Newsletter : Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto Title University No.72

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Citation Newsletter (2015), 72(Autumn 2015): 1-34

Issue Date 2015

URL http://hdl.handle.net/2433/202757

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Kyoto University No.72 AUTUMN 2015 Contents

003 Editorial

Special Feature: Reflections on Current Thai Politics

004 Thailand’s Royalist Democracy in Crisis Thongchai Winichakul

007 Royal Succession at Stake: The Future of the Thai Monarchy Pavin Chachavalpongpun

010 Thailand urportsP to Be in Search of an Upright Political System, But Can “Democracy” Still Be Regarded as a Viable Option? Titipol Phakdeewanich

013 Thailand: AYear After Tanet Charoenmuang

016 “Constituting” the Nation: Modern-day Thai-style Dictatorship David Streckfuss

018 Understanding Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Mechanism in Cambodia Sothun Nop

023 Researching the Indonesia’s 1965 Tragedy Today: A View from within Agus Suwignyo

027 Youth, Voice, and Methodology: Learning (with) Young Migrants in a “Temporary Shelter Area” Decha Tangseefa

031 Library

033 Publications

034 Fellows

Front Cover: Protesters photographed as they were leaving a protest, which took place in front of the Office of the Governor of the Province of Ubon Ratchathani, on December 9, 2013. They were acting in support of the political movement of the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), and this protest was part of the attempt to mobilize anti-government sentiment, outside of Bangkok. Such protests anticipated Thailand’s latest coup d’état of May 22, 2014. Photo: Titipol Phakdeewanich Back Cover: Democracy Monument Bangkok. Photo: Titipol Phakdeewanich Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University 003 century. Leading on century. st consortium for Southeast Asian Studies in Asia (SEASIA) Asian Studies consortium for Southeast st anniversary and the Center is currently preparing for its anniversary in anniversary preparing event and the Center is currently th military coup since 1932 has once again underscored the fragile nature of democracy in Thailand. of democracy in Thailand. military nature the fragile 1932 has once again underscored coup since th December 2015. This will be followed by the 1 2015. This will be followed December This year celebrates CSEAS 50 This from this analysis, Pavin Chachavalpongpun also focuses on the links between the military also focuses on the links between Chachavalpongpun and the monarchy this analysis, Pavin from Titipol democracy. these two institutions and their influence on Thai between and examines the relationship military for the autocratic will set a long-term precedent junta “caretaker” Phakdeewanich asks if the current as a counterweight will democracy return Or and irredeemable. management of a society deemed unmanageable and the last year looks back over Charoenmuang Tanet to trump authoritarian interventions and solutions? politics reorganizing been have details what conditions He dynamics to the 2006 coup. the coup’s compares David of coups. Finally, the “constitutionalization” may be seeing we within the nation and raises the issue that a concerned analysis of the comments on both the spectacle and drama of the coup and presents Streckfuss societal effects of military intervention 15 months later. The 18 Editorial The Editors The conference in which 600 scholars from around the world will participate in Kyoto on December 12–13. This on December will participate the world around in Kyoto in which 600 scholars from conference of Japan Minister the former Prime Yasuo, Fukuda our guest of honor his Excellency will be attended by event who will participate in (2007–08). CSEAS looks forward to all the guests, friends, and collegues, old and new, and globally. both regionally Asian studies planned to help cement our position in Southeast have we the events In this special issue we bring together a group of concerned Thai scholars who contextualize the current political the current who contextualize of concerned Thai scholars bring together a group this special issue we In been have discourses that Winichakul examines the different turmoil that has engulfed the nation. Thongchai military around coups and newrevolves constitutions; one which used to explain democratization in Thailand; an absolute another traces democracy as part that emerges in 1932 with the transition from of a linear process of the issue and contextualizes role of the monarchy Thongchai scrutinizes the to constitutional monarchy. of coups in the early 21 round of the current democracy against the background royalist Tumultuous anti-government protests between November 2013 and May 2014 organized by the People’s People’s the by 2014 organized 2013 and May November between protests anti-government Tumultuous road buildings and offices, of government led to the occupation Committee (PDRC) Reform Democratic the then of power, After being found guilty of abuses rallies in the capital, Bangkok. intersections, and mass 2014 martial May 20, law was declared On office. from was removed Yingluck Shinawatra, Minister, Prime Prayut Chan-o-cha, a in Thailand, after months of political unrest 22, then on May the nation and throughout overthrew Royal Thai Army of the officer and a former Commander-in-Chief Thai army Royal retired d’état. Boonsongpaisan in a coup Niwatthamrong - - - com- 1 The reign of King Bhumibol The reign of King Bhumibol 2 Thongchai WinichakulThongchai Over the past 50 years, this has been a common the past 50 years, this has Over can explain the role of the monar those who For The question here though, is why the succession succession the though, is why here question The political role of the monarchy and monarchists pletely stopped after the 1932 revolution which 1932 revolution which the stopped after pletely in Siam. ended absolute monarchy in Thailand. Thai historiogra historical misperception battles counter-revolutionary phy is oblivious to the and actions by the monarchists long after 1932. It overlooks the role of the monarchy in politics which in the late 1940s was revived and has been active at believe that Thais least since the 1960s. Generally, the monarchy is truly politics “above” as the official 2006 the mantra has propagated for decades. After people were increasingly aware of coup, however, became the “palace’s” support for putsch. It then in Thai- common knowledge to political observers coup in land and around the world that the latest 2014 was about the palace. chy in the current crisis, so far they have argued that the 2006 and 2014due to looming prob- coups were lem of succession. (1946 source of privileges, power to present) and the its end. is coming to for monarchists and benefits to fill his But his successor will unlikely be able the father’s shoes, and worse, could undermine Meanwhile, the former Prime glory of monarchy. the Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is considered as a threat to the throne. His wealth, power and popularity put him in direct contest with the royalist elite for the two The era. post-Bhumibol the in “kingmaker” coups were attempts by a coalition of royalist king- hands in their firmly succession the to secure makers (despite the differences among themselves). a is truly or not, or how much, Thaksin Whether threat to the monarchy is beside the point. The mon- archists’ fear of him is real. so much? Why matter kingmakers and why do the Eng- would not a succession to the throne in, say, or Japan, lead to a political crisis to land, Denmark, the extent that is unfurling in Thailand? The legal rule for succession is not a cause for concern for it has been clearly established. The answer lies in the fact monarchy the country a democratic in while that rele political or economic effective not have does such is not vance, let alone real authority or power, the case in Thailand where the stake of the succes- might prompt to think of the sion is very high. One

University of Wisconsin-Madison; Former Visiting Research Scholar, CSEAS Research Scholar, Visiting University of Wisconsin-Madison; Former ­history of democratization in Thailand developed he 2014 coup in Thailand is normally explained explained is normally Thailand in 2014 coup he according discourses to two conventional of de- Both discourses have one thing in common, that Both discourses have one thing in common, that through a process of linear progress starting in 1932; mocratization in Thailand. First is the vicious cycle cycle mocratization in Thailand. First is the vicious coups, fol- discourse: a repeated cycle of military lowed by a new constitution, a general election. the serious failure of the elected govern- However, to to corruption scandals, threats due ment—either combination of by communists or a the monarchy, them—leads This to another coup. discourse was the 1950s more prevalent between and 1980s when to 2006, from 1992 coups were more frequent. Yet, when electoral democracy was more stable, a sec- ond discourse became more common, one where the the 1973 from the end of the absolute monarchy, military rule 23 year-long popular uprising that ended military put finally that 1992 uprising to the through rule to rest as it was believed up to 2006. The latest two coups in 2006 and 2014 have revived the vicious cycle as an explanation. is, an understanding that democratization is the struggle against the military for an electoral democ- racy of civilian rule. This is a common political experi- almost all of whom were ence for Thai adults today, born in the 1940s or after and coming of age in the in the world in the 1950s. Democratization late 1970s, as they might have learned, were mostly military regimes. Apparently they, struggles against the that think and historians, including academics T Thailand’s Royalist Democracy in Crisis in Democracy Royalist Thailand’s Special Feature: Reflections on Current Thai Politics Thai on Current Reflections Feature: Special

NEWSLETTER No. 72 004 Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University 005 , his , his ted into and permeated the everyday life of ted into and permeated life of the everyday The history of royalist democracy is closely related The history of royalist Royalist democracy is also a main factor in the The structural conflict above erupted into the open The strength of royalist democracy thus far has has far thus democracy of royalist strength The charisma and accomplishments have been amplified amplified been have accomplishments charisma and politico-cultural atmosphere by “hyper-royalism”—a is considered superlative in in which the monarch has Hyper-royalism not humanly possible. ways Bhumibol. Indispensable for royalist democracy Indispensable for royalist ­Bhumibol. ­penetra draconian with the Together Thais (Thongchai 2014). the monarch becomes literally, lèse-majesté law, legally inviolable. Thai and royalism ideologically, blas- violation becomes religious-like; becomes phemy (Streckfuss 2011). is a in Thailand. It of democratization history to the began in legacy of the absolute monarchy (one that that it hasthe 1880s and ended in 1932) in the sense been formulated the monarchists by in their effort to monarchy. after the end of absolute regain power initial revival in 1947–51, devel- the After a short-lived monarch opment of King Bhumibol as ideal modern began in the early 1960s, thanks to the US who pro- to instrument as a strategic monarchy the moted toward counter communism. The turning point with the supremacy for royalist democracy came rule. The popular uprising in 1973 against military monarchists grew to dominance in 1992 and royalist democracy has thrived since then at the expense of in political the military that has gradually declined power. roots at the of current political crisis. Fundamentally, a changing political crisis is a conflict between the system that demography and an obstinate political semi-urban, The accordingly. change to refuses metropoles and urban semi-rural people outside the poor in the metropoles are the emerging classes as a result of the changing socio-economy particularly in the rural sector since the late 1980s. These emerg- ing classes enjoy electoral democracy for it has pro- vided better material benefits, a fairer share of public resources, and above all better access to power. This is in stark contrast with the benefits and services provided by the centralized bureaucracy which in Bangkok and the classes upper the favors metropoles. The obstinate political system is a royal- ist democracy which relies on bureaucracy as its backbone and dislikes electoral democracy. when elected authority increased its and was power more aggressive during Thaksin’s period of govern- ment rule (2001–06), huge popular man- due to the victories. electoral got from landslide they dates Their efforts in trying to change too much too fast (Suehiro 2014) thus became a threat to the status Around the same time in quo of royalist democracy. been developed in tandem with the one of King King of one the with tandem in developed been - democ is a form of “guided democracy Royalist The monarchy is supposed to be “above” politics The elected authority under the royalist democracy king democracy relies on a charismatic Royalist wealth of the crown (Porphant 2008),is which among crownwealth of the (Porphant more important world. But probably richest in the the but much less known is the political power of the “royal- political system—the current in the monarchy ist democracy.” racy”—an ostensibly democratic polity but one in and elected authority do not which the electorate have substantive power or have little impact on pub- hands in the remains power true because lic policy Its formal name, “the of the oligarchy or autocracy. with the Monarchy as Democratic Regime the Head of the State,” is a quite revealing euphemism for a political system in which the formal parliamentary unelected, system is under the domination of the undemocratic power of the monarchy. sense of being uninvolved, beyond, or clearly in the politics separated from politics. Instead, it is “above” in the sense of being “on top of” the formal and from, is not separated It political system. apparent the contrary, politics. On the uninvolved, or beyond its enormousmonarchy is actively involved, thanks to I influence, in albeit informally. the political system royalist democracy how the hope to show concretely operates in the realms of public policies, key person- nel, budgets, and resources allocation, although the to make limited space of this essay does not allow further elaborations. bureau- it to say that the Suffice the main cracy—literally servants of the king—is The military—who functionary of royalist democracy. often proclaim are “soldiers that they of the king”— The judiciary—who by law is “the its protector. in this judges of the king”—the ultimate lawmakers system. is a necessary function in the operation of the state. But it should stay within the guided parameters, not in competition or in conflict with royalist interests. The elected authority should have as much power as necessary for its role as the efficient manager of the state. New initiatives, policies, personnel, budget allocations, should reflect its role within nevertheless, the limits but not beyond. who is either genuine or an invented and orches- trated one. The ideal characteristics - of modern mon as put forward by royalist ideologues over the archy, years and successfully materialized in the reign of King Bhumibol, includes being sacred and extraordi- yet a popular king who nary or super-human, appears close to and cares for the well-being of his people (Dhani Nivat 1969). According to a royalist by is co-owned Thailand’s sovereignty ideologue, the monarch and people, hence the royalist democ- racy (Bowornsak 1994; 2007).

- - 18(4): 499–519. London: Routledge. Vol. 36, No. 2, 1947. Vol. Kotmai kap thangluak khong sangk Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, on Trial Truth - Uni Chulalongkorn printing. Bangkok: th The Pacific Review wo Elephants in the Room of Thai Politics and and wo Elephants in the Room of Thai Politics ,” I mean a social institution and entity that are ,” I mean a social institution and entity : T ­ land: Reform of the Public Sector and Budget the System under the Thaksin Government. Southeast Asian Studies Treason and Lèse-majesté. Treason 3(2): 299–344. Monarchy the State of Denial. In “Good Coup” Gone Bad: Thailand’s Political Downfall, edited by Developments since Thaksin’s Chachavalpongpun, pp. 79–108. Singapore: ISEAS. Pavin active in cultural, social, economic, and political life like like and political life in cultural, social, economic, active monar Duncan McCargo (2005) shows that the other. every chy “institution,” as it is often called, is a network of non- monolithic groups and people whose interests rely on, and who get legitimacy from, their varying associations with the The monarchy in monarch (king). It is “network-monarchy.” charismatic king. The than the entity is a larger this sense king himself is the pivot of the machine, not an unknowing or active is a very sense in this monarchy part. The passive in this sense “monarchy” I use the term political force. throughout, in contrast with the monarch, king, queen, prince, princess, and so on for the individuals. Another term, the “palace,” is ambiguous but justifiably so to denote the fuzzy actor(s) or subject(s) who can be identified only by its spatial metaphor. 38(1): 166–189. London: Century. Struggle for Democracy in the Twenty-First Zed Books. Crisis in Thailand. Contemporary Asia 1997. Journal of land and the Crisis of versity Press. of Monarch. Prince In Collected Articles by H.H. Dhani Nivat, from Reprinted The Siam Society. pp. 91–104, Bangkok: Journal of the Siam Society [Law and alternatives for Thai society]. Bangkok: society]. Bangkok: and alternatives for Thai [Law hom thai Nititham. phatthanakan kotmaimahachon—ekkachon lae mahachon 2: The division volume between nai prathet thai [Public law, and the development of public public law and private law, law in Thailand], 5 Marshall (2014), and Pavin Chachavalpongpun in his several Marshall (2014), and Pavin writings and public addresses. Among the proponents of this view are Andrew MacGregor By “monarchy

Suehiro, Akira. 2014. Technocracy and Thaksinocracy in Thai- and Thaksinocracy Akira. 2014. Technocracy Suehiro, Thongchai Winichakul. 2014. The Monarchy and Anti- Streckfuss, David. 2011. A Kingdom in Crisis: Thailand’s Thailand’s in Crisis: M. 2014. A Kingdom Marshall, Andrew Legitimacy McCargo, Duncan. 2005. Network Monarchy and Ouyanont. 2008. Bureau The Crown Property in Thai- Porphant Dhani Nivat, Prince. 1969 [1947]. Thai Old Siamese Conception Notes 1 2 Bowornsak Uwanno. 1994. ————. kan bangyaek kotmai 2007. Kotmai mahachon, lem 2: References The latest two coups The latest two coups in 2006 and 2014, thus, were brought back to as the military was Secondly, the early 2000s, royalist democracy also faced a a faced also democracy 2000s, royalist early the crisis of reliance on the charisma within. Given its health caused grave his deteriorating King Bhumibol, a successor who The prospect of having concerns. com- monarchy modern but an ideal is anything pounded issues. The looming problem of succession royalist democracy from within could spell the end of conflict is erupting. at a time when structural to take control of the the efforts of the monarchists the perceived threats to royalist state and get rid of - Unfortu of the monarchy. democracy and critics measures may backfire on two counts. these nately, law lèse-majesté the of enforcement as the First, and unreasonable becomes more frequent, harsher, after the number of people charged skyrocketed (the of punish- 2006 coup; the unprecedented severity dubious and the of expression; for a crime ments process with outrageous interpretations of the law), it instead of eliminating the critics of the monarchy, has generated more dissent. Critics of the monarchy are no longer limited to small circles of intelligentsia among widespread but are periods, as in previous populace. common folk who were once the royalist serve the monarchy while the latter is weaker and how long in the potentially weakening even further, future can the military remain the protector of royalist have monarchists the that possible it Is interests? unlocked the door for the return of Praetorianism, democracy? themselves bringing the end to royalist situation, The answer depends on the post-Bhumibol particularly the next king’s charisma, performance, and his relationship with the military and people, with mon- fate of the telling about the all of which will be archy as a political force and how it will survive in the twenty first century as well. On the other hand, a that is decade past the in crisis the from sign positive Thai politics is no longer the exclusive business of Popular awakened. have Thai people elites. the future of democracy will be a factor determining the both the monarchy and of the possibility Praetorianism.

