Understanding the Fog Shrouding Thai Vision Junya Yimprasert and Richard Thompson Coon

For the world at large - an essay about Thailand

Understanding the fog shrouding Thai vision Junya Yimprasert and Richard Thompson Coon

Action for People's Democracy (ACT4DEM Thailand) [email protected] (December 2015)

Preface

This essay attempts to enable readers to better understand the causes of what is being described as a deadlock in the political life of the Kingdom of Thailand. Deadlock here means that, at present in practice, there appears to be no body or group with ability to architect or engineer a way-out of the cycle of protest - military crackdown and coup - new constitution - election and protest - that is causing so much suffering, humiliation and loss.

Some key factors contributing to the turmoil are presented and discussed, with emphasis on the role of the civil society, in particular on the contribution of the trade union movement and the NGO Coordinating Committee on Development NGO- COD.

In looking at how to move-on from the politics of having to choose between an elected government and love of King and country, the paper pays respect to the potential risk of further violence in a country where the Prime Minister was, before self-appointment, the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army, whose main, active role to date has been to crack-down on Thai people struggling for their rights.

As the power-struggle at the top of Thai society intensifies around matters connected to the transition of the throne, the people of Thailand and the Thai economy are being pushed into a fragile predicament.

The paper proposes that all responsible people inside and outside Thailand, especially the International Community, can and need to focus more honestly on the origins of the political fog that is shrouding the answer to the question of how Thailand can move forward - to realise the democratic aspirations of the people of Thailand in harmony with those of the ASEAN Community - to build a sustainable regional economy.

This essay is developed from a conference paper prepared for: 'Political participation in Asia: Defining and deploying political space', Stockholm University, 22‐24 November 2015.

CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE 1. The roots of confusion 3 1.1 70 years of oppression and suppression 3 1.2 Monarcho-militarism versus democracy 4 1.3 King Bhumibol (Rama 9, 1946 - present) 4 1.4 The Cold War military juntas 1958 – 1989 6 1.5 Education 6 1.6 Elections and the belated class-struggle 8 1.7 The so-called Democrat Party 9 1.8 'Thai-style' corruption 11 1.9 69 years of political instability 12 1.10 The semi-democratic 'People's Constitution' of 1997 14 1.11 The Shinawatra phenomenon 14 2. Propaganda, brain-washing & the prestige of the Palace 1 6 2.1 Propaganda and brain-washing 1957 - 1980 and onwards 16 2.2 The Royal projects 17 3. A feudal turmoil 19 3.1 Growing resistance 19 3.2 The Thaksin era 20 4. The civil society 23 4.1 A few words about the People's Alliance for Democracy PAD (2006 - 2008) 23 4.2 Why NGOs participated in the royalist crack-down on democratic freedom 23 4.3 Why trade unions participated in the royalist crack-down on democratic freedom 24 4.4 A few words about the NGO Coordinating Committee on Development NGO-COD 26 4.5 'Thai-style' defamation of universal values 30 5 The way forward 31 5.1 Political deadlock 31 5.2 Monarcho-militarism 32 5.3 Moving forward by respecting people's choices 33 CONCLUSION 34 References 35

About the authors 39

CHAPTER ONE

The roots of confusion

1.1 70 years of oppression and suppression

'Killing communists for nation, religion and King' was normal fare for Thai children born after 1946.

The roots of Thailand's current political confusion are embedded in 70 years of extreme, pro- royalist propaganda. Below are just a few examples of the horrific events that punctuate all too regularly the history of the Land of Smiles since Bhumibol became king in 1946. From the few records that are available the death-toll from political assassinations and extrajudicial killings is seen to top 11,000, but this figure in no way speaks of the actual number of people that have died as a result of political oppression and state-sponsored crackdowns since 1946, a number that never will be known:

• 25-28 April 1948. Hundreds of police and military officers stationed in Narathivat Province surround and crackdown on the villagers of Dusongdor. About 400 villagers were murdered. • 28 Feb - 01 March 1949. By order of the chief of the military junta Marshall Phibun, 4 members of the Pridi Alliance for Democracy were assassinated. After being arrested and handcuffed, 4 of them, Members of Parliament, were riddled with bullets in the back of a police van. The Chief of Police Intelligence, an outspoken defender of democracy, was shot dead in the street, opening the door to the most evil period in the history of the Royal Thai Police. • 13 December 1952. By order of the Chief of the Royal Thai Police, the Leader of the Labour Party Tieng Sirikhan, former MP from Sakon Nakhon Province, was brutally murdered in Bangkok together with four friends. Their bodies were taken to be burnt in Kanchanaburi Province, 200 km from the scene of the crime. • 1971-1973. During this period of 'killing communists for nation and king', in Pattalung Province alone around 3,000 villagers were brutally murdered by the Royal Thai Army - some were burnt alive in drums of oil, some pushed into sacks to be dropped down the side of a mountain or pushed out of helicopters. • 14-15 October 1973. Monarcho-military crackdown on working-class people and students. 77 people were killed on the streets of Bangkok, most by military gunfire. 847 were wounded. • 6 October 1976. Monarcho-military crackdown on student protest, in which, according to government records, 41 students were killed by a mixed force of Royal Thai Police, Royal Thai Border Guards and para-military ‘Protect the Monarchy’ thugs. 30 bodies were identified, 10 were too damaged to identify. Hundreds were injured. 3,154 students were arrested. Many thousands of people went into hiding, most fleeing to the forest. In anger over the brutality of the state many did join the Communist Party of Thailand and remained in hiding until granted immunity after the Communist Party was dissolved in 1980. • 17 - 19 May 1992. Monarcho-military crackdown. This 'Bloody May' witnessed about 45 killed on the streets of Bangkok, about 38 by bullets from the Royal Thai Army. Official reports say 38 people were ‘disappeared’, unofficial reports say 70. • April-May 2010. Monarcho-military crackdown under PM Abhisit Vejjajiva (Democrat Party), who declared a 'Live firing zone’, in other words issued elite troops with license to kill Thai civilians. 99 people were killed on the streets of Bangkok, almost all by military snipers. About 2000 were wounded. 470 were arrested. When official records say ‘wounded’ or ‘died on the spot’ they forget to add 'from a military bullet to the back of the head'. 3

1.2 Monarcho-militarism versus democracy

On the morning of 24th June 1932, the People's Party, comprising mainly young Thai educated abroad, with a civilian sector led by Pridi Bhanomyong and a military sector led by a young military officer Plaek Phiboonsongkram (later PM, later Marshal and Dictator), conducted a peaceful coup d'étât that changed the system of rule in Thailand from Absolute Monarchy to Constitutional Monarchy with the power of the King limited by a half-appointed half-elected Parliament.

The 1932 coup aimed to set Thailand on the road to democracy. After 80 long years that aim has yet to be fulfilled.

In 2015 Thailand is ruled by a military junta calling itself the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). The country has a National Legislative Assembly of 220 people hand-picked by the NCPO, half of whom are military officers. The function of the NLA is largely to rubber-stamp the dictates of the NCPO. Both these set-ups are headed by the last C-in-C of the Royal Thai Army, General Prayuth Chan-o-cha, self-appointed Prime Minister and Dictator.

Returning to 1932, on 24 June the first statement issued by the People's Party's to annul absolute monarchy reads as follows:

"All the people … When this king succeeded his elder brother, people at first hoped that his government would bring peace and security, but matters have not turned out as they hoped. The king maintains his power above the law as before. He appoints court relatives and toadies without merit or knowledge to important positions, without listening to the voice of the people. He allows officials to use the power of their office dishonestly, to take bribes in public construction and procurement, and seek profit from changes in the prices of money, which squanders the wealth of the country. He elevates those of royal blood (phuak chao) to have more privileged rights than the people. He governs without principle. The country’s affairs are left to the mercy of fate, as can be seen from the depression of the economy and the hardships of making a living – something the people know all about already."

This statement remains as relevant in 2015 as it was 80 years ago. How come? Because of the continuous and systematic refusal of the Palace, royalist and military elite to accept universal suffrage and the authority of a parliament formed through open election.

In 1933, the first royalist coup to fail was fed with money by Rama 7. In January 1939, with Marshall Phibun as PM, the royalist elite made a second attempt. This resulted in the execution of 18 leaders, life imprisonment for several and long sentences for others implicated. Prince Chainart (Rangsit Prayurasakdi), the uncle of King Ananda and Prince Bhumibol, received a life sentence. The Palace placed Phibun under enormous pressure to release Chainart, but Phibun stuck to his guns. Not until Phibun was pushed from power after the withdrawal of Japanese troops was Prince Chainart pardoned, in September 1944. As the last remaining son of Rama 5, Prince Chainart returned to being the most influential person in Palace politics. On 16 June 1946, immediately after the death of King Ananda (on 9 June), Prince Chainart took over as Regent and, in 1947, the Chairmanship of the Supreme Council of State. The public crowning of King Bhumibol, who had returned from Switzerland to take-up permanent residence in the Palace, took place on 5 May 1950. The crowning of Rama 9 marks the beginning of systematic efforts to re-establish the power of the monarchy.

1.3 King Bhumibol (Rama 9, 1946 – present)

In Thai history the assassination of Rama 8 does mark an important turning-point, that at which the original effort to establish a democracy starts to be sabotaged systematically by the elite, a process that led in time, through endless propaganda, to blind worship of Bhumibol as the champion leading the country's development, as the King of Kings with his people at heart and so on.

Contrasting with this image are the facts that King Bhumibol has been involved with, and given his

4 approval to, 10 military coups and enjoyed working together with 8 military juntas. Also, during the few short periods when Thailand has had an elected Parliament, on record is his reluctance and on several occasions refusal to cooperate with the Parliament.

For 62% of Bhumibol's reign, for 44 years, the country has been governed by non-elect juntas or cabinets appointed by His Majesty in person. With old King Bhumibol at the very end of his life, in 2014 General Prayuth Chan-o-cha, C-in-C of the Royal Thai Army, appointed himself as Bhumibol's 26th Prime Minister (Thailand's 29th).

The world is repeatedly asked to accept that "Military dictatorship for Democracy with the King as Head of State" is a model of governance that is good for all. In this play the King's Privy Council takes responsibility for making the democratic vacuum in Thailand look respectable.

Another core role of the Privy Council is to ensure that no senior royalist personage or junta be held responsible for conducting illegal acts or violating human rights, to ensure no royalist leader can be taken before a civilian court.

Through the atrocious 70-year history of royalist crackdowns, military coups and abuse of human rights no senior royalist leader has ever been called to justice. In the divine world of the Palace guilt is an ephemeral matter. The Palace has always endorsed any coup that allies with the Palace and approved the re-writing of the Constitution 19 times so that the impunity of royalist leaders is always guaranteed.

Bhumibol and his leading staff have not been shy to voice opinion on how the concept of democracy must be adjusted to their - the Chakri - conception of 'Thainess', or of voicing their opinion that poverty needs to be eliminated before they, the Chakri, can permit full democratic governance. In fact these points of view merely echo those of Rama 5, 6 and 7, who all made clear that, in their view, Thai people are not ready for democracy.

All speeches delivered by Bhumibol and senior members of the Royal Family - to all graduates of the military and police academies, to all judges and senior civil servants, to all university graduates and all subjects of the crown - exhort the audience to be good and obedient to the rule of 'good people', in other words to the 'King's men'. In all these speeches the word 'democracy' is hard to find.

The King's inability to mention the word democracy underlines the Palace's lack of interest in the legitimacy of a parliament elected by the people:

"There are both good and bad people in the country. There is no one who can make everyone to be good people. To make the country in peace and order, this is not done by making everyone good people, but by promoting good people, by giving good people to rule the country and control bad people, to not let them have power to create chaos.”

(Speech of the King to the General Meeting of the National Scout Organisation, 11 December 1968.)

“In the choice lay between military government and student power, he, the king, though no lover of dictatorship, would much prefer the military. The student might have some ideals, but they had no experience or responsibility, and they were badly influenced from outside. The military on the other hand has a sense of discipline and responsibility, were concerned for the betterment of the country and had experience of government."

