Frames, Blunders, Vulnerabilities, Polarization, and Facebook: The Struggle of the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement in Thailand
By Bhanubhatra Jittiang B.A. in Political Science, May 2011, Chulalongkorn University
A Thesis submitted to
The Faculty of The Elliott School of International Affairs of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
May 17, 2015
Thesis directed by
Christina Lammert Fink Professor of Practice of International Affairs
© Copyright 2015 by Bhanubhatra Jittiang All rights reserved
ii
This thesis is dedicated to Ajarn Pranee Thiparat and Ajarn Chaiwat Khamchoo.
iii Acknowledgements
Working on this thesis has been a wonderful yet arduous journey. It is my pleasure to finally have a chance to thank the individuals and institutions that have made this a great experience. First and foremost, I wish to thank my excellent thesis advisors,
Professor Cathy Schneider and Ajarn Christina Fink, and my reader and program director, Dr. Sean Roberts, for their guidance, understanding, patience, and unlimited support not only for this work, but also for other matters while I was in a master’s program at the Elliott School of International Affairs. Professor Schneider has had the most profound influence on me for the past two years. She introduced me to social movements and has been a source of inspiration for me to continue working on this topic.
Ajarn Christina has been a “caring mentor” who has provided me with emotional and academic support. She has always been there to listen to my concerns and to motivate me to complete this thesis, especially at the time when I was overwhelmed by classes, Ph.D. applications, and personal issues. Dr. Roberts is a great source of academic support and intellectual inspiration. Through several discussions with him, I was able to realize gaps in my research. I hope one day to achieve their standards of scholarship and collegiality.
My special debt is also due to Ajarn Pranee Thiparat of Chulalongkorn University whose guidance, wisdom, and care as a teacher and mentor has been a source of intellectual nourishment and motivation. I also want to thank Ajarn Chaiwat Khamchoo of Chulalongkorn University and the Office of the Higher Education Commission of
Thailand for making my opportunity to pursue graduate studies in the US possible.
iv My fieldwork in Thailand would have been impossible without help from many people. I am so grateful to Niwat Muentaisong, Piyanat Soikham, Naphaphanni
Singsuwan, Hannarong Yaowalers, the Manopkawee Family, and the Seub Nakasathien
Foundation. I would like to especially thank Kusuma Prapawicha and Panyarat
Luewanich for their tireless assistance in arranging my interview schedule.
While writing this thesis, I thank Kanoksyn Khemjinda, Wimolrat
Tangmanwitayasak, Patavee Intara-apaipong, Worrawit Nakpan, Ittipat Meewan,
Wichanon Sae-jie, George Chantarachot, Phusima Pinyosinwat, Sitarom Boonrod and
Witchaya Kaewkoed for providing me with all sorts of emotional support, especially during the time when I was depressed and despaired. I also want to thank Mohammad
Hamze, Tanvi Lal, Deep Pal, Scott Neilitz, and Cara Fulton for help correcting my
English and for their friendship over the past two years.
Mare and David Hull, who were my host family when I came to the US for the first time from 2005 to 2006, also contributed to this research. I thank them for their endless love and care and for their hospitality in allowing me to use their home as a working station for data analysis.
The journey toward my master’s degree would be less memorable without
Pichawut Manopkawee. His presence by my side for the past two years provided me with courage, emotional strength and spiritual support. His research in fluvial morphology also inspired me to be interested in water related issues, particularly dam construction, which was the origin of the topic for this thesis.
Last but not least, I am grateful beyond words to my parents for providing me with funding for this research and for their infinite love, attention, and care which have
v sustained me while I have been pursuing graduate studies in the US. Their faith and shared joy in my pursuit of higher education will always be treasured.
Needless to say, no one above is responsible for any mistake that might occur in this thesis.
vi Abstract of Thesis
Frames, Blunders, Vulnerabilities, Polarization, and Facebook: The Struggle of the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement in Thailand
This thesis investigates how an anti-dam movement that had minimal support from local people was successful in attracting a multitude of support from different sectors in Thai society to pressure the government to reconsider the dam’s construction. It argues that the adoption of several frames that resonate with the interests of different groups of people and a reliance of social media allowed the anti-dam movement to appeal to a broad swath of Thai society, many of whom had dramatically different goals in joining the movement. This, as well as the blunders and vulnerabilities of the government, resulted in the movement successfully pressing the government to reconsider the dam construction project. However, the multifariousness of the movement and the use of social media for mobilization allowed some actors to propagate their own political agenda and shift the attention of the movement’s participants to other issues, leading to the downfall of the movement.
This thesis adds to the understanding of collective action frames in that the effectiveness of frames is determined not only by their relevance to people’s concerns but also by the movement’s strategies and its means of communication. At the same time, blunders and vulnerabilities could also serve as a bridge linking groups that may not share the same goal. Most importantly, this thesis argues against the recent scholarship on the relationship between social media and social movements that mostly highlights the positive impacts of social media on collective actions. While the use of social media for
vii mobilization can allow a movement to succeed, over-reliance on social media for mobilization can lead to the downfall of the movement as well.
Keywords: anti-dam movement, Mae Wong Dam, frame, social media, blunder, vulnerability, Thailand
viii Table of Contents
Dedication………………………………………………………………………………...iii
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………….iv
Abstract of Thesis………………………………………………………………………..vii
List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………..x
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………..xi
List of Symbols / Nomenclature…………………………………………………………xii
Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………1
Chapter 2: Thai Political Context and the Mae Wong Dam Project……………………..24
Chapter 3: The Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement and A Quest for Popular Support…...47
Chapter 4: Responses from the Government and Pro-Dam Supporters:
Counter Mobilization, Blunders, and Vulnerabilities………………………..73
Chapter 5: The Beginning of the End: The Involvement of Political Actors in the
Anti-Dam Movement………………………………………………………...82
Chapter 6: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………....94
References……………………………………………………………………………..…97
ix List of Figures
Figure 1…………………………………………………………………………………..29
Figure 2…………………………………………………………………………………..30
Figure 3…………………………………………………………………………………..35
Figure 4…………………………………………………………………………………..37
Figure 5…………………………………………………………………………………..38
Figure 6…………………………………………………………………………………..39
Figure 7…………………………………………………………………………………..39
Figure 8…………………………………………………………………………………..42
Figure 9…………………………………………………………………………………..62
Figure 10…………………………………………………………………………………66
Figure 11…………………………………………………………………………………90
x List of Tables
Table 1…………………………………………………………………………………...40
Table 2…………………………………………………………………………………...43
Table 3…………………………………………………………………………………...46
xi
List of Symbols / Nomenclature
1. BS The Board of Specialists in Water Resources Development
2. EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
3. EIMP Environmental Impact Management Plan
4. EHIA Environmental and Health Impact Assessment
5. FROC The Flood Relief Operations Center
6. INGO International Non-Governmental Organization
7. IRB Institutional Review Board
8. JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
9. MNRE Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
10. NESDB The National Economics and Social Development Board
11. NEB The National Environmental Board
12. NWFPC The National Water Resources and Flood Policy Committee
13. ONEP The Office of the Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and
Planning
14. ONWFPC The Office of the National Water Resources and Flood Policy
Committee
15. PAD People’s Alliance for Democracy
16. PDRC People's Democratic Reform Committee
17. PPP People’s Power Party
18. RID Royal Irrigation Department
xii 19. SEA Strategic Environmental Assessment
20. SMO Social Movement Organization
21. SNF Seub Nakhasathien Foundation
22. SNS Social Network Site
23. THB Thai Baht (currency)
24. TRT Thai Rak Thai Party
25. UDD United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship
26. USD United States Dollar (currency)
27. WCS Wildlife Conservation Society
28. WFMC The Water and Flood Management Commission
29. WWF World Wild Fund for Nature (formerly the World Wildlife Fund)
xiii Chapter 1
Introduction
Thesis Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to explain the origin, dynamics, and outcomes of the
Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement in Thailand between April 2012 and December 2013.
My study focuses on the relationship between; 1) online and offline mobilization; 2) a domestic social movement and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs); and 3) a social movement and a popularly elected government. The research also focuses on the use of strategic frames, vulnerabilities, and blunders in a case in which the movement was able to pressure the popularly elected government to reconsider the construction of a dam, which was designed to protect poor communities and their agricultural areas from floods. This thesis contributes to the literature on collective action frames, social movements and social media, and INGOs and domestic social movements through an in-depth examination of the interaction between anti-dam movement leaders, anti-dam movement participants, governmental actors, pro-dam supporters, INGOs that supported the movement, and people who were not mobilized by the movement.
Background
Every year during the rainy season from July to October, floods affect several provinces of Thailand, especially those in the central region located along the
Chaophraya River. There is usually minimal flood damage as the rain lasts for a short period. In 2011, however, unusual monsoons resulted in significantly higher water levels in the rivers in the northern and the central region of the country. The excess rainwater
1 caused the Chaophraya River to overflow, resulting in heavy floods in Nakhon Sawan,
Uthaithani, Ayutthaya, Pathumthani, Suphanburi, and the national capital—Bangkok.
Amidst widespread floods in the northern and the central region of the country,
Yingluck Shinawatra assumed office as the first female prime minister of Thailand in
August 2011. Yingluck established the Flood Relief Operations Center (FROC) to centralize flood monitoring and relief operations. However, several experts harshly criticized the government actions as flawed, ineffective and inefficient, especially since the FROC Headquarters was also inundated in November 2011 (“The flood crisis”,
2011). After the flood situation was relieved later that year, the Yingluck government began to discuss a new water and flood management scheme to prevent and manage future floods. This resulted in the proposal of THB 350 billion (approximately USD 11 billion) water and flood management scheme that included more than 200 projects.
However, the government’s plan faced resistance particularly in the case of the Mae
Wong Dam that was to be constructed in the Mae Wong National Park. The cabinet approved the Mae Wong Dam project on April 10, 2012 and allocated THB 13.2 billion
(USD 410 million) for the 8-year construction period. The government claimed that the dam would prevent floods and alleviate droughts in Nakhon Sawan and neighboring provinces. The majority of people living in the dam’s irrigation area also support this project because they believe that the dam would help prevent floods and droughts, which they face regularly (“The Mae Wong Dam project”, 2012).
However, the government’s approval of the Mae Wong Dam project had led to the emergence of an anti-dam movement organized by Sasin Chalermlarp, the Secretary-
General of the Seub Nakhasathien Foundation (SNF). In the beginning, the Sasin-led
2 movement called for the government to redo the Environmental and Health Impact
Assessment (EHIA) claiming that the report underestimated the natural assets in the Mae
Wong Forest. The movement argued that the area where the planned dam would be constructed is a floodplain where wildlife, such as peacocks and sambar deer, migrate for food and mating every summer and is a home to the remaining 250 tigers in Thailand.
Furthermore, since dam construction would last for eight years, the campaign predicted that the project would have a significant negative impact on wildlife and result in widespread deforestation.
Sasin used social network sites, especially Facebook, as a major platform to mobilize support for his campaign to stop the construction of the dam. He regularly circulated links, quotes, videos, and statements related to the negative consequences of dam construction through his profile and organized both offline and online mobilization.
The movement was able to obtain support from local environmentalists, INGOs, and the general public. With the successful mobilization of the anti-dam movement, the Yingluck government was pressured to reconsider the construction of the Mae Wong Dam.
The story of the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement raises a series of significant questions about the politics of development, and theoretical understandings of collective action frames, social movements and social media, and domestic social movements and
INGOs: How was the anti-dam movement successful in attracting a multitude of support from different sectors in Thai society to pressure the Yingluck government to reconsider the dam construction? Why did the popularly elected government retreat especially when the project aimed at responding to the Great Floods that severely damaged the Thai
3 economy and affected a large number of poor communities? What does the story of the anti-dam movement tell us about social media?
Arguments
In this thesis, I argue that the anti-dam movement was successful in mobilizing support from a large number of people because of several factors, including the popularity of the movement leader, the advantages from the government’s blunders and vulnerabilities, the propagation of frames that are closely related to the larger beliefs of people, and the use of social media for mobilization. The categorization of the issue under a broad term containing several different frames and clever use of social media in particular allowed the movement to draw support from political actors1 who could put direct pressure on the Yingluck government. This linkage was unintentionally created when the government, with existing vulnerabilities, committed blunders in responding to the anti-dam movement. Having suffered from vulnerabilities and mistakes, and being afraid of losing power, the Yingluck government eventually decided to reconsider the dam construction project.
While the use of social media and frames as well as the support of political actors was significant for the diffusion and the mobilization of the anti-dam movement, they also led to the downfall of the movement as well. When other issues or frames that were more closely related to the concerns of people on social media emerged, online participants of the anti-dam movement swiftly turned their attention to another
1Political actors is the term that I use to refer to the Yingluck government’s opponents that engaged in the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement in order to distinguish them from those who did not join the movement. This term also encompasses private individuals, political parties, activists, elites, and military personnel who share the goal of overthrowing the Yingluck government as well.
4 movement. This resulted in the fading away of the movement before it completely terminated the dam construction project.
Theoretical Framework
Before analyzing the struggle of the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement, I would like to present my theoretical framework on collective action frames, the relationship between social media and social movements, and the connection between INGOs and domestic social movements.
Collective Actions Frames and Counter Frames.
One of the most critical dimensions of social movements is a collective action frame (Ferree, 2003; Polletta, 1998; Snow & Benford, 2000). Snow and Benford (2000) define collective action frames as “action oriented sets of beliefs and meaning that inspire and legitimize social movement activities and campaigns” (p.614). Activists frame issues in ways that highlight grievances, propose solutions, and mobilize support (Benford &
Snow, 2000). Significantly, frames are often generated through “active, ongoing, and continuously evolving processes” (Snow & Oliver, 1995, p. 587). Frames can sometimes resonate with that of third parties in order to attract external support for the movement
(Bob, 2005; Ferree, 2003). This happens through the process that Snow, Rochford,
Worden and Benford (1986) call frame alignment in which “some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary” (p.464).
The purpose of having frames is to recruit new members, acquire new resources, and mobilize existing support (Benford & Snow, 2000). At the same time, frames help movements take advantage of vulnerabilities and blunders of the opposing side (Jasper &
5 Poulsen, 1993). Jasper and Poulsen (1993) describe ‘vulnerability’ as a pre-existing condition that makes those opposing the movement vulnerable, while depicting ‘blunder’ as an action taken by the opposing side in response to criticisms of the movement.
However, they specify that the opposition to the movement can establish a counter frame to respond to the movement and also to overcome its own strategic vulnerabilities and blunders. As a result, the social movement can be discredited. Thus, a frame, especially one targeting vulnerabilities and mistakes of the opposing side, is considered key to the success or failure of a movement and its opposition. In order to make frames powerful and effective, Snow and Benford (1988) suggest that they have to be connected to a larger belief system and must be relevant to the reality of the participants.
A collective action frame is mainly a marketing concept, which activists use to appeal to people and other activists. By having a specific frame, a movement can draw significant support for its course of actions. The adoption of several frames also allows more people to identify themselves with a particular movement. The importance of collective action frames can clearly be seen in the ways that they allow the movement to connect with other actors, such as INGOs.
INGOs and Domestic Social Movements.
Over the past few decades, non-state actors have played a significant role in global politics. Among these emerging actors, scholars have shed light upon global civil society organizations (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Keohane & Nye, 1971; Mansbach,
Ferguson & Lampert, 1976). Global civil society can be conceived of as comprising formal and informal organizations that have objectives, operations, and members on a global scale (Bob, 2001). INGOs are one of the most common forms of global civil
6 society organizations. The universe of INGOs includes charitable, religious, human rights, and environmental organizations (Scholte, 1997). Significantly, scholars have paid close attention to how these organizations have shaped and changed the dynamics of global politics especially through their engagement with actors in domestic contexts, e.g. the state, local NGOs, and individuals (Keohane & Nye, 1971; Mansbach, Ferguson &
Lampert, 1976). In order to understand the relationship between INGOs and domestic actors, the approach taken by scholars can be classified into two categories—top-down and bottom-up.
The top-down approach mainly focuses on the role of INGOs in pressuring governments when legitimacy of the government is in doubt (Lipschultz, 1992). At the same time, it also provides support for domestic actors especially local NGOs that are in need of financial and technical assistance (Scholte, 1997). Accordingly, several academics see INGOs as moral actors (Falk, 1995; McCoy & Heckel, 2001). However, an understanding of the role of INGOs through this approach does not sufficiently explain the dynamics of how these entities choose to support certain actors within a domestic context (Bob, 2001). It also does not recognize how domestic actors, especially local NGOs, attract support from INGOs. In other words, this approach neglects the two- way dynamics of the interaction between domestic actors and INGOs by excessively and exclusively concentrating on the role of the INGOs themselves.
