern region, which generally supports conservative parties, and the less developed southwestern region of Chŏlla, which commonly support the progressive

33 party. This regional division resulted from unbalanced regional development during

Park’s period and was expanded during Chun Doo-hwan’s period. In addition, South

Korean’s party identification has been based on regionalism and personal loyalty, in which voters’ decisions are usually based on the ties between political leaders and voter’s regional identities (Kim 2014). Finally, the cleavages over national identity issues, including national unification, the North -South relations, and the South

Korea-U.S. relations, became salient after the 1980s. The Gwangju incident, in which democratic movements were bloodily suppressed by the pro-American authoritarian regime, aroused an anti-American sentiment and a sympathy for North

Korea, and the democratization in 1987 lifted the authoritarian ideology, opening public debates over identity politics and national unification.

To summarize, Taiwan and South Korea followed a similar experience of democratic transition, but the slight divergence in party system and political cleavages has been shaped since their transitions. Rapid economic development and social modernization were background conditions contributing to democratic transitions in Taiwan and South Korea. The rise of the Tangwai movement in Taiwan and the Minjung movement in South Korea shaped political cleavages between the authoritarian regimes and the oppositions. Under political pressures from the oppositions, democratic transitions were accomplished between the authoritarian

34 reformers and the moderate oppositions. In the 1990s, Taiwan and South Korea consolidated their democracies because they prevented democratic breakdowns caused by anti-reformist and habituated democratic institutions as the ―only game in town‖ to solve political conflicts. Since the democratic transition, Taiwan has developed a stable two-party system between the KMT and the DPP, with political cleavages centering around national identities issues. South Korea, conversely, has developed a fragmented and more unstable party politics between the conservative bloc and the progressive bloc, and multiple issues such as regional divisions, the left-right cleavage, and national identity cleavages, have become a major chasm between the conservative parties and the progressive parties.

IV. Comparing the developments of National Identity in Taiwan and South Korea

Taiwan and South Korea share a similar experience of national divisions, authoritarian rules, and democratic transitions, but they have diverged in their identity politics since their democratization. In Taiwan, national identities are sharply divided between the KMT (the pan-blue bloc) and the DPP (the pan-green bloc). The KMT and the pan-blue bloc, on the one hand, adopt Chinese nationalism, support for cross-strait engagements, and unification with China. The DPP and the pan-green bloc, on the other hand, support Taiwanese nationalism, a hard-line stance

35 against the PRC, and eventual Taiwan independence. This cleavage in Taiwan’s national identities is derived from a hundred years of separation between Taiwan and

China and ethnic conflicts between Chinese mainlanders and Taiwanese islanders during the authoritarian period.

Compared to Taiwan, South Korea does not suffer from a sharp chasm based on ethnic conflicts and contending stands on national unification. South Korea is one of the most ethnically homogenous societies in the world, since it inherits a strong ethnic nationalism from its thousand years of history, and more importantly there is no debate over ―unification versus independence‖ in South Korea. Nevertheless, the national identity cleavage still exists between the conservative bloc and the progressive bloc. The conservative bloc, on the one hand, takes pro-American and anti-North Korean stances. The progressive bloc, on the other hand, is critical of the

U.S. engagement in the Korean Peninsula and sympathetic toward North Korea.

South Korea’s relations with the U.S. and North Korea should not be merely viewed as debates over diplomatic policies and national security. Instead, they should be explained as an issue of identity politics, since these relations are tied to the nationalist goal of unifying the Korean peninsula and have heavily influenced

Korean national identities (Shin, 2010: 8-18). In terms of national unification, the conservatives and the progressives both have national unification as their ultimate

36 goal, but they diverge in their perspectives on the form that national unification will take. The conservatives assert that the ROK is the sole legitimate regime in the

Korean Peninsula and should take a hard-line stance to dominate national unification.

The progressives, conversely, advocate that North Korea should be viewed as an equal partner, and the progress of national unification should be advanced by aiding and cooperating with North Korea.

Despite this difference between Taiwan’s and South Korea’s identity politics, their national identity cleavages are derived from the legacy of authoritarian ideology and the confrontations between the opposition and the authoritarian ideologies. The development of identity politics in these two countries is closely related to the progress of their democratization. In the preparatory phase, the oppositions attempted to challenge the authoritarian ideology by developing an opposite counterpart. During the decision phase, the reformers with ex-authoritarian incumbent parties compromised their previous ideology and the oppositions were also de-radicalized. After the first power rotation, policies enforced by the new incumbent parties were opposed by the previous authoritarian parties, causing polarization over identity cleavages.

In the following chapters, I will analyze the development of Taiwan’s and

South Korea’s identity politics in these three phases through a historical

37 institutionalist approach, which analyzes how the dynamics between ―path dependence‖ and ―punctuated equilibrium‖ affect institutional changes. According to the theory of path dependence, the cost of changing a political institution will be increased when this institution has existed for a longer time, because the phenomenon of ―institutional layering‖ makes it difficult to abandon the long-standing institution. Instead, maintaining an existing institution will bring the effect of increasing return. Therefore, a significant alteration of institution is less likely to occur, and a previously established political structure will affect the future institutional developments. Nevertheless, the concept of“punctuated equilibrium‖ shows that political actors will change a long-standing institution when encountering a ―critical juncture‖ such as internal or external crises. Such a ―critical juncture‖ results in the end of a previously long-standing institution and the beginning of a new institution. In short, the dynamic balance between ―path dependence‖ and

―punctuated equilibrium‖ shapes interactions between political actors and political institutions, determining whether political actors maintain or changes political institution existing for a long time.

(1) The preparatory phase: the opposition’s challenge to the authoritarian ideology

In the preparatory phase, the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes was challenged by the opposition. The opposition developed an opposite ideology to

38 challenge the authoritarian ideology which was the foundation of the regimes’ legitimacy. The effect of national identity issues on political mobilization can be explained by several theories. Snyder (2000) claims that the openness of press freedom during the early phase of democratization offers political elites opportunities to manipulate nationalist issues, broadening political cleavages and polarization over ethnic and nationalist cleavages, which increases the risk of ethnic conflicts, violence, and even international wars. In addition, the rapid social changes during democratizations usually lead to conflicts and competitions among elites, which motivates them to mobilize existing ethnic and nationalist cleavages.

Klandermans (1988) propounds a conception of consensus mobilization. In this conception, during struggles between the oppositions and the authoritarian regimes, the opposition tends to develop an ideology challenging the official ideology, to arouse public awareness of discontent with the authoritarian regime. The consensus mobilization can mobilize an anti-authoritarian sentiment as the precondition for the next-step action mobilization. Calhoun (1993) suggests that nationalist issues are highly controversial as critical political cleavages in modern politics, because any definition of nationalism will legitimate one side but delegitimate the other side.

These theories can explain why the oppositions aroused nationalist ideologies against authoritarian regimes in the preparatory phase of democratizations, and why

39 ideological conflicts over nationalist cleavages were exacerbated in this phase.

In the 1970s, the international legitimacy crises of the ROC undermined the

KMT Chinese nationalism and its claim as the sole legitimate regime in China. At this period, the Tangwai movement arose and challenged the KMT authoritarian rule.

At the beginning, the Tangwai movement’s discourse was centered around appeals for democratic reforms. However, the Formosa Incident in 1979, in which the government suppressed pro-democracy demonstrations and Tangwai members, was the turning point which radicalized the Tangwai movement’s ideology. After the

Formosa Incident, the Tangwai movement developed Taiwanese nationalism as the consensus mobilization against the KMT claim on Chinese nationalism (Wang 1996).

The Tangwai movement combined Taiwanese nationalism with its previous appeals for democratic reforms to challenge the KMT official ideology. Compared to the previous appeal focusing on democratization, the combination of democracy and

Taiwanese nationalism was a more powerful discourse to shake the legitimacy of the

KMT authoritarian rule. This legitimacy was based on anti-communism and its goal to recapture mainland China, in which the KMT maintained its authoritarian rule in

Taiwan to accomplish the national unification of China. Nevertheless, the failure to reconquer mainland China over 30 years delegitimized the KMT authoritarian rule.

In response, the Tangwai movement developed a Taiwanese nationalist ideology

40 which regarded the KMT regime as a foreign regime exiled from mainland China.

Under the dictatorship from the foreign regime, the Taiwanese should oppose the

KMT rule and build a democratic Taiwanese nation-state. For example, in 1983 the

Tangwai movement announced that ―the future of Taiwan should be determined by all Taiwanese residents‖. This announcement utilized Taiwanese self-determination to advocate democratic reforms and oppose the KMT authoritarian regime.