(Talk given by the King to British diplomats, 9 October 1976, 3 days after the military coup and brutal massacre of students at Thammasart University.)

The King is considered by his advisors and promoters to be demonstrating democratic behaviour when he listens to other people and is publicly promoted by his advisors as being a democratic King because he sometimes listens.

1.4 The Cold War military juntas 1958 - 1989 From the 1960ies onwards the Cold War saw the royalist establishment driving their interests into the country's remote and previously somewhat autonomous areas, in particular into the so-called 'red areas', with the Royal Thai Army clearing forests and controlling the building of roads, royal palaces and large numbers of large dams that displaced large numbers of people.

Under the patronage of the Palace, in the name of 'Protecting the Nation, Religion and King', young and old were recruited into a para-military network called 'Village Scouts' and indoctrinated with slogans like 'Killing communists is not a sin'. The Village Scouts have never been completely off the radar. The network was revived and fully re-funded by the military junta that conducted the 2006 military coup, and remains in function today as a low-key, village-level network of watch- dogs, agents of fascist Thai authority which, under General Prayuth, enhanced by 21st Century tools, has become a hydra, a Thai gestapo, a real menace to civil society and decent folk.

For the 30 years between 1958 and 1988 the country was ruled almost continuously by army chiefs of staff, namely Marshall Sarit Tanarat (1958 - 1963), Marshall Thanom Kittikachorn (1963 – 1973) and General Prem Tinnasulanonda (1981-1988).

During these 30 years there was only one open, parliamentary election in 1974, producing a Parliament that was shattered by the violent military coup of 6 October 1976, in which, under the wing of the Privy Council, two extreme para-military organisations, the Nawaphon and the Red Bulls, led gruesome brutal assaults against students on the Royal Ground in front of Thammasart University who were protesting the return to Thailand of the exiled dictator Marshall Thanom Kittikachorn.

Although, with the support of the Palace, the premiership of General Prem Tinnasulanonda survived two attempted military coups, by the end of the 1980s the absolute power of the King and Army under Prem had become intolerable for all. Both people and politicians began demanding that their Prime Minister must come from elected members of the Parliament.

When Prem eventually dissolved his Government in 1988 the King immediately appointed him to his Privy Council, which he has chaired since 1998. It was Prem who, in 1981, formalised the so- called 'Royal Projects' by making them part-and-parcel of the national budget.

Prem is all about 'Soldiers of the King', 'Civil Servants of the King', 'Governments of the King', 'Armies of the King' and 'Subjects of the King'. At 95 Prem still Chairs the Privy Council and remains one of the most powerful personages in Thailand. Prem has never been a candidate in any election.

The General Election of 1989 brought in a mild character called General Chatchai Chunhawanwas with his slogan 'Change the battlefields to commercial fields', but Pappa Prem was already nose- down organising the next coup d'étât and he had Chatchai out of office in February 1991.

Thailand then passed through another historic year of protest, which eventually forced the C-in-C of the Army who led the 1991 coup to step down in 1992. On this occasion, after the shooting of 45 civilians in the streets by the Royal Thai Army, the King stepped in to mediate between the coup and the protest leader, thus restoring face as the good King of the good people of Thailand.

1.5 Education

Although, under Marshall Phibun's junta, Thailand welcomed and then fully adopted the 1959 UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child, and introduced a National Children's Day, the focus of Thailand's many military juntas has always been on ensuring that educational values, all universal values in fact, are subjugated to the interests of the monarcho-military hegemony.

To commemorate the adoption of the 1959 Declaration a song was composed around the Declaration's 10 Rights of the Child, a song which has been broadcast on every National Children's

Day since 1959. The song provides an example of how 'Thai style' interpreting and implementing of human rights and norms dogs them in 'Thainess', over-turning their essence and meaning.

In the song 'Dekdee' ('Good children') the 10 Rights are twisted into commands and duties. Below are the 10 rights of the Declaration, their interpretation in the song in Thai, and a translation to English of the Thai interpretation. 1. The right to equality, without distinction on account of race, religion or national origin. นับถือศาสนา Believe religion. 2. The right to special protection for the child’s physical, mental and social development. รักษาธรรมเนียมมัน Protect traditional customs firmly. 3. The right to a name and a nationality. เชื อพ่อแม่ครูอาจารย์ Believe in parents and teachers. 4. The right to adequate nutrition, housing and medical services. วาจานั นต้องสุภาพอ่อนหวาน Speak with politeness and sweetness. 5. The right to special education and treatment when a child is physically or mentally handicapped. ยึดมันกตัญ ู Be grateful and reciprocate with loyalty. 6. The right to understanding and love by parents and society. เป็นผู้รู้รักการงาน Be a person who loves work. 7. The right to recreational activities and free education. ต้องศึกษาให้เชียวชาญ ต้องมานะบากบันไม่เกียจไม่คร้าน Be professional in education. Endure trying hard without laziness. 8. The right to be among the first to receive relief in all circumstances. รู้จักออมประหยัด Know how to save money and economise. 9. The right to protection against all forms of neglect, cruelty and exploitation. ต้องซื อสัตย์ตลอดกาล นํ าใจนักกีฬากล้าหาญให้เหมาะกับการสมัยชาติพัฒนา Be faithful forever. Sportsmanship and courage to suit the contemporary national development. 10. The right to be brought up in a spirit of understanding, tolerance, friendship among peoples, and universal brotherhood. ทําตนให้เป็นประโยชน์ รู้บาปบุญคุณโทษ สมบัติชาติต้องรักษา เด็กสมัยชาติพัฒนา จะเป็นเด็กที พา ชาติไทยเจริญ Be useful. Aware of sin, merit, virtue, punishment. National treasures must be preserved. Children of the nation in development, will be the children that bring Thailand to prosperity.

In practice Thailand's rulers enjoy playing a double game with the UN, presenting themselves as charming good boys while scoffing at implementation of Declarations in domestic policy. Dictatorial leaders are rarely not aware of the importance of education, especially of education that undermines autocracy. Within a few months of appointing himself Prime Minister, General Prayuth Chan-o-cha (assisting architect of the 2006 military coup and leader of the 2014 military coup) had concocted his very own 12-point set of national values and was ordering the Ministry of Education and nation at large to incorporate them into all aspects of education. Below is one of many translations.

1. Loyalty to the Nation, the Religion, and the Monarchy 2. Honesty, sacrifice, endurance, and noble ideology for the greater good 3. Gratitude for parents, guardians, and teachers 4. Diligence in acquiring knowledge, via school studies and other methods 5. Preserving the Thai customs and tradition 6. Morality and good will for others 7. Correct understanding of democracy with the King as Head of State 8. Discipline, respect for law, and obedience to the older citizens 9. Constant consciousness to practice good deeds all the time, as taught by His Majesty the King 10. Practice of Sufficiency Economy in accordance with the teaching of His Majesty the King 11. Physical and mental strength. Refusal to surrender to religious sins. 12. Uphold the interest of the nation over oneself. From first grade in school to graduation from university Thailand's educational system has always treated all students as children. In all schools and universities wearing white and black or white and blue uniforms all the way to graduation is more-or-less compulsory. Until the end of high-school all children must stand in lines in front of the national flag before morning classes and again when classes end - to sing national songs. Many are now aware that Thailand's education system and conception of human development has been hijacked by monarchism, that Thai-style education has somehow fallen off the wagon. Not knowing what to do, how to do or who will do feeds the atmosphere of fear of higher authority, breeding pessimism and carelessness. Thai people have to be adaptable and they are resilient, but the Problem of Thailand is quite simply that an educationalist, anybody in fact, who attempts to criticise the pedagogy that stems from the pinnacle of power risk being ostracised by their superiors and, if persistent, exterminated. Composed 55 years ago, the song Dekdee did at least conclude by saying that "The children of the nation in development will be the children that bring Thailand to prosperity." True enough but difficult from behind bars. 1.6 Elections and the belated class-struggle

Between 1941 and 1944, during the Japanese occupation of Thailand, there were no elections, but why with a young and potentially influential king taking the throne in 1948 elections could not be regularised needs some investigation and critical analysis.

The reign of King Bhumibol has been a constantly revolving wheel of military coup, dissolved constitution, King-appointed PM, new constitution, election, protest, military coup, dissolved constitution. Just a glance at the record of elections reveals that any Thai government, elected and otherwise, serves under constant threat of monarcho-military intervention. Since the introduction of democracy in 1932 elections have been highly irregular, with elections placed on-hold or in the freezer for long periods of time.

As mentioned, the two key leaders of the non-violent 1932 Democracy Coup were force into exile. In 1947 Pridi Bhanomyong went to China, never to return, and died in France in 1983. In 1957 Marshal Phibun was forced into exile by the Palace and Marshal Sarit, and died in Japan.

Fear of communism drove the Palace and Cold War juntas to indulge in many forms of extreme activity. Slogans like 'Killing communists is not a sin' were promoted without remorse. As mentioned, during the 1950ies any person contradicting the line of the military was eliminated. This stalinistic approach was continued well into the 1970ies. Between 1975 -77 around 100 peasant 8 leaders were assassinated, including the founder and leader of the Socialist Party of Thailand, Dr. Sanong Boonyotayan. There are no accurate records of political assassinations from this period, which did succeed in eliminating all possibility for people to build any kind of social movement, and it ended in typical Thai-style - with Thai Communists marching to the Palace in their communist uniforms to vow to protect the Monarchy.

During the American War in Vietnam, Thailand provided the US Air Force with one of their main bases for the carpet bombing of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. In the name of development, the huge support provided by the USA to Thailand's military regimes, and also directly to the Palace, had an enormous impact on Thai politics. Many of Thailand's leading figures today remain products of extreme Cold War propaganda, notably the King, Chairman of the Privy Council and top military brass.

Under Field-Marshal Sarit Thanarat and then Field-Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn there was no election for the 11 years between 1958 and 1969.

Thanom's military regime had to run an election in 1969. This much anticipated election is significant in that it gave birth to several new political factions. The junta made sure that the 1969 election returned the junta to power, but finding itself unable to manage the diversity of elected MPs it dissolved the whole parliamentary system with a coup in 1971, after which the King sent a letter to Thanom thanking him for 'Saving the nation'.

It required the massive people's demonstrations and student protests on 14 October 1973 and the death of 77 demonstrators (shot by the army) to force Thanom's regime to step down. The King himself then appointed a Cabinet of 'good people' with a PM taken from his own Privy Council to prepare for a General Election in 1975.

Once again the life of the Parliament elected in January 1975 was short. It was dissolved after the brutal, military crackdown on students protesting the return to Thailand of dictator Thanom when, on 6 October 1976, according to the Junta, 45 people died, according to the records of the October People about 530 were killed. Some 3,000 were arrested and many leaders imprisoned for many years. Many thousands fled to the forests, many to join the Thai Communist Party. To so some extent the direct intervention of the King and Privy Council in the chaos of 1973 re- invoked the role of the 'Council of the King' as the wisest council in the land.

1.7 The so-called Democrat Party

Returning to the beginning of the story, 14 years after the abolition of absolute monarchy, just two months before the assassination of Rama 8 and crowning of Rama 9, the monarchists set about founding their own political party, which they called the Democrat Party. It was launched on Chakri Day 6 April 1946 and directly set about contesting the Pridi Alliance in the General Elections held in August of that same year.

Launched with fine promises that it would “never support any form of dictatorship in any shape or form" within a few months, aiming to bring down the Pridi Alliance, the Party had entered into open coalition with the junta of Marshal Phibun. At the same time leaders of the Democrat Party were actively attempting to frame Pridi as King Ananda's assassin.

The Democrat Party has never been a democrat party, but the founding of the party does represent an important turning-point in Thailand's modern history, because, with the full support of the Palace and, thereby also, ability to call on the Royal Thai Army for assistance, the Democrat Party became a permanent problem in the political life of the country: a slippery snake.

Thailand has never been lacking in diversity of political opinion. Records show that more than 100 political parties have been registered at some time or other since 1945. No political party from the time of the formation of the Democrat Party has survived, except the Democrat Party with its solid ties to the Monarchy and royalist elite. All political parties were outlawed between 1958 and 1969, after which only the Democrat Party was able to re-surface under the same name. 9

All political parties with aims conflicting with the aims or interests of the Monarchy have had to witness their leaders sent into exile or assassinated - for 'insulting the King' or being 'a threat to national security'.