Recognizing some limitations of the former approach, there are a group of scholars who have taken a bottom-up approach, which focuses on the dynamics of the relationship between domestic actors and INGOs in a domestic context (Bob, 2005; Keck
& Sikkink, 1998). Keck and Sikkink (1998) developed an influential “boomerang model”
7 that explains the situation, in which individuals or organizations in a country could not effectively pressure their own government to initiate change from within, and chose to seek support from INGOs to pressure the government from outside. Although this model helps better explain the dynamics of the interaction between domestic actors and INGOs, it does not address the causal mechanism of how INGOs choose to support certain groups but not others (Bob, 2005). To fill this gap, Clifford Bob (2005) argues that INGOs chose to support particular domestic actors or social movements because of their strategic appeal to funding sources. Domestic movements attract support from INGOs by framing their goals, culture, tactics, ethics, and organizational needs to match those of INGOs.
Moreover, in order for the movement to successfully attract support from INGOs, it needs to frame its objectives in ways that are compatible with the mission of INGOs
(Bob, 2005).
The bottom-up approach allows scholars to better understand dynamics of the interaction between domestic social movements and INGOs. Clifford Bob, in particular, has provided insights regarding how domestic movements can come up with a strategic appeal to attract funding from INGOs and how INGOs decide to support certain domestic movements. While Bob clearly indicates how domestic movements can attract financial support from INGOs through their interaction via international platforms, he does not address how INGOs and domestic movements can interact within the domestic context.
In other words, domestic social movements can attract support from INGOs through their national office that is located in the country where the movement operates. Accordingly, an understanding of such dynamics can be an add-on to Bob’s theoretical framework.
Furthermore, the interaction between social movements and INGOs in mobilizing support
8 for movements in recent decades can be more effective when they undertake online mobilization efforts especially via social media where information can be quickly dispersed.
Social Media and Social Movements.
Social media is an application on the Internet through which people can interactively create, share, or exchange information with their virtual communities and networks (Joseph, 2011). This platform is free of charge and therefore everyone who is capable of connecting to the Internet can access the contents. There are several types of social media, including collaborative projects, virtual worlds, content communities, and social networking (Joseph, 2011). Among them, social networking sites (SNS), especially
Facebook and Twitter, are the most popular forms of social media. Through SNSs, people can share texts, pictures, videos, and applications. At the same time, these sites also allow groups, bands, or companies to create pages that attract fans.
Although social movement scholars have paid attention to the relationship between the Internet and social movements since the 1990s (Chadwick, 2006; Froehling,
1997; Pickerill, 2004), the interest in social media increased dramatically after the occurrence of the so-called “Twitter Revolution” in Moldova and Iran, and the so-called
“Facebook Revolution” in the Middle East (Castells, 2012; Earl & Kimport, 2011;
Harlow & Harp 2012; Lynch, 2011; Mico & Casero-Ripolles, 2013; Morozov, 2011).
Most of the research on social media and social movements investigates the relationship between online and offline mobilization to understand whether online mobilization can foster closer ties among offline participants (Broadfoot, Munshi &
Nelson-Marsh 2010; Gladwell, 2010; Kluitenberg, 2006; Meek, 2012; Weyland, 2012),
9 and also studies the impacts of social media on social movements to determine whether social media yield negative or positive impacts to collective actions (Bennett, 2006;
Bimber, Flanagin & Stohl, 2005; Earl & Kimport, 2011). Investigations of the relationship between social media and social movements have generated a debate between the two camps of scholars that Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheafer (2013) refer to as the “cyber-enthusiasts” and “cyber-skeptics”.
Cyber-enthusiasts express optimism about the contributions of social media regarding collective actions (Castells, 2007; Kluitenberg, 2006; Shirky, 2011). Van Laer and Van Aelst (2010) divide cyber-enthusiasts into two main groups based on their view of contributions of social media: the reinforcement hypothesis and the innovation hypothesis. The former group argues that social media can reinforce existing ties among the movement participants by facilitating collective actions, particularly in ways that allow a spread of information and the creation of online social movement organizations
(Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2002). Most importantly, Van Laer and Van Aelst (2010) argue that groups and activists choose social media to reinforce an offline repertoire of actions because social media reduces the cost of mobilization.
On the other hand, proponents of the innovation hypothesis (Bennett &
Segerberg, 2012; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Lievrouw, 2011;) argue that social media has generated new forms of activism. Earl and Kimport (2011) provide a compelling argument that “the Web can allow more than the simple augmentation of protest: innovative uses of the Web can transform protest” (p.19). This platform provides more accessibility to information through online applications. As a result, issues and movement activities can be advertised to a large number of audiences (Bennett, 2005; Lotan, Graeff,
10 Ananny, Gaffney, Pearce & Boyd, 2011; Olesen, 2004). For example, bloggers, activists, and journalists could communicate real-time development of the situations in Tunisia and
Egypt during the Arab Spring to audiences worldwide through this platform (Lotan et al.,
2011; Lynch, 2011). The availability of information via social media can also increase awareness and interest in certain issues (Castells, 2009). It can also create a sense of collective identity based on common interests (Papacharissi, 2010), help social movements to form and reach critical mass (Harlow & Harp, 2012; Lovejoy & Saxton,
2012), and foster the involvement of people in offline collective actions (Zuckerman,
2011).
In addition, innovation scholars also argue that social media establishes a horizontal, decentralized form of movement (Segerberg & Bennett, 2011) and generates deliberative spaces that can be highly democratic (Chadwick, 2008; Olsson, 2008;
Ostman, 2012). Since people can easily engage in a debate by liking, sharing, and commenting on the posts (Ostman, 2012; Shirky, 2011), a wide range of issues can be deliberated and scrutinized via this new space. Accordingly, social media becomes a tool for checks and balances, which is integral to every democratic society.
Since social media provides individuals or groups with horizontal, informal, and flexible platforms, innovation scholars further argue that this new tool generates a distributive form of leadership when carrying out collective actions (Jameson, 2009).
Everybody can access the platform and propose ideas, which they see as critical for collective actions. Such actions could eventually lead to a widespread conversation among online peers, inducing any participant to take the lead in the online discussion.
11 Thus, physical organizations of movements have become less necessary for online mobilization (Shirky, 2008).
Earl, Kimport, Prieto, Rush and Reynoso (2010) classify the use of the Internet tools for activism into four categories: (1) brochureware, which uses Internet technology to spread information but not to mobilize support; (2) e-mobilization, which uses online tools to facilitate offline actions; (3) online participation, which uses online tools to mobilize people to join offline action; and (4) online organizing of e-movements, in which a whole movement is organized online.
Despite overwhelming literature on the contention that social media can enable movements without formal organizations and on the contributions of social media to social movements, Earl (2015) argues that social movement organization (SMO) is still relevant to the organization of collective actions on social media in several ways. For example, SMO can help the movement remain active and help facilitate offline protest using the Internet. Bennett and Segerberg (2012), cyber-enthusiasts, also recognize the limits of social media on collective action:
The spread of collective identification [on social media] does not require people to make more difficult choices and adopt more self-changing social identities than DNA [Deoxyribonucleic Acid] based on personal action frames organized around social technologies. The spread of collective identification typically requires more education, pressure or socialization which in turn makes higher demands on formal organizations and recourses (p. 748).
Recognizing the limits and the problems generated by social media on collective actions, a number of scholars who can be classified as cyber-skeptics (Gladwell, 2010;
Lynch, 2011; Morozov, 2011; Weyland, 2012) argue that online participation can bring negative consequences to social movements (Morozov, 2010; Lynch, 2011). While social media can encourage ties among like-minded participants, the connectivity alone is not
12 enough to create social movements (Gladwell, 2010; Morozov, 2011). Through this new platform, only weak ties are generated (Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010) and people may only get involved in low-risk activism or “slacktivism” (Gladwell, 2010). Gladwell
(2010) asserts, “Facebook activism succeeds not by motivating people to make a real sacrifice but by motivating them to do the things people do when they are not motivated enough to make a real sacrifice” (para. 19). Therefore, the online participation that may be related to offline events has no particular impact on the real dynamics of a movement.
Morozov (2011) also argues that the number of participants online only helps increase the confidence of activists who run a campaign.
Additionally, cyber-skeptics argue that more accessibility to information on social media is problematic in itself (Bimber, 2003; Weyland, 2012). More information available on social media does not necessarily indicate an increased ability of people to process information (Bimber, 2003). Thus, the increase in information online may not lead to a better understanding of issues or a spread of collective identity that direct people to get involved in movements. At the same time, an influx of information on social media can create an incomplete information dilemma, resulting in people being deceived by online information. Although Weyland (2012) specifically talks about the Arab Spring in his research, his point can be applied more broadly to highlight cases in which an abundance of online information has led people to take part in collective actions without a full understanding of the issue. He points out that in Egypt,
People did not wait for solid information but rushed into action based on rumors. Swept along by rash inferences derived from very precarious information, critical masses of people were willing to throw caution to the wind … As solid, reliable information was scarce, ‘improbable rumors’ ran wild, ‘catching on rather quickly’. Protest stood on fragile ground, shifting rapidly from overconfidence to paranoia and back” (Weyland, 2012, p. 927).
13
Accordingly, although incomplete information may mobilize people to take part in offline collective actions, the presence of people in the field does not necessarily indicate a possibility of having a successful movement. Similarly, Morozov (2011) argues that a large amount of information available on social media creates shorter spans of attention.
In other words, once there is a new development on another issue, important news will be forgotten. For example, the death of Michael Jackson could swiftly shift attention of
Twitter users from the uprising in Iran in 2009 (Morozov, 2011).
While cyber-enthusiasts argue that social media can expand the democratic sphere, cyber-skeptics see that that contribution of social media on democracy can be limited (Cammaerts, 2008; Lynch 2013). Political elites, employers, and states can “erode the participative and democratic potential of the Internet” (Cammaerts, 2008, p. 372).
Social media can be manipulated by certain individuals or groups with vested interests through a top down relay of information. More importantly, Marc Lynch (2011) argues, using the case of the Arab Spring, that movements mobilized through social media are often held together by a simple message but neglect the building of the organizations and
“warm social networks and trusts that are the heart of civil society” (p. 305).
Accordingly, the movement may end up either powerless or worse, as in Egypt, shifting the locus of political power from elected governments to the military. Hence, social movements may not necessarily lead to an enhancement of democratic sphere.
Although the debate between cyber-enthusiasts and cyber-skeptics has thus far provided numerous inputs for a better understanding of the relationship between social media and social movements, more research still needs to be done especially to investigate in what way social media has contributions to social movements and
14 democratic development. The understanding of such relationships has both theoretical and practical implications. In recent years, social media has become a significant mobilizing tool that has enabled several movements to mobilize not only against authoritarian regimes but also against popularly elected governments. Thus, there is a gap in the literature on the mechanism that helps explain how social movements use social media to diffuse and mobilize support.
Research Design
Case Study.
I chose the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement in Thailand as a case study for this research through the purposive sampling technique, which is a strategy in which
“particular settings, persons, or activities are selected deliberately in order to provide information that cannot be gotten as well from other choices” (Maxwell, 2013, p.97).
This case possesses two distinctive characteristics from other movements in Thailand: 1) the movement was one of the earliest movements in Thailand that mobilized support both offline and online; and 2) the movement emerged in spite of little support from people who are immediately connected to the project. Given both characteristics, the results of an in-depth investigation of this case study would significantly contribute to the study of social movements.
Methodology.
This study is a qualitative research employing ethnography as a methodology.
Ethnography is “a qualitative design in which the researcher describes and interprets the shared and learned patterned of values, behaviors, beliefs, and language of culture- sharing group” (Creswell, 2013, p.90). Since the case that I investigated was a movement
15 in which participants had been mobilized through shared norms and beliefs, the employment of ethnography allowed me to see how the patterns of beliefs operated. In order to capture a well-rounded understanding of the movement, I have adopted a specific approach to ethnography called “cubist ethnography,” developed by Auyero (2007). This approach recognizes that “the essence of object is better captured by showing it simultaneously from multiple points of view” (Auyero, 2007, p.26). The research conducted in this manner draws data and information from different groups that are related to the movement. However, since the platforms in which the Anti-Mae Wong
Dam Movement operated were both offline and online, traditional ethnography alone was insufficient. I have also adopted a digital approach to ethnography for this investigation.
“Digital ethnography” refers to a method for representing real-life cultures through storytelling in digital media (Underberg & Zorn, 2014). This approach to ethnography involves the use of different techniques that allow the researcher to understand a certain object through observation in both the offline and the virtual world. Combining several approaches to ethnography for this investigation, I refer to my methodology as
“contemporary cubist ethnography”. The term contemporary signals the use of both the traditional and the digital approach to ethnography. The contemporary cubist ethnography can be summarized as the essence of the subject which appears both offline and online and can be captured by showing it simultaneously from multiple points of view.
Data Collection.
Consistent with the contemporary cubist ethnography methodology, there were three modes of data collection that I used to conduct this research, namely documentary
16 research, interviews with key subjects both face-to-face and via online tools, and attending seminars. Before travelling to conduct interviews in Thailand, I carried out documentary research to understand the development of the project and the anti-dam movement. I went through websites of organizations involved in the anti-dam movement and Facebook pages of those organizations and those pages of the anti- and the pro-dam supporters, including ‘Kad Kan Khuen Mae Wong [Against the Mae Wong Dam],’
‘Yood Khuen Mae Wong: Stop Mae Wong Dam,’ and ‘Mae Wong Dam Phue Took
Cheevit [Mae Wong Dam for Everybody]’. Also, I watched and selected videos from
YouTube and hired an assistant to transcribe them. After travelling to conduct interviews in Thailand, I still continued working on documentary research. I accessed information about the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement and the dam construction project between
April 2012 and December 2013 from newspaper articles through the IQ news clippings database, which was available at Chulalongkorn University. This database also helped me in counting the number of news articles related to the Mae Wong Dam issues and the movement against this particular project during that period as well. Furthermore, after an interview with my subjects, I also asked them to give me permission to access their personal Facebook page in order to obtain data in the form of Facebook posts during the time when the anti-dam movement was active. I included personal Facebook posts as another form of documentation that helped me better understand this case study.
I traveled to Thailand to conduct interviews with multiple subjects in June 2014.
Since I only had one month for conducting fieldwork, I arranged all interview appointments while I was in the US. My personal connections were used to access people whom I wanted to interview. In all, I interviewed 38 subjects, including three leaders of
17 the anti-dam movement, 22 anti-dam supporters, six pro-dam supporters, four people who were not mobilized by the anti-dam movement, two government officials, and one member of the mainstream media whose show about Sasin Chalermlarp was postponed from broadcasting. Among these interviews, 29 interviews were conducted face-to-face, while nine interviews were conducted via Facebook chat. I also used this online tool to conduct an interview because some subjects wanted to maintain their privacy.
Third, I attended three seminars organized by anti-dam supporters and pro-dam supporters. First, I joined the seminar of the anti-dam supporters entitled “From 350 billion-Baht Project to the Immediate Water Management Scheme for Thailand,” which was held on June 11, 2014 at the Engineering Institute of Thailand. Many Thai water management experts, including Sasin Chalermlarp who led the anti-dam movement, attended this event. On June 27, 2014, I attended another anti-dam seminar entitled “the
Development of the Mae Wong Dam Project,” which was organized at Kasetsart
University. The representatives from the World Wild Fund for Nature also attended this event. On June 30, 2014, I participated in the pro-Mae Wong Dam seminar entitled
“Let’s Construct the Mae Wong Dam for Wildlife, the Forest and the People” which was organized by Sopon Pornchokchai, a business consultant. The representatives from the
Royal Irrigation Department (RID) and the local politicians who supported dam construction were present at the event.
Sample Selection and Informed Consent.
In order to approach subjects for an interview, I used the snowball sampling method. This method is a non-probability sampling technique where existing subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances. I first asked friends and
18 colleagues in Thailand to help get me in touch with the key informants. When I talked to them about my research and my wish to interview them, I also asked them to recommend people whom they thought I should talk to. Then, I began to contact other subjects for interviews. I was able to successfully interview 38 subjects from an originally planned 44 subjects. Six respondents who declined to give me an interview were all pro-dam supporters. They told me that they were not comfortable to talk about the topic of my research.
As a graduate student, I was required to follow the guidelines of the Institutional
Review Board (IRB), including obtaining consent from each subject in the research and keeping information secured to protect the privacy of informants. Prior to my travel to
Thailand, I requested the IRB to approve my research proposal as well as my interview questionnaires and an informed consent form. When contacting my informants for an interview, I sent them a research information sheet and an informed consent form, both of which were written in the Thai language. My intention was to inform my subjects about the research and I requested them to give me an oral consent or sign the form to take part in this research. Since most of the subjects wanted to maintain their privacy, I referred to each interviewee by the order of the interview and the date. However, for interviewees who are public figures, such as Sasin Chalermlarp and Somkiat Prajamwong, I have used their name when referring to them in this thesis.