NEWSLETTER No. 72 006 Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University 007 - Associate Professor, CSEAS Associate Professor, Pavin Chachavalpongpun Pavin The royal family has long played an indispensable The royal family has long played an indispensable Bhumibol has exercised clout with the army in has caused anxiety among Thais about what the among Thais about what the has caused anxiety is partly due to the future holds. This nervousness environment now that thegenerally uncertain political of a self- custody again in the nation is once is also the appointed military government. But it perhaps too result of Bhumibol’s reign having been Revered successful: Can his successor match up? businesses, and bureaucrats, big by the military, in is extolled king the alike, society mainstream schools as and the media a demigod and lauded as by the pal- the people’s monarch. Photos released ace show him travelling through remote regions with maps and cameras in hand, a trickle of sweat on his brow. role in by maintaining Thai politics, especially close during periods of even relations with the military, civilian rule. Over the years, Bhumibol has managed to become an indispensable partner of the generals, monarchy’s as the cast themselves have and they and early ultimate defenders. In the late 1950s Marshal Field with ties developed king 1960s, the Sarit Thanarat, who ruled Thailand like a strongman. royal the honoring practices obsolete exchange, In such as prostration before the king, were family, revived, as part of further sanctifying Bhumibol. Old royal ceremonies snowballed, accord and invented ing to Thongchai Winichakul (Thongchai 2014, 90). In the 1980s, appointed Bhumibol General Prem Tinsulanonda the is now Prem minister; as prime head of Bhumibol’s Privy Council, where he fends off any attempts by the government to curtail royal pre- rogatives. British scholar Duncan McCargo argued that Prem is a part of the “network monarchy” designed to safeguard the power position of the king, and is often in competition with civilian govern- ments (McCargo 2005, 499). ways that are widely perceived to have been in the nation’s general interest. During massive protests in 1992, he persuaded the unpopular prime minister of General Suchinda Kraprayoon, to step the day, down. Suchinda staged a coup in 1991, overthrow- ing the government of Chatichai Choonhavan. After allowing an election in 1992, Suchinda appointed prompting the public’s himself as prime minister, - - - - , among , among Prayuth Chan- ­

1

Royal Succession at Stake: at Stake: Succession Royal Monarchy the Thai of Future The Now more than a year since the latest coup, the Now more than a year since the latest coup, the On May 31, 2015, King Bhumibol was hurriedly On May 31, 2015, King Bhumibol was hurriedly On the throne since 1946, Bhumibol is the world’s n this short my argument essay on the grounds of crisis is straightforward: the current Thai political Special Feature: Reflections on Current Thai Politics Thai on Current Reflections Feature: Special vered institution, vered the political inter not only to defend but also that of its own. est of the monarchy, and stabil- to bring peace military has evidently failed the military contrary, On the ity back to Thai society. government of Prime Minister General ocha has further deepened rifts in society other things, by incessantly tracking down those with targets, crit different political opinions. Among these ics of the monarchy are dealt with ever more harshly. an has been The fact that King Bhumibol Adulyadej active political periodically player intervening in poli- why indicate to seems decades past the over tics of the pal- what has been going on within the walls among ace stirs up a deep sense of apprehension the Thai public (Handley 2006, 9). The military staged a coup on May 22, 2014 mainly upcoming royal succession. to take control of the This important event will determine the future of Thai- long been land, simply because the monarchy has during this at the center of Thai politics. The military, re the exploit to continued has period, transitional I airlifted to Bangkok’s Siriraj hospital following his his following hospital Siriraj Bangkok’s to airlifted at Hua palace from his seaside to Bangkok return Hin just three weeks before. His ailing wife, Queen Sirikit, who had suffered a severe stroke in 2012, accompanied him. Their latest hospitalization ignited of the end looming the about speculation frenzied of the out in and been has king The era. Bhumibol hospital since 2009. rumors about the In the past, Thai the impacted badly health deteriorating king’s a tre has played king the while Yet, market. stock able to talk openly mendous role in politics, being about the monarchy is still forbidden in Thailand. As I myself an academic working on the Thai monarchy, have become a victim of the draconian lèse-majesté which is defined to royalty, crime of injury or the law, by Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code. It states that insulting, or threatening comments defamatory, about the king, queen, and regent, are punishable by 3 to 15 years in prison. monarch. But his worsening health longest-reigning - , Number 225, January 25–31, unit. Supposedly in place to 2 For a time, Vajiralongkorn sought to boost his his boost to sought Vajiralongkorn a time, For fired. Vajiralongkorn could have perceived that had that had perceived could have Vajiralongkorn fired. leaning toward army, he been alienated by the Thaksinearned him some kind of popu- might have lar support from Thaksin’s loyal fans. Thus accord- he could have also earned a popular mandate. ingly, in supporters of Thaksin’s some why This explains the endorsed openly have movement red-shirt the November monarch. In next as the crown prince 2013, during the protests against the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, - Metro of the chief bureau the asked Vajiralongkorn a known confidant of Thaksin, to politan Police, negotiate with the demonstrators. This only alienated a few them further—as did the prince’s decision, to allow Thaksin’s supporters to camp months later, appeal by cultivating relations with Thaksin, who won appeal by back strategy in 2001 and 2005. But the elections played well with either the people or the generals. generals. played well with either the people or the Vajiralongkorn titles, military holding many Despite Since 1978, lacks the support of the armed forces. has maintained a vast praetorian guard, known in he Thai as the Rachawallop ensure his security and perform charitable works, it military. is seen as a counterforce to the official Despite consisting of around 5,500 members, the Rachawallop has been unsuccessful in expanding its troop numbers due to its direct connection with the Crown Prince. Princess Chulabhorn offered her support to the anti- Fig. 2 Princess Chulabhorn offered her support to the Yingluck protesters in 2013 Source: ASTV Manager Weekly 2014 - , October 15, 2008 This would be a tough act to follow for anyone, but resentment, which led to widespread protests and protests and resentment, which led to widespread In 2006, after violent crackdowns by the army. against Prime Minister months of demonstrations Thaksin endorsed the coup that Shinawatra, the king the queen deposed him. The footage of the king and granting an audience with Prem and General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, one of the coup makers, signified the palace’s backing of the military’s political interven- have been because his interventions tion. However, per is somewhat Bhumibol limited, and periodic Queen Sirikit attended a funeral of a royalist yellow shirt Fig. 1 Queen Sirikit attended a funeral of a royalist yellow who was killed in a fatal clash with the police in 2008 Source: Khom Chut Luek Newspaper ceived as being above politics. needs to step up Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn attempts to signal that he his recent plate. Yet to the is a worthy successor appear to be falling short. In his only 1972, the king designated Vajiralongkorn, son, as heir to the throne, and under current succes- simply ratify the should king’s Parliament sion law, preference after his death. But for many years, the crown prince, now 62, showed little interest in royal spent much of his and political affairs. Vajiralongkorn in Munich, living a life some consider dissolute, time for example taking naked photos of his wives and which he had Foo, marking the death of his dog Foo promoted to the rank of air marshal, with a lavish the with contrast eccentricities These funeral. image of the king, and have not squeaky-clean

NEWSLETTER No. 72 008 Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University 009 18(4): 499–519. . New Haven and London: Yale Yale London: and Haven . New Gone Bad: Thailand’s Political Political Thailand’s Bad: Gone The Pacific Review ” Coup Good University, on January 21, 2015. on January 21, University,

, edited by Pavin Developments since Thaksin’s Downfall, edited by Pavin Chachavalpongpun, pp.79–108. Singapore: ISEAS. King Bhumibol Adulyadej Bhumibol King University Press. Crises in Thailand. and the State of Elephants in the Room of Thai Politics Two “ In Denial. made himself a full-fledged, dominant political actor.” Research Institute of Southeast Asian Affairs (ISEAA), Research Institute of Southeast Asian Affairs (ISEAA), Chiang Mai The monarchy remains a major political The monarchy remains in symbol He asserted, “Unlike other monarchs in the world, Bhumibol He asserted, “Unlike other monarchs in the world, In an email interview with Paul Chambers, who is Director of with Paul In an email interview McCargo, Duncan. 2005. Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Legitimacy McCargo, Duncan. 2005. Network Monarchy and Thongchai Winichakul. 2014 The Monarchy and Anti-Monarchy: Notes 1 2 Handley, Paul M. 2006. The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Paul Handley, who favor Sirindhorn, and the crown prince and his and his crown prince Sirindhorn, and the who favor - govern military that the is possible It supporters. disre- could is wary of Vajiralongkorn, ment, which gard the king’s preference and designate another But that decision would candidate to the throne. fragmented nation. It is surely divide this already newfound behavior may unlikely and the prince’s with the military. bring rapprochement with the Bhumibol era in its twi- Thailand. But now, light and a problematic succession ahead, the insti- tution is weakening. Under these circumstances, should to take the throne be allowed Vajiralongkorn but with the understanding that as prescribed by law, he will essentially forgo politics. By withdrawing from best chance of it is the royal family’s political fray, the is It also Thailand’s maintaining its moral authority. best chance for some measure of stability. References - - birthday. The prince also appeared to have The to have prince also appeared birthday. st After Yingluck was ousted and the military took took military the and ousted Yingluck was After ajiralongkorn’s efforts are paying off, but there are are there but off, paying are efforts ajiralongkorn’s outside one of his residences and to send his per and to send of his residences outside one to protect Yingluck. sonal guard to have seemed May 2014, Vajiralongkorn control in reaching out to the new changed tack. He started (As Prayuth government. the king’s designated heir, accession should simply be the crown prince’s rule, the military but under by Parliament, endorsed In August 2014, necessary.) army’s support is also inauguration cere the over presided Vajiralongkorn National Legisla- mony of the new military-appointed endorsing the coup. This implicitly tive Assembly, occasion of on the flowers Prayuth sent March, he his 61 ­V no realistic alternatives. One of Vajiralongkorn’s three no realistic alternatives. One of Vajiralongkorn’s sisters, Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, is beloved by the people, thanks partly to her charitable activi- earth, muchties. She is seen as humble and down to But current succession law and estab- like her father. lished practice allow her to accede does not readily to the throne. The constitution was amended in 1974 ascend the to permit a daughter of the king to a male heir throne—but only in the absence of This apparent and under other strict requirements. become presumably means that Sirindhorn could and queen only if Bhumibol Vajiralongkorn demoted would be designated her as his new heir—which unprecedented. The king may already be too weak to make such a daring move, especially since it a triggering by monarchy entire the might shake royalists conservative the between struggle power been cleaning his wife, Princess house. He divorced out of con- 2014, reportedly Srirasmi, in December monarchy’s cern that her relatives had damaged the benefit. dignity by exploiting his name for financial under Her parents and brothers were later charged It is unclear whether the lèse-majesté law. - - gain a signifi Titipol Phakdeewanich* Titipol Although they must, for the foreseeable future, future, foreseeable must, for the they Although However, this draft was considered so profoundly However, Notwithstanding the various behind-the-scenes, cant amount of public support, regardless of the oft- cant amount of public support, regardless of the repeated arguments that such forms of intervention- illegitimately to desire nefarious of a reflective are ism and likely future out coerce and influence society, comes. Thus, the question arises as to whether there can be a realistic prospect for internationally estab- within principles democratic and recognized lished such a Thailand. remain on the sidelines of the debate, the two major and the Party Democrat the political parties—namely, for disparate strategic rea- Pheu Thai Party—were sons, both clear in publicly stating that they would not accept the revised draft of the CDC. In addition, Suthep Thaugsuban, the President of the People’s which was (or PDRF, Democratic Reform Foundation Democratic Reform formerly known as the People’s endorse to officially was quick or PDRC), Committee, lution”) of 1932 brought Thailand from the status of of status the from Thailand of 1932 brought lution”) to that of “constitutional mon- “absolute monarchy,” installation of what is to the archy”—would lead being referred to as “Thai-style” democracy. millions of Thais—perhaps, many by undemocratic would new constitution because the most especially, have established the National Strategic Reform and which was to (or NSRRC), Reconciliation Committee officials, by consist of top bureaucrats and military by the appointment—that it was ultimately blocked in September. NRC), (or Council National Reform progress apparent any delayed further This only Despite this towards more democratic structures. setback for the Junta, apparent, albeit temporary, many Thais sneakingly suspect that the NSRRC, or a place, one variant thereof will ultimately be put into way or another. there are and more overt strategic maneuverings, many millions of other quite in Thais who remain with the intention for Thailand to establish agreement open that suggests This an NSRRC-type of body. military involvement in Thai politics can Former Visiting Research Scholar, CSEAS Research Scholar, Visiting Former - - Thai constitution— th d’état” (or “Siamese Revo- d’état of May 22, 2014, and

least 144 civilians have been been have 144 civilians least

hailand has been a society in limbo ever since hailand has been a in limbo ever society since Thai military coup the In, what has been a concerted effort to further to further In, what has been a concerted effort Although Thailand’s dwindling numbers of demo- The Junta, and their Constitution Drafting Commit ing establishment of an arbitrary and non-democratic authoritarian jurisdiction, Thailand’s intractable prob- - en existing to escalate threaten only now lems trenched divisions. secure the power and status of this ruling Thai Junta, will, the attempt to silence the more vocal opponents been a matter of primary con- have most assuredly, of cern. According Freedom report by the to a recent a Expression Documentation Center (based at iLaw, Junta of August 2015, the end Thai NGO), by the military their or sent summoned, directly had either at least 782 representatives to “visit” the homes of at Thai civilians—and yet, it remains as seemingly divided as it ever has it ever has yet, it remains as seemingly divided as been, after a decade and more of almost continual social-political discord. Nevertheless, in the wake of National Council for coup—which was led by the the with it, the result and Order (or NCPO)—and Peace repeatedly trailed by the military, since the coup, itself repeatedly trailed by the military, 2015). Centre Documentation Expression of (Freedom cratic stalwarts are attempting to retain some sense of conviction in making the case for a swift return to democratic norms—to those who are still prepared is a dawning notions—it such or entertain listen, to becoming millions, are that Thais, in their reality increasingly accepting of the resort to authoritarian approaches, in attempting to resolve the Thai social- because many of the political impasse. Moreover, latter have already emerged as avowed advocates for authoritarianism over democratization, whilst the remaining voices for democracy are now necessarily prudent in their seeming diffidence, in general, this foreshadows the likelihood of a continued worsening outlook for Thailand. tee (or CDC), had been hoping that their August August their that hoping been had CDC), (or tee 2015 draft proposal for a 20 T since the “Siamese coup Thailand PurportsThailand of in Search to Be But System, Political an Upright Be Still Can “Democracy” Option? as a Viable Regarded Special Feature: Reflections on Current Thai Politics Thai on Current Reflections Feature: Special

