Masaryk University Faculty of Social Sciences Department of Political Science Lenka Homolková, E.MA Electoral Integrity And

Masaryk University Faculty of Social Sciences Department of Political Science

Lenka Homolková, E.MA Electoral Integrity and Electoral Violence How electoral integrity impacts on the propensity of electoral violence in South Asia?

[Ph.D. DISSERTATION]

Supervisor: prof. PhDr. Jan Holzer, Ph.D.

Brno 2019 Abstract

The problems of electoral integrity increase the perception of fraudulent elections, undermine public confidence in the electoral process, and therefore mobilize the electorate to engage in electoral violence. In recent years, scholars have played a significant role in conceptualizing the electoral integrity and delineating the normative standards that underpin the concept. However, electoral integrity is more than compliance with international standards — the broader contexts in which elections take place shapes the integrity of the process. Deeply rooted societal factors, electoral dynamics, political will, and looser consent, as well as the strategies to mitigate vulnerabilities in the process play, among others, an essential role in determining whether the political stakeholders and public perceive the elections as having integrity or lacking it.

Scholars identified many factors impacting on electoral integrity and electoral violence; nevertheless, the relative importance of these individual factors is yet to be assessed. At the same time, the conceptual models and even more so, the indicators still vary among the scholars and election practitioners. While the link between electoral integrity and electoral violence emerged in academic research, it has focused mainly on the cross-national time-series, but the cross-country or regional studies remain still scarce. Scholars also focused extensively on the electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa, but the phenomenon of election-related conflicts is yet to be systematically studied within the South Asian region, despite it is equally common. The combined Perception of Electoral Integrity (PEI) index score for the region of South Asia for elections between 2012 and 2018 has been 49.14, ranging from 34 in Afghanistan to 74 in Bhutan. Overall, it is much below the global average of 55.8 for the same period (Norris and Grömping 2019: 6). The electoral violence occurred in over 88% of national elections held in the region between 1980 and 2017. The type of violence, however, differs.

The dissertation seeks to address these gaps aiming at consolidating existing analysis into one comprehensive conceptual framework, using cross-national studies within the region of South Asia. Focusing primarily on the link between electoral integrity and electoral violence, it considers the relative importance of the elections-, political-, and structural-level factors to determine to what extent the lack of electoral integrity impacts on the propensity of electoral violence. 2

With this specific aim, the dissertation begins with the operationalization of the concepts of electoral integrity and electoral violence using De Vaus’ (1996) methodology. The aim is to break the complexity, eliminate variations across conceptual models, and develop a comprehensive set of indicators for each of the factors impacting on both electoral integrity and electoral violence. The dissertation focuses on a more comprehensive integrity assessment. It also goes beyond a mere study whether the integrity impacts the occurrence of electoral violence. We construct three separate models to examine occurrence, intensity, and impact – in terms of civilian deaths, of electoral violence, as they result from the breaches of electoral integrity.

The quantitative research confirms that electoral integrity overall correlates with electoral violence. Secondly, despite the clear risk of reverse causality, the multiple linear regression (MLR) demonstrates that some aspects of electoral integrity impact on the propensity of electoral violence. The structural indicators, notably the existence of conflict/war, ethnic/political division, and human development appears to have the most substantial impact.

The political-electoral dynamics complement the integrity indicators mentioned above, notably the vote-buying, loser consent, and strategies of the ruling party. The qualitative analyses, placing the results in the perspective of the Asia Foundation study on the key triggers of political violence in Asia (2017), generally confirm the hypothesis and quantitative research. We must consider the impact of the ongoing conflicts and money in politics that impact on the level playing field, and therefore increase the propensity of electoral violence in South Asia. The quantitative analyses also help to explain the odd outcomes and ‘outliner’ data, i.e., the suggestion that the increase in HDI would also lead to an increase in electoral violence.

We interpret all the results in the context of the region studied. In the region of South Asia, the politicization of ethnic, religious, and other societal division often serves as a strategy of the opposition and the ruling parties to win the elections. Such a strategy further divides society. At the same time, in the world’s most impoverished countries, the development usually first benefits the part of the society with higher income, creating further divisions. The winner-take-all contest,

which, according to our data, affects over 60% of all elections in South Asia, increases stakes in the process and therefore the propensity of electoral violence.

The mentioned integrity indicators can explain the propensity of electoral violence in over 50% of the cases. As the dissertation focuses very much on establishing a comprehensive framework, operationalizing concepts, and setting up the indicators to assess a complex relationship with electoral violence, it directly identified some areas that deserves further study. It is a relatively new area of research. Therefore, it opens space for further analysis and approaches both at academic, as well as practitioner level.

To establish a complete electoral integrity framework, however, requires further time and research. This dataset can clearly explain the main electoral violence patterns in the specific region and represents a solid start into the further research. Nevertheless, cross-national series with more cases could equally have a stronger predictive value. To improve accuracy, we suggest testing the dataset on the data from similar sources. E.g., quantify only the elections that hosted an election observation mission, and only use observation reports following a similar, rigorous methodology. The variables added could include a specific indicator of violence against women, technology in the electoral process, or corruption. Furthermore, there is a need for in-depth national studies, using the established integrity framework.

The complex study of electoral integrity, with our dataset, or with added variables and cases, serve as a robust framework to establish the predictors of electoral violence. It can also serve to design better electoral assistance projects to tackle the root causes of electoral violence.

Key words: electoral integrity, electoral violence; South Asia, conflict, integrity framework, political dynamics

List of abbreviations

ANOVA Analysis of Variance BEC Bangladesh Electoral Commission CE Commissioner for Election [Sri Lanka] CEC Chief Electoral Commissioner CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women CERD Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination CMEV Center for Monitoring Electoral Violence CREV Countries at risk of electoral violence dataset CRPD Convention on the Right of Persons with Disabilities CSO Civil Society DDR Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration ECB Election Commission of Bhutan ECC Electoral Complaints Commission [Afghanistan] ECI Election Commission of India ECN Election Commission of Nepal ECP Election Commission of Pakistan EDR Electoral Disputes Resolution EMB Electoral Management Body EVPI Election Violence Prevention Database EVS Electronic Voting System GDEDS Global Commission on Election, Democracy, and Security HRC Human Rights Committee HDI Human development index IDPs Internally Displaced Persons IEC Independent Election Commission [Afghanistan] ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems IIIDEM Indian International Institute for Democracy and Election Management 5

JEMB Joint Electoral Management Body [Afghanistan] LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. [Sri Lanka] NELDA National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy MLR Multiple linear regression PEI Perception of Electoral Integrity PDA Pakistan’s Democratic Alliance PLA The Movement of Maoist People’s Army. [Nepal] PRIO Peace Research Institute Oslo PAFFREL People’s Action for Free and Fair Election [Sri Lanka] QOG Quality of Government ROPA Representation of People Act [India] SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SVEEP System Voter Education and Electoral Participation [India] UCDP Upsala Conflict Data Program UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN United Nations UNP United National Party [Sri Lanka] YCL Youth Communist League [Nepal]

Table of Contents

Abstract ...... 2

List of abbreviations ...... 5

List of Figures ...... 9

1. Introduction ...... 11

1.1. Structure of the dissertation ...... 17

PART I: METHODS AND CONCEPTS ...... 22

2. Chapter One: State of the discipline ...... 22

2.1. Electoral integrity ...... 22

2.2. Electoral violence: factors and typology ...... 25

2.3. Direct link between electoral integrity and electoral violence ...... 29

3. Chapter Two: Operationalization of the concepts and definitions ...... 31

3.1. Definition of electoral integrity ...... 31

3.2. Definition of electoral violence ...... 32

3.3. Operationalization of the concepts and the link between electoral integrity and electoral violence ...... 33

4. Chapter Three: The methodology and critical hypothesis ...... 51

4.1. Operationalization of the concepts ...... 51

4.2. Data collection and description of datasets used ...... 52

4.3. Quantitative analysis ...... 55

4.4. Qualitative analysis ...... 58

4.5. Limits of the research ...... 59

PART II: COUNTRY CASES ...... 62

5. Chapter Four: Electoral integrity and violence in South Asia - a data consolidation ...... 62

5.1. Afghanistan ...... 62

5.2. Bangladesh ...... 71

5.3. Bhutan ...... 80

5.4. India ...... 85

5.5. Nepal ...... 91

5.6. Pakistan: ...... 100

5.7. Sri Lanka ...... 109

5.8. Verification and summary conclusions ...... 120

PART III: ANALYSIS ...... 127

6. Chapter Five: Does electoral integrity influences the propensity of electoral violence? .... 127

6.1. Correlation between electoral integrity and electoral violence ...... 127

6.2. Impact of different dimensions of electoral integrity on electoral violence ...... 134

7. Chapter Six: What the quantitative assessment cannot tell us? ...... 164

7.1. Top five factors influencing electoral violence in South Asia and beyond ...... 164

7.2. Challenges to the systematic examination of pre-set integrity indicators on electoral violence in South Asia: Bhutan, other outliners and odd outcomes ...... 167

7.3. Impact of mitigation measures on the electoral violence in South Asia ...... 169

8. Conclusions: Advancing the study of electoral integrity and electoral violence ...... 172

9. Annexes ...... 177

Annex I: List of Elections ...... 177

Annex II: Electoral integrity and electoral violence indicators ...... 178

Annex III: Full dataset ...... 185

Annex IV: Full dataset - recalculated for MLR [scale 0 – 1] ...... 187

10. References ...... 189

10.1. Publications and documents ...... 189

10.2. Legislation and legal references ...... 213

10.3. Internet websites ...... 214

10.4. Personal communication with the author ...... 215

List of Figures Figure 1: Consolidation of electoral integrity concepts [p. 25] Figure 2: Operationalization of electoral integrity [p. 37] Figure 3: Conceptualization of electoral violence [p. 47] Figure 4: Conceptualization of electoral violence triggers [p. 48] Figure 5: Sub-dimensions of electoral integrity and violence (overlaps) [p. 50] Figure 6: Afghanistan - EMB Capacity Score (detailed) [p. 67] Figure 7: Afghanistan – all data [p. 70] Figure 8: Bangladesh - EMB Capacity Score (detailed) [p. 76] Figure 9: Bangladesh – all data [p. 79] Figure 10: Bhutan - EMB Capacity Score (detailed) [p. 83] Figure 11: Bhutan – all data [p. 84] Figure 12: India - EMB Capacity Score (detailed) [p.88] Figure 13: India – all data [p. 90] Figure 14: Nepal - EMB Capacity Score (detailed) [p. 97] Figure 15: Nepal – all data [p. 99] Figure 16: Pakistan - EMB Capacity Score (detailed) [p. 105] Figure 17: Pakistan – full data [p. 108] Figure 18: Sri Lanka - EMB Capacity Score (detailed) [p. 114] Figure 19: Sri Lanka – all data [p. 118 – 119] Figure 20: Correlation between universal suffrage and genuine elections (Pearson’s R, IBM SPSS Statistics) [p. 1221] Figure 21: Correlation between universal suffrage and genuine elections [p. 121] Figure 22: Our data for EMB capacity vs. PEI data for EMB capacity [p. 122]

Figure 23: Correlation between our EMB capacity dataset and PEI dataset (Pearson’s R, IBM SPSS Statistics) [p. 122] Figure 24: Correlation between author’s EMB capacity dataset and PEI dataset [p. 123] Figure 25: Full electoral violence dataset (dependent variable) [p. 124-125] Figure 26: Basic correlation (Pearson’s R) between PEI index and electoral violence [p. 128] Figure 27: Basic correlation (Pearson’s R) between dimensions of electoral integrity and electoral violence [p. 131-132] Figure 28: Linearity test - relationship between electoral integrity indicators and occurrence of electoral violence [p. 136-140] Figure 29: Model Summary, MLR (Stepwise) [p. 141] Figure 30: ANOVA test, relevance and significance of the model [p. 142] Figure 31: Multiple Linear Regression, Electoral Integrity & Occurrence of Electoral Violence [p. 144] Figure 32: Linearity test - relationship between electoral integrity indicators and intensity of electoral violence [p. 145-149] Figure 33: Model Summary – Intensity of EV (MLR, stepwise, all cases [N=58]) [p. 150] Figure 34: Model Summary – Intensity of electoral violence (MLR, stepwise, elimination of four cases [N=54]) [p. 150] Figure 35: ANOVA test, relevance, and significance of the model [p. 151] Figure 36: Dataset 1, Multinomial Linear Regression, Electoral Integrity & Intensity of Electoral Violence [p. 155] Figure 37: Linearity test - the relationship between electoral integrity indicators and impact of electoral violence [p. 156-160] Figure 38: Model Summary – Impact of electoral violence (MLR, stepwise, elimination of four cases [N=54]) [p. 161] Figure 39: Model Summary – Impact of electoral violence (MLR, stepwise, all cases [N=58]) [p. 161] Figure 40: Dataset 1, Logistic Regression, Electoral Integrity & Impact of Electoral Violence [p. 162]

1. Introduction

The concept of contentious politics has attracted significant attention in the academic research, looking into diverse phenomena such as social movements, ethnic and religious conflicts, insurrections, rebellion, political strikes, genocide, and civil war (Kriesi et al. 1995; Tilly and Tarrow 2006; Norris 2015: 2-4). The specific areas of electoral studies and research on social movements as two closely related aspects of conflict, however, have yet to be systematically studied. The inherent link between the violence and different aspects of political contestation hence require closer attention (McAdam and Tarrow 2010; Norris et al. 2015; Asia Foundation 2017).

At the same time, the Post-Cold War period marks an extensive study of democratization and civil wars as a dominant theme in the comparative research. However, the topic of electoral violence has received much less attention (Snyder 2000; Dunning 2011; Straus and Taylor 2012; Norris et al. 2015). A large number of internal conflicts and civil wars in fragile states re-escalate during the electoral period (Atuobi 2008: 10-15). Although elections are inherently political, they do not have to be necessarily conflict-inducing, if the root-causes, often latent or deeply rooted in the society, are addressed. In these cases, the electoral process can legitimize a country’s structures of governance. On the contrary, however, the struggle for power can exacerbate already existing tensions in society and elevate the root causes of conflict. Very often, these root causes of conflict, and therefore electoral violence, remain insufficiently addressed due to the lack of knowledge and analysis, notably at the sub-national level (Asia Foundation 2017). Also, the existing datasets on electoral violence are often unreliable and tend to underreport the levels of violence. The data on local forms of violence are especially challenging to find. Reporting often focuses on one type of violence – mainly the civil war, political violence, or terrorism, rather than electoral violence, which further complicates the effective response (Asia Foundation 2017).

That said, the phenomenon of electoral violence remains widespread with around one-fifth of the recent elections worldwide experiencing an election-related conflict. Around 12% of elections worldwide lead to opposition boycotts, while 17 % see post-election riots and 18% result in electoral violence involving at least one civilian death (Hyde and Marinov 2012; Norris et al. 2015: 1-22). The region of South Asia is equally prone to election-related violence. This dissertation 11

identifies that 51 out of 58 (nearly 88%) of all national-level elections held between 1980 and 2017 experienced election-related violence leading to at least one civilian death.

Although electoral violence does not always result in a civil war, it often leads into a widespread conflict as we witnessed, for example, in Kenya (2007-8) or Nigeria (2011). Localized violence remains omnipresent in South Asia, often with dramatic cumulative impact (Asia Foundation 2017: 2). It claims lives and, in many instances, severely damages the legitimacy of the electoral process as well as undermines the elected governments. Vice-versa, an existing conflict, the pervasive climate of fraud, mistrust, and intolerance have sparked massive protests, and violence in the past. Perception of fraud, but also mismanagement of the electoral process is likely to encourage direct actions – demonstrations, protests, and possibly violence. Long-established democracies would have, usually developed safeguards to overcome minor flaws in the electoral process. In fragile states, however, without reserves of public trust, it may deepen and increase dangers of instability (Norris 2015: 16).

Moreover, the lack of public trust severely damages electoral integrity. Looking at this problem from the other perspective, the lack of electoral integrity increases the perception of electoral fraud, malpractice, and manipulation, and undermines public confidence in the electoral process. Problems of integrity often strongly impact on electoral violence. The damaged electoral integrity, therefore, mobilizes propensity to engage in popular protests, which may lead to electoral violence (Norris 2014; Höglund 2009). As such, the link between electoral integrity and violence becomes self-evident.

In recent years, scholars have played a significant role in conceptualizing the electoral integrity and delineating the normative standards that underpin the concept. However, electoral integrity is more than compliance with international standards. It further goes beyond a mere ‘quality of elections’ (Hallf 2017). The electoral process, which is correctly administered but fails to engender the trust of the electorate, may equally lead to the electoral violence. The lack of credible, transparent, and inclusive procedures and impartial electoral authorities increases the danger of contentious elections. Also, whether the elections have or have not integrity is shaped by the broader context in which the process takes place. Electoral dynamics, public perceptions, political 12

will and looser consent, but also the strategies to mitigate vulnerabilities to electoral manipulations play, among others, an important role in determining whether the elections are perceived as having integrity or lacking it. Similarly, structural, political and electoral context plays an essential role in a possible escalation of electoral violence (Hallf 2016; GCEDS 2012: 10; Norris et al. 2015; Vickery and Shein 2012; Höglund 2009).

According to the wide research conducted by Pippa Norris and her team, contentious elections appear more probable in regimes in transition and the world’s most impoverished societies (Norris et al. 2015). The electoral violence, however, is not common only in transitional or fragile states. Even established democracies in Asia have witnessed more or less widespread instances of electoral violence (Kumar 2015: 40). While elections are inherently contentious, if lacking integrity, electoral violence is not a product of the electoral process. It is a consequence of a breakdown of the electoral process where violence and conflict often become tactics of electoral competition (Kumar 2015: 39; Kohli 2001: 3). India, one of the largest democracies in the world, and a country with the well-functioning electoral administration, has been experiencing significant levels of electoral violence. Indian democracy has demonstrated success in establishing regular elections, universal suffrage, broad civil and political freedoms, and the world’s freest press and media, not afraid to challenge the government. That notwithstanding, electoral violence has become an integral part of the Indian electoral process. Electoral violence is often attributed to the criminalization of electoral practice and communalization of electoral stakeholders, leading to divisions in society (Kumar 2015: 40; Shruti 2012). While India has not experienced a national civil war since its independence, the conflict in the East over the Jammu and Kashmir causes the most transnational terrorism in the country (Asia Foundation 2017: 52). Arguably, it remains among the root causes of electoral violence in India.

That said, scholars, as well as practitioners working on elections world-wide, have identified many factors impacting on electoral integrity and subsequently electoral violence. Nevertheless, we are yet to assess the relative importance of these individual factors or groups of factors and a role they play in different contexts. Going beyond India and looking at the specific situation of South Asia, the 2014 elections in Afghanistan resulted in international mitigation. Perception of the widespread fraud in the electoral process, related unwillingness to accept defeat, recurrent tensions, challenges 13

to the procedures, led to incidents including occasional physical violence in the audit process (EU EOM Afghanistan 2014). The main trigger of electoral violence, however, remains the ongoing insurgency and the terrorist threat against the electoral process. National political conflict and transnational terrorism also fuel electoral violence in Pakistan (Asia Foundation 2017: 4). The politicization of ethnic and religious identities and the instigation of religious riots using Hindu- Muslim divide have been a common phenomenon not only in India but also in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh (Beech et al. 2019; Mohsin 1984: 468). The continuous marginalization of certain parts of the population, grievances caused by local resources conflicts, and elites protecting own interest, often leading to high levels of political contentions, seems key triggers of current electoral violence in Nepal (Asia Foundation 2017: 117). With the regional dynamics in mind, the question remains, why Bhutan is little prone to electoral violence? And are these the key triggers influencing the electoral violence in South Asia?

While the link between electoral integrity and electoral violence emerged in the academic research, it has focused mainly on the cross-national time-series, but the cross-country and cross-regional studies remain scarce (Norris 2015; Halff 2016). Scholars also focused nearly exclusively on the electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa, but the phenomenon of election-related conflicts is yet to be systematically studied within the South Asian region, despite, as shown above, it is equally common. The combined Perception of Electoral Integrity (PEI) index score for the region of South Asia for elections between 2012 and 2018 has been 49.14, ranging from 34 in Afghanistan to 74 in Bhutan. Overall, it is much below the global average of 55.8 for the same period (Norris and Grömping 2019: 6). The type of violence may be, however, different.

Anchoring the dissertation in the state of the discipline, which reflects on the existing academic research hinted above and electoral practice, the analysis leads to the establishment of three hypotheses. Firstly, there is a clear link between electoral integrity and electoral violence. Despite the significant challenge in establishing causality between the two phenomena, we assume that, secondly, electoral integrity impacts on the propensity of electoral violence. Noting the above causes of electoral violence in South Asia, we establish that structural level variables and political- electoral dynamics would play a crucial role in explaining the complex relationship between electoral integrity and violence. The countries like India and Bhutan transcend the traditional 14

understanding of this relation. Bhutan, a country in transition from an absolute monarchy, evinces from very little to none level of electoral violence. Contrary to that, a full-fledged democracy, India, is extremely prone to the violent electoral confrontations. Thirdly, therefore, it is established that India and Bhutan pose a challenge to the traditional understanding of the electoral integrity impact on electoral violence. As such, we note that due to the diversity of the region, and its uniqueness, the triggers of electoral violence may be equally particular. Using cross-regional studies within South Asia, the dissertation, therefore, seeks to understand, which key factors influence the propensity of electoral violence in the region.

The preliminary research related to the state of discipline has revealed, however, that the understanding of the key conceptual models and even more so, the indicators of electoral integrity still vary among the scholars and election practitioners. Can we, therefore, study electoral integrity in a more robust and complete way?

The dissertation addresses these gaps by consolidating existing analysis into one comprehensive conceptual framework. We then identify six dimensions and 25 sub-dimensions of electoral integrity, using De Vaus (1996) concept of operationalization in the social sciences. Individual dimensions are quantified using either existing datasets or own research, developing data for 58 national-level elections between 1980 and 2012 (see Annex I). Similarly, we further quantify the occurrence, levels, and impact, in terms of human lives, of the electoral violence in the region. While employing correlation and linear regression models, the dissertation seeks to answer the following questions: Which dimensions of electoral integrity have the most substantial impact on electoral violence in South Asia? What indicators (sub-dimensions of electoral integrity) have the strongest influence on the propensity of electoral violence in this region?

The quantitative data analysis confirms the established hypothesis. Structural factors, political- electoral dynamics, and public sector management, notably the existence of conflict/civil war, vote-buying and the capacity of the Electoral Management Body (EMB), respectively, come the strongest in the correlation test. Existence of conflict/war also evinces the strongest impact on the occurrence, intensity, and impact of electoral violence using Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) models. Poverty – Human Development Index (HDI) and ethnic/political division (structural 15

indicators) also seem to have the most substantial impact on electoral violence. Second most influential factors are vote-buying but also the abuse of incumbency/strategies of the ruling party indicator, and the loser consent. Allegations of fraud, EMB capacity, and periodicity of elections also appeared to have some influence over either occurrence, intensity, or impact of electoral violence in the region.

It is worth noting that the availability of the election-level data for all 58 cases has been a challenge, and the data analyzed may not always be based on the same assessment. The research also reveals some, seemingly odd results contradictory to the findings by different scholars. For these reasons, the dissertation further employs a qualitative analysis to describe these oddities. For example, the result shows that the lower ethnic/political division, the stronger the occurrence of electoral conflict. The higher regime score, meaning more democratic country establishment, the stronger correlation with the occurrence, intensity, and impact on electoral violence.

The research of the Asia Foundation (2017) presents five critical factors influencing violence in South Asia. These include the overall conflict/violence and the presence of sub-national level civil war; the politicization of ethnic and religious identities; development, and urbanization. The level of development/HDI, however, rather increases violent trends in the region as it exacerbates inequalities between different groups of the population. The qualitative analysis of the dissertation looks at these factors, which confirm the findings and explain most oddities in the quantitative results (Asia Foundation 2017). The case of Bhutan also appears among the ‘outliner’ data. The India case further seems to cause some of the oddities in the data. Both examples require explanation, which we provide in the quantitative part of the text.

As such, the dissertation consolidates the existing research and presents an elaborate set of electoral integrity indicators that further open space for the new research in the emerging area of electoral studies and integrity. It confirms the link between electoral integrity and violence in South Asia and underlines the main causes. With a more systematic research building on these indicators, the results could be used to complement electoral programming aiming at mitigating the election- related violence. The research further reveals additional indicators that could play an essential role in the study of electoral integrity, such as a more detailed study of violence against women in 16

election, use of electoral technology, or specific study of corruption, which however go beyond the scope of this research at this moment.

1.1. Structure of the dissertation Part I of the dissertation focuses on the existing state of the discipline research related to electoral integrity, and violence. It establishes the key indicators, methodology and hypothesis.

In Chapter One – State of the Discipline - the dissertation begins with an analysis of the existing literature, research, and concepts of the electoral integrity, and violence to consolidate existing models and prepare grounds for establishing a comprehensive conceptual framework. It looks at the aspects that different scholars considered necessary for the conceptualization of electoral integrity and aims at eliminating discrepancies in the different conceptual frameworks. It further looks at factors and typology of electoral violence. Firstly, the author looks at the classification of electoral violence as it is generally considered a political phenomenon. The approach to that phenomenon, however, differs, which results in a variety of triggers of electoral violence. The consolidation of electoral violence triggers is vital for further analysis. The chapter also looks at the link established by scholars and practitioners between electoral integrity and electoral violence, which remains essential for establishing the main hypotheses.

Chapter Two – Operationalizing the concepts and definitions – focuses on the operationalization of the concepts of electoral integrity, and electoral violence using De Vaus’ (1996) methodology. It takes into consideration a current state of the discipline, including concepts and approaches presented by different scholars as well as practitioners. The aim is to break the complexity, eliminate variations across conceptual models, and develop a comprehensive set of indicators for each of the factors impacting on both electoral integrity and electoral violence.

Firstly, the author establishes the definition of electoral integrity and electoral violence, based on the literature research conducted in the first chapter. The definitions are adapted to allow the development of measurable indicators of electoral integrity. Using de Vaus’ scheme, and based on the state of the discipline research, the author establishes seven dimensions of electoral integrity and their sub-dimension, which we then convert into measurable indicators. The chapter also 17

identifies the existing datasets that are used to fill the data battery analyzed in this dissertation. Subsequently, the author operationalizes the concept of electoral violence, looking first at its levels, which then serves to establish dependent variables. The author also establishes dimensions and relevant sub-dimensions of electoral violence. Adding dimensions of electoral integrity and violence into the Venn diagram demonstrates a correlation between the two phenomena.

As the state of the discipline and operationalization remains key to establish the research hypothesis, only Chapter Three describes the methodology. This Chapter mainly underlines the methodology of the data collection. It describes existing datasets used in the dissertation and explains the experimental data batteries developed in the areas with the absence of systematic data. Subsequently, it describes different types of analysis used in the dissertation. It combines qualitative and quantitative analysis, using desk research as well as a short field study trip. The quantitative research is based mainly on correlation methods using Pearson’s R and MLR models. Qualitative part first explains and verifies the results against similar research. Subsequently, it identifies odd outcomes and cases that deviate from the standard and explain them on a qualitative basis.

In Part II, Chapter Four, we present country studies for each election in the dataset. This Chapter aims to describe and justify the data entered in the data battery in those dimensions of electoral integrity that cannot be derived from existing datasets. These subdimensions of electoral integrity include the universal suffrage, adherence to civil and political rights, EMB capacity, allegations of fraud, and confidence in electoral institutions. We also research and quantify missing values in the existing datasets. In the case of electoral violence, consistent data only exists for its occurrence. We, therefore, quantify the intensity and impact categories. The chapter overall presents a compact analysis of each of the seven countries in the region. It focuses on the advancement in electoral rights, development in administration, changes in public confidence, and levels of electoral violence. At the end of this Chapter, we run a basic correlation model to confirm the correctness of the data. It is important to note that despite objective criteria used, the analysis always reflects the understanding of the author. The test ensures that the data are as objective as possible.

Parts I and II of the dissertation result in a full dataset, including 25 sub-dimensions/indicators of electoral integrity for 58 elections held in South Asia from 1980 till 2017. It also establishes the dataset for occurrence, intensity, and impact of electoral violence.

Part III then continues with quantitative and qualitative analysis. In Chapter Five, we seek to establish a correlation between electoral integrity and electoral violence in South Asia using existing datasets and own ‘experimental’ data battery. The research focuses on a more comprehensive integrity assessment and the impact of individual areas of electoral integrity on the electoral violence. It also considers a political dimension and electoral cycle dynamics, noting that a failure in one step of the electoral cycle can undermine the overall electoral integrity and, therefore, lead to electoral violence. Preliminary research suggests some correlation between electoral violence and electoral integrity in South Asia. Establishing a potential correlation between breaches of integrity in individual parts of the electoral cycle will allow the examination of more specific micro-causes of electoral violence. Furthermore, the dissertation also looks at structural causes of electoral violence seeking to establish a possible correlation between the individual dimensions of electoral integrity and electoral violence in South Asia.

We further test the impact and relative importance of elections-, political, and structural-level factors on electoral violence employing MLR. Firstly, the necessary tests for linear regression are conducted to identify the right model. Occurrence, intensity, and impact of electoral violence represent the dependent variables. As indicated earlier, the dissertation goes beyond a mere occurrence of electoral violence. Therefore, three separate regression models are designed to test each of the dependent variables. The models assess the impact of different types of sub-dimensions of electoral integrity/indicators on various scales of electoral violence throughout the electoral cycle. The dissertation distinguishes between specific factors, such as electoral fraud, malpractice, and systemic manipulation; electoral laws and procedures; political system, electoral system, electoral justice; loser consent; regime type and transition context; human development index; natural resources; ethnic, political and religious fractionalization, among others. The aim is to create a comprehensive model including electoral, political, and structural factors, and assessing their relative importance to the propensity of electoral violence.

Chapter Six focuses on the qualitative data to cross-check some of the conclusions established throughout the quantitative research, correct for possible data bias, and explain the odd outcomes. The Chapter basis its analysis on the recent Asia Foundation’s (2017) research focusing on the causes of violence in Asia. It also goes back to the established literature research as well as specific circumstances of each country concerned.

Preliminary research suggests that the diversity of the South Asian region may not lead to definite conclusions employing a quantitative approach solely. For example, Norris (2015) suggests that autocratic or hybrid regimes are more prone to electoral violence. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, India, for example, has been a stable democracy for the entire period covered by the research, and yet faces significant episodes of electoral violence. Bhutan is the opposite case. The qualitative part seeks to explain deviations from the standard research with an attempt to explain the trends. The author analyzes the links between electoral integrity and electoral violence within these countries and compares the findings with the quantitative results for the South Asian region to explain specific realities.

In conclusion, the overall aim of the dissertation is to assess the extent to which electoral integrity in its different dimensions and forms impacts on the propensity of escalation of electoral violence and its levels, answering the below questions:

• Does the correlation exist between electoral integrity and electoral violence? • Can causality be established between electoral integrity, its (sub-)dimensions, and electoral violence? • Which dimensions of electoral integrity have the most significant impact on the occurrence of electoral violence? • What are the critical sub-dimensions/indicators of electoral integrity impacting on the occurrence of electoral violence and its levels? • What are the leading causes of electoral violence in South Asia?

On a specific example of South Asia, the research aims to develop a comprehensive assessment framework looking at ways of measuring the relative importance of electoral integrity and other 20

electoral, political and structural factors on escalation or decline of electoral violence. The relative importance of specific factors influencing the escalation of electoral violence likely varies from one country to another. However, presumably the electoral integrity in one or more of its dimensions would play a significant role. The dissertation explores the possibility to develop a scheme that could be used in different countries and regions to identify the critical integrity factors influencing electoral violence. As integrity factors could be mitigated at the technical and political levels, the dissertation also seeks to contribute to the electoral conflict prevention and resolution strategies.

PART I: METHODS AND CONCEPTS

2. Chapter One: State of the discipline

2.1. Electoral integrity The conceptualization of electoral integrity remains problematic. It is often defined by what it is not, rather than what it is. It is also staggered across different sub-fields providing only partial insights into a complex phenomenon (Norris 2014; Van Ham 2015; Norris et al. 2017). The concept of electoral integrity generally derives from the international standards and global norms governing the electoral process (Norris 2014). An alternative definition is drawn from the principles of democracy. Elections without transparency, inclusiveness, and participation can be seen as lacking integrity (Birch 2011).

The electoral dynamics furthermore influences electoral integrity throughout the electoral cycle. All eleven steps in the electoral cycle play a vital role to ensure Source: Norris 2015: 2-25 [Steps in the electoral cycle] electoral integrity. Failure in a single part of the electoral cycle may negatively impact the entire electoral process (Norris 2015).

While the electoral cycle generally reflects the chronology describing the phases in the electoral process, the electoral integrity goes further beyond. Building upon Schedler’s (2002) menu of manipulation and Birch’s (2011) effect of legal framework manipulation, Norris et al. (2017) introduces salient indicators to judge electoral integrity. These indicators include the laws favoring incumbents, access of candidates to media, use of political violence, and impartiality of election officials, among others. This political-electoral dynamic therefore indicates another key aspect of

electoral integrity. The electoral cycle, therefore, cannot be only considered de jure, but also based on its actual implementation. The legal framework must comply with international standards.

Moreover, Maarten Hallf (2016) rightly points out that the basis for public trust, an integral part of the overall integrity of the electoral process, is shaped by the broader political context in which elections take place. Elections should not be the end in themselves but lead to a legitimate government that reflects the free will of the people. Besides, the acceptance of electoral loss is an essential aspect of electoral integrity. The acceptance of results is often affected by the credibility and quality of elections, evaluations by the observers, but also a behavior of political leadership and stakes involved. The elections promoting zero-sum dynamics tend to be more conflictive than those promoting division of power (Halff 2017, p.7). Lowering the stakes, for example, through reform of the electoral system may lower the potential of the conflict. In this sense, structural factors and root causes of the conflict would equally play an important role in the overall integrity of the process. The core model of electoral integrity introduced by Norris, Frank, and Martinez i Coma (2015: 139) incorporate these aspects (Hallf 2017: 7).

Whether the election results in the legitimate government does not, however, only depend on actual integrity of the electoral process. Perception of fraud is likely to encourage direct actions – demonstrations, protests, and possibly violence. Long-established democracies would have, in most of the cases, developed safeguards to overcome minor flaws in the electoral process. In fragile states, however, without reserves of public trust, it may deepen and increase dangers of instability (Norris 2015: 16). Furthermore, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) has been working with the concepts of actual and perceived integrity. If stakeholders in the electoral process believe that the election was unfair or poorly administered, they are less likely to accept the outcomes (Shein, Vickery 2012).

It is important to point out, however, that scholars and practitioners have also approached incoherently the terminology related to breaches of electoral integrity, which may have harmful consequences. For example, calling negligence of the electoral official ‘a fraud’ may lead to a perception of the deliberately manipulated process, despite the problem is caused by the lack of

training of the polling staff. Moreover, fraud only relates to deception. The definition does not encompass the acts of coercion, destruction, and deliberate failures to act.

To clarify the matter, Vickery and Shein (2012) distinguish between the three categories: 1) Systemic manipulation, i.e. deliberate attempts to manipulate the legal and procedural framework to distort the will of the voters; 2) Fraud, i.e. deliberate manipulation of the process in the short- term, usually immediate electoral period; and 3) Malpractice, i.e. negligence and a breach of the relevant duty of care usually by the electoral officers. Norris (2013) distinguishes between first- and second-order malpractice according to the severity of their potential consequences and impact on the election results. The first-order malpractice or legal conception of fraud generally refers to deliberate wrongdoings to manipulate the process (systemic manipulation and fraud as described by Vickery and Sein). The second-order violations or electoral maladministration encompass mostly the maladministration, human error, and the lack of capacity (malpractice in Vickery’s and Sein’s terms).

It is worth noting that, malpractice has developed as a sub-field of public sector management and comparative institutions study. Therefore, it should be analyzed as part of the quality of the electoral management bodies. Fraud and manipulation then fall under the political behavior to influence electoral results. Whether the outcome reflects the will of people and leads to a legitimate government would influence the credibility of elections together with the EMB capacity, and technical aspects of the process (Halff 2017: 7).

Lastly, according to Vickery and Shein (2012), the deterrence and mitigation tools, explicitly designed to mitigate fraud, manipulation, and malpractice, will increase the electoral integrity.

The below table shows the overlapping concepts. To sum up, in some of the cases, all instances of breach of the legal framework and the Code of Conduct are, incorrectly, and without distinction, called fraud, or malpractice. Occasionally, the words are interchangeable in the existing literature (see the first two lines in Figure 1). It is evident, however, that malpractice more often links to the electoral maladministration, hence it is placed in the far-right corner. Norris distinguishes first- order violations/legal conceptions of fraud (see third and fourth line in Figure 1), which, in its 24

description, reflects Vickery and Shein’s systemic manipulation and fraud, both deliberate wrongdoings (see the last line in Figure 1). Norris’ second-order violations or electoral maladministration reflect less dangerous levels, mostly accidental, wrongdoings or negligence, which is called malpractice in Vickery and Shein’s terms. This dissertation operates with Vickery’s and Shein’s terminology as it provides a clear distinction between the concepts and offers categories for the long-term and short-term deliberate wrongdoing.

Figure 1: Consolidation of electoral integrity concepts

Fraud Malpractice Norris First-order violations Second order violations Norris et al. Electoral Legal conception of fraud maladministration Vickery & Shein Systemic manipulation Fraud Malpractice

2.2. Electoral violence: factors and typology Similar deems valid for electoral violence and its triggers. As noted earlier, the concept of contentious politics has attracted significant interest in academic research. Although the research on social movements as a closely related phenomenon yet remains scarce (Kriesi et al. 1995; Tilly and Tarrow 2006; McAdam and Tarrow 2010; Norris 2015: 2-4). At the same time, the extensive study of democratization and civil wars as a dominant theme in comparative research has marked the post-Cold War period. But the topic of electoral violence has received much less attention (Snyder 2000; Dunning 2011; Straus and Taylor 2012). The electoral violence has also been approached from different angles by academics and practitioners. The below part firstly summarizes triggers of electoral violence, followed by their main demonstration, and a typology.

Firstly, electoral violence is seen as a phenomenon of violence, aiming to achieve political objectives. Elections are widely considered the primary method of achieving a peaceful resolution of disputes and a mean to manage political competition peacefully. At the same time, however, if political conditions fail to create unity among stakeholders, the election can divide societies, 25

destabilize political landscape, and exacerbate already existing tensions leading to violence. Ellis (2006) sees the electoral process as ‘inherently conflict inducing.’ UNDP introduces a notion of constructive versus destructive conflict. The electoral process introduces new uncertainties, which if not channeled into a debate (constructive conflict), lead to violence (destructive conflict) (UNDP 2009).

Based on Lijphart’s (1969; 1994; 2008) power-sharing theories of democracy, dividing power may influence the integrity of the electoral process and decrease election-related violence. That introduces a ‘type-of-competition’ factor (UNDP 2009). Proportional representation systems leading to coalition governments seem less prone to electoral violence in comparison to winner- takes-all (plurality/majority) systems of elections. The expectations about winning and losing and the stakes in electoral competition may affect positively or negatively the likelihood of electoral violence (dynamics and patterns of political mobilization factor) (UNDP 2009; Lijphart 2008; Norris 2004; Reilly and Reynolds 2000). Social grievances, deeply rooted in society, as well as the identity politics equally contribute to outbreaks of electoral conflict as well as the regional norms and influence (Collier-Hoeffler 2004; Collier 2009; Norris 2015; Borzyskowski 2015; Borzyskowski 2016).

Looking at the contextual factors, the UNDP defines the societies undergoing or just undergone a democratic transition as the most at risk of electoral violence (UNDP 2009). A definition underlining this hypothesis was put forward also by Schedler who indicated that there was a link between the hybrid regimes – regimes representing mid-point between the democracy and authoritarianism – and electoral violence (Schedler 2004: 139 – 141). Norris et al. (2015) concurs that contentious elections are more probable in hybrid regimes, which are not yet fully democratic but no longer classified as dictatorships. She further suggests that the world’s most impoverished societies are particularly vulnerable to contentious politics and a lack of fair procedures and impartial electoral authorities increases the danger of contentious elections.

The contentious elections occur in the societies with deeply rooted disputes, where electoral stakeholders challenge impartiality, authority, and independence of the electoral administration. Disagreements over the electoral rules, and procedures throughout the electoral cycle ultimately 26

challenge the legitimacy of the winning candidates. The lack of public confidence in the process, demonstrations and opposition boycotts, and in the most severe cases, electoral violence, including threat, coercion, destruction of property, and physical harm to people, characterize contentious elections. They ultimately challenge the regime’s stability (Lipset and Schneider 1983: 64; Norris 2015).

Regarding the essential demonstrations of electoral violence, as a sub-category of political violence, Ellis (2006) sees this phenomenon as intentionally employed to achieve political aims. That is happening in a broader context of democracy or, more often, democratization. As such, he places the phenomenon of political violence into the broader context. Two main theories focus on rational choice, and structural perspective, seem to be reflecting the above factors exacerbating a propensity of electoral violence (Simpser 2013; Hafner Burton et al. 2014; Norris 2015). In rational choice theory, electoral violence stems primarily from the strategies of the ruling party to maintain power. On the other side of the spectrum, opposition coalitions seeking their political objective or criminals or insurgents aiming to disrupt the electoral process. The structural theory then looks into deep-rooted causes of electoral violence, including for example communal or ethnic conflict involving multiple actors.

Höglund (2009), however, looks at electoral violence as a separate phenomenon defining electoral violence as an ultimate kind of electoral fraud. Understanding the electoral violence is either goal- oriented or instrumental, Höglund classifies electoral violence looking at actors, timing, and motives. Electoral violence also links to another form of electoral misconduct and fraud. Electoral process marred by fraud, malpractice, and political influence (breaches to electoral integrity), together with the levels of social violence can lead to more serious conflict or war (Norris 2014). Haglund’s theory moves the study of electoral violence towards the electoral cycle and electoral dynamics approach. Failure in one part of the electoral cycle may be damaging to the entire process (Schedler 2002: 36-50; Norris 2015). Electoral violence is generally perceived as organized, purposeful, and instrumental. The mobilization requires leadership, organization, and resource capacities (Höglund 2009). Patterns of violence recur across the electoral cycle (timing and motives play a significant role). The patterns of violence can change with the phase of the electoral cycle. Ellis (2006) divides electoral violence to five periods: 1) Run-up to electoral events; 2) The 27

campaign; 3) Polling Day(s); 4) between voting and proclamation of results; 5) Post-elections – outcomes and their aftermath.

Collier-Hoeffler (2004) further distinguishes between the state-level and election-level variables. The overlap between state control, economic opportunity, identity politics, and horizontal inequalities, contribute to the increased likelihood of violent confrontation (Ellis 2006; Stewart 2001). Overall, and in line with the above theories, Ellis (2006) emphasizes the 1) context of regime, democratization or political change in which the violence occurs (contextual factor), and 2) the effect of electoral system choice on the conflict dynamics and the nature and patterns of political mobilization (type of competition). While we focus on the electoral cycle and dynamics, Collier-Hoeffler (2004) adds the effect of electoral administration and conflict management efforts as other critical factors to determine the propensity of the electoral violence.

Scholars and practitioners have further distinguished between the specific aspects of electoral violence. Regarding the typology, the UNDP distinguishes between three primary forms of electoral violence: 1) Act of physical harm, including assaults and attacks, gender-based violence, and political assassinations among others; 2) Attacks against objects, building and structures and people, including the deliberate destruction of campaign material, vehicles, ballot boxes to deter communities from exercising their right to vote in a free and fair manner; and 3) Threat and intimidation, which may have a substantial impact on participation and even the results despite the physical violence may not be used.