Data Analysis.
To analyze data, I employed a categorical and holistic approach. Firstly, I categorized data into themes according to the literature and new categories that the research may reveal. Then, I coded data from documentary research and interviews into
19 each of the themes accordingly. Finally, I holistically looked at all categories of data by developing narratives that allowed me to see how multiple categories of information are intertwined.
Limitations and Validity.
In this research, there were three major threats to validity, including researcher bias, reactivity, and the inability to access some groups of people. Researcher bias can be attributed to the way in which I conducted interviews with my subjects. As I asked the questions in my prepared questionnaires, I sometimes guided interviewees to respond to some questions in order to get specific information to support my claims. Thus, some answers in the interviews might not reflect the thoughts of my subject but were guided by me to reflect my initial assumption. Given this limitation, in some interviews where I asked leading questions, I have also used available data from other sources, including interviews of those subjects published elsewhere and sometimes their Facebook posts, to verify their actual thoughts.
Second, reactivity—the influence of the research on the setting or individual studied (Maxwell, 2013)—is another limitation of this research. Some participants altered their performance or information because they realized that I was conducting an interview. Reactivity became a significant issue since my fieldwork was done two weeks after the 2014 military coup in Thailand. Thus, many people were afraid of revealing their connection to the dam construction issue and political conflicts in Thailand. For example, some respondents asked me to identify the side of the Thai political conflict I identified with. However, since reactivity is unavoidable, Hammersley and Atkinson
(1995) suggest that the researchers only need to understand and use it productively.
20 Third, another limitation of this research came from the fact that I was not able to interview representatives from INGOs who were involved in the Anti-Mae Wong Dam
Movement. When I called WWF to schedule an interview with my subject, the staff person who picked up the call briefly explained that the organization only provided academic information to the movement and directed me to another number. When I called the number, I was asked to send another letter requesting an interview. Even though I followed their procedure, the staff of WWF did not get back to me. I tried to follow up for an interview by calling them but I was not able to schedule an interview with anyone. The staff told me that the person I requested to interview was busy at that time. In the case of Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), I was able to schedule an interview with my subject; however, the interview was cancelled at the very last minute.
As a result, I was not able to interview officials from either organization involved in the anti-dam movement. However, I was able to access information from these INGOs through publications on their website, and published interviews available on YouTube and in newspapers.
To test the validity of the conclusion in this study, there are two main validity test strategies that I have employed: rich data and triangulation. Rich data is a strategy in which the research has detailed and varied enough data to portray a picture of what is going on in a certain phenomenon (Maxwell, 2013). In this research, rich data came from verbatim transcripts of available interviews on YouTube and interviews that I conducted by myself in Thailand. I was able to access some interviews of people related to the Mae
Wong Dam through newspaper articles as well. By accumulating data from these three sources, I had sufficient information to ensure that my conclusion would be valid.
21 Triangulation was another validity test strategy that I used in this research. This technique involves the collection of data “from a diverse range of individuals and settings, using a variety of methods” (Maxwell, 2013, p.128). For this research, I used several methods to collect my data, including interviews, seminar participation and document research. Each of the methods also involves a variety of sources from which I could collect data. Therefore, I was able to compare information about a certain issue or even an interview of a subject on a certain topic through these various sources of information.
Presentation
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter discusses the thesis purpose, research questions, literature review, arguments, and research design. The second chapter highlights the Thai political context in which the anti-dam movement erupted and contains a detailed explanation about the Mae Wong Dam project. The third chapter describes the development of the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement. This includes a discussion about the emergence of the movement, the development of collective action frames, and the use of social media for mobilization. The fourth chapter explains the responses of the Yingluck government and implications of those actions for the anti-dam movement. It demonstrates how the Yingluck government’s actions turned to be vulnerabilities and blunders, which later helped the movement mobilize support from political actors. The fifth chapter deals with the role of political actors in the movement, and the success and downfall of the movement. It explains how the involvement of political actors in the anti-dam movement led to its success in pressuring the Yingluck government to reconsider the dam construction project and became part of the reason
22 why the movement eventually faded away. Finally, the sixth chapter concludes my study by highlighting a complex relationship between collective action frames, the role of
INGOs, and social media, and social movement through the investigation of the movement’s success and the retreat of the government.
23 Chapter 2
Thai Political Context and the Mae Wong Dam Project
Thai Political Context
In 1932, a group of progressive soldiers and civilians successfully staged a bloodless coup and changed the system of government in Thailand from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. Since then, Thailand has gone through a democratization process, which was disrupted many times, leading the country to be ruled by military dictators. The kingdom has experienced eleven successful military coups and seven coup attempts thus far (Fisher, 2013). The most recent successful coup took place on May 22, 2014 to oust the caretaker government led by Yingluck
Shinawatra.
The coup leader justified the 2014 coup as an attempt to restore stability and order as well as to resolve political conflicts, which began in 2005 (Prasirtsuk, 2015). From
2005 to now, Thailand has experienced continuous conflicts between two political blocs, namely the Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts. The conflict between the two sides primarily revolved around issues related to Thaksin Shinawatra, the former prime minister, now in exile (see, for example, McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005; Phongpaichit &
Baker, 2009a; Phongpaichit & Baker, 2009b). Thaksin was a prominent businessman who rose to power after his newly formed Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) won a landslide victory in the 2001 general elections and gained close to majority control in the parliament. Thaksin’s popularity helped strengthen his authority and allowed him to effectively manage Thai politics for the next four years. He adopted a series of populist policies, such as a 30 Baht universal healthcare program and a four-year debt moratorium
24 for farmers, which favored a large number of poor people in the rural areas of Thailand.
The implementation of his policies allowed Thaksin to aggregate strong support from constituencies in several parts of the country. This led him and his party to obtain a massive victory in the 2005 general elections winning majority in the parliament. He became the first elected prime minister in the Thai history to complete a full term and the first one to win re-election.
The Yellow Shirts are a group that opposes Thaksin (see, for example, Nostitz,
2009; Pongsudhirak, 2008). The Yellow Shirt group accused Thaksin as well as his allies of corruption, abuse of power, and disloyalty to the monarchy. They consist mainly of royalists, ultra-nationalists and middle class urbanites, which in 2005 formed a movement known as the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). The military leaders and minor members of the Thai royal family also supported the movement. They see him as a threat to the monarchical institution because his popularity has led rural people to revere him as much as the king (McCargo, 2005). At the same time, they have also criticized Thaksin for disrespecting the king especially when he used the most sacred Buddhist temple in
Thailand, Wat Phra Kaew, which is reserved for the use of the royal family, to make merit. The Yellow Shirts organized street protests leading to the coup that ousted Thaksin in September 2006. The Yellow Shirts also organized rallies against Thaksin’s allies two years later as well as against Yingluck Shinawatra in 2013 and 2014.
In contrast to the Yellow Shirts, the Red Shirts are a group that supports Thaksin
(see, for example, Buchanan, 2013; Taylor, 2012). They were formally known as the
United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD). Members of this group are mostly rural workers from outside Bangkok, left-wing activists, and some business
25 people who recognize that the control of elites and urban people has threatened democracy. Some of the Red Shirt supporters are also anti-monarchy. They see the monarchical institution as an impediment for democratic advancement in Thailand. The
Red Shirts originated at the time of the resistance to the 2006 coup and the protest against the Yellow Shirt-supported government led by Abisit Vejjajiva between 2009 and 2011.
The members the Red Shirts are allies of the Pheu Thai Party led by Yingluck
Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister.
The political conflicts between two political blocs erupted with Thaksin’s involvement in several controversies, such as alleged conflict of interests and his war on drugs policy which led to the deaths of approximately 2,500 alleged drug dealers who were never brought to trial (see, for example, Phongpaichit & Baker, 2009a;
Pongsudhirak, 2012). The THB 79 billion (USD 1.88 billion) Shin Corporation transaction2, in particular, had led to the outrage of a large number of people and the eruption of the Yellow Shirt Movement against Thaksin. Sondhi Limthongkul, a media mogul who used to be a close ally of Thaksin, led the movement. The movement used corruption and defamation of the royal family as major frames to mobilize support. They criticized Thaksin of amending the law to benefit his family’s business. This was because the Shin Corporation transaction was exempt from capital gains tax. The protests of PAD continued for over six months and ended with a military coup ousting Thaksin from premiership on September 19, 2006. The junta explained several causes that led to the
2The Shin Corporation transaction was the act in which Thaksin’s family sold 49.6% the stake in Shin Corporation, the leading telecommunication company in Thailand, to Temasek Holdings, a Singaporean company, immediately after the Thai Telecommunication Act, which was passed by the TRT-led parliament became effective in 2006. Many Thais were angry that such a sensitive industry had been put in the hands of non-Thais.
26 coup, including Thaksin allegedly causing an unprecedented rift in society, corruption, nepotism and insults to the king, which were mostly the claims on which the Yellow
Shirts opposed Thaksin. After the coup, Thaksin’s supporters began to fight back by forming the Red Shirts in 2006. The movement called for the immediate restoration of a democratic government. The UDD rallied against the coup as well as PAD, accusing it of instigating the 2006 coup.
Tensions between the two political blocs intensified after the 2007 general elections. The People Power Party (PPP), a new party of Thaksin’s allies, managed to win 233 out of 480 parliamentary seats. The return of the “Thaksin regime3” in the parliament led PAD to play an important role in Thai politics again. It accused the new government for its close ties to Thaksin Shinawatra, interference in the justice system, and the attempt to amend the 2007 constitution. PAD protestors took over the government complex and the Suvarnabhumi International Airport.
In 2008, Thailand experienced three changes of government in three months.
Samak Sundaravej, the first elected-prime minister after the 2006 coup, was removed from power by the constitutional court. He was accused of conflicts of interest because he was paid for being a host of cooking shows while serving as the prime minister. Somchai
Wongsawat, a brother-in-law of Thaksin Shinawatra, replaced Samak as head of the party and was successfully nominated as the next prime minister of Thailand. However, he was dismissed from power in December 2008 after three months in office because the
Constitutional Court dissolved the PPP and banned its executive members from politics for five years. This verdict was given after one of the executive members of the PPP
3Thaksin Regime refers to the regime in which Thaksin Shinawatra is the major figure driving the assumption of administrative power.
27 allegedly engaged in election fraud. The dissolution of the PPP led some of the members to create new parties, which later joined the coalition of the Democrat Party led by
Abhisit Vejjajiva and nominated him to premiership in December 2008. The rise to power of Abhisit led to the Red Shirt outrage between 2009 and 2010. They claimed that
Abhisit assumed power without the consent of the Thai people and began to mobilize support from constituencies in the northern and the northeastern region of the country to fight against the Abhisit government. The unrest took place in Pattaya where the ASEAN
Summit4 was to be held in 2009 and then again in the center of the business district of
Bangkok in 2010. As a result, the government decided to use military force against the protestors, leading to the death of almost one hundred people and the injury to almost a thousand people. Abhisit finally dissolved the parliament in May 2011 and held general elections two months later.
In the 2011 general elections, Yingluck Shinawatra, a sister of Thaksin
Shinawatra, was named the leader of the newly formed Pheu Thai Party. Before engaging in politics, Yingluck held several important positions in her family’s business. Yingluck’s low profile and her femininity led people to have a new faith in politics (Branigan, 2011).
However, her election campaign faced strong opposition from people in Bangkok and people of the southern region of Thailand. The main point of contention against her was that she had been nominated to assume power by her brother, Thaskin Shinawatra, and had no experience in politics (“The flood crisis”, 2011).
Despite strong criticisms, Yingluck led her party to win a majority of 265 in the
500-seat parliament in the elections with a 75.03% voter turnout rate, defeating the incumbent coalition government led by Abhisit Vejjajiva. Her party had a very strong
4ASEAN Summit is an annual meeting held by the member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
28 hold in the northern and the northeastern region of the countries where 41% of the Thai population resided. Figure 1 shows the area where the Pheu Thai party won the seats in red while the area in blue represented provinces that the Democrat Party, which was then the incumbent government, won the seats. In Bangkok, Pheu Thai party won only 10 out of 33 seats and those were outskirt area of Bangkok. The area where the Yingluck-led party won elections is highlighted in red in Figure 2, while the area where the Democrat
Party gained seats is represented in blue.
Figure 1. Results of the 2011 General Elections in Thailand
During her time in power, Yingluck faced two major movements; one was the
Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement, which called for the termination of the Mae Wong
Dam project; and the second one was the Anti-Government Movement, which aimed at overthrowing her government. The latter movement, which was led by People's
Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), was able to pressure Yingluck to dissolve the parliament in December 2013. However, Yingluck remained as caretaker prime minister
29 until May 2014, when the Thai armed forces seized power from her government. The military argued that the coup was needed to initiate a reconciliation process between the
Yellow Shirt and the Red Shirt groups and to normalize the situation in Thailand
(Prasirtsuk, 2015).
Figure 2. Results of the 2011 General Elections in Bangkok, Thailand
The 2011 Great Floods and the Water and Flood Management Scheme
During the period when Yingluck Shinawatra was in power, one of the major issues that led to opposition against her was the water and flood management scheme.
The discussion about this issue emerged after Thailand experienced one of the greatest floods in history in 2011.
Before Yingluck came to power in August 2011, several provinces in the northern and the central region of Thailand experienced severe floods. This was primarily caused by the tropical storms followed by seasonal monsoon rains (Raybould, 2011). The situation became worse when most of large dams’ reservoirs in the northern region of the country were filled beyond capacity. As a result, backwater from the dams was released
30 downstream to major rivers in the central region in early July, inundating several provinces from Nakhon Sawan to Bangkok, the national capital. Over 20,000 square kilometers of farmland were inundated. The World Bank estimated that total economic loss from floods as of December 1, 2011 was at THB 1,425 billion (approximately USD
45.7 billion) (The World Bank, 2011).
After Thailand recovered from the flood situation in November 2011, the
Yingluck government enacted the Regulations of the Prime Minister Office on National
Water and Flood Management B.E. 2555 (2012), establishing, 1) the National Water and
Flood Policy Committee (NWFPC), and 2) the Water and Flood Management Committee
(WFMC) to effectively and coherently integrate the management and the command of flood and water situations in the country. WFMC, which is chaired by the Minister of
Sciences and Technology, has a responsibility to formulate action plans, approve of water management projects, and monitor the implementation of projects. The progress of this commission is reported to NWFPC, which is chaired by the prime minister. The Office of the National Water and Flood Policy Committee (ONWFPC) is also established to serve as a secretariat of both NWFPC and WFMC. Also, the government proposed the THB
350 billion water and flood management scheme in which the government planned to invest in 249 water and flood management projects, including the Mae Wong Dam.
The Development of the Mae Wong Dam Project
The Mae Wong Dam project was one of the projects led by the Royal Irrigation
Department that had been under consideration of several governments for more than thirty years. The development of this project could be divided into two phases. The first phase was between 1970 and 2011 when the Royal Irrigation Department had been in
31 charge of the project. The second phase was between 2011 and 2013 when the project was a part of the water and flood management scheme, which was presided by WFMC in consultation with RID.
RID first proposed the construction of the Mae Wong Dam in 1970. This inchoate project emerged out of the feasibility study on the development of the Sakae Krang River
Basin, which found that the construction of the Mae Wong Dam was needed for irrigation in the area. In 1982, the National Economics and Social Development Board (NESDB) enlisted the construction of the dam as one of the immediate projects in the Fifth National
Economics and Social Development Plan. This paved the way for RID, with a support from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), to conduct another feasibility study on the dam construction between 1982 and 1984. As a result of the study, RID and
JICA concluded that the “the Mae Wong Dam project is the most important project for the development of the Sakae Krang River Basin” (The Royal Irrigation Department,
2012, p.1-1). However, the Thai cabinet considered in 1989 that the feasibility study on the project was incomprehensive. Therefore, RID needed to conduct the Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) of the dam on aspects that were unrepresented in previous studies. Consequently, RID hired researchers from Chiang Mai University to conduct the
EIA between 1990 and 1991. The EIA report was released in January 1991 and the
Environmental Impact Management Plan (EIMP) was finalized in February 1994.