In large part the attempt to study developments in party politics during the reign of King Bhumibol means following the workings of the eager for power Democrat Party.

As noted, it was Marshall Phibun's 1947 military junta that kicked-out Pridi - the acknowledged father of movement for democracy in Thailand - that allowed the Democratic Party to win their first General Election in 1948. However, within a few months the Dictator, dissatisfied with the government of the new Democrat Party, kicked-out the party's PM and appointed himself Prime Minister. The Democrat Party did not lead a Government again until 1975, and then again in 1976, both times coalition governments that lasted just a few months.

The last time the Democrat Party actually won an election (by two seats) was in 1992. During the 1997 'Asian Financial Crisis' it was able to bring down the Government of that time (of the New Aspiration Party) and then led a coalition government up until Thaksin Shinawatra, the populist media tycoon, won his famous land-slide victory in 2001.

After losing heavily again to Thaksin in the 2005 election the Democrat Party decided to join the royalist mobilization led by Sonthi Limthongkul - to take-down Thaksin. The Democrat Party then boycotted the 2006 General Election and engaged in all possible tactics to sabotage the Government, and gave full support to the military coup that kicked-out Thaksin in September of that year.

None-the-less, in 2007 Thaksin won his fourth General Election in succession.

The message was now completely clear to the Democrat Party and royalists, either they accept the result of democratic elections or they engage in even more aggressive tactics. They chose the latter.

Royalist supporters wearing yellow shirts printed with 'We love the King' began occupying and ransacking government building, closing-down international airports and doing everything possible to sabotage the ability of the Government to govern.

The huge chaos generated by the royalist mobilization provided the Constitutional Court, a set-up of the 2006 military junta, with the excuse it needed to declare, in December 2008, the 3 main parties forming Thaksin's coalition Government un-constitutional. This enabled the Democrat Party to seize control of Government in December 2008.

The absurdity of the politics makes making it make sense quite difficult to explain.

In March 2009 the streets of Bangkok began to fill with 'Red Shirts', predominantly rural people from the north-east and northern regions demanding an immediate return to the ballot box - to a general election. The Democrat Party knew that it had to call an election that it could not win.

With Thaksin in exile and 111 of his MPs banned from politics by order of (the junta's) Constitutional Court, it was Thaksin's sister Yingluck Shinawatra that once again defeated the Democrat Party, with a clear majority, in the 2011 General Election.

Once again the Democrat Party and royalist supporters were left with the unpleasant question of how to deal with the reality: even with full employment of their arsenal of trickery and sabotage, they were not able to win at the ballot box.

Black-mailed by the threat of further violent confrontation with the royalist-Democrat Party alliance, Yingluck was forced to dissolve her Cabinet in December 2013. As a fragile acting Prime Minister she called for a General Election in February 2014. When the time came, the Democrat Party boycotted the election and royalist mobs, secretly in league with the Election Commission, went about disrupting polling stations. Many people stayed home out of fear. Only 47 % were able to vote. The Election Commission was forced to set a new election date for the areas unable to vote. The so-called Constitutional Court finally ended the theatre by declaring all and everything unconstitutional. 10

In May 2014 the Royal Thai Army came out of barracks to stage yet another military coup, capturing Yingluck and sending her and those members of her cabinet that had not been able to escape to a military camp. After some days in detention for 'attitude adjustment' they were released, but thenceforth held under close watch by the military authorities.

The continuous refusal of the Democrat Party to accept the results of elections is causing the state of Thailand and the people of Thailand a great amount of stress and suffering. The constant sabotaging of the democratic process by The Democrat Party is dragging the country to the depths of ignominy.

The current confusion is, as usual, being exasperated and made worse by the ceaseless pumping- out of propaganda, with the blessings of the Palace and Privy Council, about duty to protect Nation, Religion and His Royal Highness as Head of Democracy.

It is important to point out that despite the severe and often violent attempts to suppress the inevitable growth and diversity of political views and opinions, Thailand has over 70 registered political parties, but there is no political space. All political space is, at present (November 2015) still full to bursting with the suffocating theatre being played-out between Thaksin supporters and the Democrat Party, whose royalist backers have no qualms about bullying the whole country with dastard, military crack-downs and coups.

1.8 'Thai-style' corruption

In Thailand the pro-active maintenance of rigid class hierarchy and top-down patronage of political life, coupled with constant use of propaganda to brain-wash people into imagining that they are not ready or capable of ruling themselves, has been ensuring that democracy cannot mature and that the most privileged can remain the most privileged. This patronage produces and perpetuates governance that focuses on the channelling of public money to governmental construction projects with human development as an apology. A business cannot be run successfully, a person cannot become a politician or be successful as a politician, without participating, in some way or other, in regularising above- and below-board payment of commission fees, without oiling in some way or other the wheels of corruption in governmental business, contracts and projects. There is in reality no sector of Thai society that is free of the hierarchy of corruption. Governmental contracts and projects are the traditional preserve of the 'old guard': the high-rank royalists and military men. Thailand has some 1400 military generals most of whom are engaged in making personal wealth. As the relative wealth and status of the middle ranks grow the old guard comes under pressure from below. To maintain a favourable status-quo it must decide, from time to time, on a shake-up and clamp-down. Failure of elected politicians is the customary excuse for re-establishing military rule and the power of the elite. From time to time, street protests against corruption are not un-welcome since they provide the elite with a visible excuse to crack-down on corrupt politicians whom they can easily accuse of corruption and of failing to maintain control. A glance at the political record reveals that, in the name of the King, a few dozen protesters, usually small farmers, are sacrificed Thai-style at more- or-less regular intervals from time to time. As Foreign Direct Investment increased in the 90ies so too did Thailand's hierarchical, autocratic machinery of state sink deeper into the chicken-and-egg syndrome. A military coup is declared necessary to overthrow political corruption and permit 'good people' who love the King to re-set the road to democracy one day. A royalist junta is then permitted to run an election provided only 'good people' can be elected.

1.9 70 years of political instability In the 83 years since the 1932 'Democracy Coup' Thailand has had 29 Prime Ministers, 26 during 69 years under King Bhumibol. 4 PMs were appointed by the King himself, 8 PMs came to power through King-approved military coups, 13 through elections. The PMs that came from military coups have averaged 5 years in power, those from elections about 2 years.

Comparative study of election results since 1948 is almost exclusively a study of just 3 political parties: the Democrat Party established in 1946 - Thailand's oldest still functioning party, the Chat Thai Party - a play-safe party established in 1975 and outlawed by the Constitutional Court in 2008, and the Thai Rak Thai (Thai Love Thai Party) of the Shinawatra faction established in 1998, still active under the name of Phue Thai (For Thai Party).

In 2015 the people struggle, as ever before, to know how to deal with their 19th Constitution as presented to them by the 10th military junta to rule over them in the 70 years of Bhumibol's reign. Who in Thailand has not had enough of injustice, humiliation, violence and tomfoolery? Not many. Most of Thailand is hoping for a properly conducted General Election under international supervision.

More apprehensive than ever before, the royalist fanatics have come up with a farcical twist to their old games: 'Reform before Election'.

Thailand is facing, now, the consequences of 70 years of failure to establish regular democratic elections, of 70 years of royalist sabotage of democratic procedure during the reign of the King. The tragedy is huge.

It is certainly the great hope of the great majority that, with the assistance of the International Community, the next General Election in Thailand will raise Thailand, finally this time, from the feudal quagmire. Although still powerless, 53 political parties attempted to participate in the February 2014 General Election.

GRAPH 1: Thailand's erratic General Election history during the reign of Bhumibol 1946 - present.

GRAPH 2: General Elections and the 3 main political parties 1946 – present

Table 1: Thailand's juntas and Prime Ministers 1946 to present.

Time in office: Deposed Head of government In office by: Party Start End Days Months Years by:

Dr. Pridi Banomyong 24-Mar-46 11-Jun-46 5 1946 election Resigned Free Thai Rear Admiral Thawan Constitutiona 23-Aug-46 8-Nov-47 16 2 1 1946 election 1947 coup Thamrongnawasawat l Front 1947 military coup 8-Nov-47 10-Nov-47 2 Military coup Military Major Khuang Aphaiwong 10-Nov-47 8-Apr-48 29 4 Coup and election 1948 coup Democrat 1948 military coup 6-Apr-48 8-Apr-48 2 Phibun coup Military Field Marshall Plaek (Phibun) 8-Apr-48 29-Nov-49 21 7 1 Self coup Military Phibunsongkhram 1 1949 military coup 29-Nov-49 29-Nov-49 1 Self-appointed Military Field Marshall Plaek 29-Nov-49 16-Sep-57 18 9 7 1957 coup Military Phibunsongkhram 1957 military coup 16-Sep-57 21-Sep-57 5 Sarit coup. Military Coup / Palace's Pote Sarasin 21-Sep-57 1-Jan-58 21 3 Resigned Palace man Field Marshall Thanom 1-Jan-58 20-Oct-58 20 9 1957 coup 1958 coup Military Kittikachorn 1958 military coup 20-Oct-58 9-Feb-59 20 3 Sarit coup. Military Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat 9-Feb-59 8-Dec-63 10 3 Self-appointed Death Military Field Marshal Thanom 9-Dec-63 14-Oct-73 5 10 9 Military Kittikachorn 1971 military coup 18-Nov-71 17-Dec-72 29 1 Self-appointed Military Field Marshal Thanom 1973 Student 18-Dec-72 14-Oct-73 26 9 Self-appointed Military Kittikachorn Upraising Dissolution of Palace / Prof. Sanya Thammasak 14-Oct-73 15-Feb-75 1 4 1 Privy Council cabinet Privy council Mom Rajawongse Seni Pramoj 1 15-Feb-75 14-Mar-75 27 1975 election Resigned Democrat Mom Rajawongse Kukrit Pramoj 14-Mar-75 20-Apr-76 6 1 1 1975 election Resigned Social Action Mom Rajawongse Seni Pramoj 2 20-Apr-76 6-Oct-76 16 5 1975 election 1976 coup Democrat 1976 military coup 6-Oct-76 8-Oct-76 2 1976 coup 1977 coup Military Thanin Kraivichien 8-Oct-76 20-Oct-77 12 1 Palace's man Palace 1977 military coup 20-Oct-77 10-Nov-77 21 Military Dissolution of General Kriangsak Chomanan 11-Nov-77 3-Mar-80 20 4 2 1977 coup Military cabinet Dissolution of General Prem Tinsulanonda 3-Mar-80 4-Aug-88 5 8 1977 coup Military cabinet General Chatichai Choonhavan 4-Aug-88 23-Feb-91 19 6 2 Election 1991 coup Chat Thai 1991 military coup 24-Feb-91 2-Mar-91 6 1991 coup Military Anand Panyarachun 2-Mar-91 7-Apr-92 5 1 1 Palace's man 1992 election Palace People’s General Suchinda Kraprayoon 7-Apr-92 10-Jun-92 3 2 1991 coup Military protest Dissolution of Anand Panyarachun 10-Jun-92 23-Sep-92 13 3 Palace's man Palace cabinet Dissolution of Chuan Leekpai 23-Sep-92 13-Jul-95 20 9 2 1992 election Democrat parliament

Dissolution of Banharn Silpa-archa 13-Jul-95 25-Nov-96 12 4 1 1995 election Chat Thai parliament New General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh 25-Nov-96 9-Nov-97 16 11 0 1996 election Voted out Aspiration 1996 election Chuan Leekpai 9-Nov-97 9-Feb-01 3 3 1996 election Democrat term end Completed Thai Rak Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra 9-Feb-01 9-Mar-05 28 4 2001 election election term Thai 2005 & 2006 Thai Rak Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra 6-Feb-05 19-Sep-06 3 7 1 2006 coup election Thai 2006 military coup 19-Sep-06 1-Oct-06 12 2006 coup Military Dissolution of Palace / General Surayud Chulanont 1-Oct-06 29-Jan-08 28 3 1 Privy Council cabinet Privy council Constitutional People's Samak Sundaravej 29-Jan-08 8-Sep-08 10 7 2007 election court power Constitutional People's Somchai Wongsawat 18-Sep-08 2-Dec-08 14 2 2007 election court power Abhisit Vejjajiva 17-Dec-08 5-Aug-11 19 7 2 2007 election 2011 Election Democrat Constitution Yingluck Shinnawatra 5-Aug-11 7-May-14 2 9 2 2011 election Pheu Thai court 2014 military coup 22-May-14 24-Aug-14 2 2 2014 coup Military General Prayuth Chan-ocha 24-Aug-14 10-Nov-15 17 2 1 Self-appointed Military

Prime Ministers and Heads of State 1946 - 2015 14 in office by ELECTION av. time in office 2 years. Total time 25.8 years 8 .. MILITARY COUP .. 5 .. 38.9 5 .. KING'S APPOINTMENT .. 1 .. 5.3

Note that the 13 that came to office by military coups and King’s appointment cover 44 years or 62% of the reign to date of Rama 9.

