Goethe and His Age

lukacs Goethe and his Age GOETHE AND HIS AGE Georg Lukacs Translated by Robert Anchor MERLIN PRESS London © 1968 The Merlin Press Ltd, 3 Manchester Road, Isle of Dogs, London E.l4 Reprinted 1979 Printed in Great Britain by Whitstable Litho Ltd, Whitstable, Kent Contents Page Preface 7 Chapter I Minna von Barnhelm 19 II The Sorrows of Young Werther 35 III Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship 50 IV The Correspondence between Schiller and Goethe 68 v Schiller's Theory of Modern Literature 101 VI Holderlin's Hyperion 136 vn Faust Studies 1 57 1. Origins 158 2. The Drama of the Human Species 17 5 3· Faust and Mephistopheles 194 4· The Tragedy of Gretchen 217 5· Problems of Style: The End of the "Artistic Period" 2 34 Index 255 5 Preface ESSAYS collected in this volume originated in the thirties; oHEnly the Faust studies were completed in 1940. This being the case,T the question arises as to whether their present publication is justified. Today, when the problem of German literature or culture is discussed, one very often encounters the prejudices of those who will hear nothing of an examination or re-examination of such questions. The problem of German culture is generally posed abstractly and, therefore, necessarily answered abstractly and falsely. One answer is a blunt rejection of the whole of German culture. As a profession of anti-Fascism this seems very radical. In reality, this radicalism is more than dubious. For is an anti-German attitude really a guarantee of anti-Fascism or even of a position against reac tion ? In the ranks of anti-German politicians, writers, etc. do we not find avowed reactionaries, and even Fascists? If we reject Nietzsche or Spengler as the spiritual forefathers of modern German anti-humanism, and at the same time grow enthusiastic about Ortega y Gasset-what have we gained ? At the other extreme, the question is posed with equal bias. There it is said that the political develop ments of recent decades must in no way influence our judgments about philosophy and literature.The fact that Hitler could prevail in Germany more than a decade should change nothing as regards what German literature from Goethe to Rilke means to us. Both extremes are abstract. Neither the categorical condemnation, nor the separation of the phenomena from the social soil on which they have grown, can answer the question or provide a solution as regards how we are to view German culture, past and present; how a critical reckoning with it is to influence the democratic renovation of contemporary culture. Let us attempt a concrete formulation of the question. Engels once compared the development of Germany and France from the beginning of the liquidation of feudalism to the emergence of nat ional unity and bourgeois democracy. He came to the conclusion that in every epoch the French have found a progressive solution in historical problems, the Germans a reactionary one. The fateful date for Germany is 1525, the year of the important German Peasants' war. Alexander von Humboldt already recognized 1 8 PREFACE that this is the turning-point where the development of Germany went astray. While the defeat of the great peasant uprisings in France and England did not break the progressive line of develop ment of these countries, in Germany the defeat of the peasants produced a national catastrophe the consequences of which remained perceptible for centuries. In the West (and in Russia), absolute monarchy resulted from the class struggles of feudalism in the process of dissolution, and with it the first step was taken toward the achievement of national unity. In Germany, the failure of the Peasants' war produced not, as in Poland, for example, a feudal democracy of nobles, but again a variation of absolute monarchy; nevertheless a specific variation, purely reactionary and anti-national: the German petty principali ties. Their victory and consolidation signified the perpetuation and solidification of the feudal disunion of the German nation. For centuries the autonomy of the petty principalities was the most serious obstacle to German national unity. Their ostensible indepen dence, their ostensibly independent politics for a long while made Germany the passive object of European foreign policy, the battlefield of European wars. And over against the legends created by German historians it must be emphasized here that, in this respect, Prussia was a typical German petty principality; hence an obstacle to national union, an open door for foreign intervention. Viewed from within, this development means that the emergence of bourgeois culture proceeded at a very slow pace; in its place appeared a corrupt semi-feudalism. The fact that such social conditions in every way obstructed the formation of a progressive national culture requires no detailed discussion. That explains why Germany, very belatedly, trod the path lead ing to modem bourgeois existence, economic and political as well as cultural. In the West, the first major battles in the class