A Goal of a World Without Nuclear Weapons Is Essential
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Sidney Drell and James Goodby The Reality: A Goal of a World without Nuclear Weapons Is Essential Should the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons serve as a serious guide for U.S. policy? This goal has been the declared purpose of several U.S. administrations. It has been included in treaties to which the United States is party and in official U.S. documents. In truth, however, with the possible exception of a brief period shortly following World War II after the Acheson- Lilienthal Report was adopted by the Truman administration,1 the goal of a nuclear weapons–free world has not provided a compass for policy, nor has it had any real operational impact on U.S. government policies. It is widely accepted today that nuclear weapons must be maintained be- cause they are still an effective and necessary deterrent against attack. Some also accept this as the best possible policy because they believe that a world without nuclear weapons is a practical impossibility. Among those in this camp, some believe that the United States would be more secure in a world without nuclear weapons but that a serious effort to reach that goal would have a negative impact on fundamental U.S. national security interests. For- mer secretary of defense Harold Brown is in this camp. In his recent article “New Nuclear Realities,” Brown expressed the view that “the assertion that we intend to abolish nuclear weapons is likely to gain less in goodwill and cooperation in nonproliferation programs from others than it will lose when it becomes clear that there is no believable program or prospect of doing so.”2 We share a different view that is captured in a January 4, 2007, Wall Street Journal article signed by former secretaries of state George Shultz and Henry Sidney Drell is a professor of physics emeritus at Stanford University and a senior fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. He may be reached at [email protected]. James Goodby, a former U.S. ambassador, is currently a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. He may be reached at goodby@hoover. stanford.edu. © 2008 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Insti- tute of Technology The Washington Quarterly • 31:3 pp. 23–32. THE WASHING T ON QUAR T ERLY ■ SUMMER 2008 23 l Drell & Goodby Kissinger, former secretary of defense William Perry, and former chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn (D-Ga.): Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical mea- sures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America’s moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the ac- tions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.3 This conclusion, which is central to the case for revisiting the idea of a world free of nuclear weapons as an operationally meaningful goal, emerged from two recent conferences at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, in cooperation with the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). It was strongly support- ed by the participants at a February 2008 international conference organized in cooperation with the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in Oslo. Practical Steps toward Nuclear Reduction The initial Wall Street Journal article generated concerns, expressed most clearly by Brown, that eliminating nuclear weapons would serve as a harmful distrac- tion from making progress toward achieving more modest, practical goals of arms control. Our judgment, along with that of many others who have associat- ed themselves with this project, is that a series of practical steps can be initiated leading to a world without nuclear weapons. Moreover, as the world proceeds down that path, political conditions will be created that will improve the pros- pects for getting to zero. Our difference with Brown derives from the assumption, counter to his, that the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons is achievable. Before probing deeper into reasons for our two very different judgments on this issue that have led us to such different conclusions, it is important to recognize that Brown’s article notably presents no arguments against initiating the steps that we propose. These steps will contribute to important progress in reducing the nuclear dangers that the world faces today and should be taken whether one accepts the goal of a nuclear weapons–free world or thinks it is unrealistic. In that regard, our ideas and those of Brown are very similar. We agree with Brown’s judgments on most of his points and specific recom- mendations, including the need for a more sustained and powerful U.S. diplo- matic effort to resolve the regional instabilities that drive nuclear arms races. Shultz entitled his keynote address in Oslo “The Age of Diplomacy,” meaning that the next few years will require a massive and skillful U.S. diplomatic ef- fort to reverse current trends in the nuclear arena.4 24 THE WASHING T ON QUAR T ERLY ■ SUMMER 2008 The Reality: A Goal of a World without Nuclear Weapons Is Essential l We also agree with Brown that the likelihood of nuclear proliferation has increased in recent years and concur with his statement that “nuclear weapons proliferation is just as dangerous as most people have always believed.”5 He at- tributes that to the declining influence of the major nuclear powers, the Unit- ed States and Russia, and increasing regional instabilities. Another important reason why this risk has increased is that, with the spread of nuclear know- how and material, we are facing an increas- ing danger that the deadliest weapons ever invented will be acquired by ruthless national A series of practical leaders or by suicidal terrorists. Furthermore, steps can be initiated there is a growing awareness that the steps the international community is taking to address leading to a world these threats do not adequately respond to the without nuclear danger. The world is approaching a time when weapons. nuclear weapons will be more widely available while deterrence becomes less effective and increasingly hazardous as a policy choice. This concern was addressed at the first Hoover Institution conference in 2006, on the twentieth anniversary of the remarkable summit at Reykjavik in October 1986 when President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev endorsed the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. They failed to achieve an agreement to abolish all of their respective nations’ nuclear weapons, but they initiated steps leading to significant reductions in nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire class of threatening missiles. Two major treaties eventually resulted from that summit, pushing policies in the direction of deep reductions in nuclear forces and launching a trend that has continued to this day. An Action-Oriented Agenda The initial Hoover conference participants considered two questions: What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and Gorbachev? Can a worldwide consensus be forged on a series of practical steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger? The participants, including veterans of the past six U.S. administrations along with a number of other experts on nuclear issues, concluded that there was an urgent need to confront the challenges posed by these two questions and to develop an action-oriented agenda. Fur- thermore, it was recognized that the United States and Russia, which possess about 90 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads, have a special responsibility, as well as the experience, to demonstrate leadership. Yet, other nations must join the effort, and the sooner the better. THE WASHING T ON QUAR T ERLY ■ SUMMER 2008 25 l Drell & Goodby At a second conference at the Hoover Institution one year later, this time in cooperation with the NTI, the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons was reaffirmed, and specific steps toward that end were elaborated in considerable detail. The conference considered near-term steps that should be taken start- ing in 2008 and are listed in a second article by Shultz, Kissinger, Perry, and Nunn in the Wall Street Journal on January 15, 2008.6 The article declares that the in- Deterrence is becoming ternational community should extend key provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduc- less effective and tion Treaty of 1991; take steps to increase increasingly hazardous the warning and decision times for the as a policy choice. launch of all nuclear-armed ballistic mis- siles, thereby reducing risks of accidental or unauthorized attacks; discard any existing operational plans for massive attacks that still remain from the Cold War days; and undertake negotiations toward de- veloping cooperative, multilateral ballistic missile defense and early-warning systems, as proposed by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin at their 2002 Moscow summit. The international community should also accelerate work dramatically to provide the highest possible standards of security for nuclear weapons, as well as for nuclear materials everywhere in the world, to prevent terrorists from acquiring a nuclear bomb; start a dialogue, including within NATO and with Russia, on consolidating the nuclear weapons designed for forward deploy- ment to enhance their security and as a first step toward careful accounting for them and their eventual elimination; strengthen the means of monitoring compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to counter the global spread of advanced technologies; and adopt a process for bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into effect, which would strengthen the NPT and aid international monitoring of nuclear activities.