1.10 The semi-democratic 'People's Constitution' of 1997

The 1997 Constitution is sometimes referred to as the 'People's Constitution' because it was produced by a drafting committee of 99 people, 76 of whom were elected by the people of each Province and 23 of whom were nominated by institutes of higher education, but the Constitution restricted the election of MPs to those with university degrees, thereby excluding 70 - 80% of the population from candidature.

The 97 Constitution gave birth and much power to many non-elect state-funded but autonomous institutions e.g. the Election Commission, Human Rights Commission, Constitutional Court, Anti- Corruption Commission, Law Reform Commission and various organs of the Judiciary. These new state bodies were intended to be free of party politics so that they could monitor the work of the Parliament but, in 'Thai-style', they became almost immediately mere instruments of the royalist elite. Never-the-less the 1997 Constitution is often seen, in various respects, as the point to which the country must return to clear-up the political chaos of the last decade.

In 1997 many people were feeling and hoping that Thailand might be about to experience a political sunrise, hoping Thailand was about to become a country leading the way to democracy in the ASEAN.

1.11 The Shinawatra phenomenon

The arrival of corporate tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra sent a shock-wave through Thai politics.

Thaksin came from a wealthy family of merchants and politicians in Chiang Mai, being himself educated at the Police Academy and rising to the rank of Police Colonel before becoming a business tycoon and billionaire, before entering politics in the mid-90ies. As an elected PM controlling a massive majority in Parliament, Thaksin was able to employ a previously unknown style of authoritarian, fast-track, populist politics. His impact could not and cannot be dismissed or passed-over.

With almost absolute control of the Parliament he fast-tracked Thailand's first ever attempt to introduce a free healthcare system (his '30 Baht scheme') and implemented Thailand's first ever system to provide villagers with access to low-interest cash. He also launched his infamous 'War on drugs', that led him to declare a State of Emergency across many border zones and permit authorities to use violence with impunity for keeping peace and order.

The Royal Thai Army removed him from power in their 2006 coup, and the Criminal Court removed him from politics with a 2-year prison sentence for misuse of power. Thaksin escaped and has since managed to conduct Thai politics from the outside, to the extent that he still dominates the political theatre.

Thaksin and what became known as 'Thaksonomics' aggravated the fears of those who cannot imagine how to row the boat without their King of Kings at the tiller.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Chapter 2 Propaganda, brain-washing & the prestige of the Palace

Note: 'Palace' here means Royal Family and staff, Privy Council, Bureau of the Royal Household (managing some 20 palaces) and the Royal Projects.

2.1 Propaganda & brain-washing 1957 - 1980 and onwards

The immediate decades after World War II saw most countries struggling hard for economic recovery, struggling to cast-off dictatorship, to attain full independence and establish democratic governance. The Kingdom of Thailand's political direction and development was, in most aspects of life, the exact opposite.

While the Cold War period in Thailand was characterised, as elsewhere, by phenomena such the 'Baby boom' and imposition of the 'Green Revolution', all forms of human rights and development came under a highly oppressive and often quite barbaric chain of monarcho-military dictatorships.

In the name of 'Nation, Religion and King', in every walk and dimension of life, in schools, temples and workplace, the life of all people young and old was pumped full, day-in day-out, of propaganda and twisted values. All were subjected to relentless, full-scale propaganda aimed at making fear of communism worse than that of the fires of hell. The propaganda machine took full advantage of the intrinsic, latent fears of Thailand's various ethnic communities - fears of abnormal or inexplicable phenomena, many of which were already bound-up in, and exploited by, the deficient pedagogy of a Buddhist monkhood not yet emerged from subjugation to Absolute Monarchy. Cold War propaganda aimed and in many respects succeeded in catalysing many different forms of already existing prejudice.

The slightest attempt of any person to question or deviate from the norms being imposed placed all authors at risk of being reported and accused of attempting to overthrow the monarchy. The word 'people' was intentionally excluded from the propaganda, books were banned and writers thrown in jail. People ceased to be people and became mere 'subjects of the King'. In itself the word 'freedom' was a threat to national security.

Marshal Sarit (1957 - 1963) concentrated on reviving the ceremonies, practices and privileges of absolute monarchy. In 1958 he changed the date of National Day (1938) to that of the King's Birthday. All construction projects were built in the name of members of the royal family. Billboards depicting the royal family flooded the landscape and their portraits became obligatory on the walls of all institutions, courts, offices and private homes. The arrival of TV brought with it two military TV channels. Every TV channel was compelled to show the Palace News at 20.00 hrs and still is required to do so, and still is obliged to broadcast Palace and military news on demand.

The elimination of the Lao monarchy by the Pathet Lao (communists) in 1975 did much to catalyse the fear of a people's uprising in Thailand, and it spurred the Royal Family to full co-operation with the Royal Thai Army and the USA's war on communism, and to using all and any means to prevent communism and any form of socialist thinking taking root in Thailand.

Thailand's royalist leaders have made little or no attempt to move-on from the mantras of Cold War indoctrination. Since the Cold War there has been no real effort by any governmental authority to clear away the shadows of Cold War psychological warfare. Unquestioning, uniformed obedience to military-style tutoring remains the norm in all schools and universities.

It was only at the start of this century that Thai people started to shake the blankets of fear, started realising that, for instance, the provision of free healthcare was not something available only to the kharatchakarn, the servants of the king - Thailand's 2 million civil servants, but a social right that should be available for all and is available to all in many countries.

2.2 The Royal Projects

Dating back to the 1950ies, the so-called Royal Projects were formalised, as said, through integration into the state budget in 1981. In 2001 they were consuming 2 billion Baht / annum of the state budget and in 2013 around 2.5 billion (about 52 million Euro). In 2013 there were 4,447 Royal Projects.

In large part the purpose of these royal projects, which reach like a cobweb to all corners of the country, is to maintain the prestige, validity and status of the Monarchy in the minds of the people. By engaging thousands of Thailand's 2 million civil servants they also serve to keep all branches of the civil service, including army and police, tied to the Palace.

Although full details of any royal project are difficult or impossible to obtain through the Internet, some details are available for the 100 or so projects that are being promoted as successful.

One of the 'successful' projects that is receiving much attention from the royal family, is the 'Development of Ban Huay Lan in accordance with the Guidance of his Majesty the King', Sankamphang District, Chiang Mai. This village has been a Royal Project since 1987 - with forest conservation, water management, income generation and community development all part of the programme.

State support to the Ban Huay Royal Project between 1987 - 2014 was 50 million Baht. (Note here that the expense-per-visit of a member of the royal family to any royal project is between 1 - 2 million Baht.) If, according to royal definition, making a village the size of Ban Huay 'sufficiently sustainable' requires a 50 million Baht subsidy over 30 years then, through allocation of 145 billion Baht / annum, Thailand's 80,000 villages could be 'sufficiently sustainable' in 20 - 40 years. This is not altogether impossible in view of a state budget currently running at around 2.7 trillion with the defence budget now running up to around 207 billion Baht (5.2 billion Euro).

These royal projects are creaming-off public finance that many people might wish to see being put to use in other ways, but any criticism of royal projects would likely be considered an insult to royal wisdom and be criminalised.

The point that needs to be made is that rural projects that do not dedicate themselves to the King's philosophy and so-called 'Sufficiency Economy' can find it difficult if not impossible to get financed or to receive the cooperation of the authorities required to become operational.

Since formal establishment in 1981, royal projects are by law formally managed by the Office of the Royal Development Projects Board, which is comprised of the Army C-in-C, members of the Privy Council, the Director of the (State) Bureau of the Budget, Permanent Secretaries of all leading ministries etc., with the Prime Minister as chairperson, in short a set-up with no limits.

Despite receipt of full support from every Government, in 1989 the King himself decided that his interests required greater efficiency and so he founded the Chaiphattana Foundation as a royal NGO to speed-up implementation of royal projects by tapping into private and corporate capital.

All people in Thailand grow-up watching, at 8 p.m. every evening, members of the royal family gathering money for their innumerable charities. They are none-the-less denied the right to any independent evaluation of this high-profile activity. Under the political climate maintained in Thailand and the law of lès majesté (Article 112 of the Criminal code), there is no way to monitor the direction of flow of the vast amounts of tax-free cash that pass through the coffers of the Palace and royal projects.

The apparent ease with which the Palace is able to raise money in a cash-strapped society means that, like it or not, much of civil society is sucked into adapting principles and objectives to gain royal patronage. Even long-standing independent NGOs like the Foundation for Thailand Rural Reconstruction are now under the patronage of the Palace.

In 2013, 300 of the 900 organisations listed by the Ministry of Finance as tax exempt were either 17 registered by members of the royal family or directly under the patronage of a member of the royal family or engaged in some activity to promote the monarchy.

Graph 3. Royal Household budget, state finance only, 1938 - 2015

Graph 4. Budget of the Kingdom of Thailand

Chapter THREE

A feudal turmoil

3.1 Growing resistance Through the decades of military dictatorship following World War II the Chakri Monarchy was carefully re-built to almost absolute form, to become once again untouchable, free to do as it wished and pleased, free to garner huge wealth from private, public and corporate sources with impunity. In the shadows of this ever-growing monarcho-military corporation - of royal councils, armies, projects, courts, property bureaus and construction projects - the people were left with no real ways or means to develop or defend their own interests from the schemes and policies of central government - from roads, dams, agricultural directives, land acquisitions and displacement, from manifold injustice in general. By 1973 there was half a million people marching on the streets of Bangkok demanding that the military gang that had ruled from 1957 step-down. This uprising of the working class carried a brief moment of hope, before being savagely smashed by the Royal Thai Army in October 1976, with much loss of life and imprisonment.

After the 1976 crack-down the new military junta raised the punishment for lèse majesté - for criticising, defaming or insulting the royal family in any vague way - from 7 to 15 years imprisonment. Through vigorous use of Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code, a law resurrected in 1956 from the days of absolute monarchy, the people could be silenced and cowed and the sanctity of the Monarchy secured. Only silence or praise of the Monarchy was tolerated, as is the case today.

In 1980 a law was passed granting amnesty to the thousands who fled to the forest after the 1976 crack-down. Most were glad of their amnesty, glad to leave their lives in the forest and the disorder of the Communist Party. Many returned to become leaders of non-governmental organisations, some to politics and academic life as good servants of the King. By the 1990ies many of these October People had become influential as reformists in many areas of Thai society.

In the year of protest that followed the February 1991 military coup, all people hoped - Bangkokians, trade unionists, October People, NGOs and many politicians including many from the Democrat Party - that Thailand was about to rid itself of military dictatorships forever, but it was not to be so.

In May 1992 the Royal Thai Army managed to shoot and kill 45 people on the streets of Bangkok. Once again the King stepped-in to mediate between the leaders of the coup and the people, and the result? The coup leader was allowed to step-down with impunity, the King appointed a new Prime Minister and the people saluted the King. In usual 'Thai-style' nobody took responsibility for the shooting of 45 civilians by the Royal Thai Army.

