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Framing the Colours of Thainess: the Emergence of Yellow and Red Thai Identities

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Framing the Colours of Thainess: the Emergence of Yellow and Red Thai Identities FRAMING THE COLOURS OF THAINESS: THE EMERGENCE OF YELLOW AND RED THAI IDENTITIES A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the University of Canterbury by Suthida Pattanasrivichian University of Canterbury 2016 i To my parents, Jim, Na Yai, and Pa O Thank you very much! ii Abstract This thesis explores the movement of the Yellow and Red Shirts in their early periods. Sondhi Limthongkul created the Muang Thai Rai Supda group. This was the initial group of the Yellow Shirts, while the Red Shirts was originally started as the several anti-coup groups. In a successful social movement the leaders need to ensure long lasting support, thus a large number of participants are vital to enlarge and strengthen the movements. To achieve this, framing becomes a significant tool for the leader to select and highlight effective issues and events, and frame them to resonate with their followers and bystanders. In Thai social movements, frames have been employed into many movements, particularly nationalist frames. Four nationalist symbols the king, nation, religion, and democracy/modernization metaframes have become sources of mobilizing frames which stem from these metaframes. To understand social movements in Thailand, the cases of Sondhi Limthongkul and the anti-coup groups were selected for investigation through social movement and framing theories, including the Thai metaframes concept. The questions asked by this research focus on how the metaframes and mobilizing frames of Sondhi Limthongkul and the anti-coup groups were applied, focused on, and adjusted in their early movements. In addition, the different identities which derived from framing are questioned and explored. To investigate the framing tactics the timeline of the two studied cases are divided into two phases. In each phase, the focus of frames in each group is revealed to see the differences of frames, framing tactics, and the diverse identities of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups. The results tell that the focus on the metaframes and mobilizing frames of the two groups are different. The movement of Sondhi concentrated on the king, religion, and nation metaframes, while the democracy/modernization and nation metaframes were emphasized by the anti-coup groups. The mobilizing frames that iii were mostly used by Sondhi were the king, Somdet Pra Sangkarat, and corruption, while the anti-coup groups concentrated on the anti-coup, anti-amat, and people s democracy mobilizing frames. The problem definition, causal attribution, and moral’ evaluation functions are heavily focused on in the framing of the two groups. Notably, the two groups enhance the power of the frames by promoting them together as a package, while the culprits were blamed individually for clear and simple recognition. Another major result of this study is that the different focuses on frames bring about different identities. Sondhi Limthongkul focuses on the three nationalist symbols of the king, religion, and nation, and persuades his participants to protect these symbols. Thus, his identity is focused on being a true Thai . In contrast, the democracy symbol is emphasized the most in the framing of the anti-coup groups. They demand the restoration of democracy, the 1997 constitution, and the elected government. As a result, the democratic Thai is framed as the identity of the anti- coup groups. The different identity of the two groups results from the different focus on the metaframes and mobilizing frames. Framing identity could create strong bonds between the movement and the participants and increase support. He cost of doing so was a deeply rooted sometimes violent conflict based on diverging identities. iv Table of content Page Acknowledgement i Abstract ii Table of contents ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… iv List of tables………………………………………………………………………………………………………………......................... vii List of figures …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... viii Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1 Chapter 2 Literature………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… review and methodology .. 13 2.1.………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... Literature review 13 2.1.1 Social movement concept ………………………………………………………………… 13 What are social……………………………………………………………………………………. movements? 12 ……………………………………………………………………….. Emergence of social m 15 ……………………………………………………………… Participation in social movements 16 ovements………………………………………………………… Leadership in social movements 18 ……………………………………………………… 2.1.2. Frames and social movements 21 2.1.3. Mobilizing frames and Metaframes ………………………………………………………… 23 Mobilizing frames ………………………………………………………………… 23 ………………………………………………………….. Metaframes 25 ………………………………………………………………………………. 