Since the legitimacy crises in the 1970s, the KMT under Chiang Ching-kuo’s leadership implemented the Taiwanization reform, which increasingly recruited

Taiwanese elites, such as Lee Teng-hui, into the KMT party system and the state bureaucracy. The Taiwanization enabled the KMT to legitimize itself and gain more support from the Taiwanese (Wang 1989). In addition, Chang Ching-kuo propounded a new discourse of ―defending Taiwan through reform‖, which adapted the KMT ideology of unifying mainland China to the fact that Taiwan was the only de-facto territory, to reconcile the conflict between KMT ideology and Taiwanese identity (Tang 2006). In response to the rise of Tangwai and Taiwanese nationalism, the KMT made compromises and tolerated the opposition, and even acquiesced to the establishment of the DPP in 1986 that violated martial law. After Chiang passed away in 1988, his successor, Lee Teng-hui, accelerated Taiwanizaiton and democratic reforms.

41

In South Korea, the opposition movements in the 1970s protested Park

Chun-hee’s Yushin regime, which built its legitimacy on Korean nationalism, anti-communism, and economic developmentalism. Mass pro-democracy demonstrations arose after the assassination of Park in 1979; notwithstanding,

General Chun Doo-hwan staged the May 16 Coup and started his military authoritarian rule. In May 1980, Chun sent the military to suppress the pro-democracy demonstration in Gwangju, leading to the Gwangju incident in which the army opened fire on protestors. The Gwangju incident was the turning point of South Korea’s Minjung movements. Before the Gwangju incident, the

Minjung movement centered their discourse around democratic reforms. After the incident, however, the Minjung movement turned radical to adopt a Marxist and anti-American ideology, because demonstrators believed that the U.S. army in South

Korea supported Chun’s military suppression during the Gwangju incident. The influence of moderate Christians on the Minjung movement had been gradually replaced by more radical student and labor movements (Shin & Chang 2011: 25). To challenge the authoritarian ideology, the Minjung movement developed an ideology combining the demands for democracy, anti-Americanism, and Marxism. According to their discourses, the U.S. was viewed as an imperialist and neo-colonial hegemony that established South Korea as its puppet state, and South Korea was a

42 periphery country exploited by the U.S. hegemony. Therefore, to accomplish democratization, the Korean peninsula should be liberated from U.S. imperialism and their role as a puppet state. In addition, the rise of Marxism provoked public rethinking of national unification and the South Korea-North Korea relations.

Marxists believed that the anti-imperialist and anti-authoritarian revolution should not be limited in South Korea’s territory. Instead, the liberation of Korean nation should include North Korea, and national unification should be the precondition for liberation (Shin, 1995: 523). The Marxist discourse provoked a pro-North Korean sentiment and a different perspective of national unification from the official ideology, which challenged the authoritarian ideology of anti-communism and claims on South Korea as the sole legitimate government in the Korean Peninsula.

After the Gwangju incident, Chun Doo-hwan maintained the authoritarian ideology of anti-communism and Korean nationalism. Chun took a hard-liner stance to arrested opposition leaders including Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam, and Kim

Jong-pil. Nevertheless, Chun’s legitimacy was unstable due to the May 16 coup and the Gwangju incident, so Chun was forced to make concessions to the opposition by releasing their leaders and promising democratic elections. However, Chun’s ruling party and the opposition parties could not come to a consensus on the constitutional amendment, which foreshadowed the collapse of Chun’s regime in the 1987 June

43

Democratic Struggle.

In a comparative perspective, Taiwan and South Korea’s opposition movements were similar in their ideological developments during the preparatory phase. At the beginning, both Taiwan and South Korea’s opposition ideologies were based on moderate appeals for democracy. However, the Formosa Incident in 1979 and the

Gwangju Incident in 1980 were the turning points that radicalized the opposition’s ideologies. By developing opposite ideologies against the authoritarian counterparts, the opposition movements were able to shake the foundation of authoritarian legitimacy. Nevertheless, Taiwan and South Korea’s movements had developed divergent nationalist ideologies in the 1980s. Comparing Taiwan and South Korea’s authoritarian regimes, the KMT rule in Taiwan had more stable legitimacy, so it could gradually undertake Taiwanization reform to strengthen its support from the

Taiwanese, and continue its rule after the democratic transition. In contrast, Chun

Doo-hwan’s regime lacked sufficient legitimacy and failed to respond the opposition’s demands, finally leading to the collapse of his rule in 1987.

(2) The decision phase: reforms of ex-authoritarian ideologies and the de-radicalization of opposition ideologies

After the inauguration of President Lee Teng-hui in 1988, Lee further advanced the Taiwanization reform and adapted the KMT ideology to the rise of Taiwanese

44 identity. The 1991 constitutional amendment opened the re-election of the National

Assembly, which had maintained most of its representative seats from mainland provinces and suspended re-elections for forty years to symbolize the KMT’s legal claims on these mainland provinces. In the same year, Lee lifted the ―Period of

Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion‖ which had been enforced since 1947. These political reforms advanced Taiwan’s democratization, symbolizing that the KMT had relinquished its ideology of anti-communism and recapturing mainland China. The compromise of the previous authoritarian ideology allowed for the development of cross-strait relations with the PRC, which had been viewed as a nonnegotiable enemy during the previous authoritarian period. Lee’s cross-strait policies originally followed the KMT Chinese nationalism pursuing national unification with China. For example, the National Unification Council was established in 1990 and the Guidelines for National Unification were enacted in

1991, which was considered as the ultimate goal for cross-strait relations. However,

Lee resorted to Taiwanese nationalism after the deterioration of cross-strait relations in 1995. In 1995, Lee’s speech at Cornell University was considered pro-Taiwan

Independence by the PRC. The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis during Taiwan’s first presidential election in 1996 further deteriorated cross-strait relations. After Lee won the presidential election in 1996, Lee’s policies inclined toward Taiwanese

45 nationalism. For instance, Lee announced the "no haste, be patient" policy (戒急用

忍) to suspend cross-strait economic developments in 1996. In 1999, Lee declared that cross-strait relations should be viewed as ―special state-to-state relations‖, which was viewed as the pursuit of Taiwanese independence by the PRC.

The DPP lost the agenda setting on democratic issues due to KMT domination of democratic reforms, so the DPP turned its focus on Taiwanese identity issues. For example, in 1991 the DPP listed Taiwan independence in the party platform, advocating drafting a new Taiwan independence constitution. Nevertheless, the DPP did not perform well in the following legislative election, leading to the DPP’s adjustment of its Taiwan independence ideology. In 1995, the DPP president, Shih

Ming-teh, announced ―Taiwan is already an independent sovereign state, so it is unnecessary for the DPP to declare Taiwan independence‖. In response to Lee’s "no haste, be patient" policy, the DPP proposed the ―Strengthen the base, move westward‖ (強本西進) as its cross-strait economic policy, which was even more open than the KMT restrained policy. In 1999, the DPP ratified the Resolution on

Taiwan's Future, which promised that the independence of Taiwan’s sovereignty could coexist with the status quo of the ROC constitution. The transformation of the

DPP ideology implied the DPP transition from a radical missionary party to a broker party that moderated its ideology toward the center to gain more voters’ support.

46

In South Korea, after the collapse of Chun Doo-hwan’s dictatorship in 1987,

Chun’s successor, Roh Tae-woo, negotiated with the opposition and announced the

―June 29 Declaration‖, which opened the direct presidential election at the end of that year. Due to the division of opposition parties, Roh won the election and continued the rule of the previous authoritarian incumbent party. Roh launched the

Nordpolitik policies which sought to establish diplomatic relations with communist countries such as the USSR, the PRC, and North Korea. Roh’s Nordpolitik reflected the regime’s adjustment of its anti-communist ideology. In terms of South

Korea-North Korea relations, the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and

Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North and the Joint

Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was signed in 1992.

Domestically, in 1990, Roh’s ruling party, the Democratic Justice Party, merged with two opposition parties, Kim Young-sam’s Democratic Reunification Party and Kim

Jong-pil’s New Democratic Republican Party, forming a new ruling party, the

Democratic Liberal Party. In the 1992 presidential election, Kim Young-sam, who was one of the former opposition leader, was nominated as the presidential candidate by the ruling DLP and won the election. At the beginning, Kim Young-sam continued Roh’s reconciliation policy to North Korea. However, South Korea-North

Korea relations sharply deteriorated after the First North Korea Nuclear Crisis in

47

1993, and Kim took a hard-liner attitude toward North Korea.