NEWSLETTER No. 72 010 Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University 011 - When the promise of democratic progress was still still was progress of democratic promise the When felt This hopeful sense of optimism was perhaps Sustained political upheaval has significantly a promising that 2015 will be not appear It does cient, if disagreeable “progress” over the next few “progress” over the next few cient, if disagreeable would there be left for democ- years, then what case to be otherwise regarded as racy in what may come irredeemable society? an unmanageable and who had those notion, then tenable a sufficiently been historically sidelined and marginalized by the Thais, could believe privileged relatively and by state, also could as they as long means democratic in believe that it would bring them full state recognition, more advan- and with it and increased regard of the taged demographics. by the otherwise forgotten and vulnera- most keenly exis- ble rural poor who have lived an often marginal tence in North and Northeast Thailand. They had after government by discounted repeatedly been of increasingly generations by and also, government, affluent urbanized Thais. Their well-documented Thaksin Shinawatra, developing relationship with Mr. 2001 who was Prime Minister of Thailand between and 2006, reflected, despite very real and continuing high- probable the democracy, Thai with problems it—and with water mark for any reasonable belief in this latest coup, its possible death knell. unsettled undermined the prognosis for an already Nearly 20 passed years have since Thai economy. the Asian financial crisis of 1997, when Thailand lost its status as a potential contender that could hope to economies, and Tiger” tie in with the leading “Asian the path that they had forged. In the intervening years, Thailand has continued to discover new ways wider world just how much of an illu- to prove to the sion that ambition really was—and so the flagrant being now values for democratic disregard witnessed,only acts to reinforce such perceptions. When we also consider that the global economic outlook remains quite uncertain for so many coun- Chi- corrections to the recent tries, not least, with the indices, Asian stock market wider the nese, and then of indulgence the afford hardly can Thailand then further compounding obstacles to progress. reliant that is increasingly for a Thai economy year on tourism and therefore on a positive image abroad. August 2015 Bangkok bombing at the Erawan The Shrine, in the key commercial district of Ratchapra- song, made the world’s headlines and in the fallout, racy” in itself risks merely becoming a vaguely hoped vaguely a becoming merely risks in itself racy” for aspiration can as something which or ideal, and the practical sidelined in favor of be forever realities social-political to any given immediate that pertain with Thailand seemingly ever concern—especially if Moreover, next. crisis, to the lurching from latest executives can make suffi the Junta and its civilian - and he continues to and he continues to What are the consequences? All too many Thais Thais All too many consequences? What are the an increas- when this is also a time Concurrently, - notion of “democ the context, an overall such In From various approaches to Thai Buddhism, - chil From historical periods recent relatively of the terms In In attempting to better contend with the phenome- In attempting to better arshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram (Prime Minister of of Minister (Prime Phibunsongkhram Plaek arshal ­M Thailand between 1938 and 1944), Field Marshal Marshal Thailand between 1938 and 1944), Field between Sarit Thanarat (Prime Minister of Thailand Kittika- 1958 and 1963), and Field Marshal Thanom chorn (Prime Minister of Thailand 1963 between and as more notorious, and these 1973), are some of the well as other similarly testing times certainly left their wounded, and now highly susceptible mark on the Thai psyche. that in order to get things done the believe reflexively ends very often really do justify the means. But only for so long, of course, as this accords with their own this is a mentality that will will and desire. Ultimately, only lead to yet further violence and chaos. The solu- tion to this predicament will almost inevitably be an intensified pursuance of autocratic egre- and often giously implemented statist solutions, in relation to which Thais are already so well accustomed. ingly large number of Thais are looking to the Chi- nese political model, as they begin to believe that western-identified democratic values may not be the democratic for the This is a challenging time answer. movement within Thailand, because language the of democracy has become ever less convincing within land. this ever-divided nicious effects, as it continues to operate not only in but also Thai society from the top, overseeing imbues society at a ways in which it because of the level. This has been a more mundane day-to-day societal Thai which informs historical problem dynamics at almost all levels, and it has manifested itself in a number of ways. well as in rela- as dren’s education, and the family, developing nation state, structures of the tion to the by most of this is subtly (or not so subtly) influenced a long-established and pervasive Thai patronage system. It predates societal problems that may oth- emergent as newly regarded ostensibly be erwise and its consequential myriad compound effects that historians have been attempting to fathom, with regard to the past several hundred years, and more travails. of Thailand’s perennial misadventures and Field of eras the control, authoritarian overt of what became a failed draft,what became publicly advocate for a national referendum on the on the referendum for a national advocate publicly divided sharply still despite hand, other the On issue. draft pro- a mere to publicly criticize public opinion, of the Junta. posal is to risk the ire non of Thai authoritarianism, be understood it should that Thais are certainly well aware of its various per

Thai Thai Available at http:// Available Bangkok: Bank of Bangkok: Bank of Press Release on Economic and Mone- tary Conditions: July 2015, No.45/2015. Thailand. as of August 2015, under NCPO Regime. Accessed on September 2, 2015. freedom.ilaw.or.th/. And now that the once grudgingly accepted The Thais that share this essential mindset are, to The alliance between Thaksin between Thaksin The alliance Shinawatra and the the effort to subvert this alliance Admittedly, 2013 and 2014. Then finally, with the alliance with the remain- 2013 and 2014. Then finally, of facade cracked the undeterred, and resolute ing only for the Thai democracy would finally crumble, and to coup to explicitly reveal—to both Thai citizens criticisms the world, and with it the evident public from much of the international community—the often implicitly understood reality of the Thai state structure. social-democratic contract has been so categorically historical truth has been an underlying rescinded, Thais who have been relatively advantaged revealed. by the all-too-often rigged and corrupt social-political- of Thailand and therefore con- dynamics economic sider themselves either well established, or on the democracy rise, will only concede to a semblance of for so long as they are guaranteed not to be side- lined or otherwise disadvantaged. a greater or lesser extent, the very same demograph- ics that previously argued for a coup, and who advo- So much for cate for authoritarian solutions today. “democracy” then, “Thai-style” or otherwise. Both the months long lead up to the coup, and the months since, already indicate the fading chances for a once more widely held Thai ambition. References Bank of Thailand. 2015. of Expression Documentation Centre. 2015. Statistic Freedom Phakdeewanich is a visiting fellow at the Centre for *Dr Titipol the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of at the Faculty Kingdom, and is based United of Warwick, Thailand. Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, Political rabble-rousers of the Bangkok street protests of ­rabble-rousers of the Bangkok street gize the Thai economy. The contradiction is glaring. The contradiction economy. gize the Thai to bring a helped had, in certain respects, rural poor to Thai democracy. of legitimacy greater semblance in which to begin to rectify his- This included a way their alliance was strongly torical injustices. Although resisted by their critics throughout the period during his surrogates or Shinawatra Thaksin either which to finally democracy threatened in office, when were era of truly widespread prog- shift Thailand into an only a matter of time before ress, then it was really the inevitable. battle, by way of Thailand’s resulted in a protracted that failed, democratic structures at first, and when and the PDRC, of the public stage of the way by - - - - It is uncertain whether such indebtedness is lim- It is uncertain whether such indebtedness Thailand’s economic problems will more than likely According to the Bank of Thailand, in July 2015, 2015, of Thailand, in July Bank to the According The has Junta the questions anticipated many of Junta that the less is rather there Nevertheless, eign inputs from tourism, foreign direct investment, investment, direct from tourism, foreign inputs eign to moderate and international finance, the attempt further state intervention and the situation through indebtedness, would seem to be inevitable. ited to the short to medium term or becomes an should it However quandary. long-term unavoidable months Thailand’s few next the case that over be the to position continues social-political-economic Thai this could provide a shock to the worsen, then economy that can only be realistically contended This state. of the role of the through a furtherance for pretext the further only would, almost assuredly the Thai authoritarian statist imperative. have been a significant contributing factor in the decision of the Junta to reconsider the policies that were originally introduced by Thaksin Shinawatra. At poli these implementation, original their of time the Thaksin Shi were contentiously contested by cies nawatra’s critics who now overwhelmingly constitute in support of authori- demographics same very the what means by which to implement tarianism as the same policies. very to the amounts, in practice, and One Vil- policy, These include the “Village Fund” lage One Product (or OTOP), as part of the latest urgent policy proposal for a stimulus plan to reener the Thai tourist industry has directly affected at been time being. least for the growth across economic sectors of the all the major evidenced a slowing down (as Thai economy had with the exception of the compared to July 2014), the (although public spending tourist industry and will not be accounted for within effect of the bombing these figures). It will therefore also be of a significant 2015, Junta that in July concern to the Thai exports actually declined by 3.1 percent (Bank of Thailand 2015). aforemen- in relation to the that are now being raised new policytioned and has put into place a number of mitigate mechanisms that are intended to at least than of lower problem potential the of severity the from tourism. revenue anticipated governmental Indeed, there is consensus now a general that the industry Junta should act to ensure that the tourist which can will continue to enjoy a level of growth help to keep the Thai economy afloat. that markets international the convince can do to Thailand in these uncertain is a place to be investing times. This significant will be, to a extent, out of their mechanisms are tourism policy hands. Although the not in themselves significantly affecting overall gov- ernmental continually healthy for spending, without

NEWSLETTER No. 72 012 Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University 013 arty leader and Tanet Charoenmuang Tanet -dominated cabinet with the junta leader as as -dominated cabinet with the junta leader Public Mai University Administration, Chiang In Thailand, a number of opposition campaigns campaigns of opposition a number Thailand, In After detention in military camps for all one week, Unlike the coup in 2006, Unlike the coup in 2006, leader in which the coup Dr. Sunai Julpongsatorn, prominent Pheu Thai MP, Thai MP, Pheu Sunai Julpongsatorn, prominent Dr. was set up urging the end of a military Groups rule. times many have world the around citizens of Thai demonstrated their opposition against a military regime in their country. against the coup took place in different forms and redshirts, wearing included examples The areas. three-finger a showing writing on public buildings, sign, and a group reading of George Orwell’s famous “1984” in public. Several arrests of university students were made in an open opposition move- ment. Their release followed after the military did not moved they but tension, greater any to create want on to conduct psychological war against students’ parents and teachers. Most alarming, however, the Over of lèse-majesté. cases the be to appears been have 40 people past 12 months, at least arrested, charged, and sentenced in violating sec- ­Jarupong Ruangsuwan, Pheu Thai P ­military Assembly); premier; the NLA (National Legislative the CDC the NRC (National Reform Council); and have been (Constitution Drafting Committee). All a role in appointed by the junta and obviously played overthrowing an elected government. members of the Yingluck cabinet and over 500 Red- sign an agreement to shirt leaders nationwide had activi- not to initiate or take part in any more political to report ties and were released. Some who refused to a military themselves to the military had to go hearings and reporting have dragged court and the In the meantime, hundreds fled to on until now. neighboring scorescountries and of them have now secured or political sought asylum status in Europe, the New In the U.S., Australia, Japan, and the U.S. by Dr. led for democracy Thai Movement Free of the coup, pro-democracy Redshirt leaders all over coup, pro-democracy Redshirt of the in military and detained arrested were country the camps. shortly gave power to an appointed government afterwards, military the junta remained in power and organizations to form five four more established the These are namely, “major currents of power.” International Relations, Faculty of Political Science and and Science of Political Faculty International Relations, Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science and Science and Department of Political and Chair, Associate Professor

military coup in Thailand in May 2014 military coup in Thailand in May 2014

th

ven though Thailand has ven though Thailand already had 17 coups 2014), past 81 years (1932–early the in the when strike took place on May 22, 2014, the world world 22, 2014, the May on place took strike Thailand: A Year After Year A Thailand: th In fact, these four characteristics have made the the made have four characteristics fact, these In The 18 Special Feature: Reflections on Current Thai Politics Thai on Current Reflections Feature: Special