Wasserman and Jaggard distinguished between the riot, disturbance, and incident. Riot is a serious and sustained outbreak of violence involving implicit and explicit use of force. The disturbance would then classify as a less serious breach of peace that is episodic, involving not sustained outburst. The incident would then describe the demonstrative type of action by the crowd of people that interferes into a part of the electoral process. NELDA dataset classifies ‘an incident’ electoral violence if it involves civilian death(s) (Hyde and Marinov 2012:14). In addition to NELDA dataset, there is also an intensity and impact of the violence, which this dissertation examines.

As in the case of the definition of malpractice, fraud, and systemic manipulation, the classification of electoral violence is not always uniform. While riot, disturbance or incident may lead to physical harm, including civilian death(s), an attack against objects or threat and intimidation, NELDA does not classify cases as electoral violence unless at least one person dies. Noting that, scholars have failed to distinguish the scale of electoral violence in the systematic research of the phenomenon. While an isolated incident can cause one civilian death and still result in an ‘electoral violence’ classification, in another case, the hundreds of deaths would be classified similarly.

2.3. Direct link between electoral integrity and electoral violence Norris (2015) suggests that problems of electoral integrity increase the risk of electoral violence. She puts forward the hypotheses that non-acceptance of electoral results increases the vulnerability to the risks of electoral violence in the post-election phase. She also suggests that the risk of electoral violence is more significant in ‘autocracies’ rather than in other regime types as she establishes that non-acceptance of electoral results is higher in hybrid regimes and not–established democracies. That would imply that political systems in transition become more prone to electoral violence. Grömping and Martinez i Coma (2015), as well as Norris (2015), further suggest that failure in one step of the electoral cycle can undermine electoral integrity and therefore lead to electoral violence. Systemic research to link between individual areas of the electoral cycle and electoral violence has not yet been established, however, mainly due to missing data.

At the same time, the researchers and practitioners have pointed out that the EMB of India is regarded as a model of an independent electoral institution (Wall et al. 2009; Quraishi 2014). India also maintains its status of a robust democracy, with a competitive multiparty system, vibrant civil society, and mostly respected political liberties (Puddington, and Dunham (eds.) 2018). The winners of the elections generally represent the will of the people (Kumar 2015). Despite of that, India evinces significant levels of electoral violence (Baruah 2014; Kumar 2015; Vaishnav 2014). Why is there electoral violence in India? India evinces the highest level of political/ethnic fragmentation in the region, which stands at 0.81 on the one (0) to one (1) scale. India has also had the highest number of ongoing conflicts in the region during the assessed period. The case of India suggests that broader political context, the ongoing conflicts, and ethnic/political fragmentation

play an important role in the escalation of electoral violence. Is it, however, the fragmentation itself or rather the use of ethnic and political divides for political purposes? (Berenschot 2011).

To sum up, the literature research suggests that overall electoral integrity impacts on electoral violence, but only a few specific aspects of the electoral cycle have been directly assessed. Impact of electoral integrity was examined for electoral dynamics, which following the above hypothesis would mean a direct impact on electoral violence. Further analysis is, however, lacking. The systematic analysis of individual aspects of electoral integrity and country specifics is equally scarce. The operationalization of the concept addressed in the next chapter is to shed light, especially on the links between electoral integrity and violence and allow setting up the key hypothesis.

3. Chapter Two: Operationalization of the concepts and definitions

This literature research shows that electoral integrity and electoral violence are at a minimum the complex phenomena, often overlapping, leaving definitions and concept unclear and open to different interpretations. It is worth pointing out, however, that the triggers and demonstrations of electoral violence are often similar to the main aspects of electoral integrity, which likely indicates a correlation. To measure the correlation between electoral integrity and electoral violence, the clarification of these concepts remains essential. The overlaps between various aspects of electoral violence, its triggers, and electoral integrity will be demonstrated further in this chapter. To measure the extent to which lack of electoral integrity impacts on the propensity of escalation of electoral violence, the specific indicators need to be established. We establish the indicators through the operationalization of the electoral integrity and electoral violence concepts. Using de Vaus’ (1990) scheme, the following part of the dissertation firstly develops a nominal and operational definitions of each concept and secondly translates them into specific, observable measurable (De Vaus, 2002: 224 - 227).

The nominal definition means simply a concept – electoral integrity and electoral violence, which ramify in several dimensions and sub-dimensions (De Vaus 1990: 52). Defining different dimensions and sub-dimensions helps to develop the operational definition and set up clear indicators to determine the concepts. The next part of the dissertation develops nominal and operational definitions of electoral integrity and electoral violence. The precise definitions, including the indicators, are essential to determine the relationship between the two phenomena, and subsequently to establish a potential impact of electoral integrity on the propensity of electoral violence.

3.1. Definition of electoral integrity The Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security (GCEDS 2012) puts forward a definition of electoral integrity that takes into consideration state-level and election-level variables. This dissertation builds on this expanded definition of electoral integrity taking also into consideration structural, political, and regime variables, perceived integrity, i.e., voters’

confidence in the process, and electoral integrity management/mitigation measures. The definition as such reflects diligently most of the dimensions brought by the above-mentioned scholars and practitioners.

“Election with integrity is any elections based on the democratic principles of universal suffrage and political equality as reflected in international standards and agreements. An election that is and is perceived as professional, impartial, and transparent in its preparation and administration throughout the electoral cycle, leading to outcomes accepted by the electorate. The electoral stakeholders play a key role in mitigating risks to electoral integrity, including those stemming from broader political contexts in which the election takes place. Elections with integrity are a mean towards legitimate governments and not an end in itself (GCEDS 2012: 6).”

The definition encompasses the international standards, transparent and impartial electoral administration, electoral cycle approach, and political dimension of electoral integrity, including the acceptance of the results and the creation of legitimate governments. It adds mitigation measures that play a critical role in enhancing electoral integrity. Moreover, it does not only focus on actual electoral integrity but considers perceptions of the electorate. The definition appears to encompass the complexity of the electoral integrity concept and, therefore, will be used throughout the dissertation to determine (sub)-dimensions of electoral integrity and create operational indicators.

3.2. Definition of electoral violence Regarding the definition of electoral violence, the dissertation builds upon the concepts introduced by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2009); Höglund (2009), Wasserman and Jaggard (2006); and Hyde and Marinov (2012:14) indicated above. It goes beyond the immediate electoral period and also focuses on the electoral cycle, timing, and motives. The definition also distinguishes the scale of electoral violence. As definitions of electoral violence focus on one of these phenomena without encompassing a full complexity, we create our definition. As noted earlier, the innovativeness of this dissertation lies, among others, in an attempt to examine the

complexity of electoral violence in more systematic research. Based on the state of the discipline analysis, the definition of the electoral violence is as follows:

‘Electoral violence is an ultimate kind of electoral fraud using coercion aiming to influence the electoral process (motive). Electoral violence occurs in different parts of the electoral cycle (timing). Electoral violence can take various forms and levels of severity, including attacks against objects; threat or intimidation; acts of physical harm not involving or involving civilian casualties ranging from isolated incidents to widespread killings.”

Both definitions cover a very complex phenomenon. To measure the correlation between electoral integrity and electoral violence, and the impact of electoral integrity on the propensity of electoral violence, it is vital to develop operational definitions. The operational definitions will also be crucial to establishing measurable indicators. The analysis uses de Vaus’ (1996) scheme to distinguish between the key dimensions, sub-dimensions, and measurable indicators for both electoral integrity and electoral violence. For both indicators, the dissertation identifies data sources used for further research.

3.3. Operationalization of the concepts and the link between electoral integrity and electoral violence The above literature research – state of the discipline - helped to identify the main dimensions of electoral integrity and electoral violence. These dimensions are crucial for the operationalization of both concepts. The study of existing literature and approaches then led to an establishment of the operational definitions. The following sections break the complexities and facilitate the understanding of the dimensions and sub-dimensions of both concepts. These concepts serve to develop indicators necessary to measure correlation and impact of electoral integrity on the propensity of electoral violence. The overlaps between those concepts identified during the operationalization phase illustrate the correlation between electoral integrity and electoral violence and support the fundamental hypothesis of the dissertation, fully presented in the subsequent methodology chapter.

3.3.1. Operationalization of electoral integrity concept Based on the research of the leading literature and ongoing practice, we divide the concept of electoral integrity into six dimensions. These dimensions include firstly the international standards, which are among the critical elements defining electoral integrity. The narrow definition of electoral integrity, which this dissertation transcends, bases the electoral integrity concept in international standards applicable worldwide. For that reason, international standards should be the first indicator of electoral integrity. These standards include universal and equal suffrage, where citizens enjoy both the right to vote and right to stand as a candidate. The vote of every voter should have equal value. The genuine and periodic elections that allow for political pluralism and free expression of the will of electors are equally included (UDHR Art. 21; ICCPR Art. 25). Fundamental freedoms, democracy promotion, and adherence to human rights is the necessary building stone for electoral integrity (Norris 2013). Nonetheless, the concept of human rights as describes rather encompasses the fundamental political rights directly related to the process. To break down the complexity and to establish the most specific indicators possible, this dissertation works with the notion of specific political and civil rights as they related to the electoral process, rather than attempting to encompass the entire human rights framework. The measure of compliance with international standard is based on the existing datasets and framework rigorously designed by this dissertation. The set-up measures of compliance are described further in the dissertation.

The second dimension incorporates the political-electoral dynamics that includes both behavioral and structural indicator. The recent studies have transcended the electoral integrity and electoral cycle approach, focusing on multi-dimensional concepts, arguing that the internal dynamics of electoral competition has been the critical indicator (Stegmaier and Linek 2014; Frank, Martinez i Coma2017: 154). The electoral practice and cases around the world further confirm this hypothesis (Halff 2017). The political-electoral dynamics impacting the electoral integrity, therefore, incorporates the following sub-dimensions: (i) systemic manipulation and fraud, which impact strongly on the adherence to international standards and best practices; (ii) loser consent in relation to the acceptance of the electoral results; (iii) the role of the opposition; and (iv) strategies of the ruling party to maintain power. To win the election, both the ruling party and the opposition often breach the established rules of the game. That often undermines the integrity of the process. Lastly, 34

the electoral system and the stakes involved. The electoral practice clearly shows that in the societies with winner-takes-all electoral systems and therefore, the high-stakes, the willingness to accept the results would be lower than in the countries with power-sharing agreements (Halff 2017: 6; UN 2017).

Similarly, the practice demonstrates that in the post-conflict settings and transitional contexts, the contestants are less willing to accept results, even in the absence of substantive evidence for fraud and manipulation. The structural factors, such as ethnic and political divisions, poverty and economic development increase the stakes in winning the elected positions and therefore secure the economic well-being of ones’ family or community. The regime type, especially at a particular stage of political transition as indicated above, impact on electoral integrity (Halff 2017: 6; UN 2017; Norris et al. 2015: 139). These structural factors, therefore, figure under the third dimension of electoral integrity. It is worth noting that these structural factors encompass mainly the deeply rooted society indicator, not alleviated by the electoral competition, or reform. As such, they differ from the electoral system/stakes involved, already included in the above-mentioned political- electoral dynamics indicator.

As noted earlier, the fraud claims, even without substantive evidence, impact on the results’ acceptance, and trust in the process. The public perception affects the overall electoral integrity. Norris argues that similar to the corruption, electoral malpractice (fraud or systemic manipulation in our framework) involves clandestine efforts to influence the process. Therefore, the perception, even if false, creates an essential aspect of electoral integrity and reality of the electoral process. Elections that lack integrity are likely to fail even if well-organized at the technical level (Norris 2015). Moreover, the overall legitimacy of the electoral process largely depends on both – actual and perceived integrity. For that reason, the public perceptions, including allegations of fraud, systemic manipulation, and malpractice, as well as general confidence in the electoral process, electoral institutions, and observer reports that widely shape the public outlook on the process, form the fifth dimension of the electoral integrity concept and its sub-dimensions.

Lastly, the implementation of mitigation measures has the potential to impact on the overall integrity of the electoral process positively. These mitigation measures would include electoral 35

reforms, judicial remedies, and restoration of infringed rights on the one hand, but also training and awareness courses, integrity programs and codes of conducts (Vickery and Shein 2012: 19). For that reason, the last dimension of electoral integrity includes the implementation of mitigation measures.

Figure 2 establishes the dimensions and sub-dimensions of electoral integrity, whose specifications are described in the text. The whole purpose of the exercise is to establish the indicators to determine these dimensions of electoral integrity. Credible surveys have already established some of the indicators. This research will use existing surveys. Since we, nevertheless, focus on a broader context of electoral integrity, notably the political dimension, some of the indicators will have to be established using qualitative analysis of observer reports, policy documents, media releases and similar. The aim of the following part of the dissertation aims at establishing the indicators of electoral integrity.

Before moving towards the indicators, it is worth pointing out the electoral cycle. Norris (2015) suggests that different aspects of the electoral cycle impact on electoral integrity. This dimension transcends this dissertation, notably due to the absence of detailed data on each of the 11 electoral cycle aspects of electoral integrity for the entire period. Moreover, other indicators already incorporate these aspects of electoral integrity. The hypothesis, however, open space for further research related to South Asia or broader.

Figure 2: Operationalization of electoral integrity

3.3.2. Electoral Integrity Indicators Following the definition of dimensions and sub-dimensions of electoral integrity, the following part of the dissertation proceeds with delineating the electoral integrity indicators. Each indicator defines the individual sub-dimension of electoral integrity.

International standards dimension of electoral integrity focuses on universally agreed principles and norms to promote genuine democratic electoral processes. The international standards set up the normative framework for the country’s electoral process to ensure that the will of the people 37

is a basis of the authority of the government. International standards for elections are enshrined in numerous international instruments, such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966) and its General Comment 25 (1996), and specific Conventions and Declarations related to the political participation of women and other marginalized groups. These standards include, inter alia, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (1965), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (1979), and Convention on the Right of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) (2006). 1 Based on these instruments and the earlier state of the discipline research, we have identified the below electoral integrity indicators.

- Universal suffrage forms the first sub-dimension of international standards. It generally refers to the right to vote and to be elected. The right should be established by the law and not a subject to the unreasonable restriction (UNHRC GC 25, para 10). Right to vote is not an absolute right and is very often subjected to the criteria of citizenship or age, which are considered reasonable restrictions. The limitation of the right to vote based on race, color, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property, or status is considered unreasonable restrictions (ICCPR, Art. 2.1). The law primarily establishes the right to vote and stand, nevertheless, its actual implementation is equally crucial. For example, while the law in Saudi Arabia does not establish a ban on women’s voting, the lack of female-run polling stations prevented women from participation. Moreover, in its decision, the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee (HRC) considered the invalidation of candidacy based on insufficient proficiency in the official language in Latvia as a violation of the electoral right under Articles 25 and 2 of the ICCPR (Ignitane v. Latvia [UNHRC Decision 2001]). Reasonable restrictions are those based on objective and justifiable criteria (ICCPR GC 25, para 4); the application should not be disproportionate. The right to stand should not be, for example, limited by the requirement of a party membership (ICCPR GC, para 17). To evaluate universal suffrage, we conduct our own legal and situational analysis for each country concerned

1 The detailed analysis of international instruments guiding the electoral process goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. The aim is only to present the essential instruments and set up the international standards indicator based on the existing normative framework.

and elections examined, establishing the dataset. We assess whether the right to vote and stand is both established in the law and implemented in practice. The key assessment considers the restrictions and conditions established in the law, their compliance with international law and practical implementation. The dataset develops ordinal variables on the scale (one) 1 to five (5). Score one (1) means that the right to vote and stand is respected both de jure and de-facto; score five (5) indicates significant problems with legal framework and implementation.

- Genuine elections allow for the free determination and expression of the will of voters. In other words, the voters should be allowed to vote freely without undue interference, influence, and coercion. The results of genuine elections should be respected and accepted (ICCPR GC 25, para 11). There is no clarification, however, whether genuine elections require political pluralism (Chiico Bwalya v. Zambia [UNHRC Decision 1988]). In the practical terms, genuine elections necessitate participation, genuine choice of the voter on the ballot, and the functioning government. Freedom Houses’ political rights category determines the ability to participate freely in the electoral process and serves as an indicator for the genuine election’s category. The scale established is ordinal, ranging from (1) – most free/most genuine to (7) – least free/least genuine.

- Periodic elections sub-dimension refers simply to whether the elections have been conducted in the unduly long intervals. The legal framework regulates the interval between the elections. The indicator also assesses whether the government decided to postpone elections or held them early due to the premature dissolution of the elected body. The indicator, based on the NELDA dataset, establishes a dichotomous variable ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (Hyde and Marinov 2015).

- Adherence to civil and political rights covers mainly the civil liberties, respect for the rule of law, personal autonomy, and individual rights, in addition to the freedom of association and assembly. At the same time, the country concerned must respect the rights of disadvantaged groups. The indicator combines Freedom House’s civil liberties scale, together with the Quality of Government (QOG) dataset (Teorell et al. 2018) on Association and Assembly rights, and Women’s Political Rights. We create a dataset to assess the right to participate in elections by persons with disabilities. Since the participation of persons with disabilities is yet to be adequately addressed in the region, we assess whether the country takes any specific measures to facilitate the right to vote of persons 39

with disabilities. The indicator combines the mentioned datasets established on an ordinal 1-10 scale.

The political – electoral dynamics refers to situations related to different parts of the electoral cycle by different political actors and electoral stakeholders. It tends to influence the conduct of the elections and most notably the acceptance of the results.

- The systemic manipulation sub-dimension focuses on the use of the national legal and regulatory framework and provisions to distort the will of the voters and the extra-constitutional irregularities in the legal framework. The indicator works with the QOG dataset. While the dataset is titled ‘vote fraud,’ the data description, nevertheless, refers to systemic manipulation definition as established in the dissertation. The simple dataset uses dichotomous, ordinal variable ‘yes’ – ‘no’, and focuses solely on the existence of the laws aiming to distort the will of the voters.

- The fraud sub-dimension takes into consideration notably vote-buying. It uses the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) dataset on the scale zero (0) - systematic vote/turnout buying, to four (4) – no evidence of vote/turnout buying.

- Loser consent/acceptance of results indicator focuses on the challenges to the electoral results, ranging from disputes resolved through the legal channels, through peaceful protests to violent protests. The NELDA assesses the occurrence of riots or protests on the ordinal dichotomous scale ‘yes’ and ‘no’. Irrespective of the quality of elections, the politicians, often more than the EMBs, influence the acceptance of the results. NELDA dataset used in this dissertation reflects this issue.

- Role of the opposition yet represents another complex sub-dimension of political-electoral dynamics. As for indicators, we firstly look at the role of opposition in terms of chances of running, winning, and participation as opposed to boycotting, using dichotomous NELDA variables. To complement the analysis, QOG offers the ‘competitiveness index’ – ordinal variable - assessing the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. The findings of these datasets are then tallied and interpret on the scale 1 to 100. The higher the score, the more competitive elections with the stronger role of the opposition. 40

- Strategies of ruling party indicator looks into the willingness of the incumbent to give up power and the incumbent’s behavior in pursuit of her/his electoral ambitions. NELDA introduces numerous variables that are used to assess this sub-dimension. We calculate the overall strategies of the ruling party on an ordinal scale as a mean of these variables. Score one (1) represents general unwillingness of the incumbent to give up power and employment of the strategies leading to that aim.

- Further sub-dimension of political-electoral dynamics is the electoral system/stakes involved. We establish the indicator in two separate ways. Firstly, we look at a simple division between the key families of the electoral systems – plurality/majority and proportional representation system. Secondly, we look more closely on different types of electoral systems. The indicator is set up as a nominal variable on the scale from (one) 1 to (five) 5. Each number represents the specific category/type of the electoral system. We assess the electoral system and stakes involved sub- dimension in two different categories – for presidential and legislative elections, merged into one indicator. The dissertation uses the International IDEA datasets for electoral family and electoral system used for the national-level elections. The dataset, however, does not cover all the elections analyzed in the dissertation. We, therefore, further use observer reports and existing literature to determine the electoral system used. The classification is done as follows: 1 – Plurality/majority system or two-round system (presidential elections); 2 – Plurality/majority system or first-past- the-post (FPTP) (legislative elections); 3 – Plurality/majority system/single-non-transferable-vote (SNTV) (legislative elections); 4 – Proportional representation system or a system with proportional representation element (mixed system); 5 – Preferential voting or single-transferable- vote (STV).

It is worth noting that the dissertation does not imply that any of the electoral systems have more integrity than the other. There is no international standard related to the electoral system choice. For that reason, the indicator is a nominal variable – without assessment value. As the state of the discipline research, however, revealed, the type of electoral system, in certain conditions, may influence the stakes involved. Stakes involved further influence the political and electoral behavior

of the electoral stakeholders. For that reason, we include the electoral system variable in the analysis.

- The last dimension under the political-electoral dynamics encompasses the outcome of the electoral process and government legitimacy. The indicator reflects the outcome of the electoral process. It considers whether the elections reflected the will of the people. The dataset used stems from the V-DEM database looking at whether the elections have been considered ‘free and fair’.2 In our terms, that means whether they have been credible and reflected the will of the electorate. The indicator takes into consideration all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and post- elections (Pemstein et al. 2015).

Public sector management dimension of electoral integrity: In addition to international standards, the concept of electoral integrity generally derives from the quality of elections. As literature and experience on the ground suggest, the EMB’s performance often links to the quality of the electoral process. The EMB is not only responsible for delivering elections, but also to ensure that public and electoral stakeholders are well informed.

- First sub-dimension of public-sector management refers to the capacity of the EMB. The PEI used to establish ordinal variable on the scale from 20 to 100 includes EMB impartiality, transparency and professionalism, the performance of electoral authorities, the information provided to the public and the public scrutiny. We establish our dataset based on these specific electoral authorities’ indicators. Each category is assessed on the scale one (1) to five (5), one being the poorest performance. The total score is calculated on the interval scale from 20 to 100; the higher the score, the stronger the capacity of the EMB.

2 The methodology for electoral observation as well as electoral assistance practice has, in recent years, moved away from assessing whether the elections have been ‘free and fair’. The notion ‘free and fair’ cannot be objectively assessed in accordance with international democratic standards. As such, the indicator of ‘freedom and fairness’ are rather replaced by inclusive, credible, and transparent, which are more objective indicators. As earlier datasets, academic literature and the less technical audience still use the ‘free and fair’ terminology; it remains occasionally employed throughout the dissertation. It is, however, considered with reservations. 42

- As noted earlier, the irregularities indicator reflects the procedural hick-ups mainly caused by the electoral or government officials. The question does not deal with vote-buying or systemic manipulation. V-DEM has established an irregularities dataset that measures the occurrence on the zero (0) to four (4) interval scale. The lower the number, the more irregularities have occurred (Permstein et al. 2015).

As noted above, malpractice should be part of public sector management. In the terminology of this dissertation, it includes especially non-intentional conduct not having a substantial impact on the electoral outcomes. As there is no separate dataset for malpractice and it would be complicated to assess as a separate indicator, we include it in the EMB performance indicator.

Structural factors: Experience suggests that macro-level factors are going beyond the quality of the electoral process form a vital part of the electoral integrity and impact on electoral violence.

- Firstly, we include the ethnic/political division indicator. The QOG Index considers the combination of racial, ethnic, social, political, religious, and linguistic characteristics. The dataset provides information about a level of fractionalization on an interval scale from 1-100. The higher the score, the more fragmented is the society. Zero (0) would mean a homogenous country.

- Second sub-dimension examines poverty, economic development, and human development using two specific datasets. First, we consider the UNDP HDI. HDI summarizes the main dimensions of human development, excluding poverty, inequalities, human security, and empowerment, which are covered by different sub-dimensions of electoral integrity (UNDP 2018). Secondly, using NELDA dataset, we examine whether the country is experiencing economic growth or is in crisis. We convert NELDA dichotomous data on one ordinal scale (1-3), presenting overall account on the growth-crises indicator of electoral integrity.

- Furthermore, significant episodes of conflict/civil war have a direct impact on the escalation of electoral violence. They also strongly impact electoral integrity. This relationship is linked not only to a prevalent culture of violence but also the availability of weapons, often among the general population. To examine the correlation, we consider the sub-dimension conflict/civil war. Based 43

on QOG typology of conflict, we assess, how many – if any – conflicts are ongoing in the specific country at the time of holding the elections. The QOG dataset and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) armed conflict database also considers local-level conflicts that are particularly important to electoral integrity (Asia Foundation 2017: 2-3). The dataset combines all QOG indicators into the ordinal scale (0 – 5), where zero (0) means no ongoing conflicts, and five (5) indicates five or more current conflicts at the territory of the national state concerned.

- Furthermore, we examine the transition sub-dimension of electoral integrity. The indicator is an ordinal dichotomous variable set-up based on the NELDA score (yes – the country is in transition; no – the country is not in transition).

- Regime/government type is classified based on an ordinal scale ranging from ten (10) to minus ten (-10) based on Polity IV dataset. Full democracy scores ten (10). The regime is classified as autocratic if it reaches the score of minus six (-6) or lower.

The public perception sub-indicator is mainly experimental due to different approach to the analysis of the public perception of electoral integrity and the lack of distinction between electoral fraud, malpractice, and systemic manipulation. There is also an absence of dataset for purely public perceptions of the electoral process.

- In the first sub-dimension, the author looks into the observer reports and international observer reports that are known to impact on public perception of the electoral process (Hyde 2011). Especially, claims of fraud by Western monitors are likely to increase suspicion of the electorate regarding the electoral process. Therefore, we investigate whether the observer reports, and the related perception of the electorate impact on the electoral violence. Under the sub-dimension, the dissertation establishes three bivariate variables looking into whether there were reports critical of government’s handling of the process and whether these reports impacted on a large number of people, therefore, influenced public opinion and decreased confidence in elections. The data considers ample allegations of fraud in the electoral process (Hyde and Marinov 2015: 14). Secondly, the dissertation considers the presence of fraud allegations in the reports of Western or

other observers and thirdly any evidence that the observers refused to observe the elections because they believed they would not be ‘free and fair’.

- The third sub-dimension considers allegations/perception of fraud work with publicly available documents, articles, and media reports before, throughout, and after elections. The experimental dataset establishes the ordinal dichotomous variable based on three credible sources. If three credible sources report that there were widespread allegations of fraud, the variable is coded one (1). In the opposite case, the variable scores zero (0).

- The confidence in the process sub-dimension is based in the NELDA question whether there was a perception that elections would not be ‘free and fair’. The ordinal dichotomous variable is coded zero (0) if there was low or no confidence in the process, i.e., significant concerns that the elections would not be ‘free and fair’. In the opposite case, the variable is coded one (1).

- The evaluation of confidence in electoral institutions sub-dimension stems from the qualitative research and existing population surveys, where applicable. The indicator is set up as an ordinal variable on a scale one (1) to three (3); one (1) representing low confidence, and three high confidence in electoral institutions.

The last dimension of electoral integrity focuses on the mitigation measures. It reflects upon the UNDP Programs in place to strengthen electoral integrity and mitigation measures to prevent electoral violence. Electoral Violence Prevention and Intervention database (EVPI) dataset focuses on the existence of electoral assistance programs to improve electoral integrity. Since the database only covers programs since 2003, we complement the existing database (Birch and Muchlinski 2017). The variable uses the ordinal dichotomous scale with (one) 1, indicating that UNDP programs were in place. The database also provides data on UNDP programs specifically targeting the prevention of electoral violence. That includes mapping of election violence incidents, early warning systems, forecasting, and diagnostics (Birch and Muchlinski 2017: 2). Our own research complements this information, incorporating programs that are also implemented by other organizations and entities. The indicator is coded similarly, with one (1) for the existence of electoral violence prevention programs and 0 (no) for the absence of such interventions. 45

As demonstrated, scholars have widely studied the individual aspects of electoral integrity. Therefore, the academic field provides various datasets that could be used to establish indicators for the comprehensive study of electoral integrity (see Annex II for an overview of indicators and description of variables). As shown in the next chapter, it is not the same case for electoral violence where comprehensive datasets remain scarce.

3.3.2. Operationalization of electoral violence Based on the literature research and existing resources, the electoral violence must be operationalized looking at two angles. Firstly, as a specific phenomenon, and secondly considering its triggers. The operationalization of the electoral violence as a phenomenon is critical for the main aim of the dissertation – to assess the impact of electoral integrity on the propensity of electoral violence. The triggers, however, suggest an inevitable overlap between electoral integrity and violence, which we consider throughout the overall research.

Electoral violence phenomenon, treated in the dissertation as a dependent variable, can be divided into three dimensions – as indicated in Figure 3 below. We distinguish the occurrence of electoral violence, its intensity, and impact, in terms of a number of deaths and scale of injuries. We divide these three manifestations of electoral violence into three sub-dimensions. The sub-dimensions include acts of physical harm that may or may not lead into civilian death(s), attacks against objects, as well as threat and intimidation to deter participation or coerce voters to vote or not vote for specific candidates.

- As for the occurrence of electoral violence, NELDA sets up a dichotomous, ordinal variable distinguishing between electoral violence involving, or not involving civilian deaths (‘yes’ or ‘no’).

- We further assess the intensity of electoral violence on the bases of Wasserman and Jaggard’s (2006) distinction between the riot, disturbance, and incident. The indicator is set up as an ordinal dependent variable, classifying the intensity of electoral violence on the scale zero (0) to three (3),

zero (0) representing no violence, and three (3) referring to systematic and widespread cases of electoral violence.

- As for the impact indicator, in terms of civilian deaths, we also set up an ordinal dependent variable ranging from (0) no violence to three (3), indicating five or more deaths (see Annex II for details of the variables). Besides, the Dataset of Countries at Risk of Electoral Violence (CREV) distinguishes between verbal conflict – classified in this dissertation as threat and intimidation, and physical harm with or without fatalities, which reflects the impact of electoral violence dependent variable. The intimidation and harassment type of electoral violence, in the absence of civilian deaths, is scored one (1) in the dataset. We consider attacks against objects as a form of intimidation and threat.

Figure 3: Conceptualization of electoral violence

Triggers of electoral violence encompass four dimensions – political-, state- and election-level triggers, and public perception. As Figure 4 shows, the sub-dimensions widely overlap with the sub-dimensions of electoral integrity. Therefore, we do not describe them again. The Venn diagram (see Figure 5 below) focuses on the areas of electoral integrity analyzed in the literature as impacting on electoral violence and vice-versa. Furthermore, as indicated in the state of the discipline research, there is generally a correlation between the electoral integrity and electoral violence, which we consider notably while setting up the hypothesis, and in the quantitative part of the research.

Figure 4: Conceptualization of electoral violence triggers

The Venn diagram then demonstrates in more detail, that there is a full overlap between electoral and political dimensions of electoral integrity, structural/state–level. The literature research also suggests that the type of regime or regime in transition (state-level variable) would have an impact on electoral violence. Non-acceptance of the results (political-level variable) has also been assessed as undermining the electoral integrity and therefore leading to electoral violence. Furthermore, any aspect throughout the electoral cycle (election–level variable) that goes wrong possibly influences the outbreaks of electoral violence. On this basis, we can go beyond a mere correlation and establish that electoral integrity impacts the propensity of electoral violence. State– level variables and political–level variables are likely to play a critical role, followed by election – level variables, notably in case of failures.

Norris (2015) bases her analysis in the correlation between PEI dataset and NELDA electoral violence question. As indicated earlier, however, the dissertation considers PEI dataset an expert review rather than a mere public perception. The public perception dataset in the dissertation is established based on media review and publicly available information. Nevertheless, the practice suggests that public perception of fraud, which also encompasses systemic manipulation, malpractice, and general lack of confidence in the electoral process, directly impacts on electoral violence levels. The expert analysis put forward, for example, in observer reports have a history of increasing or decreasing electoral violence levels (Hyde 2011).

Despite the existing research does not consider the international standards, as established in the legal frameworks, as impacting the electoral violence directly, their breaches would lead to fraud, systemic manipulation, or malpractice. Therefore, we assume an indirect impact. We also suggest that international standards would have a lower impact than their practical implication. *** Up till this part, we delineated concepts and definitions of electoral integrity and violence, set up indicators, and established possible challenges to the study of electoral integrity and violence. In the next chapter, we will summaries the finding into a consolidated hypothesis and methodology.

Figure 5: Sub-dimensions of electoral integrity and violence (overlaps)

Electoral integrity Electoral violence

Electoral Cycle Electoral laws and procedures Electoral Boundaries Cycle Failure Voter registration Political – Electoral Dynamics Party and candidates’ Fraud, systemic manipulation, Political mobilization registration malpractice Actors Campaign finance (Non) acceptance of results / loser consent Motives Voting process Role of the opposition Timing Vote count Strategies of the ruling party Electoral system / stakes involved

State legitimacy Electoral administration – malpractice, Capacity of the EMB Awareness of Electorate Structural factors Political / ethnic division conflict / civil war Economic development Poverty Regime type Regime transition Electoral system choice International standards Public perception Suffrage Perception of fraud, systemic Threat / intimidation Genuine manipulation, malpractice Riot / disturbance Periodic Observer reports Incident Adherence to Confidence in EMBs / Systemic / widespread human rights elections electoral violence

4. Chapter Three: The methodology and critical hypothesis

This dissertation covers the region of South Asia. The region is defined based on the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. We had to exclude the Maldives due to the missing technical data on its electoral process. The dissertation covers national elections – legislative and presidential – from 1980 until 2017 (see Annex I). The period identified for the research considers the changes brought by the fall of Communism in 1989 following the waves of democratization. The period studied, therefore, allows the analysis of the countries before, during, and after the transition. Another reason is mainly pragmatic. With the end of the Cold War, the election monitoring and observation significantly increased, allowing for enough adequate data necessary for the research (Hyde 2011: 357).

4.1. Operationalization of the concepts Our primary research uses quantitative and qualitative approaches. Firstly, the data are collected based on indicators established in the previous chapter. The operationalization stems from the qualitative paradigm prescribing that the reality can be objectively measured. As social and political sciences usually include complex constructs and attributes, which cannot be measured or directly observed, we examine their observable indicators instead. As such, one of the critical moments leading to quantitative analysis, is the operationalization, i.e., the transformation of abstract social and political constructs into observable indicators. The indicators then must be validated to ensure that they truly represent the phenomenon to be measured (Mareš et al. 2015: 17 – 18).

Operationalization is a creative process that first requires identification of individual dimensions and sub-dimensions of the main concepts. Subsequently, different dimensions and sub-dimensions lead us to operational definitions and indicators. The dissertation works with adapted de Vaus’ scheme. While de Vaus states that one indicator is not enough to objectively measure complex social science phenomenon, the dissertation identifies six dimensions of electoral integrity measurable based on over 25 indicators. It is worth noting that De Vaus argues in favor of using

nine indicators deploying introverted/extroverted scales, and assertively scale focusing on various types of information (Mareš et al. 2005: 18; de Vaus 1990: 50-52).

4.2. Data collection and description of datasets used Based on the established indicators, we move towards the data collection. We collect data for all national elections in the seven South Asian countries in the period from 1980 until 2017. Wherever possible, we use the data from the established datasets introduced below. None of the academic literature or dataset, nevertheless, fully grasps the complexity of the electoral integrity and violence phenomena. Therefore, information for some of the indicators cannot be established based on existing nation-wide data. We, therefore, create our datasets using primary sources such as electoral legal framework, and non-standardized interviews with electoral experts in the countries concerned, as well as secondary sources notably international and national observer and media reports. The data collected through the own ‘experimental’ datasets are explained later in the chapter. These data are sourced and justified throughout the dissertation. It is to ensure transparency and allow the reader to assess the accuracy of the data. We do not further explain the data collected through the existing datasets, since they are internationally recognized, and data collected are already fully verified.

The dissertation works with the following datasets:

- National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy dataset (NELDA) provides a comprehensive comparison of elections worldwide, initially between 1945 and 2012, later till 2015. It compares over 3,000 elections nation-wide allowing for longitude comparison and time- series data. The dataset does not consider bye-election. The unit of observation is one election round. The dataset also does not consider indirect elections, i.e., elections by the institution, such as instances in most parliamentary systems when a legislature elects the president. Referenda are only included if they are functionally equivalent to the presidential election, usually in single-party regimes. The dataset includes 58 variables coded ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘N/A’, and ‘unclear’. Unclear represents the lack of information, N/A means not applicable. The variables coded for every election round only reflects the status during that particular election (Hyde and Marinov 2015). We do not work with all variables, but only with those identified as the most critical indicators of 52

the electoral integrity. We have determined the criticality of the categories in the operationalization part of the dissertation.

Moreover, Hyde and Marionov’s NELDA dataset measures electoral violence by the number of incidents leading to civilian fatalities before, during, and after elections. The coding is also dichotomous ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (2015: 16). As explained further in the text, NELDA dataset is enough to run some simple correlations between electoral integrity and violence in South Asia. However, to respond to the question related to the impact of breaches of electoral integrity on electoral violence, it is essential to distinguish between different levels of the violence. The data on the levels of violence are established through the own analysis.

- The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity dataset (PEI) is the first systemic attempt to measure electoral integrity throughout the entire electoral cycle. PEI, introduced by the Electoral Integrity Project, uses 100-point index measuring an 11-step electoral cycle in 49 specifically designed questions. The evaluation is conducted by different electoral experts worldwide carefully selected by the PEI authors. The PEI Index provides an overall assessment of electoral integrity. At the same time, it allows researchers to disaggregate scores for all 49 indicators. The disaggregation of the data is therefore flexible, allowing the construction of any conceptually preferred measure (Norris et al. 2015). The dataset, however, only compares elections held from July 1, 2012, till December 31 December 2017. No dataset exists to include both systematic data for electoral violence and all aspects of electoral integrity. In the dissertation, the dataset is used to run a basic correlation with the electoral violence dataset, to test the hypothesis.

- Freedom House and Polity IV datasets include data on the government system since 1945. Freedom House dataset also includes more comprehensive data on civil and political liberties since 1979. The Freedom House data are used to inform indicators of international standards dimension of electoral integrity. Polity IV is then used to establish the type of political regime in each of the examined states during the individual election rounds.

- The Quality of Government (QOG) Standard dataset aggregates data from 1946 till 2017 in the cross-national series. The data is categorized into 18 thematic topics (Teorell et al. 2018). The 53

dissertation works mainly with the data on ethnic and political fractionalization, conflict, state legitimacy, and political rights, including women rights. On the conflict, the QOG dataset uses the Upsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) armed conflict database. The database aggregates the data on armed conflicts – internal and external – since 1946 till present (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

- Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) is a multidimensional and disaggregated dataset conceptualizing and measuring democracy in all its complexities (Coppedge et al. 2015). The dissertation uses the dataset to inform the indicators under the political–electoral dimension of electoral integrity, and irregularities under the public sector management.

-International Idea database of electoral systems comprises of various reviews of national legislation since 1990 till 2018, establishing the category and type of electoral system.

-Election Violence Prevention Intervention (EVPI) database includes data on electoral violence prevention programs undertaken by the UNDP between 2003 and 2015. The data collected are based on the UNDP electoral assistance reports (Birch and Muchlinsky 2017 (a)). In the dissertation, the data is used to inform mitigation measures dimension of electoral integrity. The dataset is, however, extended to the period from 1980 till 2003 using our own research.

Since the datasets do not always cover the entire period analyzed by the dissertation (1980 – 2017), we, therefore, complete the missing data using methodologies set up in the individual datasets.

To populate all indicators identified throughout the operationalization of the electoral integrity concept, we need to establish several ‘experimental datasets’. We use existing analysis, primary and secondary sources, such as legislation, and observer reports, respectively.

The dependent variable, electoral violence, is established first based on existing NELDA dataset, question 33: “Was there significant violence involving civilian deaths immediately before, during, or after the election?” NELDA establishes the value based on the following assumption: The variable is coded “yet” only if there is electoral violence involving civilian death. The deaths that 54

result from the civil war and are not intended to disrupt or influence the electoral process are not counted (Hyde & Marinov 2015: 13). The dichotomous variable is, however, not sufficient to conduct entirely the intended research related to the impact of electoral integrity on electoral violence. Based on the operationalization of the concept of electoral violence, we further examine this phenomenon based on intensity and impact. We, therefore, establish two additional datasets classifying electoral violence.

4.3. Quantitative analysis The quantitative analysis is conducted at several levels to allow cross-checking and ensure the credibility of the research. The state of the discipline and subsequent operationalization of the concepts suggest that electoral integrity overall correlates with electoral violence [Hypothesis 1]. It also indicates that electoral integrity impacts on the propensity of electoral violence [Hypothesis 2].

Hypothesis 1: Electoral integrity overall correlates with electoral violence.

The first part of the quantitative analysis, therefore, tests the correlation between electoral integrity and electoral violence. The indicators of electoral integrity and electoral violence entered in the Venn diagram indicated overlaps between the phenomena, which serves as a basis for the first hypothesis. To test the hypothesis, we use the PEI overall integrity score for each of the South Asian countries. We correlate the PEI dataset in three separate models against occurrence, intensity, and impact of electoral violence. It is worth reiterating that PEI only covers elections from 2012. As such, we only test cases of elections between 2012 and 2017.

In the literature research, we also established that the breaches of electoral integrity would likely impact the propensity of electoral violence. It also appears that some indicators of electoral integrity have a stronger impact on the propensity of electoral violence than the others.

Hypothesis 2: Electoral integrity impacts on the propensity of electoral violence; some of the indicators have a stronger impact than the others.

To test this hypothesis, we then correlate each dimension of electoral integrity with the occurrence, intensity, and impact of electoral violence. We conduct the analysis using the simple Pearson’s correlation coefficient. Pearson’s correlation coefficient measures the linear correlation between the two variables; i.e., the change in the value of the independent variable causes a proportional change in a dependent variable. We use de Vaus’ classification of correlation data to interpret the correlation coefficients (Mareš et al. 280 – 297; de Vaus 2002).

The causality between electoral integrity and violence needs to be tested at the macro-level cross- regional series taking into consideration different dimensions of electoral integrity. The operationalization part of the dissertation establishes, which factors appear to have the most substantial impact on the propensity of electoral violence. Subsequently, employing linear regression models, the dissertation tests: 1) impact of individual (sub-)dimensions of electoral integrity on the occurrence of electoral violence; 2) impact of individual (sub-)dimensions of electoral integrity on the intensity of electoral violence; and 3) influence of individual (sub- )dimensions of electoral integrity over the impact of electoral violence.

The impact of individual dimensions of electoral integrity on the propensity and levels of electoral violence is tested using Multiple Linear Regression (MLR). We can only conduct the classic MLR if specific criteria are met: (i) variables are measured at the interval scale. Non-interval variables are dichotomous; (ii) multicollinearity must be avoided; (iii) there should be no outline values in the data; (iv) there is linearity in the data; (v) the values are normally distributed; (vi) there is some homoscedasticity in the data, i.e., there is a similar variance in the data (De Vaus 2002: 343 – 344; Mareš et al. 2015: 353 – 374) . We conduct the fit test first to determine whether to use the method.

If the tests are positive, we build the models using the ‘funnel of causality’. A method allows understanding how inputs from various levels of abstraction impact policy outcomes (Wilder 2016: 721 – 741). In our case, the outcome is an occurrence, intensity, and impact of electoral violence. If using the ‘blocks’ MLR, we build the model hierarchically, including first the independent variables with the lowest anticipated impact on electoral violence. The hierarchy of independent 56

variables is established in the correlation test. The results of the MLR analysis show changes in the likelihood of occurrence of electoral violence in reaction to the changes in the values of the independent variable from the minimum to the maximum (Mareš et al. 2015: 353 – 374; Linek et al. 2012: 178 – 183). Different dimensions of electoral integrity form independent variables entered in the dataset.