Upon their completion, both reports were submitted to the Board of Specialists in
Water Resources Development (BS)5 for review. BS recommended that RID should
5The Board of Specialists in Water Resources Development (a.k.a. the Board of Specialists or BS) is one among 17 bodies appointed by the National Environmental Board (NEB) to review the Environmental and Health Impact Assessment report of the project that may have significant environment impacts. The board consists of environmental specialists who have no mandate to impose any action on the project. Therefore,
32 conduct another study that compared environmental impacts of the two possible sites for the dam construction, namely the Khao Sobkok and the Khao Chonkan valley. Afterward, the reports, together with recommendations from BS, were submitted to the National
Environmental Board (NEB) 6 for the decision on the project. NEB agreed with recommendations of BS and requested specifically that: 1) RID should comprehensively consider environmental, economic and engineering aspects of the dam at both potential construction sites; and 2) RID must report the progress of the studies directly to NEB. As a result, RID hired Creative Technology Co., Ltd. and Paul Consultant Co., Ltd. to conduct another EIA. However, BS rejected the report and recommended NEB to dismiss the project in 1998. A board member explained that the project would negatively impact a large number of households in the dam construction area because they would have to relocate. NEB, on the contrary, disagreed with the rejection of the report by BS and requested RID to proceed with the study on the project by following their suggestions: 1) conducting public hearings; 2) reassessing environment costs of the project by taking into account both direct and indirect ecological costs; 3) comparing costs and benefits of having a project at each of the construction site; and 4) recalculating costs of other alternative water management plans. The government insisted that it would like to construct the Mae Wong Dam because it agreed with the investigations in the past that the dam would bring benefits to community in the dam’s irrigation area (The Royal
Irrigation Department, 2012). the board mainly serves as the consultative body, providing recommendations on environmental impacts of the project to NEB. 6The National Environmental Board (NEB) is the body created according to the Enhancement and Conservation of the National Environmental Quality Act B.E 2518 (1975) and the New Enhancement and Conservation of the National Environmental Quality Act B.E. 2535 (1992). The board is chaired by the prime minister of Thailand and currently has 23 members. NEB has a mandate to initiate policy, plans and projects to enhance and conserve the national environmental quality. Results and recommendations of the board are submitted to seek cabinet approval.
33 In 1999, RID conducted public hearings on the Mae Wong Dam project in
Nakhon Sawan province, which led to the conclusion that “people in the Mae Wong
River Basin frequently experience droughts and floods and call for the construction of the
Mea Wong Dam as the solution to the problems” (The Royal Irrigation Department,
2012, p.1-1). RID resubmitted results of the new study directly to NEB in 2002.
However, NEB rejected the report, citing that there was an incomplete cost and benefit analysis of the two possible sites for the dam construction. Therefore, it requested RID to conduct a new study on both of the construction sites and also urged RID to explore a possibility of having an integrated water management plan in the Sakae Krang River
Basin. After completing the new study, RID submitted the new report to NEB in 2004; however, the board delayed the project and requested RID to: 1) integrate the project into the Integrated Water Management Plan of the Sakae Krang River Commission7; and 2) employ Strategic Environment Assessment (SEA) (see Figure 3).
7The Sakae Krang River Commission is the body created according to the Regulations of the Office of the Prime Minister on National Water Resource B.E. 2550 (2007). The commission consists of 24 members and has a mandate to provide policy, plans, measures and recommendations on the management of the Sakae Krang River Basin to NWFPC.
34 Figure 3. Differences between SEA, EIA and EHIA
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Strategic Environmental Assessment is “the process by which environmental considerations are required to be fully integrated into the preparation of plans and programs and prior to their final adoption. The objectives of the SEA process are to provide for a high level of protection of the environment and to promote sustainable development by contributing to the integration of environmental considerations into the preparation and adoption of specified plans and programs” (Environmental Protection Agency, 2015).
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Environmental Impact Assessment is “the process by which the anticipated effects on the environment of a proposed development or project are measured. If the likely effects are unacceptable, design measures or other relevant mitigation measures can be taken to reduce or avoid those effects” (Environmental Protection Agency, 2015).
Environmental Health Impact Assessment (EHIA) Environmental Health Impact Assessment is “an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) with a health component included in the appraisal process. EIA has a defined methodology of its own, where health is often absent. EHIA goes against this trend by including health, but only as one component in the assessment, so the analysis of health issues is not as focused as with the Health Impact Assessment (HIA). Often, health assessment in EHIA includes health issues that can be measured, such as chemical and pollution exposure, while focusing less on qualitative information such as community perceptions of health issues” (The World Health Organization, 2015).
35 Again, RID strictly followed instructions of NEB. First, it submitted a proposal requesting the Sakae Krang River Commission to integrate the Mae Wong Dam project into their Water Management Plan. The Commission approved the request in April 2007.
Then, RID hired researchers from Kasetsart University to conduct SEA, which was completed in March 2009. However, while the Mae Wong Dam was under the reconsideration of NEB between 2009 and 2010, the Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment (MNRE) initiated a new impact assessment guideline requesting any large- scale project to have EHIA conducted before the project proposal being submitted to BS or NEB. Since the Mae Wong Dam project was qualified as a large-scale project, RID had to conduct more studies on 1) the integrated water management approach; 2) the necessity of having the dam construction; 3) the impacts of the dam construction when comparing to other water management plans; and 4) the impacts of the dam on the ecosystem and the river basin. In August 2011, RID hired Creative Technology Co., Ltd. to conduct EHIA. The report for this investigation was finalized on July 25, 2012, which was after the government had already approved the project on April 10, 2012 (see Figure
5 for the process of approving the EHIA report).
Project Description
The Mae Wong Dam project is planned to be constructed in the area of the Mae
Wong National Park in Nakhon Sawan and Kamphaeng Phet province (see Figure 4). The project is designed as a zone type rock-fill dam, blocking the Mae Wong River at the
Khao Sobkok valley (see Figure 6 and 7 for detailed information about the dam and the reservoir). This location was chosen after the cost and benefit analysis between the two possible sites (see Table 1). Since the construction of the dam at Khao Chonkan would
36 affect 2,100 households, RID considered the new site at Khao Sobkok, which is located in the Mae Wong National Park, to be more suitable. At the new location, only one property of the National Park Service and three households would be affected because people are not allowed to settle in the area of the national park. However, the performance of the dam would be at a similar capacity.
Figure 4. The Thai Western Forest Complex and the Mae Wong National Park
Note. From The Western Forest Complex, by the Elephant Conservation Network, 2015
37 Figure 5. The Process of Approving the EHIA Report
RID (hires a consultant company to conduct EHIA) Submits the EHIA report
ONEP
Disapprove BS (reviews the report) ONEP
Approve
ONEP Submits an approved report, recommendations Submits results of of BS to inquire for the review by BS recommendations
RID/The entity that holds public Independent bodies hearings
ONEP Reports results of the review by BS, recommendations by Summarizes Independent bodies, and results of public hearings results of the review by BS NEB Voices out Submits recommendations Individual/Institutions/ opinions The Cabinet Specialists
Launch the project 38
Figure 6. Dam Information Type Zone Type Rock-fill Elevation +210.0 meters (mean sea level) Width 12.0 meters Length 903.023 meters Height 56.0 meters Headwater Slope (Vertical: Horizontal) 1: 1.75 Tailwater Slope (Vertical: Horizontal) 1: 1.60 Note. From the environmental and health impact assessment report of the Mae Wong Dam project: Executive summary, p. 2-1, by the Royal Irrigation Department, 2012, Bangkok: The Royal Irrigation Department.
Figure 7. Reservoir Information Area 612 square kilometers Average Precipitation 1,055 millimeters per year Average Water Volume 261.51 cubic meters per year Bed Elevation +154.000 meters (mean sea level) Normal Reservoir Elevation +204.500 meters (mean sea level) Highest Reservoir Elevation +204.810 meters (mean sea level) Lowest Reservoir Elevation +180.000 meters (mean sea level) Normal Reservoir Volume 258 million cubic meters Highest Reservor Volume 262 million cubic meters Lowest Reservoir Volume 21 million cubic meters Water Surface at the Nornal Reservoir Volume 17.60 square kilometers Water Surface at the Highest Reservoir Volume 19.52 square kilometers Water Surface at the Lower Reservoir Volume 3.2 square kilometers Note. From the environmental and health impact assessment report of the Mae Wong Dam project: Executive summary, p. 2-4, by the Royal Irrigation Department, 2012, Bangkok: The Royal Irrigation Department.
39 Table 1. Costs and Benefits Analysis of Each of the Dam Construction Site
Construction Site Detail Site 1: Site 2: Khao Sobkok Khao Chonkan 1) Reservoir Area (square kilometers) 612 930 2) Reservoir Volume 258 380 (million cubic kilometers) 3) Water Surface at the Highest Reservoir 19.52 62.60 Volume (square kilometers) 4) Height (meters) 56.00 31.50 5) Length (meters) 903 270 6) Irrigation Capacity – Wet Season 467.04 467.04 (square kilometers) 7) Irrigation Capacity – Dry Season 180.68 209.824 (square kilometers) 8) A number of affected households 3 2,100 9) A number of affected buildings 1 3,300 10) A length of affected roads (kilometers) 18 66 11) Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) 13.38 6.20 Note. From the environmental and health impact assessment report of the Mae Wong Dam project: Executive summary, p. 2-26, by the Royal Irrigation Department, 2012, Bangkok: The Royal Irrigation Department.
Rationale for the Dam Construction
RID explained that droughts and floods are two significant factors leading to the construction of the Mae Wong Dam. Both phenomena have consecutively occurred in the
Mae Wong River Basin for over a decade; however, their severity has intensified since
2005. RID projected that the construction of the dam would ease the problems, and also
40 help eradicate poverty and elevate the standard of living of people in the dam’s irrigation area (see Figure 8) (The Royal Irrigation Department, 2012).
Droughts.
From 2005 to 2007, Nakhon Sawan province had been affected by severe droughts. During a drought between October 10 and November 20, 2005, the Nakhon
Sawan Provincial Agricultural Extension Office estimated the loss of approximately THB
26 million in agricultural production, especially in four sub-districts of Mae Wong district, including Rai Ley, Khao Chonkan, Mae Wong, and Wang San. Additionally, several areas in Kamphaeng Phet province also experienced severe droughts. In Pang
Makha district, for example, droughts affected the area four times in 2007 alone. As a result, the government had to subsidize approximately THB 2 million (USD 70,000) every year for farmers in this district.
Floods.
Floods remain the biggest problem in the Mae Wong River Basin and have frequently occurred over the past several years. From 2004 to 2008, 17,533 people in the area were affected costing the government approximately THB 141 million (USD 5 million) in compensation. According to the records, the number of affected villages had dramatically increased between 2003 and 2011, especially in Lad Yao district (see Table
2).
41 Figure 8. Irrigation Area of the Mae Wong Dam
Reservoir Mae Wong Dam
Mae Wong National Park
Irrigation Area Klong Pho Reservoir
Tab Salao Reservoir
Note. Adapted from the environmental and health impact assessment report of the Mae Wong Dam project: Executive summary, p. 2-11, by the Royal Irrigation Department, 2012, Bangkok: The Royal Irrigation Department.
42
Table 2. Number of Villages Affected by Floods in the Mae Wong River Basin
Number of Affected Villages District Sub-district 2003 2004 2011 Khao Chonkan 17 17 17 Wang San 14 14 14 Mae Wong Mae Ley 26 26 26 Mae Wong 9 9 9 Total 66 66 66 Lad Yao 10 15 15 Huai Nam Khon - 3 10 Wang Ma - 16 16 Sroi Lakorn - 1 10 Mab Kae - - 7 Hnong Yao 9 - 9 Hnong Nom Wua 9 9 9 Ban Rai 10 14 29 Lad Yao Nern Khee Lek 12 12 12 San Chao Kai Tor 11 10 11 Sra Kaew 10 10 10 Wang Mueang 10 8 10 San Chao 3 3 3 (Municipality) San Chao Kai Tor - 3 3 (Municipality) Total 84 104 154
Note. From the environmental and health impact assessment report of the Mae Wong Dam project: Executive summary, p. 2-12, by the Royal Irrigation Department, 2012, Bangkok: The Royal Irrigation Department.
43 People who live in the Mae Wong River Basin depend on agriculture for their livelihood and have continually voiced their concerns about frequent floods and droughts in the area. Most people who live in the dam’s irrigation area grow rice, sugar cane, and cassava (Lad Yao District Office, 2012). These people recognize that floods and droughts severely impact their crops. Some also claim that droughts and floods have led to other social problems, such as migration and poverty. Wicharn Dhammacheewan, a resident in
Mae Ley sub-district, explained,
I used to grow corn but I have shifted to planting cassava now. Growing corn makes me poorer because we have less water nowadays. The climate is unpredictable and droughts are the major problem. If there is no water, everything will come to the end. I may have to migrate to a big city to become a laborer (“Another water management project”, 2012).
Pichai Piluk, another resident of Lad Yao sub-district, also stated,
The irrigation system in the area [of the Mae Wong River Basin] is not working. When water comes to our village, there is no place to hold the water. We experience droughts for three to four months a year, so we cannot grow rice or other crops. This happens every year (“Another water management project”, 2012).
Boonchoo Prommarak, a former village leader, told the news reporter,
When the floodwater flows into the area, it will be there for several days, causing damage to agricultural products and properties. The government’s compensation is not enough to make up for what we have lost. People are poorer. Youths have been migrating for jobs in big cities. Elders have been left uncared for. This sort of situation has happened for quite some time because of floods and droughts in the area (“Another water management project”, 2012).
Considering the frequency of floods and droughts, residents in the area endorse any projects that would ease both problems, especially the Mae Wong Dam. One of the residents said,
There is no place to hold water for us now. A small dam that we have is not working because floodwater has brought sediment which buried the dam. This resulted in an alteration of the river channel. We think that a larger dam is a better
44 solution to deal with droughts and floods in the river basin (personal communication no. 25, June 24, 2014).
According to the survey by a consultant company in 2013, 61% of residents in Mae
Wong district, 84% of people in Lad Yao district, and 69% of people in Nakhon Sawan province endorsed the Mae Wong dam project (see Table 3). This large number of people who were in favor of dam construction can partially explain why the Thai government had never fully dismissed the Mae Wong Dam project. However, this project was strongly opposed by the anti-dam movement led by Sasin Chalermlarp and Seub
Nakhasathien Foundation because they recognized that the dam would have serious negative impacts on the environment.
45
Table 3. Opinion Survey of People in the Mae Wong River Basin Regarding the Mae Wong Dam Project, 2 – 3 October 2013
District/ Total Population Population over 20 Years Old Percentage Municipality Total 20+ Yes Abstain No Yes* No* Yes Abstain No Yes* No* Mueang 145,278 109,152 84,138 20,466 4,548 103,554 5,598 77% 19% 4% 95% 5% Mueang Nakhon 95,237 71,555 16,398 4,472 49,194 17,889 53,666 23% 6% 69% 25% 75% Sawan Municipality Krokphra 35,966 27,022 12,888 3,742 5,820 18,615 8,407 48% 14% 22% 69% 31% Lad Yao 81,492 61,228 44,529 8,349 8,349 51,560 9,668 73% 14% 14% 84% 16% Lad Yao 8,296 6,233 1,438 1,247 3,548 1,798 4,435 23% 20% 57% 29% 71% Municipality Mae Wing 53,132 39,920 17,696 11,112 11,112 24,522 15,398 44% 28% 28% 61% 39% Mae Pern 20,515 15,414 8,596 2,668 4,150 10,395 5,018 56% 17% 27% 67% 33% Chumtabong 18,918 14,214 8,577 2,573 3,431 10,153 4,061 60% 18% 24% 71% 29% Total 458,834 344,736 194,261 54,629 90,151 238,486 106,251 57% 16% 27% 69% 31%
Note. From “AREA discusses an opinion survey of people on the Mae Wong Dam project,” Prachathai, 2013. Retrieved from http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2013/10/49062
46 Chapter 3
The Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement and a Quest for Popular Support
Social Movement Organization
The Seub Nakasathien Foundation (SNF).
The Seub Nakasathien Foundation was the lead organization of the Anti-Mae
Wong Dam Movement. The foundation was established on September 18, 1990, with its name adopted from Seub Nakasathien, the former superintendent of the Huai Kha
Khaeng Wildlife Sanctuary who committed suicide to raise environmental awareness among Thai people. Queen Sirikit of Thailand provided the first grants for the foundation. Later, several Thai governments in the 1990s organized events to raise funds for SNF. At present, SNF still receives support from and works closely with the
Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation of Thailand. The main mission of the organization is to support conservation and preservation of forest and wildlife for sustainability of nature, humanity, and society. In recent years, the foundation mainly operates in the Thai Western Forest Complex, considered the largest forested area in Thailand.
As the government decided to construct the dam in the Western Forest Complex, the foundation believed it was necessary to mobilize support to halt the project. Sasin
Chalermlarp, together with other senior members of the SNF, believes that no dam should be constructed in Thai forests anymore. This resulted in them leading the SNF to engage in the fight against the construction of the Mae Wong Dam.