seemed to be sinking deeper into more pondering seemed to more pondering be sinking deeper into rather than being surprised. It was a surprise for coup took place on Septem- the many people when led his Thai ber 19, 2006 after Thaksin Shinawatra to set an unprecedented four records Rak Thai Party in Thai politics: the first elected leader to complete a 4-year term in office; the first to win re-election; the especially victories, big consecutive two win to first the second; and the first to form a one-party government. of a possibility the fear and worry establishment and further regime democratic strong and stable status quo. changes which would undermine the elected and Thus, a coup was carried out and an the by overthrown was popular government hugely How- in exile. forcing Thaksin to live military power Thaksin’s successors continued to win two fol- ever, 2007 and lowing general elections, one in December the other in July 2011. Instead of calmly accepting for themselves and seeking ways to improve defeat the next election, the conservative plotted another another overthrew junta military latest the So coup. elected government on May 22, 2014. Whether it was another surprise or an experience that left one with a heavy heart depended very much on how one looks at it. E 18 was, by Thai standards, well planned and quickly and quickly planned Thai standards, well was, by executed. Suthep Thuagsuban, vice chairman of the from his post and resigned (DP), Party Democrat government, called the party to lead an anti-Yingluck (PDRC). Committee Reform Democratic People’s They seized several intersections for demonstrations with the sites and the Government House, clashed police with weapons, prevented voters from going to for a military cries the led way and along the vote, coup. The political turmoil lasted from November late the military enacted 2013 to mid-May 2014. Finally, martial law on May 20, 2014 forbidding any political gatherings and two days later staged a coup, citing the necessity to save the nation from deteriorating crisis, and demise. Within one hour national disunity, - ripitak, Thaksin’s ripitak, Thaksin’s The second is the political crisis concerning the crisis concerning the The second is the political The third involved the recent August 17 bombing Prayut appointed Somkid Jatus ­Prayut appointed Somkid economic a new to head minister, prime deputy announced a major plan to team, who has already by increasing revive the economy of the the income seen to be it remains However, classes. lower whether the national economy can be stimulated - interna amidst on Thaksinomic approaches based political system and the gov- tional calls for an open listen. ernment’s refusal to 6, 2015, the September constitution. On draft of the vote a surprise made (NRC) Council National Reform to reject the draft by 135 to 105. Most scholars and all military almost it. Yet accept to voted leaders NGO move no, indicating a new and police officers voted a by the coup leaders. The draft fully advocates appointed weak political party system, a powerful and a powerfully senate, an outside prime minister, to control over committee and strategic appointed by some the elected government, ironically labeled of coups.” academics as the “constitutionalization and Pheu Thai both the Democrat Party However, have opposed the draft. So the coup leaders Party the NRC, it knew that if the draft were approved by would be very likely that the new constitution would Heated referendum. a national by rejected be constitution the new would allow more debates over the military people to be politicized and turn against regime. The rejection of draft the by the referendum junta. On will cause a huge embarrassment to the the no vote at the NRC will not only the contrary, eliminate all political conflicts that may arise before and during the referendum, but also allow the military government to hold on to for power at least another 18 months. and deaths the caused that Shrine Erawan the at injuries of many foreign tourists and Thais. The clean-up of the scene within 16 hours after the tragic of in terms especially people many surprised event forensic evidence search. One source casts doubt over the arrest of “middle eastern” looking people in Bangkok with regard to the bombing. Confessions can be made, but how much can they be authenti- cated? The situation is more complicated when other factors are taken into account: the conflict between the pro-election side and pro-coup side, the struggle for power among the pro-coup factions, the conflict over the military appointments, the conflict between the Thai government and the Muslim forces over the Uighur problem, and the violent conflict South in the of the country. cerning purchasing people’s low and an eco- power nomic slump in almost all areas of life. General nomic growth rate drop to 1–2%. At the same time, same At the rate drop to 1–2%. nomic growth con heard been have complaints more and more - 1 International pressure on Thailand to return to a to a return on Thailand to pressure International people to The sending back of 109 China’s Uighur As the military regime now moves on into its sec- democratic regime has appeared to be a constant democratic regime has appeared to be a constant from an Apart Prayut government. problem for the and the regime criticism against a backward open govern- Western democracy, calls for a return to ments including Australia have forbidden the coup adopted and have territories their to enter leaders These range different methods to pressure Thailand. between the from, a reduction of military exercises pressure on the and Thailand, and the U.S., EU U.S. illegal work Thai government to solve the problem of to requests to improve the ers in the fishing industry, international flights to meet quality of Thai Airways between thestandards. Increasingly friendly relations from Thai government and China, seen by remarks to Thailand the military junta leader and several visits by high-ranking Chinese officials, include an attempt andfrom the Thai side to purchase three submarines a fast train project. These all point towards a cooling the for U.S. the and Thailand between of relations first time in six decades. strong criticism has also drawn July in early China from government but also not only from the U.S. who have opposed the groups of Muslims in Turkey Chinese government’s of treatment ethnic groups in of Uighur Xinjiang Province. There were hundreds people in Xinjiang who fled into Thai territory and Upon the Chi- would like to seek refuge in Turkey. government’s request and against a plea from nese government, the Thai government sent the Turkish of action The authorities. Chinese the to back them the Thai junta-government sent a clear message to how well the Thai leaders have Washington responded to the requests of the Chinese govern- ment. In addition, many have worried that Thailand could be another target of international conflicts with regard to the mishandling of human rights in Muslim- related issues. emerged have problems major three of rule, ond year and are likely to remain for some time. First, the economy is slowing down and the junta govern- has producers and rubber of rice treatment ment’s has also been a decrease in There been negative. tourism and the flight of foreign investment due to both the coup situation and/or investment privileges like Vietnam and Myan- economies” in “developing her eco- Thailand for the first time has seen mar. tion 112 of the Thai criminal code. Several of the tion 112 of the Thai criminal code. of Several the of imprison- years up to 20–60 have faced indicted ment and punishment the rate has increased under military court control. The increase of these political UN Office of Human Rights to conflicts has led the on harsh call for a halt and concern voice punishment.

NEWSLETTER No. 72 014 Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University 015 สมคิด : [Today world] [Today ข้อทักษิโณมิคส์ 7 Lok Wanni tlhr2014.wordpress.com . วิเคราะห์ 35 (1822, July July 35 (1822, Matichon Weekend ? [Today world] 16 (529, August August 16 (529, world] [Today Wanni Lok ? ได้อย่างไร ้ Huffington Post , September 9, 2015. Accessed ระบอบเผด็จการโดยรัฐธรรมนูญ จะล้มเหลว . Welcome. ­Welcome. September 11, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rachael- willis-/thailands-junta-is-overst_b_8100196.html. 29–September 4): 8–9. (in Thai ) 29–September 4): 8–9. (in torship 10. (in Thai ) 16 (530, September 5–11): 35 (1820, July 3–9): 910. (in Thai) Matichon 35 (1820, July เรามาถึงจุดนี Thai) 17–23): 10. (in His Military Government Fail? คสช and new.voicetv.co.th. Accessed August 11, 2015. and new.voicetv.co.th. Thai Lawyers for Human Rights. See

Suthachai Yimprasert. 2015. Suthachai Yimprasert. 2015. The Constitutionalization - of Dicta Willlis, Its Overstaying Is Junta 2015. Thailand’s Rachael. ————. 2015b. How have We Arrived at This Point? Point? Arrived at This How have We 2015b. ————. Pichet Yingkiatkhun. Analysis of Thaksinomics: Will Somkid and Note 1 Weekend . รับมีรุก

รุก-รับ 2557 และ [Today world] 16 (531, 16 (531, world] [Today Wanni Loke . 2549 ง เอ � ำ ่ รัฐประหาร

ร่างเอง ร่างเอง เขียนเอง คว September 12–18): 8. (in Thai ) September 12–18): 8. (in , September 9, 2015. The Japan Times Illness. of Deeper 2015. http://www.japantimes. 11, September Accessed co.jp/opinion/2015/09/09/commentary/world-commentary/ thai-terror-blast-symptom-deeper-illness/. 2014 Offensive Defense Coups: Offense and Defense, บทเรียนการเมือง it Thus, the democracy transition towards in Thai- Chachavalpongpun, Pavin. 2015. Thai Terror Blast a Symptom 2015. Thai Terror Chachavalpongpun, Pavin. Lessons of 2006 and Column “Domestic.” 2015a. Political Anudit Nakornthap. 2015. You Drafted It, Wrote It, and Rejected Drafted It, Wrote It, and Rejected Anudit Nakornthap. 2015. You References land will not just be a long road, but also difficult one all the nature of us to understand which requires rapidly developing an ongoing and actors within context. Protesters photographed leaving a protest in front of the Office of the Governor of the Province of Ubon Ratchathani, December 9, 2013. Protesters photographed leaving a protest in front of the Office of the Governor of the Province of Ubon Phakdeewanich Photo: Titipol -

David Streckfuss The dictator ever speaks of the importance of rule The dictator ever is that democracy to recognize is right dictator The The dictator was wrong to think, though, that a especially for the ones who believed they came to who believed they came to especially for the ones The dictator is irritated when position reluctantly. the or when or implied, “dictatorship” is used word the says that the regime came to power someone needs—to dictator wants—he through a coup. The consent of believe that power was seized with the the people. The dictator affirms always his own sin- is loved with all his heart that he and believes cerity oppositionby the nation. As he is sincere, displays of (fixable must be the result of a misunderstanding of an ill- with an attitude adjustment), or the result must intentioned group whose nefarious impact be reduced or eliminated. says the dic- “Everyone must follow the law,” of law. who overthrew it was he that perhaps forgetting tator, he that forgetting constitution, and law existing the has said and again time that it is he who now makes No matter: everyone must follow the law. the law. these days. He sees himself under siege everywhere what Yet perhaps as a kind of fighter for democracy. little resemblance to is peddling has very regime the the range of ideas surrounding democracy outside of Thailand. The regime has focused most of it “rec- about onciliation” efforts on teaching Thai people year last intervention military The democracy. true was not for the military build to seize power but to up democracy does not come from True democracy. elections but from a duly appointed government that saves the people from the dirty business of politics. reconcili- core proposition of military-style That’s the ation: people have to reconcile themselves to a true of popular hope any that ends democracy sovereignty. “democratic” coup would open doors to foreign gov- ernments. It has been a hard go. The Ministry of For eign Affairs seems to have had a single purpose since the coup: explain to the world why the coup was necessary and how everything has returned to attacked has regime the hurt, Repeatedly normal. statements made by other governments about the state of Thailand. The dictator “prime minister” has and governments ASEAN by received been only Former Visiting Research Scholar, CSEAS Research Scholar, Visiting Former - - Honorary Fellow, University of Wisconsin-Madison; Honorary Fellow, . The politicians are remnants of the overthrown The politicians are remnants of the overthrown Over time, the dictator forgets the opposition has t is inevitable that the dictator tends toward mega- dictator t is inevitable that the lomania as the entire structure of power focuses ­everyone else is a bit player else, are legally like everyone government. They, are allowed banned from criticizing the regime. They but they are to kick up a little dust now and again, from mounting any sort carefully monitored and kept Those of opposition. cowed. been The people have at least stay who don’t get in line with the regime (or in for attitude called harassed, politely are silent) adjustments, pressured by their bosses. The names of persistent offenders are removed from commit tees, boards, directorships. It is communicated to tees, boards, directorships. It is communicated to them that not only will there be no institutional sup- port for them if they run into trouble, but that the institution will collaborate - fully with the regime to iso than perhaps sym- Other them. late and intimidate of con- signing a public letter say, bolic support by, cern, no one will stand up in the name of those of principle. as a matter regime by the persecuted properly dictatorship under no principles are There faith, a glorious future. all about emotion, It’s defined. In such a coerced silence, the dictator keeps dictat ing, a single voice that speaks for a nation. been silenced and starts believing the regime’s own propaganda. The dictator forgets that he was by a group of people minister as prime “elected” carefully hand-picked by the regime. The dictator is touched by polls that tell him he is admired and that perhaps forever. the people want him to serve longer, is unbecoming but inevitable for dictators, Petulance upward to the one individual in charge. The dictator upward to the one individual essen- is the regime, the human face that becomes tially the sole symbol of dictatorship. The “cabinet” is “parliament”merely an expression of the dictator; the by the is a facet of the dictator; other bodies created really It dictator. are also just aspects of the regime doesn’t matter if the dictator is a “team player” who works on the basis of some sort of “consensus” with these various other bodies, or whether he (or she) is bod- in these Anyone charge” kind of leader. a “take are at summarily dismissed and so they ies can be the end of the day irrelevant. Under dictatorship, I “Constituting” the Nation: Nation: the “Constituting” Dictatorship Thai-style Modern-day Special Feature: Reflections on Current Thai Politics Thai on Current Reflections Feature: Special

NEWSLETTER No. 72 016 Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University 017 - And this seems to be a function of Thai-style dicta- a function of Thai-style to be And this seems An anonymous satirical of the leader of the junta in rendering after six months “glorious leader” style floated on Facebook the coup. The words read: “Congratulations to Gen. Prayud to [your]Chan-o-cha.” On the flag it says, “Returning Happiness Followers.” torship following a polite coup: overwhelm and torship following a polite coup: overwhelm and onslaught of exhaust the captive audience with an daily absurdities. The opposition began in anger fol- frustra- with followed coup, but that was the lowing mocking amusement. But tion and sometimes even after some time, there a feeling arose of bewilder silence. To ment, then boredom, and finally now it is look upon this absurd spectacle after 15 months can physically sicken and psychologically cripple. The beyond the political folly that is Thailand has gone merely absurd or ludicrous. It has now become utterly grotesque. Even writing this hurts. Maybe I’ll return to my silence. - - *

*

* - seri taken be is to of dictatorship lifeblood The The regime controlled all the factors going into the Thailand has been a captive subject to a gross a captive subject to a gross Thailand has been in 2014. It absurdity since the military seized power a ludicrous a ridiculous spectacle, has all been about the has been episode cruelest drama. The handpicks legal regime draft constitution. The is plainly “experts” who draft a constitution that undemocratic, perhaps intentionally so. The constitu- tion is passed for approval to another handpicked on If passed, the the National Reform Council. body, albeit less junta could stay in power indefinitely, But as turns it out, the junta itself lobbied to directly. have the draft constitution voted down, perhaps fear China. It has moved closer to, not without irony, hasChina. It closer moved irony, to, not without North Korea. people forget how own terms, to have ously on its start people when It thrives was gotten. the power or implications of this or that talking about details the provision, or that constitutional of this policy, Once the population gets law. merits of this or that regime has the of activities nitty-gritty involved in the brought about, indirectly but it legitimizes powerfully regime. the core illegality of the ref ing it would fail to pass in a promised nationwide constitution- erendum. Then the junta appoints a new again. drafting committee, and the farce begins held solely constitutional drafting and should be constitution didn’t pass the That the responsible. sought to National Reform Council, that the junta a repudiation of the bring it down, should have been regime and to ought have brought jeering crowds out into the streets. Out of good sportsmanship, the junta should have stepped down. But the dictator will not step down. He and his motley production will absurdly go on and on. - Sothun Nop Former Guest Scholar, CSEAS Guest Scholar, Former As a tropical country, Cambodia has sunshine has sunshine Cambodia As a tropical country, country, as a developing is known Cambodia ian country where more than 80% of the total popula- ian about 52% living in the tion live in rural areas with Sap Lake. central plains and 30% around the Tonle 2001; UNDP 2013a). 2001; UNDP 2013a). almost all the year with high average temperatures, dry and the and has two distinct seasons namely the rainy seasons. rainy season The lasts for six months with winds south-westerly from May to October, accompanying clouds that bring around 75% to 80% intense spectacular in often rainfall, annual the of bursts with fantastic for an hour at a time lightening displays. The other half of the year is the dry season, average which runs from November to April where The most temperatures range from 27 to 40ºC. comfortable and coolest period in the country is and Shaw and January (Nguyen October between 2010; RGC 2001). age” and “dark war a long civil experienced which regime between 1975–79). It is also an agrar Pot (Pol Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP), Cambodia; Cambodia; (RUPP), of Phnom Penh Royal University Lecturer-Researcher, Faculty of Development Studies, Studies, of Development Faculty Lecturer-Researcher, and is into divided 25 2 Fig. 1 Administrative Map of Cambodia Source: Nationasonline.org provinces. The population in 2013 was 15.14 million with three (WB 2015). Cambodia shares a border divided into countries (Fig. 1) and the mainland is three main parts (the middle, the mountains, and the the country coast). The flat areas are in the middle of which are the main areas Sap Lake, for around Tonle rice cultivation. The country is surrounded by plateau and mountainous areas, which are mostly located in the north and northeast of the country including the mountain Dangrek, Cardamom, and the Elephant ranges. Theseareas are useful for agro-industrial cassava, cashews, and so on. crops such as rubber, The third region is the coastal zone located in the which is beneficial for southwest country, of the oil some kinds of agro-industrial crops particularly by covered are palm. Some parts of this coastal area mangrove forest (Nguyen and Shaw 2010; RGC Background of Cambodia Asia. It Cambodia is located in mainland Southeast covers an area of 181,035 km Understanding Climate Change Impacts Impacts Change Climate Understanding in Cambodia Mechanism Adaptation and