We can use the MLR also if the tests, notably the linearity test, are not favorable. We, however, have to build the models differently. Given the diversity of the South Asian region, this second option appears as the most likely scenario. The dissertation would use the ‘stepwise’ method, entering in the dataset only those independent variables with the statistical significance. The outcome of the MLR then directly shows, which of the independent variables – indicators of electoral integrity – influence the propensity of electoral violence, its intensity, and impact. The results also show how strong is the influence, and to what extent can these indicators predict the occurrence of electoral violence, and its levels (De Vaus 2002: 343 – 344; Mareš et al. 2015: 353 – 374).

Building the models, the six dimensions of electoral integrity, broken down to 26 indicators, represent the independent variables. Each indicator is considered one independent variable. Independent variables used are ordinal, interval, and in one exceptional case, nominal. The method allows understanding “how inputs from various levels of abstraction impact policy outcomes” (Wilder 2016: 721 – 741). In our case, the outcome is an occurrence, intensity, and impact of electoral violence.

Using MLR models, the dissertation assesses the impact of various indicators of electoral integrity on the occurrence of electoral violence in the region of South Asia. To conduct the MLR, we use the IBM SPSS Statistics software. To ensure that the models are significant and adequate, we first need to assess the analysis of variance (ANOVA) table, notably the F and R-square values. If the F value is higher than one (>1), and Sig. of the model value is lower than 0.05 (<0.05) the model is relevant and statistically significant. The R-square then indicates how much variance can be explained by the model; i.e., what percentage of electoral violence cases (occurrence, intensity,

and impact) the model can explain. If the percentage is over 50, we can consider the results positive, noting the complexity of quantifiable data in the social sciences.

It is worth pointing out that in the case of using the ‘stepwise’ method, the data entering the model are only those with statistical significance. As such, the R-square would be the primary indicator for interpretation. Moreover, the fundamental value remains coefficient B. The B-coefficient indicates the influence of the independent variable on the dependent variable, not taking into consideration other values in the dataset. The positive value of the B-coefficient indicates a positive relationship between the independent and dependent variable, and the negative value indicates the opposite. The coefficient is used to interpret the influence of electoral integrity indicators that have statistical significance over the occurrence, intensity, and impact of electoral violence.

4.4. Qualitative analysis It is worth reiterating that the availability of the election-level data for all 58 cases has been a challenge, and the data analyzed may not always be based on the same assessment. Provided the complexity of the social sciences research, the quantitative analysis may not always bring the complete results. Incomplete results may also be attributed to the fact that the quantitative models can only explain the occurrence of the phenomenon in 50 or 60 percent (De Vaus 2002: 343 – 344; Mareš et al. 2015: 353 – 374). We, therefore, complement the quantitative research by qualitative analysis.

The qualitative part of the dissertation first identifies any odd outcomes stemming from quantitative research. The aim is to explain these outcomes using qualitative assessment of the countries and elections concerned. The dissertation also identifies cases that deviate from the up- to-date research to illustrate or explain phenomenon emerged from the quantitative research. The qualitative analysis also seeks to expand on the emerging area of academic research on electoral integrity and electoral violence.

Based on the existing available research on the subject matter, the qualitative research serves as a control group to the quantitative analysis. The cases, which we draw from the region of South 58

Asia, help to analyze trends in electoral violence, and electoral integrity research in its broader context. This dissertation examines concrete political, structural, geographic and other factors that likely impact on electoral integrity and related electoral violence, in order to seek an explanation for possible deviations from standard conclusions and open space for further research.

As indicated earlier, the region of South Asia is highly diverse, with specific problems. India notably does not appear to fully fit in the established hypothesis with relatively high electoral integrity score and at the same time, high levels of electoral violence. Also, India is an established democracy, which should, according to the above hypothesis, indicate lower levels of electoral violence. India is a diverse state with different levels of ethnic divisions (state-level variable) and different levels of violence throughout the country. Electoral integrity and violence can be therefore localized, and the trend may be different in the country with the decentralized government and the size of India. Staggered elections may also impact on the trend. For very different reasons than India, Bhutan emerges equally as a possible outline case.

Hypothesis 3: Electoral violence trends in India and Bhutan are likely to evince different trends in the relation between electoral integrity and electoral violence.

The qualitative part also helps to identify possible other indicators, beyond the scope of this dissertation, and open space for further research.

4.5. Limits of the research As the electoral level data is not available for the entire region of South Asia, the research needs to deal with the lack of complementary cases for electoral integrity and electoral violence. We overcome the problem using the standardized methodology and the establishment of the ‘experimental’ standardized datasets. An assessment informed by different researches may, nevertheless, lead to slightly different evaluations. Differences in individual evaluations are, admittedly, also the case of NELDA, which was done by different researchers. We mitigate a potential bias through the enhanced transparency of the research - explanation of the scores established in this dissertation, and throughout the research.

Given that the general dataset questions are very straightforward, it is unlikely that any potential discrepancy would affect the overall research results. We cannot replicate the PEI scores as they are based on the interviews with specific experts in the countries concerned. Therefore, PEI could be used only to complement the research and not as the primary dataset, despite its excellent information value and validity for the research.

The research may not allow establishing causality between the electoral integrity and electoral violence fully. As Venn diagram suggests, the aspects that influence electoral integrity tend to influence the propensity of electoral violence equally. The dissertation may, therefore, base its conclusions partially on a possible correlation between the two, rather than argue for a causal relationship. The dissertation may also face a problem of reversed causality as electoral violence during elections equally undermines public trust in the electoral process and other aspects of electoral integrity. We mitigate the problem by employing different datasets and cross-checking using the correlation models.

Besides, given the relatively low volume of research on electoral integrity and electoral violence, the correlation is not yet confirmed. Similarly, South Asia, as a separate region, was never examined in a standalone study of electoral integrity and violence. Electoral integrity overall and some of its specific categories may not have a significant effect on electoral violence in South Asia. That is given the violence affects all the countries of South Asia regardless their level of democratic development or other factors (except for Bhutan), but the PEI varies. If that is the case, this dissertation will work with the null hypothesis, which would naturally impact on the research questions. More focus would, therefore, need to shift to structural causes of electoral violence. This potential problem is, however, mitigated by departing from the definition of electoral violence as a unified phenomenon that necessitates just one civilian casualty. The dissertation works with electoral violence, distinguishing between its levels and severity.

The lack of available data also impacts on the established variables. For example, it is not possible to sufficiently distinguish between fraud, malpractice, and systemic manipulation in the quantitative part of the thesis as no standard dataset exists to distinguish between the three aspects and observer reports and literature often overlook the differences. The line between the three 60

aspects is often fragile, and countries do not always distinguish between the three in their legal frameworks. We mitigate this problem by using specific aspects of fraud, malpractice, and systemic manipulation, which the standardized datasets present. Systemic manipulation is, for example, measured based on (non)existent laws and regulations countering democratic principles. We then address the issue in detail in the qualitative part of this dissertation.

Given the diversity of the region, and different underlining causes of electoral violence in each country, as well as a possible outline values, the relationship between electoral integrity and electoral violence may not be linear. As such, we cannot use the initially intended type of MLR methods. We have, however, already identified the possible alternative models. The result may be, however, that the dissertation would be only able to explain the impact of electoral integrity on the propensity of electoral violence partially.

Overall, grasping the complexity of electoral integrity is extensively difficult. The dissertation identifies the essential aspects, noting that there is still a large area to be explored and added to the datasets. As such, the dissertation opens space for further academic research of the electoral integrity and electoral violence.

PART II: COUNTRY CASES

5. Chapter Four: Electoral integrity and violence in South Asia - a data consolidation

As explained earlier in the methodological part of the dissertation, not all the dimensions of electoral integrity have yet been thoroughly quantified. We use the existing data as much as possible but develop separate datasets for the following indicators: (i) two sub-dimensions of international standards – suffrage and adherence to civil and political rights; (ii) under the public sector management, we thoroughly evaluate the EMB capacity and establish our dataset; (iii) in relation to public perception, no uniform data exist for allegation of fraud and confidence in electoral institutions. Missing data were identified in the sub-dimensions focusing on loser consent, opposition role, and strategies of the ruling party as well as observer reports, confidence in the process, and mitigation techniques. We also develop the dataset for the dependent variable – electoral violence. The subsequent chapter justifies and explains the dataset values developed by the author and introduces related problems of electoral integrity and violence. At the same time, it presents full datasets for electoral integrity indicators for each of the countries that are analyzed in this dissertation.

5.1. Afghanistan 5.1.1. International standards: Legally established right to vote and challenging implementation The 1988 elections were the first direct elections in the 80s, held under the Soviet occupation and only in government-controlled territories. The Constitution enacted in 1987, stipulated that the law should regulate election procedures. Nevertheless, the law had not been adopted before the elections took place (Afghanistan Constitution 1987: Art. 131). In the government-controlled areas, media have been primarily under state control. The regime had prohibited any anti- government assembly or expression. No discussion on alternatives existed (Gastil 1989: 342).

Inter-Parliamentary Union concluded that all Afghan citizens had the right to vote and be elected but lacked the genuine choice on the ballot. All national assembly candidates were members of Afghanistan National Front, and especially members of its leading political group – People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) (IPU 1988). Furthermore, according to numerous analysts, the elections were supervised by the pro-Soviet ruling party failing to reflect the genuine will of the people (Emadi 2008: 11-12; Bjelica and Sorush 2018). The process was marred by state interference and violence and boycotted by the mujahidin population (IPU 1988). The right to vote and stand, therefore, faced significant problems in implementation in the absence of a clear legal framework.

The situation improved following the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The Bonn agreement resulted in the establishment of interim administration head by Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai. The administration was tasked with the formation of constitutional commission and an election commission whose first task was to develop and accurate voter list and register political parties (Piano, and Puddington 2004). Between 2004 and 2015, Afghanistan administered five electoral cycles. Legislative elections in 1988, 2005 and 2010, and Presidential election in 2004, 2009 and 2014. Except for 1988 and 2014 elections, each process has been postponed at least half year and beyond the Constitutional limits (Hyde and Marinov 2012; Afghanistan Constitution 2005).

The political rights and civil liberties of people remained limited. Nevertheless, several international electoral observation missions that followed the Afghan election in this period concluded that the Election law and Constitution met many international standards for universal suffrage. The right to vote and be elected remains largely safeguarded in the legal framework, and the ratio of population to elect representatives is recognized in the Constitution. Furthermore, the quota to safeguard women participation were being gradually implemented (Election law, Afghanistan 2004; Constitution of Afghanistan 2004; OSCE/ODIHR Afghanistan 2004; EU DESM 2004; EU EAT 2014; OSCE/ODIHR Afghanistan 2009: 9-15; ANFREL 2009: 4; ICG Afghanistan 2009(b): 7; ICG Afghanistan 2009(a); Election law 2016; EU EAT 2010: 8-10). Nevertheless, the law generally recognizes the right to vote and stand; implementation, however, faces significant problems.

The security has gradually become one of the key issues impacting universal suffrage in Afghanistan. Since 2010, at least one-third of the country fell into a high-security risk. The situation has been affecting disproportionately the women population. Along with pervasive culture of impunity, weak governance, extreme poverty, and traditional patriarchal structure, women suffrage has been seriously undermined (EU DESM 2004: 16-17 & 21; OSCE/ODIHR Afghanistan 2005: 38; EU EOM Afghanistan 2009: 15-37; ICG 2009(b): 23-24; Kippen 2008: 15- 17; EU EAT 2010: 5-20; EU EAT 2014:9; OSCE/ODIHR Afghanistan 2014: 10).

Furthermore, inconsistency in determining eligibility criteria and disenfranchisement of returnees (EU DESM 2004: 15; EU EOM Afghanistan 2005: 1-2), and lack of reliable population figures undermine the principle one-person-one-vote. Vetting candidates in the absence of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs and restriction to the Kuchi (nomadic population) participation further impacted the implementation of the right to vote and stand. Disenfranchisement and impersonation of female votes have further undermined Afghan political participation in the process (EU EOM Afghanistan 2005: 10; Ennis 2006; Reynolds and Wilder 2004).

As such, despite increasing efforts, notably attempting to accommodate women and minority participation, the suffrage rights have been severely undermined and lowering Afghanistan grading for universal suffrage indicator. Besides, Afghanistan has yet to pay systematic attention to the political participation of persons with disabilities. No special provisions were put in place to facilitate the exercise of their voting rights. In 2010, Afghanistan took effort to take into consideration voters with special needs. The practical implementation, however, fell below the expectation (EU DESM 2004: 7; EU EOM Afghanistan 2005: 15; UK Border Agency 2013: 24 - 107; EU EOM Afghanistan 2010: 14 & 39; EU EOM Afghanistan 2014: 7).

5.1.2. EMB Capacity: Legal challenges to the independent electoral administration Regarding the performance of electoral administration, the 1988 election process was, according to the interlocutors straightforward – “a piece of paper, with no option to choose from multiple candidates, which was to be marked and dropped into a steel box” (Ahmadzai 2019). No established mechanism or procedure however existed. The Communist regime oversaw the 64

process. For this reason, the performance of the electoral administration indicator receives the lowest score. Furthermore, the lacked documentation, and Afghan stakeholders confirmed that very little information existed about the 1988 election (Ahmadzai 2019; Kohi 2019; Manawi 2019).

Since 2009, following two electoral cycles held under the Afghan – international Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB), Afghan Independent Election Commission (IEC) is a Constitutionally-mandated body with regulatory powers. Although until the adoption of the 2016 Election law, the authorities remained relatively undefined. Despite described as ‘independent”, the legal framework, notably the appointment of the Commissioners by the President, fails to protect IEC’s independence (Ennis 2006: 4-10; Constitution 2005, Art. 156; Election law 2016; OSCE/ODIHR Afghanistan 2004: 8-10; EU EAT 2010: 9-12). The Election law also establishes the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC); however, with no provision of independence (EU EAT 2010: 12-24; EU EOM Afghanistan 2009: 40).

The impartiality and independence of the IEC have remained a problematic issue, also in practice. The accusation of partisan appointments and conflict of interest resurfaced already in 2004 and 2005 elections during the existence of the JEMB. Reports also alleged bias of some polling officers (OSCE/ODIHR Afghanistan 2004: 8-11; EU DESM 2004; Wilder 2005: 25-37; EU EOM Afghanistan 2005: 2-4). Despite efforts during the 2009 and 2010 electoral cycles, provisions in the Code of Conduct, stipulating IEC independence, were not applied consistently with these requirements (EU EOM Afghanistan 2009:15-16; ICG 2009(b): 24). The statements of the IEC Chairman reflected the views of the candidates, which undermined his impartiality (Kippen 2008: 9; ICG 2009(b): 24). Accusations of fraud and bias have tarnished the IEC's reputation (EU EOM Afghanistan 2014: 3; NDI 2013: 1; EU EAT 2014: 47; EU EAT 2010: 9-12). The better appointment procedure introduced in 2014 did not address IEC’s impartiality problems (EU EAT 2014: 47). For these reasons, the rating of EMBs independence and impartiality remain slightly negative.

The EMBs also did not operate in full transparency. The Election law does not provide for open sessions. In 2004, observers and candidates could not attend JEMB open sessions. The IEC also 65

did not allow for sufficient time to disseminate information to ensure the public’s understanding of the electoral process (EU DESM 2004: 27; OSCE/ODIHR Afghanistan 2004: 8). While the EMB became more transparent in terms of openness to scrutiny in 2005 electoral process, it still did not distribute regulations and procedures on time to allow meaningful observation. The information flow between the IEC and the candidates remained a minor challenge. The increased score, nevertheless, reflects some positive developments in the IEC transparency (OSCE/ODIHR Afghanistan 2005: 17; EU EOM Afghanistan 2005: 1). Access to information has also improved in 2009 and 2010 electoral cycles. The IEC implemented a multi-layered information sharing to voters, and the quality of public outreach products improved. IEC sessions should, however, open to observers to allow opportunities for permanent scrutiny of the process (OSCE/ODIHR Afghanistan 2009: 27; EU EAT 2010: 41; EU EAT 2014: 48).

The overall performance of the EMBs faced significant challenges, notably concerning communication between the decision-making and executive branch of the IEC. Similarly, inadequate awareness among the polling staff led to procedural irregularities (OSCE/ODIHR Afghanistan 2004: 8-10; EU DESM 2004; Wilder 2005: 37). The EU noted the slightly better performance of the field staff in 2005 elections. However, the frequent changes among the IEC officials and staff led to the loss of expertise in the next, 2009 electoral cycle (EU EOM Afghanistan 2005; Kippen 2008: 15-17).

The international observers evaluated the performance of the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) as ‘disappointing’ with no dedicated field structure, lack of responsiveness and late decision-making during the 2004 and 2005 elections (OSCE/ODIHR Afghanistan 2004:5; EU DESM 2004: 24-26; OSCE/ODIHR Afghanistan 2005: 11). While the EU mission praised the ECC for acting diligently during the 2009 elections, they reported severe challenges to the performance to both EMBs in 2010. The heightened security issues further exacerbated these challenges (EU EOM Afghanistan 2009: 15-21; EU EOM Afghanistan 2010; NDI 2010).

The electoral administration showed consistent technical and operational improvements in 2014. Nevertheless, its credibility was undermined by the unsatisfactory implementation of anti-fraud measures, contradictory decisions, general lack of transparency in results and audit, absence of 66

comprehensive investigation into the fraud cases. As a consequence, the electoral process faced a crisis of confidence right before the 2014 presidential run-off (EU EAT 2014:3-10).

Figure 6: Afghanistan - EMB Capacity Score (detailed) Information EMB distribution EMB Performance Election independence to the Public capacity of election year and citizens / scrutiny total score authorities impartiality voter education 1988 1 1 1 1 20 2004 2 2 2 2 40 2005 2 2 3 2 45 2009 2 3 2 2 45 2010 2 3 2 2 45 2014 2 2 2 2 40

5.1.3. Public perceptions: Allegations of fraud, a face-saver for unsuccessful candidates There were no allegations of fraud in the 1988 elections since only one party competed on the ballot. Contrary to that, however, all upcoming Afghan elections assessed in the dissertation became notorious for widespread fraud allegations. The key fraud allegation issues to highlight include the perception of high-level corruption in the 2004 process (Larson 2013: 9); allegation of intimidation and vote-rigging, notably during the counting process (Wilder 2005: 35; EU EOM Afghanistan 2010: 26); rumors of vote-buying in rural areas (Larson and Coburn 2009: 5); allegations of ballot stuffing, poor quality ink. It is worth noting that many of these allegations were not substantiated and instead served as face-saving for the unsuccessful candidates. Nevertheless, perception of fraud undermined the credibility of the process (Wilder 2005: 35-37; OSCE/ODIHR Afghanistan 2005: 1-9).

Despite of the perceived fraud and the lack of capacity, Afghan electoral administration had enjoyed relatively high levels of confidence until post-2014 elections. Apart from 2010, when confidence levels dropped to 54%, over 65 % of the Afghan population trusted electoral administration. Post-2014, the level of trust decreased to 39% (Asia Foundation 2014).

5.1.4. Electoral violence: organizing elections in the situation of active insurgency Afghanistan held the 1988 elections during the ongoing civil war (Hyde and Marinov 2012). They were marked by violence and boycotted by the Mujahedeen3 (IPU 1988). The numbers of people killed during the electoral process, cannot be, however, established. The persistent reports of threats and intimidation by local commanders and violent attacks marked the 2004 election. At least 12 election staff were killed, and three international election officers kidnapped. The insecurity can be attributable to the three sources (i) post-Taliban extremists opposing democratic transition; (ii) inter-factional violence by regional warlords) (Wilder & Reynolds 2004: 1-3; EU DESM 2004: 1-2; OSCE/ODIHR Afghanistan 2004; Hyde and Marinov 2012). Credible cases of intimidation by armed groups and partisan local government officials also marked the 2005 elections. Eight candidates (seven during the campaign period) and 11 electoral staff were killed (OSCE/ODIHR Afghanistan 2005: 38; Wilder 2005: 17).

Elections held in 2009, 2010 and 2014 were no different with multiple instances of threats against candidates and their campaigns, often explicitly targeting women, and Taliban’s threatening “Night Letters.” The 2009 electoral process further resulted in intimidation of citizens and journalists reporting on the election (EU EOM Afghanistan 2009: 27 – 30; ICG 2009(b): 23-24; EU EOM Afghanistan 2010: 5-36; EU EAT 2014). The acts of violence included (i) rocket attacks; (ii) explosions targeting polling stations and government facilities; (iii) incidents on election day; and (iv) kidnappings of electoral personnel, to systematically disrupt the electoral process. At least 300 incidents were reported during each of these elections (Kippen 2008: 15-17; EU EOM Afghanistan 2010:5 – 19; EU EAT 2014).

The three electoral cycles also resulted in significant numbers of civilian deaths. In the 2009 electoral process, at least 13 electoral officers were killed during the immediate period leading to elections; 31 died, and 79 were injured on the polling day (EU EOM Afghanistan 2009: 28). In the 72 hours leading to 2010 election and including election day, at least 55 electoral staff, candidates and campaign workers lost their life. According to international sources, overall 105 were injured and 66 killed in the process that was interrupted by at least 33 explosions and 63 rocket attacks.

3 Mujahedeen is the group of fighters in Afghanistan battling the Soviet Union from 1979 to 1989. 68

Candidates’ husband was murdered on account of her candidacy (EU EOM Afghanistan 2009: 19- 20). In the 2014 elections, there were 240 confirmed attacks against the electoral process that resulted in at least 100 deaths (UNAMA and OHCHR 2014).

Figure 7: Afghanistan – all data

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS POLITICAL - ELECTORAL DYNAMICS

systemic Type of CIVPOL loser opposition electoral state suffrage genuine periodic manipulati vote buying strategies election rights consent role system legitimacy on

1988 1 5 6 1 2 0 1.3 0 35 0 2 1.17 2004 2 4 6 0 6 0 1.68 0 65 1 1 2.13 2005 1 4 5 0 6 0 1.68 0 50 1 3 2.11 2009 2 4 5 0 6 0 0.46 1 73 1 1 1.88 2010 1 4 6 0 6 0 0.52 0 20 0 3 1.7 2014 2 4 6 0 6 1 0.49 1 60 0 1 1.83

5.2. Bangladesh Since its secession from Pakistan, Bangladesh has faced turbulent political history with its parliamentary democracy and multi-party system challenged by assassinations, military rules, and irregularities (EU EOM Bangladesh 2001). The country has held competitive elections with the multi-party parliamentary system since 1971; nevertheless, not towards sustainable democratic changes (Nohlen: 2001: 516).

Since the 1980s, Bangladesh held nine national elections out of which five outside of the Constitutional term. The 1981 and 1986 presidential elections represented the last direct vote under the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh (Art. 38). Leftist and centrist parties boycotted the 1986 elections. The then-president Eshrad won both elections and enacted Constitutional amendments indemnifying his actions as a military rule. The opposition parties did not accept this provision as a legitimate government, which led to resolving the Parliament and holding new elections in 1988, under the caretaker government. President Eshrad handed over the power in the 1990s (Nohlen 2001: 516-520).

5.2.1. International Standards: Legislation allowing harassment of the opposition Since 1971, Bangladesh has been implementing non-discriminatory policy guaranteeing suffrage to all citizens irrespective of sex or religion. The law established the eligibility to vote at 18 years- old for voters not declared of unsound mind, 35 years old for presidential, and 25 for parliamentary candidates (Constitution 1972, Art. 122). The electoral legal framework further allows disqualification of candidates with loans. This provision may lead to unnecessary disenfranchisement. There was no ban on independent candidates contesting; candidates holding office in statutory body of the state were eligible.

The Constitution of Bangladesh guarantees equal rights for women and men. Reserved seats for women have existed since 1974, however, with a formula that supports the winning party. Women could also contest general seats. Nevertheless, a variety of cultural factors have let to severe violations of women’s rights (Nohlen 2001: 519; Chowdhury, and Al Masud 1997: 53-69; Constitution 1972, Art. 66 et Art 122).

In 1974, however, Bangladesh adopted a Special Powers Act allowing detention without charge of political opponents (Special Powers Act 1974). Criteria set up in the Constitution are generally acceptable; nevertheless, the possibility of detention without charge, in combination with 15 years of turbulent rule created a space for arresting political opponents. As such, we can conclude that there were still some gaps in the electoral legal framework and severe problems with implementation. The country had remained under a type of totalitarian rule. The universal suffrage, nevertheless, gradually improved over the years and generally, Bangladesh has been enjoying a plurality politics.

The government had set the 1981 elections without the consultation of the opposition, which subsequently boycotted the process (Hassan 1983: 274). The 1986 parliamentary elections were held under the same legal framework as previous elections, with a high number of contesting candidates (IPU 1986). Country’s democratic transition, nevertheless, begun with the resignation of General H. M. Eshrad. The 1991 elections brought pro-centrist Bangladesh National Party (BNG) under Khaleda Zia in power. Two women consequently became prime ministers. Despite women starting to emerge on the high-level positions within the government, women role in politics remained marginal (Puddington, and Piano 2008: 67-74).

The Awami League boycotted 1996 elections. Upon further pressure from opposition parties, the Constitutional amendment introduced the caretaker government. Despite some violence and irregularities, the 1996 election was freest in Bangladesh history, bringing Awami league in power (Nohlen 2001: 518). The polls have also seen a higher voter turnout. During the 2001 elections, Awami league used force to break up opposition rallies and violence to enforce strikes (Karatnycky (ed.) 2001: 75-78). Arbitrary detentions of political opponents occasionally occurred under the Public Safety Act (EU EOM Bangladesh 2001). Besides, women were not able to vote in several constituencies for religious reasons. As women are not mainly directly elected, they do not enjoy equal opportunities in parliament. Overall, the security situation restricted suffrage, and the environment did not encourage women participation (EU EOM Bangladesh 2001: 21).

The lead-up to the postponed 2008 elections saw the military-backed replacement of the caretaker government. Emergency regulations significantly restricted civil rights and political activity. 72

Despite equal suffrage remained enshrined in the Constitution, the government continued to misuse the Special Powers Act against the opposition. Article 91E of the Representation of People Order (1972, as amended in 2008) has given wide-ranging powers to the Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC) to exclude a contesting candidate. Religious minorities and women remained underrepresented, despite efforts to introduce general policies to promote women participation and protect both groups from harassment and violence (EU EOM Bangladesh 2009: 13). The elections considered with only isolated irregularities by domestic observers led to the re-election of the Awami League. The opposition parties boycotted the parliament (US Department of State 2013).

The 2014 tenth parliamentary election saw, yet again, large-scale electoral violence, notably in the pre-electoral period. The opposition again demanded the creation of the caretaker government. They withdrew from the election after the government rejected the demand. Most international missions withdrew before the election (Eckstein 2019). The General Forces of Intelligence employed informers to conduct surveillance on the opposition, and in several instances, the police prevented opposition’s public function. The movement of the opposition leader, Khaleda Zia, was restricted; other prominent Bangladesh National Party (BNP) supporters were arrested or went into hiding. Jamiat-e-Islami was disqualified, allegedly for the breach of the Constitution (EP 2014; HRW 2014(a); HRW 2014(b); Lorch 2014; UK FCO 2014).

Although Constitution protects all segments of the population equally, and there is no restriction placed on the participation of persons with disabilities in the process, up till 2001, there was nearly a zero-attention paid to the involvement of persons with disabilities (Constitution 1972, Art. 58D, 10 – 36; DRWG 2009: 12). In the 2001 election, only one party mentioned disability on its agenda. Due to a strong NGO advocacy, the situation changed in 2008, when nearly all parties included rights of persons with disability in their discourse. Bangladesh became a pioneer in the region in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), although the main focus has directed to welfare issues. Following improvements in the 2009 legislation, the disability information had been incorporated in the National voter list regulations for the first time, and persons with disabilities actively participated in the election (DRWG 2009: 23).

5.2.2 EMB Capacity: Caretaker government enhances the independence of electoral administration The Bangladesh Electoral Commission (BEC) is a constitutionally mandated body, created by the president (Representation of People Order 1972, Constitution 1972 Art. 118). To support BEC, the government may issue directions as it may consider necessary (Representation of People Order 1972, Art. 5.2; BEC 1973). Since 1972 till 2000, the BEC had little authority to enact electoral regulations (Nohlen 2001: 523). The 1981 non-party Caretaker government was created to hold the election and extend support to the BEC (Constitution 1972, Art. 58 D). The non-party-based caretaker government enhanced the independence of the electoral administration. On the contrary, however, the government’s appointments and interference in the BEC’s operations, negatively impacted on the independence of the electoral administration.

The BEC shared information with the public through their publication in the National Gazette. The information dissemination has slightly improved in 1986, with further transparency in 1991. BEC, for example, issued detailed information on candidate nomination in the National Gazette. However, no obligation to hold open sessions allowed for minimal scrutiny of the BEC’s performance (Nohlen 2001: 524; Samarasinghe 1991: 2140).

The 1972 Constitution prescribes a single electoral roll. The overall assessment suggests that improvements were needed to enhance the accuracy of the register and ensure that only eligible voters were on the list. Despite challenges, electoral administration generally performed in a largely satisfactory manner (Constitution 1972, Art. 121; Nohlen 2001: 524; Samarasinghe 1991: 2140).

In the 1991 elections, the government has taken steps to improve neutrality of electoral administration, including at the district level. The government had appointed three judges of the Supreme Court, made some transfers in Regional Electoral Officers as well as superintendents of the police. The administration issued a 160-point Code of Conduct trying to convene the message that the government has been scrupulously independent (Nohlen 200l; Samarasinghe 1991). The 1996 establishment of the Caretaker government strengthened institutional setup and enhanced the notion of independent conduct of the electoral process (Shamrat 2016; Constitution Act 1996). 74

The 2001 election equally took place under the Caretaker government, perceived as allowing for more independent electoral conduct (EU EOM Bangladesh 2001: 3). The BEC was empowered to form electoral rules without the consent of the government. Contrary, however, the amendments abolished the possibility for the BEC to remove a candidate from the list. Another critical problem impacting the independence of electoral administration existed at the deputy commissioner (DC) level. The DC is also responsible for the local administration and hence nominated by the ongoing government (EU EOM Bangladesh 2001: 5-6). The transparency and efficiency of the BEC could be improved. There were no procedures for publishing BEC’s decisions, and the EU Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) complained about not receiving adequate information. BEC conducted various voter registration programs around the country. EU EOM noted, however, that they were politically biased and often failed to explain electoral procedures to the citizens (EU EOM Bangladesh 2001: 19; Akhter 2001).

Similarly, the openness of the electoral administration to public scrutiny could be significantly improved. Observers could follow the electoral process without significant difficulties; however, there were no provisions for open sessions or mechanism to submit BEC’s documents for the public scrutiny. Overall, the BEC performed generally satisfactorily in the 2001 elections (EU EOM Bangladesh 2001: 6-15).

With the international technical support, the military-backed caretaker government oversaw the large-scale electoral reform to the voter register and BEC administration. The process led to the successful 2008 election (Eckstein 2019). Political interlocutors, however, perceived BEC as biased (EU EOM Bangladesh 2009: 14; Shamrat 2016). BEC was responsible for voter and civic education, partially delegated to the civil society.

The transparency of the process could have been enhanced. BEC did not disseminate the information of its hearings related to the electoral dispute resolution and did not provide a reliable account on the number of appeals. Also, the Magistrates complained about the lack of information to pass judgment. In some parts of the country, the polling station results were not publicly displayed (EU EOM Bangladesh 2009: 13-27). Furthermore, BEC did not open its meetings to the 75

observers and did not share the minutes. Despite some transparency problems, BEC conducted most of its electoral activities professionally. EU EOM assessed the performance of the polling staff generally good (EU EOM Bangladesh 2009: 15-16).

In 2009, Bangladesh passed the Right to Information Act, strengthening the legal framework for the BEC to disseminate its news to the electorate. The evaluation of different organizations vary. US, UK, and EU sharply criticized the process, but other influential regional actors, including India, China, Japan, and Russia endorsed the results (ICG 2015: 7). The elections were held under transparent constitutional parameters (Bhattacharjee 2014). However, the institution remained week, perceived as biased and lacking independence. The BEC generally performed well, despite allegations of interference in its affairs. Observers also reiterated numerous challenges to the BEC’s independence (NDI 2018: 3-4).

The IEC released results in a user-friendly format for the 2014 election. That increased transparency of the process, although the communication with stakeholders and the public was not clear and structured. Awareness-raising campaigns also remained insufficient, and the international partners recommended their strengthening. Finally, the poll workers required better training to be able to conduct their tasks competently (NDI 2018: 3-4; Eckstein 2019).

Figure 8: Bangladesh - EMB Capacity Score (detailed) Information EMB distribution EMB Performance Election independence to the Public capacity of election year and citizens / scrutiny total score authorities impartiality voter education 1981 2 2 1 3 40 1986 2 3 1 3 45 1991 3 3 1 3 50 1996 3 3 1 3 50 1996 3 3 1 3 50 2001 3 2 2 3 50 2008 3 2 2 3 50 2014 2 2 2 3 45

5.2.3. Public perceptions: low confidence of people in the government Except for 2001 elections where the provision of Caretaker government increased public confidence in the process (EU Bangladesh EOM 2001: 3), the allegations of fraud marred the Bangladeshi polls. These allegations usually came from the losing candidates. While the opposition claimed that 1991 and 1996 elections were fraudulent and unfair, the observers praised the process (Islam 2015: 1; FH 1998). The 1998 fraud allegations were only related to the publication of the results with scarce evidence of improper behavior (EU EOM Bangladesh 2009: 36). The refusal of establishing the caretaker government for 2014 elections led to the perception of fraud and systematic manipulation and resulted in the opposition boycott. All international observers left the country (ICG 2012; ICG 2015; Lorch 2014).

Equally, Bangladesh is known for the low confidence of the people in the government. The population perceived political and electoral institutions weak and irrelevant, notably in the 1980s / (FH 1998). In 1996, the caretaker government undertook several administrative changes to promote confidence and impartiality of the civil service. These steps slightly enhanced public trust in the electoral administration for the two upcoming electoral cycles (EIU 1996; Reuters 17 April 1996; IRRBC 1996: 5). That changed in 2006-2007. The public confidence again decreased mainly due to the inability of the BEC to correct the voter rolls. Also, Presidential pressure on the appointments of the electoral commissioners became problematic, dividing the country and leading to suspicion. The appointed Chief Electoral Commissioner did not enjoy the confidence of the opposition due to partisan appointment and restrictions imposed on domestic observers. The removal of the Caretaker government provision in 2014 undermined further parties’ trust in the system and the institution (ICG 2012; FH 2014; NDI 2018). Largest observer organizations noted that elections were not credible and withdrew (or did not send) the observers due to the government’s way of handling the process (Chowdhury 2013; Chowdhury 2014; ICG 2015).

5.2.4. Electoral violence: confrontations between political opponents While the 1981 polls only saw some isolated incidents of violence during the electoral campaign with no confirmed cases of death, approximately 110 people died in multiple instances of electoral

violence related to 1986 election (Samarasinghe 1991: 2140). The 1991 elections saw prison revolts, politically motivated murders, political assassinations, and attacks on newspapers and journalists. Polling violence also marred both 1996 elections resulting in several dozens of deaths (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

The poll violence and tensions, as well as the permanent confrontation between the BNP and the Awami League, marked the 2001 pre-electoral period. Cases of intimidation were reported on the election day inside and outside of the polling stations. The electoral process, considered by some journalists the most violent in Bangladesh history, resulted in 108 incidents causing injuries and 85 deaths (EU EOM Bangladesh 2001: 12 – 33; Hyde and Marinov 2012). Instances of intimidation and incidents during the campaign between the supporters of rival candidates also occurred during the 2008 election. More than 140 people were killed during the campaign period. Violence also occurred after the election (Puddington, and Piano (eds.) 2008: 67-74; EU EOM Bangladesh 2009: 22; Hyde and Marinov 2012). Violence also increased leading up to 2014 polls resulting in 169 death in the intra-party clashes. On the election day, more than 120 polling stations were set ablaze, and hundreds of homes were vandalized. The BEC suspended the voting process in 300 polling stations due to violence. Additional 19 people died during the election day, including three election workers (Lorch 2014; HRW 2014(a); HRW 2014(b); Quadir and Bose 2014; European Parliament 2013; Puddington 2015).

Figure 9: Bangladesh – all data

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS POLITICAL - ELECTORAL DYNAMICS

systemic Type of CIVPOL loser opposition electoral state suffrage genuine periodic manipulati vote buying strategies election rights consent role system legitimacy on

1981 2 4 5 0 8 0 1.01 0 65 1 2 2.8 1986 3 4 5 1 6 0 1.01 1 55 0.5 2 1.6 1991 1 3 4 0 9 0 1.47 1 90 1 2 3.2 1996 1 3 2 1 8 0 1.5 1 50 0.75 2 2.9 1996 1 3 2 0 8 0 1.5 0 90 1 2 2.9 2001 1 4 3 1 7 0 1.4 1 90 1 2 2.8 2008 1 4 5 0 8 0 1.71 0 90 1 2 2.87 2014 1 4 3 0 8 0 1.62 1 75 1 2 0.57

PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT STRUCTURAL FACTORS PUBLIC PERCEPTION MITIGATION Poverty internati Confide Ethnic / Fraud Confide Malprac /Econo Conflict Regime observer onal nce in Mitigati EMB political Trans allegatio nce in UNDP tice mic / war type reports observer the on (EV) division ns EMB devel reports process growth/ HDI crisis 1981 40 0.6 22 0.36 2 1 0 -4 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1986 40 0.6 22 0.39 1 1 0 -7 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1991 45 2.6 22 0.39 1 5 1 6 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1996 45 2.2 22 0.43 0 0 0 6 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1996 45 2.2 22 0.45 1 0 1 6 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 2001 50 2.4 22 0.51 1 0 1 6 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 2008 50 2.2 22 0.52 2 0 1 -6 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2014 45 1 22 0.58 1 0 0 5 0 2 1 0 2 1 1 5.3. Bhutan Unlike other countries in the region, the Bhutanese electoral experience remains short. Until 2007, the Bhutanese People’s Party (BPP) was the only party in existence. The only opposition – Druk National Congress (DNC) operated illegally from the exile. Ethnic Nepalese opposition in exile also kept the ‘party structure’ along with the patriarchal clans rather than political party lines (Lehr 2001). The election before 2007 used family voting and electoral posts were mixed with appointments (Puddington et al. 2007: 100-104; Nohlen et al. 2001). The system, generally, enjoyed very little transparency and accountability; freedom of expression remained severely restricted. Women were represented in the National Assembly, contrary to ethnic Nepalese who remained underrepresented (Puddington et al. 2007: 100-104).

In 2007, as part of a realization of Bhutan’s gradual transition to democracy, the post of electoral commissioner, mandated by the 2006 draft Constitution, was created (Piano et al. 2006: 92-96; Puddington et al. 2007: 100-104). In June 2007, Bhutan subsequently legalized political parties and elected 15 members to the 25-member Upper House. All candidates, nevertheless, ran as independents. The new draft of the Constitution (2007) provided for a bi-cameral parliament, a two-party political system, and granted some fundamental human rights. Parties, previously illegal, became registering in 2007, despite the system allowed only parties with national aspiration (Puddington et al. 2007: 100-104; Puddington and Piano 2008: 92-101; Nohlen et al. 2001).

5.3.1. International standards: towards electoral democracy The 2007 Election law requires a minimum a bachelor’s degree to participate in the government, which impacted on the candidacy in the polls. The electoral preparations and electoral process enjoyed only limited transparency and accountability; authorities kept restrictions against the freedom of expression (Bhutanese law prohibits criticism of the government of any kind). Freedom of association and assembly had remained restricted. Draft Constitution guaranteed freedom of association and assembly to the groups not harmful to the peace and unity of the country; independent unions and strikes remained prohibited. Women have participated freely in society and life. Although they remained underrepresented in politics, as religious and ethnically based customary law led to discrimination against women (Draft Constitution 2007; Puddington et al. 2007: 100-104; Puddington and Piano 2008: 92-101). 80

In 2008 polls, Bhutanese Peace and Prosperity party won 45 of 47 seats. Bhutan implemented a two-round system for their first National Assembly election. In the first round, voters elect the party; in the second round, parties field members of parliament. There was no second round as only two parties reregistered for the race. Overall, the elections generally met international standards, despite falling short in certain areas. New 2008 Constitution has guaranteed some fundamental rights but failed notably to grant sufficient protection to the ethnic Nepali population (Constitution 2008; Constitution Project 2018; FH 2013). The members of the Royal Family and Buddhist monks cannot vote. The voters lacked genuine choice on the ballot and possibility of alternative ideologies (EU EOM Bhutan 2008; IPU 2007; IPU 2008).

By 2013, Bhutan moved towards the electoral democracy. However, the main issues with the universal suffrage mentioned above remained yet to be improved and formalized. The second elections held under the parliamentary democracy in Bhutan were generally considered credible by the international observers (IPU 2013; US Department of State 2013: 11; Norris et al. 2014). Campaign material was only allowed in Dzonga and English and difficult to approve.

Regarding the participation of persons with disabilities, Bhutan admitted that despite being a signatory of the UN CRPD, the government only started collecting data recently. The obstacles to the participation of persons with disabilities include the polling station setup (e.g., in buildings not easily accessible), the problematic infrastructural conditions of the country, the attitude of the society leading to discrimination, and low awareness regarding the rights of persons with disabilities. The ECB acknowledged the challenges and drafted a plan, with an attempt to implement it in the upcoming elections (ECB 2018: 11-13).

5.3.2 EMB capacity, public perceptions, and electoral violence: trusted and credible electoral institution despite its short experience with multiparty elections The king appoints the EMB from the list recommended by the prime minister, speaker, and chairperson of the National Council and a leader of the opposition party (EU EOM Bhutan 2008: 12). The selection process as such is in the spirit of the inclusive electoral board. The main functions of the electoral administration include the issuing of electoral rules, delimitation of 81

electoral boundaries, electoral roll preparation, registration of political parties, voter education, campaign finance oversight, and adjudication of election-related complaints. EMB carried its functions with overall impartiality, transparency, and professionalism (EU EOM Bhutan 2008: 10- 12). As it was the first multiparty elections, the relevance of allegations of partisanship remained irrelevant.

Election Commission of Bhutan (ECB) placed a strong emphasis on voter education and engagement with the electorate via local trainers, TV, and education spots. The ECB has also regularly issued a notification in the newspaper ensuring transparency of the process. The lack of civil society participation in the process, however, deprived voters of independent information. The national observers were civil servants appointed to the EMB. Their role resembled more of that of the electoral officers. Generally, no independent civil society (CSO) observation was allowed, which goes against international principles (EU EOM Bhutan 2008).

Despite logistical challenges, the EMB implemented procedures according to the schedule, voting, and counting was well conducted. Results were tabulated thanks to the use of an electronic voting system quickly. The regulations implemented by the EMB were overall strict that often led to disenfranchisement (EU EOM Bhutan 2008).

In the 2013 election, despite continuous appointment by the king, the ECB remained seen as independent from the government (Norris et al. 2014: 29; Bisht 2013). Only the domestic observers observed the process. The national experts rated the election overall positively. Despite no law guaranteeing Bhutanese citizens access to independent information and the regulation of domestic observation by the EMBs, the elections were perceived without fraud or significant irregularities (US Department of State 2013: 11; Norris et al. 2014: 29; ECB 2013). The ECB communicated the information to the citizens via its website and through various public outreach programs. For example, ECB issued a comprehensive handbook for the candidates, including on electoral dispute resolution and other aspects of the electoral process (ECB 2013).