After the democratization of South Korea and the end of the Cold War, the

Minjung movement, based on the radical ideology of Marxism and anti-Americanism, lost support from the middle class, and it was gradually replaced by the Simin movement, which focused on multiple social issues (Lee, 2011). In addition, Roh’s Nordpolitik de-radicalized the Minjung movement, since the accessibility of communist societies to the left-wing dissidents enabled them to witness the deterioration of communist countries and broke their ideal imagination of Marxism (Kihl, 2015: 244).

Upon comparing Taiwan and South Korea in terms of their developments of identity politics, both their ruling parties and opposition parties adapted their previous ideologies to post-democratization societies. The former authoritarian ruling parties, the KMT in Taiwan and the DJP in South Korea, gradually abandoned their authoritarian ideologies under the reform-minded leaderships and effectively responded to their opposition by adopting part of its ideologies, which deprived its control of agenda setting. By adjusting authoritarian ideologies of anti-communism, the KMT and the DJP could reconcile with their previous divided enemies, normalizing cross-strait relations and South Korea-North Korea relations. However,

Lee Teng-hui and Kim Young-sam adopted different ideologies when their

48 reconciliation policies encountered challenges from divided counterparts. Lee appealed to Taiwan nationalism against the PRC pressure after the Third Taiwan

Strait Crisis. Kim resorted to the former anti-communism ideology against North

Korea after the First North Korea Nuclear Crisis. The opposition parties in Taiwan and South Korea renounced radical ideologies, developing more practical ones to gain support from the majority of society. In Taiwan, the DPP in Taiwan abandoned its revolutionary Taiwan independence ideology in the 1990s. Instead, the DPP supported cross-strait economic exchanges and accepted the status quo of the ROC constitution. In South Korea, the radical Minjung movement also gradually lost public support after democratization. The previous opposition parties, Kim

Young-sam’s DRP and Kim Jong-pil’s NDRP, were even incorporated into the ruling party. The ideological convergence between the ex-authoritarian parties and the opposition parties likely resulted from democratic elections, which motivated parties to adjust ideologies toward the central spectrum to gain support from most voters.

(3) The first power rotation: polarization over national identity cleavages

In Taiwan’s presidential election in 2000, three major presidential candidates,

Chen Shui-bian from the DPP, Lien Chan from the KMT, and James Soong, were ideologically similar in their cross-strait policies and unification-independence issues, which were primarily based on Lee Teng-hui’s discourse on ―special

49 state-to-state relations.‖ In addition, all three candidates advocated the opening of cross-strait economic relations against Lee’s "no haste, be patient" policy (Wu,

2005). Chen won the presidential election in 2000, which accomplished the first party rotation in Taiwan and ended the fifty-years-long KMT rule. At the beginning,

Chen remained at the middle of the spectrum in cross-strait relations and unification-independence issues. For example, Chen followed the DPP’s Resolution on Taiwan's Future, which guaranteed the status quo of the ROC constitution. In

Chen’s presidential inauguration, he announced the ―Four Noes and One Without,‖2 which promised that he would not change the political status of Taiwan. In 2001,

Chen replaced Lee’s "no haste, be patient" policy with more open cross-strait policies. However, Chen appealed to Taiwanese nationalism in 2002 after suffering from diplomatic pressure from the PRC. For example, Chen defined cross-strait relations as ―One Country on Each Side‖ in 2002 and proposed a referendum of drafting a new constitution. During Chen’s second term after 2004, his ideology moved forward more radical Taiwan independence ideology. Chen replaced his previous cross-strait economic policy with a restricted policy and abolished the

National Unification Council and The Guidelines for National Unification. Chen

2 I would not declare Taiwanese independence, change the national title from "the Republic of China" to "the Republic of Taiwan", include the doctrine of special state-to-state relations in the Constitution of the Republic of China, promote a referendum on unification or independence, or abolish the National Unification Council and the National Unification Guidelines.

50 announced a more radical claim on ―Four Wants and One Without.‖3

Meanwhile, in the opposition party, the KMT, Lee Teng-hui resigned the presidency after losing the 2000 election. The resignation of Lee repositioned the

KMT ideological spectrum in Chinese nationalism. When the KMT encountered

Chen’s radical discourse on Taiwan independence, the KMT developed a stronger anti-independence and pro-Chinese ideology. For instance, when the PRC enacted the Anti-Secession Law in 2005, the KMT president, Lien Chan, met the PRC leader,

Hu Jintao. During their meeting in Beijing, Lien Chan announced the five points of compromise4, including acknowledging the 1992 consensus and encouraging cross-strait economic exchanges.

South Korea achieved its first power rotation in 1997 when Kim Dae-jung’s progressive party, the National Congress for New Politics Party, won the presidential election. Kim attempted to improve the South Korea-North Korea relations, which had deteriorated since the 1993 nuclear crisis. For instance, Kim’s presidential inauguration speech announced three principles regarding North Korea5 and his hope to expand cultural, academic, and economic exchanges with North Korea on the basis of separating the economy from politics (Kihl, 2015: 249). Kim initiated

3 Taiwan wanted independence, the rectification of its name, a new constitution, and development. Taiwanese politics is without the question of left or right, but only the question of unification or independence. 4 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/29/content_438686.htm 5 First, we will never tolerate armed provocation of any kind; second, we do not have any intention to undermine or absorb North Korea; and third, we will actively pursue reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North (Kihl, 2015: 249).

51 the ―Sunshine Policy‖, which promoted economic cooperation and reconciliation with North Korea to pursue the ultimate objective of the Korean unification. In 2000, the inter-Korean summit meeting was held in Pyongyang and the ―June 15th North–

South Joint Declaration‖ was announced by the two sides. In the 2002 presidential election, the progressive leader, Roh Moo-hyun, won the election and further advanced Kim’s Sunshine policy. Despite the Second North Korea Nuclear Crisis in

2006, Roh still sought to peacefully solve the crisis and attended the second inter-Korean summit in 2007, resulting in the ―2007 North–South Summit

Declaration‖ at the end of the summit. In regard to South Korea’s relations with the

U.S., the contradiction between the U.S. hard-liner policy toward North Korea and

South Korea’s Sunshine Policy made the progressives dissatisfied with the U.S.

Furthermore, a traffic accident caused by the U.S. armored vehicle in 2002 aroused anti-American demonstrations and the polarization over the U.S.-South Korea alliance between the conservatives and the progressives, so issues regarding anti-Americanism became salient during the 2002 presidential election (Kim, 2014:

87). After the election, Roh Moo-hyun undertook anti-Americanist policies, which opposed the U.S. domination of the military commandership and the extraterritoriality of U.S. military in South Korea. Furthermore, Roh criticized the

U.S. interference in the Second North Korea Nuclear Crisis and blamed the U.S. for

52 obstructing the Korean unification. In response to the progressive’s pro-North Korea and anti-Americanist polices, the main opposition conservative party, the Grand

National Party (GNP), appealed for the ideology of anti-communism and national security. The conservatives accused the Sunshine Policy of compromising the national security and offering unbalanced aids to North Korea. The conservatives also criticized the progressives’ anti-Americanism for breaking the long-standing

U.S.-South Korea alliance.

In comparison, polarization over national identity has been expanded since

Taiwan’s first power rotation in 2000 and South Korea in 1997. In Taiwan, the DPP, on the one hand, moved toward radical Taiwanese nationalism and anti-Chinese ideology. In response, the KMT, on the other hand, adopted a pro-cross-strait engagement and anti-Taiwan independence stance. In South Korea, the progressive ruling parties implemented the Sunshine policy and hard-line stance against the U.S., while the conservatives opposed the Sunshine policy and supported the U.S.-South

Korea alliance. The polarization over identity politics still deeply affects Taiwan and

South Korea today, shaping national identities cleavages between the KMT and the

DPP in Taiwan and between the conservatives and the progressives in South Korea.