NEWSLETTER No. 72 018 Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University 019

mm

mm and 84

). ibid. et al. (2008) has similarly confirmed that (2009) the temperature of Cambodia is is of Cambodia temperature the al. (2009) et However, Diepart (2014) contended that even even that contended (2014) Diepart However, Although there are no clear statistics that indicate Cambodian rainfall has not shown any consistent Cambodian rainfall has not shown any respectively by 2090 ( though there is no significant variation in terms of the amount of rainfall, there are changes in relation to rainfall patterns. He argued that before 1930s rain started falling down in May and increased to its peak in the But later declined until November. then in July, 1980s, less rain started falling in May and continued before declining increasing to its peak in September, rainfall period (Fig. 5). Changes in the in November can lead to the failure of agricultural crops due to a lack of water supply with more loss and damage due to heavy rain during the late crop calendar in September. the current impacts of rising sea levels on coastal areas of Cambodia, there are lots of concerns regarding this problem. McSweeney et al. (2008) pro- are region in the that sea-levels claimed have jected to increase between 21 to 52 cm by 2090. With this significant increase, it will bring about more water on fresh flooding, and effects of severe risks a rise in sea levels (Nang et al. 2014). a rise in sea levels According to Baran 0.3 to 0.6ºC by 2025. to increase between expected McSweeney to is projected of Cambodia temperature average betweenincrease between 0.7 to 2.7ºC by 2060, and 1.4 to 4.3ºC by 2090 (Fig. 3). increase or decrease since 1960s (Fig. 4), but this is of one-day projected to increase on a magnitude rainfalls of up to 54 and five-day - In term of economic factors, UNDP (2013a) has In term of economic factors, (2013a) UNDP has Along with growth and the process of national res- Cambodia is one of the least developed countries in the region and is more vulnerable to climate change impacts due to its limited adaptive capacity (UNDP 2010). Cambodia is and Francisco 2013b; Yusuf affected by climate changes in four ways: an increase in temperature; a change in rainfall pat Contemporary Climate Related Issues in Cambodia Due to the substantial destruction of the country’s country’s Due to the substantial destruction of the Cambodia physical infrastructure during the civil war, as its still faces many social and economic issues 2010; continues to develop (Nguyen and Shaw RGC 2001; UNDP 2013a). demonstrated that Cambodia has experienced The during the last decade. strong growth rates increased Cambodian economy is estimated to have - Ministry of Eco by 7.6% in 2013. According to the (2013a), cited by UNDP nomics and Finance (MEF) the current annual GDP per capita is US$1,036 com- pared to around US$200 in 1992. This growth will income help Cambodia to become a lower-middle nation in the near future. toration, many natural resources have been used of land used in term to significant changes leading forest In 2004, for instance, last decade. during the areas but those Cambodia, covered largely areas have gradually declined and been replaced by agri- cultural and barren land (Fig. 2). terns; a high prevalence of floods and droughts; and Fig. 2 Cambodian Land Cover Change between 2004–13 Data Source: OpenDevelopment Cambodia This current situation means that Cambodia is This current situation means that Cambodia is ha (31%) were devastated by droughts. Physical ha (31%) were devastated by droughts. Physical infrastructure included 45,372 house, 194 hospitals, schools, roads, and irrigation systems which were annual economic loss of also affected. Average Cambodia was $16.1 million from floods affects and $7 million from drought (UNISDR and WB 2010). confronting many potential climate related hazards including floods, drought, windstorms, landslides, and frequency greater the to Due diseases. and intensity of these climate risks, the livelihood of com- affected and are at high munities have been severely risk (CDRI 2012; Nguyen and Shaw 2010; RGC impacts of cli- the particular, In 2013). 2013; Sreng mate change affect the livelihood of poor communi- ties leading to serious problems relating to food ill health, and a loss of livelihoods activities. security, on the burden is an added there Simultaneously, government to achieve its goals of poverty eradica- tion and sustainable development. Change in Rainfall Patterns: Chrey Bak (Kg Chhnang Province) Chrey Fig. 5 Change in Rainfall Patterns: Source: Diepart (2014) Fig. 4 The Projection of Cambodian Precipitation Source: McSweeney et al. (2008) The Projection of Temperature in Cambodia Fig. 3 The Projection of Temperature (2008) Source: McSweeney et al. Cambodia has experienced more extreme floods lost and peo- lives and crops were Consequently, In relation to losses and damages, NCDM (2013) quality in the coastal zones. and droughts during the last decades. According to the National Committee for Disaster Management cited by Heng (2014), flood intensity trends (NCDM) have increased between 2000 and 2013. In 2013, for example, 20 of 25 provinces of Cambodia were affected by floods (Fig. 6). ple were seriously affected by vector born diseases. The trend of drought frequency has also increased in the same period (ibid.). In 2012, for instance, 14 of 25 provinces of Cambodia were affected by drought land and crop failure to lead which 7), (Fig. degradation. 1996–2013, 2,050 people that between confirmed were killed due to disasters. About 1.7 million ha (accounting for 67% of total losses) of paddy field were damaged by floods, while around 0.77 million

NEWSLETTER No. 72 020 Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University 021 - - Goals Development of Cambodia towards a green, low carbon, climate resilient, equitable and sustainable society Description (CDRI 2012; (CDRI RGC 2006; Sreng 2013). establish The ment of these policies, strategic plans and frame- that aims at RGC of the is a commitment work adapt to climate communities to better assisting related hazards and contribute to fulfilling global tar gets in addressing climate change issues (RGC change climate to related national polices Key 2013). 1. adaptation are included in Table Overall strategic plan comprising inputs from 9 different ministries Strengthening the disaster management system in Cambodia Empower local government reduction Growth, Employment, Efficiency and Equity Climate change projects have been integrated into development programs. 39 priority projects (focus on improving agriculture, water resource management, coastal protection and human health) Policies/ Strategies Policies/ K

Cambodia Climate Change Strategic Plan (CCCSP)-2013 Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction Decentralization and Deconcentration (D&D)-2002 National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) Overall national development and poverty Rectangular Strategies-2004 Cambodian Climate Change Alliance (involvement of NGOs and development partners) National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) -2006 Table 1 Table ey NationalPolicies Fig. 7 Drought Situation and Its Intensity in Cambodia Source: NCDM (2013) Flood Situation and Its Intensity in Cambodia Fig. 6 Flood Situation and Its Source: NCDM (2013) In response to these issues, the Royal Government Royal Government the issues, to these In response of Cambodia (RGC) developed its climate change adaptation policy (CCAP), which aims to increase roles and responsibilities of relevant ministries the and institutions from a national to grassroot level National Policies and Mechanism for Climate National Policies Change (3): 1–5, Strengthening UNDP Climate 5: 59–79. , Vol. 5. Phnom Penh: CDRI CDRI 5. Phnom Penh: , Vol. Synthesis Report on Ten ASEAN Coun- Synthesis Report on Ten . Phnom Penh: Ministry of Planning. . Phnom Penh: . Singapore: ulnerability in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Cambodia Development Review 16 Zone in Cambodia ­ . Kobe: Asian Disaster Reduction Centre (ADRC). . Kobe: Change V ­ 10. Climate Change Adaptation Resilient Seeds: Implementing Mitigation and Adaptation Best Practices in Rural Cambodia. Strategies Global Change for 16(6): 699–720. doi: 10.1007/ s11027-011-9289-7. pre- Rural Communities. Paper Insights from Cambodia’s Phnom Penh, Research Forum, sented at the Development Cambodia. agement Change Country Profiles: Cambodia. School of Geography UNDP. and the Environment of the University of Oxford and Adaptation Capacity of Rural People in the Main Agro- ecological (Cambodian Development Resource Institute). National Committee for Report 1996–2013. Phnom Penh: Program. Disaster Management/United Nation Development - Envi and Disaster Risk Reduction in Cambodia. Community, ronment and Disaster Risk Management and Fisheries: Vulnerability and Adaptation in Cambodia. and Adaptation in Cambodia. Vulnerability and Fisheries: Fish Center. World Penang: Climate Change. Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA). ment Plan 2001–2005 Royal Government of . Phnom Penh: Climate Change (NAPA) Cambodia. National Climate Change Committee. 2014–2023. Phnom Penh: 65. , Vol. of Cambodia ment and Climate Change: The Case CDRI. Phnom Penh: presented at the Climate Paper Area Related to Water. Daegu, Flood Management, and Urban Issue Change August 15, 2013, from http://www.unescap. Retrieved Korea. org/sites/default/files/S3a1_Cambodia.pdf. from http://www.kh.undp.org/content/cambodia/en/home/ countryinfo/ Examples from Rural Affected Communities. Adaptation: Two Nation Development United Cambodia: Phnom Penh, Program. tries Disaster Risks Assessment. United Nation Office for Bank. Disaster Risk Reduction and The World from http://data.worldbank.org/country/cambodia. Climate D’Agostino, A.D’Agostino, L.; and Sovacool, B. K. Climate- Sewing 2011. Resilience: for Socio-Ecological 2014. Learning J.-C. Diepart, Heng, L. A.- 2014. Country Report of Cambodia Disaster Man and Lizcano, M.; G. 2008. C.; New, McSweeney, and Ouch, C. 2014. Sam, S.; Lonn, P.; Nang, P.; Analysis and Damage Loss Disaster 2013. Cambodia NCDM. Adaptation Change R. 2010. Climate H.; and Shaw, Nguyen, Baran, E.; Schwartz, N.; and Kura, Y. 2009. Climate Change Change Climate 2009. Y. Baran, E.; Kura, N.; and Schwartz, of Rural Livelihoods in the Context of CDRI. 2012. Challenge References Draft Second Five-Year Socioeconomic Develop - RGC. 2001. Draft Second Five-Year to Action of Programme Adaptation 2006. National ————. Strategic Plan 2013. Cambodia Climate Change ————. and Chhim, C. 2011. Agricultural Develop- Ros, B.; Nang, P.; Sreng, S. 2013. Climate Change Issues in Cambodian Coastal 2013a. About Cambodia. Retrieved August 22, 2013, UNDP. 2013b. Case————. Study in Cambodia Community Based UNISDR; and WB. 2010. 20, 2015, February Retrieved WB. 2015. Cambodia Population. A. Mapping A.; H. 2010. Hotspots! and Francisco, Yusuf,

- 2011). -based natural resource man- et al. seminate climate change policies to the gen- hange communities’ perceptions/attitude through perceptions/attitude communities’ hange resource management tools, and introduce them resource management tools, and introduce them to more climate resilient crops. Local seed improvement should be promoted. Dis eral public and highly consider community’s input in policy establishment and adjustment. Provide farmers with irrigation systems, water Provide farmers with irrigation systems, C enhancing their knowledge and understanding help them about climate change impacts. This can - to be more aware and cautious about contempo rary issues related to climate change. Enhance community with full agement through providing communities support, and incentives to protect their authority, livelihood dependent resources in a sustainable legislation needs to be strictly enforced Policy way. without any discrimination. Encourage more studies on climate change Encourage more studies on climate be avail- related topics. Empirical findings should to all able in Khmer language and be distributed relevant stakeholders. Even though these national policies these national Even though and frame-

5. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Center for Southeast Japan for University, Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto supporting three-month stay as a visiting researcher. He would also like to extent grateful thanks to Professor of CSEAS, Director and Associate Kono, Yasuyuki - staff mem and other Satoru Kobayashi, Professor, bers for their coordination and kind support during his stay in Japan. 3. 4. 2. Way Forward Way impacts of climate negative the order to minimize In change, strengtheningadaptive capacity of individ- of conclusion, By way to a key. ual and institution is achieve this long-term goal, I suggest that - the follow be taken into account and put ing potential areas into action: 1. munities, which are affected annually by the issues by the issues are affected annually munities, which leading to more change, has proliferated of climate impacts (D’Agostino and concerns about future Sovacool 2011; Ros works have been established, the number of com of number the established, been have works

NEWSLETTER No. 72 022 Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University 023 - - Agus Suwignyo ord 2010). (for example, Lemelson 2007; (for example, Lemelson 2007; films ­ History Department, Gadjah Mada University History Department, This very last episode of mass killings that came This very last episode of mass killings that came The so-called 1965 tragedy in Indonesia was a was a in Indonesia 1965 tragedy so-called The ­Schonhardt 2012; Cribb and F Oppenheimer 2012; 2014). However in Indonesia, in Indonesia, 2012; 2014). However Oppenheimer efforts to re-examine the tragedy cannot yet free researchers from clumsy reactions, intimidation, and even terror. ferent groups of people who allegedly moved under Hundreds of thousands the commands of the Army. sympathizers, and leaders of the members, of the without or imprisoned killed reportedly were PKI being tried between October 1965 and 1966 ( after the crush of the PKI by the Army on October 5, his- official Indonesian by excluded is, however, 1965 It remains a subject of intense study exclusively tory. by foreign scholars and few Indonesian historians alike. The series of killings itself has spurred various theories about the persons, plots, purposes, and periodization involved. Scholarly attention to study the topic in academia outside of Indonesia has pro- to 1990) Cribb (see historiography from void gressed various kinds of scholarly analyses including ency clopedia entries (McGregor 2009) to a model that is more popular and engaging such as semi- documentary terms, such as “victims” and “perpetrators.” terms, such as “victims” that resulted from ideological series of bloody events 1960s. during the and political contestation Existing tragedy as a series of killings studies refer to the of a total of thousands of people—some claim 500,000—as an impact of power contestation on the one between the Indonesian Communists hand, and the Liberals the Army and on the other hand. The pretext to the mass killing was the murder presidential the by generals Army Indonesian of six under the armed guards, who allegedly operated (Partai Party auspices of the Indonesian Communist Indonesia, PKI) in the cities of Jakarta and Komunis on the night of September 30, 1965. The Yogyakarta Indonesian Army under the command of Lieutenant attempt to General Soeharto saw this murder as an launched a carry out a coup d’etat and immediately armed against the insurgent military counter-attack the Army’s conquest of the rebel- forces. However, the end of ling military on October 5, 1965 was not the bloody drama. In the years that followed, retalia- dif by Communists the against back paid was tion have suggested an

ifty years have passed, but the so-called 1965 1965 so-called but the passed, have years ifty remains an unsolved puz- tragedy in Indonesia general public and scholars ­ Researching the Indonesia’s 1965 1965 the Indonesia’s Researching within from A View Today: Tragedy In this essay, I attempt to portray the collective the collective I attempt to portray In this essay, approach they assume to be the “right one” as to approach they assume to be “right the one” as to to be “the voice out what they respectively believe is way middle an inclusive tragedy, truth” about the - 1965 trag Indonesia’s the Researching necessary. the overall edy today requires an understanding of psychological Indonesian people in the setting of the is crucial to long-term aftermath of the event. It and pro- employ a methodology that is considerate example by portional of different perspectives, for and fol- taking balanced coverage of both preceding lowing historical events and factors involved, and by re-defining some of the so-far taken-for-granted

zle, making it one of zle, making it one of the darkest spots in the coun- challenges to the Today, try’s contemporary history. have emanated as much researching the tragedy from ideological as from psychological questions. mental state that some of my fellow Indonesian citi- to the 1965 zens have continued to hold in regards tragedy and hence to show the gaps in the ways the scholars (foreign) and public general Indonesian argue that, while both I have perceived the tragedy. the F