Overall, the ECB professionally delivered the 2013 elections. Experts commended significantly strong performance, which is remarkable given Bhutan’s limited experience with the electoral 82

process and pluralistic elections. The EMB enjoyed a high level of public confidence. Although the Druk Phuensum Tshogpa, obtaining 45% of the votes (15 seats), therefore feeling defeated in the electoral process, petitioned the king with 15 election complaints (Norris et al. 2013: 29). The legal process, regular for the electoral contests, was not marred by outcries of fraud or violence. As such, it represents a pursuit of electoral justice, following the international standards for democratic elections.

During the first 2007 elections, that marked the beginning of the transition, over the ten bombs exploded to oppose the electoral process Apart from the one bomb-maker, none. of the incidents claimed civilian live (EU EOM Bhutan 2008: 1-12). Overall, however, the electoral violence remains generally unknown in Bhutan (Nayak et al. 2018; Puddington and Piano 2008: 92-101; FH 2009; FH 2013).

Figure 10: Bhutan - EMB Capacity Score (detailed)

Figure 11: Bhutan – all data

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS POLITICAL - ELECTORAL DYNAMICS

systemic Type of CIVPOL loser opposition electoral state suffrage genuine periodic manipulati vote buying strategies election rights consent role system legitimacy on

Bangladesh

2007 1 4 6 0 6 0 2.97 0 30 1 2 3 2008 1 4 6 0 6 0 2.97 0 60 1 2 3 2013 1 4 4 1 7 0 2.96 0 75 1 2 2.75

5.4. India India has had a generally comprehensive legal framework, consisting of The Representation of People Act (ROPA) 1951; Registration of Electors Rules, 1960; and Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961. The framework and generally the way of organizing inclusive elections has changed very little throughout the years.

5.4.1. International Standards: people’s right to choose their government deeply enshrined in Indian society Since 1975, following the establishment of the universal suffrage in India, the country has never curtailed people’s right to choose their government (The Economist 2009). The Constitution Part XV: Elections, provides for universal adult suffrage and inclusive electoral process. India has the lowest sex ratio among South-Asian countries and a comprehensive system of statistical analysis to ensure that no one above 18 years old is left out. In 1980s elections, the people elected 20% of women. They also formed over 50% of the voters. The participation of women, however, still faces challenges. In 1991, for example, only 16 women put themselves forward as candidates, out of 660 contestants. The former Chair of the Electoral Commission of India (ECI) also noted that India was the world’s largest democracy with no independent media. Despite that, India has always been always praised for allowing its citizens choosing their government freely, scoring the highest in the South Asian region (Quraishi 2014: 310-312; Singer 2007).

Similarly, to other countries in the region, the participation of persons with disabilities has remained a challenge to the suffrage in Indian elections. ECI started to consider persons with disabilities more specifically during the 2009 elections and became a clear champion in the region. ECI fitted some voting centers with ramps, prepared a list of candidates in braille, disseminating information about elections widely by its electronic media. Such information is accessible to persons with visual impairments. Some awareness raising (for some groups of persons with disabilities) was included into training programs of the ECI. The poll worker manual paid some attention to persons with disabilities (ECI 2009: 33-34). Nevertheless, in 2014, the ECI still received criticism for not being serious about the issue (“Election Commission not serious about persons with disabilities” 2014). Subsequently, in 2016, ECI adopted a Strategic Plan (2016 –

2025) to remove barriers and ensure full inclusion of the persons with disabilities in the electoral process (ECI 2018: 18-21).

5.4.2 EMB capacity and public perceptions: election administration with high integrity and public trust ECI is created as an independent authority, mandated by the Constitution (Quraishi 2014: 5; Constitution of India 1950, Art. 324 & 329). It was initially set up as a single-member body, with only Chief Electoral Commissioner (CEC) (Constitution of India 1950; Quraishi 2014 33-34; ECI 1981(a) & 1981(b)). The ECI then expanded to three members before the ninth parliamentary (Lok Sabha) election amidst the differences between the Congress government of then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the then CEC Peri Sastri. The government wanted to time elections in a way to prevent a political opponent from running. The CEC declined and the government, to curtail its powers, developed the ECI into a multi-member institution. Two additional Commissioners were nominated. Despite many disagreements amongst the CEC and the Commissioners, the 1989 elections were delivered successfully.

The three-member arrangement had been, however, short-lived. The election of the National Front Government led to the abolishment of the three-member arrangement (Chopra 2019). One of the Commissioners – S S Dhanoa - challenged the decision at the Supreme Court. The Court dismissed his petition, however, noted that the ECI was entrusted with an important constitutional function and to strengthen its independence, and checks-and-balances, it should be made a multi-member body (Bidwai 2009; S.S. Dhanoa vs. Union of India and others 1991). As such, ECI has become a multi-member body again for the 1991 election.

The ECI has always been perceived as independent, enjoying a high level of people’s trust. Also, despite the appointments done by the government without a proper consultation mechanism. On several occasions, a collegium, including the opposition, had suggested addressing these issues, however, the concept had never materialized (Quraishi 2014: 39-40).

Over time, numerous provisions aimed to enhance ECI’s independence. 1) ECI has an explicit right to announce the Election day to deny incumbency advantage. 2) To enhance transparency, 86

ECI has an elaborated website and publishes the voter list. 3) Candidates have the right to nominate polling agents. 4) To ensure neutrality, ECI strictly follows the Code of Conduct. ECI is further supported by the three directors-general in the Secretariat to ensure professional technical conduct of the process (Quraishi 2014:67-69; ECI 2017: 20-23). Since its establishment in 1950, the people have traditionally respected the ECI for its institutional integrity and ability to handle such a massive exercise as Indian election (Sharma 2019).

ECI has had a comprehensive framework for information sharing with citizens and ensured detailed reporting after every election (ECI [Website]; Mate 2016). To curb the criminalization of politics, ECI embarked a reform in 1990 to enforce the right to information. Its role further expanded in 1997 (Trilochan, Sastry 2014). In 2001, the High Court ordered the ECI to disclose information about candidates and ensure that the political debates would be telecast (Association for Democratic Reforms vs. Union of India (2001)). Since 2003, due to the intervention of the Supreme Court and the oversight of ECI, the candidates seeking election to the national offices are required to publicly furnish details of their criminal, educations and financial records (Vaishnav 2015; Union of India vs. Association for Democratic Reforms 2002). The enactment of Representation of People Act (amendment), Ordinance of 2002 further required additional disclosure of information related to the electoral process (People’s Union for Civil Liberties vs. Union of India 2003; Singhvi 2009 [judgment]; ROPA 2002). To further enhance transparency, voter education, continuous learning, and professionalism, ECI established an Indian International Institute for Democracy and Election Management (IIIDEM), which has been driving electoral affairs of the region since 2011.

To ensure scrutiny of its performance, ECI hires observers that can correct shortcomings (ROPA 1951). Observer reports are, however, not public. The independent domestic election observation is not common in India. To enhance electorate awareness, ECI attempts to make the voter education system more user-friendly. It keeps posting the election information on milk packets, phone bills, and other every-day use products (System Voter Education and Electoral Participation [SVEEP]) (ECI 2017: 84-90).

Overall, the perception of ECI performance has remained highly satisfactory, with no complaints about electoral administration. The establishment of the IIIDEM further enhanced the ECI’s performance (Butler et al. 1995; Lokniti Team 2004; Kondo 2007; Shah 2007: 1-27; Nohlen 2001). Only in 2009, the issue of electoral rolls divided the ECI. Despite disagreements, ECI decided to go forward based on the majority decision (Quraishi 2014: 70-71).

Figure 12: India - EMB Capacity Score (detailed) Information EMB distribution EMB Performance Election independence to the Public capacity of election year and citizens / scrutiny total score authorities impartiality voter education 1980 4 4 3 3 75 1984 4 4 3 3 75 1989 4 4 3 3 75 1991 4 4 3 3 75 1996 4 4 3 3 75 1998 4 4 4 4 80 1999 4 4 4 4 80 2004 4 4 4 4 80 2009 4 4 4 3 75 2014 4 4 4 4 80

Until 2009 and 2014, when the allegations of fraud appeared against the Electronic Voting System (EVS) – an essential feature of Indian election, the ECI enjoyed a high level of trust and high level of confidence in the electoral process (Cleo 2014).

The credibility of the electoral process, unfortunately, somehow decreased in 2014 election, with allegations of fraud in the EVS, as well as suspicion of proxy voting and vote-buying (Herstatt 2014; Halderman, Prasad et al. 2014: 4; IFES 2014: 5).

5.4.3 Electoral violence: an integral part of Indian election Electoral violence in India generally stems from electoral anomalies, socio-cultural diversities, caste polarization, and communal divides (Brass 1985; Jaffrelot 2008). Economic inequalities, 88

money in politics, and criminalization of the political arena also play a significant role. About 17% of candidates in 2014 elections faced criminal charges, including rape, murder or extortion (Asia Foundation (India) 2017: 50-60; Pachauri 1989; Alihodžič and Asplund 2018; Shardai 2009; UNDP 2011; CBS News 2009; Mitra 2005: 326-343).

Nevertheless, violence was not a significant concern until the 1980s. Some incidents of violence occurred in the 1980 elections but resulted in less than five deaths. It became an integral part of the Indian electoral process, still in a limited manner until the mid-90s. Since then, it became a widespread and inevitable factor (Quraishi 2014: 150 – 160; Asia Foundation (India) 2017). The total of 48 people was killed during the 1984 and 58 in the 1998 election - the majority of deaths in Bihar province. Since the mid-1990s the numbers of deaths increased. Only in 2006, the electoral violence started to decrease again, however, each election still resulting in about 50 deaths on average. In 2014, elections, as a series of politically motivated attacks against Muslims resulted in 43 deaths (Pachauri 1989; Harbers et al. 2019).

The violence, nevertheless, remain localized – attributed to specific provinces, notably Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir), often against specific groups. As such, we classify the intensity of violence as ‘disturbance’, i.e., not entirely widespread throughout the country. That also to make a distinction in violence patterns across the region against countries like Afghanistan (Asia Foundation (India) 2017; Harbers et al. 2019; Birch and Muchlinski 2017; The Guardian 2014).

Figure 13: India – all data INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS POLITICAL - ELECTORAL DYNAMICS Type of CIVPOL systemic vote loser opposition electoral state suffrage genuine periodic strategies election rights manipulation buying consent role system legitimacy 1980 1 2 2 0 12 0 1.59 0 90 0.75 2 3.6 1984 1 2 2 1 11 0 1.31 0 70 0.75 2 3.8 1989 1 2 2 1 10 0 1.57 0 90 0.5 2 3.8 1991 1 2 3 1 8 0 1.41 1 70 1 2 3.8 1996 1 2 2 1 9 0 1.45 0 95 1 2 3.8 1998 1 2 2 0 9 0 1.42 1 95 0.75 2 3.8 1999 1 2 2 0 9 0 1.42 1 75 0.75 2 3.8 2004 1 2 2 1 9 0 1.4 1 75 0.75 2 3.8 2009 1 2 2 1 10 0 1.46 1 75 0.75 2 3.43 2014 1 2 2 1 10 0 1.26 0 75 0.75 2 3.4

PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT STRUCTURAL FACTORS PUBLIC PERCEPTION MITIGATION EMB Malprac Ethnic / Poverty /Economic Conflict Trans Regime observer internati Fraud Confide Confide UNDP Mitigati tice political devel / war type reports onal allegatio nce in nce in on (EV) division HDI growth/ observer ns the EMB crisis reports process 1980 75 2.4 81 0.44 1 1 0 8 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1984 75 2 81 0.44 2 3 0 8 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1989 75 2.4 81 0.48 2 5 0 8 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1991 75 2.6 81 0.51 1 5 0 8 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1996 75 2.8 81 0.55 2 4 0 8 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 1998 80 2.8 81 0.55 2 4 0 9 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1999 80 2.8 81 0.55 2 6 0 9 1 0 0 1 3 0 0 2004 80 2.8 81 0.6 2 3 0 9 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 2009 75 2.22 81 0.57 1 5 0 9 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 2014 80 2 81 0.62 1 2 0 9 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 5.5. Nepal 5.5.1. International Standards: from ‘exclusionary democracy’ towards the most inclusive legislative body in the region Nepal held the first direct election to the National Parliament in 1989, after 30 years since the dissolution of the last elected body. The first two polls (1981 and 1986), boycotted by the-then reformist parties, could not be, however, considered meaningful. During those years, Nepal did not manage to establish a full universal suffrage. To take part in politics, one had to be a member of the class organization. Also, in the 1986 elections, Nepal outlawed political parties (Nohlen et al. 2001: 622; IPU 1981; Von Einsiedel (ed.) 2012: 233; IPU 1986).

Between the years 1990 and 2002, Nepal had been titled an exclusionary democracy (Lawoti 2008: 365-367). The political representation decreased comparing to the first multi-party elections held in 1959 (Lawoti 2008: 369). The democratic rule was being, however, gradually re-established and Nepal declared a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, democratic, independent and sovereign constitutional monarchy with elections based on the principle of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage (Nohlen et al. 2001: 623).

The criteria to stand as a candidate became generally reasonable (25 years old, should not hold public office or profit paid by the government, not bankrupt), except for the prohibition of persons of unsound mind, which may lead to the disenfranchisement of persons with disabilities. Both independent and party candidates could contest the polls (Nohlen et al. 2001: 626). In practical terms, the lack of unified ID cards and no provision for absentee or postal ballot system caused a problem to the numerous populations of refugees and people living abroad across an open border with India. Many of the refugees and absentees were being disenfranchised (IFES 1991: 12-21).

The holding of periodic elections in Nepal was interrupted from 1999 till 2008. In 2002, the King proclaimed an absolute monarchy, dismissed the Prime Minister for the failure to hold legislative elections in 2002, and declared the state of emergency. He mobilized an army to crush the Maoists said to be engaged in riots and insurgency throughout the country. The King was destituted in a 2005 Coup d’Etat, and the military action against Maoists had intensified leaving thousands of

deaths (The Carter Center 2008: 16-18). Despite of numerous attempts for the peace talks (2001 – 2003), the Comprehensive peace agreement was only signed in November 2006. The UN sent a mission to Nepal in 2007, including the technical assistance to the Nepali Electoral Commission component to hold the next elections in 2008 (The Carter Center 2008: 14-33).

The renewed legal framework allowed for an acceptable political representation and increased the representation of marginalized groups. That also due to the commitment made during the peace process. The incorporation of the proportional representation system in the legal framework increase the inclusiveness of the political participation. The 2008 elections also saw, for the first time, affirmative action to enhance participation of marginalized groups.

Establishing a fully inclusive electoral process, however, takes time. As such, the complaints regarding the lack of participation of disadvantaged groups remained recurrent. The Carter Center EOM (2008) accurately pointed out the disenfranchisement of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

Due to the established quota, 33.21% of women were elected, making Nepal the champion in the South Asia region (EU EOM Nepal 2013: 70; Carter Center 2013: 12-33). Candidates’ registration process was considered unrestrictive and inclusive (Franklin 2008: 13; EU EOM Nepal 2008: 3).

The 2013 elections marked a similar level of representation. High number of candidates and political parties contesting demonstrated a relatively genuine choice of the voter on the ballot. Some deficiencies remained regarding the protection of the right of political representation of traditionally marginalized groups and implementation of the safeguards (EU EOM Nepal 2013: 6 & 12; Von Einsiedel et al. 2012). Eligibility to exercise the right to vote mainly remained reasonable. However, a possibility to use other documents than citizenship certificate would enhance franchise (EU EOM Nepal 2013: 6-10). On a less positive note, Nepal was unable to maintain the 2008 progress on women participation, despite the quota in the Interim Constitution. Long-standing social exclusion, associated with class, ethnicity, and geography, had continued to present a fundamental obstacle to women’s participation (EU EOM Nepal 2013: 9). Right to participate in public affairs have become well protected in the Election law. The Nepalese election 92

commission extended the reasonable voter rights to prisoners, election staff, people in care centers, and elderly. However, any voting possibilities were lacking for Nepalese diaspora (EU EOM Nepal 2013: 17; The Carter Center 2013: 9). Despite deficiencies, the quota made the Nepalese legislative body the most inclusive in South Asia, although a bit less inclusive than in 2008 (The Carter Center 2013: 5).

Similarly, the 2017 elections saw the political freedoms well respected; however, disrupted by a series of violent attacks (EU EOM 2018: 4). Constitution and electoral system have been designed now to promote gender and social inclusion, notably its proportional representation part. Due to the voter registration system, the voting rights were, nevertheless, often restricted to those who just turned 18 years old, polling staff, security personnel and those who wanted to change their voting location (EU EOM Nepal 2008: 5-6 & 16). Affirmative action has been applied to tackle historical shortcomings in female participation, but patriarchal and cultural barriers have prevailed in Nepalese society. Women also remained underrepresented in electoral administration, notably in higher-level positions (EU EOM Nepal 2018: 26-28).

The participation of persons with disabilities in the electoral process started to be discussed only in 2008, although, without specific guidelines in the law (EU EOM Nepal 2008: 8). In 2010, Nepal ratified the UN CRPD and its Protocol. Persons with disabilities also became protected in the Interim Constitution of Nepal (2008, Article 63(4)). The Election Commission also incorporated the participation of persons with disabilities in the electoral Code of Conduct (Carter Center 2013: 16; 27-29 & 104). The legislation to give effect to the Convention was, however, only enacted in 2017 in the Right Relating to Persons with Disabilities Act. Despite of all the efforts, minimal provisions were put in place to protect the right to vote of the disabled. Moreover, legally, people of an unsound mind cannot vote, and assisted voting may breach the right to cast a ballot without undue interference (Electoral Rolls Act 2017; Carter Center 2017; UN CRPD Article 29).

5.5.2 EMB capacity: experienced electoral administration The election administration has not been established in a ‘free’ sense until 1991, as the political process remained under the control of the Panchayat Policy and Evaluation Committee (Nohlen et al. 2001: 622; Kumar 1964). The EMB developed more towards independent administration only 93

in 1991. The king appointed the then election commission upon recommendation of the Constitutional Council for a six-year term. Article 117 of the Constitution set up a Constitutional Council composed of legislative and executive branches of the government. The commissioners cannot be members of any party; officials cannot be transferred or dismissed by the government (Nohlen et al. 2001: 628; IFES 1991: 11; Constitution 1990, Art. 103, 104, 108). These provisions set up good precedence for independent election administration. The similar rules led the constitution of the commission until the 1999 election.

Following the breakdown of the Nepalese electoral democracy, the 2007 Interim Constitution and Election Commission Act (2007) established the Election Commission of Nepal (ECN) as an independent body responsible for organizing elections, with significant regulatory powers (EU EOM 2008: 13-14). Overall, the body was respected as neutral and maintaining transparency throughout the process, nevertheless, with over-representation of Brahmin men. The public and electoral stakeholders perceived the election officials as impartial (The Carter Center 2008: 13 – 43; EU EOM Nepal 2008: 2). The ECN enjoyed similar confidence and perception of impartiality also in 2013 and 2017 election. The staff across the board remained generally perceived as independent. The only significant criticism received in 2017 was related to the lack of enforcement of the electoral violations, which might have undermined the integrity of the electoral process (EU EOM Nepal 2013: 6 & 14; EU EOM Nepal 2018: 30).

The ECN distributed exhaustive and accurate reports for every constituency and ensured complete and updated website (Nohlen et al. 2001: 628). Each party was allowed to have a poll watcher to scrutinize the ECN’s performance. They, nevertheless, did not enjoy equal access. ECN was generally responsive to the needs of international observers (Nohlen et al. 2001: 628; IFES 1991: 26 -31). In 2008, the ECN conducted a massive voter registration campaign. However, the outreach to voters was not sufficient according to the observers (The Carter Center 2008: 34). The ECN had also adopted an Open Media Strategy to increase the participation of the voters (EU EOM 2008: 6). Regarding the oversight of the electoral administration, the ECN had established a constant dialogue between officials and electoral stakeholders and set-up regular meetings with political parties. Despite that, the observers enjoyed only limited access to the meetings of the electoral commission. Greater electoral oversight by the observers and increased training for civic observers 94

would enhance the transparency of the electoral process (Franklin 2008: 10-11; EU EOM 2008: 3 -7; The Carter Center 2008 31-34).

The public information and space for scrutiny by the ECN further improved significantly during the 2013 elections but decreased again in 2017. In 2013, ECN held regular press conferences to update stakeholders on electoral preparations. The district officers remained in a frequent liaison with the electoral interlocutors. The ECN had also implemented an ambitious voter education program, including 14,000 educators.

The Election law duly establishes the observer participation in the process; however, the Directive issued on the observers did not allow to observe in the same village as they registered. Also, high educational requirements restricted observation efforts. Despite these challenges, the observers generally observed all parts of the electoral process and played a positive role in enhancing transparency (The Carter Center 2013: 7-8).

On the contrary, the electoral stakeholders criticized the 2017 elections for the lack of transparency. The decisions, internal rules, and procedures on voter registration data had not been publicly available. The ECN failed to publish the information on polling center turnout. Despite significant efforts, observers assessed the voter education as insufficient and, in some areas, ‘inexistent’. Furthermore, no mechanism existed for regular consultations with stakeholders and observers were denied access to some parts of the electoral process. International observers reported severe restrictions in their access to ECN information (EU EOM Nepal 2008: 5 – 27; The Carter Center 2017: 2).

The overall performance of the electoral administration is seen to provide a valuable lesson for emerging democracies organizing a multi-party election. The institution gained considerable experience already during the Panchayat Policy and Evaluation Committee oversight (IFES 1991: 2-27). Despite the solid performance, it has, however, faced significant procedural issues throughout the conducted electoral processes. The 1994 elections were marred by irregularities that decreased the quality of performance of the ECN (Finn 1995: 424). Generally, despite a reliable performance, there were significant flaws in the process that decreased quality of the 95

election. These include instances of malpractice and fraud not addressed by the ECN (The Carter Center 2008: 33).

The 2008 electoral cycle went relatively smoothly with operations completed in an efficient manner (Franklin 2008: 12; EU EOM Nepal 2008: 2). There were occasional delays in the electoral process, Code of conduct was weekly enforced, and confusions in the legal framework created some contradictory provisions in the implementation of the elections (The Carter Center 2008: 32 – 50).

The technical preparations of the 2013 elections improved significantly. The ECN satisfactorily conducted them, despite logistical challenges. It had shown competence in conducting essential operations and nation-wide training activities. Voter eligibility criteria were consistently applied. The main shortcoming had remained the lack of clarity in the roles and responsibilities for the Election Dispute Resolution (EDR) process (EU EOM 2013: 15-16; The Carter Center 2013: 8- 11; Norris et al. 2013: 74). The 2017 election saw successful electoral preparations despite late adoption of relevant legislation, but procedural weaknesses related to the reconciliation of the ballot. The ECN had shown reluctance to exercise oversight power, which led to the inconsistent application of the legislation. The most polling stations conduct was good; however, the oversight by the returning officers remained inadequate. Domestic observers noted the lack of enforcement of the Code of Conduct and confusing provisions regarding the implementation of the counting procedures (EU EOM Nepal 2018: 5-37; The Carter Center 2017).

Figure 14: Nepal - EMB Capacity Score (detailed) Information EMB distribution EMB Performance Election independence to the Public capacity of election year and citizens / scrutiny total score authorities impartiality voter education 1981 1 1 1 3 30 1986 1 1 1 3 30 1991 4 3 3 3 65 1994 4 3 3 3 65 1999 4 3 3 3 65 2008 4 3 3 3 65 2013 4 4 3 4 75 2017 4 2 2 4 60

5.5.3 Public perceptions: EMB enjoying the public confidence The elections in Nepal had mainly been perceived as “free and fair” despite of malpractices committed by most parties in 1986, 1991, 1999 and 2017. The main issue had remained biased media coverage. Nobody, nevertheless, seriously challenged the way elections had been conducted (ICG 2008: 1; IPU 1994; IFES 2001: 19 – 26). In 1994, the national observers alleged proxy voting, voter buying, intimidation and tampering with the ballot, mainly by the ruling party. The elections were repeated in 42 constituencies (ICG 2008). The electorate lodged about 50 complaints in 2008 election alleging fraud and a “local style” electoral manipulation. (Dahal 2010: 19; EU EOM Nepal 2008: 35-36). Some Maoist leaders equally alleged fraud in 2008 and claimed that 2013 elections were rigged and threatened to withdraw from the counting center (The Carter Center 2013: 11; Harris 2013; Puddington and Piano 2008: 498-503; ICG 2008). Since the Panchayat, the ECN has generally enjoyed the confidence of the electorate, notably due to consensual appointments of the election officials (EU EOM 2008: 5 – 6 & 28; The Carter Center 2013: 6).

5.5.4 Electoral violence: mainly sporadic incidents of violent nature In comparison to other countries in the region, Nepalese elections were far less violent, notably in terms of violent deaths. In the 1981 election, the police reportedly opened fire to suppress disturbances in two areas and arrested 30 persons dissuading people from voting. At least seven people were reported injured and two killed by police in a riot near the border with India (Hyde & 97

Marinov 2002; Mercy Corps 2003: 35-37). The subsequent electoral cycles have seen some instances of harassment and intimidation by various Communist party factions. The election- related violence increased slightly in 1991 elections where twelve individuals were killed in political violence. Elections in 1994, as well as 1999, saw five deaths in isolated incidents. There was a relatively low turnout during the election day and scattered instances of violence (“Nepal. 1946-present” 2019; IPU 1999; IPU 1995: 424; IPU 1994).

Instances of voter intimidation increased during the 2008 campaign period. While security increased following Jana Andolan II (People’s Movement) and the peace process, the campaign atmosphere was tensed, marred by insecurity, and violence that undermined freedom of movement (The Carter Center 2008: 27-28). The Movement of Maoist People’s Army (PLA) was seen responsible for physical attacks, abductions, and harassment right before elections and creation of the atmosphere of fear. There were several instances of killing – three Maoists cadres, one Youth Communist League (YCL) member and one candidate died during the electoral process (The Carter Center 2008: 30; EU EOM Nepal 2008:1).

The 2013 process was generally peaceful with several sporadic incidents of violent nature and instances of intimidation. Such cases decreased comparing to 2008 election. The campaign had seen attacks on public transportation, destruction of party vehicles, and obstruction of the campaign due to individual rivalries. Seventeen people were injured, and one killed as a result (The Carter Center 2013; EU EOM Nepal 2013: 20-21). A series of violent attacks on candidates and campaign throughout the country disrupted the 2017 electoral process. Between 7 November and 7 December, more than 150 violent incidents occurred countrywide. Attacks with improvised explosive devices targeted candidates from specific political coalitions and parties. There were 29 attacks on the polling centers and election offices. Over 50 people were injured. A member of a Nepali Congress was killed, following his disappearance on the election day on 7 December (COCAP 2017: 1; EU EOM 2017: 19-20).

Figure 14: Nepal – all data

PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT STRUCTURAL FACTORS PUBLIC PERCEPTION MITIGATION internati Confide Ethnic / Fraud Confide Malprac Poverty /Economic Conflict Regime observer onal nce in Mitigati EMB political Trans allegatio nce in UNDP tice development / war type reports observer the on (EV) division ns EMB reports process growth/ HDI crisis 1981 30 0.7 68 0.33 0 0 0 -9 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1986 30 0.8 68 0.38 0 0 0 -2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1991 65 1.6 68 0.42 1 0 1 5 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 1994 65 1.5 68 0.42 0 0 0 5 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 1999 65 1.5 68 0.47 1 1 0 5 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 2008 65 1.78 68 0.5 0 3 1 6 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 2013 75 2 68 0.56 1 0 1 6 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 2017 60 1.8 68 0.57 1 0 1 5 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 5.6. Pakistan: Pakistan’s electoral history during instability often led to early dissolutions of the parliaments, coup d’états and emergency rules. The 1980 elections followed the replacement of the National Assembly dissolved in July 1977. The Martial Law imposed on the country was lifted on 30 December 1985 (IPU 1985). The 1985 National Assembly was then prematurely dissolved on 29 May 1988 (IPU 1988(a)), followed by the eleven years of civilian rule. During that time, four general elections were held (1988, 1990, 1993, 1997) – all following the premature dissolution of the National Assembly (IPU 1990; IPU 1993; IPU 1997). The situation of constant political instability and rampant corruption led again to the military takeover in 1999 (EU EOM Pakistan 2002: 7-13). The 2002 elections were held only three years after the dissolution of the parliament and the October 1999 Coup d’état. Equally, the subsequent, 2008 electoral process started under challenging circumstances. The imposed emergency rule was only lifted one day before the campaign period (IPU 2002; EU EOM Pakistan 2008: 3). Only the 2013 election finally evinced the increased political competition and voter participation (EU EOM 2013: 3).

5.6.1. International Standards: challenges in law and implementation The 1985 elections were held on the non-party basis under the martial law (FAFEN 2010: 232). The 1973 Constitution has been reintroduced, offering significant powers to the president. There was a separate electorate for Muslims and non-Muslims, which led to the disenfranchisement of small religious groups, notably Ahmadis. The candidates’ nomination criteria were applied subjectively, based on government politics. Women candidates remained under-represented (FAFEN 2010: 175-232).

Since 1988, the polls were considered more democratic, technically based on universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage criteria. However, the above problems, notably with Ahmadis, who remain disenfranchised until today, persisted. Women chance to be directly elected was low - the frequent instances of misusing woman’s vote impaired women’s meaningful participation in the electoral process. Similarly, to the rights of Pakistani minorities, women also faced challenges due to the religious and cultural context. In some constituencies, the universal suffrage for women remained nearly inexistent (Nohlen et al. 2001: 664; Dhagamwar 1993; IPU 1997).

100

The 2002 and other subsequent electoral processes saw some improvements to the universal suffrage. However, significant challenges persisted, both in the legal framework and in actual implementation. In 2008, the EU indicated that the legal framework was not in line with genuine democratic elections (EU EOM Pakistan 2008: 3). The legal framework had remained restrictive notably of the candidates, infringing the right to stand. The Bachelors’ degree or Madrassa qualification requirement excludes in estimation 95% of the population from the contest. Bill defaulters and loaners (including family) could not participate as candidates in the electoral process. Contentious and inconsistent application of the legal framework was also used to disqualify the political opponents, including prominent figures such as Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 2002 election (EU EOM Pakistan 2002: 7 & 36-40; EU EOM Pakistan 2008: 3; EU EOM Pakistan 2013: 3 & 21-22).

Five percent threshold had prevented smaller parties to enter the parliament. Also, to fulfill the quota, both women and non-Muslim were picked from the closed-party lists of those by-passing 5% threshold. The provision disadvantages women, non-Muslim, and independent candidates (EU EOM Pakistan 2002: 25). Ahmadis continue to register on a separate voters’ list, leading into severe disenfranchisement (EU EOM Pakistan 2008: 4-7; FAFEM 2010: 590). The declaration of emergency legislation frequently challenges the guarantees of individual freedoms (EU EOM Pakistan 2008: 10).

Despite women participation has been established in the Constitution (Art. 25 refers to the equality of all nationals before the law), lack of formal education and absence of equality in every aspect of life have hampered women participation in the process. The aspects unfavorable to women would include the lack of education, awareness, and no national ID card that prevents women from registering and accessing their right to vote. Recruit female candidates’ agents to ensure monitoring of the female polling stations has also proven a significant challenge. Although women are represented de jure, there is a vast gender gap in reality (EU EOM Pakistan 2008: 4-7; FAFEM 2010: 590; EU EOM Pakistan 2013).

Persons with disabilities share the same challenges in Pakistan as in many other developing countries. These include stereotypes and perception of a disabled person to be a burden for the 101

family. The persons with disabilities often do not have the digital ID card, are not included in the population census and therefore not registered in the voter list. Despite Pakistan approved a National Policy and Action Plan followed by the Special Citizens Act in 2006 and 2008 respectively, the election day procedures and polling scheme have yet to support greater participation of voters with disabilities (OHCHR 2015; Khan et al. 2011; IFES 2013; EU EOM Pakistan 2013: 48 & 53).

5.6.2 EMB capacity: well-resourced EMB but with persistent shortcomings The 1973 Constitution set up a three-member electoral commission, composed of Supreme or High Court Judges. The president appoints the CEC and commissioners. The institution whose appointment mechanism does not allow for an independent election administration is appointed for every election to prepare electoral roll and organizing elections. The institution has, however, remained administratively weak and perceived as following the orders of the government (Waseem 1997: 3; Election Commission Reconstitution Order (1980); FAFEN 2010: 179 & 588; EU EOM 2008: 5 & 22-23).

Overall, the institution has lacked its independence in the public perception throughout all electoral processes held during the assessed period. The experts reported the following instances in relation to the independence of the Pakistani election commission: (1) On a number of occasions (1985 and 1997), the Commission was directed to prepare a new voter roll by the Chief Martial Law Administration and subsequently the government, against the powers of the Commission (Commonwealth 1997: 11-12; FAFEN 2010: 179 & 423). (2) Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) also relied heavily on the governmental bodies to implement directives, as it was constraint by the law or custom. (3) The favoritism of the anti-Bhutto parties and alleged engagement of government officials in fraudulent activities during the 1990 election, decreased public confidence in the electoral administration. That mainly as the ECP did not take adequate action to deal with the abuses (NDI 1990: vii). (4) Army dominated the administration of elections in 1993 and 1997. While NDI assessed the military role as generally positive, it was heavily criticized by the national election observers (NDI 1993: 19 - 23; Waseem 1997: 4; IPU 1993; FAFEN 2010: 423).

102

During the 1988 elections, the judicial background of the Commissioners contributed to the integrity and constitutionality of the process, as well as the administrative staff at the lower level election administration was perceived more neutral than civil servants. Nevertheless, in the 2002 election, the CEC contributed to legitimizing Musharraf’s coup d’état. That naturally led to the compromised electoral administration. The election commission further failed to protect its mandate from the outside interference and to take a decision against electoral violations by specific candidates, which cast doubts on its independence (NDI 1988: 24; EU EOM Pakistan 2002: 19; 30-33). There was no sign of a deliberate partial behavior during the 2008 and 2013 elections. In the latter, the ECP lost the confidence of the public in its independence only towards the end of the electoral process (EU EOM Pakistan 2008: 5 & 22-23; EU EOM Pakistan 2013: 55-56).

The legal and regulatory framework for the ECP does not provide for open sessions or electoral observation. The transmission and communication of the results had been unclear and lacked transparency. Voter education was limited during the 1980s and 1990s elections. In 1990, reports suggested that parties could not observe the count, and some candidates’ agents were not allowed to monitor the process (NDI 1990: 28).

The access of party agents, however, improved in the next 1993 electoral cycle (NDI 1993: 23). The ECP implemented some additional transparency measures in the 1997 elections, which were also observed by international and national organizations, including EU, Commonwealth, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and Human Rights Society of Pakistan (Nohlen 2001: 671; FAFEN 2010: 430-436).

The voter registration and stakeholder engagement efforts remained limited also in 2002 and 2008 elections. The new Legal Framework Order (2002) yet did not provide for open sessions of the Commission. However, numerous international missions received permission to access. The ECP did not hold regularly scheduled meetings and did not publish its decisions on the website. Generally, there was a lack of openness of the ECP to the public scrutiny. National observers were also unable to access all the polling stations (EU EOM Pakistan 2002: 72; EU EOM Pakistan 2008: 3-23). The situation remained similar also during the 2013 elections. Besides, observers could not

103

access the tabulation. Furthermore, the government’s ultimate power to decline disclosure of records curbed the ability of public access to information (EU EOM 2013: 3-20).

Observers and experts criticized the ECP for its performance related to numerous issues throughout the assessed electoral cycles. The 1985 electoral roll update was considered a lengthy exercise “beyond the understanding of a common man” (FAFEN 2010: 178). The candidates’ application criteria were not applied consistently (FAFEN 2010: 180). The 1988 election has been conducted in a relatively orderly manner, generating immense respect for the results. Election Officials generally remained in line with the law, but the process witnessed a few irregularities (NDI 1988: 1-4). The insufficient funding for the 1990 election did not allow the ECP to re-draw the boundaries. The electoral setup then benefitted, in some instances, the caretaker government (NDI 1990: 29). The statistical anomalies were observed in 15% of the constituencies. The election cell has been established for vote counting by government officials, which was against the law. The knowledge of election staff was relatively high; however, they could benefit better training opportunities (NDI 1990: 23 – 60).

The 1993 balloting took place in an orderly manner, and elections proceeded smoothly. In some instances, however, election officials prevented women from voting (NDI 1993: 20). Overall, there has been a lack of monitoring of a complaint process, training programs for staff were insufficient; there were inaccuracies in the delimitation of constituencies (NDI 1993: 23-24). The issue of cumbersome electoral rolls - incorrect and outdated, leading to the exclusion of female voters in some constituencies and general dissatisfaction with the delimitation of constituencies persisted until 1997 election (Waseem 1997:4; FAFEN 2010: 423).

The 2002 elections were logistically considered a success. The counting process was reported as fast and transparent, with some inconsistencies in the aggregation phase. The poll workers did not ensure that respect for the secrecy of the vote. There was inconsistency in candidates’ evaluation. The ECP relied on the judiciary in handling the nomination of the candidates. National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) was responsible for the collection and production of the voter list, instead of the ECP (EU EOM 2008: 35-59).

104

As the ECP moved towards the 2008 electoral cycle, it has had collected significant experience. It has become a well-resourced EMB. Nevertheless, the ECP did not take full control in some areas under its responsibility, which resulted in numerous shortcomings. The ECP Secretariat lacks necessary management components such as training department, legal, and logistics. Significant problems were observed at female polling stations as well as in the accuracy of the voter roll (EU EOM Pakistan 2008:4; FAFEN 2010: 595). The preparations for 2013 elections were generally successful. Nevertheless, the process resulted in significant procedural shortcomings. The numerically strong Secretariat has lacked capacity in certain areas. The ECP introduced last- minute changes to some critical electoral operations (such as polling station scheme), which undermined the quality of the process (EU EOM 2013: 15-32).

Figure 16: Pakistan - EMB Capacity Score (detailed) Information EMB distribution EMB Performance Election independence to the Public capacity of election year and citizens / scrutiny total score authorities impartiality voter education 1985 2 1 1 2 30 1988 3 1 2 3 45 1990 2 2 1 2 35 1993 2 2 2 2 40 1997 2 2 2 2 40 2002 2 2 2 2 40 2008 3 2 2 3 50 2013 3 2 2 3 50

5.6.3 Public perceptions The confidence in the electoral institutions has faced significant challenges. Pakistan’s Democratic Alliance (PDA) notably indicated the overall distrust in the electoral administration during the first electoral cycles assessed (1985 – 1990) (Sikander 2011; NDI 1990: iix & 55). In 1993, the ECP adopted several regulations that increased confidence in the process, but opposition parties boycotted this election (NDI 1993: 20). The confidence in the institutions improved in 2008, despite criticism of efficacy and lack of trust that the institution operates independently (EU EOM Pakistan 2008: 3-6). The 2013 amendment of the Constitution and the appointment of the

105

Caretaker Government enhanced confidence in the electoral administration comparing to 2002 and 2008 (EU EOM Pakistan 2013: 3).

The 1985 elections saw electoral boycott, however, unlike all later elections, they were generally perceived as fraud-free. Although the electorate perceived the 1997 election generally credible, allegations of fraud emerged in a subsequent electoral cycle. Nevertheless, all next Pakistani electoral cycles assessed in the dissertation have been marred by widespread allegations of fraud (NDI 1990: 22; Chandio 2011; Sayed 1992: 524; NDI 1990; The Seattle Times 1990; Mufti 2018; Waseem 1997: 10; EU EOM Pakistan 2002: 33 – 57; HRW 2003; Feldman et al. 2006; FAFEN 2007; ICG 2008; EUEOM Pakistan 2008(a); EU EOM Pakistan 2013: 36-37).

5.6.4 Electoral violence: Pakistan’s ups and downs Pakistan had seen episodes of widespread, systematic violence as well as peaceful conduct of the electoral process. The electoral violence in Pakistan stems mainly from its troubled political history. Following the independence from the British colonial rule in 1947, permanent power- struggles between the executive power and the army have led to numerous military take-overs, weak institutions; sectarian politics, and more recently active insurgencies and religious extremism. The 1985 elections were generally peaceful, and the 1988 elections had not seen any direct intimidation or violence (NDI 1988:3; Hyde and Martinov 2012; UNDP 2011: 16-17). The 1990 elections, however, were considered one of the bloodiest in 47 years, resulting in dozens of deaths from both main contesting parties. The instances of violence included drive-by-shooting, harassment of voters, and partisan clashes, among others. Women, in particular, became vulnerable to intimidation (Hyde and Marinov 2002; NDI 1990: 50-60). The 1993 elections were relatively calm and peaceful, with 84 incidents classified as not-serious nature and one assassination in Punjab (NDI 1993: 12). The 1997 election saw two people wounded, and one killed during the election day (US Department of State 1999).

Observers reported an undue pressure on voters and candidates during the 2002 pre-electoral period, including kidnapping. A smaller number of incidents referred to violent attacks against candidates or their supporters. Six election-related deaths were reported and frequent destruction of the property (campaign banners in particular). The election day saw seven deaths and undue 106

pressure on candidates and voters. In isolated confrontations, the assailants had attacked offices of anti-government candidates. We cannot, however, asses these attacks as systematic, although they contributed to the ‘general levels of violence’. Discrimination and harassment were, however, more widespread (EU EOM Pakistan 3-59). The violence and threat levels significantly increased in the 2008 electoral process that begun under the emergency rule. About 100 people died during the campaign period, mainly in clashes between the candidates’ supporters. There were credible reports of harassment of the opposition by the police. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto at the 2007 campaign rally led to political violence claiming lives of about 140 people. Between 11 December and 4 March 2008, immediate electoral period, 100 bombs, rockets, and suicide attacks were executed together with 123 incidents of shooting involving the total of 615 victims, out of which 413 were killed. The electoral violence was widespread, notably in the areas of ongoing conflicts between Taliban militants and Baluch independent fighters (EU EOM Pakistan 2018: 13; FAFEN 2007: 602). The 2013 election day saw 62 violent incidents resulting in 64 election-related deaths. Some 130 attacks during the electoral period resulted in 150 people killed (EU EOM Pakistan 2013: 4).

107

Figure 16: Pakistan – full data

5.7.1. International Standards: deterioration of suffrage rights Sri Lankan Constitution does not explicitly establish the right to vote. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of speech encompasses this fundamental right. Despite the more and more legalistic approach adopted by the Courts throughout the years, the right to remedy in case of breaches of the right to vote has been difficult to obtain (Nohlen et al. 2001: 702; Constitution 1978, Art. 17 & 126). Although Sri Lanka has had a strong tradition of electoral competition, universal suffrage, and high voter turnout since 1931 (NDI 2000: 5), the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1979) restricted political rights and civil liberties. The third amendment of the Constitution allowed for the re-election of President Javawardene, while her strongest competitor got deprived of the civic rights (Nohlen et al. 2001: 699; Warnapala 1983: 17-19). The incident notwithstanding, Sri Lanka continued in its strong democratic tradition of electoral competition established in 1931 (NDI 2000: 6). Sri Lanka also applied an alternative vote in 1982 and implemented the Proportional Representation system in 1989, granting every voter three preferential votes and strengthening their right to choose (Nohlen et al. 2001: 701; Parliamentary Election Amendment Act. No. 24, 1987).

During the ongoing conflict, tens of thousands of Sri Lankans could not vote in the 2004 and 2005 elections. That was either due to Tamil-imposed boycotts or massive displacement of the population. The people’s right to vote was restricted notably in the North and East – predominantly Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) – dominated areas (IPU 2004; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2004: 3-31; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2005: 1-38). Due to an active insurgency, it was difficult to prove that the elections took place in the LTTE – controlled areas. In both elections, candidates were denied a free campaigning in the LTTE-controlled areas (EU EOM Sri Lanka 2005: 29). The LTTE-

109

enforced boycott led to low participation also in government-controlled areas (EU EOM Sri Lanka 2005: 1-4 & 36; Sundari 2007).