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(4) The comparative historical institutionalist analysis

The concept of ―path dependence‖ implies that it is difficult for authoritarian regimes to concede their ideologies because the effect of ―institutional layering‖ will increase the cost of institutional changes. Nevertheless, Taiwan and South Korea’s authoritarian regimes succeeded in responding to the opposition and adapting their ideologies to democratic reformers. These successful examples can be explained by structural factors and the concept of ―punctuated equilibrium.‖ Structural factors include the authoritarian regimes’ responsiveness to social demands and the characteristics of pacted transitions to democracy in Taiwan and South Korea. First, the existence of elections in Taiwan and South Korea’s authoritarian regimes

54 enabled them to respond to the opposition ideologies, offering these two regimes some flexibility to adjust their official ideologies. Although the KMT authoritarian regime had more coercive restrictions on the opposition than South Korea, the

KMT’s Taiwanizaition reform under Chiang Ching-kuo’s leadership was even more successful than Chun Doo-hwan’s rule. Second, during the elite settlement of pacted transitions, authoritarian elites in Taiwan and South Korea attempted to maximize their political interests and maintain their power during the transitions. To ensure winning political support in democratic elections, the soft-liners within authoritarian regimes had to adapt their ideology to the majority of society. In Taiwan, Lee

Teng-hui gradually shifted his ideological position toward Taiwanese nationalism. In

South Korea, Roh Tae-woo partly compromised the regime’s anti-communist ideology and initiated the Nordpolitik policies. In 1990, the Roh’s ruling party even merged with two opposition parties.

With regard to punctuated equilibrium, both Taiwan and South Korea’s authoritarian regimes encountered crises of legitimacy, forcing them to reform their ideologies. In Taiwan, the very foundations of KMT legitimacy based on Chinese nationalism were shaken by international de-recognition in the 1970s and domestic ethnic divisions between the Taiwanese majority population and the Chinese mainlander elite minority. South Korea’s authoritarian regime did not encounter

55 diplomatic challenges and ethnic resentment as Taiwan faced, but Chun’s political legitimacy was unstable due to his control of power through a military coup and the bloody suppression of the Gwangju movement. Besides, the authoritarian regime’s ideological foundations were challenged by the rise of anti-American and pro-North

Korean sentiment after the Gwangju Incident.

The above-mentioned comparison shows that Taiwan and South Korea experienced a parallel development of their identity politics regarding national identities and national unification during their democratic transitions. In the preparatory phase, the Formosa Incident in 1979 Taiwan and the Gwangju Incident in 1980 South Korea can be viewed as the first ―critical juncture‖ in which the opposition movements became radical and harnessed nationalist issues to mobilize public support against authoritarian regimes. Challenged by opposition ideologies, the KMT authoritarian regime gradually conceded its ideology of Chinese nationalism and accelerated the Taiwanization reform in response to the opposition

Tangwai movement. Chun Doo-hwan’s authoritarian regime in South Korea, nonetheless, failed to respond to the opposition’s demands for political reforms, finally leading to the breakdown of Chun’s regime in the 1987 June Struggle.

The second ―critical juncture‖ lies in the inauguration of Roh Tae-woo in 1987

South Korea and Lee Teng-hui’s succession in 1988 Taiwan. As soft-liners within

56 the former authoritarian regimes, these reform-minded political leaders gradually surrendered the previous authoritarian ideologies based on nationalism and anti-communism. In response to incumbent reformers, the opposition parties, the

DPP in Taiwan and the progressive parties in South Korea, had to renounce their radical ideologies and moderate their stances on the ideological spectrum, to win support from the majority of voters after democratic transitions.

The third ―critical juncture‖ is the first power rotations in 1997 South Korea and in 2000 Taiwan. In South Korea, the progressive leader, Kim Dae-jung, won the presidential election and carried out the pro-North Korea Sunshine policy. Kim’s successor, Roh Moo-hyun, continued the Sunshine policy and even enforced an anti-American policy. In response, the conservative parties resorted to the anti-communist and pro-American ideologies. In Taiwan, after the DPP presidential candidate, Chen Shui-bian, won the presidency in 2000, he adopted an anti-Chinese policy and attempted to pursue Taiwan independence, and Chen’s ideological shift was countered by resurgence in KMT ideology based on an anti-Taiwan independence stance and Chinese nationalism. During this period, both Taiwan and

South Korea were suffering from political polarization over their identity politics, and cleavages in national identities were sharply divided between the incumbent parties and the opposition parties.

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V. The effect of identity politics on opinions about democracy

The above-mentioned analyses of Taiwan and South Korea’s identity politics imply ideological polarization between major political parties. However, this polarization in the partisan elite level is not necessarily applicable to the mass public.

Rigger (2016: 33-34) argues that Taiwan’s public opinion during Chen’s presidency moved to a central spectrum with rising Taiwanese identities, moderate standpoints on the independence-unification issue, and support for cross-strait economic engagements. In addition, Rigger also claims that in 2008 presidential election both the KMT and the DPP candidates moderated their ideologies to attract the median voters. Yu (2016) argues that Taiwan’s public opinion trend during Chen’s presidency only reflects political division along partisan line rather than polarization along ideological lines, because many independence voters still remained moderate stances on cross-strait and independence-unification issues. Therefore, according to

Rigger and Yu, ideological polarization may merely occur in the elite level rather than in public opinion. This chapter will analyze if the ideological confrontation of political parties has affected public opinions on democracy.

(1) The research design for Taiwan

In democratic elections, the ―losers’ consent‖ sometimes causes a gap between

―winners‖ and ―losers‖ in their support and satisfaction with political systems

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(Anderson, 2005), in which supporters of losing parties are less satisfied with political systems than supporters of winners. My research design is based on the quantitative analysis by Chu, Huang, and Chang (2016) in which the dependent variable is support for democracy, the main explanatory variable is perceived quality of governance, and the exogenous explanatory variable is partisanship. Their research shows that support for democracy is positively correlated with perceived quality of governance, but partisanship also negatively affects interviewees’ support for democracy when their partisan attachment conflicts with that of the incumbent party. In my research design, I will measure the correlation between the evaluation of democracy and national identity. In this quantitative design, I will hypothesize that an interviewee evaluates democracy more positively when his/her national identity is consistent with the incumbent party’s ideology and vice versa. For instance, an interviewee who supports Chinese unification may have more negative opinions on Taiwan’s democracy in the DPP incumbency from 2000 to 2008, and vice versa for a pro-Taiwan independence interviewee in the KMT incumbency from

2008 to 2016. Partisanship will be viewed as a controlled variable in my research design, since partisanship may affect both one’s opinions on democracy and national identity. However, sometimes the effect of partisanship may not be significant, since many respondents tend to claim to be non-partisan when they answer their party

59 identification. My hypothesis is based on the assumption that one’s opinions on democracy would be affected by both their partisanship and opinions on identity politics.

The Taiwan Election and Democracy Studies (TEDS) database has several variables including interviewee’s opinions on democracy, partisanship, and their attitudes toward national identity and unification-independence issues. The dependent variable, opinions on democracy, can be subdivided into four variables.

The first variable is support for democracy which refers to interviewees’ general preference for democracy or authoritarianism, so I will hypothesize that support for democracy will not be easily affected by partisanship. The 2004 survey asks ―Some people say, democracy may have problems, but it is still the best system? Do you agree or disagree with this statement?‖ In 2008, 2012, and 2016 surveys ask respondents to choose which of the following three statements is closest to their opinion: 1) ―Democracy is preferable to any other kind of regime‖; 2) ―For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of regime whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime‖; 3) ―In some circumstances, an authoritarian regime can be preferable to a democratic one.‖ The second dependent variable is satisfaction with

Taiwan’s democracy. The surveys ask ―On the whole, are you satisfied or not satisfied with the way democracy works in Taiwan?‖ The third dependent variable is

60 the evaluation of Taiwan’s democratic quality. The surveys in 2012 and 2016 ask:

―In your opinion how much of a democracy is Taiwan today?‖ The 2008 survey does not include this question, and the 2004 survey has a slightly different question

―Currently in Taiwan, how much do you think that individual liberties and human rights are respected? Are they very well respected, somewhat respected, not very respected, or not respected at all?‖

Nevertheless, the TEDS surveys were done after the elections, implying that interviewees’ opinions may be affected by not only the incumbent party but also the outcome of elections. Therefore, the causality may be ambiguous in the 2008 and

2016 surveys when party rotations occurred. Under these circumstances it is uncertain if interviewees’ opinions were affected by the incumbent party more or by the outcome of elections. The fourth dependent variable, the evaluation of the election’s influence on democracy, may resolve this ambiguity by focusing the questions on electoral outcomes. The 2004, 2008, and 2012 surveys ask: ―Do you think this presidential election improved democracy in Taiwan, damaged democracy in Taiwan, or did it not have any influence in this area?‖ Unfortunately, the 2016 survey does not include this question. The comparison between this variable and the other two dependent variables in 2008 can test whether opinions about the incumbent party or the outcome of elections had a stronger impact on respondents’

61 opinions on democracy.