- - ­ op.cit.). . In the case of the attack at Gad- Second, official issued by local statements police remained authorities university Third, generally, First, identification by the media of the vigilantes of the vigilantes by the media First, identification izations who administered the screening argued back by saying that the Indonesian Human Rights Human Rights back by saying that the Indonesian Commission “had endorsed film.” the They said the rector’s attempt to disperse the forum had resulted banner FUI vigilantes under the from intimidation by just had crowded officers, by police who, guarded the where hall auditorium campus of the outside event was to take place (Solidaritas.net, Shared Resentment Generally speaking, these cases of attacks, intru- sion, and intimidation show a degree of reluctance an to take authorities and state university the by active role in protecting the freedom of speech of cit in used be to was freedom when especially izens 1965 relation with issues that dealt with the tragedy. are not exclu- the silence and reluctance However, sively attributive to any authority group in particular. it is the It is just a common general public. Rather, ated under the banner of Islamic radical groups, but no such identification was ever definite. Even if nam- Islam Pembela as Front ing of such organizations Islam Umat and Forum Front) Defender (FPI, Islam did occasionally take Forum) (FUI, Islam People’s place, no further details and official statements were attacks concerned the Moreover, publicized. ever in the next days’ can hardly be found news, making mostly on-line. them a one-time media blow, failure of the on such attacks always pointed to the to present or gatherings seminars of the organizers It is com- written permits to hold such assemblies. mon that official the statements gave no word on the attacks or the attackers. Given the tone of the state- actually the ments, one might assume that it was attacks up the who had backed themselves police and the vigilantes. of their of speech freedom the limiting about silent civitas academica and Social of Political jah Mada University Faculty Sciences, the rector of the university immediately not seemissued a condemning statement, which did to go beyond the campus walls. In another case, at rector of the Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, students the university himself attempted to prevent arguing that from screening the documentary while the movie “had not got a license for public screening from the government.” Activists of the student organ eth century, Tan Malaka. Many more examples of Malaka. Many more examples of Tan eth century, attacks and intimidation but all in can be presented, common. several points in all they shared who crushed university forums on the 1965 tragedy often only addressed the point that they had oper - - ave started to occur among university university among occur to started ave ­ h Two of the most recent cases of intimidation by most recent cases of intimidation by of the Two In previous cases, attacks and intimidations also also intimidations and attacks cases, previous In students recently (see, for example, Solidaritas.net, for example, Solidaritas.net, students recently (see, March 2015),11, public opinions about such attacks remain ambivalent. and intimidation generally 2015, vigilantes took place on 23 and 24 of February forcefully of people A number respectively. renounced and revoked two public seminars on the topics related to the 1965 tragedy that were held in Java, two different Indonesian towns: in Solo, Central Sumatra. In Solo, the semi- and in Bukittinggi, West Secretar nar was organized by what calls itself “Joint Reactionary Vigilantes and the Silent General and the Silent Vigilantes Reactionary Public cases of suppression, couple of years, In the past by vigilantes in Indonesia intimidation and attacks and more intense against those have become more carried out advocacy who either held a discussion, issues the on research or conducted projects, Although counter- tragedy. related to the 1965 reactions iat for the 1965 and aimed to Victims in Surakarta,” and program for mental health service discuss a physical rehabilitation of the elderly (Tempo.co.id, In Bukitttinggi, the dispersed 24, 2015). February - “Foun seminar was held by an organization called which dation of the Murder Victim Researchers,” the people aimed to present research on the life of who survived the mass killings and imprisonment 23, February 30 years after 1965 (Tempo.co.id, 2015). In both cases, the spokesmen of local police defended the vigilantes’ attacks by emphasiz- violent ing that the seminar organizers did not have a permit for organizing the events. led to the cancellation of a number of gathering, - dis cussions, and seminars organized by some commu- nity groups and university students in Java. In Octo- Joshua of British cineaste ber 2014, the screening Oppenheimer’s semi documentary “The Look of Sci Social and Political of Faculty the at Silence” had to ences, Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta intru- of enforced off because of “threats be called sion from vigilantes from outside of the campus,” according to a university internal security officer. a rotary also in Yogyakarta, earlier, months Several “families themselves who called of people meeting of the victims of 1965 massacre” was crushed by a could meeting that the group, who argued vigilante “stimulate the re-rise of Communism in Indonesia.” Meanwhile, in the cities of Malang and Surabaya, both in East Java, authorities of several universities repudiated the screening of Oppenheimer’s docu- mentaries and the seminars on Dutch historian Harry Indonesian-edition book on a West-Sumatra Poeze’s early twenti- born socialist thinker and activist of the

NEWSLETTER No. 72 024 Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University 025 - - It seems to me that the feeling of resentment is is It seems to me that the feeling of resentment mer head of UGM Archive Bureau, March 2015). I mer head of UGM Archive Bureau, March 2015). I also argue that although orthodox Islam has histori cally stood in the front line of refusal to deal with the 1965 tragedy (Cribb 2009, 290), and although Umat Islam Islamic organizations (such as Forum involved in Islam [FPI]) Pembela [FUI] and Front human against intimidations and attacks recent Teachers’ Training in their 1960s, School just to make Training Teachers’ talk about the 1965 I did not lead her to sure that In Jakarta, instead asking of me for an off- tragedy. my male informant wasted a interview, the-record cassette before telling his harsh 90-minute recording at the bureau teachers’ of the as head experience Basic Education during the split Department of The feeling of reluctance of the tumultuous 1960s. to touch upon again the general public in Indonesia in different is thus rooted 1965 tragedy topic of the I observe one thing in com- individual reasons. Yet, do not seem to understand why mon: some people again it is necessary to deal with the dark past they while now to happen expected themselves had not just cannot they want to move on. Some others admit that the comfortable country as they perceive it can be ruined by “land of might-have-been” realities. deeply embedded and widely spread among people It backgrounds. social and ideological of different groups encompasses the three categories of social active role Robert Cribb identifies as having taken an in spreading hatred against the Communists, i.e. the “the conservative wing of orthodox Islam, and Army, is Party”—which Nationalist Indonesian secular the there no more (Cribb 2009, 289–291). The feeling of resentment today concerns not only those who were 1960s during the but or politically involved in power through also the “nobody commoners” who passed what was the years knowing hardly anything about going on but having to experience impact of the September series of events both prior and after the 30, 1965 The feeling of resentment is murder drama. indeed overwhelming. The Researchers’ Challenges that the argue I to imply? is all this supposed What recent cases of attacks, forced intrusion, and clumsy reactions were not necessarily State-driven although the Decree No. XXV of the Indonesian Temporary of 1966 on the banning of the PKI and the Parliament Communist ideology did still play effective (TAP MPRS No. XXV/MPRS 1966) and the Indonesian National Archive (ANRI) still puts off releasing 50-year old classified documents on the 1965 case (Merdeka.com, March 11, 2015), so does the Gadjah for Archive Bureau (interview with Mada University ­ - - During my doctoral research on the history of of history the on research doctoral my During I also observe a shared feeling of resentment in in I also observe a shared feeling of resentment ized in the campus. In another case, a young col ized in the campus. In another case, a league who was presenting a research project that that project a research presenting who was league promi- aims to investigate the involvement of several nent university professors in the 1965 tragedy, a from comments ad hominem sharp very received senior staff member who, while questioning the young colleague’s religious orientation (sic!), expressed his concern about “the threat to harmony and unity” should the issue be raised again today. who Still in another different case, a senior professor, in the late tragedy period of the the experienced mass killings that the told me 1960s as a teenager, because “the what history was supposed to be were choice was to kill or be killed by the Communists.” schoolteacher training, I received clumsy reactions from several informants whom I wanted to interview. informant struck me male Bandung, an elderly In right at opening his house door by a high-toned remark: “No interview about PKI!” the while I had come for his schooling experience at the Hollands - Unga 1930s. In in the (HIK) Kweekschool Inlandse for her ran, Central Java, a woman informant waited husband’s time when I queried details of nods every her youth experience as a student of the Female fact that no reactions from public figures, political or religious the attacks are heard that condemn leaders work on the 1965 on those who and intimidation - Suma West Bukittinggi, case As in the topic today. activists took legal measures tra, only human rights after what happened such attacks although against beyond public. Therefore, to the that is not known and the of university authorities resentment the to defend that tend police’s official statements forum organizers, I notice there attackers and blame Indo- general of the resentment is a shared feeling of I 1965 issues. the with dealing when public nesian feeling of collective fright of suggest that it is the it be on the (imposed) impact of the 1965 tragedy, it is also some, For “perpetrators.” or on the “victims” of the political the feeling of collective self-defense conscious movements that many seemed to be only very enough of the meaning and consequences of the event. not during the time period recently, some details in different cases. First of all, there are Indonesian elements inside the universities and society that do not want the 1965 at large tragedy to in the public be discussed, researched, or “revived” har “social to relating for reasons today discourse In the recent cases of attacks and intimida- mony.” in the individuals some it, tion, thus rumors have themselves security and internal campus faculties texted a message to the local police commanders them about and the leaders of vigilantes informing to be organ the events of the 1965 tragedy that were ­ ­ ­ , - The 99 Jan.–Mar. - ISSN 1961-9898, accessed March on 23, orban-65-Dibubarkan-Nusyahbani-Lapor-ke- , Mass Violence of Online Encyclopedia http://www. -1965-masih-terlarang-wawancara-kepala-anri-4.html, tofkilling.com/, accessed on March 23, 2015. Inside Indonesia edition, edited by Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, William and S. Parsons, Totten Samuel by edition, edited rd Jokowi, accessed on March 26, 2015. [On seminar permit, victims of 1965 Berizin, Ini Kata Panitia in Solo speak out], http://www.tempo.co/read/news/ 2015/02/24/058644977/Seminar-Korban-65-di-Solo-Tak-Berizin- accessed on March 26, 2015. Ini-Kata-Panitia, Indonesian Genocide. https://theconversation.com/solar- , power-fluctuations-may-be-a-thing-of-the-past-1965 accessed on March 26, 2015. massviolence.org 2015. [Archives on corruption made Gestok 1965 Masih Terlarang not], http:// movement 1965 on the open to public, those iorg.merdeka.com/khas/arsip-korupsi-bisa-dibuka-tapi- accessed on March 26, 2015. accessed on March 23, 2015. , January 18. Times New York [Associa- satu, FUI Gagal Bubarkan Acara Nonton Senyap students impeded FUI from disbanding tion of Yogyakarta the screening of “The Look of Silence”], http://solidaritas. net/2015/03/mahasiswa-yogyakarta-bersatu-fui-gagal- bubarkan-acara-nonton-senyap.html, accessed on March 24, 2015. Ajaran Komunisme/ Indonesia dan Pelarangan Komunis Dispersal on the Decree Marxisme-Leninisme [Parliamentary and the Banning of Communist Party Indonesian of the Communism/Marxism-Leninism]. Nursyahbani Lapor ke Jokowi [Discussion held by victims of to Jokowi], files a report Nursyahbani 1965 disbanded, http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2015/02/23/058644703/ Diskusi-K gestok theac Tragedy, http://40yearsofsilence.com/ , accessed on March Tragedy, 25, 2015. 1966. pp. 289–326. London: Taylor and Francis. and Francis. pp. 289–326. London: Taylor Center for from Java and Bali. Clayton: Monash University Southeast Asian Studies. 65. 3 tury of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts and Eyewitness Essays Critical Genocide: of tury ————. February 24, 2015. Seminar Korban 65 di Solo Tak 65 di Solo Tak Korban 24, 2015. Seminar February ————. Wieringa, E. Saskia 1965 around the Silence the 2014. Breaking Mada University Gadjah of the head former with Interview Archive Bureau, March 2015. Merdeka.com. March 11, 2015. Arsip Korupsi Bisa Dibuka, Tapi Bisa Dibuka, Tapi Merdeka.com. March 11, 2015. Korupsi Arsip Joshua. 2012. The Act of Killings, http:// Oppenheimer, , 2014. The Look of Silence, http://filmsenyap.com/ ————. of Silence Lifted in Indonesia. Schonhardt, Sara. 2012. Veil Ber Yogyakarta March 11, 2015. Mahasiswa Solidaritas.net. Partai Pembubaran MPRS No. XXV/MPRS 1966. Tentang TAP 65 Dibubarkan, 23, 2015. Diskusi Korban February Tempo.co.id. Lemelson, Robert. 2007. 40 Years of Silence: An Indonesian An Indonesian of Silence: 2007. 40 Years Robert. Lemelson, Katharine E. 2009. Indonesian The Killings of 1965– McGregor, ————, Studies ed. 1990. The Indonesian Killings 1965–1966: Michele. 2010. The Killings of 1965– Cribb, Robert; and Ford, Cribb, Robert. 2009. Cribb, Robert. Massacres. The Indonesian - In From Cen References - - about about .] in Indonesia have a story to tell .] in Indonesia have

.

Saskia E. Wieringa rightly says that “[a]lmost all To present a plurality of voices thus means to cre- present a plurality of voices thus To rights activists must have shared the ideological ideological shared the must have rights activists of Communism for the banning undertones and at of resentment the public feeling related issues, 1965 dealing with to not exclusively have today does reluc- silent general public, the Rather, do with them. ambivalent media and the tant university intellectuals of the mental state on an overall reflecting indeed are has its own historical Indonesian nation, which ratio- which 1965 tragedy, of the and explanation nale of importance to be counted shares an equal place the tragedy. in any narrative about people [. vived tortures and also members because lost family of the Communists’ harsh propaganda in the period those who before September 30 as some of have opposed discussions on the 1965 tragedy indicated. ate balanced and proportional spaces to understand facts from different versions of experiences and individual testimonies Because inside. within the mixes bias that of any free be naturally cannot between factual experience and personal opinion— I confuse notice some Indonesian researchers even informants’ narratives— with emotion personal their to present a plurality of voices also means to do away with judging one particular party while impos Unless a balanced ing tribunal agendas on the other. and proportional landscape of historical evidence is achieved and equally shared by both of those who propose and oppose investigations of the tragedy, any agenda for court of justice or reconciliation will which only complicates remain a political absurdity, rather than eases the issues. the [1965] period” (Wieringa [1965] period” the This statement 2014, 3). aim to hear we in mind when is important to be kept refers to thea plurality of voices. As the 1965 tragedy contestation bloody dynamics related to ideological of the 1960s, in order to present the different voices explore the entirety studies should of 1965 tragedy, of events preceding and following the September 30 in the murder of Army generals, not just the killings example, aftermath. The concept of “victim,” for needs to be defined not only to represent those who or lost experienced the New Order imprisonment family members in the aftermath of the September generals, but also those who sur 30 murder of Army

NEWSLETTER No. 72 026 Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University 027 - cannot In effect, the In effect, the 8 Focusing on the on Focusing childhood 6 Decha Tangseefa Visiting Research Scholar, CSEAS Research Scholar, Visiting Hence, “youngness” was treated Hence, “youngness” was treated 7 The notion of the young is not easily settled, how- The notion of the young is not easily settled, in my research with awareness that there was always a tension between youth as a chronological age as opposed to as a social construct. diversities that distinguished one young person from another were “as important and as significant as the commonalities they might share” (James and James 2004, 16). It is critical to retain the tension as an exis- tence called youth encompasses both a physical aspect and cultural codes signified by it. In other words, the young need to be treated “very special” (i.e., need more care and protection) since many of them cannot “take care” of themselves, especially the very young. Because of this physical condition, “incomplete” considered as the young are often the of the grown-up. They are on the way toward adult hood and are measured against “an excessively ide- young as parts of an ethnic nationality who were who were young as parts of an ethnic nationality of ‘their’ context reinforcing the from “unhooked place” (Diehl research 2002, 8), my then aimed to exceptional “new ways” of the these illuminate home. lives—lives that had been forced to leave Not only did my research with Bluebond- agree ever. (2007) that a continued prob- Langner and Korbin lematization of the nature and development of an - but also the defini maintained, individual must be tions of the terms child, youth, and be easily settled. one, old or young, “are learning how, or are being or are being one, old or young, “are learning how, (re)socialized, to live in a new way.” - - - It 3