Furthermore, the IDPs faced significant restrictions throughout the process, as they were not previously registered and could not provide any documentation. Sri Lankans residing abroad (about 1.2 million) did not have any voting options. Additional group deprived often of the voting rights were plantation workers (EU EOM Sri Lanka 2005: 1-10). The limited access to some parts of the country remained a problem for the 2010 elections, but no unreasonable restrictions on the right to vote were observed (Kodikara 2009; Commonwealth 2010: 9).

The 2015 election resulted in severe under-representation of women in the entire process due to the lack of affirmative action. Candidate nominations were inclusive, but the law on campaigning imposed overly restrictive requirements for candidacy, possibly burdensome especially for women. Also, the blanket denial of voting for people with criminal conviction presented an undue restriction on suffrage rights. The requirement to not ‘complete any period of civic disability’ violated the fundamental right to vote principle. The provision allowed the disenfranchisement of individuals or groups only based on suspicion (Ellena et al. 2016: 39-46; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2015: 4-27; Civic Disability Act. 1965; Constitution of Sri Lanka Art. 157 a).

The participation of women throughout the main categories of the process – women as voters, candidates, and election workers, have remained low. Women were represented as polling staff but not at the senior election administration posts. In the 2004 election, only 4.4% of women were elected, mainly due to the personalized electoral system not favoring women (EU EOM Sri Lanka 2004: 30-31). The reasons for female underrepresentation remain mainly (i) violence and intimidation; (ii) overrepresentation in vulnerable employment; and (iii) lack of voter education (EU EOM Sri Lanka 2005: 37-38; Ellena et al. 2016; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2015: 25-27).

Persons with disabilities equally remain severely under-represented in political life. The law prevents the voters of unsound mind from voting, which violates the rights of persons with disabilities (Registration of Electors Act. No. 44(2)). For the 2015 elections, Sri Lanka, for the first time, implemented assisted voting and organized transportation for disabled voters, upon 110

request. Only a few requests were, however, submitted due to the lack of public awareness. Election Commissioner also asked for persons with disabilities to be considered while determining the locations of the polling stations. By that time, Sri Lanka signed but not ratified the UN CRPD (EU EOM Sri Lanka 2015: 12-13).

5.7.2 EMB capacity: towards institutionally strong electoral administration Many Sri Lankan electoral provisions have not changed since their introduction by the British administration. The decision-making body has composed of one Commissioner for Election (CE), operationally situated under the Department of Election, with operational and financial oversight under the executive president (Commonwealth 2015: 7-20; Presidential Election Act, 1981). The president appoints the CE. Parties and the general public have expressed views in the 1980s and 1990s that there was a need for the election commission to hold a credible and transparent election. The government has, however, never implemented the idea (Election Commission of Sri Lanka 2015: 1; Government Proposals for Constitutional Reform, October 1997, Art. 111). In the continuous absence of election commission, the political pressure on one individual had, on numerous occasions, undermined the authority and independence of the electoral commissioner (namely during the 1982, 1999 and 2000 elections). Although most of the time, the CE has been perceived neutral. In theory, the CE’s powers cover a broad administrative and judicial aspects. These powers are not, however, fully exercised (NDI 2000: 8-10).

The situation improved towards the 2004 elections. The electoral administration managed to earn the respect of the Sri Lankan diverse community, including the confidence of political parties, mainly due to a consensual approach in decision-making (EU EOM Sri Lanka 2004: 11). As such, the electoral administration was considered generally impartial during all other assessed electoral cycles, despite the appointment mechanism and the absence of full independent commission. Failure to implement the 17th amendment of the Constitution and introduce electoral commission has, however, impacted on the credibility of key institutions. In the 2010 election, the CE publicly noted that the state institutions did not comply with the EMB’s guidelines and directives and the EMB did not receive full support. CE also publicly expressed his frustration regarding the government’s transfers of civil servants during the electoral period – a possible tool to influence the outcomes of the process. The firm stance and robust defense of the integrity of the electoral 111

process strengthened further the perception of CE’s impartiality (Commonwealth 2010: 27; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2005: 2-16; IFES 2016: 21-23; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2015: 2; Commonwealth 2015: 20).

Public information and voter education, as well as the absence of strategic stakeholder engagement, have been a weakness of the electoral administration (Ellena 2016: 3; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2015: 5-11). The voter materials often lacked clarity and did not convey the necessary message. The electoral administration has finally conducted sufficient voter education program in 2015, however, failed to inform correctly about the changes in the electoral system. The voter education can be, nevertheless, considered adequate, given the high literacy rates among the Sri Lankan population (EU EOM Sri Lanka 2010: 27; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2015 12-13; Daily FT 2015). The absence of the legal framework for observers further undermines the opportunities for public scrutiny of the process (EU EOM Sri Lanka 2015: 11).

The national and international groups generally oversaw the 1980s and early 1990s elections. During the 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2004 elections, domestic observers – People’s Action for Free and Fair Election (PAFFREL) and Center for Monitoring Electoral Violence (CMEV) and other groups - were denied access to voting and counting centers, which decreased transparency of the vote and ability of the public scrutiny. Access remained unhindered for international observer groups (NDI 2000: 11; Rofeh 1999; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2004). The meetings were open to domestic and international observers during the 2005 elections, which increased the transparency of the process. Enhanced transparency and public scrutiny would be, however, beneficial to the efficient Electoral Dispute Resolution (EDR). Preparation of decisions and their publication in a systematic manner would further enhance the transparency of the process (EU EOM Sri Lanka 2015: 1).

As per its legal obligation, however, the CE held weekly consultation meetings with political parties and independent candidates since the 2004 elections. The polling agents were present in

112

nearly all polling stations, except for the problematic cluster stations4 (EU EOM Sri Lanka 2004: 11-27; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2005: 2; EU EOM 2015: 11; Commonwealth 2010: 10 - 27).

While the body managed to administer the process in a generally satisfactory manner, the institutionally weak electoral administration lacked powers to deal with the deterioration of the electoral quality. The worrisome developments included notably the level playing field, increased number of instances of voter impersonation and complicated and inaccuracy-prone voter registration (NDI 2000: 8-10).

Overall, the elections in the South were generally conducted democratically and in a well- organized manner. Electoral administration met all legal deadlines for electoral preparation. Polling staff training could improve, notably regarding the uniform application of the procedures and counting process. The secrecy of the vote was not, for example, fully guaranteed. While the counting process was handled professionally, including the preferential votes, the numbers did not match in 1/3 of cases. The voter registration and updates to the voter lists remained a persistent problem. In terms of the performance of the EMB, the election missions issued similar recommendations for all electoral cycles since 2000 (EU EOM Sri Lanka 2004: 3-49; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2005: 28-33; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2010: 10-11).

Both 2015 elections – parliamentary and presidential, were considered successful due to strong leadership by the election commission, which was well-resourced (staff) and institutionally strong. Some inefficiencies occurred at the polling sides, and there were cases of the lack of compliance with electoral law (IFES 2016: 1-3; Commonwealth 2015: 13-16; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2015: 10- 11). The EMB accomplished the technical preparations within operational timelines, procedures mainly followed, thanks to the professional conduct of the electoral officers. The training of polling officers on electoral layout, to ensure full secrecy of the vote would be beneficial (Commonwealth 2015: 13-16; PAFFREL 2014: 1; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2015: 11; CPA(a) 2015).

4 The cluster stations are the polling places set up in the areas controlled by Sri Lanka army, close to the ‘no man’s land’. The purpose was to grant the voters in the LTTE controlled areas an opportunity to vote. 113

Figure 18: Sri Lanka - EMB Capacity Score (detailed)

Information EMB distribution to Performance EMB capacity independence Public Election year the citizens / of election total score and scrutiny voter authorities impartiality education 1982 2 2 3 2 45 1988 3 2 3 2 50 1989 3 2 3 2 50 1994 3 2 3 2 50 1994 3 2 3 2 50 1999 2 2 3 3 50 2000 2 2 2 3 45 2001 2 2 2 3 45 2004 3 3 2 3 55 2005 3 3 3 3 60 2010 4 3 3 3 65 2010 4 3 3 3 65 2015 4 3 3 3 65 2015 4 3 3 3 65

5.7.3 Public perceptions: trusted EMB despite widespread allegations of fraud Since the 1980s, the elections were marred by electoral violations, abuses, and severe fraud allegations, notably the impersonation of voters, vote-rigging, and numerous instances of voter intimidation (Samarasinghe 1989: 133; NDI 2000: 7). There has been a broad public perception that members and officials of the government were benefiting from the misuse of state resources and corrupted financial practices (IPU 1994; Samarasinghe 1994: 1023). International observers also alleged the severe violations during the 1999 election where United National Party (UNP) accused governing People’s Alliance of electoral violence and harassment of the voters. Political party and civil society representatives also accused several Members of Parliament of implication in well-documented cases of fraud and violence (NDI 2000: 12). CMEV, as well as opposition parties, alleged intimidation, and violence in nearly half of the country (Karatnycky 2002: 554- 558).

The 2004 elections saw fewer complaints about the abuse of state resources. However, major controversy emerged regarding the imbalanced media reporting. EU and domestic observers reported widespread impersonation and multiple voting in the cluster stations (EU EOM Sri Lanka 114

2004: 2). The opposition also alleged fraud by the ruling coalition during the 2010 parliamentary elections (CBC News 2010; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2004: 22). The electorate lodged approximately 240 complaints regarding the alleged fraud and irregularities, several requiring re-polling (EU EOM Sri Lanka 2004: 26-27). The election observers and advocacy groups further questioned the fundamental fairness of the 2010 campaign, due to the widespread misuse of state resources (Polgreen 2010; Sify News Desk 2010; LiveMint 2010; Puddington and Piano (eds.) 2011: 625- 633; Commonwealth 2010: 14-15). Similarly, the 2015 parliamentary elections were alleged to be marred by gross levels of corruption that manifested itself through vote-buying and abuse of state resources. Observers reported 1,200 government officials involved in campaigning (TI 2015: 4; Ellena et al. 2016: 9; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2015: 3). The fraud was also reported in the 2015 Presidential election, however, allegedly not to the level of the worst predictions (The Guardian 2015). PAFFREL reported 147 violations related to the abuse of state resources (Commonwealth 2015: 9).

Despite of the above, electoral administration of Sri Lanka has generally enjoyed high confidence of the electorate, notably thanks to the personality of the CE that improved after 1982 electoral process (CPA 2011). The confidence further increased towards the most recent electoral cycles. In 2011, 45 – 65% of the population trusted the electoral administration (CPA 2011: 42). The confidence decreased to 8.7 - 33% between the electoral cycles (CPA 2013: 26) and increased towards the 2015 elections (17.2 – 45.1%) (CPA 2015: 31). Right before the 2015 elections, 61 – 67% of the population trusted the electoral administration to deliver a ‘free and fair’ election (CPA 2015b).

5.7.4 Electoral violence: outbreaks Sri Lankan electoral process has also been marred by continuous outbreaks of political violence, stemming from ethnic division and periods of active insurgency. Between 1980 and 1989 the country was plagued by deadly political and electoral violence in almost all regions. The 1989 presidential elections were considered the most violent in Sri Lanka’s history back then. The death toll reached the thousands. The LTTE threatened to kill every first five voters coming to vote in the areas under their control. The violence impacted proportionally the political participation (Samarasinghe 1989: 131; Hyde and Marinov 2012). 115

While the 1994 election day was relatively peaceful, 24 people died during the pre-electoral period. Overall, 1.600 incidents and 21 campaign-related killings were reported nation-wide (IPU 1994; Samarasinghe 1989: 1023; Asia Foundation 2017(a): 161 -162). In 1999 election, the LTTE attacked pre-electoral rallies of both main candidates targeting Tamil opponents and Sri Lankan government. Violence between the Tamil minority and Sinhalese majority increased significantly into the form of riots. At least eight people died during the 1999 presidential election (NDI 2000: 5; Asia Foundation 2017(a): 161 -162).

As a result of intense fighting during the 2000 and 2001 election, 73 and 83 people respectively lost their lives in the election-related violence. Violent clashes among opposition factions marred the campaign periods. Both main parties were responsible for the violence spread due to the lack of enforcement of the rule of law. Nearly 200 cases of severe electoral violence were reported in each of the electoral cycle (Asia Foundation 2017(a): 161 -162; IPU 2001; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2004: 1-23; CMEV 2015).

Following the signature of the ceasefire, the 2004 and 2005 elections became more peaceful. The 2004 electoral campaign, however, led to five people murdered and 15 seriously injured. The level of violence increased as election day approached - four people lost their lives. The number of incidents reached nearly 2.000 but majority were considered minor incidents. The violence originated primarily with the LTTE and became more localized. It was seen to intimidate Tamil voters. While the 2005 elections saw an increased level of violence on the election day, there were overall fewer incidents during the process than in 2004. The campaign was said to be most peaceful in the then Sri Lanka history. CMEV recorded overall 484 incidents during the campaign and 272 during the election day. Several people were injured, and four people killed in a mosque bombing. It was not clear whether the incident was related to election, however, NELDA dataset indicates election-related killing (EU EOM Sri Lanka 2004: 19 – 29; Asia Foundation 2017(a): 161-162; EU EOM Sri Lanka 2005: 2-28, CMEV 2015; PAFFREL 2014; Hydea and Marinov 2012; BBC News 2015).

116

Instances of electoral violence further decreased in the 2010 electoral cycle. Over 800 incidents, out of which 55% classified as major, were however reported; five persons died during the campaign period related to the 2010 Presidential election and one person related to the general election. Commonwealth observers reported 108 instances of threat and intimidation (Commonwealth 2010: 15-25; Puddington and Piano (eds.) 2011: 625-633; CMEV 2015). The 2015 presidential election also saw significant instances of violence. Forty people were killed in the process (PAFFREL 2014: 2-3; Commonwealth 2015: 10). On the contrary, the 2015 parliamentary elections were reportedly the most peaceful and efficiently conducted in Sri Lanka’s history. Campaign environment was relatively peaceful, however, with several instances resulted in five deaths, cases of assault and arson. The incidents were, however, isolated. Election day equally saw increased incidences of intimidation and virtual boycott enforced by LTTE aiming to exercise control and influence (EU EOM 2015: 2-29; CMEV 2015).

117 Figure 18: Sri Lanka – all data

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS POLITICAL - ELECTORAL DYNAMICS systemic Type of CIVPOL loser opposition electoral state suffrage genuine periodic manipulati vote buying strategies election rights consent role system legitimacy on 1982 2 3 2 1 10 0 1.6 0 77 0.75 5 2.5 1988 2 2 3 1 7 1 1.5 0 90 1 5 2.17 1989 1 2 4 0 7 1 1.5 0 70 1 4 2.33 1994 1 2 4 1 8 0 1.75 0 70 1 4 3.17 1994 2 2 4 1 8 0 1.75 0 70 1 5 3.17 1999 2 2 3 0 8 0 1.59 1 70 1 5 2.5 2000 1 2 3 1 8 0 1.53 0 90 1 4 2.67 2001 1 2 3 1 7 0 1.32 0 70 1 4 3 2004 1 4 3 0 8 0 1.6 0 70 1 4 2.83 2005 2 4 3 0 8 0 1.55 0 90 0.75 5 2.36 2010 2 3 4 0 9 0 1.68 0 90 0 5 2.25 2010 1 3 4 1 9 0 1.68 0 70 0 4 2.25 2015 2 3 5 1 6 0 2.12 0 95 1 5 3.2 2015 1 3 5 1 6 0 2.12 0 95 1 4 3.2

5.8. Verification and summary conclusions The below dataset reflects the information collected through the existing reliable datasets and additional analysis. As the established datasets used (as described in the Chapter Three) are reliable and verified, we do not describe all the data in the dataset presented in this dissertation. The above analysis reflects only on the information analyzed by the author and converted into quantifiable data, notably on the universal suffrage and adherence to civil and political rights; public perception, and electoral violence. The chapter provides an overview of the main issues faced by South Asian elections. See Annex III for the full dataset.

We have faced significant challenges in the availability of documents to conduct a thorough analysis of all elections in the region from the 1980s until 2017 to complement the datasets. It has proved very difficult to find documents that would provide data that can be standardized and notably on some parts of the electoral cycle, the reliable data were not available. To enhance the credibility of the data presented in this dissertation and test their reliability, we conduct two cross- data tests below.

5.8.1. Test 1: Correlation between universal suffrage and genuine elections Genuine elections indicator reflects upon the free participation in the electoral process, and it is a standard Freedom House dataset scaled one (1) for the best situation to seven (7) for the worst situation. We set up our dataset for the universal suffrage indicator. The universal suffrage measures the right to vote and stand in elections on the scale one (1) - suffrage well established de jure and de facto, to five (5) - suffrage established neither in the law nor in practice. The restriction of participation is expected to go hand-in-hand with impact on the universal suffrage; therefore, the two indicators should correlate.

The basic correlation between the two variables – genuine and suffrage – reveals that the Pearson’s correlation coefficient reaches the value of 0.531, which indicates a high degree of correlation between the two variables (De Vaus 2002). The below graph equally shows the strong correlation between the majority of the cases. The small discrepancy only emerges in the case of Sri Lanka. This discrepancy results from the established strong universal suffrage tradition in the country. The universal suffrage was only affected by the conflict and related lack of voters' access to the 120

electoral process. Unlike in other cases, it was not affected by the fluctuations in political freedoms that affect the genuine election indicator. The correlation test hence supports our analysis.

Figure 20: Correlation between universal suffrage and genuine elections (Pearson’s R, IBM SPSS Statistics)

Figure 21: Correlation between universal suffrage and genuine elections

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1988 2005 2010 1981 1986 1996 2001 2014 2008 1980 1989 1996 1999 2009 1981 1991 1999 2013 1985 1990 1997 2008 1982 1989 1994 2000 2004 2010 2015 Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka

Suffrage Genuine

5.8.2 Test 2: Correlation between EMB quality dataset and PEI dataset Perception of Electoral Integrity (PEI) dataset provides reliable public perception data on the quality of electoral administration, however, only between 2012 and 2015. The author has used similar questions as per the dataset, nevertheless, attempted not to base the assessment on public

121

perception but actual information about the functioning of the EMB. Electoral experts represent the PEI respondents; therefore, their assessment should be generally accurate and hence similar to the dataset established by the author. As such, the two datasets should correlate.

Relationship between the two datasets indicates a nearly perfect correlation coefficient of 0.922 (De Vaus 2002). The only deviation emerges in the case of 2013 elections in Pakistan where author evaluates EMB performance at 50 and PEI at 68.2. The decreased mark by the author is attributed to the restriction of observers to the tabulation process and generally not meeting a full transparency measure. The closeness of the number yet again confirms the validity of our analysis.

Figure 22: Our data for EMB capacity vs. PEI data for EMB capacity

ID EMB_author EMB_PEI* AFG2014 40.0 41.0 BNG2014 45.0 50.3 BHU2013 80.0 79.3 IND2014 80.0 80.1 NEP2013 75.0 75.4 PAK2013 50.0 68.2 SRL20151 65.0 68.0 SRL20152 65.0 67.0 * Norris et al. 2013; Norris et al. 2014; Norris et al. 2015.

Figure 23: Correlation between our EMB capacity dataset and PEI dataset (Pearson’s R, IBM SPSS Statistics)

122

Figure 24: Correlation between author’s EMB capacity dataset and PEI dataset

90.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 AFG2014 BNG2014 BHU2013 IND2014 NEP2013 PAK2013 SRL20151 SRL20152

EMB_author EMB_PEI

The analysis shows a diverse degree of democratic development throughout the region as well as different levels of development in the electoral administrations. All countries demonstrate an improving trend in managing the electoral processes, to a certain degree. Except for Bhutan, and in no small degree, India, all countries in the region face a problem of electoral fraud and in numerous instances diminished confidence in the electoral institutions.

5.8.3 Dataset for electoral violence In this chapter, we also establish the data for electoral violence, using three different datasets. The NELDA established dataset distinguishes between occurrence and non-occurrence of electoral violence; yes (1) is coded if at least one election-related death occurs. Nevertheless, in a few instances (Afghanistan 2004; India 1980; Nepal 2013 and 2017; Pakistan 1997; and Sri Lanka 2004, 2010 both elections and 2015 parliamentary election), we corrected the NELDA coding according to this formula changing the scoring from zero (0) (no election-related death) to one (1). Based on NELDA coder’s description, the elections experienced less violence than anticipated, but some deaths occurred. Alternatively, the author’s sources suggest that election-related deaths occurred, contrary to the NELDA’s coding. In the case of NELDA coding, we follow a simple logic – election death occurred, yes or no. We do not aim to factor in improvements comparing to previous elections or levels of violence (the dataset displays the amended numbers in bold). 123

Figure 25: Full electoral violence dataset (dependent variable)

Occurrence of Intensity of Impact of electoral electoral electoral violence violence violence (NELDA) Afghanistan 1988 1 3 N/A 2004 1 3 3 2005 1 3 3 2009 1 3 3 2010 1 3 3 2014 1 3 3 Bangladesh 1981 0 1 1 1986 1 3 3 1986 1 3 3 1991 1 3 3 1996 1 3 3 1996 1 3 3 2001 1 3 3 2008 1 3 3 2014 1 3 3 Bhutan 2007 0 0 0 2008 0 0 0 2013 0 0 0 India 1980 1 1 2 1984 1 2 3 1989 1 2 3 1991 1 2 3 1996 1 2 3 1998 1 2 3 1999 1 2 3 2004 1 2 3 2009 1 2 3 2014 1 2 3 Nepal 1981 1 1 2 1986 1 1 2 1991 0 1 3 1994 0 1 2 1999 1 1 2 2008 1 2 2 2013 1 1 2 2017 1 2 2 Pakistan 1985 1 1 2 1988 0 0 0 1990 1 3 3 1993 1 2 2 1997 1 1 2 2002 1 2 3 124

2008 1 3 3 2013 1 3 3 Sri Lanka 1982 1 3 3 1988 1 3 3 1989 1 3 3 1994 1 3 3 1994 1 3 3 1999 1 3 3 2000 1 3 3 2001 1 3 3 2004 1 2 3 2005 1 3 2 2010 1 3 2 2010 1 3 2 2015 1 3 3 2015 1 1 2

The levels of violence are factored in the additional two datasets. Firstly, we measure the intensity of violence – no violence, isolated incidents, disturbance (more systematic incidents but not occurring on a large or national scale) and riots (massive large-scale electoral violence). In the second dataset, we distinguish the impact, mainly in terms of death. The dataset distinguishes between no violence, violence without deaths, 1-5 cases of deaths as a result of electoral violence and situations resulting in over five (5) deaths. The dataset could not distinguish further between the numbers of deaths due to the absence of systematic, verified, and reliable electoral violence data. Distinguishing further beyond less than five (5) or more than five death could jeopardize the credibility of the data.

The research indicates that electoral violence is widespread in all the countries in the region except for Bhutan. However, in each of the countries, the underlining cause differs. The electoral violence stems from the situation of active insurgency to sectarian politics, criminalization of elections, deeply rooted rivalries between political opponents and ethnic and religious divisions. The intensity levels vary throughout the countries – India and Nepal, despite significant electoral violence cases, score better in terms of intensity. Nepal also has a moderate record regarding the election-related deaths comparing to other countries in the region.

125

The next chapter analyses how different dimensions of electoral integrity impact on the propensity of electoral violence and its levels.

126

PART III: ANALYSIS

6. Chapter Five: Does electoral integrity influences the propensity of electoral violence? In this section, the dissertation assesses how electoral integrity and its dimensions influence the occurrence, intensity, and impact of the electoral violence. Based on our hypothesis, established through a thorough study of electoral integrity and violence, the correlation between overall electoral integrity and electoral violence appears imminent. Furthermore, the hypothesis suggests that structural factors and public perceptions have a stronger impact on the occurrence, intensity, and impact of electoral violence. The hypothesis also suggests that India, the country with the most robust tradition of democracy but at the same time, significant levels of electoral violence, would likely decrease the overall indicative value of the models. Notably, that is as it defies the standard models of established democracies on the one hand and countries with significant levels of electoral violence on the other. In this chapter, we conduct quantitative analysis to confirm or reject the established hypothesis and to examine the critical reasons for the occurrence and levels of electoral violence.

6.1. Correlation between electoral integrity and electoral violence To anchor the analysis, we first explore the relationship between electoral integrity and electoral violence. As explained earlier, it may be challenging to establish casualty between the two phenomena, mainly due to the overlapping causes, indicating a potential problem of reversed casualty. For example, while the occurrence of fraud may lead to electoral violence, specifically harassment, intimation, and beyond, electoral violence is an ultimate type of electoral fraud. As such, violence influences electoral integrity. The correlation shows that there may be a relationship between the two phenomena, but it does not establish causal relations. The following part examines the overall correlation between integrity and violence, followed by the examination, which dimensions and sub-dimensions of electoral integrity have the most prominent relationship vis-à- vis electoral violence.

127

Firstly, we test the correlation between overall electoral integrity and electoral violence. For that test, we use the Perception of electoral integrity index (PEI) (Norris et al. 2013). At the time of writing this dissertation, however, the dataset was only available for the period between 2013 and 2017. As a result, the dataset includes only nine elections. It is worth reiterating that given the PEI bases its analysis in the questionnaires shared with electoral experts and administrators, not the general public, and therefore it is not treated as perceptional by this dissertation.

The test has demonstrated a significant negative correlation between overall electoral integrity and electoral violence. The lower the electoral integrity index, the higher the instances of occurrence of electoral violence, its intensity, and impact. The statistical significance of the data sample, however, remains low provided that the sample only includes nine examples in the region. The result, therefore, serves only as a test of hypothesis established based on the literature research. The test confirms that there is a relationship between electoral integrity and electoral violence.

Figure 26: Basic correlation (Pearson’s R) between PEI index and electoral violence Pearson’s R / Correlation Interpretation (de Data Correlates with coefficient (above Vaus) 0.3 only) Occurrence of EV - .601 Strong / very strong PEI Index EV Intensity - .587 Strong / very strong EV Impact - .514 Strong / very strong

We conduct further correlation tests inputting each sub-dimension of electoral integrity into the correlation with occurrence, intensity, and impact of the electoral violence. We then check each correlation pair of variables for any significance in their relationship. The simple correlations using Pearson’s R coefficient shows that there is an important to a strong relationship between electoral violence and at least one indicator in each dimension of electoral integrity, except for mitigation factors. Most of the sub-dimensions correlate at the low/moderate levels.

The dataset indicates some degree of correlation for universal suffrage and impact of electoral violence with Pearson’s R coefficient at - .308 / 9.5%. The direction of correlation is, however, at odds with the general research. It suggests that the increase in values of the electoral violence 128

correlates with the decrease in the value in universal suffrage. The decrease in universal suffrage value in the dataset indicates the improvement in the right to vote and stand in the electoral process. In other words, the negative correlation would suggest that the number of deaths resulting from electoral violence increases when universal suffrage improves. The significance of the relationship was, however, calculated at 0.20, which indicate a lower degree of significance (p > .05).

The stronger correlation appears in the relationship of vote-buying with the occurrence, and the impact of electoral violence. The higher value of vote-buying in the dataset signifies the lower numbers of such instances. In case of occurrence of violence, the correlation would mean the relationship between the lower level of vote-buying and the occurrence of electoral violence. This relationship appears not very significant (p = .19). On the contrary, there is a negative correlation between vote-buying and the impact of electoral violence. The relationship indicates that the increase in vote-buying correlates with the increased number of deaths resulting from electoral violence. This relation appears to be statistically more significant (p = .04). There is also a significant relation (p= .012) between loser consent and impact of electoral violence. The general acceptance of the results, i.e., no disturbing riots and coup d’états after the election, decreases the impact of electoral violence, with the 11% variance of the data (Pearson’s R = .332).

The test, however, identifies further a significant correlation (p= .019) between the intensity of electoral violence and the EMB capacity. Lower the EMB capacity, the higher the intensity of electoral violence (Pearson’s R at - .308 with 9.48% variance of the data).

The analysis found moderate to strong correlation in three indicators of the structural factors dimension of electoral integrity: ethnic and political division, conflict/civil war, and the regime type. Part of the correlation, however, seems at odds with the previous research. The ethnic/political division indicator grows with a higher degree of ethnic fractionalization. The correlation coefficient with the intensity of electoral violence is negative, which would mean that the lower intensity of electoral violence would correlate with the higher ethnic fractionalization. The results, quite significant (p = .007), must be given a specific interpretation.

129

India, which has the highest level of ethnic/political fractionalization in the region, despite the impact of violence is quite high. In the dataset, we classify the intensity of electoral violence at the lower levels, given it only appear in specific states but not the entire territory. Similar would be the case of Nepal with relatively high ethnic fractionalization index but the low intensity of electoral violence. Bhutan, with the relatively high level of ethnic/political division compared to the region, evinces no occurrence of electoral violence. On the contrary, Bangladesh or Sri Lanka, which have the lowest index of ethnic/political fractionalization in the region demonstrate high levels of electoral violence intensity. As such, we note that ethnic/political fractionalization may not offer a convincing explanation for the overall electoral violence in South Asia.

Similar deems valid for the regime type. The correlation (Pearson’s R at .346) with high significance (p = .008) is in positive numbers meaning that the increase in regime score, i.e., the movement towards democracy would signalize the increase in the impact of electoral violence. The explanation again lies with the reality of the region. The impact of electoral violence is high in most of the countries except Bhutan. India, with the highest regime type score, has a high number of election-related deaths. Bhutan at the same time, with the low regime scores, evinces no instances of election-related deaths. The specific dynamic of these particular two countries appears to have a significant influence on the dataset.

The ongoing civil war/conflict, in particular, the number of ongoing conflicts, seem, on the contrary, to have a strong impact on the occurrence of electoral violence and its impact. The correlation coefficients are at .334 and .465 with a strong significance p = .010 and p = .000 respectively. The increase in the number of conflicts leads to the increase of occurrence of electoral violence and the numbers of related casualties. Naturally, this stems from the ongoing insurgency and frequent violent interference in the electoral process by anti-government elements and the availability of the weapons. It is important to note, however, that despite efforts to establish the dataset with casualties only related to the electoral process, it may be challenging to distinguish between the casualties resulting from the conflict itself. As such, we must consider the margin of error.

130

Lastly, the strongest correlation appeared in the relation between the perception of fraud and the intensity of electoral violence (Pearson’s R at .504 signalizing strong or very strong correlation, significance at P = .000). The perception of fraud in the electoral process increases the intensity of electoral violence.

No significant correlation appears in the relation between the UNDP/UN technical electoral assistance and the mitigation measures in the region with the occurrence, intensity, and levels of electoral violence. The explanation is mainly that the provision of the UN electoral assistance in the region has been directed primarily to the countries with the ongoing insurgency. The conflict – violence pattern prevails over the assistance/mitigation – violence relation.

Figure 27: Basic correlation (Pearson’s R) between dimensions of electoral integrity and electoral violence Dimension of Sub-dimension / Correlates with Pearson’s RR / Interpretation (de electoral integrity indicator of EI Correlation Vaus) (EI) coefficient (above 0.3 only) Occurrence of EV - .208 Low / moderate Universal suffrage EV Intensity - .105 Low / moderate EV Impact - .308 / 9.5% Moderate / strong Occurrence of EV - .121 Low / moderate Genuine EV Intensity .079 Negligible / none International EV Impact .217 Low / moderate standards Occurrence of EV .252 Low / moderate Periodic EV Intensity .149 Low / moderate EV Impact .197 Low / moderate Occurrence of EV .106 Low / moderate Civil and political EV Intensity .062 Negligible / none rights EV Impact .106 Low / moderate Occurrence of EV .114 Low / moderate Systemic EV Intensity .199 Low / moderate manipulation EV Impact .188 Low / moderate Occurrence of EV .302 / 9.12% Moderate / strong Vote buying EV Intensity - .173 Low / moderate EV Impact -.378 / 14.28% Moderate / strong Loser consent / Occurrence of EV .229 Low / moderate Political – electoral acceptance of EV Intensity .249 Low / moderate dynamics results EV Impact .332 / 11% Moderate / strong Occurrence of EV .100 Low / moderate Opposition role EV Intensity .051 Negligible / none EV Impact .100 Low / moderate Occurrence of EV .173 Low / moderate Strategies of ruling EV Intensity .270 Low / moderate party EV Impact .151 Low / moderate 131

Electoral Occurrence of EV -.053 Negligible / none system/stakes EV Intensity .020 Negligible / none involved EV Impact .000 Negligible / none Occurrence of EV - .040 Negligible / none State legitimacy EV Intensity .251 Low / moderate EV Impact .078 Negligible / none Occurrence of EV - .151 Low / moderate EMB capacity EV Intensity - .308 Moderate / strong Public sector EV Impact - .110 Low / moderate management Occurrence of EV - .107 Low / moderate Malpractice EV Intensity - .221 Low / moderate EV Impact - .124 Low / moderate Occurrence of EV - .017 Negligible / none Ethnic / political EV Intensity - .348 / 12.11% Moderate / strong division EV Impact - .047 Negligible / none Occurrence of EV .193 Low / moderate Poverty / economic EV Intensity .238 Low / moderate development (HDI) EV Impact .105 Low / moderate Poverty / economic Occurrence of EV .193 Low / moderate development EV Intensity .238 Low / moderate (growth – crisis) EV Impact .105 Low / moderate Structural factors Occurrence of EV .334 / 11.2% Moderate / strong Conflict / civil war EV Intensity .265 Low / moderate EV Impact .462 / 21.3% Moderate / strong Occurrence of EV - .162 Low / moderate Transition EV Intensity - .142 Low / moderate EV Impact - .188 Low / moderate Occurrence of EV .287 Low / moderate Regime type EV Intensity .168 Low / moderate EV Impact .346 Moderate / strong Occurrence of EV .109 Low / moderate Observer reports EV Intensity .241 Low / moderate EV Impact .220 Low / moderate Occurrence of EV .129 Low / moderate International EV Intensity .257 Low / moderate observer reports EV Impact .166 Low / moderate Occurrence of EV .192 Low / moderate Public perception Allegations of fraud EV Intensity .504 / 25.4% Strong / very strong EV Impact .262 Low / moderate Occurrence of EV - .109 Low / moderate Confidence in the EV Intensity - .241 Low / moderate process EV Impact - .030 Negligible / none Occurrence of EV - .076 Negligible / none Confidence in EV Intensity - .180 Low / moderate electoral institutions EV Impact - 060 Negligible / none Occurrence of EV - 162 Low / moderate UN electoral EV Intensity - 0.17 Negligible / none assistance EV Impact - .188 Low / moderate Mitigation Occurrence of EV .199 Low / moderate Mitigation EV Intensity .203 Low / moderate techniques EV Impact .031 Negligible / none Note: Descriptive statistics – cross tab – correlation ran by the IBM SPSS Statistics. Interpretation: De Vauss’ (2002) correlation in social sciences. 132

In addition to underlining the most reliable indicators, overall analysis shows that there is a various degree of correlation between individual dimensions of electoral integrity and electoral violence. Most cases evince low to moderate correlation, noting that according to de Vauss (2002) every relationship in social sciences scoring above .2 may be somehow significant (the output passes the low correlation and moves towards the moderate relationship). To draw some preliminary conclusions on each dimension of electoral integrity, we examine the percentage of cases that correlate above .2. The analysis is also indispensable for building the models for the logistic regression analysis conducted in the next chapter.

We find the highest percentage of the moderate to significant correlation in the structural factors dimension (44%), followed by political – electoral dynamics, international standards and public sector management (all at 38%). Surprisingly, the public perceptions sub-dimension, that evinced the strongest correlations in one of its indicators – the perception of fraud, only demonstrates the moderate relations of other variables with electoral violence in 20% of the cases. In case of mitigation measures, there is a low correlation overall - moderate and higher relation with electoral violence only in 16% of the cases.

To sum up, the correlation test supports, at least partially, the hypotheses established earlier. Firstly, the correlation appears to exist between electoral integrity and violence, which we demonstrated on the test of the relationship between PEI and electoral violence datasets. Secondly, sub-dimensions of electoral integrity classified as structural factors evinced the most robust correlation result with electoral violence. Specific public perceptions indicator, electoral fraud, demonstrates the strongest correlation but the correlation of the overall dataset remains low. Thirdly, several cases demonstrate a dynamic at odds with the previous research into the examination of factors influencing the electoral violence. The analysis shows that the most substantial factor causing its deviation is India’s advanced democratic development and, at the same time, significant levels of electoral violence, which is not usual in the electoral violence discourse (UNDP 2009; Norris et al. 2015).

133

6.2. Impact of different dimensions of electoral integrity on electoral violence To expand the research and discover links between electoral integrity and electoral violence and their strength, we use the Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) method. The method allows discovering the influence of each independent variable – indicators of electoral integrity, on the dependent variable - electoral violence. As noted earlier, the dissertation does not only focus on the mere occurrence of electoral violence but also assesses the influence on its intensity and impact. As such, three datasets with different dependent variable are assessed using this method. As noted in the methodology chapter, the classical MLR can be only conducted if specific criteria are met: (i) Variables are measured at the interval scale. Non-interval variables are dichotomous. (ii) Multicollinearity is avoided. (iii) There should be no outline values in the data. (iv) There is linearity in the data. (v) The values are 'normally' distributed. (vi) There is some homoscedasticity in the data, i.e., there is a similar variance in the data (De Vauss 2002: 343 – 344; Mareš et al. 2015: 353 – 374). We conduct the method-fit test.

The condition of the interval scale of the variables is confirmed. The data include dichotomous variables (simple yes–no answers) and interval variables measured on the scale. The only exception is the electoral system/stake involved where scale has no indicative value. The variable is nominal – we assign a random number to each type of system. One nominal variable, however, is not too much a problem. If the regime type/stakes involved variable evinces some importance, the value would be interpreted simply as having some effect on electoral violence.

As Figure 26 shows, the basic correlation test that has confirmed a link between some of the variables. Naturally, following also a simple qualitative assessment, the independent variables, to some extent, correlate among each other. For example, the regime type variable is based on the Polity IV scores, which also considers political competition (Marshall et al. 2014). As such, there is a natural correlation between the opposition role, strategies of the ruling party, and the regime type variables. Similarly, EMB capacity considers the performance of the electoral institutions, while malpractice variable reflects the election-day irregularities. The EMB scoring also includes these irregularities, which may lead to correlation.

134

Similarly, the EMB performance would, in some instances, influence the trust in the electoral administration. Allegations of fraud generally correlate with confidence in the electoral process. The higher the public perception that fraud is being committed in the electoral process, the lower the confidence. The international standard indicators are usually also highly correlated, as political freedoms often go hand-in-hand with civil liberties (Freedom House). As such, the absence of multicollinearity criteria is not met.

The linearity, outliner values, and homoscedasticity tests are conducted using the scatter dot graphs (see below). These tests are conducted for each dependent variable separately, followed by regression analysis of the importance of each of the dependent variables.

6.2.1. Impact of electoral integrity indicators on the occurrence of electoral violence The correlation test has shown that the impact of individual integrity indicators on the occurrence of electoral violence would be likely the lowest. It is because the electoral violence occurs in all the countries in the region, except for Bhutan. That is despite a significant political, cultural, and developmental diversity, in each of the South Asian countries. Overall, electoral violence occurs in 51 out of 58 cases in the dataset (87.9%). As described earlier, the occurrence of electoral violence is also caused by very diverse factors in each of the analyzed countries. The below graphs indicate that there is no strong linearity in all the relationships between the independent variables – indicators of electoral integrity, and the dependent variable – electoral violence, although, in some case, not very strong. The relationship between the dependent variable that only has two values (occurrence of electoral violence – yes or no) and dichotomous independent variables is particularly problematic as it places the values on the far ends of the regression line. This issue also affects the requirement of homoscedasticity.

The below graphs establish the regression line to assess the linearity of the relationship between independent variables and the occurrence of electoral violence. Due to the above-stated reasoning related to the electoral violence in the region, the model shows some outliner values. They are, however, different types of cases in each aspect of electoral integrity. Most recurrent would be Bhutan (all elections), 1980 India, 1981 Bangladesh, and 2004 Afghanistan. Since not recurrent in each of the models, we cannot eliminate the outliner data. 135

Figure 28: Linearity test - relationship between electoral integrity indicators and occurrence of electoral violence

Graph 1: Universal suffrage – Occurrence of violence Graph 2: Genuine – Occurrence of violence

Graph 3: Periodic – Occurrence of violence Graph 4: Genuine – Occurrence of violence

Graph 5: Systemic Manipulation – Occurrence of violence Graph 6: Vote buying – Occurrence of violence

136

Graph 7: Loser consent – Occurrence of violence Graph 8: Opposition role – Occurrence of violence

Graph 9: Strategies of ruling party – Occurrence of violence Graph 10: Electoral system – Occurrence of violence

Graph 11: State legitimacy – Occurrence of violence Graph 12: EMB capacity – Occurrence of violence

137

Graph 13: Malpractice – Occurrence of violence Graph 14: Ethnic / political division – Occurrence of violence

Graph 15: Human Development Index – Occurrence of violence Graph 16: Growth/Crisis – Occurrence of violence [Economic development 1] [Economic development 2]

Graph 17: Conflict/war – Occurrence of violence Graph 18: Growth/Crisis – Occurrence of violence

138

Graph 19: Regime type – Occurrence of violence Graph 20: Observer reports – Occurrence of violence

Graph 21: International Observer Reports – Occurrence of violence Graph 22: Allegations of fraud – Occurrence of violence

Graph 23: Confidence in process – Occurrence of violence Graph 24: Confidence in EMBs – Occurrence of violence

139

Graph 25: UNDP programmes – Occurrence of violence Graph 26: Mitigation techniques – Occurrence of violence

As such, the test does not meet the conditions for MLR using a simple ‘enter’ or ‘blocs’ method. The dissertation aims at assessing, which indicators have the strongest influence on the propensity of electoral violence in the region. Therefore, the linear MLR using a ‘stepwise’ method appears the most appropriate. It is essential to point out that the ‘stepwise’ method requires at least 40 cases per variable. The dataset includes 58 cases (N=58) of elections in seven countries, therefore fulfills this requirement and can be used (Mareš et al. 2015: 357).

The ‘stepwise’ method helps to identify the best possible model for analysis. The method only identifies the independent variables that are statistically significant and entering them in the model in steps. As such, it discovers, which indicators would be the most significant. Each step adds one independent variable (Mareš et al. 2015: 353 – 374). As such, the model helps to identify the critical individual integrity aspects impacting the propensity of occurrence of electoral violence, which has been among the main goals of this dissertation.

For the occurrence of electoral violence, the MLR stepwise method includes only five out of 26 independent variables in the equation. These variables would be, therefore, statistically important: (i) conflict / war; (ii) vote-buying; (iii) looser consent / acceptance of results; (iv) Ethnic / political division; and (v) periodic election; (vi) EMB capacity. The variables are entered in the model in steps, adding one variable at each step. The Model Summary shows that in the sixth step when all 140

variables are inputted, the prediction value of the model would be R2 = .514, meaning that these six indicators could roughly explain the occurrence of the electoral violence in 51.4%. The other indicators are responsible for the remaining 48.6% of predictions related to electoral violence.

Figure 29: Model Summary, MLR (Stepwise)

The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test also shows a strong statistical significance of the entered data (F >1; Sig. <0.05).