Public attitudes toward national identities and cross-strait issues are the independent variable in my research, and they can be subdivided into three variables.

The first variable is a question about national identities asking ―Do you consider yourself as Taiwanese, Chinese or both?‖ The second independent variable refers to unification-independence issues. This question asks: ―Concerning the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China, which of the following six positions do you agree with?‖ I recoded answers into five categories—immediate independence, status quo but move toward independence, status quo, status quo but move toward unification, and immediate unification. The third variable is more policy-oriented than the above-mentioned two variables, asking public opinions on cross-strait economic exchanges. The survey in 2004 does not have this question. The 2008 survey asks ―If government opens up the cross-Strait economic exchange, do you think Taiwan's economy will get better, get worse, or stay about the same?‖ The

2012 and 2016 surveys ask: ―After 2008, the cross-Strait economic interactions have intensified. As a result of this, do you think Taiwan's economy has gotten better, worse or is about the same?‖

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(2) Data analyses of Taiwan

Table I. The correlation between cross-strait issues and support for democracy Dependent Variable: Support for Democracy Coefficients (The larger is more pro-democracy) 2004 2008 2012 2016 Nation Identities -0.01359 -0.176502*** -0.120351** -0.21301*** (The larger is more pro-Chinese) *** *** *** Partisanship (The larger is more pan-blue) -0.09192 -0.035589 -0.106370 -0.15147 *** Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) -0.03232 -0.142902 -0.006289 -0.03768 Age -0.04529*** 0.091951*** 0.093474*** 0.12203*** Education N/A 0.003128 -0.011748 -0.0189

** *** * * Independence-Unification issues -0.04814 -0.130887 -0.059091 -0.07206 (The larger is more pro-unification) *** *** *** Partisanship (The larger is more pan-blue) -0.07945 -0.031513 -0.120171 -0.18902 ** Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) -0.03522 -0.135672 0.001226 -0.02885 Age -0.04407*** 0.085764*** 0.085156*** 0.11466*** *** Education N/A -0.007394 -0.018483 -0.18902 Evaluation of cross-strait economy N/A 0.020109 -0.013587 -0.07741 (The larger is more positive) ** *** *** Partisanship (The larger is more pan-blue) N/A -0.090731 -0.137011 -0.20535 ** Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) N/A -0.140444 -0.001244 -0.01801 Age N/A 0.092127*** 0.087495*** 0.10525*** Education N/A -0.005729 -0.024583 -0.02756

Source: TEDS2004P (Independence), TEDS2008P (Independence), TEDS2012 (Independence), and TEDS2016 (Independence), Significance level: ***p ≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; *p ≤0.05

Quantitative analyses (Table I) mostly show that pro-Chinese, pro-unification,

and pro-engagement interviewees generally have less preference for democracy than

those who support Taiwanese identities, Taiwan’s independence, and oppose

cross-strait engagements, regardless of the year of incumbency. Especially, the

effects of national identities and independence-unification issues are statistically

significant. Nevertheless, the ―losers’ consent‖ does not work because the effect of

63 identity politics on support for democracy is mostly negative regardless of the DPP and the KMT incumbency. Among all three independent variables the most significant one is the national identities. The 2008, 2012, and 2016 surveys show that interviewees with stronger Chinese identities tend to have less preference for democracy (Figure I). Another independent variable, independence-unification issues (Figure II), also has a strongly significant effect on support for democracy in

2008, in which the pro-unification attitude negatively associates with support for democracy. In the 2004, 2012, and 2016 surveys, the effect of independence-unification issues on support for democracy is still significant but less than the 2008 survey, and the controlled variable of partisanship has a more significant effect on support for democracy, in which the pan-blue partisanship negatively correlates with support for democracy. The other variable— evaluation of cross-strait economic engagement (Figure III), has the most insignificant effect on support for democracy.

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Figure I. The correlation between national identities and support for democracy

Figure II. The correlation between independence-unification and satisfaction with democracy

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Figure III. The correlation between cross-strait economy and support for democracy

Table II. The correlation between cross-strait issues and satisfaction with democracy Dependent Variable: Coefficients Satisfaction with Democracy 2004 2008 2012 2016 (The larger is more satisfied) * * Nation Identities -0.06878 -0.01199 0.008109 -0.066704 (The larger is more pro-Chinese) *** ** *** Partisanship (The larger is more pan-blue) -0.22713 0.07158 0.180891 -0.019364 * Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) -0.02683 -0.06961 -0.016097 -0.050079 Age -0.01658 -0.02618 -0.02047 -0.007485 Education N/A 0.01177 0.036226** -0.005756

Independence-Unification issues -0.07813*** 0.02102 0.05501** 0.02434 (The larger is more pro-unification) *** * *** * Partisanship (The larger is more pan-blue) -0.21653 0.058279 0.16423 -0.04326 * Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) -0.0441 -0.070078 -0.02488 -0.03532 * Age -0.01641 -0.02803 -0.02668 -0.01674 ** Education N/A 0.007269 0.03309 -0.01307

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Evaluation of cross-strait economy N/A 0.11787*** 0.17436*** 0.20616*** (The larger is more positive) *** ** Partisanship (The larger is more pan-blue) N/A 0.03868 0.10835 -0.06129 * Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) N/A -0.07929 -0.0145 -0.04574

Age N/A -0.0273 -0.01742 -0.01147 * Education N/A 0.01171 0.02665 -0.01747

Source: TEDS2004P (Independence), TEDS2008P (Independence), TEDS2012 (Independence), and TEDS2016 (Independence), Significance level: ***p ≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; *p ≤0.05

The second dependent variable— satisfaction with Taiwan’s democracy (Table

II), reflects the ―losers’ consent‖ in which interviewees have lower satisfaction with

democracy when their political opinions conflict with the incumbent party’s position.

The effects of national identity and independence-unification issues on satisfaction

with democracy are insignificant compared to partisanship (Figure IV). The

correlation between pro-Chinese identity and satisfaction with democracy is

negative and significant in the 2004 and 2016 surveys, while the effect in 2008 and

2012 surveys are insignificant. The effect of the independence -unification stance on

satisfaction with democracy is significant as well in the 2004 and 2012 surveys. In

2004 the pro-unification stance has a statistically significant and negative correlation

with satisfaction with democracy, while in 2012 the pro-unification stance positively

correlates with satisfaction with democracy (Figure V). Compared to partisanship,

National identities and the independence- unification stance are not strong

explanatory variables to satisfaction with democracy. Nevertheless, the other

independent variable—the evaluation of cross-strait economy has stronger

67 explanatory power in satisfaction with democracy than partisanship (Figure VI). The surveys in 2008, 2012, and 2016 (the 2004 survey does not include this variable) show that interviewees who believed that intensification of cross-strait economy will improve their personal economy were more likely to be satisfied with Taiwan’s democracy. Although analyses in all the three years show the same direction of positive correlations, this phenomenon can be still explained by ―loser’ consent‖. On the one hand, despite the DPP’s incumbency in 2008, the reason why interviewees who negatively evaluated cross-strait economy had lower satisfaction with democracy may be explained by the winning election of the KMT in this year. On the other hand, the fact that those who negatively evaluated cross-strait economy had lower satisfaction with democracy in 2012 and 2016 can be interpreted by their discontent with cross-strait economic engagements under the KMT’s incumbency.