2.1.4. The Thai metaframes 28 ……………………………………………………………………………………….. The pre-official nationalism era 29 ……………………………………………………………………………… The official nationalism of King Vajiravudh 33 …………………………………………………………. The chat idea 33 …………………………………………. The religion idea 36 ………………………………………………………………………………….. The king idea 40 …………………………………………………………………………….. The origin of democracy in Thailand 44 ………………………………………………………………………………….. The nationalism of the P s Party 48 ………………………………………………….. The nationalism of Phibulsongkram 51 eople’ ……………………………………………… The Seri Thai 55 ………………………………………………… The nationalism of Sarit Thanarat 57 movement…………………………………………………………………. The 1973 student 62 …………………………………………………… Conclusion 63 movement…………………………………………………………... 2.2. Research questions and hypotheses................................................................................ 65 2.3. ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 66 The cases 67 Methodology………………………………………………………………………………………….. The case of Sondhi Limthongkul 67 …………………………………………………………………………………………… The case of the anti-coup group 68 …………………………………………………….. Data 69 ……………………………………………………... The case of Sondhi Limthongkul 69 source……………………………………………………………………………………….. The case of the anti-coup group 71 ……………………………………………………. Method of analysis 72 …………………………………………………….. Mobilizing frames 72 ……………………………………………………………………………... Metaframes 74 ………………………………………………………………………….. 2.4 Structure of the thesis 75 …………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………….. v Chapter 3 Framing and identity of Sondhi Limthongkul .. 77 Sondhi Limthongkul and Thaksin Shinawatra in the old days 79 Muang Thai Rai Supda and the beginning of the…………………………………………………... news war 83 ………………………………. In the first phase at Thammasat University 88 ………………………………... 1. The corruption mobilizing frame 88 …………………………………………………………. 2. The monarchy mobilizing frame 96 …………………………………………………………… 3. The Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame 102 ……………………………………………………………. 4. The media control mobilizing frame 108 ………………………………………….. 5. The populism mobilizing frame 114 ………………………………………………………. 6. The Thaksin's police state regime mobilizing frame 121 ……………………………………………………………... 7. The violence in the southernmost provinces mobilizing frame 126 ……………………………….. In the second phase at Lumpini Park 133 ………………... 1. The corruption mobilizing frame 135 ………………………………………………………………….. 2. The monarchy mobilizing frame 143 …………………………………………………………… 3. The Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame 153 ……………………………………………………………. 4. The media control mobilizing frame 158 ………………………………………….. 5. The populism mobilizing frame 163 ………………………………………………………. 6. The Thaksin's police state regime mobilizing frame 167 ……………………………………………………………... 7. The violence in the southernmost provinces mobilizing frame 170 ……………………………….. The Conclusion 178 ………………... Chapter 4 Framing and identity of the anti-coup groups 187 ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. Thaksin Shinawatra, the mastermind of the Red 188 …………………………………………………… The decline of Thaksin 192 Shirts………………………………………... The 19 September 2006 coup 193 Shinawatra……………………………………………………………………... The formation of the anti-coup groups 195 …………………………………………………………………………….. The first phase of the anti-coup groups ....... 198 ……………………………………………………………….. 1. The anti-coup mobilizing frame 198 movement……………………………………....... 2. The anti-amat mobilizing frame 205 …………………………………………………………….. 3. The unproductive Surayud Chulanont government mobilizing frame 214 …………………………………………………………….. 4. The democracy mobilizing frame 220 ……… 5. The media control mobilizing frame 228 people’s …………………………………………….. 6. The Buddhism mobilizing frame 234 ………………………………………………………. 7. The Thaksin mobilizing frame 236 ……………………………………………………………. The second phase of the anti-coup groups 240 ……………………………………………………………….. 1. The anti-coup mobilizing frame 242 movement……………………………………. 2. The anti-amat mobilizing frame 247 …………………………………………………………….. 3. The unproductive Surayud Chulanont government mobilizing frame 254 …………………………………………………………….. 4. The democracy mobilizing frame 257 ……… 5. The media control mobilizing frame 266 people’s ……………………………………………... 6. The Buddhism mobilizing frame 273 ………………………………………………………. 7. The Thaksin mobilizing frame 277 ……………………………………………………………. The 283 ……………………………………………………………….. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………….. vi Conclusion 295 Introduction 295 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Research questions and hypotheses 296 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… Hypothesis 1 297 …………………………………………………………………… Research question 1 and Hypothesis 2 300 …………………………………………………………………………………………………... Research question 2 and Hypothesis 3 302 …………………………………………………………….. Hypothesis 4 308 …………………………………………………………….. Research question 3 and Hypothesis
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