Figure 30: ANOVA test, relevance and significance of the model

141

The variable entered in the model already in the first step demonstrates the most significant impact on the occurrence of electoral violence. The independent variable measures a number of ongoing conflicts in the country, including civil, inter-state, and other types of the conflict. Model 1 indicates that the increase in a number of conflicts by one unit would lead to an increase in the propensity of occurrence of electoral violence by 0.571.

All the independent and dependent variables have been re-calculated on the scale zero (0) to one (1), to allow for a better presentation (See Annex IV). One unit in this scale means the occurrence of five or more conflicts. The below regression equation demonstrates that the occurrence of electoral violence is 1.127 times more likely in case the country faces five or more ongoing conflicts. The likelihood of occurrence of violence is 0.67 times more likely in the country with one conflict compared to the country with none. According to the R2 value, the number of conflicts could explain 17.8% of all occurrences of electoral violence in the region.

EV = 0.556 + (0.571 x 1[five+ conflicts]) EV = 0.556 + (0.571 x 0.2 [one conflict])

The second independent variable entered in the dataset is vote-buying. The prediction value of the entire model immediately increases, indicating that the existence of conflict and instances of vote- buying explain 29% of occurrences of electoral violence (R2 = 0.29).

The third model adds the ethnic/political division variable. The predictability of the model increases to R2 = .351, meaning that the three variables inputted can explain the occurrence of electoral violence in 35.1% percent of the cases. The significance of the electoral system variable in the model is, however, slightly lower at .027. The conflict/civil war variable reaches slightly lower value than in the Model 2 (1.300 as opposed to 1.483). The importance of vote-buying indicator decreases significantly to 0.941 comparing to 2.026 in the previous model.

EV = 0.727 + (0.573 * 1) = 1.300 (conflict/war) EV = 0.727 + ((- 0.214) *1) = 0.513 (vote-buying) EV = 0.727 + (-0.569*1) = 0.158 (ethnic/political division) 142

The coefficient for ethnic/political division is in the negative numbers, therefore indicates that the decrease in ethnic fractionalization index would lead to an increase in the occurrence of electoral violence. That seems at odds with the ongoing academic research and would require qualitative observation.

The fourth and fifth models add loser consent/acceptance of the results and periodicity of elections respectively into the equation. The entries increase the significance of electoral system/stakes involved variable - the prediction value of the variables increases to 46%.

Finally, the last variable entered into the equation is the EMB capacity. The model’s predictability is established at 0.514, indicating that these six variables in the dataset can explain the occurrence of electoral violence in roughly 51.4%. The other causes would explain the remaining cases. The table below shows the overall impact of the six variables on the occurrence of electoral violence. Since we now have all the variables in the equation, it is worth interpreting the entire model.

EV = 0.831 + (0.521 * 1) = 1.352 (conflict / war) EV = 0.831 + ((-) 0.793) *1) = 0.038 (vote buying) EV = 0.831 + (-0.573)*1) = 0.258 (ethnic/political division) EV = 0.831 + (0.264 *1) = 1.095 (loser consent / acceptance of results) EV = 0.831 + (0.235 *1) = 1.066 (periodic) EV = 0.831 + (-0.793 * 1) = 0.038 (EMB capacity)

Based on the above equations, we can draw the following conclusions: (1) The increase in a number of conflicts would lead to an increase in the propensity of occurrence of electoral violence. The constant, however, is already quite high, which means that high number elections held in the countries without conflict also witnessed electoral violence. That reflects the fact that in the South Asian region, electoral violence has occurred in 51 out of 58 held between 1980 and 2017. (2) We calculate vote-buying based on occurrence. Answering ‘yes’ to the occurrence of vote-buying leads to the allocation of zero value. The higher the number, the fewer instances of vote-buying. 143

That means – decrease in the vote-buying score (increase in a number or severity of vote-buying cases) also increases the propensity of electoral violence. (3) A decrease in ethnic/political fractionalization would lead to an increase in the occurrence of electoral violence. (4) The loser consent/acceptance of results data are established in the response on the question “Were there riots after the elections? Was there a coup d’état to prevent the elected individual from taking the seat?” (Hyde and Marinov 2012). Answer ‘yes’ to the question means an increase in the value from the 0 to 1, which represents the non-acceptance of the results. As such, rejection of the results increases the likelihood of the occurrence of electoral violence. (5) Elections not held according to the Constitutional timelines would increase the propensity of electoral violence. (6) Finally, the occurrence of electoral violence decreases significantly as the capacity of the EMB increases. The link between two indicators, EMB capacity and vote-buying and electoral violence, is very significant (both indicators evince similar values). Value 1, meaning no vote-buying and EMB with perfect performance, indicates nearly zero occurrences of electoral violence (0.038). Value 0, which is on the other side of the spectrum, signifies the strong probability of the occurrence of electoral violence (constant 0.831 at the zero value of the independent variable).

Figure 31: Multiple Linear Regression, Electoral Integrity & Occurrence of Electoral Violence Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Occurrence of B* Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig Electoral Violence Conflict / war (no conflict ® over .571 .001 .541 .001 .573 .000 .484 .002 .431 .005 .521 .001 5 conflicts) Vote buying - - -1.084 .005 -.214 .001 .002 .001 -.793 .036 (yes ® no) .1.145 1.214 Ethnic/political division -.569 .037 -.541 .027 .522 .013 .573 .030 (low ® high) Loser consent / acceptance of results .246 .032 .257 .020 .264 .014 (yes ® no) Periodic .208 .026 .235 .010 (no ® yes) EMB capacity -.793 .021 (low ® high) Constant .556 .000 .942 .000 .727 .000 .642 .001 .590 .001 .831 .000

144

6.2.2. Impact of electoral integrity indicators on the intensity of electoral violence We conduct a similar analysis for the intensity of electoral violence dependent variable. The linear test shows about similar characteristics as in the previous case of occurrence of electoral violence (see the graphs below). As such, the tests do not meet conditions for linear regression using ‘enter’ or ‘blocks’ methods; the ‘stepwise’ MLR method remains the most appropriate.

Figure 32: Linearity test - relationship between electoral integrity indicators and intensity of electoral violence

Graph 1: Universal suffrage – Intensity of violence Graph 2: Genuine – Intensity of violence

Graph 3: Periodic – Intensity of violence Graph 4: Genuine – Intensity of violence

145

Graph 5: Systemic Manipulation – Intensity of violence Graph 6: Vote buying – Intensity of violence

Graph 7: Loser consent – Intensity of violence Graph 8: Opposition role – Intensity of violence

Graph 9: Strategies of ruling party – Intensity of violence Graph 10: Electoral system – Intensity of violence

146

Graph 11: State legitimacy – Intensity of violence Graph 12: EMB capacity – Intensity of violence

Graph 13: Malpractice – Intensity of violence Graph 14: Ethnic / political division – Intensity of violence

Graph 15: Human Development Index – Intensity of violence Graph 16: Growth/Crisis – Intensity of violence [Economic development 1] [Economic development 2]

147

Graph 17: Conflict / war – Intensity of violence Graph 18: Growth/Crisis – Intensity of violence

Graph 19: Regime type – Intensity of violence Graph 20: Observer reports – Intensity of violence

Graph 21: International Observer Reports – Intensity of violence Graph 22: Allegations of fraud – Intensity of violence

148

Graph 23: Confidence in process – Intensity of violence Graph 24: Confidence in EMBs – Intensity of violence

Graph 25: UNDP programmes – Intensity of violence Graph 26: Mitigation techniques – Intensity of violence

The above graphs, nevertheless, show that unlike in the previous data related to the occurrence of electoral violence, we can treat some recurrent outliner data separately. In the data models above, all Bhutan elections, and the 1988 elections in Pakistan are isolated, and furthest away from the regression line. We, therefore, test the model in the “stepwise” linear regression. Analyzing all data cases allows entering four independent variables in the model: allegations of fraud; conflict/war; ethnic/political division; and strategies of the ruling party. The highest possible predictive value of the model remains at .484, which means that only in 48,4% cases, the intensity of the electoral violence can be explained by the variable in the equation. We must seek the reason for the remaining 51.6% of the cases in other variables (see Figure 32, Model summary below).

149

Figure 33: Model Summary – Intensity of EV (MLR, stepwise, all cases [N=58])

The elimination of outliner data cases significantly improves the model. Seven variables, instead of four, are then considered statistically significant, and the predictability of the model increases to R2 = .552, i.e., the seven most reliable indicators explains 55.2% of variances in the intensity of electoral violence. Therefore, the dissertation works with 54 cases (N=54), eliminating Bhutan, and 1988 elections in Pakistan. We explain the outliner cases =in the qualitative part of the dissertation.

Figure 34: Model Summary – Intensity of electoral violence (MLR, stepwise, elimination of four cases [N=54])

The model shows that the most reliable indicator of the intensity of electoral violence is the allegation of fraud, entered first in the dataset. The allegation of fraud variable may, by itself, explain 22.7% of variances in the intensity of electoral violence. The ANOVA test shows that the model and the seven data entered are statistically very significant. The model evinces the highest possible level of significance in all its steps (Sig. .000). The F values are above 10 in all the cases, which demonstrates that the model is very much relevant to the analyzed data. As such, the test shows that the MLR model is suitable to analyze the electoral integrity indicators and their impact 150

on the levels of electoral violence. Let us now look at the more detailed analysis of individual indicators.

Figure 35: ANOVA test, relevance, and significance of the model

The first variable entering the equation is allegations of fraud. Interestingly, although it is the most potent stand-alone variable influencing the intensity of electoral violence, its significance decreases as other variables are entering the dataset. The data in the first step show that one-point increase in the allegation of fraud variable causes .276 increase in the intensity of electoral violence. The allegation of fraud is a dichotomous variable with the no-yes values. As the below regression equation suggests, if there are allegations of fraud, the intensity of electoral violence is likely to increase by 0.859 points. The intensity of violence is also calculated on the scale zero (0) to one (1) from none to widespread (riot) electoral violence. The first step of regression analysis would, therefore, suggest that occurrence of allegations of fraud would, in about 22.7% of the cases (Model 1 R2 = .227) lead to a significant level of violence (disturbance = value 0.667) or even widespread riot-type (value = 1) electoral violence.

151

EV = 0.583 + (0.276 x 1) = 0.859

In the second step, the conflict/civil war variable enters the equation; however, with not that strong statistical significance (Sig. .045). The two variables would influence the intensity levels of electoral violence by approximately 28.7%. Entering the third variable into the equation (Model 3), the importance of conflict/civil war variable increases (Sig. 004).

The third indicator – ethnic/political division, is also highly significant. The predictive value of the model increases to 37.9% (R2 = .379). Similarly, to the results of the correlation test conducted earlier, it is essential to note the actual predicted effect of the ethnic/political division variable. The variable is measured on the interval scale from zero (0) to one (1). Increase in the value indicates the higher level of ethnic/political fractionalization. As the B value is in the negative numbers, we can read the regression equation as follows: In case of entirely homogenous society (Constant), the intensity of the conflict would be 0.786 (slightly above disturbance levels). That is in contrast to the fully heterogeneous society where the intensity of violence would decrease to 0.304, mere incident(s) – level. It means that the increase in heterogeneity in society would decrease the intensity of the conflict. That is at odds with previous research. We discuss the reasons qualitative chapter of the dissertation.

EV = 0.786 + (-0.482 x 1) = 0.304

Models 4 and 5 add UNDP Programmes and Strategies of the ruling party in the equation. As noted earlier, the significance of the allegations of fraud variable decreases. In Model 5, the variable becomes statistically insignificant (Sig. .122) and is, therefore, left out in Model 6. The significant result here would be a predictability value of the Model 5 (with fraud allegations variable) and Model 6 (without fraud allegations variable). Model 5 explains about 52.1% in the variability of the data, while Model 6 only 49.6%. That means that Model 5, including five variables, have a stronger predictive value than Model 6. That said, we assume that the allegation of fraud indicator would still play a significant role in the intensity of electoral violence. Also, it is worth noting that it appeared among the most significant variables at the dataset that included all variables. Bhutan, 152

with no allegations of fraud and no electoral violence, appears to have significantly contributed to the prominence of this specific variable, before eliminated from the equation due to the outliner specifics.

Model 7 excludes the allegation of fraud indicator and includes the poverty/economic development (HDI) variable. The shift increases the overall predictive ability of the model to 55.2% (R2 = .552). Both models (5 & 7) are highly statistically significant, although, in the case of Model 7, all individual variables in the equation have strong statistical significance. As such, Model 7 should be considered the most relevant to predict the impact of electoral integrity indicators on the intensity of electoral violence. Let us now look at the Model 7 and overall indicators of electoral integrity that have the most definite impact on the intensity of electoral violence.

Five indicators are entering Model 7. All the variables entered in the equation are highly significant. Strategies of the ruling party and poverty/economic empowerment evince slightly lower level of statistical significance than conflict/war, ethnic/political division, and UNDP/UN programs.

The below equations allow us to formulate the following conclusions: (1) The conflict/war variable has the most substantial impact on the intensity of electoral violence levels. The constant (zero hypotheses) is, however, high for this dataset. That means that while five or more conflicts in the country would nearly certainly lead to an increased intensity of electoral violence (riot), there is a significant number of countries in the dataset that experience zero conflict, but at the same. time experience the strong intensity of electoral violence (riot). With one unit increase in a number of conflicts, the intensity of electoral violence increases by 1.292 units. (2) The dataset indicates that electoral violence decreases by 0.108 units, with every unit increase in ethnic fractionalization. Similarly, to the assumption made during the correlations tests, the result is at odds with the general research. (3) The levels of intensity of electoral violence also seem to be higher in the countries in the region with UNDP election programs in place. That conclusion, however, requires qualitative analysis. The assumption would be mainly that the UNDP/UN programs deploy to the countries that experience integrity and violence problems. It is worth noting that very little correlation exists between the mitigation measures dimension of electoral integrity and electoral violence. (4) The 153

strategies of the ruling party indicator focus on whether the incumbents are confident of victory before elections, if they extended time in the office or if they have taken unlawful action against the opposition. The indicator also looks at a level playing field, notably in terms of media coverage. We code the variable from one (1) for the leveler playing field and willingness to give up power to zero (0) for the abuse of incumbency. In our model, the strategies of the ruling party result in a negative coefficient, which would mean that leveler playing would lead to a decrease in the levels of electoral violence. (5) Similarly, the increase in HDI would lead to increasing levels of electoral violence. Equally, to the ethnic/political division, this indicator seems contradictory to the general research. We assume that the specificity of some countries in the region would explain this link. Some countries which are relatively well economically still experiencing significant levels of electoral violence, such as Sri Lanka. We will further analyze the issue in the qualitative assessment. EV = 0.927 + (0.365 * 1) = 1.292 (conflict/war) EV = 0.927 + ((-) 0.819) *1) = 0.108 (ethnic/political division) EV = 0.927 + (0.287*1) = 1.214 (UNDP programmes in place) EV = 0.927 + ((-)0.207 *1) = 0.72 (strategies of the ruling party) EV = 0.927 + (0.503 *1) = 1.43 (poverty / economic development [HDI])

154

Figure 36: Dataset 1, Multinomial Linear Regression, Electoral Integrity & Intensity of Electoral Violence Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Occurrence of B* Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig Electoral Violence Allegations of fraud .276 .000 .306 .000 .216 .005 .144 .054 .113 .122 (no ® yes) Conflict / war (no conflict ® .204 .045 .301 .004 .375 .000 .374 .000 .385 .000 .365 .000 over 5 conflicts) Ethnic/political - - - - - division .009 .000 .000 .000 .000 .482 .662 .742 .886 .819 (low ® high) UNDP Programmes in .222 .005 .231 .003 .270 .000 .287 .000 Place (no ® yes) Strategies of ruling party - - - 0.00 (level playing field .031 .014 .167 .191 .207 6 ® abuse of incumbency) Poverty/economic 0.01 development (HDI) . .503 .503 8 (low ® high) 1.05 1.21 .000 .927 .000 Constant .583 .000 492 .000 .786 .000 .866 .000 .000 5 9

6.2.3. Influence of electoral integrity indicators on the impact of electoral violence

The next section looks at the link between electoral integrity indicators and the impact of electoral violence, in terms of the number of deaths. The conducted linear test below shows Bhutan (all elections) and Pakistan 1988 as “outliner” values, similar to the previous cases, although including those values, evince, in many cases, the linearity in the dataset.

155

Figure 37: Linearity test - the relationship between electoral integrity indicators and impact of electoral violence

Graph 1: Universal suffrage – Impact of violence Graph 2: Genuine – Impact of violence

Graph 3: Periodic – Impact of violence Graph 4: Adherence to CIVPOL rights – Impact of violence

Graph 5: Systemic Manipulation – Impact of violence Graph 6: Vote buying – Impact of violence

156

Graph 7: Loser consent – Impact of violence Graph 8: Opposition role – Impact of violence

Graph 9: Strategies of ruling party – Impact of violence Graph 10: Electoral system – Impact of violence

Graph 11: State legitimacy – Impact of violence Graph 12: EMB capacity – Impact of violence

157

Graph 13: Malpractice – Impact of violence Graph 14: Ethnic / political division – Intensity of violence

Graph 15: Human Development Index – Impact of violence Graph 16: Growth/Crisis – Impact of violence [Economic development 1] [Economic development 2]

Graph 17: Conflict / war – Impact of violence Graph 18: Growth/Crisis – Impact of violence

158

Graph 19: Regime type – Impact of violence Graph 20: Observer reports – Impact of violence

Graph 21: International Observer Reports – Impact of violence Graph 22: Allegations of fraud – Impact of violence

Graph 23: Confidence in process – Impact of violence Graph 24: Confidence in EMBs – Impact of violence

159

Graph 25: UNDP programmes – Intensity of violence Graph 26: Mitigation techniques – Intensity of violence

Unlike in the previous case, the predictive value of this model significantly decreases if the outliner variables are taken out of the equation (see the model summary below). In such a case, the ‘stepwise’ method only considers one significant independent variable – conflict/war. The prediction value remains only at R2 = .196, which means that the model can explain 19.6% of electoral violence impact (number of deaths) by the conflict/war variable.

Figure 38: Model Summary – Impact of electoral violence (MLR, stepwise, elimination of four cases [N=54])

Entering all independent variables into equation (see Figure 38 below) increases the prediction value of the model to R2 = .474. As such, the model can explain the impact on electoral violence by the four variables entered in the equation from about 47.4%. The model considers four variables as statistically significant. The variables included are (i) conflict/war; (ii) vote-buying; (iii) poverty/economic development; and (iv) ethnic/political division. All four models are statistically very significant (Sig. .000) and relevant (F ranges from 11.7 to 15.4), therefore, it fits the dataset.

160

Figure 39: Model Summary – Impact of electoral violence (MLR, stepwise, all cases [N=58])

The conflict/war variable again enters the dataset first, with the potential to explain the impact of electoral violence in 20.4% of the cases. An increase in conflicts by unit leads to the increase in the impact of deaths in 1.106 units. EV = 0.702 + (0.404 x 1) = 1,106

The second variable in the dataset is the vote-buying. The increase in vote-buying (decrease in the value of the variable, which is in negative numbers) would lead to an increase in the impact of electoral violence. The predictability value of the model increases to 34.1%.

Third and fourth variables in the dataset that enter the model are poverty/economic development (HDI) and ethnic/political division. These four variables can explain the impact levels of electoral violence in about 47.4% (R2 = .474). The last two variables, nevertheless, remain statistically less significant than the conflict/war and vote-buying.

161

The conclusions stemming from the model indicate: (1) Similarly, to the intensity of electoral violence dataset, the conflict/war variable would cause the increase in an impact of electoral violence on the population - deaths stemming from the electoral process. The number of such cases, however, would be already high in the countries with no ongoing conflicts. (2) If there was no vote-buying (VB value = 1), there would be no electoral violence. In the case of widespread vote-buying (VB=0), the violence level would statistically reach five (5) or more deaths. As such, the vote-buying indicator, even though it only improves the model by 12.2%, would generally have influence over the impact of electoral violence. (3) The third indicator is equally at odds with the general research, as it indicates that the increase in HDI would lead to a stronger impact of electoral violence. Nevertheless, its significance remains at the lower levels. (4) Lastly, the leveler playing field and less abuse of incumbency would decrease the impact of electoral violence.

EV = 0.905 + (0.441 * 1) = 1.346 (conflict/war) EV = 0.905 + ((-) 1.053) *1) = - 0.148 (vote buying) EV = 0.905 + (0.641*1) = 1.546 (poverty/economic development) EV = 0.905 + ((-)0.357 *1) = 0.548 (strategies of the ruling party)

Figure 40: Dataset 1, Logistic Regression, Electoral Integrity & Impact of Electoral Violence Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Occurrence of B* Sig B Sig B Sig B Sig Electoral Violence Conflict / war (no conflict ® .404 .000 .385 .000 .359 .000 .441 .000 over 5 conflicts) - - Vote Buying - .003 1.04 .000 1.05 .000 (yes ® no) .718 7 3 Poverty/economic development (HDI) .745 .009 .641 .020 (low ® high) Ethnic/political - division .027 .357 (low ® high) Constant .702 .000 .385 .000 .676 .000 .905 .000

162

6.2.4. Summary conclusions The correlation test and MLR were able to confirm some of the established hypothesis partially. Firstly, there is a clear link between electoral integrity and electoral violence in both – small and large samples. Secondly, structural factors, notably the presence of conflict(s)/civil war(s) during the electoral period have proven the most significant indicators of the electoral violence risk. The second most reliable indicator is political-electoral dynamics, notably the vote-buying and loser consent. The public perceptions, contrary to the established hypothesis, did not evince a powerful impact on these particular cases. Thirdly, contrary to the established hypothesis, India does not represent the outliner value. Bhutan emerges a much stronger case than anticipated, despite it only represents a small sample of three elections held during the analyzed period. In line with the hypothesis, India may be partially responsible for the oddity in some outcomes of the analysis. To ensure a reliable conclusion, we need to complement the quantitative analysis with the qualitative assessment. The next and the last chapter of the dissertation seeks to qualitatively assess the analyzed sample to complement the conclusions about the impact of electoral integrity on electoral violence.

163

7. Chapter Six: What the quantitative assessment cannot tell us? The correlation test and MLR demonstrated that slightly over 50% of occurrences and levels of electoral violence in South Asia could be explained by problems related to electoral integrity. As social science is an extremely complex phenomenon and the region of South Asia is very diverse, this is not a bad result. We base this assumption mainly on the correlation test between electoral violence and perception of electoral integrity as well as MLR modeling. It is worth noting that MLR modeling only included statistically significant variables in the dataset while leaving aside indicators of electoral integrity that still may have some influence on the propensity of electoral violence, although not statistically significant on their own. To make conclusions about the causes of electoral violence in the region of South Asia, we need to qualitatively evaluate the situation of each of the countries in the region and see what additional factors we should consider concerning electoral violence. The analysis should also explain the role of public perception in the propensity of electoral violence in the region. General research suggests a possibly strong impact, which, however, has not been a result of the quantitative analysis.

Both the correlation test and MLR revealed some results, which are at odds to the overall academic research. These results likely reflect the diversity of the region and cases with exciting democratic development – election conflict dynamics (Brass 2010). The qualitative analysis, therefore, further aims at exploring the reasons for these odd outputs. Explaining them in the qualitative terms will, among others, prove or disprove the establish hypothesis regarding India and its possible impact on the examined statistics.

Lastly, quantitative research has shown that mitigation techniques have a very limited or adverse effect on the electoral violence variables. That seems at odds with the established practice and purpose of these programs. The subsequent chapter will aim to explain these results.

7.1. Top five factors influencing electoral violence in South Asia and beyond The critical aspects of electoral integrity influencing the electoral violence emerged through quantitative research. If the research has been accurate, these indicators should, at the same time, represent the root causes of violence in South Asia. Let us look at the full picture of South Asia.

164

The recent study of Asia Foundation (2017(b)) underlines five key patterns resulting in the violent electoral dynamics. The Asia Foundation has a long-established presence in nearly all South Asian countries and draws on its own experience and knowledge of local politics and power, which strengthens the credibility of their conclusions. The study suggests that conflict and violence affect nearly every country in South Asia. The sub-national conflicts became widespread and have a dramatic cumulative impact (Asia Foundation 2017(b): 2). It is the number of conflicts that evinced the highest impact on the propensity of electoral violence and its levells, which reflects very well the conclusions made by Asia foundation.

The study also says that the Asian countries manage relatively well the national competition but often developed a significant conflict at the sub-national level. In Bangladesh and Pakistan, the national political conflicts have been particularly bloody but have not led to the widespread civil war (Asia Foundation 2017(b): 2). That, in particular, explains the vast existence of significant levels of electoral violence even in countries where there are no ongoing conflicts at the national or inter-state level – specifically, the most recent elections in Bangladesh, and some elections in Pakistan or Sri Lanka.

The ethnic and religious identities are often politicized; the instigation of religious riots have been a significant part, for example, of the Indian politics (Asia Foundation 2017(b)). Similar faith-for- votes exploitation and us-versus-them philosophy of Hindu-Muslim divide have been a common phenomenon in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh - the countries with the lowest ethnic fractionalization index in the region (Beech et al. 2019; Mohsin 1984: 468). While the ethnic/political division is a crucial factor, the mere level of fractionalization does not determine the occurrence of electoral violence and can indicate adverse predictions when it comes to its intensity and impact. The critical factor here would be how the divisions are being exploited. Exploiting societal, political, and ethnic divisions to gain votes has become a strong trend in other countries in the world. As such, we need to consider amending the integrity indicator in the future research from the mere fractionalization index towards the examination of the political dynamics behind the ethnicity and political division. It is worth pointing out, however, that the strategies of the ruling party indicator and generally political-electoral dynamics indicators came up very strong in explaining the intensity of electoral violence. The ethnicity or political vision of the ruling party is naturally one 165

of the exploiters. Those harassed by the ruling party are then the ones representing other ethnic or political group (us-vs-them division). The ethnic-fractionalization index would, therefore, become more indicative if we read it in conjunction with the strategies of the ruling party indicator of electoral integrity.

The crucial fourth factor triggering violence in the Asian region is, according to the Asia Foundation (2017(b): 3), the development and urbanization. The research, nevertheless, points out that while rapid development has improved the lives of the many, it also gave rise to inequality and regional disparities. That goes with the centralization of the government in the hands of the few and the ethnic/political fractionalization. The ethnic or religious group which is underrepresented likely benefits less the products of the development. The Asia Foundation suggests that the development may likely increase the levels of political violence. Similar results were revealed by quantitative research. The economic development, notably the HDI that take into consideration various factors of human development, has proven valuable in predicting the intensity and impact of the electoral violence. The results yield the same conclusions as drawn by the Asia Foundation. The increase in HDI leads to an increase in the conflict. The inequality in society, which is a recipient of the increased levels of development explains the direction of impact on electoral violence.

Lastly, Asia Foundation concludes that gender-based violence impacts in a much more significant way on the overall political violence levels than it was previously understood. The comprehensive analysis remains, however, still tricky due to under-reporting and the lack of consistent data and comparisons within the countries (2017(b): 3). The dissertation has worked with international standards as one of the indicators of electoral integrity. The gender-based violence or women participation has not been, however, set up as a standalone indicator but instead examined in depth when assessing the universal suffrage. Adherence to international standards indicator has emerged in the third strongest correlation with the occurrence of electoral violence, its intensity, and impact, confirming partially Asia Foundation’s findings. On this note, however, consideration should be given to including gender-based violence, violence against women in elections, and women political participation as standalone indicators.

166

Noting our quantitative analysis and research presented by Asia Foundation, we can conclude that structural factors, political – electoral dynamics, and international standards would explain the occurrence of electoral violence, its intensity, and impact in South Asia. We should, however, pay equally the attention to the phenomenon of the money in politics. Political parties and candidate need significant amounts of money to win the elections. The elected leaders are usually rich or influential or supported by oligarchs. With the rampant corruption and the phenomenon of criminalization of politics, notably in India, those winning the elections often do not compete on the equal playing field. The disadvantage of the, usually opposition candidates, with fewer resources, leads to the lack of trust in the process. The subsequent lack of acceptance of the results and losing candidates claiming widespread fraud in the process, often without sufficient evidence, is a result of frustration stemming from an uneven competition (Asia Foundation 2017(b); Kumar 2011; Kumar 2015; Kumar, Singh 2015; Shruti 2012; Pachauri 1989; Kumari 2017; Saif 2019, Chhokar 2017; Singh 2017; inter alia). The importance of vote-buying and loser consent variable in the occurrence and impact of electoral violence indicates this phenomenon.

7.2. Challenges to the systematic examination of pre-set integrity indicators on electoral violence in South Asia: Bhutan, other outliners and odd outcomes The initial desk research suggested that India would deviate from the standard dataset, notably due to its established democracy but the high occurrence of electoral violence. As noted earlier, while the electoral violence occurred in every election in India since 1980, resulting in five or more deaths since 1984, the intensity cannot be classified the same high as in other countries in the region. The electoral violence has been scattered and occurred only in specific states with specific political characteristic. Similarly, to this assessment, many Indian scholars and practitioners suggested that we cannot study India as a single state but by individual geographical units and regions (Kumari 2017; Kumar, Singh 2017; Chhokar 2017; Shastri et al. 2009; Dikshit 1993). The case of India could be, therefore, well explained in a separate case study, analyzing the indicators per each state. This study, unfortunately, goes beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Moreover, Bhutan, has emerged as a clear outliner case in this dissertation, and therefore require a closer assessment. Bhutan has been an absolute monarchy since 1907 and only recently allowed for limited individual rights and freedoms. The 2007 and 2008 elections became a part of the 167

phased top-down peaceful movement towards democracy. The political competition, however, remains very limited for the first two elections that only allowed a limited political competition and did not allow a voter a genuine choice on the ballot. The elections did not attract much interest among the population. A few bombs detonated since the announcement till the election day, with no reports of civilian deaths. The actions resulted only in a limited number of injuries. At the same time, the electoral management body, despite the lacking previous experience, the EMB carried out its electoral activities in a professional, impartial, and neutral manner. Despite shortcomings in the specific areas related generally to the universal suffrage, the elections overall mostly met the international standards for the democratic process.

As such, the case of Bhutan impacted on the correlation result between the shortcomings in universal suffrage and lower levels of electoral violence. After omitting the Bhutan case in the intensity of electoral violence dataset, where it presented a sole outliner value, the suffrage indicator has not emerged as prominent. Looking at the data in the entire region of South Asia, universal suffrage at all levels correlates with increased levels of electoral violence. Sri Lanka or India, for example, have the best suffrage data in the region but are yet still highly prone to the electoral violence, with a very high impact.

Similarly, Bhutan also influences the regime–violence score in the correlation test. Still an autocratic regime, Bhutan’s elections were mostly violence-free, notably comparing to other countries in the region. On the contrary, India, an established democracy, and Sri Lanka, with the high regime score evince high levels of electoral violence. As these three countries represent nearly 50% of the data in the dataset, we can conclude that the oddity in the correlation between the lower regime score and higher levels of electoral violence reflects the specific cases in the region and is not a methodological error.

Another case that came out as a strong outliner in the intensity of electoral violence dataset are the 1988 elections in Pakistan. While the general characteristics of electoral integrity did not change between 1985 elections till nearly 2000, there was nearly none electoral violence in the 1988 competition. Despite fears whether these elections would remain peaceful, they represented a smooth post-election transition. The elections were widely accepted, and the Prime Minister 168

obtained an overwhelming vote of confidence by the National Assembly thereafter. Also, the new full-term president has been elected (NDI 1988: 1-10). The theory suggests that the first elections post-transition may be more peaceful and orderly. That, however, does not yet mean the victory for democratic development. The second elections post-transition are the ones crucial for democratic consolidation. That has been the case of Pakistan whose subsequent elections were marred by violence. The transition 1988, however, impacted on the dataset related to the intensity of electoral violence (IPU 1988; Nohlen 2001).

7.3. Impact of mitigation measures on the electoral violence in South Asia The remaining outcome of the quantitative analysis that requires a qualitative explanation is the impact of mitigation measures. The correlation test showed that there is a minimal impact of mitigation measures on the propensity of electoral violence. Furthermore, the link MLR suggested that the presence of the UNDP/UN electoral assistance programs is links to the higher levels of electoral violence in the region. The established practices suggest that many factors are essential in preventing electoral violence. Among them, it is an institutional design and system. Systems that present narrow ideological platforms and encourage winner-takes-all policy are particularly prone to electoral violence as they disproportionally benefit the ruling government. Such systems influence everything from the electoral campaign to the vulnerability of the country to fraud (UNDP 2011: 15-16; Reilly). This assumption is further in line with the outcome of the quantitate analysis that attributed significant importance to the political – electoral dynamics dimension of electoral integrity.

Further factors include the legal electoral system and EDR. The two aspects are particularly important and should have been assessed separately, as they likely significantly impact on the electoral violence. Collecting the same level of data for all countries has, nevertheless, proven impossible. The comprehensive technical electoral data and evaluations do not exist for all the countries, notably those before the emergence of electoral observation and standardized assessment of the electoral process. Establishing such dataset would require field research with the involvement of the researchers coming from the countries concerned. That reaches beyond this dissertation but opens space for further analysis.

169

The former is in our dissertation, mainly represented by the international standards dimension of electoral integrity. The EDR forms part of the EMB capacity analysis. While the electoral system indicator did not seem to play a significant role, the EMB capacity came out strongly in some parts of the research.

Lastly, the confidence of the public in the process that can be affected by observer reports would also play a role and therefore impact on the effectiveness of the programs. In our research, the other factors have overshadowed the public perception dimension – notably structural indicators of electoral integrity, notably the omnipresent conflict (UNDP 2006: 15-18).

To prevent electoral violence, it is primarily critical strengthening the credibility of the electoral process, which requires more than technical development and transparency but also political and legal reforms, broad public and civil society participation (UNDP 2006: 29). As such, mitigation programs are also linked to the political will of the recipient government to improve the credibility of the process through various electoral reform. Such reforms often require changes in the attitude of electoral stakeholders and population, which require a significant amount of time, sometimes decades. It, therefore, does not happen in one electoral cycle.

UNDP technical support programs also not always encompass all aspects of electoral integrity and violence and are sometimes deployed only to address specific areas of the electoral process. In South Asia, the UNDP/UN deployed the most robust technical assistance programs to Afghanistan and Pakistan, countries with troubled political history and fully plunged in conflict. We need to note that in the South Asian region, the political and electoral issues are closely tied together and the winning of the election is often about ‘survival’. Using extra-legal and violent means to ensure victory is often prominent in the countries using electoral systems that promote winner-takes-all attitudes (UNDP 2006: 29). In this research, however, the electoral system did not evince such a substantial impact on electoral violence. The reason may be mainly that the countries in the region, except for Sri Lanka and Nepal use the plurality/majority systems. Therefore, we cannot establish a broader correlation.

170

To sum up, the qualitative research firstly confirmed the results of the quantitative analysis and explained any odd figures. We can conclude that the diversity in the region does not allow for fully predicting the conclusions of the analysis, however, indicates some significant trends in the region.

171

8. Conclusions: Advancing the study of electoral integrity and electoral violence

This dissertation sought to establish the correlation between electoral integrity in its broader sense, occurrence, and levels of electoral violence. To fulfill this objective, we had to establish a broader core model of electoral integrity. Based on the de Vaus' concept of operationalization, we managed to frame the electoral integrity in six key dimensions, further divided into 25 sub-dimensions, and reflected in 26 indicators. Based on the state of the discipline research, we assumed that contentious elections not enjoying the confidence of the electorate (and therefore lacking electoral integrity), are likely to trigger non-acceptance of results and subsequently post-electoral violence. Lack of incumbent's will to give up power, or the prevalent winner-takes-all policy, will likely cause pre-electoral or election day violence. Scholars examined different parts of electoral integrity, seeking its relationship with electoral violence. However, scholars and practitioners have yet to establish a unified electoral integrity framework. The dissertation, therefore, set up a possible concept for further use on the cross-national series, and world-wide data, on the one hand, and further expansion and perfection, on the other.

We have also classified electoral violence more widely than in other studies, aiming to go beyond the mere occurrence. We analyze how electoral integrity influences the propensity of electoral violence and its levels in the South Asian region.

The research was generally successful in confirming the initial set-up hypothesis and answer the critical analytical questions. Based on the quantitative research and qualitative test, we confirm, firstly, that the electoral integrity overall correlates with electoral violence. Secondly, despite the clear risk of reverse causality, the MLR demonstrated that some aspects of electoral integrity impact on the propensity of electoral violence. Some indicators have a stronger impact than others. Thirdly, the electoral violence trends in India and Bhutan evinced a different trend than other countries in the region. Surprisingly, India did not stand out as an outliner value. Given the number of elections, and to some extent, similar characteristics with Sri Lanka, it somewhat influenced the broader results in the region. Bhutan, however, stands out as an outliner value. Although the

172

dissertation offered some analysis of the individual countries in the region, as it related to the quantification of sub-dimensions/indicators of electoral integrity, the results invite further analysis of these two specific cases. As noted earlier, testing our electoral integrity framework on the individual Indian states would likely bring impressive results into the relationship between electoral integrity and electoral violence.

Let us now look at each of the research questions separately:

Does the correlation exist between electoral integrity and electoral violence? The establishment of the comprehensive electoral integrity framework was vital to study the relationship between electoral integrity and electoral violence, and to answer the critical research questions. In the pursuit of the answers, we identified three fundamental hypotheses, mostly confirmed by both quantitative and qualitative research. The basic correlation using Pearson’s R confirmed the correlation between electoral integrity and electoral violence overall. It also showed that structural factors, followed by political-electoral dynamics, international standards, and public sector management, evince the most robust relationship with the electoral violence overall.

Can causality be established between electoral integrity, its (sub-)dimensions, and electoral violence? Using the Venn diagram, we have further established that triggers of electoral violence and dimensions of electoral integrity overlap. The correlation tests complemented by the qualitative explanations indicated that there was multicollinearity between the variety of the data. The results confirm the risk articulated in the methodology. While there is a clear relationship between electoral integrity and electoral violence, it may be tricky to establish causality. That is also because the violence may be equally 'an ultimate kind of electoral fraud (Höglund 2009). The MLR, therefore, had to use the ‘stepwise’ method, to only identify the integrity indicators, which are significant in their impact on electoral violence.

Which dimensions of electoral integrity have the most significant impact on the occurrence of electoral violence? Despite the limits and risk of reverse causality, we identified structural indicators, especially ongoing conflict/war, ethnic/religious identities, development and raising inequalities in society, having the most substantial impact on the occurrence of electoral violence 173

and its levels. Together with the political-electoral dynamics factors that further impact the level playing field, the structural indicators would explain a large portion of electoral violence in South Asia. The Asia Foundation’s (2017) research confirms the results that stemmed from the quantitative analysis. The research, however, suggests that violence against women would play a stronger role than anticipated. That conclusion is in line with our correlation test, where international standards were in a relatively symbiotic relationship with electoral violence. The gender dimension was, however, only examined for electoral participation.

What are the critical (sub-)dimensions/indicators of electoral integrity impacting on the occurrence of electoral violence and its levels? In more detail, the research revealed several specific sub-dimensions/indicators of electoral integrity that influence the occurrence, intensity, and impact of electoral violence. We did not anticipate that the correlation would be strong between electoral integrity and electoral violence in NELDA’s simplistic definition for the region of South Asia. We thought that distinguishing between different levels of electoral violence would produce more accurate results. The analysis has proven the contrary. In addition to the common indicator – conflict/civil war, also vote-buying, and ethnic/political division influence all three dependent variables (the occurrence, intensity, and impact of electoral violence). Periodicity of elections and loser consent/acceptance of the results, as well as EMB capacity, influenced the occurrence of the electoral violence significantly. Our electoral integrity indicators can explain the occurrence of electoral violence in over 50% of the cases.

For the intensity of electoral violence, the allegations of fraud, however, only in conjunction with conflict as other indicators decreased its significance, also have a predictive value for the occurrence of electoral violence. The HDI, along with the UNDP programs and strategies of the ruling party, also appeared in the equation. The seven indicators can explain 55% variance in the intensity of electoral violence. That, however, only after the dataset took out outliner data and reduced to 54 cases only. The four significant indicators can predict the impact of electoral integrity on electoral violence in about 47.4% of the cases.

What are the leading causes of electoral violence in South Asia? Despite a comprehensive model, the qualitative and quantitative analysis, therefore, answer this question in about 50% of the cases. 174

The research of existing literature, complemented by the correlation tests suggest that other factors, which did not come up from the MLR, may also be necessary. In the larger model, the framework would probably explain more data variability. Some indicators might have been, however, left out and the framework can be further improved in subsequent research.

As the dissertation focused very much on establishing a comprehensive framework, operationalizing concepts, and setting up the indicators to assess a complex relationship with electoral violence, it directly identified some areas that could not be studied. As a relatively new area of research, it opens space for further analysis and approaches both at academic, as well as practitioner level. Norris and her team, for example, recently looked into the impact of corruption and coercion on the electoral violence (Norris 2018).

Numerous authors also suggested that electoral technology, if implemented based on national consensus, in a sufficient timeframe and a transparent manner, has a potential to increase the integrity of the process and decrease electoral violence (Wolf 2017: 7). At the same time, however, it raises both interest and concern among the voters and practitioners (Ossei-Afful 2017; Wolf 2017; EU 2018). Nearly all countries in the world, have started to use technology for at least some aspects of the electoral process. The technology has also become an attractive solution for some problems in developing countries. While technology can resolve some problems, such as eliminating a specific type of fraud, if not carefully considered and designed with the broad political support and understanding, it could in contrary rather undermine the electoral process. Together with other problems in electoral integrity, it can trigger electoral violence (e.g., 2007 election in Kenya). A specific application of technology can, on the other hand, help preventing violence. These include, amongst others, the social media monitoring software and prediction, crowdsourced forecasts of electoral violence leading to early warning mechanisms. The impact of technology is, however, not yet systematically considered as part of electoral integrity and violence discussions, as well as the instruments to identify early risks or resolution opportunities related to the use of technology, remain scarce (EU 2018; Ellena & Petrov 2018; Alihodžič, Aman 2017).

Hence, identifying technology use in the region and adding the variable in the dataset could determine the potential impact of technology on the critical electoral integrity challenges, and 175

subsequently the influence over the propensity of occurrence of electoral violence, at different levels and severity.

To conclude, including additional indicators in the dataset would likely improve its predictive value and make it more robust. To establish a complete an entirely accurate electoral integrity framework, however, requires further time and research. This dataset can clearly explain the key electoral violence patterns in the specific region. Nevertheless, cross-national series with more cases could equally have a stronger predictive value. To improve accuracy, we suggest testing the dataset on the data from similar sources. E.g., quantify only the elections that hosted an election observation mission, and only use observation reports following a similar, rigorous methodology. The complex study of electoral integrity, with our dataset, or with added variables and cases, serve, however, as a good source of information regarding the predictors of electoral violence. It can also serve to design better the electoral assistance projects to tackle the root causes of electoral violence.