The 1990ies saw in the era of neo-liberal globalisation, led by the USA and the EU, the era of massive out-sourcing by most industries of the Global North and heavy attempts to drive through 'free trade agreements'. Aided by developments in information technology, the decade brought fast, dramatic change to the whole world. It spawned a new breed of global wheelers and dealers and opened-up the Chinese market. Wielding absurd slogans like 'Single Global Market' agents of neo- liberal capitalism lobbied aggressively at every level to eliminate any tariff or barrier that stood in their way.

In Thailand too, the 1990ies saw a massive expansion in Foreign Direct Investment with, for instance, the export value of computer parts out-stripping that of Thailand's garment industry in 1995. Rural communities came under increasing pressure from agro-industries, mining and tourism, causing ever greater frustration and unease amongst villagers who, having borne the brunt of the Cold War and been turned upside-down by the so-called Green Revolution, remained subjects of humiliation and neglect by central government.

With the most powerful nations forcing countries to open borders through supra-national agencies like the WTO and APEC, all around the world communities and anti-globalisation movements scrambled at the local, national, regional and global levels to defend and protect their rights, resources and dignity.

For the global 95%, the battle to counter the neo-liberal capitalist onslaught remains on-going. In Thailand the suppression and oppression coming out of central government in Bangkok has remained as hard as ever. As elsewhere, resistance movements have had to become more effective. In Thailand one of the stronger social movements to emerge was the 'Assembly of the Poor'. Led initially by villagers opposing the construction of large-scale dams, the Assembly of the Poor became a common platform for 125 different struggles taking place all around the country.

In April 1997 more than 20,000 members of the Assembly set-up camp outside Government House in Bangkok - 'The 99-Day Camp'. Although the Government agreed to most of their demands, implementation of promises was weak and makeshift and little of significance was resolved. Some battle-weary leaders of the Assembly of the Poor have withdrawn but many are they who continue to fight to this day.

In Thailand, between 1995 and 2005, around 30 community leaders and human rights activists were assassinated.

During the 2006 royalist mobilization to oust Thaksin Shinawatra's powerful political faction, at first in the name of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and then later in the name of the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), pressure was placed on the Assembly of the Poor by Bangkok NGOs to get the Assembly to join the mobilization. Some sectors of the Assembly did, some didn't.

3.2 The Thaksin era

Most October People found the authoritarian, harsh-driving, strategies of Thaksin Shinawatra unacceptable. Thaksin more-or-less ignored the role of trade unions and NGOs, making no attempt to co-operate with them. Like or not, early in 2006, most October People found themselves joining the royalist mobilization against Thaksin and 'Thaksonomics'.

Thaksin's personal financial power, popularity and decisive character were something altogether new in Thai politics. His fast-track ability to wheel and deal in both the domestic and global market upset the functions and functioning of the monarchy network, and of the 'in-control society' so enjoyed by the embedded royalist elite. The royalist establishment found itself running scared and concluded unanimously that Thaksin had to be eliminated.

Although understandable, when the NGO network began joining forces with the elite to overthrow Thaksin 'no matter how, no matter what' they pulled a large part of civil society onto a regressive track.

In Thailand's hegemonic society, the NGOs, trade unions, academics and October People celebrities are the people who are supposed to maintain a gram of integrity, the people supposed to stand-up in defence of democracy. Their falling-in behind the factions of Thai society that have traditionally used and see nothing wrong with using the Royal Thai Army to topple elected governments, their siding with the 'good people' whose actions cannot be monitored or brought to justice, was a clear failure of commitment. The mainly self-appointed people's leaders failed the people and succeeded in contributing greatly to the political confusion reigning in Thailand today.

Below is a passage from a speech by Somsak Kosaisook, a spokesman for the Confederation of State Enterprise Unions (SERC), made on a PDRC stage in April 2014, one month before the military coup in May 2014, poetic words that are seriously flawed:

"... No party has no end. Our work to topple the Thaksin regime will come, certainly, to an end. No long stretch cannot end, it's impossible brothers and sisters ... but in the time of battle it's normal because we are fighting against the other, while we want a quick end to the war the other party is 20 also struggling... In the past what we called the dictatorship regime - the military dictatorship regime in the past - came and went in just a few days, and they stay quiet. They have made many good virtue in it. But an evil capitalist dictatorship, it is stubborn. We have, thus, to be now more exhaustive than at any time in the past when we fought against military dictatorship ... "

Thailand's 8 or 9 military dictatorships of the past did not 'come and go' in just a few days, they held onto power for more than 60% of all time since the end of World War II, and, as for 'staying quiet', the longest period that the Royal Thai Army has stayed out of politics since 1946 is 14 years, from 1992 to 2006. Clearly the virtues of any military dictatorship leave much to be desired. According to Kosaisook an elected Prime Minister is a worse evil than a non-elect military dictator. In essence Kosaisook classifies the majority of the population, those that voted for Thaksin, as defectors.

After Thaksin Shinawatra's landslide victory in the 2001 General Election - which gave his Thai Rak Thai Party 224 of 500 seats and a parliamentary majority of 324 - he was able push through whatever policies he chose. In effect the Parliament was, or appeared to be, more in control of the country than at any time in the past, more-or-less bringing the country onto political ground that had never been trodden before.

Drenched in power, Thaksin's so-called CEO manner and praxis appeared to be undermining not only the checks and balances of state bureaucracy, but also the procedures of the Parliament itself. His self-assured and in part successful leap into international finance stunned the establishment, bringing him both admiration and hatred - friends through assistance provided to the rural poor in several ways, and enemies through his habit of inventing, deciding and executing policies as if only he knew best: signing trade agreements in the absence of debate, pushing privatisation as if unions did not exist and so on.

Between 2003 - 2009 his 'War on narcotic drugs' racked-up nearly 3000 extra-judicial killings. His attempt to quell the Southern Conflict blew-up in his face. The two campaigns became entwined in an ugly knot. In 2005 he enacted an Emergency Decree giving immunity to state officials engaging in violent action against suspected drug-traffickers, which in 'Thai-style' practice also meant against Muslim separatists and more-or-less anybody that local enforcement agencies didn't like. Thaksin's brusque handling of these complex issues triggered a kind of war of vengeance that, to this day, has produced a death toll close to 10 000.

Anti-Thaksin feelings began to coalesce in mid-2005 after media tycoon Sonthi Limthongkul & affiliates decided to oppose Thaksin openly. Joined by other anti-Thaksin groups, Sonthi became the leader of the 'People's Alliance for Democracy' (PAD).

Amongst (now proven) rumours that the PAD had support in the Palace, the PAD was powerful from the start and turned into a full-scale royalist mobilization. PAD and the royalist mob (Yellow Shirts) managed to engineer two military coups, install two juntas, oust 4 elected Prime Ministers and, for a brief, unhappy moment, managed to install a Democrat Party leader as Prime Minister.

Perhaps Thaksin could have stayed his own course if he had stood more firmly with his own electoral body and not started pandering to the interests of the monarchy, but he decided to court favour. It was Thaksin who was the first to popularise yellow (the 'King's colour') T-shirts printed with 'We love the King' during his successful organising of the King's 60-year Jubilee in 2006. In a twist of irony these T-shirts became the uniform of the mob that brought him down. He increased the Palace's state budget and upped the application of lèse majesté, but these and other forays came to no avail. In any case he faced a bottom-line: he was an outsider, a police officer, a merchant, a commoner from the North. As a powerful outsider who simultaneously challenged and pandered to monarchic power he could but fail. Within the royalist establishment fear of the Thaksin challenge merged with the fear of losing King Bhumibol. Thus did Thaksin, the many times elected leader of the majority of the population, become the most hated enemy of royalists.

Perhaps Thaksin lost out because, despite his populist politics, he was neither a real friend of the people nor a real friend of the Monarchy.

Besides turning the class divide into a gaping chasm, the last ten years of colour politics has pulled Thailand even further from issues of common principle and closer to protection of individual ego and self-interest. This is not good news in a country whose rulers have always found human rights difficult to swallow. When the NGO leaders of such a country renegade on their principles they cast the populace adrift.

In the current sea of confusion, Thai civil society can only hope that a new generation of leaders if not yet visible is none-the-less with them somewhere, waiting their chance to stand-up: a new generation that, with capacity to learn from all that has happened, has a much better grip on human rights.

The last ten years of turmoil should by now have made clear to the outside world, to the international 'human rights community', that under the surface of the Land of Smiles there is much that by rights demands to be recognised, that the regular Thai citizenry is in much greater need of solidarity than meets the eye.

CHAPTER FOUR

The civil society

4.1 A few words about the People's Alliance for Democracy PAD (2006-2008)

Led by a handful of charismatic people, the People's Alliance for Democracy was a strong revival of the civil-society mobilization and organisation that brought an end to nearly 40 years military dictatorship in 1992. At that time more-or-less the whole population was hoping that the age of military dictatorships in Thailand had finally come to an end.

Reaching out to royalist sympathisers throughout the country, in 2006 the PAD led one of the most powerful royalist mobilizations in Thai history. It was well-structured with first and second level leadership and organised teams dealing with broadcasting, fund-raising, catering and para-military training. It had also a strong back-up team of royalist legal advisors.

The PAD was founded and led by royalist media tycoon Sonthi Limthongkul whose Manager Group owned and still owns news channels, after he fell-out with fellow media tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra, whose Shin Corporation ran satellite communications.

Sonthi was joined by the rigorous Buddhist group Santi Asoke led by a former Governor of Bangkok, Major-General Chamlong Srimuang, by NGO-COD leaders Pipob Thongchai and Suriyasai Katasila, by an Advisor to the Assembly of the Poor, Somkiat Pongpaiboon, and by the prominent labour leader Somsak Kosaisook.

Chamlong, Pipop, Suriyasai and Somsak had all become public names as leaders of the successful 1992 protest against the military coup which had terminated the elected Chatchai Government in 1991.

4.2 Why NGOs participated in the royalist crack-down on democratic freedom

As mentioned earlier, many NGO leaders and spokespersons have come from or are associated with the network of October People: those who were pardoned for their communist leanings in the early 1980ies. As people of conscience who to some extent held the respect of others, many moved back into Thai society to take up work with communities that, after decades of Cold War oppression were still being pushed and humiliated, directly and indirectly, by enforced centralisation policies and by the growing impact of capitalism's neo-liberal global offensive.

Fisher-folk, small farmers, villagers, hill tribes, the new urban working-class, many tens of millions of people, faced a common problem: they had no mechanisms, no political channels or instruments, other than mass protest, with which to defend and protect their rights, resources and interests. All were, more-or-less, politically hamstrung.

Working to facilitate with effect the interests of the poor and working-class requires commitment and courage. No less so in the Land of Smiles where royalist pedagogy and a claustrophobic matrix of hegemony and hierarchy, and real fear of harassment by royalist authorities and fanatics, combine to ensure that people keep their heads down.

In real political terms, without a paid-up membership, the bargaining power of an NGO is frequently limited or negligible, because of dependence on sponsors. Many NGOs do important work but, in real political terms, NGOs often prove unreliable or weak in a political crisis.

Whatever their claims to representing the interests of the poor, however well-known their talking- heads, it can be said that, in Thailand, non-governmental organisations from earliest times until 23 today have failed, and continue to fail, to enable Thailand's working classes to face-up to the impacts of the growing alliance between the autocratic establishment and neo-liberal capitalism. This failure is caused by the absence of political education and the consequent inability of Thai NGOs to realise that radical leadership means nothing in the absence of collective bargaining power.

In short, Thai civil-society has so far failed to provide itself with the bargaining power it needs to be able to generate constructive, supportive dialogue with elected parliaments and governments, or with ability to negotiate effectively with corporate power.

The aim of the Monarchy has always been perfectly clear, to censor Freedom of Speech and to ensure, by whatever means, that radical leaders put their private interests before democratic principle. As said throughout this essay, the pressures on NGOs within the Kingdom of Thailand to dilute their principles and compromise with their stated positions is quite extreme.

In their often desperate search for funding, most NGOs find themselves turning, if not to directly to royal foundations, then to organisations like the Thai Health Promotion Foundation that are well- known for channelling money to projects that do not confront royal interests.