4 For three years, three For 2 Reading this news

1 This short article aims to dis 5 the Thai-Burmese borderland during

on September 3, 2015. on September along ­ hocking images of drowned Syrian boy show The tragic plight of refugees” is a headline of

Youth, Voice, and Methodology: Methodology: and Voice, Youth, in Migrants Young (with) Learning Area” Shelter a “Temporary Going back to the borderland again in 2008, one Bambi Schieffelin defines socialization as an Bambi Schieffelin defines socialization as an 2008–11 when I continuously—almost every week— and some- a teacher, went to work as a researcher, one who hoped to offer a little help. reminded me of my engagements with young young with engagements of my me reminded migrants of a few main questions that guided me was: How of a few main questions that guided me was: How displaced’s socialization should one understand the of the young? I was attempting to come to terms with music, the intertwining relations between identity, and socialization as well as ways in which such rela- tions affect the displaced’s conceptions and experi- ences of “home,” especially those of the young Karens in Blae Koh.

was the plight of those displaced that have driven was the plight of those displaced that have driven me to directly learn from them since 2000. “S Guardian I was also teaching in what the Thai state calls a a calls state Thai the what in also teaching was I as well as “temporary shelter area” named Blae Koh, and music therein. conducting research on youth cuss a methodological conundrum of the nexus nexus conundrum of the cuss a methodological between the notions of youth and voice. mem knowledgeable between process “interactive bers and novices (children) who are themselves active contributors to the meanings and outcomes of case interactions with others” (1990, 17). But in the case; as every of displaced people, such is not the - This, in fact, This, in fact, 12 and the ways they and the With was a my research this kind of awareness, instance, in his “Why don’t anthropologists his “Why don’t anthropologists instance, in Chil- like A.dren?” Lawrence Hirschfeld aptly articulates: “Socialization theory—thethat adult disposi idea - tions adult largely through are achieved interventions in children’s lives—... obstructs the appreciation of of acquisition to the make children contribution the (Hirschfeld 2002, 614). As cultural sensibilities” the young have both been “adults-in-the-making,” incompetent one hand, as “culturally treated, on the at their most interesting, simply creatures, who are, James ‘appendages to adult society’” (ibid., 613; Cf. per are they hand, other the On 1997). Prout and no mastery of their own cul- ceived as possessing ture, but in transition to culture—only adults “own” the means of cultural reproduction (Hirschfeld 2002, the has been although there 614). In this regard, too often need to listen to the young’s voices, “all those voices are silenced” by images of the young that “cling to the more traditional, developmental dis- than rather incompetence, young’s of the course” competence, as social actors (James 2007, 266). As a consequence, discussion of the young is “typically transformed into talk about adults the young organize the environment” in which of the cul- develop “so as to facilitate the acquisition in which tural competence appropriate to the society they live” (Hirschfeld 2002, 614). part of an emerging anthropology of children and children’s childhoods, which not only incorporates well with views and perspectives, but also dovetails anthropology’s long-standing orientations toward emic view and contributing multivocity—hence, to an attempt to understanding kaleidoscopic landscape of human societies under studied. In other other In 10 Yet, “taking “taking care” is Yet, 9 ., 144). My classroom when I was teaching in the camp. ibid - eth of each cultural bearers the are They 11 Nonetheless, the body of research exploring the the exploring of research body the Nonetheless, young’s lives most familiar to anthropologists is, by by is, anthropologists to familiar most lives young’s this on socialization. For literature the and large, the young body of knowledge, which perceives - by focusing on the adult’s influ through an adult lens activi- ence on the young “achieving” it, the young’s ties are casted as auxiliary or subordinate. For nicity, society, or nation. “[I]n times of conflict, war, or nation. “[I]n times of conflict, war, society, nicity, can “children therefore, upheaval,” social and become bearers of social huge anxieties” (Dubinsky much how forget often grown-up The 2007, 145). cultural to carry on their frail weight children “have shoulders” ( as much a cultural act as—if not more than—it is a not more than—it is cultural act as—if as much a physical imperative. But the socialization theory gen- the physiognomy of youth with- erally relies only on that vulnerability is a cognizant out being adequately the young are treated as cultural meaning. When signifiers of vulnerability any qualifications, without it and ability to be powerful disregards their potential cultural producers. social actors and alized version of adult autonomy, independence, and independence, of adult autonomy, alized version The younger are, they the more innocent maturity.” they are–in of need protection. words, vulnerability is a cultural sign that each soci- words, vulnerability on the existence of the ety enacts and reenacts therefore, have witnessed many interna- young. We, people. young campaigns to protect ardent tionally or… The young are “constituted as…agent[s] com- whole of the survival the which by catalyst[s] of human munity is secured”; they signify “fragility life and its future” and, the words often, they speak of “lie encapsulated the innocence and authenticity to the adult the human condition, fast being lost world.”

NEWSLETTER No. 72 028 Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University 029 - - - 18(4): 387–407. 109(2): 241–246. Berkeley: Berkeley: oetics and Politics of Ethnography. Taking Flight in Condemned Grounds: Forcibly Flight in Condemned Grounds: Forcibly Taking 16 ­ In-between Spaces. Doctoral dissertation, Univer 7(4): 360–377. Journal of Refugee Refugee of Journal in Greece. Vulnerability of Refugee Studies and Opportunities in the Anthropology of Childhoods: An Stud- and Childhood Childhoods, to Children, Introduction ies. American Anthropologist Challenges of Studying Refugee Children in the Middle East Afghan and Sahrawi Palestinian and North Africa: Young Refugees. Journal of Refugee Studies ­Culture: The P University of California Press. Atrocities: Thai- and the Peoples Displaced Forcibly Burmese The Body, Childhood Childhood The Body, In Bodies. of Vulnerable Construction London: pp. 38–59. Alan Prout, by edited and Society, MacMillan. Literature, and Art. Cambridge, Mass.: Century Ethnography, Harvard University Press. sity of Hawai‘i. Displaced Karens and the Thai-Burmese In-between Spaces. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 31(4): 405–429. With ori- and methodological theoretical all these References Study A Case Stress: under 1994. Livelihoods Richard. Black, Jill E. Korbin, Myra; and 2007. Challenges Bluebond-Langner, and Methodological al. 2005. Theoretical et Dawn Chatty, each young person: “how that voice both shapes each youngperson: “how that voice both shapes and reflectsthe ways young are]… in which…[the understood, therefore the discourse and within within any young]…find themselves which…[the 266). society” (James 2007, entations, my study on and youth music in a - “tempo so-called unset open for the rary shelter area” was tling notions: for instances, the young are perceived against, but also as aggressor not only aggressed (e.g., child soldiers [Rosen 2007]); the young are not adults, but are also “agents of only acted upon by cultural interpretation and political change and 2007, 242). change” (Bluebond-Langner and Korbin of the Such complexity informed the direction young were research project so as to ensure that the and competency. ascribed with agency then to conscious decisions young’s the Acknowledging crucial. thus was of activities in all kinds participate As “thousands of children and youth caught up in armed warfare horrible who are committing crimes,” how should “as innocent victims they be seen: of political circumstance who should be protected and be held forgiven,” or “as moral agents who should 2007, 304) responsible for their actions?” (Rosen consciousHence, by not acknowledging the young’s decision to participate in such violence, “with all the are we pressures,” and negative positive attendant to recognize inclined to fail to respect the young and their agency. Decha Tangseefa. 2003. Imperceptible Naked-lives and and 2003. Imperceptible Naked-lives Decha Tangseefa. Christensen, Pia Haudrup. 2000. Childhood and the Cultural Christensen, Pia Haudrup. 2000. Childhood and the Cultural Twentieth- Clifford, James. 1988. The Predicament of Culture: Clifford, James; and Marcus, George E., eds. 1986. Writing ————. 2006. of Per Shelter Areas’ and Paradox ————. 2007. Temporary

- - 14 15 —surely, —surely, 13 First, the study did not clump the young together First, the study did not clump the young , 265). Or it is, in James Clifford’s words, “the ibid., 265). Or it is, in James Clifford’s words, “the not a without lot of obstacles. act The of listening to by awareness on the the young was accompanied social and cultural constraints in operation at the and Korbin time of listening (Bluebond-Langner the study was well aware of three 2007). Moreover, conducting this when issues interlocking critically young”: kind of research—“giving voice to the problem- homogenization of “the young” is greatly atic; readily accessible and apparent voice is - impos in the sible; and the young’s active collaboration and, highly research process is, thus a necessity productive (James 2007). their as members of a category and disregarding so others, among ethnicities, and classes, races, that a singular was not “made to masquer category - ade for all children” (ibid., 262). Had we homoge to give nized them, we would have not attempted “greater audibility and visibility as social actors them inhabiting social a variety of different worlds.” More- disempow- simply been the young would have over, more.” ered; and “their voices rendered silent once should as not come a surprise, anthropology’s given writing and theorizing, of researching, experience young, especially the other”—when the about “the consid- often than not been young, have more very ered as otherness to adults (James 2007, 262). Like research project on regard, my a few studies in this effect, “move[ed] away from youth and music, in about children’s adults by on statements relying consid- toward and, instead, and experiences worlds themselves” children by statements ering This is because, by presenting the young’s perspec- tives, youth research is not only about making the young’s voices “heard in this very literal sense,” but forms and characteristics the also about exploring that the “voice” gets enunciated. Such forms and of subjectivity the constitute turn, in characteristics, ethnographer who in the end assumes an executive, editorial position” (Clifford 1988, 51). Precisely, the third issue of the because of this complexity, young taking part as co-researchers becomes criti- cal. The whole question of “voice” in conducting the young’s active col- research assumes, implicitly, laboration in the research process: a research is car Second, because the young’s voices and concerns concerns Second, because the young’s voices and accessible and apparent. There are not immediately are always complexities of the ways in which chil- dren’s interests are represented: by whom their was I purposes. for what and represented, are voices well aware that as the writer of my text, I, an therefore adult “retain[ed] control over which children’s voices” parts of which and over prominence “given were what children have to say” were to be presented ( ried out with the young more than on the young.

- - - - - of the resi- ) articulates in . orbin (2007, 245). See also other orbin (2007, 245). See also other 42); James (2007, also Jenks 261); see and Korbin (2007, 243); see also Rosen and Korbin and Korbin (2007, 243). However, in chil- (2007, 243). However, and Korbin see also e.g., Hirschfeld (2002); see James (2007); rson (2000) who conducted research on chil- research conducted rson (2000) who lexicon of the Thai state, which designated forci scence encounter during the process of achieving process of achieving during the encounter scence ; see also Geertz 1988, 145), ­official e, e.g., Black (1994); Bluebond-Langner and Korbin and Korbin Black (1994); Bluebond-Langner e.g., e, . e.g., Chatty et al. (2005); James (2007); James and Prout iehl (2002, 16); Cf. Tefferi (2007) for discussion on tension for discussion on tension (2007) Tefferi Cf. 16); (2002, iehl Se Priscilla Alde (2007). Yet, it should be noted as Rosen (ibid. (2007). Yet, her study on child soldier that when war is as good, seen greater agency is ascribed to children’s participation in war The children are seen as evil. it is seen than in times when as whereas they are considered as a hero in the former, exploited victims in need of protection in the latter. people interviewed in that study asserted that they wanted wanted that they asserted in that study interviewed people to be treated “as individuals, not an age group.” dren’s rights is one among those in the movement toward “as people themselves: as researchers children regarding into areas that who can carry out their own research projects are pertinent to their everyday lives” (James 2007, 262). Yet, Allison James reminds us of two issues: first, what Clifford Geertz calls “ethnographic ventriloquism: the claim to speak from within,” and, second, “text positivism” and “dispersed by done research that assume to seem which authorship” voice of children’s representation is an authentic children (ibid. dren’s statements, my research project was aware of: dren’s statements, my research project was aware of: polyphony quoting, “selectivity of representation, uncritical of voices, whose point is being made” (e.g., mine or that of served is being agenda whose studied), that I children the in humanitarian agencies of the or those children’s, (mine, the “temporary shelter area”) (ibid.). In other words, I was rhetorical power that to which “the extent aware of the well ‘the voice of the child’ wields” (James 2007, 268). In R. Morgan’s research (2005, 183), we learn that the young (1996, 73); James and Prout (1997); Cf. Clifford (1988); Clif (1996, 73); James and Prout (1997); Cf. ford and Marcus (1986). Bluebond-Langner (2007); Christensen (2000); James (2007); Rosen (2007). (2007); Christensen (2000); James (2007); Rosen shelter areas shelter areas along Thai-Burmese the borderland were offi- cially established in 1984 and hence have been in existence for 30 years. An entire generation was born and raised dur capture not does temporary term the Hence, time. ing that it is the Thai one could understand that though this reality, state’s the temporariness intention to emphasize social adulthood simultaneously as gaining assistance gaining assistance as social adulthood simultaneously through presenting themselves as children. (1997). Jenks (1996). Bluebond-Langner James (2007): see also James and James (2004). dence of those staying in these spaces and on Thai soil. in these spaces and on Thai soil. dence of those staying to be involved with these come Second, people who have shelter areas call them “camps.” In 2001, while I was inter ­adole of American Anthropologist volume in this special articles 109(2). viewing the Ministry of Interior’s (MOI) personnel who super shelter the called unconsciously I area, a shelter vised almost personnel MOI the by corrected “camp” and was since Thai- word “camp.” every time I uttered the Moreover, to Relating 1951 Convention of the land is not a signatory well as the 1967 the Status of Refugees as Protocol Relating term “refugee” is not part of the Status of Refugees, to the the as “people from Burma/Myanmar, bly displaced peoples “refugee term although the Nonetheless, fighting.” fleeing camp” is not officially used by the Thai state’s apparatuses, come to it has been used by a variety of people who have in details more (see areas shelter these with involved be Decha 2007). Christensen (2000, (2007). See e.g., Bluebond-Langner and Korbin

Bluebond-Langner and K D Cf Rosen (2007); See Decha (2003; 2006; 2010a). See Decha (2010b; 2013; 2015)

15 16 14 12 13 11 7 9 10 5 6 8 4

- fab- 104(2): 611–627. edited by Shampa Biswas edition. London: Falmer edition. London: Falmer nd London: Routledge. The Give and Take of Everyday Life: The Give and Take http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/ Childhood. 2015. Singapore: ISEAS.