176

9.Annexes Annex I: List of Elections

AFGHANISTAN Type of election Date NEPAL Type of election Date 1988 Parliamentary elections 6 to 15-Apr-88 1981 Parliamentary elections (Pratinidhi Sabha) 9-May-81 2004 Presidential election 9-Oct-04 1986 Parliamentary elections (Pratinidhi Sabha) 12-May-86 2005 Parliamentary elections 18-Sep-05 1991 Parliamentary elections (Pratinidhi Sabha) 12-May-91 2009 Presidential election 20-Aug-09 1994 Parliamentary elections (Pratinidhi Sabha) 15-Nov-94 2010 Parliamentary elections 18-Sep-10 1999 Parliamentary elections (Pratinidhi Sabha) 3 & 17-May-99 2014 Presidential election 5-Apr & 14-Jun-14 2008 Constituent Assembly Election 10-Apr-08 BANGLADESH 2013 Constituent Assembly Election 19-Nov-13 1981 Presidential election 15-Nov-81 2017 Parliamentary elections (Pratinidhi Sabha) 26-Nov & 7-Dec-17 1986 Parliamentary elections 7-May-86 PAKISTAN 1986 Presidential election 15-Oct-86 1985 National Assembly elections 25-Feb-85 1991 Parliamentary elections 27-Feb-91 1988 National Assembly elections 16-Nov-88 1996 Parliamentary elections 15-Feb-96 1990 National Assembly elections 29-Nov-90 1996 Parliamentary elections 12-Jun-96 1993 National Assembly elections 6-Oct-93 2001 Parliamentary elections 1-Oct-01 1997 National Assembly elections 3-Feb-97 2008 Parliamentary elections 29-Dec-08 2002 National Assembly elections 10-Oct-02 2014 Parliamentary elections 5-Jan-14 2008 National Assembly elections 18-Feb-08 BHUTAN 2013 National Assembly elections 11-May-13 2007 Gyelyong Tshogde / National Council 31-Dec-07 & 29-Jan-08 SRI LANKA 2008 National Assembly (Tshogdu) 24-Mar-08 1982 Presidential election 20-Oct-82 2013 National Assembly (Tshogdu) 13-Jul-13 1988 Presidential election 19-Dec-88 INDIA 1989 Parliamentary elections 15-Feb-89 1980 Lok Sabha (House of the People) 3 & 6 Jan-80 1994 Parliamentary elections 16-Aug-94 1984 Lok Sabha (House of the People) 24, 27 & 28 Dec-84 1994 Presidential election 9-Nov-94 1989 Lok Sabha (House of the People) 22-26 Nov-89 1999 Presidential election 21-Dec-99 1991 Lok Sabha (House of the People) 20-May - 15-Jun-91 2000 Parliamentary elections 10-Oct-00 1996 Lok Sabha (House of the People) 27-Apr - 30-May-96 2001 Parliamentary elections 5-Dec-01 1998 Lok Sabha (House of the People) 16-Feb - 7 Mar-98 2004 Parliamentary elections 2-Apr-04 1999 Lok Sabha (House of the People) 5-Sep -3-Oct-99 2005 Presidential election 17-Nov-05 2004 Lok Sabha (House of the People) 20-Apr - 10-May-04 2010 Presidential election 26-Jan-10 2009 Lok Sabha (House of the People) 16-Apr - 13-May-09 2010 Parliamentary elections 8 & 20-Apr-10 2014 Lok Sabha (House of the People) 7-Apr - 12-May-14 2015 Presidential election 8-Jan-15 2015 Parliamentary elections 17-Aug-15

177 Annex II: Electoral integrity and electoral violence indicators

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

1. International standards Sub- Operational Indicators Source / dataset Type of variable dimension definition Own dataset Analysis of the legal considering framework and actual universal suffrage situation on the ground; Ordinal (1-5) in the legal Reasonable restriction: 1 – right to vote & stand respected de facto and frameworks and age, citizenship; de jure Universal their Unreasonable 2 – right to vote & stand exist in the legal suffrage: right to implementation restriction: race, color, framework, but implementation of one of the vote and stand; sex, language, political two rights faces some challenges suffrage must be Key sources: or other opinion, 3 – right to vote and stand in the law, established in the Country national or social implementation faces significant problems law and subject constitutions and origin, property, birth, 4 – right to vote and/or stand not fully to reasonable electoral legal status; established in the law; significant problems restrictions only framework; Proportionality, with implementation observer reports; fairness, equal 5 – significant problems with legal framework Freedom House implementation for and implementation and other women and democracy marginalized groups. analysis Political rights Ordinal (1-7) Free participation Genuine choice of the 1 – most free/most genuine; 7 – least free/least genuine in the electoral Freedom House voter on the ballot genuine process Participation Where the elections suspended before this Elections held in election? NELDA Q1/ period intervals Were these elections NELDA Q6 Ordinal/dichotomous periodic established in the early or late relative to 0 – no / 1 – yes law the date they were supposed to be held per established procedure? Freedom of Ordinal (1-7); reversed scale expression and Freedom House 7 – most free; 1 – least free Civil liberties belief, associational and organizational Ordinal (1-10) adherence to rights, rule of 1-10 (1 – AAR/free speech denied; 4 – Association and civil political law, personal QoG – ciri_assn AAR/free speech systematically limited; 7 – assembly (AAR) rights autonomy and AAR/free speech partially limited; 10 – [civ_pol] individual rights; QoG - ciri_speech AAR/free speech unrestricted for political and Freedom of Speech Freedom of civic groups and individuals) association and assembly; Ordinal (1-10) Women’s 0 – women’s political rights (WPR) not political rights, QoG – ciri_wopol guaranteed by law; 1 – WPR guaranteed by 178 and rights of Safeguards and respect law, but severely prohibited in practice; 2 – persons with for women political WPR guaranteed by law, but still moderately disabilities in the rights prohibited in practice; 3 – WPR guarantees electoral process. both in the law and practice

Own dataset Ordinal/dichotomous Facilities were 0 – no / 1 – yes available for the disabled population during electoral cycle and voting TOTAL SCORE: Calculate as a cumulative score of the above-mentioned categories on the ordinal scale 1-14 (the higher the score the stronger adherence to civil and political rights)

2. Political – electoral dynamics Sub- Operational Indicators Source / dataset Type of variable dimension definition The use of domestic legal Manipulation of the systemic Ordinal/dichotomous and regulatory legal and regulatory manipulation QOG - dpi_fraud 0 – laws countering democratic principles provisions to framework to influence [manip] 1 – laws not countering democratic principles distort the will electoral outcomes of the voters Ordinal (0-4) 0 – Yes (systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates) 1 - Yes, some (non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties) fraud Vote/turnout Evidence of vote- V-DEM - 2 - Restricted (money and/or personal gifts [vote_buy] buying buying v2elvotbuy were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an ‘entry- ticket’ expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout) 3 - Almost none (limited use of money and personal gifts) 4 – None (no evidence of vote/turnout buying) Were there riots and protests after the loser consent Handling and election? acceptance of NELDA Ordinal/dichotomous acceptance of Was there a coup that the results Q29/NELDA Q42 0 – no / 1 – yes results prevented the elected [loser] leader from taking office? role of the The opposition Ordinal/dichotomous, re-calculated Was the incumbent or opposition has a fair ruling party confident of [oppos] chance to win; NELDA Q12 1 – yes; 5 – no

179

The opposition victory before can run in the elections? elections Were opposition leaders unhindered. prevented from running? NELDA Q13 1 – yes; 5 – no Did some opposition leaders boycott the election? NELDA Q14 1 - no; 5 - yes Extent to which alternative preferences Ordinal (1-5) for policy and QOG - p_parcomp 0 – N/A; 1 – Represented; 2 – Suppressed; 3 – leadership can be Factional (ethnic- or other-based political pursued in the political factions); 4 – Transitional; 5 – Competitive arena TOTAL SCORE: Cumulative score at the 100% scale. The higher the score the stronger the role of the opposition/political competition.

Before elections, were NELDA 7 there clear indications

that the incumbent had

made a prior decision to Incumbents give up power? willingness/un Has the incumbent willingness to Ordinal/dichotomous [NELDA – all extended his or her term strategies of give up power NELDA 9 categories] in office or eligibility to ruling party Harassment of 0 – no / 1 – yes run in elections at any [rull_p] opposition point in the past? Media bias in Is there evidence that favor of the government incumbent NELDA 15 harassed the opposition? TOTAL SCORE: Mean of all responses on the Were there allegations scale 0-1 with one (1) representing the general of media bias in favor of unwillingness of the ruling party to give up the incumbent? NELDA 16 power, and employment of the strategies leading to that aim. Categorical / nominal 1 – Plurality/majority system or two-round Legislative elections - system (presidential elections) Plurality-majority 2 – Plurality/majority system or first-past-the- system (winner-takes- International Idea post (FPTP) (legislative elections) electoral all); Type of Database of 3 – Plurality/majority system/single-non- system/stakes Proportional electoral Electoral systems transferable-vote (SNTV) (legislative elections) involved Representation/categori system used Other sources: 4 – Proportional representation system or a [el_syst] es of electoral systems Observer reports system with proportional representation element

(mixed system) Presidential election 5 – Preferential voting or single-transferable- Plurality/majority vote (STV)

Ordinal/converted to interval (0 – 4) Pre-election, election, State Election 0 - No, not at all (the elections were and post-election period [government] outcomes V-DEM - fundamentally flawed, and the official results allows for the people to legitimacy reflect the will v2elfrfair had freely express their will [st_leg] of the people little if anything to do with the 'will of the in the electoral process people') 180

1 - Not really (the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election) 2 – Ambiguous (substantial competition and freedom of participation but hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not) 3 - Yes, somewhat (deficiencies, fraud and Irregularities did not in the end affect the outcome) 4 – Yes (some amount or human error and logistical restrictions without significant impact on the results)

3. Public sector management Operational Sub-dimension Indicators Source / dataset Type of variable definition PEI electoral assessment authorities’ indicators: Ordinal (1-5 scale) in each indicator of EMB EMBs impartial; Impartiality, Own dataset capacity EMB shares transparency based on information with to EMB capacity and PEI_electoral TOTAL SCORE: citizens; [EMB] professionalism authorities Ordinal/converted to interval (20 – 100) EMB allows for the of the electoral assessment 20 – 100 (the higher the score the higher the public scrutiny of its institutions indicators capacity of the EMB/electoral authorities) performance;

EMB/electoral authorities perform well Ordinal/converted to interval 0 – Yes (almost nationwide irregularities). 1 - Yes, some (non-systematic, but rather Procedural common irregularities) problems, 2 – Sporadic (limited number of sporadic intentional or irregularities) Was there evidence of irregularities unintentional, V-DEM – 3 - Almost none (only a limited number of irregularities in these [malpr] impacting on v2elirrreg irregularities, most elections? the conduct of probably unintentional) the electoral 4 – None (no evidence of intentional process irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.)

181

4. Structural factors Operational Sub-dimension Indicators Source / dataset Type of variable definition Combination of racial, linguistic, ethnic/political Ethnic Ordinal/converted to interval (1-100_ ethnic, social and division fractionalization/ 0 – totally homogeneous other characteristics QOG - fe_etfra [division] political 100 – totally fragmented determining the level fractionalization of fractionalization in society

Interval Higher HDI signifies the higher mean of human development

Life expectancy Human Development poverty/ Ordinal/dichotomous [NELDA – all Education UNDP - HDI economic categories] Gross National development/ 0 – no / 1 – yes Product human Is economic growth in development TOTAL SCORRE is established on an ordinal the country said to be [pov_HDI] scale (0 – 2) Economic growth good? NELDA Q17 [pov_GC] 0 – country’s growth is not said to be good, Economic crisis Is country said to be in NELDA Q18 country is in economic crisis an economic crisis? 1 – country’s growth is not said to be good, but the country is not in economic crisis 2 – country is not in economic crisis; its economic growth is said to be good QOG - ucdp_type 1 (extrasystemic conflict) QOC - ucdp_type Ordinal (1-5) 2 (interstated 0 – no ongoing conflict armed conflict) conflict/civil 1 – one ongoing conflict Major episodes of Number of ongoing QOC - ucdp_type war 2 – two ongoing conflicts conflict conflicts 3 (internal armed [conflict] 3 – three ongoing conflicts conflict) 4 – four ongoing conflicts QOC - 5 – five or more ongoing conflicts ucdp_type4 (internationalized internal armed conflict) Was the country ruled Elections under by ‘transitional Ordinal/dichotomous transition the transitional leadership’ tasked NELDA Q10 0 – no / 1 – yes [trans] leadership with holding

elections? Ordinal Regime grading 10 – Full democracy Type of regime regime type Power-sharing within 6 - 9 – Democracy Type of Polity IV [reg_type] the government 1 - 5 Open anocracy government (-5) - 0 – Closed anocracy -10 - (-6) Autocracy

182

5. Public perception Operational Sub-dimension Indicators Source / dataset Type of variable definition Reports of Is there evidence that government’s reports critical of the observer handling of Ordinal/dichotomous government’s handling reports elections / NELDA Q28 0 – no / 1 – yes of the election reached [observe] international large numbers of monitors people?

Ordinal/dichotomous Were international [NELDA – all categories] observers present? 0 – no / 1 – yes Allegation of fraud by international Western observers? NELDA Q46 TOTAL SCORE is established on ordinal observer Monitors refused to NELDA Q47 scale (0 – 2) reports observe elections NELDA Q49 0 – if NELDA Q46 = no [int_obs] because they believed 0 – if NELDA Q46 = yes & NELDA Q47 = no they would not be free 1 – if NELDA Q46 & Q47 = yes (to both) and fair? 2 – if NELDA Q49 = yes

At least three

independent national-

level sources (media, allegations/ Ordinal/dichotomous observer or other perception of Allegations of 0 – no allegations of fraud credible reports, policy Own dataset fraud fraud 1 – yes there were widespread allegations of analysis) indicated [fraud] electoral fraud there were allegations

of fraud in the process

Perception that Are there significant Ordinal/dichotomous [reversed NELDA confidence in the elections concerns that the scale] the process NELDA Q11 would be ‘free elections would not be 0 – low or none confidence in the process [con_proc] and fair’ ‘free and fair’? 1 – sufficient confidence in the process Ordinal (1-3) confidence in Electorate’s 1 – low confidence in electoral institutions electoral Confidence in confidence in Own dataset 2 – moderate confidence in electoral institutions electoral authorities EMBs institutions [con_EMB] 3 – high confidence in electoral institutions

6. Mitigation Sub- Operational Source / Indicators Type of variable dimension definition dataset UNDP Existence of UNDP programs in Ordinal/dichotomous programs in programs to EVPI place to improve 1 – yes place improve electoral UNDP reports electoral integrity? 0 - no [UNDP_prg] integrity mitigation Techniques to Programs / techniques Ordinal/dichotomous EVPI measures prevent electoral to prevent electoral 1 – yes Own dataset [mitig] violence violence? 0 - no

183

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Electoral Violence Sub- Operational Indicators Source / dataset Type of variable dimension definition Was there an electoral Occurrence Electoral violence violence involving at Ordinal/dichotomous of electoral involving at least least one civilian death NELDA Q33 1 – yes violence one civilian death during, before, or after 0 - no [NELDA_v] election? Ordinal (0-3) [Wasserman & Jaggard 2006 Own dataset classification] Intensity of Was the electoral Sources: 0 – no violence electoral Scale of electoral violence widespread or observer reports, 1 – incident(s) violence violence only included isolated media analysis, 2 – disturbance [intensity] incidents? CREV 3 - riot

Ordinal (0-3) Did the violence occur? Own dataset 0 – no violence Impact of If yes, was it in the form Sources: 1 – intimidation/harassment; injuries/no death electoral Impact in terms of of intimidation and observer reports, 2 – up to five civilian deaths violence civilian deaths harassment or it also media analysis, 3 – five or more civilian deaths [impact] resulted in civilian CREV deaths?

184

Annex III: Full dataset

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES DEP. VARIABLES INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS POLITICAL - ELECTORAL DYNAMICS PSM STRUCTURAL FACTORS PUBLIC PERCEPTION MITIG. VIOLENCE divisio conflic reg_typ observ int_ob con_p con_ UNDP NELD intensit ID Type suffrage genuine periodic civ_pol manip vote_buy loser oppos rull_p el_syst st_leg EMB malpr pov_HDI pov_GC trans fraud mitig imapct n t e e s roc EMB _prg A_v y AFGHANISTAN 1988 AFG1988 0 5 6 1 2 0 1.3 0 35 0 2 1.17 20 1.17 0.75 0.3 1 3 0 -7 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 3 2004 AFG2004 1 4 6 0 6 0 1.68 0 65 1 1 2.13 40 1 0.75 0.4 0 2 1 -7 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 1 3 3 2005 AFG2005 0 4 5 0 6 0 1.68 0 50 1 3 2.11 45 0.88 0.75 0.41 2 2 0 -7 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 3 3 2009 AFG2009 1 4 5 0 6 0 0.46 1 73 1 1 1.88 45 0.75 0.75 0.45 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 3 3 2010 AFG2010 0 4 6 0 6 0 0.52 0 20 0 3 1.7 45 0.89 0.75 0.46 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 3 3 2014 AFG2014 1 4 6 1 6 1 0.49 1 60 0 1 1.83 40 0.67 0.75 0.49 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 3 3 BANGLADESH 1981 BNG1981 1 4 5 0 8 0 1.01 0 65 1 2 2.8 40 0.6 0.22 0.36 2 1 0 -4 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1986 BNG1986 0 4 5 1 6 0 1.01 1 65 0.5 2 1.6 40 0.6 0.22 0.39 1 1 0 -7 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 3 1986 BNG1986 1 4 5 1 6 0 1.01 1 45 0.5 2 1.6 40 0.6 0.22 0.39 1 1 0 -7 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 3 1991 BNG1991 0 3 4 0 9 0 1.47 1 90 1 2 3.2 45 2.6 0.22 0.39 1 5 1 6 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 3 1996 BNG1996 0 3 2 1 8 0 1.5 1 50 0.75 2 2.9 45 2.2 0.22 0.43 0 0 0 6 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 3 1996 BNG1996 0 3 2 0 8 0 1.5 0 90 1 2 2.9 45 2.2 0.22 0.45 1 0 1 6 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 3 3 2001 BNG2001 0 4 3 1 7 0 1.4 1 90 1 2 2.8 50 2.4 0.22 0.51 1 0 1 6 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 3 3 2008 BNG2008 0 4 5 0 8 0 1.71 0 90 1 2 2.87 50 2.2 0.22 0.52 2 0 1 -6 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 3 3 2014 BNG2014 0 4 3 0 8 0 1.62 1 75 1 2 0.57 45 1 0.22 0.58 1 0 0 5 0 2 1 0 2 1 1 1 3 3 BHUTAN 2007 BHU2007 0 4 6 0 6 0 2.97 0 30 1 2 3 65 2.73 0.61 0.54 1 0 1 -6 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 2008 BHU2008 0 4 6 0 6 0 2.97 0 60 1 2 3 65 2.73 0.61 0.54 1 0 1 -6 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 2013 BHU2013 0 4 4 1 7 0 2.96 0 75 1 2 2.75 80 3.13 0.61 0.6 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 INDIA 1980 IND1980 0 2 2 0 12 0 1.59 0 90 0.75 2 3.6 75 2.4 0.81 0.44 1 1 0 8 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 1 2 1984 IND1984 0 2 2 1 11 0 1.31 0 70 0.75 2 3.8 75 2 0.81 0.44 2 3 0 8 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 2 3 1989 IND1989 0 2 2 1 10 0 1.57 0 90 0.5 2 3.8 75 2.4 0.81 0.48 2 5 0 8 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 2 3 1991 IND1991 0 2 3 1 8 0 1.41 1 70 1 2 3.8 75 2.6 0.81 0.51 1 5 0 8 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 2 3 1996 IND1996 0 2 2 1 9 0 1.45 0 95 1 2 3.8 75 2.8 0.81 0.55 2 4 0 8 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 2 3 1998 IND1998 0 2 2 0 9 0 1.42 1 95 0.75 2 3.8 80 2.8 0.81 0.55 2 4 0 9 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 2 3 1999 IND1999 0 2 2 0 9 0 1.42 1 75 0.75 2 3.8 80 2.8 0.81 0.55 2 5 0 9 1 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 2 3 2004 IND2004 0 2 2 1 9 0 1.4 1 75 0.75 2 3.8 80 2.8 0.81 0.6 2 3 0 9 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 2 3 2009 IND2009 0 2 2 1 10 0 1.46 1 75 0.75 2 3.43 75 2.22 0.81 0.57 1 5 0 9 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 1 2 3 2014 IND2014 0 2 2 1 10 0 1.26 0 75 0.75 2 3.4 80 2 0.81 0.62 1 2 0 9 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 2 3

Type: 0 – Legislative elections; 1 – Presidential/executive election (for information only; not entered in the analysis) INDEPENDENT VARIABLES DEP. VARIABLES INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS POLITICAL - ELECTORAL DYNAMICS PSM STRUCTURAL FACTORS PUBLIC PERCEPTION MITIG. VIOLENCE divisio conflic reg_typ observ int_ob con_p con_ UNDP NELD intensit ID Type suffrage genuine periodic civ_pol manip vote_buy loser oppos rull_p el_syst st_leg EMB malpr pov_HDI pov_GC trans fraud mitig imapct n t e e s roc EMB _prg A_v y NEPAL 1981 NEP1981 0 5 3 0 6 0 0.35 0 45 1 5 0.9 30 0.7 0.68 0.33 0 0 0 -9 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 1986 NEP1986 0 5 3 1 7 0 0.4 0 45 1 5 1 30 0.8 0.68 0.38 0 0 0 -2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 1991 NEP1991 0 3 2 0 7 0 0.98 0 75 0.75 5 2.1 65 1.6 0.68 0.42 1 0 1 5 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 3 1994 NEP1994 0 3 3 0 7 0 0.85 0 75 0.75 5 2.2 65 1.5 0.68 0.42 0 0 0 5 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 2 1999 NEP1999 0 3 3 1 8 0 0.83 0 95 1 5 1.7 65 1.5 0.68 0.47 1 1 0 5 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 2 2008 NEP2008 1 2 5 0 8 0 1.29 0 90 0 4 2.3 65 1.78 0.68 0.5 0 3 1 6 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 2 2013 NEP2013 0 2 4 1 9 0 1.65 0 70 1 4 3 75 2 0.68 0.56 1 0 1 6 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2017 NEP2017 0 2 3 1 9 0 1.52 0 90 1 4 2.9 60 1.8 0.68 0.57 1 0 1 5 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 PAKISTAN 1985 PAK1985 0 4 4 0 5 0 0.72 1 45 0.75 2 1.67 30 1 0.53 0.42 2 0 0 -7 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 1988 PAK1988 0 4 3 0 8 0 1.12 0 90 1 2 2 45 1 0.53 0.42 2 0 0 -7 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1990 PAK1990 0 4 4 0 6 0 0.9 0 90 0 2 2 35 1 0.53 0.46 0 3 1 8 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 3 1993 PAK1993 0 4 3 0 6 0 0.93 0 50 1 2 2 40 0.83 0.53 0.46 1 0 1 8 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 2 2 1997 PAK1997 0 4 4 0 6 0 0.92 0 90 1 2 2.33 40 1.33 0.53 0.49 0 2 1 8 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 2002 PAK2002 0 4 6 0 6 1 0.93 0 45 0 2 1.67 40 1 0.53 0.53 1 2 0 -6 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 3 2008 PAK2008 0 4 6 0 6 1 1.26 1 45 0 2 2.58 50 1.5 0.53 0.52 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 1 3 3 2013 PAK2013 0 4 4 1 5 0 0.99 0 90 1 2 2.29 50 1.3 0.53 0.54 1 1 0 6 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 3 3 SRI LANKA 1982 SRL1982 1 3 2 1 10 0 1.6 0 77 0.75 5 2.5 45 1.5 0.43 0.65 1 0 0 6 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 3 3 1988 SRL1988 1 2 3 1 7 1 1.5 0 90 1 5 2.17 50 1 0.43 0.68 2 2 0 5 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 3 3 1989 SRL1989 0 2 4 0 7 1 1.5 0 70 1 4 2.33 50 1.17 0.43 0.68 2 3 0 5 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 3 3 1994 SRL19941 0 2 4 1 8 0 1.75 0 70 1 4 3.17 50 1.83 0.43 0.7 2 3 0 5 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 3 3 1994 SRL19942 1 2 4 1 8 0 1.75 0 70 1 5 3.17 50 1.83 0.43 0.7 2 3 0 5 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 3 3 1999 SRL1999 1 2 3 0 8 0 1.59 1 70 1 5 2.5 50 1.67 0.43 0.73 2 3 0 5 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 3 3 2000 SRL2000 0 2 3 1 8 0 1.53 0 90 1 4 2.67 45 1.67 0.43 0.73 2 3 0 5 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 3 3 2001 SRL2001 0 2 3 1 7 0 1.32 0 70 1 4 3 45 1.67 0.43 0.73 2 3 0 5 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 3 3 2004 SRL2004 0 4 3 0 8 0 1.6 0 70 1 4 2.83 55 1.67 0.43 0.75 2 0 0 5 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 2 3 2005 SRL2005 1 4 3 0 8 0 1.55 0 90 0.75 5 2.36 60 1.64 0.43 0.75 2 0 0 5 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 3 2 2010 SRL20101 1 3 4 0 9 0 1.68 0 90 0 5 2.25 65 1.94 0.43 0.75 0 0 0 6 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 3 2 2010 SRL20102 0 3 4 1 9 0 1.68 0 70 0 4 2.25 65 1.94 0.43 0.75 0 0 0 6 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 3 2 2015 SRL20151 1 3 5 1 6 0 2.12 0 95 1 5 3.2 65 2.5 0.43 0.77 0 1 0 4 0 0 1 1 3 0 1 1 3 3 2015 SRL20152 0 3 5 1 6 0 2.12 0 95 1 4 3.2 65 2.5 0.43 0.77 0 1 0 4 0 0 1 1 3 0 1 1 1 2 Annex IV: Full dataset - recalculated for MLR [scale 0 – 1]

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES DEP. VARIABLES INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS POLITICAL - ELECTORAL DYNAMICS PSM STRUCTURAL FACTORS PUBLIC PERCEPTION MITIG. VIOLENCE divisio conflic reg_typ observ int_ob con_p con_ UNDP NELD intensit ID Type suffrage genuine periodic civ_pol manip vote_buy loser oppos rull_p el_syst st_leg EMB malpr pov_HDI pov_GC trans fraud mitig imapct n t e e s roc EMB _prg A_v y AFGHANISTAN 1988 AFG1988 0 1 0.857 1 0.143 0 0.325 0 0.35 0 0.4 0.29 0.2 0.29 0.75 0.3 0.5 0.6 0 0.15 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 2004 AFG2004 1 0.8 0.857 0 0.429 0 0.42 0 0.65 1 0.2 0.53 0.4 0.25 0.75 0.4 0 0.4 1 0.15 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 2005 AFG2005 0 0.8 0.714 0 0.429 0 0.42 0 0.5 1 0.6 0.53 0.5 0.22 0.75 0.41 1 0.4 0 0.15 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 2009 AFG2009 1 0.8 0.714 0 0.429 0 0.115 1 0.73 1 0.2 0.47 0.5 0.19 0.75 0.45 0 0.4 0 0.55 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2010 AFG2010 0 0.8 0.857 0 0.429 0 0.13 0 0.2 0 0.6 0.43 0.5 0.22 0.75 0.46 0 0.4 0 0.55 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2014 AFG2014 1 0.8 0.857 1 0.429 1 0.123 0 0.6 0 0.2 0.46 0.4 0.17 0.75 0.49 1 0.4 0 0.55 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 BANGLADESH 1981 BNG1981 1 0.8 0.714 0 0.571 0 0.253 0 0.65 1 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.15 0.22 0.36 1 0.2 0 0.3 0 0 1 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.333 0.333 1986 BNG1986 0 0.8 0.714 1 0.429 0 0.253 1 0.65 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.15 0.22 0.39 0.5 0.2 0 0.15 1 0 1 0 0.5 0 0 1 1 1 1986 BNG1986 1 0.8 0.714 1 0.429 0 0.253 1 0.45 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.15 0.22 0.39 0.5 0.2 0 0.15 1 0 1 0 0.5 0 0 1 1 1 1991 BNG1991 0 0.6 0.571 0 0.643 0 0.368 1 0.9 1 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.65 0.22 0.39 0.5 1 1 0.8 0 0 1 0 0.5 0 0 1 1 1 1996 BNG1996 0 0.6 0.286 1 0.571 0 0.375 1 0.5 0.75 0.4 0.73 0.5 0.55 0.22 0.43 0 0 0 0.8 1 2 1 0 0.5 0 0 1 1 1 1996 BNG1996 0 0.6 0.286 0 0.571 0 0.375 0 0.9 1 0.4 0.73 0.5 0.55 0.22 0.45 0.5 0 1 0.8 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 2001 BNG2001 0 0.8 0.429 1 0.5 0 0.35 1 0.9 1 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.22 0.51 0.5 0 1 0.8 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 2008 BNG2008 0 0.8 0.714 0 0.571 0 0.428 0 0.9 1 0.4 0.72 0.5 0.55 0.22 0.52 1 0 1 0.2 1 0 1 0 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 2014 BNG2014 0 0.8 0.429 0 0.571 0 0.405 1 0.75 1 0.4 0.14 0.5 0.25 0.22 0.58 0.5 0 0 0.75 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 BHUTAN 2007 BHU2007 0 0.8 0.857 0 0.429 0 0.743 0 0.3 1 0.4 0.75 0.7 0.68 0.61 0.54 0.5 0 1 0.2 0 0 0 1 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 2008 BHU2008 0 0.8 0.857 0 0.429 0 0.743 0 0.6 1 0.4 0.75 0.7 0.68 0.61 0.54 0.5 0 1 0.2 0 0 0 1 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 2013 BHU2013 0 0.8 0.571 1 0.5 0 0.74 0 0.75 1 0.4 0.69 0.8 0.78 0.61 0.6 0.5 0 0 0.65 0 0 0 1 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 INDIA 1980 IND1980 0 0.4 0.286 0 0.857 0 0.398 0 0.9 0.75 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.81 0.44 0.5 0.2 0 0.9 0 0 0 1 1.5 0 0 0 0.333 0.667 1984 IND1984 0 0.4 0.286 1 0.786 0 0.328 0 0.7 0.75 0.4 0.95 0.8 0.5 0.81 0.44 1 0.6 0 0.9 0 0 0 1 1.5 0 0 1 0.667 1 1989 IND1989 0 0.4 0.286 1 0.714 0 0.393 0 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.95 0.8 0.6 0.81 0.48 1 1 0 0.9 0 0 0 1 1.5 0 0 1 0.667 1 1991 IND1991 0 0.4 0.429 1 0.571 0 0.353 1 0.7 1 0.4 0.95 0.8 0.65 0.81 0.51 0.5 1 0 0.9 0 0 0 1 1.5 0 0 1 0.667 1 1996 IND1996 0 0.4 0.286 1 0.643 0 0.363 0 0.95 1 0.4 0.95 0.8 0.7 0.81 0.55 1 0.8 0 0.9 1 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 1 0.667 1 1998 IND1998 0 0.4 0.286 0 0.643 0 0.355 1 0.95 0.75 0.4 0.95 0.8 0.7 0.81 0.55 1 0.8 0 0.95 0 0 0 1 1.5 0 0 1 0.667 1 1999 IND1999 0 0.4 0.286 0 0.643 0 0.355 1 0.75 0.75 0.4 0.95 0.8 0.7 0.81 0.55 1 1 0 0.95 1 0 0 1 1.5 0 0 1 0.667 1 2004 IND2004 0 0.4 0.286 1 0.643 0 0.35 1 0.75 0.75 0.4 0.95 0.8 0.7 0.81 0.6 1 0.6 0 0.95 0 0 0 1 1.5 0 0 1 0.667 1 2009 IND2009 0 0.4 0.286 1 0.714 0 0.365 1 0.75 0.75 0.4 0.86 0.8 0.56 0.81 0.57 0.5 1 0 0.95 0 0 1 1 1.5 0 0 1 0.667 1 2014 IND2014 0 0.4 0.286 1 0.714 0 0.315 0 0.75 0.75 0.4 0.85 0.8 0.5 0.81 0.62 0.5 0.4 0 0.95 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.667 1

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES DEP. VARIABLES INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS POLITICAL - ELECTORAL DYNAMICS PSM STRUCTURAL FACTORS PUBLIC PERCEPTION MITIG. VIOLENCE divisio conflic reg_typ observ int_ob con_p con_ UNDP NELD intensit ID Type suffrage genuine periodic civ_pol manip vote_buy loser oppos rull_p el_syst st_leg EMB malpr pov_HDI pov_GC trans fraud mitig imapct n t e e s roc EMB _prg A_v y NEPAL 1981 NEP1981 0 1 0.429 0 0.429 0 0.088 0 0.45 1 1 0.23 0.3 0.18 0.68 0.33 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 1 0 0.5 0 0 1 0.333 0.667 1986 NEP1986 0 1 0.429 1 0.5 0 0.1 0 0.45 1 1 0.25 0.3 0.2 0.68 0.38 0 0 0 0.4 1 0 0 1 0.5 0 0 1 0.333 0.667 1991 NEP1991 0 0.6 0.286 0 0.5 0 0.245 0 0.75 0.75 1 0.53 0.7 0.4 0.68 0.42 0.5 0 1 0.75 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0.333 1 1994 NEP1994 0 0.6 0.429 0 0.5 0 0.213 0 0.75 0.75 1 0.55 0.7 0.38 0.68 0.42 0 0 0 0.75 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.333 0.667 1999 NEP1999 0 0.6 0.429 1 0.571 0 0.208 0 0.95 1 1 0.43 0.7 0.38 0.68 0.47 0.5 0.2 0 0.75 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.333 0.667 2008 NEP2008 1 0.4 0.714 0 0.571 0 0.323 0 0.9 0 0.8 0.58 0.7 0.45 0.68 0.5 0 0.6 1 0.8 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.667 0.667 2013 NEP2013 0 0.4 0.571 1 0.643 0 0.413 0 0.7 1 0.8 0.75 0.8 0.5 0.68 0.56 0.5 0 1 0.8 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.333 0.667 2017 NEP2017 0 0.4 0.429 1 0.643 0 0.38 0 0.9 1 0.8 0.73 0.6 0.45 0.68 0.57 0.5 0 1 0.75 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.667 0.667 PAKISTAN 1985 PAK1985 0 0.8 0.571 0 0.357 0 0.18 1 0.45 0.75 0.4 0.42 0.3 0.25 0.53 0.42 1 0 0 0.15 1 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 1 0.333 0.667 1988 PAK1988 0 0.8 0.429 0 0.571 0 0.28 0 0.9 1 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.53 0.42 1 0 0 0.15 0 0 1 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 1990 PAK1990 0 0.8 0.571 0 0.429 0 0.225 0 0.9 0 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.25 0.53 0.46 0 0.6 1 0.9 1 0 1 0 0.5 0 0 1 1 1 1993 PAK1993 0 0.8 0.429 0 0.429 0 0.233 0 0.5 1 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.21 0.53 0.46 0.5 0 1 0.9 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.667 0.667 1997 PAK1997 0 0.8 0.571 0 0.429 0 0.23 0 0.9 1 0.4 0.58 0.4 0.33 0.53 0.49 0 0.4 1 0.9 1 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.333 0.667 2002 PAK2002 0 0.8 0.857 0 0.429 1 0.233 0 0.45 0 0.4 0.42 0.4 0.25 0.53 0.53 0.5 0.4 0 0.2 1 0 1 0 0.5 0 0 1 0.667 1 2008 PAK2008 0 0.8 0.857 0 0.429 1 0.315 1 0.45 0 0.4 0.65 0.5 0.38 0.53 0.52 0.5 0.4 0 0.55 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 2013 PAK2013 0 0.8 0.571 1 0.357 0 0.248 0 0.9 1 0.4 0.57 0.5 0.33 0.53 0.54 0.5 0.2 0 0.8 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 SRI LANKA 1982 SRL1982 1 0.6 0.286 1 0.714 0 0.4 0 0.77 0.75 1 0.63 0.5 0.38 0.43 0.65 0.5 0 0 0.8 0 0 1 1 0.5 0 0 1 1 1 1988 SRL1988 1 0.4 0.429 1 0.5 1 0.375 0 0.9 1 1 0.54 0.5 0.25 0.43 0.68 1 0.4 0 0.75 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1989 SRL1989 0 0.4 0.857 0 0.5 1 0.375 0 0.7 1 0.8 0.58 0.5 0.29 0.43 0.68 1 0.6 0 0.75 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1994 SRL19941 0 0.4 0.857 1 0.571 0 0.438 0 0.7 1 0.8 0.79 0.5 0.46 0.43 0.7 1 0.6 0 0.75 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1994 SRL19942 1 0.4 0.857 1 0.571 0 0.438 0 0.7 1 1 0.79 0.5 0.46 0.43 0.7 1 0.6 0 0.75 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1999 SRL1999 1 0.4 0.857 0 0.571 0 0.398 1 0.7 1 1 0.63 0.5 0.42 0.43 0.73 1 0.6 0 0.75 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 2000 SRL2000 0 0.4 0.857 1 0.571 0 0.383 0 0.9 1 0.8 0.67 0.5 0.42 0.43 0.73 1 0.6 0 0.75 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 2001 SRL2001 0 0.4 0.857 1 0.5 0 0.33 0 0.7 1 0.8 0.75 0.5 0.42 0.43 0.73 1 0.6 0 0.75 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 2004 SRL2004 0 0.8 0.857 0 0.571 0 0.4 0 0.7 1 0.8 0.71 0.6 0.42 0.43 0.75 1 0 0 0.75 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.667 1 2005 SRL2005 1 0.8 0.857 0 0.571 0 0.388 0 0.9 0.75 1 0.59 0.6 0.41 0.43 0.75 1 0 0 0.75 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.667 2010 SRL20101 1 0.6 0.857 0 0.643 0 0.42 0 0.9 0 1 0.56 0.7 0.49 0.43 0.75 0 0 0 0.8 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.667 2010 SRL20102 0 0.6 0.857 1 0.643 0 0.42 0 0.7 0 0.8 0.56 0.7 0.49 0.43 0.75 0 0 0 0.8 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.667 2015 SRL20151 1 0.6 0.857 1 0.429 0 0.53 0 0.95 1 1 0.8 0.7 0.63 0.43 0.77 0 0.2 0 0.7 0 0 1 1 1.5 0 1 1 1 1 2015 SRL20152 0 0.6 0.857 1 0.429 0 0.53 0 0.95 1 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.63 0.43 0.77 0 0.2 0 0.7 0 0 1 1 1.5 0 1 0 0.333 0.667 10. References

10.1. Publications and documents Abraham, Itt; Newman, Edward; and Weiss Mederith L. 2010. Political violence in South and Southeast Asia: Critical perspectives. New York: United Nations University Press. Akhter, Muhammad Yeahia. 2001. Electoral Corruption in Bangladesh. London: Ashgate Publishing Company. Alihodžič, Sead, and Aman, Adhi. 2017. Multi-institutional collaboration in Thailand: A potential way for improving election risk management. Bangkok: International Idea. Alihodžič, Sead, and Asplund Erik. 2018. The Prevention and Mitigation of Election-related Violence. Stockholm: International IDEA. Aminzade, Ronald; Goldstone, Jack A.; McAdam, Doug, et al. 2001. Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Anderson, Christopher J.; Blais, Andre; Bowle Shaun et al. 2005. Losers’ Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Asia Foundation. 2014. “Elections and Political Processes in Asia.” Available at https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Elections.pdf (consulted Jan 2017). ___. 2017. “India.” Available at https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/India- StateofConflictandViolence.pdf (consulted on August 2017). ___. 2017(a). “Sri Lanka.” Available at https://asiafoundation.org/publication/sri-lanka/ (consulted on August 2018). ___. 2017(b). The State of Conflict and Violence in Asia. San Francisco/Bangkok: Asia Foundation. Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL). 2009. “Afghanistan Presidential & Provincial Council Election: A Legal Assessment.” Document obtained from the UNDP Elect Project, Afghanistan. Atuobi, Samuel M. 2008. Election Related Violence in Africa. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC). 1973. “Report on the First General Election to Parliament in Bangladesh.” Dhaka: Government Printing Press.

189

Baruah, Sanjib. 2014. “Politics of Electoral Violence.” Outlook India. Available at https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/the-politics-of-electoral-violence/290704 (consulted Jan 2019). BBC. 2015. “Sri Lanka’s Rajapaksa suffers shock election defeat.” Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30738671 (consulted 9 January 2015). Beech, Hannah; Bastians, Dharisha; and Schultz, Kai. 2019. “Religious Minorities Across Asia Suffer Amid Surge in Sectarian Politics.” New York Times. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/21/world/asia/sri-lanka-religion-christians.html (consulted on 23 November 2017). Berenshot, Ward. 2011. Riot Politics: Hindu-Muslim Violence and the Indian State. London: C. Hurst & CO. Bhattacharjee, Joyeeta. 2014. “Bangladesh: Election-2014, an assessment.” Observer Research Foundation. Available at https://www.orfonline.org/research/bangladesh-election-2014- an-assessment/ (consulted on 24 February 2019). Bidwai, Praful. 2009. “Institutional coup.” Frontline, 26(4). Available at https://frontline.thehindu.com/static/html/fl2604/stories/20090227260409800.htm (consulted on 14 June 2018). Birch, Sarah. 2011. Electoral Malpractice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Birch, Sarah, and Muchlinski David. 2017 (a). “Codebook for the Dataset of Countries at Risk for Electoral Violence (CREV),” version 1. Birch, Sarah, and Muchlinski, David. 2017. “Electoral Violence Prevention and Intervention Database Codebook.” King’s College London. Available at http://www.electoralviolenceproject.com/datasetviolence/ (consulted on 30 May 2017). Birch, Sarah, and Muchlinski David. 2017 (b). “The Dataset of Countries at risk of electoral violence.” Available at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080%2F09546553.2017.1 364636 (last consulted on 30 August 2019). Bisht, Medha. 2013. “Bhutan: elections 2013.” Available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/bhutan-elections-2013-0/ (consulted on 17 May 2019).