4.3 Why trade unions participated in the royalist crack-down on democratic freedom

Trade unionism is grounded in direct democracy, in the bottom-up approach to realising human rights. Why in 2006 the Thai trade union movement joined the leadership of a reactionary, royalist mobilization against the wishes of the vast majority of the population is a harder case to understand than that of the NGOs, and less forgivable.

To understand the twisting of labour ethics in Thailand, perhaps the most notable aspect of the politics of the last decade, one must duck beneath the street confrontations and look to the suppression of trade unionism in the 1970ies and to the enactment of Thailand's first ever Labour Relations Act in 1975, whose main purpose was to control and limit the growth of trade unionism.

Although Thailand signed-up to the founding of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1919, it has only ratified 15 of ILO's nearly 200 conventions, and not the two core conventions, 87 and 98, covering Freedom of Association and Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining. Why not? The royalist Thai elite has always looked-down on shop-floor unionists as a shabby unskilled under-class and never shown any interest or support for the right to collective bargaining.

Organizing a union in Thailand has always been a difficult and often life-threatening task.

The main block to development of meaningful trade unionism in Thailand has been and remains the Labour Relations Act that came into force in 1975, at a time when labour relations were still handled by a department within the Ministry of the Interior. The Act limited workers to forming only shop-floor unions, and made the formation of national unions impossible in practice. Moreover the Act states directly that farmers, fisher-folk and all non-contract workers and non-Thai / migrant workers cannot form unions. Up until 2005 it also prevented civil servants from joining or forming unions.

In the last 20 years union membership in Thailand has remained quite static.

The primary task of the MOL since formation has been to sustain the weaknesses of the Labour Relations Act by ensuring that Thailand's 14 labour congresses keep the shop-floor / in-house unions as distant as possible from the machinery of state.

In 1991 the military junta out-lawed all state-enterprise unions and assassinated the leader of the Labour Congress of Thailand, which included both state and private-sector unions. It was not until 2000 that the right to form state-enterprise unions was restored.

Up until 1993 Thailand had no Ministry of Labour (MOL). The Ministry was initially staffed with employees from the Ministry of the Interior and, remaining a low-status ministry, has always suffered from being tossed around between parties and governments and from having new ministers coming in more-or-less every year.

As a secondary task perhaps, the MOL has the responsibility to make sure that workers carry 'Love the King' banners on National Labour Day, which is sponsored by the MOL and anti-union corporations.

No surprise then that total labour union membership in Thailand is currently around 600 000 workers, a shameful 1.5 % of the 38 million workforce. In Thailand the term workforce includes all people between the age of 15 and 60.

In joining openly with royalist opposition to the elected Government in 2006, the leadership of the state-enterprise unions was hoping that a Democrat Party Government might ratify ILO conventions 87 and 98. Needless to say, after 4 elected governments had been deposed by the PAD / royalist mobilization, the Democrat Party that did eventually take control in 2008, spun-out the issue of ratification to keep the unions in tow with no intention to ratify. They remain unratified.

It is important to note here that, by calling for a General Strike in 2006 and in2014, to bring-down two elected governments, it was essentially the trade union leadership that provided the Royal Thai Army (Royal Guard) with the excuse it needed to re-establish royalist power. In whose interests? Not that of the huge working-class majority.

To be able to understand how this came about, to understand how-come in 2015 Thailand is back under military dictatorship, we must look to the formation of trade unions in the early years of the Cold War.

It was only after the Second World War that Thai workers began to form unions in state-enterprise industries. Under the military dictatorships of those times the only way that this could be done was by paying homage to Chakri monarchs past and present. At that time most state-enterprise industry was engaged in construction projects under supervision of the military, thus from the start the early trade unions worked in close cooperation with their royalist, military supervisors.

From this time forward state-enterprise workers and their families have been able to enjoy the highest level of social welfare and benefits of all workers in Thailand, sometimes better than the blue-collar workers in the administrative machinery.

The privileged officers of the State Enterprise Labour Relations Confederation (SERC), well- accustomed to negotiating with the machinery of the state, developed, under the patronage of the King, a strongly patronising form of solidarity towards the private-sector unions, the lesser brethren, whose struggle to resist lay-offs and union-busting was far harder.

None-the-less, state or non-state, royalist or otherwise, the pressure to break union leaderships in Thailand has always been, and remains, strong and constant, forcing unions to compromise for the sake of their survival and the safety of worker families. For these reasons the majority of unions in Thailand are so-called 'yellow unions'.

With his political home in the Railway Workers Union, Somsak Kosaisook was a SERC figurehead that prided himself on being a champion of democracy. In 2006 he received the Friedrich-Ebert- Stiftung's Human Rights Award, but thenceforth used this award quite shamelessly as a credential to legitimise his efforts to bring down elected politicians. “I am a democrat" he would say. "I have received the Human Rights Award from former German President Friedrich Ebert who is well- known throughout the world.".

For sure there has been a lot of ego flying around the often flamboyant Yellow and Red Shirt platforms, protest camps and street conflagrations. But no surprise this elation, this sense of urgent political purpose, however misled.

Hopefully this last decade of political turmoil will prove to have been the start of the final-phase of Thailand's long drawn-out self-awakening. Hopefully, with some steam now released, the people are using the current moment to lick their wounds and have a good, sensible, re-think about how to organise for the next General Election, about how to ensure that the next bout of the movement for the liberation of Thailand will be more successful. For everybody's sake it needs to be.

It is not an exaggeration to say that Thailand's 38 million work-force, not to mention the 4 million migrant workers, still has no bargaining power worth mentioning. In Thailand the wage of a senior civil servant is some 16 times greater than the Minimum Wage. In most western democracies it is 4 - 5 times greater. According to the World Bank Thailand's income gap exceeds that of Colombia.

Graph 5. Minimum wage (2013) compared to salaries (2010)

4.4 A few words about the NGO Coordinating Committee on Development NGO-COD

NGO-COD was formed as an NGO umbrella organisation in 1985 with many aims and objectives, including the development of understanding between the NGO community and the Government. It claims to represent several hundred NGOs.

To understand why NGO-COD decided to adopt of a highly retrogressive position in 2006 it is necessary to recognise a combination of factors. Important amongst them is the fact that Thailand was becoming quietly de-classified as a poor country. With other areas of the world appearing in greater need, development aid was becoming more difficult to acquire. When Thaksin came to power he declared that Thailand no longer needed development aid, and he proceeded in politics by ignoring the work of NGOs while simultaneously implementing policies that abused human rights in many areas. Running rough-shod over the NGO community did him no good. The NGO community felt not only insulted but also that his otherwise populist politics were undermining their somewhat delicate legitimacy. Whether previously royalist or not, Thaksin drove the NGO community to side with the Democrat Party, participate in the formation of the PAD and to the issuing of a stream of statements demanding that his family withdraw from the political arena.

As political debate and awareness grows and the collective voice of the people becomes increasingly virile, as it will and must, the royalist authorities, instead of welcoming and embracing this necessary maturation, return again and again to their obscurantist lecturing about duty to 'Protect the Monarchy' and 'Love the King', to their over-worked, exhausted scapegoat and excuse for suppressing and blocking democratic process and procedure. Also, the new middle-classes, concentrated mainly in Bangkok, still see their own interests as being best protected by observing subservience to the established, autocratic hierarchy. During the run-in to the 2014 military coup, pathetic sentences like "We do not agree with the coup, but there is no other alternative" became a middle-class mantra, and the mantra of NGO-COD.

An excerpt from a Prachatai interview in July 2008 with the NGO-COD Coordinator from the Southern Region indicates what many NGOs saw as their dilemma: being caught in having to choose between supporting the royalist establishment or supporting an elected government.

"... As a Songkhla people, actually during the 20 years of my work, I did not have much interest to enter politics. The reason is short. As we all know in 2005-2006 there is campaign to crackdown on Thaksin. That time, we who work on rural development saw what problems Thaksinomics or the former Thai Rak Thai Party have done in the Southern Region, in a way that we do not agree with. Might be right or wrong, but on the issue of taking the southern communities to capitalism, which is most likely toward evil capitalism, it is in practice cruel and wounding the people in the South. We have extrajudicial killings, the intervention of various authorities that is fracture the structure of the society...

When is come to the year 2007-2008, the Thaksinomics change faces from Thaksin himself to his nominees. As we all know, it continues the same approach. For me, I was the secretary of NGO-COD (Coordinating Committee for the Southern Region). Brothers and sisters elected me to be the Secretary of NGOs in the Southern Region. When we organise meeting among the Committee on what can we do with this Prime Minister, all come to the process of to get rid of the Thaksin system. I, then, must do. Brothers and sisters push me to the stadium. I have to fight … The process of cracking down on Thaksin ended at the end of the year (2008), when the judge's verdicts come out. The Prime Minister Samak (Samak Sundaravej) and the Prime Minister Somchai (Somchai Wongsawat) must leave the posts. Our protest then must be ended... ".

In point of fact NGO-COD (Southern Region included) re-joined a re-formed PAD in 2013. This time around, the PAD, calling itself the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), was led openly by the leadership of the Democrat Party, aiming specifically at de-bunking Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra.

After the 2014 coup some deluded members of NGO-COD presented themselves to the military junta, to the NCPO, and acquired seats in the junta's National Legislative Assembly, a set-up of 220 appointed-by-the-junta persons, half of whom are serving military officers. Also, some NGO- COD people have acquired seats in the junta's National Reform Assembly, a set-up of 200 appointed-by-the-junta persons to help the junta look intelligent.

TABLE 3 below indicates the role played by the main actors in the political battle that brought down 4 Prime Ministers between 2006 and 2014, returned Thailand to military dictatorship and enabling a C-in-C of the Royal Thai Army to appoint himself Prime Minister.

TABLE 3. The royalist mobilization and civil society 2006 - 2014.

DATE ACTORS HAPPENING Reference 3 Feb. 2006 NGO-COD with 250 member organizations NGO-COD demands that Thaksin Shinawatra resigns as http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2006/ and 11 allied orgs. PM, and announces the start of action to overthrow the 02/22180 Thaksin government. 9 Feb. 2006 People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) Formation of PAD and announcement that the PAD will http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2006/ protest until Thaksin resigns. 02/7284

20 Feb. 2006 State Enterprise Labour Relations 40 state-enterprise unions announce they with join the http://www.manager.co.th/Qol/ViewNew Confederation (SERC) PAD protest. s.aspx?NewsID=9490000023037 26 Feb. 2006 PAD Official launch of PAD mobilization on the Palace Royal http://thaioctober.com/smf/index.php?to Ground with introduction of main allies e.g. NGO-COD, pic=2820.0;wap2 SERC, Santi Asoke Buddhists, Democrat Party members, elite royalists etc. 3 Aug. 2006 Unions Unions announce General Strike and demand Thaksin's http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2006/ resignation. 03/7641 18 Sept. 2006 PAD + unions Call for 'A Big Day rally' on 20 September to oust Thaksin's http://www.dek- government. State Enterprise Unions announce they have d.com/board/view/662611/ mobilized 30,000 members. 19 Sept. 2006 Royal Guard rolls their tanks into the streets of Bangkok. A meeting of the High Command of the Armed Forces and Chief of Royal Thai Police, presided-over by the C-in-C of the Royal Thai Army, announce the dissolution of the Government, Parliament and 1997 Constitution. 19 Sept. 2006 PAD PAD announces end of protest: “We do not like the military http://th.wikisource.org/wiki/แถลงการณ์ฉบับ coup, but Thaksin has gone and PAD will stop protesting.” ที _1/2551_พันธมิตรประชาชนเพื อประชาธิปไตย End of 2006 Democratic Alliance Against Dictatorship Formation of anti-coup coalition by miscellaneous civil https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_F (DAAD) society groups and progressive NGOs opposed to the 2006 ront_for_Democracy_Against_Dictato military coup. rship 23 Dec. 2007 Thaksin's Peoples Power Party (PPP) PPP wins a land-slide election at the polls and forms a new https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thai_gen Government. eral_election,_2007 28 Mar. 2008 PAD PAD reformed as before with elite royalists, Democrat Party, http://www.prachatai.com/journal/200 NGOs, TUs and academics and starts protesting again. 8/03/16228 13 Apr. 2008 Thammasart University Administration The University demands the Government to 'sacrifice itself' http://www.prachatai.com/journal/200 by dissolving the Parliament. 9/04/20826 31 May 2008 NGO-COD with the Northern NGO Network NGO-COD urges PM Samak Sundaravej to resign. http://www.prachatai.com/journal/200 and 64 other NGOs and organisations 8/09/17976 16 June 2008 20 organisations of the Network of the Network of the Poor announces that “If the Government http://www.hilltribe.org/thai/webboard/ Poor cannot solve our problems by 24 June, we will join the PAD main.php?board=002604&topboard= to evict the Government." 28