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Figure IV. The correlation between national identities and satisfaction with democracy

Figure V. The correlation between independence-unification and satisfaction with democracy

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Figure VI. . The correlation between cross-strait economy and satisfaction with democracy

Table III. The correlation between cross-strait issues and evaluation of democracy Dependent Variable: Coefficients Evaluation of Taiwan’s Democracy 2004 2012 2016 (The larger is more positive) National Identities -0.054626 0.04129 -0.029197 (The larger is more pro-Chinese) *** *** * Partisanship (The larger is more pan-blue) -0.124138 0.122435 -0.054152

Gender (―1‖ is male; ―2‖ is female) -0.045754 0.024859 -0.029898

Age -0.006126 -0.007836 -0.009606 *** Education N/A -0.005437 -0.054262

* ** ** Independence-Unification issues -0.05092 0.064623 0.06124 (The larger is more pro-unification) *** *** *** Partisanship (The larger is more pan-blue) -0.12417 0.112228 -0.08049

Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) -0.03947 0.02022 -0.02696

Age 0.00054 -0.006973 -0.01762 *** Education N/A -0.008241 -0.05338

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*** ** Evaluation of cross-strait economy N/A 0.165 0.104229 (The larger is more positive) *** *** Partisanship (The larger is more pan-blue) N/A 0.1656 -0.077423

Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) N/A -0.01069 -0.029578

Age N/A -0.01654 -0.008596 *** Education N/A 0.03771 -0.058071

Source: TEDS2004P (Independence), TEDS2012 (Independence), and TEDS2016 (Independence), Significance level: ***p ≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; *p ≤0.05

The third dependent variable— the evaluation of Taiwan’s democracy, has a

similar effect as satisfaction with democracy (Table III). The effects of national

identity on the evaluation of democracy are not significant, but they show different

directions of correlations between respondents who supported and those who did not

support the incumbent party’s stance (Figure VII). The effect of independence-

unification stance is statistically significant. The 2012 and 2016 surveys reflect a

positive correlation between support for Taiwan’s independence and the positive

evaluation of democracy, while the 2004 survey shows that support for unification

negatively correlates with the positive evaluation of democracy (

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Figure VIII). The other independent variable—the attitude toward cross-strait economy, has the most salient effect on the evaluation of Taiwan’s democracy

(Figure IX). Both the 2012 and the 2016 surveys indicates that a stronger pro-engagements stance correlates with the higher evaluation of Taiwan’s democratic quality.

Figure VII. The correlation between national identities and evaluation of democracy

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Figure VIII. The correlation between independence-unification and evaluation of democracy

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Figure IX. The correlation between cross-strait economy and evaluation of democracy

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Table IV.The correlation between cross-strait issue and evaluation of election on democracy Dependent Variable: Evaluation of election’s Coefficients influence on democracy (The larger is more 2004 2008 2012 positive) Nation Identities -0.21564*** 0.13849*** 0.082151* (The larger is more pro-Chinese) *** *** *** Partisanship (The larger is more pan-blue) -0.44667 0.35848 0.244098

Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) -0.01760 -0.04852 0.009829 *** Age 0.05747 -0.02673 -0.022339 * ** Education N/A 0.03062 0.03989

*** *** ** Independence-Unification issues -0.104282 0.15469 0.06124 (The larger is more pro-unification) *** *** *** Partisanship (The larger is more pan-blue) -0.47053 0.33133 -0.08049

Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) 0.007286 -0.05183 -0.02696

Age 0.061112 -0.01918 -0.01762 *** Education N/A -0.008241 -0.05338

*** ** Evaluation of cross-strait economy N/A 0.165 0.062475 (The larger is more positive) *** *** Partisanship (The larger is more pan-blue) N/A 0.1656 0.244575

Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) N/A -0.01069 0.007551

Age N/A -0.01654 -0.021332 ** *** Education N/A 0.03978 0.038265

Source: TEDS2004P (Independence), TEDS2008P (Independence), and TEDS2016 (Independence), Significance level: ***p ≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; *p ≤0.05

The last dependent variable— the evaluation of the presidential election’s

influence on democracy (Table IV), can test whether respondents’ opinions on

democracy are affected by the incumbent party or the outcome of elections,

especially in the 2008 and 2016 surveys when incumbent parties still held power but

opposition parties won presidential elections. Unfortunately, the 2016 survey did not

ask this question, so my research can only compare the surveys in 2004 with the

surveys in 2008 and 2012. Analyses of all explanatory variables show a strong

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―loser’s consent‖ between the DPP’s winning of election in 2004 and the KMT’s electoral victories in 2008 and 2012. Although partisanship is more statistically significant, national identities and cross-strait issues still have strong explanatory power. On the one hand, interviewees who had the Chinese identity, pro-unification, and pro-engagement stances evaluated the election’s influence on democracy more negatively in 2004 when the DPP won the presidential election. On the other hand, interviewees who had the Taiwanese identity, pro-independence, and anti-engagement stances had a more negative evaluation of elections’ effect on democracy in 2008 and 2012 when the KMT won the presidential elections. Among all independent variables, the evaluation of cross-strait economy is the most significant (Figure XII). National identities (Figure X) and independence- unification (Figure XI) issues also have moderate-to- significant coefficients with the evaluation of elections.

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Figure X. The correlation between national identities and evaluation of elections

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Figure XI. The correlation between independence- unification and evaluation of elections

Figure XII. The correlation between cross-strait economy and evaluation of elections

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In sum, most regression models accord with my hypothesis of ―losers’ consent‖ except the first dependent variable, support for democracy. The analysis of the first dependent variable indicates that support for democracy is probably not affected by losers’ consent. The direction of correlations between support for democracy and all explanatory variables regarding identity politics is the same regardless of the incumbency of the DPP or the KMT. Pro-Chinese and pro-unification identities are mostly negatively associated with preferences for democracy in the data analyses of each year. This finding implies that respondents’ inner value of democracy is affected by their national identities instead of their attitude toward the incumbent party. This negative correlation can be explained by the fact that the pro-Chinese identity and the pro-unification respondents may have more positive attitudes toward the authoritarian system in the contemporary PRC or the KMT regime in the past. Among all explanatory variables, the effect of national identities on support for democracy is the most significant, and the independence-unification stance is comparatively less, while the effect of cross-strait economy is the least. This finding suggests that support for democracy is mainly affected by ideological issues such as national identities rather than policy-oriented issues such as cross-strait economic exchanges.

Analyses of other two dependent variables, satisfaction with democracy and

79 evaluation of democracy, accord with my hypothesis that respondents’ opinions on democracy would be affected by the congruence between their cross-strait stances and the incumbent party’s position. The analysis of these two variables shows that correlations’ directions are different between the DPP incumbency and the KMT incumbency. The correlations between satisfaction with democracy and the pro-unification stance are negative in the 2004 DPP incumbency but positive in the

2012 KMT incumbency (Table II). Evaluation of democracy also has a negative correlation with pro-unification stance in 2004 but positive correlations in 2012 and

2016 (Table III). Among all explanatory variables, the effect of cross-strait economic exchanges on satisfaction with democracy and evaluation of democ4racy is the most significant, which implies that policy-oriented issues have stronger influence than ideological issues.

The analysis of the fourth dependent variable, evaluation of elections’ influence on democracy, resolves the ambiguity between the effect of incumbency or electoral outcomes, since this question focuses on the evaluation of elections’ outcome and excludes the effect of the incumbency. The analysis shows that the direction of correlation is negative in 2004 when the DPP won the presidential election but positive in 2008 and 2012 when the KMT won elections. In addition, the correlations between cross-strait issues and the evaluation of elections’ influence on

80 democracy have a sharper gap than the other two dependent variables’ correlations, implying that politicized issues such as elections are more susceptible to partisanship and cross-strait stances than value-based issues such as preference for democracy.

(3) The research design for South Korea

The research design for Taiwan’s case will be applied to the analyses of South

Korea. In this research design, I will measure correlations between opinions on democracy and issues regarding identity politics. Based on the assumption of the

―loser‖ consent, I hypothesize that respondents’ opinions on democracy are more negative when his/her stance on identity politics conflicts with the incumbent government. For example, if a respondent has a political stance inclined to the conservative viewpoint, which is more critical to North Korea but less critical to

American political influence in Korea, his/her opinions on democracy will be more positive during the conservative incumbency and more negative during the progressive incumbency.

Korea Democracy Barometer (KDB) provides surveys during the conservative incumbency in 1997 and the progressive incumbency in 1998, 2001 and 2004.

Questionnaires of the KDB surveys include my research design’s dependent variables— opinions toward democracy, and independent variables— political

81 cleavages divided by identity politics issues.

The dependent variables— opinions on democracy, are similar to my research design for Taiwan. The first one is support for democracy, which tests whether respondents prefer democracy to authoritarian regimes. This question asks respondents to choose which of the following three statements they agree most: 1)

―Democracy is preferable to any other kind of regime‖; 2) ―For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of regime whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime‖; 3) ―Under certain situations, a dictatorship is preferable.‖ The second variable is satisfaction with democracy in South Korea, and the third one refers to respondents’ evaluation of how democratic it is in South Korea. The KDB surveys lack a question asking the evaluation of the election’s influence on democracy as the

TEDS surveys have, but there is no need to test this variable in South Korea’s context, because in the surveys’ year 1998, 2001, and 2004 there were no presidential elections. Although the presidential elections were held in the end of

1997, the KDB survey in 1997 was conducted before the elections. As a result, I can exclude the confounding effect of presidential elections’ outcome and assume that interviewees; opinions on democracy were mainly affected by incumbency.