47 Sasin Chalermlarp.
The major figure that brought SNF to engage in the fight against the government was Sasin Chalermlarp. Sasin was trained as a geologist and used to teach engineering.
He had a keen interest in environmental issues since he was in high school, but did not have a chance to pursue a degree in environmental sciences because none were available in Thailand at that time. However, Sasin was still active in the environmental front and had a chance to be a mentee of the prominent environmentalist, Surapon Sudara.
The engagement of Sasin with SNF began with him being a board member of the foundation. Later, he was invited to serve as a manager of the foundation’s conservation program and was finally promoted as the Secretary-General of SNF in 2003. In his capacity as the leader of the foundation, Sasin engaged in several programs to conserve the Thai Western Forest Complex. One of them is the implementation of the Joint
Management of Protected Areas (JoMPA), a new approach to environmental conservation that allows all stakeholders to jointly participate in forest conservation initiatives with NGOs playing a role of a facilitator.
Although Sasin has engaged in forest conservation and environmental issues for more than a decade, he came into the spotlight for his cause in 2011 when the Great
Floods occured. Sasin publicly criticized the Yingluck government’s flood management plan on how it failed to achieve its anticipated outcomes. He also proposed alternative solutions to flood problems by suggesting the plan to divert floodwater to small canals in order to allow it to flow into the sea very quickly. His ideas were widely circulated on
Facebook. The failures of the government to manage floodwater made Sasin’s alternatives more appealing to the people. Sasin was invited to several news shows on
48 mainstream media to discuss flood relief measures. During this period, Sasin’s personal
Facebook page, which was opened to the public, became a source of information about flood situations and flood solutions. As a result, Sasin had approximately 70,000 followers online at that time.
Forming the Movement
After the Yingluck cabinet approved the construction of the Mae Wong Dam on
April 10, 2012, Sasin, together with the SNF, publicly launched an ‘Anti-EHIA’ campaign. EHIA refers to the report on environmental and health impacts assessment of the Mae Wong Dam, which the movement recognized as flawed in several ways. The movement contended that the report did not take into account the natural value of the forest and wildlife. Sasin and other leading members of the movement perceived that the fight to have the EHIA redone was a significant step to delay and prevent the construction of the dam. He held several private meetings to talk about the organization of the movement prior to the cabinet approval of the project.
The meetings between the organizers initially took place once a month, but became more frequent once the movement was publicly launched. The meetings were designed as an open forum that participants could join and leave anytime. At the same time, the opposition to the movement was also welcomed to the movement’s gatherings as well (personal communication, June 5, 2014). Through the initial meetings, Sasin and
SNF were able to cooperate with several local environmental groups and INGOs.
49 Appealing to Local Environmentalists.
There were more than 20 local environmental organizations8 that became allies of
SNF in the anti-dam movement. The local environmentalists recognized that environmental protection was an important issue that the Thai government must be concerned about because negative impacts on the environment can severely affect the livelihoods of people. One leader of the student organization that joined the movement described her engagement,
I have been following about dam construction since I was in high school. When I became a freshman, I had a chance to learn more about the impacts of dam construction through a dialogue with friends who cared about the same issue. The environment is important for our survival (personal communication no. 11, June 11, 2014).
In a similar way to university students, the leader of another anti-dam movement explained his support for the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement,
The Mae Wong Dam is similar to the Kaeng Sue Ten Dam9. If the dam is constructed, the forest and the ecosystem will be destroyed. This is why we have to work together to fight against dam construction. We have been in touch and have agreed to fight against the unjust decision of the government (personal communication no. 15, June 14, 2014).
8Other organizations that took part in the movement included 1) The Green World Foundation, 2) The Stop Global Warming Association, 3) The Bird Conservation Society of Thailand, 4) The Thai Western Forest Complex Conservation Committee Foundation, 5) The Water Partnership Foundation (Thailand), 6) The Group of Artists who Love the Western Forest Complex, 7) the Group of Former Students from 16 Educational Institutions Who Used to Join Environmental Activities of the Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation Commission, 8) The Phayuha’s Environmental Protection Group, 9) The Environmental Committee of the Lower Northern Region, 10) The Foundation for the Western Forest Complex Conservation, 11) The Pathipan Institute Foundation, 12) The Seub Sak Sin Pan Din See Kwae Foundation, 13) The Community Forest Network of Nakhon Sawan Province, 14) The Community Forest Network of the Western Forest Complex, 15) The Mae Katoo Forest’s Protectors Network, 16) The Graduate Volunteer Foundation, 17) The Bai Mai Group, 18) The Environmental and Biodiversity Conservation Group, 19) The Foundation for Ecological Recovery, 20) The Yaowachon Ton Kla Noi Network, and 21) The Big Tree Group. 9Kaeng Sue Ten Dam is the dam construction project that the Thai government has considered since the 1980s. The dam is planned for construction in the Yom River in Phrae province. However, the project is widely opposed by the local people because the construction will likely lead to a large-scale relocation of people and affect one the largest teak forests in the country.
50 The involvement of these local environmental groups provided the anti-dam movement with more channels to disseminate their concerns to many constituencies and different sectors of Thai society. The university student groups, for example, organized an event within the university in order to distribute information about the movement to their peers and classmates, leading more university students to learn about and later join the movement. The leader of one of the student organizations explained their mobilization on campus in the following way,
We organized a seminar once in order to distribute the information about the drawbacks of the [Mae Wong] dam to our friends. The event was open to the public as well. We invited Sasin, Hannarong [The President of the Water Partnership Foundation (Thailand)], and Dr. Roberts from WWF to join the talk. We also establish a network of university students who would fight against the [Mae Wong] dam construction (personal communication no. 14, June 13, 2014).
Attracting INGOs.
INGOs, including WWF and WCS, also took part in the movement. They joined the movement since early stages because of their concern about wildlife and environmental protection.
World Wild Fund for Nature (WWF).
World Wild Fund for Nature (formerly World Wildlife Fund: WWF) is an international non-governmental organization founded in 1961. Missions of the organization are:
To stop the degradation of the planet’s natural environment, and to build a future in which humans live in harmony with nature, by conserving the world’s biological diversity, ensuring that the use of renewable natural resources is sustainable, and promoting the reduction of pollution and wasteful consumption (The World Wide Fund for Nature Thailand, 2014).
These missions lead WWF to operate on a wide range of environmental issues in several countries worldwide.
51 WWF’s operations in Thailand began in 1995 with a mission to “ensure that there will be strong participation and support from all people to conserve the country’s rich biological diversity and increase the impact of its conservation action for a living planet”
(The World Wide Fund for Nature Thailand, 2014). This mission prompted WWF to have a close connection with several governmental and non-governmental organizations in Thailand, such as the Department of National Parks, Wildlife, and Plant Conservation, and SNF.
In the area of the Mae Wong National Park, WWF has been working on the Tiger and Prey Recovery Project. The joint effort between WWF and the Thai Department of
National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation builds upon the commitment of the
Abhisit government to double the number of wild tigers by 2022 (Pisdamkham et al.,
2010). WWF employs a comprehensive approach that combines ecological research and innovative methods of collaborative management to conserve wildlife and forest for its operation in this project (“Watching the life of the mother tiger and her cubs”, 2012). The camera traps are installed to monitor the presence of tigers in the area. WWF has been able to record the existence of 9 tigers and 2 cubs that wander from the Huai Kha Khaeng
Wildlife Sanctuary to the Mae Wong National Park (The World Wide Fund for Nature,
2012). Rungnapa Poonjampa, the manager of the Tiger Conservation in the Mae Wong and the Klong Lan National Park, told a Thai journalist,
The pictures of the mother tiger and the little cubs are important proof of the naturalness of the Mae Wong – Klong Lan Forest. A mother tiger needs sufficient food to help her babies survive. Thus, if the [Mae Wong] dam were constructed, our efforts that are beginning to show positive results would be destroyed (“Watching the life of the mother tiger and her cubs”, 2012).
52 The number of tigers in the area, which was higher than what WWF had expected, was amajor fact that WWF used to support the movement’s claim that the construction of the Mae Wong Dam would threaten the existence of wildlife, especially wild tigers.
The movement uses this information to develop a wildlife conservation frame to mobilize support from the general public.
In addition to a similar concern about the environment, another factor that led
WWF to involve itself in the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement was the existing cooperation between its local office and SNF, which was established by a former officer of SNF who later worked at WWF (Sasin Chalermlarp, personal communication, June 5,
2014). Close cooperation between the two organizations on similar issues allowed WWF to join SNF in the movement. As the struggle led by SNF succeeded, it benefited WWF and its ongoing projects as well. Therefore, joining the movement was a way for WWF to maintain its interests in terms of wildlife conservation and environmental protection in the Thai Western Forest Complex.
Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS).
The Wildlife Conservation Society was another INGO that was involved in the
Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement. WCS was founded in 1895 with a mission to save wildlife and wild places worldwide. This mission of WCS has led the organization to work on similar areas of concern with WWF worldwide. The organization initiated its
Thailand program in 1980 with the gibbon behavior study project. WCS currently has two major ongoing projects in Thailand, including the Endangered Wildlife Conservation in Western Forest Complex and the Asian Elephant Monitoring and Human and Elephant
Conflict (The Wildlife Conservation Society Thailand, 2014). The former project, in
53 particular, has a similar mandate to that of WWF, which addresses tiger conservation and also operates in the area of where the Mae Wong Dam would be constructed.
Since the government approval of the Mae Wong Dam project, Anak
Pattanavibool, the Director of WCS Thai Program, extensively published information about the threat of the dam to the forest and vulnerable species in the Mae Wong National
Park. He urged policy makers to reconsider the project by highlighting the importance of the naturalness of the forest to the country. He stated,
Mae Wong National Park belongs to all Thai, not just the local few. Water volume from the Mae Wong Stream is not the major source of floods and it is not worth spending a big-million budget to build this dam. We believe that national parks and wildlife sanctuaries are holding irreplaceable endangered species and intrinsic ecosystem values that we borrow from our future generations. National parks such as Mae Wong and wildlife sanctuaries such as Huai Kha Khaeng are there to protect the global natural heritage that current and future governments do not have the right to decimate their integrity (Pattanavibool, 2014).
The involvement of WWF and WCS in the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement reflects what Bob (2005) suggests that INGOs would support a local movement when they see such movement as the best avenue to highlight their interests. With the engagement of INGOs, the anti-dam movement was provided with academic assistance to support its claims against dam construction as well as with more channels for the movement’s agenda to be disseminated. These INGOs publicized information from their research about the drawbacks of dam construction on wildlife on their websites and also took part in most of the academic seminars organized by SNF since April 2012. For example, in the seminar entitled, “The Mae Wong Dam Project,” which was held on June
28, 2012, the representatives from both WWF and WCS highlighted evidence of tigers in the construction area and explained how these tigers would be affected by the Mae Wong
Dam project. The information from these INGOs eventually helped shape the
54 movement’s frame and at the same time helped legitimize the conservation claims of the anti-dam movement. One of the staff members of SNF stated, “we have reliable information from WWF to support our arguments” (personal communication no. 23, June
20, 2014).
Organizing the Movement
To organize the movement, Sasin and the top organizers in SNF learned from the past experience of several anti-dam movements that were successful in Thailand in order to come up with frames and techniques to mobilize popular support. The movement was particularly inspired by the success of the Anti-Nam Jon Dam Movement in 1980s that successfully mobilized more than 100 prominent environmentalists nationwide, along with a large number of local people in Kanchanaburi, the province where the dam was supposed to be constructed. At that time, INGOs, especially WWF also pledged support for the Anti-Nam Jon Dam Movement. The president of WWF announced during his visit to Thailand that his organization would fight against the project along with the movement until the government halted the project (Yamsri, 1988). As a result from having strong support, the Anti-Nam Jon Dam Movement successfully stalled the dam construction project. One of the major mobilizers of the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement explained,
“Nam Jon Dam was the first project that made people aware of the impacts of the dam construction project on the ecosystem and realize how collective actions could make things different. The government had to listen to us” (personal communication no. 2, June
5, 2014).
The lessons from the Anti-Nam Jon Dam Movement influenced the organization of the movement against the Mae Wong Dam in two important ways; first, it provided the
55 Sasin-led movement with collective action frames that it could adopt for activism; and second, it informed the latter movement of different mobilizing techniques to run a campaign and to propagate frames.
Collective Action Frames.
The Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement adopted three of the frames from the Anti-
Nam Jon Dam Movement, including forest conservation and protection of wildlife, the inability of the project to achieve its anticipated outcomes, and alleged illegal actions associated with dam construction. These frames mirrored the interests of the organizations that came together to join the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement and highlighted grievances and interests of the targets that the movement aimed to mobilize.
The forest conservation frame and wildlife protection frame highlighted interests of SNF, local environmental groups, and INGOs. A frame about illegal activity associated with dam construction was developed based on the speculation that the Mae Wong Dam project would lead to widespread deforestation and pave the way for illegal logging and wildlife trafficking. This frame was used to attract the attention of people who are concerned about illegal actions of the government. The SNF’s discussion of this frame indicated that:
During the time when the dam construction would be taking place for eight years or more, there is a possibility that the massive deforestation and the biggest wildlife trafficking in twenty years would occur (The Sueb Nakhasathien Foundation, 2012, p. 24).
In order to mobilize support, Sasin and his close allies did not use each of the frames separately. They incorporated them as a component of the “Anti-EHIA” frame, which was an overarching term covering different frames. The use of this broad frame not only allowed the movement to address several sub-frames at once, but also led the
56 movement to be receptive to other frames that other groups may use to identify themselves with the movement in the future. This was especially after the uncovering of the illegitimate shuffle of BS’s members when the “Anti-EHIA” was perceived as a campaign against the corrupt process in approving the EHIA report. This blunder of the
Yingluck government along with others enabled the movement to link to political actors
(see details in Chapter 5).
The purpose of adopting different frames for mobilization in the case of the Anti-
Mae Wong Dam Movement is similar to that of other movements worldwide. Frames are used to recruit new members, acquire new resources, and mobilize existing support
(Benford and Snow, 2000). At the same time, since frames may resonate grievances and interests of other actors (Benford & Snow, 2000; Bob, 2005; Ferree, 2003), the movement also hoped to mobilize people who may not have had an immediate connection to the Mae Wong Dam to join the movement. Sasin explained,
When we talk about this issue [dam construction], we always have a coalition. The impacts of large dams have been studied since the construction of the Chiew Lan Dam [now Rajjaprabha Dam]10, the Nam Jon Dam11, and the Pak Mun Dam12. There is always negative news about dam construction. So, people
10The Rajjaprabha Dam (a.k.a. Chiew Lan Dam) is the dam located in the Khao Sok National Park in Surat Thani province. The construction of the dam was completed in 1988. The main reason for the construction of this dam was to produce electrical power serving the Southern region of the country. Despite its successful construction, the dam had severe environmental impacts. For example, there was approximately 338 species of animals and plants that were flooded as a result of the dam construction. 11The Nam Jon Dam was a dam construction project in the 1980s. This dam was to be constructed on the Kwae Yai River in Kanchanaburi province for electrical generation and irrigation. However, several groups, including the local people, environmentalists, INGOs and scholars, formed a movement to stop the project. This movement was considered one of the biggest environmental movements in Thailand. As a result from several actions taken by the movement, the Thai government completely dismissed the project in 1988, citing that the Nam Jon Dam would bring significant negative impatcs to the environment and wildlife in the construction area, which was later enlisted as the UNESCO World Heritage Site. 12The Pak Mun Dam is the dam located on the Mun River, 5.5 km upstream from its confluence with the Mekong in Khong Chiam district, Ubon Ratchathani province. The construction of the dam was financially supported by the World Bank and was completed in 1994. However, the plan of the Thai government to construct the dam, coupled with other social issues related to poverty, led dam opponents, slum dwellers, and local NGOs, to form the Assembly of the Poor. This movement actively engage in the fight against the construction of the Pak Mun Dam. Despite oppostion from the local people, the government still proceeded with the project until it was completed. As a result from the construction of this dam, more than 300
57 understand the issue very well. When we tell them about another dam construction project, people would understand what we want (personal communication, June 5, 2014).
At the same time, the frames of the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement reflect what
Snow and Benford (1992), and Snow and Oliver (1995) suggest; they are often generated through the active, ongoing and evolving process. The movement organizers played the role of a signifying agent who identified related issues that came up into the scene. Then, they constructed or adopted frames that would benefit the movement. The adoption of a new frame and the alignment of frames can take place easily, as in the case of the Anti-
Mae Wong Dam, once the movement had adopted an overarching frame that allow other sub-frames to be incorporated and linked (see details in Chapter 5).
The Adoption of Traditional Means of Activism.