190

Bjelica, Jelena, and Sorush, Rohullah. 2018. “Afghanistan Elections Conundrum (20): Women candidates going against the grain.” Afghan Analyst Network. Available at https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghanistan-elections-conundrum-19-women- candidates-going-against-the-grain/ (consulted on 29 October 2018). Borzyskowski, Inken. 2015. “Trust Us: Technical Election Assistance and Post-Election Violence.” Paper presented at ECPR General Conference, University of Montreal (26 – 29 August 2015). Borzyskowski, Inken. 2016. “The Risks of Election Monitoring: International Condemnation and Post-Election Violence.” Working Paper: Florida State University. Brass, Paul. 1985. Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics (Volume 2). Delhi: Chanakya Publications ___. 2010. Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. London: Routledge. Butler, David; Lahiri, Ashok; and Roy, Prannoy. 1995. India Decides. Elections 1952-1995. New Delhi: Books & Things. [The] Carter Center. 2008. “Observing the 2008 Nepal’s Constituent Assembly Election, Final Report.” Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center. ___. 2013. “Observing the 2013 Nepal’s Constituent Assembly Election, Final Report.” Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center. ___. 2017. “Election Observation Mission: Nepal, Federal and Provincial Elections, 2017 – Preliminary Statement.” Kathmandu: Carter Center. ___. 2017. “Post-Election Statement, International Election Observation Mission to Nepal’s 2017 Provincial and Federal Elections.” Kathmandu: Carter Center. CBC News. 2010. “Sri Lankan Opposition alleges election fraud.” Available at https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/sri-lankan-opposition-alleges-election-fraud-1.878438 (consulted on 24 March 2019). ___. 2013. “29 Die in India Elections Violence.” Available at www.cbsnews.com/2100- 202_162-3454.html (consulted on 24 March 2019). Center for Monitoring Electoral Violence (CMEV). 2015. “Sri Lanka Brief, Electoral Violence: Interim Report, Parliamentary General Election 2015.” Available at

191

http://srilankabrief.org/2015/08/election-violence-interim-report-parliamentary-general-election- 2015/ (consulted on 23 April 2017). Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA). 2011. “Survey on Democracy in Post-War Sri Lanka.” Colombo: CPA/Friedrich Neumann Stiftung. ___. 2013. “Democracy in Post-War Sri Lanka.” Colombo: CPA. ___. 2015. “Democracy in Post-War Sri Lanka.” Colombo: CPA. ___. 2015(a). “Statement on the Presidential Election 2015.” Available at https://www.cpalanka.org/statement-on-the-presidential-election-2015/ (consulted on7 June 2019). Chandio, Amir Ali. 2011. “Non- Party based General election of 1985: Causes an effect.” 2011 International Conference on Social Science and Humanity, Vol. 5, IACSIT Press, Singapore. Available at http://www.ipedr.com/vol5/no2/113-H10169.pdf (consulted on 7 May 2019) . Chopra, Ritika. 2019. “An Expert Explains: How EC evolved, what rules it follows in case of disagreement.” The Indian Express. Available at https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/an-expert-explains-how-election-commission- evolved-what-rules-it-follows-in-case-of-disagreement-5720029/ (consulted on 12 July 2019). Chowdhury, Dilara and Al Masud, Hasanuzzaman. 1997. "Political Decision-Making in Bangladesh and the Role of Women." Asian Profile, 25(1): 53–69. Chowdhury, Sayed Tashfin. 2013. “Election monitors to boycott Bangladesh polls.” https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/12/election-monitors-boycott- bangladesh-polls-2013122712914224624.html (consulted on 29 Dec 2018). Chowdhury, Sayed Tashfin. 2014. “Violent Bangladesh poll not credible.” Available at https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/01/violent-bangladesh-poll-not- credible-201417153340105129.html (consulted on 29 Dec 2018). Cleo, Pascal. 2014. “How Secure Are India’s Elections?” Huffington post. Available at https://bit.ly/32pJgru (consulted on 23 March 2019). Collective Campaign for Peace (COCAP). 2017. “Incidents and Electoral Environment after Madheshi Morcha’s Withdrawal of Government Support, March 16 to 31, 2017.” Available at http://www.cocap.org.np/2017/07/11/incidents-and-electoral-environment- 192

after-madheshi-morchas-withdrawal-of-government-support-analysis-update_3-1/ (consulted on 7 May 2019). Collier, Paul. 2009. Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. New York: Harper Collins. Collier, Paul, and Hoeffler, Anke. 2004. “Greed and grievance in civil war.” Oxford Economic Papers – New Series 6 (4) 563-95. Commonwealth Expert Team. 2010. “Sri Lanka, Presidential Election, 26 January 2010.” London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Commonwealth Observer Group. 1997. “The General Election in Pakistan.” London: Commonwealth. Secretariat. ___. 2015. “Presidential Elections of Sri Lanka, 8 January 2015.” London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Coppedge, Michael et al. 2015. "V-DEM Codebook V8." Available at https://www.v- dem.net/en/reference/version-8-apr-2018/ (consulted 19 September 2018). Daily FT. 2015. “Election Department in the Limelight.” Available at http://www.ft.lk/article/478461/Elections-Department-in-the-limelight (consulted 7 July 2019). Dahal, Dev Raj. 2010. “Elections and Conflict in Nepal.” International Policy Analysis, Friedrich Eiber Stiftung. Available at https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/07722.pdf (consulted on 17 February 2019). De Vaus, D.A. 1990 (2nd ed.). Survey in Social Research. London: Unwin Hyman. De Vaus, D.A. 1996. Survey in Social Research, 4 ed. London: University of London Press. De Vaus, D.A. 2002 (5th ed.). Surveys in Social Research. London: Routlege. Dhagamwar, Vasudha. 1995. “Report: Elections in Pakistan, 1993.” Available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/097152159500200108 (consulted on 27 June 2019). Dikshit, S.K. 1993. Electoral Geography of India, With Special Reference to Sixth and Seventh Lok Sabha Elections. Varanasi: Vishwavidyalaya Prakashan. Disability Rights Watch Group Bangladesh (DRWG). 2009. “State of Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Bangladesh, 2009.” Disability Rights Watch Group Bangladesh, Dhaka. Available at http://www.dpiap.org/resources/doc/State_Rights_PWDs_2009Bangladesh (consulted on 8 April 2019).

193

Dunning, Thad. 2011. “Fighting and voting: Violent conflict and electoral politics.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(3): 327-39. Eckstein, Jeremy. 2019. “A Bangladesh Case Study: Technical Electoral Assistance in Deeply Divided Politics.” Available at https://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/focus-on-effective-electoral-assistance/eea_links (consulted on 14 May 2019). [The] Economist. 2009. “India’s jumbo election”. The Economist (16 April 2009). Available at https://www.economist.com/leaders/2009/04/16/indias-jumbo-election . Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). 1996. “EIU Country Report. 3rd Quarter 1996: Bangladesh.” London: Economist Intelligence Unit. ___. 2015. “Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in an age of anxiety”. Available at http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2015 (consulted Oct 2016) (consulted on 14 March 2019). “Election Commission not serious about persons with disabilities.” 2014. Punjab Kesari [hindi]. Election Commission of Bhutan. 2013. “Handbook for candidates.” Available at https://www.ecb.bt/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/HandbookforCandidates.pdf (consulted on 6 June 2018). Election Commission of India (ECI). 1981(a). “General Election 1980 (Vol. 1, 2).” New Delhi: ECI. Election Commission of India (ECI). 1981(b). “Statistical Report on General Elections, 1980 to the Seventh Lok Sabha, Volume 1.” New Delhi: ECI. Election Commission of India (ECI). 2009. “Handbook for Presiding Officers.” New Delhi: ECI. Available at https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/11726929/handbook-for- presiding-officers-election-commission-of-india (consulted on 17 June 2018). ___. 2017. “Handout for Consultations: Electoral Process India.” New Delhi: India International Institute of Democracy and Election Management (IIIDEM). ___. 2018. “Strategic Plan 2016 – 2025.” Available at https://eci.gov.in/files/file/5676-strategic- plan-book/ (consulted on 1 January 2019). Election Commission of Sri Lanka/Department of Elections. 2016. “Performance Appraisal Report of the Department of Election / Election Commission for the year 2015.” Available at https://www.parliament.lk/uploads/documents/paperspresented/performance- 194

report-department-of-elections-election-commission-2015.pdf (consulted on 7 July 2019). Ellena, Katherine; Mohan, Vasu; Smith, Jan; and Vickery, Chad. 2016. “Sri Lanka. Electoral Integrity Assessment Final Report.” Arlington: IFES. Ellena, Katherina, and Petrov, Goran. 2018. Cybersecurity in Elections: Developing Holistic Exposure and Adaptation Training (HEAT) Process for Election Management Bodies. Arlington: International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Ellis, Andrew. 2006. “Dilemmas in representation and Political identity.” In Judith, Large, and Sisk, Thimothy (eds.). Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Further Readings (Volume II). Stockholm: International IDEA. Emadi, Hafizullah. 2008. “Establishment of Afghanistan’s Parliament and the Role of Women Parliamentarians Retrospect and Prospects.” International Asian Forum, Vol. 39 (2008), No. 1-2, 5-19. Ennis, David. 2006. “Analysis of the Electoral Legal Framework of Afghanistan.” International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). Available at https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/analysis_legalframework.pdf (consulted on 17 February 2018). European Parliament. 2014. “Resolution of 16 January 2014 on recent elections in Bangladesh (2014/2516(RSP).” Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201401/20140122ATT78066/20 140122ATT78066EN.pdf (consulted on 24 March 2019). European Union. 2018. “Digital technology in elections: efficiency versus credibility?” Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/625178/EPRS_BRI(2018)62 5178_EN.pdf (consulted Jan 2019). European Union Democracy and Election Support Mission (EU DESM). 2004. “Presidential Election, 9 October 2004, Final Report.” Brussels/Kabul: EU DESM. European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM Sri Lanka). 2004. “Sri Lanka, Parliamentary Elections 2 April 2004.” Brussels/Colombo: EU EOM. ___. (EU EOM Afghanistan). 2005. “Afghanistan, Parliamentary and Provincial Council Elections, 18 September 2005, Final Report.” Brussels/Kabul: EU EOM. 195

___. (EU EOM Sri Lanka). 2005. “Sri Lanka, Presidential Election, 17 November 2005.” Brussels/Colombo: EU EOM. ___ (EU EOM Afghanistan). 2009. “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Presidential and Provincial Council Elections, 20 August 2009, Final Report.” Brussels/Kabul: EU EOM. ___ (EU EOM Bangladesh). 2001. “Bangladesh Parliamentary Elections 1 October 2001. Final Report.” Dhaka/Kabul: EU EOM. ___ (EU EOM Bangladesh). 2009. “People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Final Report. Parliamentary Elections, 29 December 2008.” Dhaka/Kabul: EU EOM. ___ (EU EOM Bhutan). 2008. “Bhutan, Final Report, National Assembly Elections, 24 March 2008.” Thimphu/Brussels: EU EOM. ___. (EU EOM Nepal). 2008. “Final Report: Constituent Assembly Elections, 10 April 2008.” Kathmandu/Brussels: EU EOM. ___. (EU EOM Nepal). 2013. “Final Report: Constituent Assembly Elections, 19 November 2013.” Kathmandu/Brussels: EU EOM. ___. (EU EOM Sri Lanka). 2015. “Final Report, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Parliamentary Elections, 17 August 2015.” Brussels/Colombo: EU EOM. ___. (EU EOM Nepal). 2018. “Final Report: Nepal, House of Representatives and Provincial Assembly Elections, 26 November and 7 December 2017.” Kathmandu/Brussels: EU EOM. ___. (EU EOM Pakistan). 2002. “Final Report: Pakistan National and Provincial Assembly Election, 10 October 2002.” Islamabad/Brussels: EU EOM. ___. (EU EOM Pakistan). 2008. “Final Report: National and Provincial Assembly Elections, 18 February 2008.” Islamabad/Brussels: EU EOM. ___. (EU EOM Pakistan). 2013. “Final Report: General Elections, 11 May 2013.” Islamabad/Brussels: EU EOM. European Union Election Assessment Team (EU EAT). 2010. “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Parliamentary Elections, 18 September 2010, Final Report.” Brussels/Kabul: EU EAT. ___. 2014. “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Presidential Election, 5 April and 14 June, Final Report.” Brussels/Kabul: EU EAT. Feldman, Ariel J.; Halderman, J. Alex; and Felten, Edward W. 2006. “Security Analysis of the Diebold ‘AccuVote-TS’ Voting Machine”, Center of Information Technology Policy,

196

Princeton University. Available at http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/ voting/ts-paper.pdf (consulted. On 7 January 2018). Finn, James ed.1994-1995. “The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1994- 1995. New York: Freedom House. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). 2014. “Bangladesh – Country case study update”. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/bangladesh-country-case- study-update. Franklin, Jeremy. 2008. “Nepal: Constituency Assembly Election April 2008.” Norwegian Center for Human Rights. Available at https://www.jus.uio.no/smr/english/about/programmes/nordem/publications/2008/0908.p df (consulted on 17 June 2018). Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN). 2007. “Draft Electoral Roll 2007: Flawed but Fixable” Available at http://fafen.org/draft-electoral-roll-2007-flawed-fixable/ (consulted on 3 December 2018). ___. 2010. National Assembly Elections in Pakistan, 1970-2008: A compendium of elections related facts and statistics. Karachi/Islamabad: Church World Services/FAFEN. Freedom House. 1998. “Bangladesh: Freedom in the World 1998.” Available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/bangladesh (consulted on 12 Dec 2018). ___. 2014. “Freedom in the World: The democratic leadership gap.” Available at https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Freedom%20in%20the%20World%202014% 20Booklet.pdf (consulted Nov 2016). Gastil, Raymond D. 1989. “Freedom in the World: Political Rights, and Civil Liberties.” New York: Freedom House. Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Wallensteen, Peter; Eriksson, Mikael; Sollenberrg, Marrgereta; and Strand, Havard. 2002. “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 39(5): 615-637. Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security (GCEDS). 2012. Deepening Democracy: A Strategy for Improving the Integrity of Elections Worldwide. Geneva: Kofi Annan Foundation.

197

Grömping, Max, and Martinez i Coma, Ferran. 2015. “Policy Report: Electoral Integrity in Africa.” Available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/hiu5qf8kd159nk2/Electoral%20Integrity%20in%20Africa% 20-%20web.pdf?dl=0 (consulted Jan 2017). [The] Guardian. 2014. “Indian election: Kashmir violence leaves three dead.” Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/22/indian-election-kashmir-violence-three- dead (consulted on 2 April 2019). [The] Guardian. 2015. “Sri Lanka election: shock as president Mahinda Rajapaksa concedes defeat.” Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/09/sri-lanka-election- shock-as-president-mahinda-rajapaksa-concedes-defeat (consulted on 7 July 2019). [The] Guardian. 2015. “Sri Lanka election: shock as president Mahinda Rajapaksa concedes defeat.” Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/09/sri-lanka-election- shock-as-president-mahinda-rajapaksa-concedes-defeat (consulted on 7 July 2019). Haffner-Burton Emilie M., Hyde Susan D., and Jablonski, Ryan S. 2014. “When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?” British Journal of Political Science (44(1) 1- 33. Halderman, Prasad, et al. 2010. “Security Analysis of India’s Electronic Voting Machines.” Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Available at https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/evm-ccs10.pdf (consulted on 23 March 2019). Halff, Maarten. 2016. “Confidence in elections and the acceptance of results.” Geneva: Kofi Annan Foundation. Halff, Maarten. 2017. “The United Nations approach to electoral management support.” Paper presented at the annual conference of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). Oslo, September 2017. Harbers, Imke; Barrtman, Jos; and van Wingerden, Enrike. 2019. “Conceptualizing and measuring subnational democracy across Indian states.” Democratization, 26(7), 1154 – 1175. Harris, Gardiner. 2013. “Election Results in Nepal Signal a Political Right Turn”. The New York Times, 25 November 2013. Available at

198

https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/world/asia/maoists-are-routed-in-nepalese- election.html (consulted on 15 July). Hassan, Shaukat. 1983. “Transitional Politics in Bangladesh: A Study of Sattar’s Interim Presidency.” India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs. Available at https://doi.org/10.1177/097492848303900302 (consulted on 17 May 2019). Herstatt, Maxmilian, and Herstatt, Cornelius. 2014. “India’s Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs): Social construction of a “frugal” innovation.” Hamburg University of Technology, Working paper No. 86. Available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264093866_India's_Electronic_Voting_Machin es_EVMs_Social_construction_of_a_frugal_innovation (consulted on 7 March 2019). Höglund, Kristine. 2009. “Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes and Consequences.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 21:3, 412 – 427. Hyde, Susan D. 2011 " Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion." American Journal of Political Science, 55: 2, 356-369. Available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00508.x . Hyde, Susan D., and Marionov, Nikolay. 2012. “Which Elections can be Lost?” Political Analysis, 20(2), 191 – 210. Hyde, Susan D., and Marinov, Nikolay. 2015. “National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset, Code book for Version 4.” Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2003. “Pakistan.” Available at https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k3/asia8.html (consulted on 19 June 2019). ___. 2014(a). “Democracy in the Crossfire. Opposition Violence and Government Abuses in the 2014 Pre- and Post-Election Period in Bangladesh.” Available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/04/29/democracy-crossfire/opposition-violence-and- government-abuses-2014-pre-and-post (consulted on 24 May 2019). ___. 2014(b). “Bangladesh: Elections Scarred by Violence: Government and Opposition Responsible for Abuses, Before, During, After Polls. Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/29/bangladesh-elections-scarred-violence (consulted on 24 May 2019).

199

International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). 1991. “Kingdom of Nepal: Parliamentary Elections, May 12, 1991, United States Election Observer Report.” Available at https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/r01771_0.pdf (consulted on 28 March 2019). ___. 2014. “Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs): Pakistan Factsheet.” Available at https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/electronic_voting_machines.pdf (consulted on 1 April 2018). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRBC). 1996. “Issue Paper: Bangladesh Political Developments and Political Violence.” Available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/07/ISSUES_PAPER_POL ITICAL-DEVELOPMENTS-AND-POLITICAL-VIOLENCE.pdf (consulted on 16 September 2018). International Crisis Group. 2008. “Nepal’s Election and Beyond.” Asia Report N°149. Available at http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Nepal_2_Apr_08_Nepal_s_Election_and_Beyond .pdf (consulted on 17 May 2019). ___. 2008(a). “After Bhutto’s Murder: A Way Forward for Pakistan.” Islamabad/Brussels: ICG. ___. 2009. “Asia Briefing N. 96, Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance.” Available at https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/afghanistan- elections-and-crisis-governance (consulted on 23 December 2018). ___. 2009. “Asia Report N. 171: Afghanistan’s Election Challenges.” Available at http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_87/documentos/171_afghanistan_s_election_chall enges.pdf (consulted on 23 December 2018). ___.2012. “Bangladesh: Back to the Future.” Asia Report N. 226. Available at https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/bangladesh-back-future (consulted on 15 January 2019). ___. 2015. “Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis.” Asia Report N. 264. Available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/54eb265b4.pdf (consulted on 5 May 2018). Inter-Parliamentary Union. 1981. “Nepal.” Available at http://archive.ipu.org/parline- e/reports/arc/NEPAL_1981_E.PDF (consulted on 23 July 2018). ___. 1985. “Pakistan.” Available at http://archive.ipu.org/parline- e/reports/arc/PAKISTAN_1985_E.PDF (consulted on 29 July 2018). 200

___. 1986 “Nepal.” Available at http://archive.ipu.org/parline- e/reports/arc/NEPAL_1986_E.PDF (consulted on 23 July 2018). ___. 1988. “Afghanistan.” Available at http://archive.ipu.org/parline- e/reports/arc/AFGHANISTAN_1988_E.PDF (consulted on 29 July 2019). ___. 1988(a). “Pakistan, Parliamentary Chamber: National Assembly Elections held in 1988”. Available at http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2241_88.htm (consulted on 29 July 2018). ___. 1989. “Sri Lanka: Parliament. ”Available at http://archive.ipu.org/parline- e/reports/arc/2295_89.htm (consulted on 7 July 2018). ___. 1990. “Pakistan, Parliamentary Chamber: National Assembly Elections held in 1990”. Available at http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2241_90.htm (consulted on 8 July 2018). ___. 1993. “Pakistan, Parliamentary Chamber: National Assembly Elections held in 1993” Available at http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2241_93.htm (consulted on 29 July 2019). ___. 1994. “Nepal, Elections held in 1994.” http://archive.ipu.org/parline- e/reports/arc/2386_94.htm . ___. 1994(a). “Sri Lanka: Parliament.” http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2295_94.htm ___. 1997. “Pakistan, Parliamentary Chamber: National Assembly Elections held in 1997”.http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2241_97.htm . ___. 1999. “Nepal, Parliamentary Chamber: Pratinidhi Sabha.” Available at http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2386_99.htm (consulted on 17 July 2018). ___. 2000. “Sri Lanka: Parliament.” Available at http://archive.ipu.org/parline- e/reports/arc/2295_00.htm (consulted on 17 July 2018). ___. 2001. “Sri Lanka: Parliament.” Available at http://archive.ipu.org/parline- e/reports/arc/2295_01.htm (consulted on 18 July 2018). ___. 2002. “Pakistan, Parliamentary Chamber: National Assembly Elections held in 2002”. Available at http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2241_02.htm (consulted on 18 July 2018). ___. 2004. “Sri Lanka: Parliament.” Available at http://archive.ipu.org/parline- e/reports/arc/2295_04.htm (consulted on 16 July 2018). ___. 2007. "Bhutan: Tshogdu (National Assembly).” Available at http://archive.ipu.org/parline- e/reports/2035_arc.htm (consulted on 20 July 2018). 201

___. 2008. “Bhutan: Tshogdu (National Assembly).” Available at http://archive.ipu.org/parline- e/reports/arc/2035_08.htm (consulted on 20 July 2018). ___. 2010. “Sri Lanka: Parliament.” http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2295_10.htm . ___.2013. "Bhutan: Tshogdu (National Assembly)." Available at http://archive.ipu.org/parline- e/reports/arc/2035_13.htm (consulted on 20 July 2018). Islam, Mohammad Mazahidul. 2015. “Electoral violence in Bangladesh: Does a confrontational bipolar political system matter?” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 53:4. Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2008. ‘‘Why Should We Vote? The Indian Middle Class and the Functioning of the World’s Largest Democracy.” In Christophe Jaffrelot, and Peter Van der Veer (eds.). Patterns of Middle-Class Consumption in India and China. New Delhi: Sage. Kay, Benedict. 2018. “Fears of violence loom large ahead of Indian election.” UCA News. Available at https://www.ucanews.com/news/fears-of-violence-loom-large-ahead-of- indian-election/82519 (consulted Dec 2018). Karatnycky, Adrian (ed.). 2001. “Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties, 2000-2001.” New York: Freedom House. ___. 2002. “Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties, 2001-2002.” New York: Freedom House. Kerr, Nicholas N. 2014. “EMB Performance and Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in Africa.” In Korzh, V. 2013. “Corrupt Electoral Technologies in Ukraine: Concept, Types, Problems of Resistance.” Law of Ukraine: Legal Journal, 2013(5), 224-229. Khan, Ahmed Mughees; Basit, Abdul; and Fozia, Nasem. 2011. “Policies for Special Persons in Pakistan. Analysis of Policy Implementation.” Berkley Journal of Social Sciences, Vol 1 (2). Available at https://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2014/02/Feb%201.pdf (consulted on 2 January 2018). Kippen, Grant. 2008. “Elections in 2009 and 2010: Technical and Contextual Challenges to Building Democracy in Afghanistan.” Kabul: ARREU. Kodikara, Chulani. 2009. “The Struggle for Political Representation of Women in Sri Lanka, A Stocktaking Report for the Ministry of Child Development and Women’s Empowerment

202

and the United Nations Development Programme.” Kiribathgoda: Sarasavi Off-Set Printers. Kohli, Atul. 2001. The Success of India Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kondo, Norio (2007). “Election Studies in India.” Institute of Developing Economies, Discussion Paper n°98. Kriesi, Hanspeter; Della Porta, Donatell; and Ruch, Dieter (eds.). 1995. Social Movements in a Globalizing World. London: Macmillian. Kumar, Chanchal. 2015. “Electoral Violence, Threats and Security: Problems and Prospects for Indian Democracy.” American Journal of Social Science Research, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 38- 51. Available at www.publicscienceframework.org/journal/ajssr (consulted on 31October 2017). Kumar, Raj. C. 2011. Corruption and Human Rights in India: Comparative Perspective on Transparency and Good Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kumar, Satish. 1964. “The Panchayat Constitution of Nepal and its Operation.” International Studies, Vol. VI No. 2. https://doi.org/10.1177/002088176400600202. Larson, Anna. 2010. “The Wolesi Jirga in Flux, 2010: Elections and Instability.” Kabul: AREU. Larson, Anna. 2013. Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan: Elections in an Unstable Political Landscape. New York: Columbia University Press. Larson, Anna, and Coburn, Noah. 2009. “Patronage, posturing, duty, demographics: Why Afghans Voted in 2009.” Kabul: AREU. Lawoti, Mahendra. 2008. “Exclusionary Democratization in Nepal, 1990 – 2002.” Democratisation, 15:2. Levitsky, Steven and Way, Lucan A. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lijphart, Arend. 1969. “Consociational democracy.” World Politics 21: 207-25; Lijphart, Arend. 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945 – 1990. New York: Oxford University Press. Lijphart, Arend. 2008. Thinking about democracy. Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice. New York. Rutledge. Linek, Lukáš. 2012. Voliči a volby 2010 [Voters and elections 2010]. Prague: SLON.

203

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Schneider William. 1983. The confidence gap: Business, labor, and government in the public mind. New York: Free Press. LiveMint. 2010. “Sri Lanka election: On the ground report from Colombo – International News.” Livemint.com. Available at https://www.livemint.com/2010/01/27173151/sri-lanka- election-on-the-gro.html (consulted on 7 July 2019). Llewellyn, Morgan H., Hall, Thad E., and Alvarez, Michael R. 2009. “Electoral Context and Voter Confidence: How the Context of an Election Shapes Voter Confidence in the Process.” Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project Working Paper No. 79. Lokniti Team (2004) ‘National Election Study 2004: An Introduction’, Economic and Political Weekly, 39(51). Available at https://www.epw.in/journal/2004/51/special- articles/national-election-study-2004.html (consulted on 17 July 2017). Lorch, Jasmine. 2014. “Election in Bangladesh: Political Conflict and the Problem of Credibility.” E-International Relations. Available at https://www.e- ir.info/2014/02/02/elections-in-bangladesh-political-conflict-and-the-problem-of- credibility/ (consulted March 7, 2019). Mareš, Petr; Rabušič, Ladislav; and Soukup, Petr. 2015. Analýza sociálněvědních dat (nejen) v SPSS. [Analysis of social sciences data (not only) in SPSS, transl.] Brno: Masaryk University (MUNI Press). Marshall, Monty G. 2014. “Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800 – 2013. Available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm (consulted Oct 2016). Mate, Manoj. 2016. “India’s Participatory Model: The Right to Information in Election Law.” The George Washington International Law Review, 48, (2). McAdam, Doug, and Tarrow, Sidney. 2010. “Ballots and Barricades: On the Reciprocal Relationship Between Elections and Social Movements.” Perspectives on Politics 8(2): 529-542. McClatchy. 2017. “Massive protests in Venezuela lead to violence, uncertainty.” Miami Herald. Available at https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation- world/world/americas/venezuela/article145430429.html (consulted December 2018). Mercy Corps. 2003. “Western Nepal Conflict Assessment.” Available at https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/file1137793491.pdf (consulted on 25 June 2019). 204

Micheni, Elyjoy. 2018. “The Role of ICT in Electoral Processes: Case of Kenya.” Africa Week Conference, 2018. Mitra, Subrata K. 2005. “Elections and the Negotiation of Ethnic Conflict: An American Science of Indian Politics?”, India Review, 24: 326-43. Mohsin, Amina A. 1984. “Religion, Politics and Security: The Case of Bangladesh.” Journal of Asia-Pacific Center for Religious Studies. Available at https://apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligi ousRadicalismandSecurityinSouthAsiach20.pdf (consulted on 28 July 2019). Moyo, Jeffrey. 2018. “Zimbabwe Protests Turn Violent as Some Call Election a Sham.” New York Times. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/world/africa/zimbabwe- elections-protests.html (consulted Jan 2019). Mufti, Mariam. 2018. “Who rigs polls in Pakistan and how?” Herald. Available at https://herald.dawn.com/news/1398566/who-rigs-polls-in-pakistan-and-how (consulted on 17 June 2019). National Democratic Institute (NDI). 1988. “Pakistan Election: Foundation for Democracy.” Washington, DC: NDI. ___. 1990. “The October 1990 Elections in Pakistan.” Washington, DC: NDI. ___. 1993. “The 1993 Elections in Pakistan.” Washington, DC: NDI. ___. 1996. “Second NDI Preliminary Statement, June 1996 Parliamentary Elections in Bangladesh.” Available at https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/1483_bd_election_062096_5.pdf (consulted on 14 May 2019). ___. 2000. “Report of the Post-Election Assessment of Sri Lanka Mission, November 28 – December 2, 2000.” Washington, DC: NDI. ___. 2010. “The 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan.” Washington, DC: NDI. Nayak, Nihar R., Singh, Rajrajeshwari, Ashok Behurria K. “Bhutan National Assembly Elections 2018: A Mandate for Change?” Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis. Available at https://idsa.in/issuebrief/bhutan-elections-2018_nnayak-rsingh-akbehuria- 121118 (consulted on 30 January 2019).

205

“Nepal. 1946 – present.” 2019. University of Central Arkansas, Asia – Pacific Region series. Available at https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/nepal-1946- present/ (consulted on 24 June 2019). Nohlen, Dietmar. 2001. Elections in Asia and Pacific: A Data Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Norris, Pippa. 2002. “Ballots Not Bullets: Testing Convocational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems, and Democratization.” In Andrew Reynolds, ed. The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 206 – 47. ___. 2014. Why Electoral Integrity Matters. New York: Cambridge University Press. ___. 2015. Why elections fail. New York: Cambridge University Press. Norris, Pippa; Frank, Richard W.; and Martinez i Coma, Ferran. 2014. “The Year in Elections 2013: The World's Flawed and Failed Contests.” The Electoral Integrity Project. Available at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11744445 (consulted on 7 September 2017). ___. 2015. Contentious Elections: From Ballots to Barricades. New York: Routlege. ___. 2017. Advancing Electoral Integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Norris, Pippa; Martinez i Coma; Ferran, Frank; Grömping, Max. 2014. The expert survey of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. Release 3.0, (PEI_3.0) February 2015. Available at www.electoralintegrityproject.com (consulted Dec 2016). Norris, Pippa; Martinez i Coma; Ferran, Nai Alessandro. 2016. The Year in Elections, mid-2016 Update. Available at www.electoralintegrityproject.com consulted Jan 2017). Norris, Pippa; Wynter, Thomas; and Sarah Cameron. 2018. "Corruption and Coercion: The Year in Elections 2017." Sydney, Australia: Electoral Integrity Project. Available at https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58533f31bebafbe99c85dc9b/t/5aa60e298165f533f6 462e58/1520832089983/The+Year+in+Elections+2017.pdf (consulted November 2018). Norris, Pippa; and Grömping, Max. 2019. “Electoral Integrity Worldwide.” Sydney: Electoral Integrity Project. Available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/csp1048mkwbrpsu/Electoral%20Integrity%20Worldwide.pd f?dl=0 (consulted on 1 September 2019). O’Donnel, Guillermo A. 1994. “Delegative Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 5: 55 – 69. 206

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe / Office for Democracy Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR). 2004. “Election Support Team to Afghanistan, Recommendations.” Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR. ___. 2005. “Election Support Team to Afghanistan, Recommendations on 2005 Parliamentary Elections.” Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR. ___ . 2009. “Election Support Team, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Presidential and Provincial Council Elections, 20 August 2009.” Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR. ___ . 2014. “Election Support Team, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Presidential and Provincial Council Elections, 5 April and 14 June 2014.” Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR. Ossei-Afful, Rhoda. 2017. “Solutions of Problems? The Increasing Role of Technology in African Elections.” Africa Close, Wilson Center. Available at https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/solutions-or-problems-the-increasing-role-of- technology-in-african-elections/ (consulted on 7 June 2017). Pachauri, Pakaj. 1989. “Criminals in elections 1989.” India Today. Available at https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/nation/story/19891130-criminals-in-elections-1989- 816781-1989-11-30 (consulted on 7 June 2017). Pemstein, Daniel et al. "V-DEM Code Book.” V-DEM Working Paper Series 2015:21. People’s Action for Free and Fair Election (PAFFREL). 2014. “First Interim Report, 2015 Presidential Election.” Islamabad: PAFFREL. Piano, Aili, and Puddington, Arch, ed. 2004. “Freedom in the World 2004. The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties.” New York, Washington DC: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. [Freedom House]. Piano, Aili; Puddington, Arch; and Rosenberg, Mark Y. 2006. “Freedom in the World 2004. The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties.” New York, Washington DC: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. [Freedom House]. Polgreen, Lydia. 2010 "President of Sri Lanka Is Re-elected by Wide Edge". The New York Times. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/world/asia/28lanka.html (consulted on 23 May 2019). Puddington, Arch (ed.). 2015. “Freedom in the World 2014, The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties.” New York and Washington DC: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group [Freedom House] 207

Puddington, Arch, and Dunham, Jennifer (eds.). 2018. “Freedom in the World 2018: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties.” New York and Washington DC: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group [Freedom House]. Puddington, Arch, and Piano, Aili (eds.). 2008. “Freedom in the World 2018: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties.” New York and Washington DC: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group [Freedom House]. ___ 2011. “Freedom in the World 2011: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties.” New York and Washington DC: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group [Freedom House]. Puddington, Arch; Piano, Aili; Eiss, Camille; and Roylance, Tyler (eds.). 2007. “Freedom in the World 2018: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties.” New York and Washington DC: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group [Freedom House]. Quadir, Serajul and Bose Nandita. 2014. “Bangladesh election marred by opposition boycott, violence.” Reuters. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh- election/bangladesh-election-marred-by-opposition-boycott-violence- idUSBREA0301N20140104 (consulted on 8 January 2019). Quraishi S.Y. 2014. An Undocumented Wonder: The Making of the Great Indian Election. New Delhi: Rupa Publications. Reilly B. 2006. “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict Prone Societies.” Democratization, vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 811–827. Reynolds, A, and Wilder A. 2004. “Free, Fair or Flawed: Challenges to Legitimate Elections in Afghanistan.” Kabul: AREU. Reuters. 1996. “Bangladesh Purges State TV ahead of Election.” BC Cycle. Rofeh, Faranak (ed.). 1999. “Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1998 – 1999.” New York: Freedom House. Saif, Shadi Khan. “Protesters lock down parliament in Afghanistan.” Anadolou Agency, available at https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/protesters-lock-down-parliament-in- afghanistan/1475895# (consulted on 7 July 2019). Samarasinghe, A. 1989. “Sri Lanka’s Presidential Election.” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 24 (3): 131-135.

208

___. 1991. “Lessons of Bangladesh Elections”. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 26 (37): 2139 – 2142. ___. 1994. “The 1994 Parliamentary Elections in Sri Lanka: A Vote for Good Governance.” Asian Survey, Vol. 34 (12): 1019 – 1034. Sastry, Trilochan. 2014. “Towards Decriminalisation of Elections and Politics.” Economic & Political Weekly, 49(1). Available at https://www.epw.in/journal/2014/1/perspectives/towards-decriminalisation-elections-and- politics.html (consulted on 13 March 2019). Sayed, Nasr Vali Reza. 1992. “Democracy and the Crisis of Governability in Pakistan.” University of California Press. Available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/2645158 (consulted on 23 March 2018). Schedler, Andreas. 2002. “Elections without democracy.” Journal of Democracy. 13.2 (2002), 36-50. Schedler, Andreas. 2006. “The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism.” In Andreas Schedler ed. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1-23. Schumpeter, Joseph. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: George Allen and Unwin. [The] Seattle Times. 1990. “World.” Available at http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19901023&slug=1100050 (consulted on 17 June 2019). Shah, A.M (ed). 2007. The Grassroots of Democracy: Field Studies of Indian Elections. New Delhi: Permanent Black. Shardai, S. 2009. “ECI Condemns Varun Gandhi for Hate Speeches.” Times of India. Available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-03-28/lucknow/ 28010953_1_varun- gandhi-highly-derogatory-speeches-hatred-between-different-classes (consulted on 24 March 2019). Shastri, Sandeep; Suri, K.C.; and Yadav, Yogendra. 2009. Electoral Politics in Indian States: Lok Sabha Elections in 2004 and Beyond. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Shamrat, Abu Sufian. 2016. “Electoral Reform in Bangladesh 1972 – 2014: An Assessment”. South Asia Journal. 209

Sharma, Niharika. 2019. “Five reasons why the credibility of India’s election commission was questioned this year.” Quartz India. Available at https://qz.com/india/1625877/evm- controversy-other-incidents-mar-indian-general-election-2019/ (consulted April 2018). Shruti, Sia. 2012.Election Reforms in India and Challenges before the Election Commission. New Delhi: Mighty Laws. Sifi News Desk. 2010. “Sri Lanka blocks websites hours before election results.” Sify News. Available at https://www.sify.com/news/8203Sri-Lanka-blocks-websites-hours-before- election-results-news-kb1kIGhbbda.html (consulted on 27 Jan 2018). Sikander, Shaheen. 2011. "ECP seeks full autonomy". The Nation. Lahore: Pakistan. Simpser, Alberto. 2013. Why Parties and Governments Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice and Implications. New York: Cambridge University Press. Singer, Wendy. 2007. A Constituency Suitable for Ladies’ and Other Social Histories of Indian Elections. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Snyder, Jack. 2000. From Voting to Violence: Democratisation and Nationalist Conflict. New York: Norton. Stegmaier, Mary, and Linek, Lukáš. 2014. “The parliamentary election in the Czech Republic, October 2013.” Electoral Studies, Vol. 35, 385-388. Stewart, Frances. 2001. “Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development.” Working Papare No. 1, Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity. London: Queen Elizabeth House. Strauss, Scott, and Taylor, Charles. 2012. “Democratisation and electoral violence in Sub- Saharan Africa, 1990 – 2008.” In Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ed. Dorina Bekoe. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. Sundari, Edrishna, Rohan, de Alwis. 2007. “The Right to vote: Its Impact on Election Laws in Sri Lanka.” Center for Policy Alternatives. Available at https://www.cpalanka.org/wp- content/uploads/2007/8/the_right_to_vote.doc (consulted on 23 January 2018). Tilly, Charles, and Tarrow, Sidney. 2006. Contentious Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. Teorell, Jan et al. 2018. “The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan18”. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/QoGStdJan18. 210

Trufillo, Horacio R. 2014. "The Role of Information and Communication Technology in Preventing Election-Related Violence in Kenya, 2013.” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 13 (2014), 111-128. UK Border Agency. 2013. “Afghanistan: Country of Origin Information (COI) Report.” COI Service, Home Office. Available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/26/afghanistan_reissue.pdf (consulted on 25 August 2018). United Nations (UN). 2017. “Report of the Secretary General: Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing effectiveness of the principle of the periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization (A/72/260).” New York: UN General Assembly. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 2014. Annual Report 2014, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Kabul: Ihsanullah Mahjoor / Associated Press. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2009. Election and Conflict prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming. New York: Democratic Governance Group/Bureau for Development Policy. ___. 2011. Understanding Electoral Violence in Asia. Thailand: UNDP. ___. 2018. Human Development Index, Indices and Indicators, 2018 Statistical Update. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2018_technical_notes.pdf (consulted on 23 March 2017). United Nations Officer of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 2015. “The right of persons with disabilities to participate in decision-making: Call for submissions.” Available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Disability/DecisionMaking/CSOs_DPOs/CSOs %20-%20AWAM_Pakistan_ENG.doc (consulted on 1 July 2019). US Department of State. 1999. “Pakistan Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998.” Available at https://1997- 2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/pakistan.html (consulted on 7 June 2019).

211

___. 2013(a). “Bangladesh 2013 Human Rights Report.” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2013. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour. ___. 2013(b). “Bhutan 2013 Human Rights Report.” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2013. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour. Vaishnav, Milan. 2014. “Crime but No Punishment in Indian Election.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/24/crime- but-no-punishment-in-indian-elections-pub-54310 (consulted on 23 April 2019). Vaishnav, Milan. 2015. Understanding the Indian Voter. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Van Ham, Carolien. 2015. “Getting elections right? Measuring electoral integrity.” Democratization, 22(4), 714-737. Vickery, Chad, and Shein, Erica. 2012. “Assessing Electoral Fraud in New Democracies: Refining the Vocabulary.” White Paper Series. Washington DC: International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Von Einsiedel, Sebastain; Malone David M.; and Pradhan, Suman. 2012. Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wall, Alan; Ellis, Andrew; Ayoub, Ayman; Dundas, Carl W.; Rukambe, Joram; and Staino, Sara. 2009. Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm: International IDEA. Warnapala, Wiswa. 1983. “Seeking Sanction for Dictatorship: The Referendum in Sri Lanka.” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 18(1/2): 17-19. Waseem, Mohammad. 1998. “Pakistan Elections 1997: One Step Forward”, 1-16. In Baxter, Craig. 1997. Pakistan, 1997. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Wasserman, Justin, and Jaggard, Edwin. 2006. “Electoral violence in mid nineteenth-century England and Wales.” Historical Research. Vol. 80 (207). Wilder, Andrew. 2005. “A House Divided? Analyzing the 2005 Afghan Elections.” Kabul: AREU. Wilder, Matt. 2016. “Whither the funnel of causality?” Canadian Journal of Political Science, 49(4): 721-41. Wolf, Peter. 2017. Election technology: precondition for transparent elections or pretext for questioning electoral integrity? Stockholm: International IDEA. 212

Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/53577/fareed-zakaria/the-rise-of-illiberal- democracy (consulted 25 January 2015).

10.2. Legislation and legal references Chiico Bwalya v. Zambia, UN HRC Decision (1988) Civic Disability Act, Sri Lanka (1965) Constitution Act, Bangladesh (1996) Conduct of Elections Rules, India (1960) Constitution of India (1950) Constitution of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (1987) [Constitution of Afghanistan] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2004) [Constitution of Afghanistan] Constitution of Bangladesh (1972) Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (1978) Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973) Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal (1990) Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal (2015) Constitution Project of Bhutan (2018) Draft Constitution of Bhutan (2007) Election Act, Nepal (1991) Election Commission Act, Nepal (2007) Election Commission Reconstitution Order, Pakistan (1980) Election Law, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2004) Election Law, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, President’s Decrees No. 23 & 24 (2016) [Election law 2016] Electoral Rolls Act, Nepal (2017) Government Proposals for Constitutional Reform, Sri Lanka (1997) House of Representatives (Election of Members) Act, Nepal (1991) House of Representatives (Election of Members) Ordinance, Nepal (2017) Ignitane vs. Latvia, UN HRC Decision (2001) Interim Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal (2008) 213

International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (1966) [UN ICCPR] Parliamentary Election Act No.1, Sri Lanka (1981) Parliamentary Election Amendment Act. No. 24, Sri. Lanka (1987) People's Union for Civil Liberties vs. Union of India, Supreme Court Judgment (2009) People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India [(2003) 4 SCC 399] Presidential Elections Act, No. 15, Sri Lanka (1981) Presidential Elections Act, No. 16, Sri Lanka (1988) Presidential Elections Act, No. 35, Sri Lanka (1988) Prevention of Terrorism Act, Sri Lanka (1979) Registration of Electors Rules, India (1960) Representation of People Act, India (1951) [ROPA] Representation of People Act, India (2002) [ROPA] Representation of People Act, Pakistan (1976) Representation of People Order, Bangladesh (1972) Representation of People Order, Bangladesh (2001) Representation of People Order, Bangladesh (2008) Special Powers Act, Bangladesh (1974) S.S. Dhanoa vs. Union of India and others (1991) The New Legal Framework Order, Pakistan (2002) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) [UDHR] United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) [UN CERD] United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) [UN CEDAW] United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) [UN CRPD] United Nations Human Rights Committee General Comment 25 (1996) Union of India vs. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) [UDHR]

10.3. Internet websites Center for Monitoring Electoral Violence (CMEV), https://cmev.org/ 214

Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA), https://www.cpalanka.org/ Election Commission of Bhutan. Available at https://www.ecb.bt (consulted on 14 May 2019) Election Commission of India (ECI), https://eci.gov.in [The] Electoral Integrity Project, https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com Election Violence Prevention Database (EVPI), https://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com/stories/interactive-electoral-violence-database- goes-live/ Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org International IDEA, https://www.idea.int Indian International Institute for Democracy and Election Management (IIIDEM), http://iiidem.nic.in National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA), https://nelda.co People’s Action for Free and Fair Election (PAFFREL), http://www.paffrel.com/ Polity IV, https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm [The] Quality of Government Institute, https://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogstandarddata UCDP/PRIO, https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/ UNDP Human Development Index, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index- hdi Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM), https://www.v-dem.net

10.4. Personal communication with the author Ahmadzai, Abdullah, Head of Asia Foundation Afghanistan. 2019. E-mail exchange with the author (31 March 2019). Chhokar, Jagdeep. 2017. Interview with the Author (12 September), New Delhi, India. Kohi, Mohammad Daud, Country Director in NDI Afghanistan. 2019. E-mail exchange with the author (31 March 2019). Kumar, Pankaj; Singh, Brij Bhushan, Transparency International India. Interview with the Author (14 September 2017), New Delhi, India. Kumari, Ranjana. 2017. Interview with the author (13 September 2017), New Delhi, India.

215

Manawi, Fazel Ahmad, former Chair of the Afghanistan’s Independent Elections Commission. 2019. E-mail exchange with the author (2 April 2019).

216