July 2007 United Front for Democracy Against People in Red Shirts began to appear on the streets in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Fro Dictatorship (UDD) defence of their elected government. nt_for_Democracy_Against_Dictatorship 29 Aug 2008 Thai Labour Solidarity Committee (TLSC): TLSC demands PM's resignation. http://www.thailabordatabase.org/th/fil a coalition of unions and labour NGOs. e3.php?id=51082901 2 Sept. 2008 TLSC and Global Unions in Thailand TLSC demands that the Cabinet resign. http://www.prachatai.com/journal/200 (UNI-TLC) 8/09/17976

2 Sept. 2008 NGO-COD North-east Region NGO-COD demands PM's resignation. http://www.prachatai.com/journal/200 8/09/17976 2 Sept. 2008 Northern Region Civil Societies Alliance Northern Alliance demands PM's resignation. http://www.prachatai.com/journal/200 8/09/17976 2 Sept. 2008 Assembly of NGOs for environmental Assembly of NGOs demands PM's resignation. http://www.prachatai.com/journal/200 protection and conservation. 8/09/17976

3 Sept. 2008 Thammasart University Administration University repeats demand that the Government 'sacrifice http://www.prachatai.com/journal/200 itself' by dissolving the Parliament. 8/09/17976 2 Sept. 2008 NGO-COD NGO-COD demands PM's resignation for failing to prevent http://www.prachatai.com/journal/200 violent confrontation in the streets. 8/09/17963 3 Sept. 2008 State Enterprise Confederation (SERC) Somsak Kosaisuk announces that SERC will join the PAD http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detai and cut water and electricity to government buildings. l.php?newsid=1220448280 11 Sept. 2008 SERC and NGO-COD Join demand that 'Good People' must be appointed to http://www.prachatai.com/journal/200 govern Thailand. 8/09/18127 7 Oct 2008 PAD and SERC 5000 PAD protesters storm Parliament House to arrest the http://www.photoontour.com/events_h PM. The PM escapes from a back door over a fence. Armed tml/7oct08/text/text2.htm PAD protesters engage in open street-fighting with the Bangkok Police Force which was attempting to blockade approaches to Government House. On both sides several people die and many hundreds are injured.

Nov 26 - 2 PAD and SERC Demanding the PM's resignation, many thousands of PAD https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008%E2 Dec, 2008 protesters, including Democrat Party MPs, occupy and %80%9310_Thai_political_crisis close-down 4 international airports: both Bangkok airports, Songkla and Phuket. 2 Dec. 2008 Constitutional Court (appointed by 2006 Constitutional Court declares all 3 of the elected parties of http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7759960.st military junta). the Government coalition unconstitutional and orders that m they be dissolved. 3 Dec. 2008 PAD and SERC PAD and SERC stop protesting. https://th.wikipedia.org/wiki การบุกยึดท่าอากาศยานในประเทศไทย_พ.ศ._

15 Dec 2008 Democrat Party The Democrat Party is able finally to take-up the reins of http://www.theguardian.com/world/20 government. 08/dec/15/thailand-prime-minister 12 Mar 2009 United Front for Democracy Against UDD demands an immediate General Election. Dictatorship (UDD / 'Red Shirts') 10 - 14 April Democrat Party Government (PM Abhisit The Royal Thai Army is requested by Abhisit Vejjajiva to No condemn message from NGOs 2009 Vejjajiva) crackdown on the Red Shirt protest. About 120 people and TUs and elites academics on the injured. 2 Red Shirt bodies recovered from the river. violence crackdown on the civilians. 12 Mar 2010 Red Shirts Red Shirts establish protest camps in Central Bangkok, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/ taking-over one of the main shopping street, as part of the asiapcf/05/17/thailand.timeline/ largest political mobilization in Thailand's history. 10 Apr - 20 Democrat Party Government (PM Abhisit The Royal Guard is requested by Abhisit's interim No statements from NGOs and TUs May 2010 Vejjajiva) and Royal Guard Government to disperse the Red Shirt protest camp in to condemn the gov't for violence central Bangkok. 40,000 soldiers of the Royal Guards are crackdown on civilians. mobilized against the protesters - with Government permission to use 'live bullets'. 99 killed, many by army sniper-fire, 1,855 wounded or injured. 6 June 2010 TLSC TLSC requests Government to provide financial http://www.beta.ryt9.com/s/nnd/91472 compensation for loss of income caused by the 'political 0 crisis'. (A pathetic and distasteful request from a labour organisation so soon after so much bloodshed.) 3 Jul 2011 Phue Thai Party - the new party of the General Election results give, once again, the Thaksin camp Thaksin camp led by Yingluk Shinawatra) a solid victory over the Democrat Party, enabling the Phue Thai Party to form a fully legitimate Government. 8 Aug 2013 Human Rights Commission of Thailand The HRC publishes (after 3 years) the result of their http://www.manager.co.th/Politics/Vie investigation into the April - May 2010 military crackdown wNews.aspx?NewsID=95600000985 and massacre of Red Shirts, stating that the 'Live firing zone' 67 was in accord with the State of Emergency Law. 12 Nov. 2013 People's Democratic Reform Committee The PAD alliance is reformed as the PDRC to launch of new http://www.thairath.co.th/content/3823 (PDRC) round of aggressive protests against the Shinawatra camp. 96 8 Dec. 2013 State Enterprises Confederation (SERC) SERC calls for a General Strike "For the sake of the http://www.publicpostonline.com/2013 Nation" . . /main/content.php?page=sub&catego ry=4&id=553 9 December PM Yingluck Shinawatra Yingluck dissolves her Cabinet, announces a General http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia- 2013 Election for 2 February 2014 and takes on the role of an 25252795 interim / acting PM. 20 Dec. 2013 TLSC TLSC demands that Yingluck resigns. http://www.prachatai.com/journal/201 3/12/50607 2 Feb.2014 Everybody General Election. The PDRC uses all means to block the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thai_gen Red Shirt vote. Red Shirts use all means to reach a ballot eral_election,_2014 box. Democrat Party boycotts the election. Election Commission does all possible to sabotage the legitimacy of the election. With half the electorate unable to reach a ballot box, results are put on hold until the areas unable to vote can vote. 21 Mar 2014 Constitutional Court (appointed by the Constitutional Court rules the whole General Election http://www.reuters.com/article/us- Government of the 2006 military junta). unconstitutional: null and void. thailand-protest- idUSBREA2K05520140321 1 May 2014 PDRC, SERC, TLSC Leaders of the PDRC and state-enterprise and private sector http://www.posttoday.com/ unions demand "Reform before election" and the resignation การเมือง/292229/สุเทพ-นํากปปส-ร่วมกิจกรรมวัน of Yingluk's now incapacitated interim Government. แรงงานสากล 7 May 2014 Constitutional Court (appointed by the Constitutional Court declares Yingluk and 9 members of her http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia- Government of the 2006 military junta). Cabinet in violation of something unconstitutional and rules 27292633 them unfit to govern. The remainder of her Cabinet is left to negotiate a new election date with an Election Commission that doesn't want to negotiate. 19 May 2014 SERC SERC calls for a General Strike on 22 May. http://www.thairath.co.th/content/4236 49 22 May 2014 Royal Thai Army The C-in-C of the Royal Thai Army, General Prayuth Chan-o- http://www.theguardian.com/world/20 cha, leads the Royal Guard into Thailand's 10th military 14/may/22/thailand-army-chief- coup, under the patronage of King Bhumibol, 'to prevent announces-military-coup violence'. Acting PM Yingluk and the remains of her Cabinet taken by the military to a military camp. 24 Aug 2014 Royal Thai Army C-in-C Prayuth Chan-o-cha appoints himself 29th PM of Thailand. http://www.reuters.com/article/us- thailand-politics-primeminister- idUSKBN0GL08A20140821

4.5 'Thai-style' defamation of universal values

The story of the last ten years of political turmoil in Thailand speaks of a society so brain-washed and conditioned to autocratic norms that, when put to the test, it finds itself not just unable but also unwilling to accept the concept of equal rights for all - to accept the principle of one person one vote.

The results of this period of turmoil illustrate how badly things can go wrong when the popular leaders of civil society, the citizen-activists, union leaders, and academics start pro-actively compromising, twisting, and making excuses for twisting, human rights and what they have said they stand for, in an madly obsolescent attempt to fit them into an archaic mould to preserve 'Thainess', as if concluding that 'Thainess' cannot be maintained by fostering equal rights and democratic principles.

Led by a well-funded bunch of middle-class people resentful of their lack of punch at the ballot box, the PAD worked furiously against what their leaders said they stood for, and it did succeed in dragging the country backwards, in a direction opposite to that already expressed at the ballot box by the great majority of the population.

When in the 21st Century civil society leaders start calling on elite troops to depose governments elected by the majority, there can be only three conclusions - the society is seriously ill, needs to identify the sickness accurately and engage in serious remedial action immediately.

Why, in the face of all the warning lights that have been flashing ever more brightly and urgently, the international community prefers to down-play the crisis in Thailand is also alarmingly indicative.

Of the many thousands of Yellow Shirts that engaged in heavy street fighting, in ransacking Government House, ministries and TV stations, as well as occupying and closing-down international airports for the 'Love of Nation, Religion and King', not more than a handful have ever been charged with any kind of crime, let alone convicted. In contrast, hundreds of Red Shirt leaders and protesters have been placed behind bars.

As indicated many over, there is no justice in Thailand. On 24 July 2015 two former MPs, whose parties have been repeatedly dissolved by the Constitutional Court, were given one-year prison sentences for accusing the Chairman of the (royal) Constitutional Court of being biased. And so on.

TABLE 4. Deaths and injuries 2008 - 2014

Date Incident Number of injuries Deaths Source

PAD mobilisation -> occupation of 25 May. - Government House Erawan's Centre, 737 8 2 Dec 2008 ministries, airports & Bangkok Medical Office. street battles with police and / or Red Shirts. 10 - 14 April Military crackdown on 120 2 Thaiwikipedia.org 2009 Red Shirt protest. 10 Apr. - Military crackdown on 89 rising in later Emergency Medical 1,855 19 May 2010 Red Shirt protest. reports to 99 Institute of Thailand Confrontations between 30 Nov 2013 - royalists and government 742 20 Erawan's Centre 27 Feb. 2014 supporters. 3,454 130

Chapter FIVE

The way forward

5.1 Political deadlock

For ten years the all too familiar Thai wheel of - protest - military crackdown & coup - new constitution - election - protest - military crackdown & coup - new constitution - has been churning without respite. Trapped as ever in the political maze of the Kingdom, tens of millions of people are increasingly fatigued by a royal circus that is run by a small number of people who profit from the absence of democracy.

How to ensure that violence does not return to the turbulence after the King has passed away nobody knows. Academics talk of a political "deadlock". What will happen nobody can predict, but two issues are perfectly clear: the capability of the armed forces to interfere in any way in the process, procedure and development of democratic governance must be removed, out-lawed by Parliament, and the principle of equal rights must be brought solidly centre stage.

The long reign of Bhumibol has been continuously fuelled with propaganda about the King of Kings wisest of the wise, father of all development etc. The 'All Thai Love the King' propaganda has been pumped-out so tirelessly that it did become some kind of world-class mismagic, causing people on the outside to conclude that Thai problems are truly Thai problems and that trade with or holidaying in Thailand must be done by ignoring the glaring democracy deficit, which being the legally unspeakable has not been difficult. But, the human and economic costs of this cause and effect are now mounting exponentially, to the detriment of trade and industry and the country at large.