In order to propagate frames to different groups of people in the Thai society, the movement needed effective means of communication. The success of the Anti-Nam Jon
Dam Movement also informed the Sasin-led movement of activities that it should carry out. This included organizing of seminars, submission of letters to government officials, publication of documents, and appearance of the movement leaders on news shows and talks on mainstream media. I refer to these techniques as “traditional means of activism” because previous anti-dam movements in Thailand often adopted these methods for mobilization, and the anti-dam mobilizers recognized these techniques as common practices as well. Sasin said,
We performed the normal functions of social movements. We provided people with information about the negative consequences of the dam construction. We households were relocated without the government providing a sufficient compensation, and a large number of fish species in the Mun River disapperared affecting livelihoods of peole who depended on the river. After a protacted fight, the Thai cabinet agreed in 2011 to provide proper compensation to displaced people and to permanently open the floodgates of the dam.
58 tried to form a coalition with the public. We held press conferences, seminars, and also took journalists to the dam construction site. We also submitted letters to inform the government that we went against the [Mae Wong] dam. We directed policy-makers to see impacts of the dam construction (personal communication, June 5, 2014).
With the adoption of these means of communication, the movement was able to communicate with several groups of people about its concerns and draw some of them to become supporters of the movement. The major groups that became allies of the movement were some of the local people in the dam’s irrigation area and university students.
Mobilizing Local People and University Students.
There were two groups of local people who joined the movement: those who were concerned about the environment and those who had an immediate connection to the area where the dam would be constructed. Local environmentalists engaged in the movement because they recognized the importance of the forest to people in the dam’s irrigation area. Some of these people were also those with an immediate connection to the Mae
Wong Forest in ways that they hunt and collect forest products (e.g. bamboo, bamboo shoots, wild mushroom, etc.) for consumption and sale. One of the local environmentalists who was highly concerned about the environment explained his engagement in the movement,
We’re going against the [Mae Wong Dam] project because the dam would be constructed in the national park. This will lead to large-scale deforestation in the area. Nakhon Sawan people care about droughts and floods, and are concerned about how the dam construction would affect the wildlife and the forest as well (Numman, 2012, p. 7).
At the same time, there was another group of villagers who took part in the anti- dam movement because the maintenance of the wilderness in the Mae Wong National
59 Park would provide local tap water for their community in the long run. People in the village depend on this source of water even at the time of droughts. Suwit Piluk talked about his village’s immediate connection to the forest,
We can survive droughts because we take water from the mountain [through the community tap] and construct our small dam to hold water. This is why we don’t need a large dam. Money collecting from the community tap can also be used for other community purposes (Kaobor, 2012, p. 10).
Both groups of local people that joined the anti-dam movement identified themselves with the forest conservation frame. This frame was appealing to them because it highlighted their concerns and interests. The support from both groups provided legitimacy to the movement in the way in which the movement was no longer perceived as a movement by outsiders.
In addition to local people, the use of traditional means of activism also allowed the movement to attract attention and support from some university students. Most of them felt connected to the movement because they recognized that the environment was very important for them and future generations. One of them told me, “How can we survive without the environment? I can’t. This led me to join the movement to fight against the construction of the dam that would have a serious impact on the environment”
(personal communication no. 14, June 13, 2014).
The Limited Success of the Movement in the First Phase.
Despite the success of the movement in drawing support from some local people and university students, this achievement is very limited. The movement was not able to mobilize support from the majority of local people and the general public. As noted in
Chapter 2 (see page 44), the survey of people in the dam’s irrigation area in October 2013
60 indicated that the majority of local people endorsed the Mae Wong Dam project (“AREA discusses an opinion survey”, 2013).
I argue that there were two main factors responsible for the limited success of the movement in the beginning. First, some of the frames that the movement adopted and propagated were in a sharp contrast to the grievances of local villagers. Second, the employment of traditional mobilizing techniques did not permit the movement to continuously capture media attention in order to attract more support from the general public.
In the area where the Mae Wong Dam was to be constructed, people were mostly in favor of the Mae Wong Dam project because they perceived that it could help prevent floods and droughts that affected their livelihoods. This shared belief of benefits from dam construction among the local people led them to go against the anti-dam movement.
A local leader told me in an interview,
People in our district do not really like those NGOs that organize the [Anti-Mae Wong Dam] movement. They do not want the dam but we want it. Have they [movement organizers] ever come to help us when floods took place here? They are outsiders and are not welcome in our area (personal communication no. 17, June 16, 2014).
This sort of counter argument portrayed the picture of the movement organizers as outsiders who did not understand the grievances of the local people who would benefit from the dam’s irrigation. This lack of support from local people delegitimized the anti- dam campaign to a certain extent.
Second, the adoption of the traditional mobilizing techniques did not allow the movement to effectively disseminate their concerns to society. Some people did not even know about the movement before the mass protest in September 2013. Thus, many of
61 them were not able to identify themselves with the movement. One of the participants, who joined in September 2013, told me, “I didn’t hear anything about the [anti-dam] movement until September 2013 when my friend began to talk about it and there was news about the [anti-dam] movement on TV and Facebook” (personal communication no.
7, June 8, 2014). Since most of the traditional mobilizing tactics that the movement endorsed included a one-day event with a passive form of action and lacked continuity, they did not help the movement attract much mainstream media attention. As a result, the concerns of the movement were not highlighted, for instance in newspapers, which is one of the most accessible sources of information for Thai people.
Figure 9. Number of Newspaper Articles on the Mae Wong Dam in major Thai language newspapers between April 2012 and December 2013
2000 1964! 1800 1600
1400 1200 1000 800
600 400 334! 200 181! 191! 97! 101! 85! 117! 0 42! 49! 16! 3! 19! 8! 4! 3! 14! 17! 37! 18! 34!
Jul-12 Jul-13 Jan-13 Jun-12 Jun-13 Oct-12 Oct-12 Oct-13 Sep-12 Feb-13 Sep-13 Apr-12 Apr-12 Apr-13 Dec-12 Dec-12 Dec-13 Mar-13 Mar-13 Aug-12 Nov-12 Aug-13 Nov-13 May-12 May-13
62 The number of mentions of the Mae Wong Dam project or the Anti-Mae Wong
Dam Movement in major Thai language newspapers13 was very high when the movement organized big offline events (see Figure 9). For example, in May 2012 and September
2012, there was a high number of newspaper articles talking about the Mae Wong Dam because the movement organized three important events, including a meeting of journalists fighting against the Mae Wong Dam on May 19, 2012, a seminar entitled “the
Mae Wong Dam Is Not a Solution to Floods, but the Destruction of the Forest” on May
26, 2012, and a music festival entitled “Before the World is Flooded, Before the Forest Is
Underwater” on September 10, 2012.
The Use of Social Media: A Quest for a New Mobilizing Technique
Since the use of traditional mobilizing techniques hindered the ability of the Anti-
Mae Wong Dam Movement to propagate their concerns to larger constituencies, the movement organizers began to look for a new tool that would be more effective in mobilizing support. Learning from his personal experience about the effectiveness of
Facebook, which brought him fame during the Great Floods in 2011, Sasin, together with top leaders of the movement, decided to use this platform for mobilization. During this time, social media sites (SNSs), especially Facebook and Twitter, had become a great tool that several movements worldwide used to mobilize support and succeed (Harlow &
Harp 2012; Lynch, 2011; Mico & Casero-Ripolles, 2013; Morozov, 2011).
Sasin and other leaders of the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement anticipated that
Facebook could be a powerful mobilizing tool because Sasin already had a large number
13The major Thai language newspapers that I surveyed included Thairath, Post Today, Daily News, Khao Sod, Kom Chad Luek, Matichon, Thai Post, Naew Na, Krungthep Dhurakij, Poochakarn, Loke Wan Ni, and Siamrath.
63 of followers on this SNS and the urban people in Bangkok that were the prime target of the anti-dam’s mobilization were members of this site as well. When talking about the urban people, Sasin refers to those who live, study or work particularly in Bangkok and have easy access to smartphones and SNSs. Between 2011 and 2012, most people in
Thailand could access new technologies, especially 3G, Wi-Fi and tablets. The number of
Facebook users in Thailand was among the highest in the world. In 2013, Thailand, a country of 67 million people, had over 24 million Facebook users (Kritsch, 2014). Sasin assumed that these people have more environmental awareness because they are more educated than those living elsewhere. He therefore concluded that they would be receptive to the call for environmental protection and wildlife preservation. Sasin explained,
We need a coalition and a powerful coalition comes from the urban people who use Facebook. Who would be concerned about environmental policy? They are these urban people. They are our target group. The use of Facebook is beneficial for the movement because the urban people often use social media and a lot of them have already subscribed to my Facebook account since 2011 when the Great Floods happened. Since the time I started the campaign, the number of followers has gradually increased. I took a look just now [June 2014] and there were about 100,300 followers on my Facebook page (personal communication, June 5, 2014).
Sasin realized that the nature of social media and technological development in Thailand at the time would allow the movement to spread its frames and information to a larger number of people very quickly. When the movement released any information on social media site, it would be easily distributed to a different group of people with one touch or one click. Sasin discussed the advantages he expected the movement to have from using
Facebook for activism:
Our use of Facebook for mobilization would not be possible without Wi-Fi or 3G. You know that 3G in Thailand was only developed last year [2013]. This helped us a lot. Another important technological advance that was beneficial for us was
64 the development of smartphones. People can now log onto social media sites from their smartphone. They can get live updates on any situation wherever they go. Thus, when I post anything on Facebook, hundred thousands of people who also have access to this website via their phone can also see them (personal communication, June 5, 2014).
On Facebook, the movement developed an “idolizing strategy”. This strategy referred to an online marketing tactic that aimed at making Sasin as an anti-dam hero, devoted to an environmental cause. Sasin would become the prime agent who disseminated information about the dam and the movement to larger audiences through a network of his friends and followers on Facebook. Sasin’s Facebook page became a hub of information about the Mae Wong Dam and other relevant environmental issues. At the same time, information from Sasin’s personal Facebook page was also shared on the official account of SNF and other Facebook pages, such as Kad Kan Khuen Mae Wong and Yood Kuen Mae Wong: Stop the Dam that were exclusively created after the eruption of the anti-dam movement. Although the administrators of these pages did not reveal their immediate connection to the leaders of the movement, the information on these accounts was beneficial for the mobilization of the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement.
They provided the movement with more channels through which people could obtain information about Mae Wong Dam project and the anti-dam movement.
At the same time, the movement also organized a new offline activity. In
September 2013, Sasin and other top leaders of the movement marched for 300 kilometers from the dam construction site to Bangkok along a major highway. The marchers took thirteen days to complete their goal. While marching, Sasin posted live updates of the movement’s activities on his Facebook account. He anticipated that this activity, together with the use of Facebook, would allow the movement to capture media
65 attention and mobilize support from Facebook users. The result of the combination of the online and offline efforts went in the way that Sasin expected; the movement was able to increase an amount of the movement supporters. On social media, the movement participants changed their profile picture to the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement logo
(see Figure 10). Furthermore, more than a thousand online supporters also showed up as marchers after learning about the event from Facebook. At the site where the march ended, more than 10,000 people, who had primarily learned about the protest from social media, had gathered to show their support for the movement and the marchers.
Figure 10. Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement Logo
For several recent movements worldwide, SNSs have been selected as the main platform to disperse frames and the movement’s issues of concern to larger audiences mainly because it is freely accessible, which allows information to go viral very quickly.
The way in which the Sasin-led movement used social media for mobilization reflects what Earl and Kimport (2011) categorize as e-mobilization, in which online tools were used to facilitate offline actions. Through the combination of both offline and online efforts, real-time developments could be broadcast with one click from one user to another through a network of virtual friends online. Nevertheless, while several scholars
66 explain that free accessibility to SNSs could contribute to a quick spread of information
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Lievrouw, 2011), I argue that this characteristic of SNSs alone is insufficient to explain the quick diffusion of the movement’s information online.
Free accessibility of SNSs may lead a person to be present online but does not explain why they actually share information. Therefore, there must be other factors explaining viral ability of social media.
The case of the Mae Wong Dam Movement demonstrates that people would likely share information when they are interested in it and such information reflects their beliefs. However, the act of sharing would only happen when an online user was convinced of “trustworthiness” of information. Thus, a personal interest and trustworthiness are two key factors explaining viral ability of social media.
Trustworthiness, in particular, allows people to confidently share links, video clips, and articles sometimes without watching, reading, or even complete understanding as along as the information has originated from a trustworthy source and trustworthy virtual friends.
In the case of the mobilization of the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement, trustworthiness is developed on two levels. First, the idolizing strategy of the movement allowed people to trust information posted by a reliable figure or organization. Since
Sasin used to provide credible information to people during the time of the Great Floods in 2011, his information about the movement and the Mae Wong Dam project appeared to have a high level of credibility. Since many people already saw him as a reliable source, they would share his information if they found it interesting. Second, trustworthiness also emerges out of the nature of the connection on Facebook. There is a
67 certain level of trust between people on Facebook since the “add friend” function on this
SNS allows users to pre-screen people whom they would let into their friend list. Thus, once trustworthy friends within that personalized list share any information from a trustworthy source, such information is double-guaranteed to be trustworthy to Facebook users. As a result, when people are interested in the information, people may share it even without a full understanding about it. Through this mechanism, information about the dam construction and the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement was disseminated quickly on
Facebook. One of the movement participants talked about the trustworthiness of information,
I shared the picture of a camera [that monitors the movement of the mother tiger and its cubs] which was placed in the forest. When it showed on newsfeeds that my friend shared it, I also shared it right away. I thought the information was trustworthy because it was originated from the SNF’s Facebook page and also from my close friend (personal communication no. 7, June 8, 2014).
Furthermore, trustworthiness of the information from the Anti-Mae Wong Dam
Movement was further reinforced by the march in September 2013. This thirteen-day event allowed the movement to continuously produce news on mainstream media as well as on social media. During this time, the number of newspaper articles regarding the movement and the dam construction project dramatically increased from approximately
30 to over a thousand articles (see Figure 8 on page 58). Pictures of Sasin, as well as information about the movement, appeared on the front page of several newspapers in
Thailand. The march also led the producer of Kon Kon Kon, the weekly show on Thai
PBS—one of the mainstream media channels—to document the story of Sasin and his campaign. At the same time, a famous writer, Chiranan Pitpreecha, also composed a song
“God Mae Wong” in cooperation with a famous country band—Hope—to endorse the
68 anti-dam campaign. This well-organized offline event that led to large-scale publicity allowed Facebook users to see the commitment of the movement organizers on their course of actions. This, as a result, helped increase the credibility of information provided by the organizers of the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement.
The combination of online and offline activities not only led to large-scale publicity of the movement, but also allowed the movement to draw support from the general public to take part in the movement. Sasin told me in an interview that the number of people who liked his Facebook page grew dramatically within a short span of time. He said,
This [idolizing] strategy allowed people to join us easily. First, information could spread out very quickly. Second, people came to join our march because we did so along a major highway to Bangkok. When we approached our destination and the news about our march dispersed to larger audiences, more people joined us (personal communication, June 5, 2014).
While there are various reasons leading people to join the anti-dam movement, I group these motives into two major categories, namely excitement and a relevance of movement frames to the larger beliefs of these people. Excitement was generated out of the interaction between online and offline activities. Different activities of the movement, including the march led by a celebrity like Sasin, the changing of profile pictures, the protest as well as the song written for the movement made people feel curious and passionate about the movement. Curiosity and passion led them to learn more about the movement. At the same time, the movement would become a more exciting phenomenon when a friend would join such activities. A friend would encourage and tell another friend to engage in the movement. Furthermore, since the march in the case of the Anti-
Mae Wong Dam Movement was one of the first major symbolic actions against the
69 Yingluck government since she assumed power in August 2011, people who might not have experience with any movement before might take the opportunity to join this exciting activity. A graduate student from the top university in Bangkok talked about her experience in this regard,
I got information about the movement and the dam construction project from online sources when my friends posted pictures and shared information. Then, I started to read more about the issue, and watched infographics available on YouTube. I finally decided to join the protest of the movement. I feel excited because that was my first time. It was my friend who encouraged me to join, too. We were all so excited (personal communication no. 5, June 6, 2014).
Another recent graduate from a university in the northern region of Thailand told me,
I joined the movement simply because of the song that was composed for the movement. I listened to the song again and again, and felt so passionate about the movement. Then I changed my profile picture to support Sasin and his movement (personal communication no. 36, July 2, 2014).
A similar impact of excitement that the movement could generate could be seen in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, where live updates of offline events got people excited and motivated them to join the events (Lynch, 2013; Weyland, 2012).