struggle of the ascendant proletariat were already being fought when, in 1848, the problems of the bourgeois revolution emerged for the first time in a concrete form for Germany. And, indeed, if we except Italy, it is only in Germany that the question was posed in such a way that the creation of national unity formed the central prob lem of the bourgeois revolution. The English revolution in the seven teenth century, and the French Revolution in the eighteenth occurred in national stat�s which were already extensively developed, states indeed, which achieved their final form in and through these revolutions. Accordingly, the abolition of feudalism, and especially the liberation of the peasants stand in the foreground of both revolutions. This peculiarity of the German revolution made the reactionary partial solution of 1870 possible in the first place. PREFACE 9 The consequence of all this is that in Germany social progress and national development did not mutually support and promote one another as in France, but rather stood in opposition to each other. Hence, even the development of capitalism could not produce a bourgeois class capable of assuming national leadership. Even when capitalism had already become the prevailing economy, indeed, even when it had already passed over into imperialism, political leader ship still remained in the hands of the "old powers". In Germany, as everywhere, the absolutism of the petty states created out of the formerly independent feudal nobility a court nobility, a bureaucratic nobility and a military nobility. The Sick ingen revolt,1 which directly preceded the Peasants' war, was the last independent movement made by the feudal petty nobility of the old type. From then on-if we disregard the few exceptions which became increasingly rare-we can observe the bureaucratiza tion and growing servility of the aristocracy. Of course, this process also occurred in France. Its social character, however, is diametrically opposed to that of Germany. In France (and England), bourgeois culture, in an increasing measure, acted on the aristocracy, even on its most reactionary element, so that anyone who remained un affected by this development rapidly became a mere eccentric. In Germany, on the other hand-especially in Prussia whichdetermined the style of the later empire-the Junker ideology left its impress on the decisive strata of the bourgeois intelligentsia. From the most superficial daily habits to matters of Weltanschauung, everywhere we can perceive this assimilation of the bourgeois intelligentsia to the ideology of the Junkers. This process completely explains the modem German "mentality" for the analysis of which we obviously have no space here. We would like only to direct the attention of the reader to some of its main features, such as the lack of civic courage that Bismarck already confirmed as being a national characteristic, and one which is unquestionably a distinguishing mark of the bureaucratic and court nobility. Very closely connected with it is the fear of making responsible independent decisions and, at the same time , the ruthless inhuman brutality aimed at inferiors (and hidden from superiors). The oft-confirmed inability of the German bourgeoisie in the area of politics must also be traced. to this development. The German bourgeois wants "order"; but he creates this order in the service of anyone and anything. Servility, Byzantinism, title-seeking become increasingly characteristic of the German bourgeoisie, and they demonstrate an almost complete absence of civic pride. • The revolt of 1522 led by the adventurer knight, Franz von Sickingen, 1481-1523. 10 PREFACE Mter the reactionary establishment of German unity, this re tardation appeared in an ideologically reverse role [ Umstilisierung], as if just this Germany were called upon to surmount [ aufheben] the contradictions of modem democracy in a "higher unity". It is no accident that anti-democratic thinking originally developed as a Weltanschauung precisely in this Germany; that in the imperialistic period Germany played the leading role in the formulation of reac tionary ideology. What is decisive, however, is that the rapid pace of belated capital ist evolution in Germany made the Reich into a leading imperialistic state; one, indeed, whose colonial possessions and spheres of interest were disproportionate to the strength and claims of its capitalism. Ultimately this is the reason why Germany attempted to force the redistribution of the world in two world wars. The necessary failure of both attempts was not merely the consequence of the actual balance of power; for the organization of this balance of power itself was already the consequence of the direction in which Germany's domestic and foreign policy was moving. Petty cunning and unpre cedented brutality instead of forethought and energy; tactical technical tricks instead of a comprehensive strategy-these character ize German politics both in war and peace.

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