In South Korea’s context, identity politics issues are based on North Korea–

South Korea relations, unification with North Korea, and South Korea–United States

82 relations, instead of contending national identities. According to questionnaires of the KDB surveys, I will subdivide identity politics issues into the following three independent variables. The first variable is public perception of the Sunshine policy during Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun’s administrations. The 2001 survey has the following question: ―How much are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the Kim

Dae Jung Government’s effort to improve the relationship between North and South

Korea?‖ The 2004 survey asks: ―Please tell me how much you approve or disapprove the following policy options…To offer economic help to North Korea unconditionally.‖ The second variable refers to South Korean’s attitudes toward the

Unite States. The 1997 survey asks: ―Who is to be blamed for our country's political problems and how much…American?‖ The 2004 survey has a question: ―Please tell me how much you approve or disapprove the following policy options…To have

American troops [in Korea] withdrawn?‖ The last variable is public support for reunification with North Korea when considering costs. Questionnaires in the 1997 and the 1998 survey ask: ―If it cost a lot of money to people like yourself to reunify

Korea, how would you feel about it?‖ In 2004, the survey has a different kind of question: ―Reunification is expected to require lots of expenses. Which of the following options corresponds closest to your view?‖

Unfortunately, the KDB data are not comprehensive regarding independent

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variables. First, these independent variables do not appear in the all-year KDB

surveys. In addition, even variables regarding similar issues, such as evaluation of

policies on North Korea and attitudes toward the Unite States, are based on

dissimilar sets of questions across different years of surveys. Due to inconsistent

variables across surveys’ years, the cross-year analyses’ comparison as I did in the

TEDS is not applicable to KDB data. Instead, analyses of these independent

variables will be individually presented by years except the third variables. Second,

the KDB surveys in 1997 and 1998 do not control partisanship, which is an

important explanatory variable. As a result, the confounding effect of partisanship to

the correlation between identity politics variables and opinions on democracy should

be considered when analyzing data in 1997 and 1998 KDB surveys.

(4) Data Analyses of South Korea

Table V. The correlations between North Korea issues and support for democracy Dependent Variable: Support for Democracy Coefficients (The larger is more pro-democracy) 2001 2004 Dissatisfaction with Kim Dae-jung’s policies on North Korea -0.04114 N/A (The larger is more dissatisfied) Partisanship (The larger is more conservative) -0.09394 N/A Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) 0.05755 N/A Age -0.01072 N/A Education 0.13391** N/A Income 0.03301 N/A

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Disapproval of unconditional economic aids to North Korea N/A -0.0853082* (The larger is more disapproved) Partisanship (The larger is more conservative) N/A -0.0143403

Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) N/A 0.0120642 Age N/A 0.0248312 Education N/A -0.0237476

Income N/A 0.0002893 Source: KDB 2001, KDB 2004 Significance level: ***p ≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; *p ≤0.05

Quantitative analyses (Table V) show a negative correlation between support

for democracy and dissatisfaction with policies on North Korea during the

progressive incumbency in 2001 and 2004. However, these negative correlations are

statistically insignificant. The correlations between support for democracy and

attitudes toward America are positive (Table VI), but these correlations are weak and

statically insignificant. The correlations between opposition to unification and

support for democracy (Table VII) are negative regardless of the conservative

incumbency in 1997 and the progressive incumbency in 1998 and 2004. The

correlations in 1997 and 1998 are not significant, while the correlation is much

stronger and statistically significant in the 2004 survey.

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Table VI. The correlations between American issues and support for democracy Dependent Variable: Support for Democracy Coefficients (The larger is more pro-democracy) 1997 2004 Political attitudes toward Americans 0.041607 N/A (The larger is less critical to Americans) Partisanship (The larger is more conservative) N/A N/A Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) 0.02179 N/A Age 0.046259 N/A Education -0.030493 N/A Income 0.003523 N/A Disapproval of withdrawing American N/A 0.010666 troops in Korea (The larger is more disapproved) Partisanship (The larger is more conservative) N/A -0.039156 Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) N/A 0.023078 Age N/A 0.023325 Education N/A -0.015148 Income N/A 0.005913 Source: KDB 1997, KDB 2004 Significance level: ***p ≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; *p ≤0.05

Table VII. The correlations between unification with costs and support for democracy Dependent Variable: Support for Democracy Coefficients (The larger is more pro-democracy) 1997 1998 2004 Opposition to unification -0.0221 -0.083415* -0.130061** (The larger is more oppositive) Partisanship (The larger is more pan-blue) N/A N/A -0.020159 Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) 0.036109 -0.004747 0.056478 Age 0.040429 -0.009051 0.020215 Education -0.036314 0.162524** -0.017787 Income -0.001427 -0.0162 0.001221 Source: KDB 1997, KDB 1998, KDB 2004 Significance level: ***p ≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; *p ≤0.05

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Table VIII. The correlations between North Korea issues and satisfaction with democracy Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with democracy Coefficients (The larger is more satisfied) 2001 2004 Dissatisfaction with Kim Dae-jung’s policy on North Korea -0.151503*** N/A (The larger is more dissatisfied) *** Partisanship (The larger is more conservative) -0.19711 N/A Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) 0.084711 N/A Age 0.005678 N/A Education -0.089718* N/A Income 0.028027 N/A Disapproval of unconditional economic aids to North Korea N/A -0.058943 (The larger is more disapproved) *** Partisanship (The larger is more conservative) N/A -0.140116

Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) N/A -0.02927 Age N/A 0.055938* Education N/A 0.016196

Income N/A 0.008566 Source: KDB 2001, KDB 2004 Significance level: ***p ≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; *p ≤0.05

The second dependent variable, satisfaction with democracy, is negatively

associated with opposition to the government’s policies on North Korea during the

progressive incumbency (Table VIII). In other words, the correlations between

satisfaction with democracy and support for the progressive incumbency’s policies

on North Korea are positive. Although partisanship still has the strongest effect, the

coefficient between satisfaction with democracy and opinions on Kim Dae-jung’s

policy is also statistically significant and strong in the 2001 survey. With regards to

the correlation between satisfaction with democracy and American issues (Table IX),

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although directions of coefficients are opposite between 1997 and 2004, this

outcome does not accord with my hypothesis, in which the correlation between

satisfaction with democracy pro-American attitudes should be positive during the

conservative incumbency but negative during the progressive incumbency. The

correlations between satisfaction with democracy and opposition to unification are

positive in 1998 and negative in 1997 and 2004, and the correlations in 1998 and

2004 are insignificant (Table X).

Table IX. The correlations between American issues and satisfaction with democracy Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with democracy Coefficients (The larger is more satisfied) 1997 2004 Political attitudes toward Americans -0.02154 N/A (The larger is less critical of Americans) Partisanship (The larger is more conservative) N/A N/A Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) 0.050361 N/A Age 0.022892 N/A Education -0.063223 N/A Income -0.004623 N/A Disapproval of withdrawing American troops N/A 0.0708463* in Korea (The larger is more disapproved) *** Partisanship (The larger is more conservative) N/A -0.165633 Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) N/A -0.0430669 Age N/A 0.0459384 Education N/A 0.0006826 Income N/A 0.0143722 Source: KDB 1997, KDB 2004 Significance level: ***p ≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; *p ≤0.05

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Table X. The correlations between unification with costs and support for democracy Dependent Variable: Support for Democracy Coefficients (The larger is more pro-democracy) 1997 1998 2004 Opposition to unification -0.075236** 0.01433 -0.060036 (The larger is more oppositive) *** Partisanship (The larger is more conservative) N/A N/A -0.15243 Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) 0.068372 -0.05896 -0.025963 Age 0.011147 0.0119 0.057148* Education -0.072848 -0.14032** 0.023946 Income -0.005383 0.02144 -0.001238 Source: KDB 1997, KDB 1998, KDB 2004 Significance level: ***p ≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; *p ≤0.5

Table XI. The correlations between North Korea issues and evaluation of democracy Dependent Variable: Evaluation of democracy Coefficients (The larger is more positive) 2001 2004 Dissatisfaction with Kim Dae-jung’s policy on North Korea -0.1571*** N/A (The larger is more dissatisfied) *** Partisanship (The larger is more conservative) -0.21547 N/A Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) -0.02916 N/A Age -0.05023* N/A Education -0.09059* N/A Income -0.01745 N/A Disapproval of unconditional economic aids to North Korea N/A -0.02986 (The larger is more disapproved) *** Partisanship (The larger is more conservative) N/A -0.19913

Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) N/A 0.01485 Age N/A 0.04727 Education N/A -0.0115

Income N/A 0.0299 Source: KDB 2001, KDB 2004 Significance level: ***p ≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; *p ≤0.05

The correlations between evaluation of democracy and opposition to the

progressive government’s policies on North Korea are negative (Table XI). In other

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words, satisfaction with polices toward North Korea is positively associated with

better evaluation of how democratic it is in South Korea. Although the effect of

partisanship is the most significant, opinions on Kim Dae-jung’s policy still has

significant effect on evaluation of democracy as well in 2001. The other two

explanatory variables, attitudes towards unification (Table XII) and opinions about

Americans (Table XIII), have weak and statistically insignificant correlations with

evaluation of democracy.