edited by Su-Ann Su-Ann by edited Myanmar, of State and the Borders Margins, Peripheries and Excluded Bodies: International e my first research experiences in the “temporary shelter shelter “temporary in the experiences first research my e - Cam Kaluli of Language Socialization York: New Children. bridge University Press. 21: Society & Children Africa. Eastern from Experience ment: 297–308. Practices American and Potentials. Pitfalls and Problems, Anthropologist 109(2): 261–272. Policy and Social Practice. London: Childhood: Theory, Palgrave. Reconstructing Issues in the Soci- Childhood: Contemporary ological Study of Childhood. 2 Berkeley: University of Cali- Refugee Community. a Tibetan fornia Press. 19(1): and the Symbolic Child. Journal of Women’s History 142–150. Stanford University Press. Stanford, Calif.: Author. Children? American Anthropologist American and the Globalization of Childhood. American ian Law, Anthropologist 109(2): 296–306. area” during 2000–01 in Decha (2003; 2007). There are two reasons for using quotation marks for the term “temporary shelter area.” First, the term temporary negates a reality that pp. 399–480. Chiang Mai: Biodiversity and Indigenous Mai: Biodiversity and Indigenous pp. 399–480. Chiang for Sustainable Development Center Research Knowledge (BIRD) (In Thai). In Oh. ceptibility: Imperceptible Naked-Karens in the Thai-Burmese in the Thai-Burmese Naked-Karens ceptibility: Imperceptible Border Zones. In Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies and Rajaram Kumar Edge, edited by Prem Politics at Territory’s pp. 231–262. University Minneapolis: and Carl Grundy-Warr, Press. of Minnesota for Non-statist Subjectivities. Theoretical Space to Account In Relations and Exception, States of Routledge. pp. 116–139. New York: and Sheila Nair, Shelter Area’. Mimeographed. making in a ‘Temporary (in Thai). Fund Bangkok: Thailand Research Shelter Area’ along the Thai-Burmese in a ‘Temporary Voices Underneath Border Zones. In Greater Mekong Subregion an et al., Santasombat Economic Quadrangle, edited by Yos Press. “Burma/Myanmar” in order to acknowledge the official ­Burmese junta’s attempt to Burmanize the whole social impact on both a ric of this land, which has also had a deep and spaces along the Thai-Burmese/ variety of peoples the term Nonetheless, for reason of brevity, Myanmar border. Thai-Burmese is used rather than the longer formula of Thai- Burmese/Myanmar. sep/02/shocking-image-of-drowned-syrian-boy-shows- Accessed September 3, 2015. tragic-plight-of-refugees. name, Myanmar, as well as to emphasize traces of the as well as to emphasize traces of the name, Myanmar, Se September 2, In this article, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar is called

Tefferi, Hirut. 2007. Reconstructing Adolescence after Displace- Tefferi, James, Allison. 2007. Giving Voice to Children’s Voices: Voices: to Children’s Voice Allison. 2007. Giving James, James, Allison; and James, Adrian L. 2004. Constructing and 1997. Constructing Allison; and Prout, Alan, eds. James, Dubinsky, Karen. 2007. Babies without Borders: Rescue, Kidnap, Dubinsky, Geertz, Clifford. 1988. Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Lawrence A.Hirschfeld, Like Anthropologist Don’t 2002. Why Schieffelin, Bambi B. 1990. Rosen, David M. 2007. Child Soldiers, International Humanitar Diehl, Keila. 2002. Echoes from Dharamsala: Life of Music in the Diehl, Keila. ————. 2015 (Forthcoming). ‘I Want to Stay Forever in You. in You. to Stay Forever ‘I Want 2015 (Forthcoming). ————. ————. 2010a. Imperceptible Naked-lives: Constructing a 2010a. Imperceptible Naked-lives: Constructing a ————. Karens’ Place- Music of the Hearth: Young 2010b. ————. Musical Youths’ ————. 2013. Learning, Longing and Lying: Jenks, Chris. 1996. 1 3 Notes 2

NEWSLETTER No. 72 030 Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University 031 LIBRARY Let’s briefly review the transitions in publication Let’s briefly review the transitions in publication The Islamic publication market rapidly expanded Other titles are directly purchased from the publish- Other titles are directly purchased from a discounts when some offer Most publishers ers. some of however, direct purchase. More importantly, the books issued by rural publishers are rarely sold at book fairs and franchise stores. trends, based on years of foundation as well as the collection publishers in the the names of cities where for are located. The one who had set a precedent established Islam books (buku Islam) was Alma’arif followed by in Bandung in 1948, which was then as Kitab publishers, Karya Diponegoro. Famous (Kudus), Putra (Semarang) and Menara Kudus Toha both located in the north coast region of Central Java on Islamic classical books also issued and have in written language in Indonesian jurisprudence Roman characters. They started up publishing the with Indonesian translation as well as booklets Koran and for prayer with abstracted lines from the Koran, played the role of familiarizing general interpretations of Islam for the public. in 1980s. It was again in Bandung, in which the two publishers, Pustaka and Mizan were established by the graduates of an elite school, Bandung Institute of Bandung). Reflecting (Institut Teknologi Technology Movements Islamic emerging of the idealism the centered on students, both publishers issued trans- lated versions of various philosophical books as well as research books in Arabic or in English. Their pub- lication included a wide range of works by such authors as Ali Shariati, who had received education and was an ideologue of the Iranian Revo- in France Mus- Qutb, a militant intellectual of the lution, Sayyid ------

akarta has been hosting an “Islamic Book Fair” hosting an “Islamic Book Fair” akarta has been since 2001 which has become an established an- The CSEASThe com is Collection Islam Indonesia J Associate Professor, Iwate Prefectural University Associate Professor, Modern Islamic Book Collection in Indonesian Language Modern Islamic Book Collection Miichi Ken nual event. The scale of the event has been growing has been growing nual event. The scale of the event an endless number has been year by year and there part of their of visitors such as students visiting as school event or groups from various regions. It also and discus- involves events such as book reviews as shops sions, as well as such corporate booths Islamic bankings, and Halal cos- with veils, dealing book the successful. Lately, metics, which are quite fair started to travel around dozens of suburban cit ies all over the country. In the beginning, 70 publish ies all over the country. 2015, by however fair, participating in the were ers the number grew to 92. They display and sell various kinds of publications ranging from treasured diction- aries, books on the ideologies of armed struggle ac- tivists to children’s books. in been publications that have related of Islam posed the market over the last few decades. It covers more than 50 publishers, about 2,000 volumes and includes some journals. Inspired by the 900 religious Insti- (the Koninklijk book (Kitab) collection at KITLV Nether Volkenkunde/Royal Land-en Taal-, tuut voor Asian and Caribbean of Southeast lands Institute Studies), the CSEAS Collection targets publications in Bahasa written in Roman characters (buku), instead of Kitab written in Arabic characters. Due to budgetary restrictions, the collection is yet exhaus- large a library is trying to collect as the tive, but selection of books as possible. Some books are pur chased at book fairs, major nationwide chain stores book specialty and at Islam such as Gramedia, in central Jakarta. shops, represented by Walisongo - The late 1980s was a time when the publishing the publishing when a time 1980s was The late Hizb ut-Tahrir, an international an international to organization aiming Hizb ut-Tahrir, Caliphate. establish the general interestmarket for a books experienced with dealing to those limited only not expansion great of Islam. The growing pres- the political ideologies particularly women ence of an urban middle-class, of Islamic books. Religious emerged as consumer modern in themes to corresponding interpretations and life, family to success, key such as the society referred to. Established in relationships were often 1986, Gema Insani Press (Jakarta) successfully met pub- a major to become and grew demands those and lineups. Mizan various lisher by providing a type of Syaamil, mentioned above also dealt with people, upper-class for relatively books business for chil- novels for young women as well as books dren. Publishers with strong ideological tones men- guidelines tioned above, are also issuing books on for society line with their own reli- and family life in a lot of gious interpretations. Mizan has published general interest books and even embarked on film making, but the collection covers their books only on related Islam hand, other the On themes. Islamic publications are also being issued by a media com- Gramedia Group which are not in our Kompas plex, collection. In addition, the arrangement of the collec- they are tion is different from other shelves in that and rise the Observing publishers. different by stored of works repertoire as the as well fall of publishers the transi within a publisher allows users to overview the over in Indonesia Islamic Movement tion of the is hoped social positioning. It and its 40 years last CSEAS’s to visit a direct pay will readers that open shelves and turn the pages of those books. - - Those who emerged around the time of democra- ous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS) Sejahtera/PKS) Keadilan (Partai ous Justice Party by the and have mainly issued translated works which the ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood, they party models itself on. years however, In recent have also published a growing number of essays written by party members. With Salafists, who inter - conserva most and strictest in the law Islamic pret both there are Al-Qowam and At-Tibyan, tive way, Java. based in the area around Solo in Central Jazeera and Aquwam are the ones belonging to the Jihadists school, who highly regard armed struggles. - pub by attention drew once Jakarta in Ar-Rahmah who lishing the personal notes of three criminals, in attack terrorist in the a role played had actually they Bali in 2002, right after However, their execution. HIT Press, news site today. are mostly known as a also in Jakarta, is a publishing department of the lim Brotherhood in Egypt, Mohammed Arkoun from Arkoun from in Egypt, Mohammed lim Brotherhood postmod- Western by influenced was who Algeria, books on Islamic other English research ernism, and expand, market began to as the studies. However, ideological conflicts also arose. Media Da’wah (Dewan of DDII department (Jakarta) is a publishing which served as a channelDakwah Islam Indonesia), Saudi Arabia for missionary to receive funds from journals published have 1980s. They in the works Shiites and moderates within and books to attack years, publications and websitesIndonesia. In recent of the Salafists and the Jihadists (mentioned below) publishers, criticized by names the issuing Shi- have ites related books (including Mizan and others in the collection such as Al-Huda). Era tization in 1998, such as Syaamil (Bandung), are Intermedia (Solo), and Robanni Press (Jakarta) run by the members current of the Islamic Prosper

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Kyoto Area Studies on Asia Kyoto 29 Vol. (in Japanese) Akiko Morishita and Politics Resources, in LocalViolence: Politics Contemporary Indonesia University Press. 2015. Kyoto Area Studies on Asia Kyoto 30 (in Japanese) Vol. Masaaki Okamoto and of Violence Politics Adaptation: Democratization of Stabiliza-and Local Politics tion in Indonesia University Press. 2015. Kyoto Fumiharu Mieno Fumiharu (in Japanese) Shobo. 2015. Keiso Financial Reform and Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Long-term Trends Finance Corporate and published as an all-English journal in 2012, aims to promote excellent, Publications http://www.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/edit/ Caroline S. Hau and Other Recuerdos de Patay Stories 2015. The University of the Philippines Press. 2015. Kyoto University Press. 2015. Kyoto Southeast Asian Studies http://englishkyoto-seas.org/ Southeast Asian Studies, and agenda-setting scholarship and provide a forum for dialogue and collaboration both within beyond the region. SEAS engages in wide-ranging and in-depth discussions that are attuned to the issues, debates, and imperatives within the region, while affirming the importance of learning scale. An integral part of the journal’s global, and historical and sharing ideas on a cross-country, mandate is to foster scholarship that is capable of bridging the continuing divide in area studies the other between the social sciences and humanities on the one hand, and the natural sciences on hand. Kyoto Area Studies on Asia Area Studies Kyoto 28 (in Japanese) Vol. Hiroyuki Seto Center-Local Relationship in Lao Local PDR: Administration of Provincial Governor under Laothe Revolutionary People’s Party 2015. NUS Press and Kyoto 2015. NUS Press and Kyoto University Press. The End of Personal Rule The End of in Indonesia: Golkar and of the Transformation the Suharto Regime Press and Pacific 2015. Trans University Press. Kyoto CSEAS Studies Series on Asian Kyoto 14 Vol. Hastuti Dewi Kurniawati Local and Indonesian Women Gender Islam, and Politics: Networks in Post-Suharto Indonesia Kyoto Area Studies on Asia Vol. 24 Area Studies on Asia Vol. Kyoto by Masuhara. Translated Ayako Kamada Yuri New Books by Staff CSEAS Journal CSEAS Monographs - - Research Title The Digitalization of Microfilm and Sino Nom Documents & A Zone of Exception: Audible Politics Linguistic Soundscape in a Thai- Shelter Area” Myanmar “Temporary “Revolutionary” to “Regret”: Shan From 50 Resistance in Burma over the Past Years Comparative Study on Traditional in Application of Resources of SATO Rural Development in Myanmar and Japan Borneo in the Midst of the Cold War, 1950–1970 Social Conflict and Political Inequality, Regime Change in Southeast Asia The Making of Modern Agriculture in the From Philippines and Its Transformation: of Agroecological History the Perspective Southeast Asian Studies and to contribute to include teacher, researcher, librarian, journalist, and and librarian, journalist, researcher, teacher, include experts (IT) Information and Technology NGO worker. on Southeast Asia are also who conduct research data- not only to manage various Center, joining the base systems but also to construct academic net throughout the world. Success- works for area study an appropriate stipend to coverful applicants receive housing, and living expenses in international travel, facili- Research funds will also be provided to Kyoto. be allocated for do- will also tate his/her work. Funds andmestic travel, subject to government regulations, to visiting available are facilities of other a number to reside in Kyoto will be expected scholars. Fellows are for the duration of their fellowship period. Fellows during normally invited to deliver a public lecture their term at Center the and encouraged to submit an article for possible publication in the Center’s journal, Kyotothe online journal . Asia Review of Southeast CSEASJapanese both researchers, also received and foreign, who visit on their own funds or exter on nal fellowships. - Position/Affiliation Librarian, Institute of Social Sciences Information, Vietnam Science, of Political Faculty Lecuturer, Thammasat University Department of Social Sciences Lecturer, of Social and Development, Faculty Sciences, Chiang Mai University Department Special Affiliated Professor, of Plant Breeding, Physiology and Agricultural University Yezin Ecology, School of Humanities, Professor, Universiti Sains Malaysia Department of Political Senior Lecturer, Science, Stockholm University Peking Department of History, Professor, University Period Name ach year CSEAS 14 accepts applicants about positions for scholars who work and researchers Van Thinh NguyenVan 2015/3/1–8/30 Decha Tangseefa 2015/3/10–9/9 Amporn Jirattikorn 2015/6/1–11/30 Khin Lay Swe 2015/6/1–11/30 GinOoi Keat 2015/7/15–10/14 Eva Hansson 2015/8/1–10/31 Bao Maohong 2015/8/1–2016/1/31 E on Southeast Asia, or any one of the countries in that any one of the on Southeast Asia, or to conduct 12 months in Kyoto region, to spend 3 to other scholarly research, write, or pursue in activities Since 1975, more connection with their field of study. than 340 distinguished scholars have availed them- scholarly re- considerable selves of the Center’s the invigoratingsources and enjoyed of atmosphere the the ancient capital of Japan and scenic Kyoto, main repository of the country’s cultural treasures, to stud- Asian area interests in Southeast their pursue ies. The Center’s multi-disciplinary character and the diverse its faculty offer visiting research interests of of scholars an ideal opportunity for the exchange ideas and the cultivation of comparative perspec- tives. The competitive selection highly process has researchers years in recent Center brought to the China, from Southeast Asian countries, Bangladesh, and western countries including the United Korea, The visiting fellows represent var States and France. ious basic disciplines in their study of Southeast Southeast ious basic disciplines in their study of Asia, and their official posts in their home institutions Fellows Research and Guest Scholars, Guest Research Scholars, Visiting at CSEASAssociates

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Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 46 Shimoadachi-cho, Yoshida, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan Tel: +81-75-753-7302 Fax: +81-75-753-7350 京都大学東南アジア研究所 〒606-8501 京都市左京区吉田下阿達町46 Tel: 075-753-7302 Fax: 075-753-7350

Editors: Mario Lopez, Shitara Narumi 〈編集〉マリオ・ロペズ 設楽 成実 Date of Issue: Autumn 2015 ISSN 2185-663X