In addition to excitement, a relevance of movement frames to the larger beliefs of people was another major factor drawing people to join the movement. Facebook allowed information from the movement to spread very quickly, allowing more people to identify themselves with the movement. Once people feel that one among several frames of the movement is in line with their own beliefs, they would make a decision to join the movement. For example, an engineer who took part in the movement explained his involvement in the movement by referring to environmental protection and wildlife conservation frame. He stated,
I agree with the movement that the Mae Wong Dam should not be built because it is such a large dam that would have an impact on the forest and wildlife. I think
70 the government should consider other alternatives (personal communication no. 16, 14 June 2014).
In frame analysis theory, a relevance of movement frames to the larger beliefs of people is considered a major factor leading the movement to draw support from the general public (Snow & Benford, 1988). Since social movement frames can be used to highlight grievances and concerns of people, potential movement participants will be able to identify themselves with the movement through different frames that the movement has adopted.
Nevertheless, the case of the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement suggests that a relevance of movement frames to the larger beliefs of people alone is insufficient for mobilizing support if the movement lacks a well-developed strategy and effective communication tools to propagate those frames. It is clear from this case study that although the movement adopted powerful frames that led previous anti-dam movements to become successful in attracting and mobilizing a large number of supporters, the propagation of those frames through traditional means of activism only provided limited success in terms of mobilization. However, when the campaign organizers developed a new mobilizing strategy by using Facebook for mobilization and organizing offline activities to complement the use of this online mobilizing platform, the fate of the movement changed swiftly. The propagation of frames online allowed the movement to easily reach different groups leading to mass diffusion of the movement’s information and mobilizing those who found the movement exciting and its frame resonating with their beliefs to join the movement. Therefore, the strategy as well as communication tools that the movement used is another determinant of the powerfulness and the effectiveness of collective action frames.
71 In addition to those activities of the movement, the success of the Anti-Mae Wong
Dam Movement also came from the way in which the movement interacted with its opponent—the Yingluck government. I argue that the use of social media for mobilization allowed the government’s blunders and vulnerabilities to be propagated.
This helped pave the way for political actors who aimed to overthrow the Yingluck government to identify themselves with the movement. The engagement of such people was significant in leading to the Yingluck government’s reconsideration of the Mae
Wong Dam project.
72 Chapter 4
Responses from the Government and Pro-Dam Supporters: Counter Mobilization,
Blunders, and Vulnerabilities
The Yingluck Government and the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement
With the Yingluck government’s decision to construct the Mae Wong Dam,
Plodprasop Suraswadi, the science minister who served as the chair of WFMC, was appointed to preside over this project as well as other projects in the water and flood management scheme. This appointment was made despite Plodprasop’s poor reputation.
When serving as the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment, Plodprasop was dismissed from government service after being indicted for allowing illegal tiger exports (Fredrickson, 2012). Furthermore, during the time of the
Great Floods in 2011, his reputation was further damaged because of what he said during press conferences. In one television interview, for example, Plodprasop told people in
Pathumthani province to rush to Don Mueang Airport14 immediately. He said, “The government cannot tell how many hours are left until the floods would have come to your home” (Pandit, 2011). Such pronouncements caused widespread panic. Also, some of the information that Plodprasop disseminated was later proved to be inaccurate and contradictory to the information provided by the Justice Minister Pracha Promnok who served as the head of FROC. As a result of his poor performance, Plodprasop was heavily criticized by the public and was not seen in the media for a short while. Media eventually called him the “extemporaneous speaker” (“Journalists named the government”, 2011).
14Don Mueang Airport was used as the headquarters of FROC during the 2011 Great Floods.
73 For the construction of the Mae Wong Dam, Plodprasop designated RID to serve as a key facilitator of the project. RID previously launched the project by conducting
EHIA. Public participation, in the form of public scoping, public hearings and public review, was required throughout the EHIA process. At the time when the government approved the project in April 2012, RID was about to begin the public review process, which was planned to take place in the following month.
During the organization of the public review event in Nakhon Sawan province, it was reported that the local politicians also organized an entertainment event for pro-dam supporters. To some officials who were present, this parallel activity showed the lack of commitment and seriousness of the politicians in getting the local people involved in the
EHIA process. One of the officials who was also an anti-dam supporter told me,
I was in the area when the public scoping, the public hearings, and the public review took place. The entertainment event was so loud and did not make a good climate for public discussion at all. How could people concentrate? I eventually suggested to the consultant company to organize a new public participation event (personal communication no. 3, June 5, 2014).
Although the public participation events for the Mae Wong Dam project were done hastily, RID claimed that they were sufficient for the project to continue. RID decided to submit the EHIA report directly to BS for approval. BS, led by Santad
Somchivita,15 rejected the report and asked RID to re-conduct EHIA again because the report underestimated the natural value of the Mae Wong Forest. This action of BS frustrated the Yingluck government since the disapproval of the report would delay the dam construction. As a result, the government chose to dismiss this board and appointed another committee to review the EHIA report of the Mae Wong Dam project in the early
15Somtad Somchivita was a Thai environmentalist who used to serve as the permanent secretary to the Ministry of Minister of Science, Technology and Environment and the Director General of the Department of the Environmental Quality Promotion.
74 2013 (personal communication no. 3, June 5, 2014; “The government removed the member of BS,” 2013). The appointment of a new pro-dam board led the Mae Wong
Dam project to continue at the same pace.
The Yingluck government was very confident in proceeding with the project because the Mae Wong Dam obtained strong support from people in the irrigation area.
The number of dam supporters did not decrease despite the eruption of the anti-dam movement. The government insisted that this dam would help prevent floods that often took place in the area. Plodprasop told the media,
Floods took place again and again because several groups are going against the construction of the Kaeng Sue Ten Dam in Phrae and the Mae Wong Dam in Nakhon Sawan. I want to tell you all that this government has a plan to construct both dams. We will not listen to the opposition anymore. The government will do what is right for the local people and everything that we are doing is lawful. (“Plodprasop directed researchers”, 2012)
In late 2012 and early 2013, the Yingluck government downplayed the Anti-Mae
Wong Dam Movement. They did not even take into account the voices of INGOs that involved in the movement. In other words, pressure from INGOs had no impact on the government’s calculation about the Mae Wong Dam project at all. This was because the minister who was in charge of the project did not recognize the significance of INGOs.
Plodprasop was the one who disregarded the importance of INGOs. In May 2013, for example, he called both local and international NGOs that engage in water management in Thailand “garbage” and refused to apologize (“Plodprasop will not apologize”, 2013).
This sort of comment from a person in charge of the project reflected the perception that the active engagement of INGOs for a certain course of action could not really make the government act differently.
75 While Bob (2005) insists that the support of INGOs for local movements not only allows these organizations to promote themselves but also leads them to give strength to the movements, this case study shows that the support of INGOs did not accomplish any of the goals. This happened because the support that the movement obtained from INGOs was primarily from their local offices in the form of academic assistance, such as providing research information. This sort of assistance from INGOs made them play a less significant role in the of the government and provided no significant leverage to the movement.
Organizing Counter Mobilization
Despite the strong contempt for the movement during its early days, the Yingluck government began to pay more attention to the opposition of the dam construction starting in July 2013. This was the time when the Central Administrative Court ruled that the government had to conduct public hearings and follow constitutional procedure before continuing with water and flood management projects, including the Mae Wong
Dam project (“The Administrative Court stalled the government”, 2013). The court’s holding was made after a group of environmentalists sued NWFPC and WFMC in July
2012 for unconstitutionally continuing with the water and flood management scheme. In response to the court’s decision, the Yingluck government appealed to the Supreme
Administrative Court16. Yingluck asked her legal advisors to look for flaws in the water and flood management scheme that the government would be able to remedy in order to continue with its plan. Teerat Rattanasewi, a spokesperson for the Prime Minister’s
Office, announced after meeting Yingluck Shinawatra on July 27, 2013, “the prime
16The decision of the Central Administrative Court was finally overruled by the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court in October 2014; however, by that time, the Yingluck government had already been ousted by a military coup in May 2014.
76 minister was a little worried about the court’s ruling but insisted that projects [in the water and flood management scheme] need to go on” (“Yingluck is stressed”, 2013).
The growing attention of the Yingluck government on the Anti-Mae Wong Dam
Movement led government officials and pro-dam supporter to take more active action to gather support for dam construction. The pro-dam mobilization could be divided into three major forms according to a key figure organizing the event. These events included organization of exhibitions by RID, organized demonstrations led by local politicians, and online mobilization led by a businessman. All these activities primarily highlighted the importance of dam construction to local people in the dam’s irrigation area in ways that it could help prevent floods and droughts.
The government organized several exhibitions to demonstrate its good intentions to construct the Mae Wong Dam as well as other dams in the water and flood management scheme. From 5 to 12 September 2014, for example, the government organized the “Water for Life” exhibition in 36 provinces around the country to promote its water and flood management scheme (“The EHIA report of the Mae Wong Dam project”, 2013). At the same time, some senior officials in RID, especially Somkiat
Prajamwong who directed the Office of Project Management and presided over the Mae
Wong Dam project, also continously appeared on mainstream media to discuss the importance of the project to people in dam’s irrigation area. During an interview,
Somkiat told me that he was very willing to talk about this issue anywhere he was invited because he would like to provide information about the dam construction to the people
(personal communication, June 28, 2013).
77 The local politicians from Nakhon Sawan also organized the one-day pro-Mae
Wong Dam demonstration. The activity was first organized in May 2012 after the government approved the Mae Wong Dam project and in September 2013 after the march of the anti-dam movement took place. Prasart Tunprasert, a member of the parliament from Nakhon Sawan, was the main organizer of this demonstration that was joined by almost 5,000 people who lived in the dam’s irrigation area. The demonstrators highlighted that the Mae Wong Dam was what people had waited for forty years. They recognized that the dam may cause negative impacts to the forest but argued that it would bring tremendous benefits to the local people, especially in terms of flood and drought prevention (“Politicians took 35%”, 2012)
On September 26, 2013, the pro-dam supporters gathered again in front of the Lad
Yao District Office to show their support for the construction of the Mae Wong Dam.
This event was organized after the march of the anti-dam movement ended. More than a thousand people who lived in the dam’s irrigation area participated in it. Plodprasop also joined this demonstration. On the stage, he told the pro-dam supporters,
Who told you I don’t love the forest? I served as the director-general of the Royal Forest Department for five years. Shouldn’t I love the forest to be in that position? Who told you I don’t love the forest? What’s the proof? You are telling Thai people that we have to preserve the Western Forest Complex. Let me ask you: who created the Western Forest Complex? Wasn’t it me? Seventeen years ago, I was the one who authorized the demarcation of the area, which is now the Western Forest Complex. I think those people who blamed me were too young to realize how I gave life to the Mae Wong Forest (News Center for Children and Youth, 2013).
Plodprasop also promised the pro-dam supporters that the Mae Wong Dam project would continue.
78 In addition to the events organized by the government officials and local politicians, Sopon Pornchockchai, a business consultant who supported the Mae Wong
Dam project, also launched an online campaign on Facebook and wrote a blog to mobilize support for dam construction. On his blog, he posted links and video clips attacking the claims of the anti-dam movement. For example, Sopon argued against the
Sasin-led movement that the existence of tigers in the site of dam construction was not true. He claimed that, if this were indeed the case, many people would have been killed.
Information on Sopon’s blog was also shared on his Facebook page named “Mae Wong
Dam Pheu Took Cheevit [Mae Wong Dam for Everybody]”. However, the number of his followers on Facebook was far less than that of Sasin or the anti-dam movement pages.
As of June 2014, it had only 3,500 followers. Apart from the online campaign, Sopon also organized a seminar to discuss the Mae Wong Dam project. However, a 750 THB
(approximately 25 USD) registration fee was required for attendance. Thus, only a limited number of people were able to join the event.
With counter-mobilization attempts, the Yingluck government was able to attract support from local people in the dam’s irrigation area. The flood and drought prevention frame that pro-the dam supporters used, allowed many of the local people to identify themselves with the pro-dam demonstration. Local people already believe that the dam construction would tremendously benefit them. When the demonstration was organized to support the Mae Wong Dam project, these local people did not hesitate to take part.
Anantachai Rungpattanasit, a resident from Lad Yao district explained his involvement in the pro-dam demonstration,
79 I joined the demonstration because I would like the anti-dam movement to recognize what we have suffered for years. Have they ever come to help us creating a wall to prevent floods? When droughts took place, did they come to distribute water to us? We want them to see what we have gone through here in Lad Yao district (Ruenklin & Pumruang, 2013).
However, while the flood and drought prevention frame led the local people to engage in the pro-dam demonstration, it did not help the pro-dam supporters attract support from outsiders to pressure the government to go on with the dam construction project. I argue that this happened because of two major reasons. First, the pro-dam demonstration did not effectively use communication tools to propagate frames; and second, the Yingluck government made several mistakes in responding to the anti-dam movement that discredited its good intention to construct the Mae Wong Dam.
First, the pro-dam supporters lacked effective means of communication to mobilize support from many people in Thailand who usually suffered from floods and droughts. Since the pro-dam activities mostly involved one-day events that did not allow them to really capture media attention, people who lived outside the area where the event was organized would neither know nor be able to join the event. Although some pro-dam factions used Facebook for mobilization, this was ineffective in propagating the pro-dam frame because the propagator was neither somebody in the eye of the public nor the one who organized major offline events to complement the use of online tools. Thus, despite pro-dam supporters having the flood and drought prevention frame that highlighted grievances of many people in Thailand, the lack of effective means of communication impeded the pro-dam supporters from mobilizing external support. This reinforces my claim in the previous chapter that the strategy as well as communication tools that the
80 movement used should be considered a significant determinant of the powerfulness and the effectiveness of collective action frames.
Second, the ineffectiveness of pro-dam supporters in mobilizing external support from the general public came from the fact that the pro-dam allies suffered from the
Yingluck government’s existing vulnerabilities and mistakes in responding to the anti- dam movement. The Yingluck government had already lost credibility during the 2011
Great Floods when it could not prevent the capital city from being inundated. The government became more vulnerable when it appointed the infamous Plodprasop to preside over the water and flood management scheme and when the central administrative court ruled that the government should adhere to the constitutional procedure in order to continue with dam construction project. Furthermore, with the reshuffle of BS’ members and the rude responses of Plodprasop to the anti-dam movement turning to be serious blunders, the movement used them to discredit the government in order to bring leverage to its side. Therefore, although local people might continue to support the Mae Wong Dam project, the general public who might have shared the same grievances as those local people were hesitant to support the project because the government’s legitimacy was in doubt.
I argue that the vulnerabilities and blunders of the Yingluck government played a very important role in the success of the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement. They helped the movement attract support from political actors who could put direct pressure on the
Yingluck government.
81 Chapter 5
The Beginning of the End: The Involvement of Political Actors in the Anti-Dam
Movement
The Involvement of Political Actors: Benefiting from the Yingluck Government’s
Vulnerabilities and Blunders
Vulnerabilities and blunders of the Yingluck government were two important instruments that benefitted the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement. On Facebook, the information about mistakes of the government was widely circulated through a process similar to the one I explained in Chapter 3 (see page 64). The online users primarily focused on the speeches of Plodprasop. Parts of his talk were taken to compare with what he spoke when serving as the director-general of the Royal Forestry Department. Before becoming a politician, Plodprasop fought to preserve forests and went against the construction of the Mae Wong Dam. However, when he turned to support the Mae Wong
Dam as a politician, some people called him a liar and untrustworthy man. One of the anti-dam protestors angrily shared the video clip of Plodprasop’s speech on his Facebook account with the personalized comment saying, “Bullshit, Bullshit, and Bullshit!”
(personal communication no. 10, September 24, 2013). Sasin also recognized benefits from responses of Plodprasop to his movement. He told me in an interview,
We would only be able to mobilize a small number of people without Plodprasop’s negative responses to us. We did nothing to attack him, you know. I didn’t even see him as my opponent. I would rather see the EHIA report, the Office National Resources and Environmental Policy Planning and the Royal Irrigation Department as my real adversary. The fact that the Mae Wong Dam project was part of the water and flood management scheme was very helpful. It led people who were doubtful about the transparency of this scheme to be skeptical of the Mae Wong Dam project as well. It made us more powerful and we got more people to engage in our movement. This was because the water and flood management scheme was politicized. I didn’t have to do much. There were
82 a lot of people who disliked the [Yingluck] government (personal communication, June 5, 2014).
The blunders and vulnerabilities of the Yingluck government allowed the movement to connect with the government opponents, whom in this thesis I refer to as political actors. This group was primarily the same group of people who rallied against
Thaksin Shinawatra. They recognized Yingluck as nominee of Thaksin whom some strongly disliked and some others hated. The presence of political actors in the anti-dam movement was apparent in September 2013 when the movement organized a march from the dam construction site to Bangkok. One of the movement participants told me during an interview that these people could be identified by banners saying, “Yingluck, Get
Out!” (personal communication no. 4, June 5, 2014). This person also told me that he would describe Sasin as a political actor, too. He stated that Sasin also shouted
“Yingluck, Get out!” on the stage where the protest took place in September 2013.