In 2015 the military, soldiers of the King, are once again with licence to take-out anybody they don't like, being legally entitled to remove people from their homes, from their bed, without giving a reason. The last decade of turmoil, the royalist war to 'kick-out Shinawatra no matter what', has produced a state-sponsored, royalist gestapo that watches people in their homes, villages, workplace, on Facebook and so on. Under all glamour and glitz, the ground on which the Kingdom squats is sinking under a sickening subservience to injustice. Wobbling dangerously on the edge of a dark chasm, could Thailand fall for the neo-royalist lure? What impact would a slide to neo- royalist techno-fascism in Thailand have on the rest of mainland S-E Asia? It is definitely time for everybody who works in, with and for Thailand to wake-up to what is really going-down in Thailand.

On 24 April 2015 Prachatai reported that the Chief of the Royal Thai Police (which has close to 250 000 officers) had announced his latest "6-month achievement" dealing with cases of lèse- majesté: "239 of 443 cases pending since last year are now completed . . When found guilty, police will strictly implement the law (Article 112) decisively . . 25 069 websites have been found guilty and closed-down . . "

Royalist fear that the authority of the Palace will not survive the passing of the King 'at the centre of our hearts' has been one of the main factors catalysing the recent rounds of violence. A great number of people in and out of uniform have been and are being instructed to fight to protect the monarchy, but against what? In practice all the military and para-military training is to prevent democratic development and uphold rigid class divisions and the privileges of the elite. Under the smiles and make-up, the political tension is running at such a pitch that nobody at present dares or knows how to bring down the heat. Any criticism of the heat becomes immediately a crime against the state.

Fear of civil war in Thailand remains an unpleasant possibility, one of several real reasons why politicians within and without often downplay the reality, so as to be seen to be paying homage to the Monarch regardless of how many times elected governments are forced to resign by the Royal Guard or so-called Constitutional Court, always a much safer road than asking 'Hei! What about justice?'.

However bold, the politics of Thaksin Shinawatra are also pervaded by fear. Although repeatedly beaten-back he has never openly denounced the two military coups that deposed his Governments. He himself does not fight back. He advises his supporters to not resist the military or the politically corrupt verdicts of the Constitutional Court. He has advised his supporters to 'Let it be and show fealty to the Monarch'. Recently he told his old Red Shirt leaders to "Play dead" and wait for the next election.

Thus are the people of Thailand, and everybody connected with Thailand, caught-up in a pathetic yet vicious power game that only lies can say is connected to sustainable development.

There is no merit in a 'Thai style' that leaves what happens next to be decided by a reptilian military junta, by an increasingly arrogant if not insane General Prayuth, who has already proved himself a true dictator and venerable bully. He has already filled all key positions of the machinery of state with military cronies (an on-going process) and, besides the neurotic attention and expense being paid to censoring and punishing Freedom of Speech and Expression, Prayuth is now venturing into power plays with both the military establishment and the Palace.

None-the-less, fatigued or not, the turmoil of the past decade has been a real political awakening for millions of people, strengthening their demand for justice. What today may seem to some like a hopeless deadlock, may not be a deadlock at all, just a loud signal that the time has come for the monarchy to accept democracy.

5.2 Monarcho-militarism

People who turn to the use of military force because they know they cannot win power in an open election are not democrats. Likewise, a political party that is only vaguely democratic when in power is clearly not a Democrat Party. Thailand's so-called Democrat Party has always been a tragi-comic soap opera, a gilded haven for royalist reactionaries who specialise in talk about good governance by 'good people'.

Claiming that 'There is no other way to deal with Thaksin Shinawatra', that 'There is no other alternative' than to call in the Royal Thai Army is a dismal misinterpretation of political reality, reflecting the impact of decades of monarcho-military domination but not the indomitable spirit of resistance, the primus motor of human development.

By turning a blind-eye, or only half an eye, on Thailand's oppressive monarcho-military antics the International Community not only shames itself but actively patronises the patronage of the Palace, actively permitting itself to be party to a de-humanising wheel of hum-bug.

The monarcho-militarist praxis of the Thai monarchy is based and built upon principles of inequality. The Palace has always said clearly that the citizenry is mere dust under the feet of the King, and there has been plenty of opportunity and yet no attempt to change this throughout the 70-year reign of the present King, on the contrary.

The Thai Monarch heads one the largest capital investment consortiums in the world, with assets valued at not less than 30 billion Euro which can by law be used "at the King's pleasure". In true feudal fashion, the administration of this immeasurably vast royal wealth is protected in first instance by an army of not less than 40 000 Royal Guardsmen, who are and have been used many, many times against people the King calls his 'subjects'.

The Chakri Household, and the network monarchy it has fostered, cannot look at democracy without seeing a real threat to their supreme power, privilege and wealth and ability to exercise immunity from justice. General Prayuth's presentation of himself as a good and trusty royal head- boy, at UN Headquarters in September 2015, merely humiliates the family of nations, casting also an unwanted shadow over the community of the ASEAN.

5.3 Moving forward by respecting people's choices

In Thailand 66 million live in an area of 513,115 square kilometres with a density of 132 people / km2. There are more than 40 ethnic groups in 77 provinces in 5 regions. There are at least five major religions and, although Thai is the official language, many other languages are widely spoken.

With economic ties in all directions there is no way that a country as diverse and as ambitious as Thailand can be held under autocratic rule. All organisations and institutions in Thailand need to understand that there can be no sustainable development, no peace, no genuine communal prosperity, without fully representational parliamentary democracy.

The Kingdom of Thailand is supposed to be a constitutional monarchy, not a military dictatorship. This means that the rights, power, freedoms and wealth of the monarchy are supposed to be determined by the electorate through a fully representative Parliament.

A constitutional monarchy does not prevent the monarch from being voted a King of Kings or Queen of Queens. Consequently a constitutional monarchy has no need for legislation like Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code. A constitutional monarchy does not have hundreds of prisoners sitting in jail accused of lèse-majesté, or being pulled from their homes by soldiers in the middle of the night because somebody has accused them of not loving the king.

Thailand is one of the great Gardens of the World. The people cannot be blamed for endless failures in central economic planning, which are exasperated by climate change, but climate change is neither cause nor excuse for arrogant, unjust, self-seeking governance. In the 12-point pedagogy that General Prayuth has ordered the nation to adopt, he talks of reciprocity: give so that you may get in return. Perhaps General Prayuth should himself be meditating on the meaning of 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you'.

The next general election needs to rescue Thailand as a member of the Community of the ASEAN and as a member of the family of nations that understands that there can be no sustainable development without pro-active, participatory democracy. The next election must be organised and monitored in full co-operation with the ASEAN and international community, not only to ensure fair play but to celebrate Thailand's return to the future.

Joyful by nature, no Thai villager does not understand the principle that every person has a vote and a right to vote. Thus there is nothing, other than bigotism, to stop all organisations working together, in communication with the whole world community, in a cross-sectoral drive to ensure that all people in Thailand do understand that their future depends upon ability to uphold universal rights and freedoms.

People in Thailand need to free themselves from propaganda that portrays them as somehow exceptional, and from from servitude to appeals for 'Thainess' presented in the imperative.

Leaders of political parties need to listen more respectfully to their members.

"Liberty, equality, fraternity" and "By the people, for the people, of the people" are slogans that have been vibrating throughout the past decade, because increasing respect for the meaning of people's democracy is the human mission and always the alternative.

******

CONCLUSION

The turmoil, violence and recessions of the last decade must be seen not only as a political awakening but also as a warning that provides lessons that can be turned to common benefit if analysed with honesty.

The behaviour of the royalist establishment - the Palace, Royal Guard, Democrat Party, Constitutional Court etc., has been all too familiar and predictable. Most certainly it knows perfectly well what it needs to be doing for the people in the name of democracy. It just doesn't want to do it.

What is most important is that the civil society - the workers, farmers, villagers, councillors, community leaders, nurses, doctors, school teachers and academics, make effort to learn as much as possible from the negative results of their respective positions - active or passive. Also, responsible officers, men and women in the police forces and regular military need to think deeply about their relation to an authoritarian system of governance that keeps demanding that they pitch themselves against their own people, about being used as instruments and pawns in an out-dated play of divide-and-rule to perpetuate wheels of injustice.

The nature of the current political debacle has been proof enough of the extent to which the thinking of the political leadership has remained bottled since the Cold War ended 30 years ago. As before as now, the 'communists', those to be eliminated, are once again not just the anti- royalists but all non-royalists. If one could ask 'the ghost of communism' why he still stalks the streets of Bangkok he would surely shrug his shoulders and say 'Ask the Palace.'

Under all 'Protect the Nation in the name of the King' propaganda, the divide-and-rule strategies perpetuated by the royalist establishment have become an embarrassment - for all Thai and all people who love Thailand.

By joining forces for the purpose of getting rid of an elected political faction they did not agree with, by choosing to become party to a frustrated royalist mobilization that they knew could end in a military 'law-and-order' coup, NGOs, trade unions and civil society networks became party to a process that humiliated and enfeebled the people and communities they purported to represent.

As yet it seems that the leadership of many NGOs and trade unions remain unwilling to face all the reasons why they worked to engineer two military coup d'étâts, in 2006 and then again in 2014. Perhaps hatred of an elected Prime Minister was at the core of the motivation, but not the whole story, not the root-cause of the 'Problem of Thailand', of the constant failure of 'Thai-style democracy'.

If NGO-COD, SERC, TLSC and other public service organisations were more admitting of their own short-comings, weaknesses and poor judgement, most surely none would not be participating in the current junta's (NCPO's) administration. All public service organisations need to look hard at their deviation from the principles upon which they are supposed to stand.

Thailand needs its NGOs and trade unions to face-up to their gaping non-achievements. Their task is to release the population from half-baked, top-down, autocratic ideology - about what for the people is sufficient. The country needs that its NGOs and trade unions re-join the regular citizenry in the task of liberating the country from dictatorship, in helping the people set their course to a fully functional, fully representative system of democratic governance - which could not be other than always bursting with 'Thainess' in any case.

Surely this last year of military juntaship is informing Thailand of the consequences of failing to respect the universality of the principle of one-person-one-vote.

Dictator Prayuth's attempt to impose his own version of Emergency Law, known as 'Article 44', and clamp down on freedom of speech and expression, indicates nothing more than that he has no legitimate mandate.

In the time since Prayuth's military coup in May 2014 there has been welcome new pressure on Thailand's ruling class, notably from the EU and US through e.g. the removal of trade privileges and the boycotting of Thai sea foods, and from many countries advising people to not travel to Thailand. FDI is down 97% and unlikely to recover any time soon.

A country with a population of 66 million, complex trade in all directions and high dependence on tourism requires nothing-less than honest, well-rounded, representative leadership.

The question of whether or not there is a King or Queen as Head of State is really not an issue of primary importance.

What is needed most urgently is a system of governance that recognises, respects and cherishes democracy as the bedrock of sustainable development, that prioritises and protects human rights, that honours freedom of speech and expression, that channels public money to the welfare of the people, who understand, far better than any royalty ever could, the meaning, value and purpose of equal rights.

*******

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About the authors

Junya 'Lek' Yimprasert has worked tirelessly since her undergraduate days in Thailand as a hands- on, grass-root labour rights activist. After beginning work with migrant workers in Singapore and Hong Kong she became engaged in organising unions, gender and labour rights workshops and many international conferences and campaigns, gaining experience in collaboration with global unions. In 2000 she founded the Thai Labour Campaign, working intensively with industrial and migrant workers. As a specialist on injustices within global supply-chains, Lek is the author of many articles and publications. She has held workshops and given presentations in some 40 countries and produced around 15 short documentaries on the issues and projects she works with. In exile since 2010 Lek has continued to campaign full-time for 'bottom-up political justice' in Thailand

Richard Thompson Coon is a biologist, artist-activist and eco-geographic regionalist with long experience in assisting socio-ecological movements express their concerns.

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