Table XII. The correlations between American issues and evaluation of democracy Dependent Variable: Evaluation of democracy Coefficients (The larger is more positive) 1997 2004 Political attitudes toward Americans -0.008262 N/A (The larger is less critical of Americans) Partisanship (The larger is more conservative) N/A N/A Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) -0.027761 N/A Age 0.033374 N/A Education -0.033426 N/A Income 0.007344 N/A Disapproval of withdrawing American troops N/A 0.03994 in Korea (The larger is more disapproved) *** Partisanship (The larger is more conservative) N/A -0.22226 Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) N/A 0.01897 Age N/A 0.03629 Education N/A -0.0326 Income N/A 0.03429* Source: KDB 1997, KDB 2004 Significance level: ***p ≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; *p ≤0.05

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Table XIII. The correlations between unification with costs and evaluation of democracy Dependent Variable: Evaluation of democracy Coefficients (The larger is more positive) 1997 1998 2004 Opposition to unification 0.004634 -0.005723 -0.03692 (The larger is more oppositive) *** Partisanship (The larger is more conservative) N/A N/A -0.2076 ** Gender (―1‖ is male: ―2‖ is female) -0.034094 -0.129886 0.04203 Age 0.035819 -0.011176 0.04437 Education -0.033066 -0.086307* -0.01069 Income 0.012155 0.001502 0.0344* Source: KDB 1997, KDB 1998, KDB 2004 Significance level: ***p ≤0.001; **p ≤0.01; *p ≤0.5

In brief, only the first explanatory variable, evaluation of the government’s

policies on North Korea, accords with my hypothesis, in which interviewees

supporting the government’s policies toward North Korea are more likely to have

higher preference for democracy and better opinions on how democracy performs in

South Korea. The two other independent variables— opinions about American issues

and Korean unification, do not accord with my hypothesis, since their coefficients are

mostly insignificant to dependent variables and directions of these coefficients are

random. The result of these analyses implies that party incumbency and ―loser’s

consent‖ only affect public opinions on the government policies toward North Korea,

since this issue is more policy-oriented and has an immediate effect on politics.

Therefore, respondents’ opinion on democracy would be easily affected by their

attitudes toward the government’s policies on North Korea. The two other issues—

opinions about American issues and Korean unification, in contrast, may be more

91 unattainable and have no immediate results, because these two issues are decided by international situations instead of the Korean government itself. As a result, respondents’ opinions on democracy may be not easily affected by these two issues.

VI. Conclusion

Taiwan and South Korea share a common experience of national divisions caused by civil wars against the communists, the legacies of anti-communist authoritarian regimes, and the pacted transition to democracy between authoritarian reformers and moderate oppositions. These commonalities shaped their identity politics and national identity cleavages between the ex-authoritarian ideologies and the opposition ideologies. Nevertheless, Taiwan and South Korea have experienced divergent developments in their identity politics. The identity cleavage in Taiwan is derived from ethnic conflicts between Chinese mainlanders and Taiwanese islanders, and it has developed into an identity division relating to Taiwanese-Chinese identification and the Chinese unification-Taiwan independence cleavage. South

Korea does not have ethnic conflicts and a sharp polarization over national unification, but U.S.-South Korea relations and South Korea-North Korea relations are significant in South Korea’s identity cleavages. Based on my comparative historical analysis of the development of identity politics in Taiwan and South Korea, my paper hypothesizes that Taiwan’s identity cleavage is intrinsically more

92 unbridgeable than South Korea’s, and it will probably be problematic for Taiwan’s democratic development. However, my comparative historical analysis shows that the ethnic division in Taiwan did not make Taiwan’s democratic transition more problematic and conflictive than South Korea’s, since the KMT’s ideological adaptability and responsiveness allowed the KMT regime to concede its Chinese nationalism and undertake the Taiwanization reform.

Theories claiming that national divisions will obstruct democratic developments may not be applicable to Taiwan and South Korea. These theories can be applied to multiethnic societies with serious ethnic conflicts. However, Taiwan and South Korea are ethnically homogenous societies without severe hostility among different ethnic groups. In fact, debates over national unification mobilized

Taiwan and South Korea’s opposition movements against authoritarian regimes, and in Taiwan ethnic conflicts between the Taiwanese and the Chinese during the authoritarian period shaped the Taiwanese democratic movements in the 1980s.

Thus, the legacy of divided nationhood promoted Taiwan and South Korea’s democratization rather than causing negative effects on their initial transitions.

Nevertheless, after Taiwan and South Korea’s first power rotation, the legacy of national divisions resulted in political polarization over national unification and identity politics. The polarization can be explained by Snyder’s argument that

93 political elites tend to manipulate and mobilize nationalist cleavages during the initial stages of democratization. However, in Taiwan and South Korea, the polarization of party politics occurred during the consolidated phase of democratic transition rather than the initial phase as Snyder suggests. Instead, the ideological gap between the former authoritarian parties and the opposition narrowed during the initial phase of Taiwan and South Korea’s democratizations, which may be explained by the adaptability of elites’ interests to democratic reforms. In this situation, elites within previous authoritarian regimes can easily adjust their ideologies to social demands, and the opposition elites have to moderate their revolutionary ideology in response.

In the chapter of quantitative analyses, I hypothesize that the losers’ consent will cause the gap between voters whose positions is congruent to the incumbent party and voters whose stances contradict the ruling party. In terms of data from the

Taiwan Election and Democracy Studies (TEDS), my quantitative analyses mostly accord with this hypothesis. Although coefficients are not significant compared to partisanship, the effect of national identities and independence-unification issues on satisfaction with democracy and the evaluation of democracy are different between the DPP incumbency and the KMT incumbency (or between the KMT’s electoral victories and the DPP’s victories). Based on above-mentioned quantitative analyses,

94 my paper suggests that the polarization over identity politics, especially cross-strait economic issues, combining with the effect of partisanship, affect public opinion on how well democracy performs in Taiwan. Nevertheless, the outcomes of quantitative analyses of data from Korean Democracy Barometer (KDB) are mostly not congruent with hypothesis of the losers’ consent except for the correlation between satisfaction with the government’s policies toward North Korea and opinions on democracy. The failure of my hypothesis to the Korean data may partly result from the incompleteness of KDB database, which prohibits the comparison of analyses across different years of incumbency.

The quantitative analyses of Taiwan and South Korea are based on different databases and questionnaires, so it is impossible to directly compare statistics between the analyses of Taiwan and South Korea’s data. However, through qualitative comparison between these two data analyses, I conclude that more policy-oriented issues, such as cross-strait economy for Taiwan and South Korea’s government policies on North Korea, have a stronger ―losers’ consent‖ effect on public opinions about democracy. Conversely, public opinions on democracy are less susceptible to ideological issues, such as national identities in Taiwan, or less achievable issues, such as withdrawal of American troops in Korea and unification of the Korean Peninsula. This conclusion implies that in Taiwan and South Korea’s

95 cases, polarization over identity politics may be divided along policy-oriented issues rather than ideological issues.

Imperfections of my quantitative analyses lie in the incompleteness of South

Korea’s database and the lack of a database that encompasses Taiwan and South

Korea’s data. Although the TEDS and KDB databases include similar variables regarding opinions on democracy, other explanatory variables and controlled variables are different, preventing me from quantitatively comparing data between

Taiwan and South Korea. In the future, a self-designed survey including both

Taiwan and South Korea’s data is desirable, since it allow researchers to directly compare statistics between Taiwan and South Korea. In addition, in order to test the effect of losers’ consent across different years of incumbency, analyses of panel data will be more accurate to track changes of a respondent’s attitudes during power rotations. As a result, in the future I can improve the quality of this comparative research between Taiwan and South Korea by designing a survey with both Taiwan and South Korea’s data and panel data over years of different parties’ incumbency.

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