However, Sasin denied his affiliation with political parties or groups. He told me, “There is no political party getting involved in the movement. I don’t think politicians even know me. They are in a different world from us” (personal communication, June 5,
2014). Sasin also maintained that the only side he chose was the environment. Given this denial, Sasin might shout the slogan against the Yingluck government to arouse excitement of political actors who participated in the protest at that time. This was because he realized that there were a large number of such people taking part in the movement. Since Sasin’s initial goal for activism was to mobilize as many people as possible to pressure the Yingluck government, he would seek every means he could to maintain the support from those people until the movement achieved its goal.
83 I argue that the participation of political actors in the anti-dam movement happened through the frame alignment process. In the case of the Anti-Mae Wong Dam
Movement, this process took place in a specific form called “frame bridging,” in which two congruent but structurally unconnected frames were linked at the organizational level or the individual level. This process occurred by having the Yingluck government’s vulnerabilities and blunders served as a linkage connecting political actors to the movement. This connection was possible because political actors already disliked the
Yingluck government and would become allies of any parties that attacking this government. Thus, the government’s mistakes helped attract political actors to join the anti-dam movement.
In addition to what Jasper and Poulsen (1993) suggest that blunders and vulnerabilities could be used as a point of contention by a movement to mobilize support, this case study show that both instruments can also become a facilitator of frame alignment. More importantly, while Snow et al. (1986) explain that frame bridging often occurs in ways that social movement organizations adopt a certain technique for diffusion and mobilization, this case study also demonstrates that it can even take place unintentionally. The diffusion of the government’s blunders and vulnerabilities on social media allowed issues of concern of the movement to be supported by political actors who already disliked the government. This led political actors to share information about the anti-dam movement using personalized message targeting the government’s mistakes on social media.
Since the anti-dam movement adopted “Anti-EHIA” as a broad term covering different frames to mobilize support, political actors were also able to identify themselves
84 with the movement by interpreting the term “Anti-EHIA” as the fight for transparency and against corruption. This reference could be made because the Yingluck hastily approved the EHIA report and dismissed the BS’ members in order to continue with the project. As a result, through a linkage between their existing beliefs about the Yingluck government and the shortcomings of the government in dealing with the Mae Wong Dam project, political actors were finally able to join the anti-dam movement.
A dentist who identified herself as a political actor told me in an interview that the sole reason leading her to join the anti-dam movement was that she hated the Yingluck government (personal communication no. 9, June 9, 2014). She further emphasized that she only learnt about the movement from her friends who posted on their Facebook. She stated,
Most of the information that I got about this movement came from social media. My friends shared links and pictures of people participating in the movement. That was why I knew about it. I knew that the movement went against the government and I just wanted to join them. Did you hear how Plodprasop responded? He just wanted to build the dam and listened to nobody (personal communication no. 9, June 9, 2014).
Similarly, a university graduate who joined the movement because of political reasons told me,
The [Yingluck] government was very corrupt. She did not even know how to run the country. I didn’t think Thai people really like her. I joined the movement because I didn’t like the Yingluck government. The dam construction project was likely to be corrupted” (personal communication no. 29, June 28, 2014).
The involvement of political actors in the anti-dam movement became more vigorous at the end of September 2013 when an episode of a TV show, Kon Kon Kon, on
Sasin Chalermlarp was postponed. The station explained the reason for this delay, “the show does not present a well-rounded information about the [dam construction] issue”
85 (“A station manager explained the reason”, 2013). However, people were able to watch this episode of Kon Kon Kon on YouTube. Although the station manager insisted that the government played no role in the postponement, there was a widespread rumor on social media that the Yingluck government involved in it. One of political actors who joined the anti-dam movement online shared a link of the show from YouTube on his Facebook with his personalized message saying, “Like expected. This is another show that is banned [from broadcasting on Television] by Thaksin’s slaves. They close our eyes and our ears, and censor everything” (personal communication no. 30, September 28, 2013).
Another famous writer, who later became one of the key figures in the Anti-Yingluck
Government Movement, posted a link about the anti-dam movement and the show,
Stop abusing power! They [the anti-dam movement] are fighting rationally and people are also rationally supporting the movement. People in the media industry must be brave. They should not become “a servant” of anybody. And they should not be afraid of their own “fear” (personal communication no.32, September 28, 2013).
One of the major reasons why many people thought that the Yingluck government was behind the postponement of this show was that the very last episodes of a TV series
“Nue Mek 2” was banned by another TV station earlier in 2013. The station director explained back then that the scene in the series, which portrayed how the government could be overthrown, was inappropriate and unconstitutional (Sawethwimol, 2013). As a result, the series was not allowed be aired. The occurrence of this incident became another factor attracting attention of a lot of people to the anti-dam movement.
Political Actors and Their Impacts on the Government
The growing attention of people, especially political actors, to the anti-dam movement and the increasing number of the movement participants had a vast impact on
86 the Yingluck government. From late September 2013, Yingluck together with people who were in charge of the Mae Wong Dam gave more compromising comments on the project. On September 22, Udom Kraiwattananusorn, a secretary of the minister of natural resources and environment, told the anti-dam protestors that the government would not rush with the Mae Wong Dam project. Yingluck also told media on September
24, 2013 that she would like to balance the concerns of all stakeholders involving in the
Mae Wong Dam project. She calmly said,
I would like WFMC to look at every aspect of the project. Water management does not require only the construction of a large dam. There can be other alternatives. We have to talk about the environment and how to balance human interests with that of nature. I think it would be better if we talk and listen to every group to come up with a conclusion that would adhere to the common interests of all Thai people (“The sign of a compromise”, 2013).
Furthermore, Plodprasop, the minister in charge of the project also refrained from giving any interview regarding the Mae Wong Dam project from early October 2013. On
October 8, for example, he said, “I do not want to get involved in this anymore. Go ask the Royal Irrigation Department! However, I am willing to talk with Sasin. We have not had any arrangement for our talk yet” (“Plodprasop dealt with floods”, 2013).
Since October 2013 the Mae Wong Dam project as well as other projects in the water and flood management scheme was slowed down. No senior officials in the
Yingluck’s cabinet gave comments on the project; only officials from RID openly discussed this topic. In the meeting with the House’s committee on political development, mass communication, and public participation on October 2, 2013, Supoj
Tovichakchaikul, Chief of the Office of the National Water and Flood Management
Policy, admitted that the EHIA report for the Mae Wong Dam project was incomplete
87 (“The government admitted that the EHIA report was incomplete”, 2013). Therefore, he explained that RID would need to reconsider the report and the project again.
The commitment of the government to consider the EHIA report and the project in early October 2013 indicated that the movement was able to disrupt the dam construction process at the policy level; however, the movement was still unsuccessful to completely halt the project. Somkiat Prajamwongse told me in an interview that the understanding of the government’s delay in construction of the Mae Wong Dam project must be comprehended in two levels. In the level of policy, he explained, the project was delayed, but in terms of the bureaucratic process, the project was continuing with RID re- investigating the EHIA (personal communication, June 24, 2014).
I argue that the decision of the Yingluck government to delay the Mae Wong Dam project was primarily influenced by the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement. However, a major question is why this did not happen before but only after political actors took part in the movement. The major factor explaining this is that the Yingluck government became severely damaged from its own vulnerabilities and blunders leading them to be afraid of being overthrown.
The Yingluck government suffered harshly from its own vulnerabilities and blunders. This could be seen from the fact that the movement was able to accumulate a large number of supporters after the government’s mistakes were propagated and the politicians were silent about this project. These officials were afraid that more speeches about the project would further damage the government’s reputation and recognized that a compromise was the only way for the government to continue with this project.
88 Furthermore, the silence from key figures in the government also reflected that the government was afraid of being destabilized by the movement. This was because political actors who had a goal of overthrowing the Yingluck government also took part in the anti-dam movement. Thus, the government might recognize that keeping silent was a way to keep these people from taking any serious actions that might affect the stability of the government.
The Continuation of the Anti-Dam Movement and Its Downfall
Even though the Yingluck government decided to postpone the Mae Wong Dam project, the anti-dam movement remained active. This was because the project was not fully terminated. However, the way in which the movement organized was different from
October 2013 onwards. Sasin was no longer the main organizer of the movement; however, other factions within the movement became more active. Green Move
Thailand17, the faction led by Smith Tungkasmit18, organized both online and offline activities to promote sustainable development and further reinforce the importance of the environment to Thai people. The activity of Green Move Thailand included an online campaign to mobilize people to sign an e-petition calling for the termination of the Mae
Wong Dam project. More than 120,000 people signed this petition. This number, I argue, reflected a minimal number of the movement participants during that time.
In addition to those events of Green Move Thailand, political actors also became more active online. They highly politicized the discussions about the Mae Wong Dam project. Links and pictures related to the Mae Wong Dam project were shared with
17 Green Move Thailand is an initiative emerging on October 9 via Facebook in order to help mobilizing support for the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement. The primary goal of the group was to mobilize people to sign an online petition calling for the termination of the Mae Wong Dam. 18Smith Tungkasmit is an environmental engineer who is now a professor at Rangsit University in Thailand.
89 personalized messages attacking the Yingluck government. For example, one of the businessmen posted a link about the Mae Wong Dam project saying, “You just wanna be corrupt with this project, right?” (personal communication no. 33, September 30, 2013).
Figure 11. Don’t Forget the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement Logo
The discussion about the Mae Wong Dam continued until the end of October
2013 when the amnesty bill incident occurred. The bill aimed at granting amnesty to all convicted politicians, including Thaksin, who had engaged in any politically wrongdoing since 2003. The majority of members of the parliament voted to pass the bill at 4 A.M. on
November 1. Within that morning, news about this incident swept Facebook, leading people to forget about the Mae Wong Dam project. Since then, some Facebook pages that were created to support the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement began to post the picture, calling on people not to forget the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement (see Figure 11). At the same time, Green Move Thailand also organized a short march on November 2, 2013, to re-spark the fight against the Mae Wong Dam project and to submit an e-petition
90 calling for the termination of the project to the Yingluck government and international bodies, including the United Nations. However, this event was not well attended.
I argue that there are three major reasons responsible for the fading away of the
Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement from public attention while the movement had not yet achieved its goal. First, most of people who joined the anti-dam movement did not feel committed to the agenda of the movement and the amnesty bill was an issue that was more closely related to their interests; second, the use of social media did not allow the movement organizers to maintain ties between participants and the movement; and third, the movement did not organize any further offline actions to reinforce its own stance.
Since many people joined the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement either because of its excitement or the Yingluck government’s blunders and vulnerabilities, these people did not have a real commitment to the movement. Political actors, for example, only joined the movement with a goal to overthrow the Yingluck government. Thus, once this movement was not effective in doing so, they would rather leave and join another movement that could potentially serve as a means to achieving their ultimate goal. A dentist who identified herself as a political actor told me in an interview,
I supported another movement [the Anti-Yingluck Government Movement] right away because its goals were more closely related to mine. They went against the amnesty bill and so did I. I just hated the Yingluck government and that was all I cared about (personal communication no. 9, June 9, 2014).
The fading away of the anti-dam movement also happened because the movement was not able to create close ties between the movement and participants. This was because the movement was mostly only active in the form of e-mobilization. While the use of social media allowed a large number of people to join the movement online, social media as Lynch (2013) has said, only allowed people to hold together through simple
91 messages. It did not create a warm connection. This happened because people joined the movement for various reasons. Thus, when the movement lacked the core pillar to hold people who joined the movement online together, the movement could not continue in the long run. A medical doctor emphasized his experience with the movement,
Movement participants were not all the same. Our goals in the movement were different. I also took part in the movement from the front of my computer and only because I read the article and felt interested. But if you talk to my friend, you will know that he joined the movement because he had a great passion for environmental issues. I am different from him (personal communication no. 10, June 10, 2014).
Third, the fading away of the movement was also because Sasin and SNF became inactive after the eruption of the anti-government movement. This happened because the movement leaders realized that their issues of concern became points of contention of the
Anti-Government Movement. Political actors who used to take part in the anti-dam movement made this connection possible. Therefore, Sasin hoped that if the Anti-
Government Movement were able to oust the government from power, the dam construction project would be terminated as well. He told me in an interview,
I was able to speculate that there will be a major political change in Thailand and I only wanted to delay the project until then. Finally I was right! There was a real change. The Yingluck government was ousted (personal communication, June 5, 2014).
The Yingluck government was pressured to resign in December 2013 by the anti- government movement led by PDRC and the general elections were organized in
February 2014. However, due to election disruptions in several areas, the court refuted and annulled the results (“The verdict of the Constitutional Court”, 2014). The involvement of the Constitutional Court in political maneuvering could be understood as the attempt to unseat the Yingluck government. Yingluck remained as caretaker prime
92 minister and the anti-government movement remained active. On May 24, 2014, General
Prayuth Chan-ocha, the Army commander, seized power and suspended the constitution in May 2014. The coup was staged in order to end the conflicts between the Yingluck government the PDRC. The rise of the military regime finally led to the dismissing of the
Yingluck government’s water and flood management scheme, including the Mae Wong
Dam project.
93 CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The Success of the Movement
The success of the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement was phenomenal to the extent that as a movement that had minimal support from people in the dam construction area, it was able to successfully mobilize strong support from the general public and was able to pressure the government to reconsider the dam construction project. The accomplishment of the anti-dam movement was primarily due to several factors, namely the popularity of the movement leader, the adoption of several frames, the use of social media for diffusion and mobilization, and the advantages from the government’s blunders and vulnerabilities.
The popularity of the movement leader allowed the movement to attract support from people who already admired him. This happened because Sasin was someone who used to provide accurate information to people during the 2011 Great Floods. Thus, when he became the leader of the anti-dam movement, people who trusted him were willing to believe that information provided by him would be accurate. This led some of them to share such information, leading to a quick dispersal of the movement especially on social media where Sasin had over a hundred thousand followers.
The collective action frames were also crucial for the success of the anti-dam movement. The adoption of a broad term covering several frames allowed different groups in the Thai society to identify themselves with the movement. This happened because many frames highlighted interests and grievances of people. This thesis also points out that the powerfulness and the effectiveness of frame is determined not only by
94 its connection to a larger belief system and the reality of people but also by the movement’s strategy and its means of communication.
In terms of the use of social media for activism, the success of the Anti-Mae
Wong Dam movement was similar to the accomplishments of social movements elsewhere (Harlow & Harp, 2012, Lynch, 2011; Mico & Casero-Ripolles, 2013;
Morozov, 2011). The movement was successful because it organized offline events to complement its online efforts. This led frames of the movement to widely diffuse, leading a large number of people to identify themselves with the movement and to be excited to join the offline activities of the movement. Furthermore, with the circulation of the government’s blunders and vulnerabilities online, a group of people who might not originally be able to identify themselves with the movement, such as political actors, were drawn into the movement as well. As a result, the anti-dam movement was able to increase the number of its supporters. However, the use of social media for mobilization also had a serious negative impact on the movement. The attention of people on social network sites changed swiftly when new issues, which were more related to people’s core interests, popped up. This as a result was one of the factors leading to the fading away of the movement from public attention.
The Retreat of the Government
The investigation of the Anti-Mae Wong Dam Movement also exposes that the study of social movements would be incomplete without the examination of the dynamics between the movement and its opponents. A close scrutiny of the interaction between the two sides allows scholars to recognize the various dimensions of social movements. This research shows that the decision of the government to slow down the Mae Wong Dam
95 project partly came from the fact that the government suffered severely from its own vulnerabilities and blunders. The movement not only used both instruments as points of contention but also as a bridge linking political actors and the movement. Given the participation of political actors in the movement, the government was pressured to reconsider the dam construction project. This was because the government recognized that such people had the potential to destabilize its power. The investigation of the interaction between the movement and the government in this thesis also reveals that not all governments feel pressure from the involvement of INGOs in local movements. The
Yingluck government did not recognize the importance of INGOs at all, because it nether saw the significance of these actors within the movement nor felt that these organizations could do any harm to them.
All in all, a single factor or a single actor cannot determine the success of social movements. Different components of movements, such as frames and means of communication, as well as different actors, such as local organizations, INGOs, and governments, play roles differently in different movements. Therefore, it may be difficult to generalize about what will make a successful movement. However, factors that are likely to be involved in the movement’s success are the popularity of the movement leader, the adoption of several frames, the use of social media for diffusion and mobilization, and the advantages derived from the government’s blunders and vulnerabilities.
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